G.R. No.

L-19060

May 29, 1964

IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN

GERONA,petitioners,
vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE
GUZMANrespondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.
In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958, petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria
Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children of
Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate
daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife,
Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely, respondents Carmen,
Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman
died on September 11, 1945; that subsequently, or on May 6, 1948, respondents executed a deed of "extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein
that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew that
petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the
transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled
and new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest
for each; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case; that
petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of
1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the
petitioners. Accordingly, the latter prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial
settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the
respondents to reconvey to petitioners their aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the register of
deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title secured by respondents as above stated and to issue new
certificates of title in the name of both the petitioners and the respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the
former and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to render accounts of the income of said properties
and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share therein; and sentencing respondents to pay damages and
attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not
entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that
petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a
legitimate child, by first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife, Camila Ramos; and that
petitioners' action has already prescribed, and, accordingly, dismissing the complaint without costs. On appeal
taken by the petitioners, this decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with costs against them.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the
present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if
affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual
discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that
accordingly, said period had not expired when the present action was commenced on November 4, 1958.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does
not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse

title (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1948). The statute of limitations operates as in other cases,
from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil.
362; Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they are
the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name,
they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title
adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the
ground that the same is tainted with fraud. 1wph1.t
Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v. Mendoza, L-12540, February 28, 1959; Cuison
v. Fernandez, L-11764, January 31, 1959; Maribiles v. Quinto, L-10408, October 18, 1956; and Sevilla v. De
los Angeles, L-7745, November 18, 1955), it is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for
reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred
by the statute of limitations (Candelaria v. Romero, L-12149, September 30, 1960; Alzona v. Capunita, L10220, February 28, 1962).
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground
of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the
fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such discovery is deemed to have taken place,
in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extrajudicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world (Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29,
1958; Avecilla v. Yatco, L-11578, May 14, 1958; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30,
1962; Lopez v. Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31, 1964).
As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:
In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned at least constructively, of
the alleged fraud committed against them by defendants on 25 June 1948 when the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of
deeds of Bulacan, Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until 4 November 1958, or more than
10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became of age on 3 March 1948. He is deemed to have
discovered defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948 and had, therefore, only 4 years from the said date
within which to file this action. Plaintiff Maria Concepcion Gerona became of age on 8 December 1949
or after the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement. She also had only the remainder of the
period of 4 years from December 1949 within which to commence her action. Plaintiff Francisco Gerona
became of age only on 9 January 1952 so that he was still a minor when he gained knowledge (even if
only constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Likewise, plaintiff Delfin
Gerona became of legal age on 5 August 1954, so that he was also still a minor at the time he gained
knowledge (although constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Francisco
Gerona and Delfin Gerona had, therefore, two years after the removal of their disability within which to
commence their action (Section 45, paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43, Act 190), that is, January 29,
1952, with respect to Francisco, and 5 August 1954, with respect to Delfin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners herein. It
is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-8409

December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS
EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on
November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953,
Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating
that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been
improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said
petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her
aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section
1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled
in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart
was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St.,
Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A Espaa Extention, in said
City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke
(probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned
residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila,
sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common
law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular
failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A).
Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at Espaa Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga,
where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence,
residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once
acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on
Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case
at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following
conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the
place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich,
Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz.
Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been
in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay
in that place permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested his wish to
live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify thereon,
despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein, that "the
deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee did not
introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose
advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A Espaa Extention was purchased, and who, therefore,
might have cast some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower
court held that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of
said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do so "due
to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable in fact, its is very likely that said
advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective
treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's
own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return
home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d.
906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of
his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then,
again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A Espaa Extention, Quezon City, was
conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San
Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by the decedent
in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the
marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion
Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his
residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full
brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the
deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion and would have
objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to
prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter,
shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the
retention of the old domicile 1 which is particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San
Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent has not been offset by the evidence of
record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and refused to
entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in
rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever action
oppositors may want to take later on because until now the personality of the oppositors has not been
established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot pass upon
this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that
these proceedings should be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before appellants
had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their filiation. When
appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged
illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection thereto stating:
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are now trying to
prove the status of your client; you are leading so that. The main point here is your contention that the
deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to cross-examine. If you
are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit

to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit.
(p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent, because of
their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from doing
so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the
foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances surrounding
the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he declared
that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for
they contestedthe jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by crossexamining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower court,
appellants' counsel announced that he would take part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose
of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein, said counsel
tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court
said, addressing appellants' counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you
are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on
my stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that
appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain that these proceedings should
bedismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record that they were not submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants
were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to
appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged
relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have admitted
Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue under
consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on November
14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated
November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said
petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court.
The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of
said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On
December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the
decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to
the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This
motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the
Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass upon
the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of
the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases
triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a
competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed
before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of
the parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in
several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the

court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent
jurisdiction and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts but,
also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately
follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate
may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and
the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27,
1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the
case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in
the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga;
that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of
the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained
appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with costs against
the appellee. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-27526 September 12, 1974
ANGELITA G. VDA. DE VALERA, AMANDA G. VALERA, OSCAR G. VALERA, DIONISIO G. VALERA,
FELIXBERTO G. VALERA, BENITO G. VALERA, EVA G. VALERA, LITA G. VALERA, TONIETTE
VALERA, ANGEL V. COLET, NORMAN PE BENITO and ROMEO PE BENITO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MACARIO M. OFILADA, as Probate Judge, Court of First Instance of Abra; ADORACION VALERABRINGAS, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Francisco Valera; PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Abra;
DOMINGO V. BANEZ as Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Abra, and CELSO VALERA, respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
Had the Court of First Instance of Abra been more cognizant of the limitations on its prerogative as a probate
court, it would not have committed the jurisdictional and procedural errors pointed out in this certiorari case by
the petitioners, the heirs of the late Virgilio Valera.
The record discloses that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing its orders of July 10, 1964, April
15, 1966 and January 4, 1967 as well as the writ of execution against the assets of the deceased Virgilio
Valera. The jurisdictional and procedural errors committed by the lower court justify the writ of certiorari.
Hence, We find the petition to be meritorious. We have to set aside the said orders and writ of execution
insofar as the heirs or estate of Virgilio Valera are concerned.
Civil Case No. 64, R-1 of the Court of First Instance of Abra is a special proceeding for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Francisco Valera. Virgilio Valera was the administrator of the estate, He died on March 21,
1961. He was survived by his widow, Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera and their ten (10) children, named
Amanda, Oscar, Dionisio, Benito, Felixberto, Eva, Lita, Toniette, Vicenta and Teresita, all petitioners herein,
except Vicenta and Teresita, who were abroad.

Later (the exact date is not shown in the record), Adoracion Valera Bringas, who claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Francisco Valera, was appointed administratrix. She filed on April 16, 1964 in
the intestate proceeding a petition to require "Celso Valera and family and Angelita de Valera and family to pay
P100.00" as monthly rental for the one-third pro-indiviso portion of the Valera residence located in Bangued,
Abra. 1
That residence is item 3 of the original inventory dated April 10, 1964 submitted by Mrs. Bringas. It is described
as follows:
Residential land & Improvements. Covered by Tax Declaration No. 16922, declared in 1948 in the
names of Virgilio & Celso Valera; cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 21571 in the name of Virgilio
Valera; cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 29338, in 1962, in the name of Virgilio Valera, located in
Partelo Street, Bangued, Abra, bounded as follows: N. Alejandro Lizards; E. Partelo Street (now Virgilio
Valera Street); S. Taft Street; W'Consiliman Brook, with an area of 1,775 square meters, and assessed
at P1,420.00 for the residential lot, and P9,500.00 for the improvements.
Appraised value P45,600.00, 1/3 of which is P15,200.00. (p. 5 of Respondents'
Memorandum)
The petition was not served on the widow and ten children of Virgilio Valera. Celso Valera interposed an
opposition to it on the ground that Francisco Valera had no interest in the Valera residence, that the property
was never leased and that the remedy of Mrs. Bringas was "in a appropriate remedy and/or procedure" and not
in the intestate proceeding. 2
The lower court granted the petition in an order dated July 10, 1964 which reads: 3
ORDER
The administratrix, through counsel, has petitioned for an order to pay rental on the property (Item 1-B,
23 of the Inventory submitted i)v the administratrix, pp. 415-416, rec.) owned in common by the estate
of the deceased Francisco Valera y Versoza and the late Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera,
corresponding to one-third (1/3) interest pertaining to the estate of the deceased Francisco Valera to be
paid by the family of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera and family who have been occupying the property
since April, 1945 in the amount of P100.00 a month, plus legal interest, the same to be paid to the
Administratrix.
WHEREFORE, finding the said motion to be well-founded and meritorious, the same is hereby granted.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court shall furnish Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera with a copy
of this order by registered mail.
SO ORDERED.
Done at Bangued, Abra, this 10th day of July, 1964.
(Sgd.) ALFONSO P. DONESA J u d g e
The directive of Judge Donesa to the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of the order by registered mail on Mrs.
Valera implies that the heirs of Virgilio Valera were not served with a copy of the petition. The said heirs,
through Atty. Angel V. Colet, a son-in-law of Mrs. Valera, filed a motion for the reconsideration of that order.
They contended that the Valera residence "should be excluded from the inventory," because that was their
"absolute property of which they have been in complete possession and occupation". 4 Mrs. Bringas replied
that Francisco Valera's estate had "already consolidated" its ownership over that one-third partition "through
the submission of the inventory and its approval" by the probate court. 5

