Fire Protection For Safety

5.
11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response
5.11
Fire Protection and Emergency Response
This section addresses the fire protection and emergency response resources related to the
proposed project. These resources include the existing services and capabilities of nearby fire
departments and neighboring oil and gas facilities, the internal fire protection plans, and the
systems and design of the facilities and their associated pipelines. The emergencies that would
require summoning these available resources include fire, oil spill, hazardous substance release,
or another event that could lead to these emergency situations, such as an earthquake, traffic
accident, pipeline rupture, etc. This section also evaluates the impacts of the proposed project
and alternatives on these services and capabilities and presents criteria used to determine
significant impacts of the project.
5.11.1 Environmental Setting

5.11.1.1
Fire Fighting Capabilities in the Project Area
Santa Barbara County (SBC) operates many fire stations within County borders, and the cities of
Lompoc and Santa Maria operate their own fire stations near the project area. The City of
Lompoc and SBC have a mutual aid agreement that allows city and county fire departments to
cooperate with one another. Therefore, the Lompoc City Fire Stations could also respond during
an emergency along the pipeline route or at the LOGP. The closest fire stations to the LOGP and
the route of the pipelines evaluated in this EIR are listed in Table 5.11.1 with street address,
equipment, number of personnel, and proximity to the projects. Figure 5.11-1 presents the
location of each of the fire stations in relation to the project area (locations are numbered as in
Table 5.11.1).
SBC Fire Station Number (No.) 51 near Lompoc is the closest to the LOGP and would be first to
respond to the LOGP in the event of a fire. The fire station is located within 10 miles (within 15
minutes response time) from most of the pipeline routes addressed in this document. The next
nearest fire stations to the LOGP are located in the City of Lompoc, including Lompoc Fire
Station No. 51 (5.3 miles from LOGP) and Lompoc City Fire Station No. 2 (7.5 miles from
LOGP). Furthermore, as presented in Table 5.11.1, Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) Fire
Department also has emergency response capabilities. SBC Fire Station No. 31 in Buellton could
also be alerted to respond to any emergency at the LOGP.
In addition to the county and city emergency response equipment, oil facilities are required by
Federal, State, and local regulations to maintain onsite fire fighting equipment as well as
materials to control oil spills or other hazardous materials releases. PXP has fire fighting and
emergency response capabilities at the LOGP in accordance with these regulations.
Other facilities in the vicinity that also have fire fighting and emergency response capabilities
include the Orcutt Pump Station and the Santa Maria Pump Station. These capabilities are also
listed in Table 5.11.1. Fire fighting capabilities at the Santa Maria and Sisquoc Pump Stations are
described in the Tosco Sisquoc Pipeline EIR (91-FDP-03, 2/1992) and the Tosco Sisquoc
Pipeline Public Draft SEIR (00-EIR-09, 12/2000).
October 2006
5.11-1
Draft EIR
5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response
Table 5.11.1
Fire Station/
Facility
1. Lompoc, Fire
Station No. 51
(SBC)
2. Buellton, Fire
Station No. 31
(SBC)
Facilities in the Area with Fire Fighting and Emergency Response Capabilities
Address
749 Burton Mesa
Rd., Lompoc
168 W. Highway
246, Buellton
3. SM Airport,
Fire Station No.
21 (SBC)
4. Santa Maria,
Fire Station No.
22 (SBC)
5. Sisquoc, Fire
Station No. 23
(SBC)
3339 Terminal
Dr., Santa Maria
Distance
Fire-fighting Equipment/Personnel
Miles1
5.3
1 engine, 1 reserve engine,
1 Captain, 2 engineers and 2
firefighter/paramedics
20
Engine/brush-fire engine (1250 gpm),
reserve engine, reserve personnel (10-15
people), 1 Captain, 1 engineer, 1 firefighter
and 1 firefighter/paramedic
18
Engine (1500 gpm), crash rescue truck, 1
Captain, 1 engineer, and 1 firefighter
1596 Tiffany Park

Ct., Santa Maria
17
5003 Depot Ave.,

Sisquoc
28
6. Los Alamos,
Fire Station No.
24 (SBC)
7. Nipomo (SLO
County)
8. Lompoc City
Station No.1
9. Lompoc City
Station No. 2
10. City of Santa
Maria, Fire
Station No. 1
99 Centennial,
Los Alamos
16
450 Pioneer St.