It was only nearly two years later that respondent Judge Macario Ofilada in his order of April 15, 1966 denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera. 6
On February 17, 1965 (before the motion for reconsideration was resolved) Mrs. Bringas filed in the intestate
proceeding a pleading known as "Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing Delivery of the Fruits of the
Properties or Value and Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix." 7
She prayed in that motion that Judge Donesa's order for the payment of rentals be executed against the heirs
of Virgilio Valera; that the heirs be ordered to deliver to her the fruits of the properties of the estate of Francisco
Valera, which, according to her calculation, amounted to P100,000 for twenty years, plus legal interest
supposedly amounting to P5,000; that the heirs be ordered to deliver the sum of P4,684.98 representing the
insurance and war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera; and that the Sheriff be ordered to "to seize
such properties of Virgilio Valera and his heirs" "to be sold according to law for the payment of double the
value of the fruits and the amount of monies alienated and embezzled".
As already stated, in an order dated April 15, 1966, respondent Judge Macario M. Ofilada denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera and granted the motion of Mrs. Bringas for execution and
for the delivery of certain funds and properties. (Note that the execution was granted although the order was
not yet final). That order, which is being assailed in this case, is quoted as follows (pp. 7-9 of the Petition):
Pending resolution before the court are the following motions:
1. Unsigned 'Motion for leave of Court to Intervene and Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
July 10, 1964', filed by counsel for the heirs of Virgilio Valera;
2. 'Motion' without any notice of hearing filed by counsel for the heirs of Virgilio Valera;
3. 'Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 10, 1965,' filed by counsel for petitioner Celso
Valera; and
4. 'Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing Delivery of the Fruits of the Properties or Value
thereof and Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix', filed by counsel for the administratrix.
Also pending is the examination of persons regarding the properties of the estate as ordered by the
court also on July 10, 1964.
On January 27, 1966, the court directed the movants seeking a reconsideration of the order directing
the payment of rentals to the estate to submit their respective memoranda within 15 days from receipt
of the order and the administratrix 5 days from receipt of adverse parties memoranda to submit her
reply if she so desires. Despite the fact that the parties had received copies of the order of January 27,
1966, none complied. Considering that this case is already more than 20 years old, the Court can not,
in the interest of justice, further hold or suspend the resolutions on these incidents. They must as they
should now, be resolved.
The motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the heirs of Virgilio Valera and his subsequent
'Motion'. appearing to be unfounded, is hereby denied.
The motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for Celso Valera is a mere repetition of the 'Opposition
to Petition for an Order to Pay Rental dated May 8, 1964. This motion is merely intended to delay the
proceedings and it is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Finding the 'Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing the Delivery of Fruits of the Properties or
Value thereof and Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix' well-founded and meritorious, it is hereby
directed:

1. That a writ of execution issue against the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera insofar as the
collectible rents pertaining t the estate are concerned;
2. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera deliver to the administratrix properties still in their
possession which are among those listed in the 'Incomplete Inventory and Appraisal of the Real and
Personal Estate of the Deceased, Francisco Valera y Versoza' filed by the administratrix on September
17, 1965;
3. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera and family account to the Administratrix the fruits of
the properties of the estate listed in the said amended inventory;
4. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera deliver to the administratrix the sum of P4,784.98 representing the
insurance and war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera;
5. That Celso Valera account to the administratrix the war damage monies received by him for the
destroyed Valera family residence and deliver 1/3 of the same to the administratrix; and
6. That failure to render a satisfactory account as hereby required within 15 days from receipt of this
order shall, conformably with See. 8 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, make the heirs of Virgilio Valera
and Celso Valera liable to double the value of the fruits and monies unaccounted for.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court immediately set 2 days for the examination of the persons
required to appear in the order dated July 10, 1964.
SO ORDERED.
Bangued, Abra, this 15th day of April, 1966.
(Sgd.) MACARIO M. OFILADA
Judge
On January 5. 1967 Judge Ofilada directed the execution of his aforequoted order of April 15, 1966. That
directive reads as follows: 8
ORDER
Pending resolution before this Court are: (1) Omnibus Motion filed by the Administratrix dated
September 15, 1966; and, (2) Omnibus Motion filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera dated October 13,
1966.
The parties, by the order of this Court dated December 12, 1966 after the hearing on said date at which
counsel discussed their respective motions, were given three days time within which to submit their
written memoranda. No such memoranda have been filed by any of the parties, and the Court took time
and efforts in considering the said motions, oppositions, affidavit and counter-affidavits.
The Omnibus Motion of the heirs of Virgilio Valera dated October 13, 1966 seeks to stay the writ of
execution issued by this Court pursuant to the order dated April 15, 1966 and relies upon an alleged
compromise agreement entered into between said heirs and the administratrix on May 21, 1966.
The Court is aware of attempts to a compromise agreement between the aforementioned parties. There
is nothing however in the record of any amicable settlement such as that required by the Court in its
order dated June 26, 1965, which required the parties 'to inform the court as soon as possible what
arrangement or settlement have been taken and arrived at by them.' The Court has given the parties
long time to agree and settle their differences, even taking time on Sundays to meet with them for this
purpose and, until the present time, no such agreement by all the parties has been presented for the

approval of the Court. Certainly the alleged compromise agreement is not such agreement especially
when the administratrix takes vigorous exception citing facts of record and valid points of law which
have not been sufficiently answered and explained. To allow the alleged oral compromise agreement in
violation of fundamental principles of law such as the time limit within which to file a petition for relief
and unsupported by the facts on record as cited by counsel for and administratrix would be to trifle with
the administration of justice especially in this case which is the oldest in this court and which has been
pending for more than twenty years now. For these basic reasons, the Omnibus Motion of the heirs of
Virgilio Valera dated October 13, 1966 must be, as it is hereby, DENIED.
And considering the motion of the administratrix dated September 15, 1966 to be meritorious, the
same, as prayed for, is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby directed that:
(1) The orders of November 14 and 25, 1966 staying the execution of the order of April 15, 1966 are
hereby lifted and let another writ of execution immediately issue to effect the order of April 15, 1966.
(2) A writ of execution issue against said heirs of Virgilio Valera for the satisfaction of the amounts due
the estate;
(3) A writ of execution issue against the properties of Celso Valera for the satisfaction of the amount
due to estate; and,
(4) The heirs of Virgilio Valera deliver to the administratrix the possession of the properties listed in
paragraph 6 and 7 of her Omnibus Motion dated September 15, 1966 and the fruits or value thereof
from April, 1945 until time of delivery, and, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 87, of the New Rules of Court, to
pay double the value of said fruits upon failure to account and deliver same within thirty days from
receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Bangued, Abra, January 4, 1967.
(Sgd.) MACARIO M. OFILADA Judge
The heirs of Virgilio Valera filed a motion dated February 6, 1967 for the reconsideration of Judge Ofilada's
order of January 4, 1967. 9 The motion was denied in the order dated February 13, 1967. 10 judge Ofilada in his
order dated February 27, 1967 ordered another execution. 11
The Deputy Provincial Sheriff levied upon the properties of the deceased Virgilio Valera and caused to be
published a notice of auction sale also dated February 27, 1967 which reads in part as follows: 12
1. Of the goods and chattels of Celso Valera and the heirs of Virgilio Valera the sum of Forty
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty (P40,320.00) Pesos for rent due the estate together with interest
thereon from April, 1945 (P25,200.00) for the principal at P1,200.00 per annum from April, 1945 to
March, 1966, and P15,120.00 for interest due at six (6) per centum per annum), plus P100.00 a month
from April, 1966 with interest at six (6) per centum until date of payment and delivery of the interest, of
the estate in the property to the administratrix;
2. Of the goods and chattels of the heirs of Virgilio Valera the sum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00)
Pesos representing double the value of undelivered fruits of the properties of the estate for 20 years
from April, 1945 to October, 1965 or One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos per year, and the
sum of Nine Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and Ninety Six Centavos (P9,569.96),
respresenting double the value of the undelivered insurance and war damage monies collected by
Virgilio Valera.

The petitioners filed a motion dated March 15, 1967 to quash the writ of execution and for the suspension of
the auction sale. 13 Judge Ofilada denied it in his order of April 1967. 14 The petitioners filed a motion dated
March 31, 1967 to set aside the lower court's orders of April 15, 1966 and February 27, 1967 on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process. 15
On April 3, 1967, the dated when Judge Ofilada denied petitioners' motion to quash the writ of execution,
respondent Deputy Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale and sold to the estate of Francisco Valera eighteen
(18) parcels of land supposedly belonging to the deceased Virgilio Valera. The price was P92,337.00. 16
The petitioners filed a motion dated April 11, 1967 for the reconsideration of the order of April 3, 1967.
Ofilada denied it in his order of April 21, 1967. 18

17

Judge

On May 8, 1967 the petitioners, the heirs of Virgilio Valera (except two children who were abroad) filed the
instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Ofilada, Mrs. Bringas, the Provincial
Sheriff and the Deputy Provincial Sheriff. Celso Valera was joined as a nominal party. The respondents were
required to answer the petition. The Court directed that a writ of preliminary injunction should issue upon
petitioners' posting a bond of P5,000.00.
The petitioners assail the brief, three-sentence order of July 10, 1964 on the following grounds: (a) that it
decided the issue of ownership as to the one-third pro-indiviso share of Francisco Valera in the Valera
residence, an issue, which according to them, is beyond the court's probate jurisdiction; (b) that it was issued
without the benefit of a trial on the merits and without hearing all the parties involved; (c) that it does not
contain findings of fact and law; (d) that it is a judgment for a money claim which should have been filed in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor, Virgilio Valera, and (e) that the order has
no basis in substantive law.
The petitioners attack Judge Ofilada's order of April 15, 1966 on the following grounds: (a) that, as a probate
judge, he had no jurisdiction to require the heirs of Virgilio Valera to account for the fruits of the six parcels of
land administered by him and that a separate action should be filed or the proper claim should be made
against his estate; (b) that he had no jurisdiction to order the heirs of Virgilio Valera to deliver to Mrs. Bringas
the sum of P4,784.98 as "insurance and war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera"; (c) that Section 8,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court contemplates that "double the value of the fruits and monies" should be
recovered in an "action" and not in an intestate proceeding, and (d) that the order was issued without any trial
on the merits and it does not contain findings of fact and law.
The petitioners further contend that the orders of July 10, 1964 and April 15, 1966 are not enforceable by
execution because they are incomplete and not precise as to the amounts supposedly due from the judgment
debtors.
As to the execution sale, the petitioners contend: (a) that the orders sought to be executed are void; (b) that
the probate court ordinarily has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution and that the instant case is not
among the exceptional cases wherein the probate court can authorize an execution, and (c) that execution for
a money claim cannot be had against a decedent's estate.
After a careful study of the arguments of the parties in their memoranda, reply, rejoinder and surrejoinder, We
find that, for the resolution of the case, it is not necessary to pass upon all those issues. The crucial issue in
the last analysis is whether the lower court, sitting as a probate court in the intestate proceeding for the estate
of Francisco Valera, could hold the heirs of Virgilio Valera answerable for certain supposed monetary liabilities
of the latter to the estate and enforce said liabilities against the properties of the deceased Virgilio Valera.
We hold that the trial court, as a probate court, erred in adjudging in the said intestate proceeding the monetary
liabilities of the late Virgilio Valera to the estate of Francisco Valera and in issuing a writ of execution against
his properties to enforce the supposed liabilities.

The controlling principle, which should govern this case, was announced by Justice Torres in 1907 in Pavia vs.
De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70, a case which is on all fours with the instant case. This Court ruled in that case:
Administrators or executors; Code of Civil Procedure; Heirs. The heir legally succeeds the deceased
from whom he derives his right and title but only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the
debts of same, and the adjudication of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime
the only person in charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor is the
executor or administrator appointed by a competent court. (Syllabus based on page 77).
In the Pavia case, an action for damages was brought by Rafaela Pavia against Bibiana de la Rosa and Salud
de la Rosa, as the only heirs of the deceased Jose de la Rosa. Rafaela Pavia claimed that she empowered
Jose de la Rosa to administer the estate of Pablo Linart and that, as administrator, De la Rosa caused
damages to the estate through his negligence. The De la Rosa sisters contended that they could not be held
liable for the negligent acts of their brother, Jose de la Rosa.
This Court held that the action was not maintainable against the De la Rosa sisters and that it should be
prosecuted against the executor or administrator of the estate of Jose de la Rosa. Hence, the action was
dismissed, reserving to Rafaela Pavia "the right to institute proper action against the executor or administrator
of the properties of the estate of the deceased Jose de la Rosa".
In the instant case, Mrs. Bringas sought to hold the heirs of the deceased Virgilio Valera liable for his
obligations to pay rentals and to account for the fruits of the properties forming part of the estate of Francisco
Valera and the war damage and insurance monies collected by Virgilio Valera. The heirs of Virgilio Valera were
dragged into the intestate proceeding for the purpose of holding them liable for the amounts supposedly due
from the deceased. As already noted, Mrs. Bringas prayed for "an order directing the Sheriff to seize such
properties of Virgilio Valera and his heirs ... as may be sufficient, to be sold according to law for the payment of
double the value of the fruits and the amount of monies alienated and embezzled" (Annex "E" of Petition).
Judge Ofilada specifically directed that the execution be issued "against the heirs of Virgilio Valera". The
Deputy Sheriff literally followed that directive by levying upon "the goods and chattels of the heirs of Virgilio
Valera".
The procedure followed by the Sheriff was erroneous. The decedent's heirs are not liable personally for the
debts of his debts. Thus, it was held:
It happens, however, that the plaintiffs are not under obligation to pay the debts of their late father, such
as items (a), (f) and (h) of the counterclaim. It does not appear that they personally bound themselves
to pay them, and the mere fact that they are the deceased's heirs does not make them answerable for
such credits against their predecessor in interest, inasmuch as article 1003 of the Civil Code is no
longer in force, having been abrogated by certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Pavia vs.
De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70, cited in Calma vs. Calma, 56 Phil. 102, 105).
The error becomes more glaring in the light of Section 7, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which allows execution
in case of the death of a party only "where a party dies after the entry of the judgment or order". The
implication is that if a person, before his death, or the legal representative of his estate was never a party to a
case, no execution can be issued against his properties after his death. In this case, the Sheriff seems to have
proceeded on the assumption that the properties levied upon belonged to the deceased Virgilio Valera and that
the said properties were in the possession of his heirs.
Furthermore, there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally cannot issue a writ of
execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of
claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the necessity of resorting to a
writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any judgment enforceable by execution.
The circumstance that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue execution (a) to
satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6,

Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (e) to satisfy the costs
when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule
of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution.
With particular reference to the sum of P4,784.96, which represents the insurance and war damage monies
allegedly embezzled by Virgilio Valera, the lower court, sitting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to enforce,
by execution, the payment of double the value of that amount. The alleged embezzler was dead. Execution
was not warranted under Sections 7 and 8, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, which both refer, to a living person,
meaning a person entrusted with a part of the decedent's estate "by an executor or administrator", and to a
person who committed "embezzlement before letters (were) issued". Section 8 explicitly provides that the
embezzler's liability shall be determined in "an action", and not in the intestate proceeding. 19
The record reveals that there is a dispute between Mrs. Bringas and the heirs of Virgilio Valera as to whether
one-third of the Valera residence and the six parcels of land listed in the "Amended Incomplete Inventory, etc."
dated August 31, 1965 20 belong to the estate of Francisco Valera. The tax declarations for those properties
are in the name of the deceased Virgilio Valera.
Their inclusion in the inventory is not conclusive as to the ownership. "Questions on title to real property cannot
be determined in testate or intestate proceedings. It has, however, been held that for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to he instituted between the parties." 21 As stressed by Mr. Justice Zaldivar in Mangaliman vs.
Gonzales, L-21033, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 462, the probate court is a court of special and limited
jurisdiction.
We have studied carefully respondents' memorandum and rejoinder. We have not found therein any citation of
a rule or precedent which would justify the arbitrary and irregular procedure followed by the lower court in
determining the liability of a dead person without hearing the legal representative of his estate and in holding
his heirs answerable for his supposed liabilities and then enforcing those liabilities against his estate. Section
6(b), Rule 78 and Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court assume that a creditor, as an interested person,
may cause a debtor's estate to be placed under administration.
The cases of Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 and Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 62 O.G. 2621 cited by the
respondents in page 19 of their rejoinder, refer to a living party, not to a decedent.
Without going into a more extensive and detailed discussion of the other irregularities committed by the lower
court, We believe that the jurisdictional errors already pointed out suffice to show that it acted in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the issuance of the writ of certiorari is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the writ of execution and the Sheriff's execution sale on April 3, 1967 and all proceedings
relative thereto as well as the orders of July 10, 1964, April 15, 1966, January 4, April 3 and May 2, 1967 of the
lower court, are declared void and are set aside, insofar as the heirs of Virgilio Valera or his estate are
concerned, without prejudice to the right of Adoracion Valera Bringas to institute the proper action against the
administrator of the estate of the estate of the late Virgilio Valera and to file the appropriate claims in the
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO
URIARTE, respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. L21938 against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of
Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the
Manila Court, respectively praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H')
and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court
denying petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding
No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same
deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of
the respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona
and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of
this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to
declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan
Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred
in failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of
Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 praying, for the reasons
therein stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7,
1963 and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for
reconsideration, and further commanding said court to approve his record on appeal and to give due course to
his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the
original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's contention that
the respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition
forcertiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the
estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a
natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son.
Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on

November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the
requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or
another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the
above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had
"executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and
which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's
capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding
No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to
dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will,
there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had
no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural
son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to
Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the
Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been
denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal
for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on questions of law. The administrator with the will
annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the
record on appeal, and under date of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for
having been filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on
appeal was approved by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L21938, bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount
to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is
hereby disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned
heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the
Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the
proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the
same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court,
Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain
judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time
he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been
acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears
to have been rendered.

The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther than the
appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore,
failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396,
the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the
petition for probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the
order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for
Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros Court
filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition
filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding
No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of
the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court
similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of
Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive
jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is
beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding
should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien
like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any
property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of
his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts
province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this premise
petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same
decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased
person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with
settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly
that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings
even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final
account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is
understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for
the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the
petition for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court particularly in Special

Proceeding No. 6344 or was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in
the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should have
submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate
motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in
accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply
litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the
will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to
Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros
Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for
submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss
Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent,
from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the
Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the
estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his
opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said
will for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in
this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not
the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of
the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived
the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this
connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19,
1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that
petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines
and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was
only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion
asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that
date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit
said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now
to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must
be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in
some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court
said that he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner
has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the
institution by him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in
support of his contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings
entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an
independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character
pending the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until
it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to
ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of
his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate

court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is
or should be declared his acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs.
Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs.
Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said
supplemental petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the
appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964,
the first being the order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order
denying petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of
what has been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than that
the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our
ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed
for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition
formandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-18148

February 28, 1963

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the
instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO
REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of
the properties mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a
testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of
Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his
widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias
and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition
of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by
her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all
surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with
the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the
exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On
June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a
counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two
projects of partition for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the
submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the executor and the
instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio
Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had
donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had
no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that
they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding
but in a separate civil action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself
was determinative of the original conjugal character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption
laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and void the deceased
Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of
it in his will.

On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring
the donation void without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was
inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls under Article
133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered
under the second category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in
relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court
disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property
mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned
in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the
legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal
properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial,
reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate
court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes
involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's
declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was
based." The motion for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition
for review by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having
limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to
the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot
be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings,"1 except where one of the parties prays merely for the
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass
provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. 2 However, we
have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to
the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely
pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that
with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken
cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not
prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as
to whether the properties herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena
Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced
by appellants that the trial court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and
that its decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and
submitted to its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can
not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no exception to the nojurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court
speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of
Courts of First Instance. The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order
the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct
from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary
action) which may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over
the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the
ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts.
This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution
of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate
and payment of all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated

estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in
which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To
this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of
the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the
court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement
of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected. 4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties
involved whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter
properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership
in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties
to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who
have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no
third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the
testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that
is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging
to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties
interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate
court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not
borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the
project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as
representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another.
As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for
resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the
approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the
character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In other
words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they
were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the
properties which is well within the competence of the probate court and just because of an opposition
thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court.
Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in
motion.5 They can not be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against
them.6
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the
properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of
these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial
partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute
estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the
act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel.7 In the present case, the
deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not
knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed
with the required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed
with costs against appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-14921

December 31, 1960

DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PABLO G. BAUTISTA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an action for liquidation and partition of the estate left by the spouses Mariano Bautista and Gertrudes
Garcia, filed on October 20, 1956 by plaintiffs Dolores B. Guico, et al., against defendants Pablo G. Bautista, et
al., legitimate grandchildren and children, respectively, of said deceased spouses.
The complaint alleged inter alia that Mariano G. Bautista died intestate on December 5, 1947 and that his
properties had already been extrajudicially partitioned among his heirs; that Gertrudes Garcia likewise died
intestate on August 31, 1956 leaving as her legitimate heirs plaintiffs and defendants; that said Gertrudes
Garcia, during her lifetime, made several deeds of donation of some of her properties in favor of all the
defendants, but did not provide that the properties donated would not be subject to collation, so that the
donees are legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way of collation the value of the properties
received by them in order that the net hereditary estate may be divided equally among the heirs; and that the
deceased Gertrudes Garcia left outstanding obligations to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the G.A.
Machineries, Inc.
On a motion to dismiss filed by defendants alleging, among other things, that the action was premature
because it is admitted in the complaint that the deceased left certain debts, the lower court dismissed the
complaint on that ground without prejudice and without costs. From the order of dismissal, plaintiffs appealed
to this Court, urging that their action for partition and liquidation may be maintained, notwithstanding that there
are pending obligations of the estate, subject to the taking of adequate measures either for the payment or
security of its creditors.
We are inclined to hold at the lower court that until all the debts of the estate in question are paid, appellants'
action for partition and liquidation is premature.
There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased person by the heirs,
extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for petition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the
appointment of an administrator for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, but this they may do only "if
the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians" (sec. 1, Rule 74). The reason is that were the deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive
the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled (Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232;
Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317; Macalinao vs. Valdez, et al., 95 Phil., 318; 50 Off. Gaz., 3041; Intestate Estate of
Rufina Mercado vs. Magtibay, et al., 96 Phil., 383).
The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending obligations. In such cases, such
obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided among the
heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate
would inevitably be submitted to administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinary
partition, the regular estate proceeding offer the advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclose
themselves and submit their respective claims within a comparatively short period (12 months under Rule 87,
unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred; while in ordinary judicial partitions the
creditors 1claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the period extinctive prescription. An heir, therefore,
may have an interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be freed from invisible claims, so that
creditors may not later appear and initiate the very estate proceeding sought to be avoided, and he may
properly object to an action for partition this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are agreeable to assuming
personal liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known as well as those undisclosed, regular estate
proceedings can not be avoided.

It is no argument that under regular administration, the estate will incur greater expenses. As a matter of fact,
plaintiffs-appellants include in their complaint a prayer for the appointment of an administrator during the
pendency of this case, in view of the existence of debts of the estate and the lack of agreement among the
heirs as to how debts would be paid.lawphil.net
Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the trial court from directing and ordering that the
pending obligations of the estate be paid first, or that they should constitute as liens on the respective shares
to be received by the heirs. In other words, appellants propose that the administration of the estate for the
purpose of paying off its debts be accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the Court performing the
duties of the administrator, or an administrator appointed to take care of such debts, as prayed for in their
complaint. Obviously, an ordinary action for partition can not be converted into a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased, without compliance with the procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the rules of
Court, especially the provisions on publication and notice to creditors.
As we see it, appellants' major objective in filing this action for partition is to have an early determination of the
question whether or not the donation inter vivos received by the defendants from the deceased are subject to
collation. But there is no reason why this question can not be determined just as expeditiously in special
proceeding, because even before the known debts of the estate are settled and paid and pending the
expiration for the filing of other claims, the issue can, upon motion of the heirs, be set for hearing, tried, and
definitely settled.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

G.R. No. L-273

March 29, 1947

CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA HERNANDEZ, intervenors-appellants.
TUASON, J.:
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia
Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their
father a parcel of land of which he died seized and known as lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral survey.
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion which is particularly
described in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A, to Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal's wife in
consideration of P860. This portion purports to be the combined shares of the intervenors in the larger parcel,
allotted to them in a verbal partition alleged to have been made (time not stated) among the five brother and
sisters.
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but which is not now important, the
plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her original complaint, dated February 3,
1944, she offered the purchasers P150 as price of repurchase, this being, according to that complaint, the
amount Andal had paid for Maria Hernandez's and Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it is alleged,
refused to part with the property.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that when the cause was called for trial on
March 8, she announced in open court that she was willing to repurchase her sister's share from Andal for
P860 and reimburse Andal for his expense; that Andal asked for continuance until the 29th stating that he had
made other expenses; that on 29th she brought P860 to repurchase the land in question but the case was
again postponed because the plaintiff's sisters had intervened; and that meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal resold
the land fictitiously to the vendors for P970.
It results that on the date last mentioned Andal executed a deed of sale for P970 in favor of the intervenors, an
amount which included Andal's expenses as well as the normal sale price. The document of repurchase gave
as reason for the transaction the fact that it had been agreed that in the event trouble should arise the sellers
should return to the buyer what they had received and pay the latter his expenses.
On February 14, 1944, the defendant filed his answer alleging that Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had sold him
their respective portions of the inherited land for P860 and that he had no objection to disposing of those
portions in favor of the plaintiff for P860 plus the expenses he had incurred in the execution of the deed of sale
amounting to P50, but that he was unwilling to accept P150, which was all the plaintiff offered him besides his
expenses.
On April 4, 1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez's answer in intervention was filed. The intervenors alleged that
there had been a partition among them and their brother and sisters "with the share of each delineated and
marked, and after partition and delineation everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of
his portion in the partition." They charged the plaintiff with bad faith in that "it was upon her request for chance
that the sale to the defendant, about to take place last November, was delayed till January of this year when
she finally informed the intervenors that they could sell to the defendant, or she could pay only P150 and could
not raise the amount of P860 offered by the defendant."
Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own behalf. Substantially she
reiterated the allegations in her two complaints. Zacarias Andal, the defendant, also testified. He said that he
was in possession of the land in question until he returned it to the intervenors. He declared that the plaintiff
offered to repurchase the land from him long after he had bought it, that is, when she was about to file her

action. He stated that after he came from Candelaria, Tayabas, with the document of sale he showed it to the
plaintiff: that was on the 23rd of January. He was able to do this because he lived near Cresencia and passed
by her house on his way home from Candelaria. He said that Cresencia Hernandez upon being shown the
document merely exclaimed, "Oh, so you already have a document." When asked whether the land "described
in the complaint of the herein plaintiff has been the object of partition among the co-owners Pedro, Basilia,
Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina surnamed Hernandez," counsel for the plaintiff objected on the ground that the
best evidence was the document of partition, and the objection was sustained. The same objection and the
same ruling were made on the same ground when the witness was queried how it was that the land he had
bought from Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had been specified in the deed of sale, Exhibit A.
In consequence of this ruling, counsel for the defendant and intervenors did not call any more witnesses but
only announced that he had witnesses ready to prove that a parol partition among the five brother and sisters
had been made, mentioning the names of six such witnesses. Counsel for the plaintiff again objected asserting
that "under the Rules of Court agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing
subscribed by the person against whom the proof is offered. "Upon this objection, the court ruled that under
Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code,
parol evidence of partition was inadmissible, adding that to decide the case it had enough with the testimony
and evidence offered by the parties.
Thereafter the court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of the land by Zacarias Andal in favor
of Maria and Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and in bad faith. It, however, did not seem to have found as a fact
the allegation that the resale was simulated. The court then made this judgment:
(a) declarando y sin valor alguno el documento de reventaotorgado por el demandado Zacarias Andal
en 26 de marzo de 1944, a favor de Maria y Aquilina Hernandez sobre el terrenocuestionado que se
presento como Exhibito 2 de dichodemandado, y consiguientemente se anulan tambien todas
lastransacciones posteriores que las mencionadas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez hayan hecho sobre el
terreno cuestionado despuesdel 26 de marzo de 1944, asi como tambien cualquiera anotacionen la
Oficiana del Registrador de Titulos de Batangas que hayaanotado dicha reventa por el demandado
Zacarias Andal a favorde las terceristas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez en el citado dia 26 de marzo de
1944; y
(b) se ordena al aqui demandado Zacarias Andal, que otorgue unaescritura de reventa a favor de la
aqui demandante Cresencia Hernandez, de las participaciones de las terceristas en el terrenodescrito
en la demanda suplementaria previo pago de P860 mas lacantidad de P50 como gastos de
documentacion. Se absuelve al demandado de los daos y perjuicios que reclama la demandante. Se
absuelve tambien a la demandante de la contra-demanda de lasterceristas.
Sin especial pronunciamento en cuanto a las costas.
The defendant and the intervenors are appealing from the foregoing decision and in their joint brief made one
assignment of error:
The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving a contract of partition among the
heirs on the ground that it was not admissible.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the questions raised we are tempted to point up some seeming
incongruities in the above-quoted judgment. Although Zacarias Andal is no longer interested in the case, as far
as the land is concerned, and even though the intervenors have become again the absolute owners and are
now in full possession of the property, while Andal has already gotten his money back, the judgment would
have Andal execute a deed of resale in favor of the plaintiff and received from her the price of repurchase. The
judgment is silent as to the intervenors with reference to the execution of the deed of sale or the receipt of the
sale price. And the lower court made no finding and expressed no opinion as to whether the offer of P150
instead of P860, not to mention Andal's expenses, by the plaintiff as price of repurchase was sufficient
compliance with article 1067 of the Civil Code on which the court rested the plaintiff's cause of action.

However, in this decision we are concerned mainly with the application of section 21 of Rule 123 and section 1
of Rule 74 both of the Rules of Court. Article 1248 of the Civil Code has no bearing on the case.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a contract as is required to be in
writing under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds the affirmative view; other authorities say no.
The reason for the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of frauds is that partition is not a
conveyance but simply a separation and designation of that part of the land which belongs to each tenant in
common. (27 C.J., 206.) The differences in the conclusions reached are "due perhaps to varied phraseology of
the statutes" in the several states. (40 Amer. Jur., 15.) However the case may be, as enacted in the
Philippines, first in section 335 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the
Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a long line of cases to be applicable to executory and
not to completed or executed contracts. (27 C.J., 206.) In this jurisdiction performance of the contract takes it
out of the operation of the statute. (Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil., 485; Almirol and Cario vs. Monserrat, 48
Phil., 67.) The statute of frauds does not declare the contracts therein enumerated void and of no legal effect,
but only makes ineffective the action for specific performance. (Almirol and Cario vs. Monserrat, supra.) In the
United States, even in those states where the affirmative view of the question has been followed, "the weight of
authority upholds the rule that an oral partition is effective when several possession is taken under it by the
respective parties to the agreement." (27 C.J., 206.)
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral
partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity
will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of
possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to
each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has
been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into
possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that
equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in
severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of
estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of the land divided by parol
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for
the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in
severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto,
or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part
performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has
been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance,
a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties. (40 Amer.
Jur., 15-18.)
It is on the effects of Rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol partition that there are sharp
divergences of opinion among the members of this Court. This section reads:
If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument file in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the

office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a
petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be validated by any acts of the
parties short of the execution of a public document and its registration.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required to be reduced to writing
either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written
form exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33
Phil., 471.) The decisions of this Court which we have noticed were predicated on this assumption. The Civil
Code, too, requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the
act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been
admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs .Hernaez,
45 Phil., 746.)
Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential of partition? In other words, is writing the act that
confers legal validity upon the agreement? There are no indications in the phraseology of this rule which justify
an affirmative answer to these questions. It must be noted that where the law intends a writing or other
formality to be the essential requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so in clear and unequivocal
terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as originally enacted in England and as enacted in some of the states, uses
the words "utterly void" with statute transactions required to be in writing are absolutely void and not merely
voidable if not made in the manner indicated. Again article 633 of the Civil Code says that donation may
be valid only when made in a public document. Article 146 of the Mortgage Law makes known its intention to
have the execution of a public instrument and its registration in the registry indispensable to the validity of the
contract by using this phrase: "in order that voluntary mortgages may be legally created in a valid manner."
Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for the same purpose similar expression with reference to the
execution of a public document: "in order that mortgage may be validly constituted." And with respect to the
formalities of last wills and testaments, section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphatic statement: "No will
shall be valid to pass upon any estate real or personal nor change or affect the same, unless it be written etc."
Other examples might be mentioned.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required public instruments is to be
constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this
Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties
dependent on the execution of a public instrument and its registration. On the other hand, the opposite theory
is not without reasonable support. We can think of possible factors against the proposition that a public
document and its registration were contemplated as necessary ingredients to give life to a contract of partition
so that without them no oral partition can bind the parties.
1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration forms a part were promulgated by
the Judicial Department under authority to deal with matters of procedure exclusively. For this court to
prescribe what is to be a binding agreement between co-heirs in the settlement of their private affairs which in
no way affect the rights of third parties would be to transcends its rule-making power. We bring out this
limitation upon the authority of this court to make rules, as an aid to interpretation, as a method of arriving at
the conclusion that section 1 of Rule 74 was meant to be remedial and not a rule of substantive law of farreaching importance and serious juridical and practical implications. It is to be presumed that the framers of the
Rules of Court realized the bounds of this court's functions and did not intend to trespass on purely substantive
rights of the parties to the partition. To the extent the execution and registration of a notarized instrument are
made essential elements to validity to protect innocent third parties, the rule is legitimate and necessary;
legitimate because decedent's estate are placed under the jurisdiction of the courts to administer and
distribute. The interests of third parties eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and practice
and invades the realm of substantive law.
Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 Rule 74, is enlightening and instructive. The
former after stating that heirs may apportion and divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit by
agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, adds the words "and not otherwise." These words, in our

opinion, were expressive of an intention to make the written formality inherent element of the validity of a parol
partition. But what is far more to the point is that by logical process of deduction the elimination from the new
rule of the words "and not otherwise" imports the casting away from the prescribed public document of its jural
character which the document enjoyed in the former code. At the same time, the inclusion of the aforesaid
words in the old provision serves to emphasize the necessity of a positive and clear language if a given
contractual formality is to be the exclusive basis of the contract's binding effect on the parties. It is of course
unnecessary to say that the attaching of jural character to the prescribed public instrument in section 596 of
Act No. 190 is no argument for contending that such document must be clothed with the same raiment in the
new Rules. Act No. 190 was a mixture of procedural and substantive provisions, having been enacted by the
legislative body itself which, unlike this court, was unhampered and untrammelled, except by the fundamental
law, in the choice of its subjects of legislation.
2. The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments in acts and contracts with greater liberality with a view
to better adaptation to human frailties and idiosyncracies. In their blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack
of experience and foresight, and their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and continue to make verbal
contracts. The advantages of an air-tight policy concerning such contracts fall far short of compensating for the
resulting damage, injustice, inconveniences and confusion. So even though articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of
the Civil Code have made provisions for public instrument for all transactions and contracts whose object is the
creation, modification or extinction of real rights in immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal
contracts may be effective between the parties. A leading case on this subject is Thunga Chui vs. Que Bentec
(2 Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Williard writing the decision. It was said in that case that when the essential
requisites for the existence of a contract are present, the contract is binding upon the parties, and, although
required to be in writing by article 1280 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintain an action under article 1279
to compel the execution of a written instrument. It says that "article 1279 does not impose an obligation, but
confers a privilege upon both contracting parties, and the fact that the plaintiff has not made use of same does
not bar his action." It further says that article 1279, far from making the enforceability of the contract dependent
upon any special intrinsic form, recognizes its enforceability by the mere act of granting the contracting parties
an adequate remedy whereby to compel the execution of public writing or any other special form whenever
such form is necessary in order that contract may produce the effect which is desired according to whatever its
object. This doctrine was iterated and reiterated in a series of decisions perhaps longer than that on any other
legal topic. And it has been extended even to verbal contracts involving land registered under the Torrens Act.
Do the Rules of Court adhere to this salutary principle? We can perceive no sufficient ground for the new Rules
to depart from it. No considerations of public policy enter into a partition of hereditary estate among co-heirs
greater than those involved in a contract between strangers which operates to create, transmit, modify or
extinguish property rights in land. If as between strangers the creation, transmission, modification or extinction
of real rights may be lawfully effected by parol agreement notwithstanding the requirement that it be put in
writing, the new rule could not be more intransigent when the transaction is between co-heirs and there is no
change of ownership but simply designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion, for its purpose
the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims.
Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve
as constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors
or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of
an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided
by law.
It is said that the findings, conclusions and judgment in the appealed decision are not assigned as errors and
that for this reason the appeal should be dismissed. We do not think that the premise of this objection is
exactly correct. The evidence on parol partition tendered by the defendant and intervenors was ruled out and
they specifically complain of this exclusion as error. In this manner the assignment of error squarely meets and
attacks the opinion and judgment of the trial court. A superficial analysis of the case will show that on the
validity of the alleged partition hangs the result of the entire litigation, and on that validity depends in turn the
competence of the excluded evidence. These two interrelated points are the core of the whole case. All other
points are incidental to and revolve around them. If a completed oral partition may be enforced, as the

defendant and the intervenors contend and as we opine, their evidence should be allowed, and if allowed and
it establishes their allegation, the plaintiff's cause of action vanishes.
If the appellant's assignment of error be not considered a direct challenge to the decision of the court below,
we still believe that the objection takes a narrow view of practice and procedure contrary to the liberal spirit
which pervades the Rules of Court. The first injunction of the new Rules (Rule 1, section 2) is that they "shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." In line with the modern trends of procedure, we are
told that, "while an assignment of error which is required by law or rule of court has been held essential to
appellate review, and only those assigned will be considered, there are a number of cases which appear to
accord to the appellate court a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and
consider errors not assigned. And an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon
which the determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered
by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error." (4 C.J.S., 1734; 3 C.J., 1341, footnote
77.) At the least, the assignment of error, viewed in this light, authorizes us to examine and pass upon the
decision of the court below.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceeding and a new
decision not incompatible with this decision, with costs of this appeal against the appellee.
FERIA, J.:
I reserve the right to express my view and write a dissenting opinion later.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., with whom concurs PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Is oral evidence admissible to prove partition of land? The answer of the appellants is in the affirmative. Thus
their only assignment of error is as follows: "The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving
a contract of partition of the land among the heirs on the ground that it was not admissible." Since no other
question, either of fact or of law, is raised by the appellants, I deem it unnecessary, under the circumstances of
this case, to pass upon said assignment.
A small parcel of land containing some 5,568 square meters was inherited by four sisters and a brother. It was
surveyed and is still assessed as a single lot, not in the name of the co-owners, but in that of an uncle. It
appears that on January 23, 1944, two of the sisters sold a portion of the lot to defendant Andal who was
neither a relative nor an adjoining owner. The vendors stated:
Este terreno es parte del terreno referido en la declaracion Tax No. 53379 en nombre de nuestro tio
Juan Dimasacat y estaamillarado todo el terreno en P290. El referido terreno yase vio en el Juzgado
de Primera Instancia de Batangas en 29 de Septiembre de 1941, at nagcaro-on ng decreto noong ika-6
ng Noviembre, 1941, na doon ay ipinasiya ang pagbibigay ng Titulo sa aming magcacapatid. (Exhibit
A.)
Upon learning of the sale one week thereafter, a third sister expressed her desire to repurchase said portion of
land and, upon refusal of the buyer, she filed a complaint for the purpose of being subrogated to the rights
acquired by Andal. The latter, in his answer, is agreeable to the prayer provided that he be reimbursed in the
total sum of P910 which he had actually paid. In the meantime, the other two sisters (vendors) intervened in
the case, alleging that, before the sale was made to Andal, the plaintiff had been given the option to acquire
the lot in question. By way of counterclaim, it was alleged that they had repurchased the lot from Andal at a
higher price.

After hearing, the lower court held that inasmuch as the plaintiff is willing to buy, and Andal to sell, the lot at the
price fixed by the latter, there is no reason why the former's complaint should not prosper, and Andal was
accordingly ordered to convey the property to the plaintiff upon payment by the latter of the total sum of P910.
As regards the contention of the intervenors, the court held that their alleged repurchase was fraudulent and,
therefore, null and void.
As these pronouncements, necessarily based on findings of fact, have not been assailed, they should be
considered final. Hence, it is absolutely futile to decide the question of law raised in appellant's assignment of
error, the same having become academic.
Even so, the point whether the sale to Andal took place after a partition is immaterial, in view of his willingness
to resell to the plaintiff, not to mention the fact that the latter's right to redeem, as an adjoining owner, maybe
based on article 1523 of the Civil Code which provides: "The owners of the adjacent lands shall also have the
right of redemption in case of the sale of a rural estate whose area does not exceed one hectare."
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
July 30, 1947
TUASON, J.:
Plaintiff and appellee has filed a motion for reconsideration. She maintains that she is entitled to judgment
because the defendant has no objection to reselling her the land and she is, on the other hand, ready to
reimburse him the purchase price. She argues that the buyer having led her to believe that he would make the
resale in her favor is estopped from going against his own acts.
Superficially, the decision is obscure as to the relation which Andal's signification in his answer, that he was
willing to sell the land to the plaintiff, bears to the dispositive part or judgment. But read in its entirety, analyzed
closely, the decision reveals in no uncertain manner that it is anchored on articles 1067 and 1522 of the Civil
Code and that all other matters discussed therein revolve around this basic conclusion. With particular
reference to Andal's signification abovementioned, the court does not appear to have made or intended to
make it an affirmative, separate basis of the judgment. Roughly, the judgment was evolved along this process
of reasoning: the plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under the above-cited provisions of the Civil Code was
evident, in the court's opinion. But, the court said in the same breath, a complication emerged. The confusion
was brought about by the resale of the property by Andal to the original owners. The court seemed puzzled.
Then it saw a way out of the perplexity; the resale was illegal and mala fide and hence ineffective. It was
illegal, mala fide and ineffective because the defendant had stated in his answer that he had no objection in
allowing the plaintiff to buy the land, and because the resale to the intervenors had been consummated during
the pendency of the action. Andal's signification in his answer estopped him from alienating the land in favor of
others.
It was estoppel that the court invoked Andal's expression of his willingness to sell the land, citing section 68
(a), Rule 123, Rules of Court. The court looked upon this expression not as a cause of action standing on its
own feet but merely as an equitable aid to keep the defendant and intervenors from making a mockery of the
plaintiff's right under the aforecited articles of the Civil Code. The Court found that the transaction between the
defendant and the intervenors had been entered into "con el proposito de desorientar al Juzgado y frustrar en
cierto modo la administracion de justicia." The appellee both in her brief and motion for reconsideration treats
Andal's willingness to sell in the same light.
To put it differently, the central principle of the case, as the court saw it, was that the evidence on the oral
partition was inadmissible and so the plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under articles 1067 and 1522 of the
Civil Code was in order. Andal's expression of willingness to sell the land to the plaintiff came into play not as a

generator of a new obligation in favor of the plaintiff, separate and distinct from the right of co-heirs to
repurchase shares in property inherited in common and sold to strangers by other heirs, but simply as a factor
to prevent the defendant's and intervenor's attempt to nullify that right.
Estoppel, in the sense in which the court regarded Andal's manifestation that he was willing to sell the land to
the plaintiff, partakes of the nature of the rule of evidence. Certainly, it belongs to the adjective branch of the
law, and the court regarded it under this criterion. The court's reference in its decision to Andal's signification
cannot have a meaning other than that the court assigned thereto a subordinate role, subordinate to the
asserted right of the plaintiff under the provisions of the Civil Code referred to.
The sole assignment of error in appellant's brief thus inevitably comprehends that part of the appealed decision
and judgment which relates to the defendant's expression of willingness to sell land to the plaintiff. A review of
the error specifically assigned necessarily carries with it the consideration of all matters related to and
dependent upon that error. Specifically, if there was a lawful partition and the partition bars the plaintiff's right
to repurchase the land under the articles relied upon, the proposition formulated in the assignment of error
then Andal's previous willingness to sell loses its raison d'etre as estoppel; it disappears with the right which
it was intended to uphold and with which it was inextricably bound up.
It should be made clear that we are only construing the decision of the lower court. We have explained
the ratio decidendi as it appeared to the court, not the theory of the parties in their pleadings. If the
supplemental complaint was intended to present Andal's offer to sell the land to the plaintiff as constituting a
new and separate cause of action a point which cannot be determined with a fair degree of certainty from a
reading of that complaint the court did not see or consider it in that light. And, it should be remembered, it is
what the court decided or how the court decided a case that we have to look as a test for judging whether the
questions for review have been formulated in the right manner.
If Andal's statement in his answer was alleged by the plaintiff to serve as an independent cause of action, that
is all the more reason, for his own benefit, why the cases should be remanded for further proceeding. The new
trial as ordered in our decision leaves the door open for the admission of evidence on the allegations in the
supplementary complaint as well as on the alleged parol partition. As matters now stand, the plaintiff could ask
for judgment on the supplementary complaint only on the untenable hypothesis that no assignment of error has
been made relative to this feature of the case. Without the benefit of this technicality, the plaintiff has not made
out a case on the supplementary complaint. The evidence is very meager to the point of nullity; many of the
allegations have been left untouched, and there are essential points that badly need amplication or
clarification. It would be extremely improper, for obvious reasons, to go into these defects and deficiencies in
detail in this resolution in anticipation of the new trial.
The motion is denied.

G.R. No. L-10474

February 28, 1958

BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.
LABRADOR, J.:
Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight modification a judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four parcels of
land described in the complaint, with costs. The judgment was rendered in an action instituted by Felisa
Sinopera, administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants one-half share of the
aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased Teodoro Tolete.
According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left
for parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel,
Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of
deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an
affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon,
the legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above properties" (Record on
Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On the same
day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of
P10,000. This sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17,
1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this sale was
also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to
the complaint).
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete
(Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as administratrix, brought
the present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and
said notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26, 1950. This notice,
however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took
place on June 17, 1950.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and
that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo
acquired any right to the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the
complaint states no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the statute of limitations;
that defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and that the complaint is malicious, frivolous and spurious,
intended to harass and inconvenience the defendants.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the
affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null
and void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of land in question, and finally
declaring that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated. The case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A",
by the trial court was correct but that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar as one-half of
the properties, conveyed is concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the same to the heirs of the deceased, is
premature. Hence, it modified the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and "C" are null and void only insofar
as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it
ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Teodoro
Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-half of the lands described in the complaint, but reserved to
Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said properties
may correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring an action for the damages that he may have
suffered against Leoncia de Leon and Benny Sampilo.

Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and have assigned the
following errors in their brief:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her
and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to
recover was filed.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers for value.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for new trial.
In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years after
the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan,
the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought within the
period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, and as decided in the cases of
McMickingvs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time within two years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two
sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation of the
such heir or such other person may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. If the decedent left no debts and
the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see
fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds.
It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring to a case in which
there are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a deceased person, and the second in which there is
only one heir. The section was taken from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as
amended by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. Whenever all the heirs of a
person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the
estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of
them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit,
without proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are
two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made

more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By
the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to answer for rights violated by the
extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect
of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof.
There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound
thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right
or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period
of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently,
they are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to their rights within
the two-year period. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the
decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also
be required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to
them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that
effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. In the case of
Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be had upon the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no provision is made
for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents
and purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be
held that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by
which the court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon
minor heirs who are not represented therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex
parteproceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would
affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement
or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. We have
examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the circumstances on
which the ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the
opinion and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to
an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1)
to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2)
when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs
of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have
participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from
his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The origin of the
Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190,
fails to support the contention. In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which shows clearly a
statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a bar against the parties who had
taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not Parties thereto. In the second
place, the statute of limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section
596 of the Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would naturally have been included in the
chapter which defines the statute.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The action is
one based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition
that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on
fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not
appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and
these proceedings must have been instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants

have the burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of limitations, which is their defense, and they have not
proved that when the action was instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date that the interested
parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.
The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent purchasers for value was
rejected as unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court said.
The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of the claim of the
heirs of Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in question does not find support in the evidence of
record. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de
Leon and he had been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of the deceased who are
claiming the property are residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that
Benny Sampilo did not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that they were
nephews and nieces, children of the deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact
furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied his aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when
the later saw Notary Public Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him prepare the
affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same date
she conveyed to Sampilo all the property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of which she
acknowledged before said notary public, coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that
the consideration for the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens our belief that said
Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the property,
and that the immediate conveyance thereof to him was a strategem concocted to defeat the former's
rights. And as regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no notice of lis pendens appeared
annotated in the certificates of title issued to Benny Sampilo when he acquired the property might be
true, for he purchased the property on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis pendens was noted on said
certificates of title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good
faith for value of the property. It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that a purchaser of registered
lands who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and investigate as to the possible
defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and investigation cannot claim that he as
a purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a valid title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong
Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.
Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA,
Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA, namely,
MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P. YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN, namely,
FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and
CRISPIN BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978
FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant,
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children, claimantsappellees.
AQUINO, J.:
These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the
deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action. Also
in issue in these two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the litigation expenses allegedly incurred
in a case regarding that same land.
Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's resolution of August 13,
1969.
The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possession a
homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis
Occidental.
One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10 of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of Juan Pangilinan
issued in 1927. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the registry of deeds of
Misamis Occidental (p. 7, Appellees' brief in L-27082).
The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by OCT No. P8419 issued on November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan , represented by Concepcion Pan de
Yamuta (p. 73, Record on Appeal in
L-27082).
According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares
which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112, also forms
part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on Appeal).
The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and
Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3)
Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of Francisco Pan who died in
1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is not clear whether Roseller,
Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children of the deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably
a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. See pages 81-82, Record on Appeal).
Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted on September
5, 1963 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.

On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots
Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows:
(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 560 or CA-G.R. No.
6721-R, February 27, 1952, Crispin Labaria vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in accordance with the
lower court's decision dated July 19, 1965 in Civil Case No. 2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11,
Appellees' brief in L-27082), three hectares which should be taken from Lot No. 1112 and
designated as Lot No. 1112-A;
(b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and children), 5.3361 hectares taken
from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-B;
(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No.
1112-C, and presumably a daughter of Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on Appeal).
(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No. 1927 and the
remainder of Lot No. 1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No. 1112-D.
It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate to
Concepcion Pan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16 for each set of heirs,
and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition. They
contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963 which
recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima
Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the partition; that the total share of
the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not
been properly allowed.
The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the estate to the
heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the twelve
hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six hectares, which were claimed by
Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded from the inventory in the court's order of
December 6, 1963) is determined in an ordinary action.
On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they asked that Lot
No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares, which lot was surveyed at should be included in the project of
partition.
On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the project of
partition. After noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of the twelve hectares,
it issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed by the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan.
That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the lower court
did not bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in
that remainder.
That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs
of Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also assail the lower court's order of
December 6, 1963, excluding eighteen hectares from the inventory, which order was sustained by the Court of
Appeals in its decision in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R, and 3426-R, May 14,1964, 5 CAR 1200.

This Court refused to review that decision in its resolution of July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.
The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968 which directed that the claim of the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan for reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from the sum of P1,459.49, as the value
of the produce of the twelve hectares already mentioned, which was appropriated by the special administrator),
be referred to the clerk of court for reception of the evidence.
In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965 that the
administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pan the. amount to be reimbursed to her estate. The court
further directed the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to recover any amount due from the
special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the amount due to the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan as directed in its order of August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the accounting of the special
administrator.
The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed from
those two orders dated May 11, 1968 (L-29545).
The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of
the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered
their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is how the title to the twelve hectares should be
decided, whether in a separate action or in the intestate. proceeding.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In
essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived" (Cunanan vs.
Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over the issue).
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or intestate
proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14,
1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in
a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties
are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership (Pascual vs. Pascual 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs. Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title should
be ventilated in a separate action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during
the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested parties are the heirs who
have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur
additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the
twelve-hectare portion.

The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to the in the
intestate, proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 568, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein they should set
forth their claim for the twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in support of their claim, such as
the partition made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the share of Prima Pangilinan and the
usufructuary rights of their parents, their long possession of the said portion, their claim for the produce of the
land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No. 560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot
No. 1920 forms part of the estate of the Pangilinan spouses.
Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator and upon Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan (who are all represented by the same lawyers). They should answer the motion within
fifteen days from service. In their answer the appellants should set forth the ultimate facts and the defenses
(such as the violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to support their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms
part of the estate of the spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan should bear one-third of the expenses incurred by Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No. 560.
After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the probate court
should receive evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs. Catolico, supra a full-dress
hearing should be held.
Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of deciding what
portion of the estate should be given to him in satisfaction of his share. His claim for the sum of P416 had
already been adjudicated by the lower court in its order of August 31, 1966 (pp. 26- 27, Record on Appeal in L29545). No appeal was interposed from that adjudication.
After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan spouses
should include the partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate should be allocated to
Crispen Borromeo. If necessary, the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112, made by Juan C.
Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed upon.
Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan . and the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan for reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in Civil Case No. 560 will be
included in the trial, the two orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1968 regarding those matters (L-29545)
should not be enforced. They should be set aside.
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares from the
partition of the estate of the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968,
regarding the claim of Guadalupe Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate to Concepcion
Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set aside.
A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings and in case no amicable
settlement is reached. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their motion within thirty days from notice
of the entry of judgment in this case.
The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines already set
forth. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-1723

May 30, 1949

LUZ MARQUEZ DE SANDOVAL, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE SANTIAGO, judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, Branch III, respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is a special civil action of certiorari filed by the petitioner against the respondent Judge Hon. Vicente
Santiago.
The herein petitioner instituted a special proceeding in the Court of First Instance of First Instance of Quezon
Province for then probate of the will and codicil executed by the deceased Daniel Marquez in which she was
designated as executrix. The will and codicil were allowed and the petitioner was appointed on August 16,
1946, executrix in accordance with the will but before the petitioner qualified as executrix the three heirs
instituted in the will all age made an extrajudicial partition of all the properties of he deceased on October 5,
1946 and entered into the possession of their respective share without the authority and approval of the court.
On August 22, 1947, that is one year after the probate of the will and appointment of the petitioner as executrix
the respondent judge required the petitioner to quality as such and file a bind of P5,000. In response thereto
the petitioner informed the respondent judge that it was not necessary for her to qualify because the heirs had
already made an extrajudicial partition in accordance with the will as shown by the copy the copy of said
partition which she submitted to the court. In view of the answer of the petitioner the respondent judge ordered
the executrix to qualify as such within forty-eight hour and declared the extrajudicial agreement of partition
entered into by the heirs null and void, on the ground that the probate proceedings having been commenced
judicially it must also be terminated judicially. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner and
denied by the court hence, the filing of the present petition for certiorari.
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the respondent, Judge or Court of First Instance of Quezon Province,
wherein the deceased was residing at the time of his death, has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to settle the
testate estate of the deceased Daniel Marquez and over the heirs and other person interested in the estate of
the deceased from the moment the application for the probate of the decedent's will was filed with the said
court and the publication required by law were made; and the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not divest
the Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere fact of dividing extrajudicially the
estate of the deceased among themselves.
If the extrajudicial partition made by the heirs of the deceased wassubmitted to the court and approved by the
respondent judge after verifying that it does not prejudicially affect the rights of third parties, the testate
proceedings pending in the court would have been legally thereby terminated. An extrajudicial partition of the
estate of a deceased by the heirs becomes a judicial partition after its approval by the court which had
previously acquired jurisdiction of the estate by the filing of an application for the probate of the decedent's will;
but as the testate proceeding is terminated in such case without the necessary publication ofnotices to
creditors and other persons interested in the estate required ina required in a regular judicial administration,
the effect of such judicial partition would be the same as if it had been effected extrajudicially without the
intervention of the court under the provisions of section1,of Rule 74, that is, subject to the claims against the
distributees by persons mentioned in sections 4 and 5, of the same rule. (McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng. 21 Phil.,
211.)
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is denied with costs against the petitioner, because the
respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in not giving the deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition of
the estate of the deceased the effect of terminating the testate proceedingover which the court has acquired
exclusive jurisdiction since said partition was not submitted to said court for approval. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA
JUGO,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982,
declaring as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at
the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of
Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the
attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of
each other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by
the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only
executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina
Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged
from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5,
1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac
before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez
and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will
reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and
our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally
and properly entitled to inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my above-named wife
for so many years, I cannot deny that I was legally married to her or that we have been separated up to
the present for reasons and justifications known fully well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I
declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the things which she has done for me,
now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did
comport and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the
law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous
marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the
deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the
issuance to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging
inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner
having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters
testamentary should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted
in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's

admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the
probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the
petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question declared valid except the
devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties so devised are instead
passed on in intestacy to the appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error"
praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to
"appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal
shares, without pronouncement as to costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10,
1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court
in a resolution dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and
decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of
a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by
law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that
even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable, the
declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife
for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor
of the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly
admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact
that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of
the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine
enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et
al.(G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit
relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise. We agree with the
respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx

... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity
of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of
whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic
validity thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any
inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or
legacy is premature.
xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one
thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the
document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution
(Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with
the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only
purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in
such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass
upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy
is void and another one valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir
and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452)
passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality,
and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have
been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs.
Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13
SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed
that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the
mental capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court

when in resolving the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's
last Will and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in
favor of the petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On
the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in
the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once
again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief
that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.
(Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a
separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into
the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his
office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the
spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before the testator's death
on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had
been estranged "for so many years." He also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were
his legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since
1952. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated that
Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I
could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed
his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital
relationship for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before
the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48.
Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married
to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true
civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner
by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife, as
already married, was an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and
passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to
present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of
August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the testimony of petitioner on the
point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the meretricious
relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right at the
inception of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of adultery
or concubinage', it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be.
xxx xxx xxx
3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private respondents respectfully offer
the following analysis:
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac where
neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of
course, it maybe argued that the marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina Gomez was
likewise done in secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family
way at that time and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so
much so that an action in court was brought concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo,
TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)

SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still both single. That
would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3).
Petitioner married the testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30 years in
between. During those 30 years, could it be believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did
not marry her nor contact her anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to ask her
groom before she married him in secrecy, especially so when she was already about 50 years old at
the time of marriage.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive demonstration
that she new that the man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with
already two children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it possible that
she would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children
and by whom? That is un-Filipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator, is it
possible that she would not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and
Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of Martin
Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters
away?
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to say the least,
inherently improbable, for they are against the experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and
promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she was going to
marry whether or not he was already married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It would
be a story that would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was
already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent
Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons
who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even
assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the
testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now
Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased,
MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate
of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla,
Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death
and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it
would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required
by law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275).
Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss
the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its order of February
23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was contrary to law
and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an
opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the
petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof
cannot stand in lieu of the original.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of
holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof
of authenticity of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962
while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time
of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be
located shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing
Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is
contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal does not
involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT
BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED
BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the
allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or
not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be
resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has
been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only
evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of
the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the
testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a
lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or
read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it
may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested
before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may
be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for
reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the
will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23445

June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and
six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed
Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner
prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to
her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that
by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors
moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1wph1.t
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce
create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The
court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The
due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court.
Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will
should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and
oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a
nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if
the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue
of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are
the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for
solution.

2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a
complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of
property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved
sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my
name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of
Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point
Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun
nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se
le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a
uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa;
que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to
have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon
wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d
611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to
do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and
Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear
case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando
caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The
one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or
bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario
Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte?
No se aade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la
institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse
que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige
con preferencia al 817. 10
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o
todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total,
cuando el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal
de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la
generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que
"anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the
nullification of such institution of universal heir without any other testamentary disposition in the will
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers
no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the
statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a
1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no
consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun
cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa
en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto
procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la
institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de
otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas
obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene
declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa
si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido
y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como
legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a
la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no
autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la
testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente,
hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este
procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only
when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a
universal heir in a will void because of preterition would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary

disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez
Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the
institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero
subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As
Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion
libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal
heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar".
This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his
share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la
legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez
Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the
other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be
supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names
altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced
heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment
is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the
institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was
omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the
estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in
commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal
disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les
corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso.23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but
that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the
extent of said legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore
cited,viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the
second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely
annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814
and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of
legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851
regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have
any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of
inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article
817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of
heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article
814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the
institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments.
And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said
article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of
property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special
title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code
in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for
the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs
allowed. So ordered.