Nipomo
115 South G
St., Lompoc
1100 North D
St., Lompoc
206 E. Cook St.,
Santa Maria
31
11. Lompoc Oil

and Gas Plant
3602 Harris
Grade Road,
Lompoc
12. Lompoc
Field
Mobile
October 2006
8
7.5
21
0-10
Engine (1500gpm), brush fire engine, 1

Captain, 1 engineer, 1 firefighter, and 1
firefighter/paramedic
Engine (1250 gpm), fire/foam tender (2800
gallons of water or 6,000 gallons of AFFF
foam), 2
1 Captain, 1 engineer, and 1 firefighter
Engine (1500 gpm), brush fire engine, 1
Captain, 1 engineer, and 1 firefighter
Emergency or Spill Response Capabilities

Paramedic unit
HazMat response truck3
HazMat team3
Paramedic engine
Type A pumper with foam capability, 2

Minimum of 2 personnel per 24-hour shift
1 Engine, aerial ladder truck in reserve, 3
personnel, reserve personnel
1 Engine, , reserve personnel
Engine (1500 gpm) with three personnel,
Reserve engine (1500 gpm) unstaffed,
Wildland engine (5 gpm, 4-wd) crossstaffed with the 3 personnel from the engine
Fire water system including water tank, fire
hydrants and pumps, foam concentrate tank,
foam discharge system, fire detection
system, flammable gases detectors
Fire extinguishers
5.11-2
Sorbent boom; sorbent pads, empty sand bags, rakes, shovels,

pitch forks, 6 SCBAs; fire fighting turnouts, tri-monitors, fire
extinguishers, portable tanks, gas or diesel trash pumps;
emergency response (ER) trailer; ER suitcase; pickup truck,
foremans vehicle, cell phones, radio base station
Radio base station; half-ton truck w/radio; two ton trucks
w/radio & cell phone 15 ton stinger w/radio; 15 ton stagecrane truck, utility truck; two half-ton trucks; three -ton
trucks, two-wheel gas trailer; two-wheel grease trailer
Draft EIR
Table 5.11.1
Fire Station/
Facility
Facilities in the Area with Fire Fighting and Emergency Response Capabilities
Address
Distance
Miles1
Fire-fighting Equipment/Personnel
13. Orcutt Pump

Station and field
201 South
Broadway,
Orcutt
16
14. Santa Maria

Pump Station
1580 Battles Rd.

Santa Maria
23
400 gallon foam system 2

200 gallons of foam in storage 2
Fire water tank, 364,000 gal
Fire detection system with audio alarm
Fire hydrants
Manually activated foam discharge outlets
15. Vandenberg
Air Force Base
Fire Department
Multiple locations
4-10
5 Type 1 engines and 1 truck company at 3

locations
1 Hazmat squad
5 Airport crash/fire/rescue companies
3 Water Tenders
1 hand crew and 1 truck company (6
locations)
Emergency or Spill Response Capabilities

plastic trash bags, excelsior, solvent, brooms, bales, various
hand tools; assorted pipe plugs, clamps, fittings; pipe cutters,
pipe tape, primer, coat line pipe; 3-in-1 gas analyzer, H2S
analyzers; air compressors; two-wheel air compressor trailer
Sieve nets, plastic buckets with lids, aquarium-type air pumps
with associated plastic tubing, gang valves, air stones, and
batteries; fiberglass/plywood storage box; three 1-ton trucks;
three -ton trucks; two 2.5-ton A-frames; hydro crane; two
2-wheel air compressors; half-ton truck
Response Trailer4:
23 lengths boom; 6 bundles sorbent pads; 1 roll excelsior
with net; dip nets with handles, 7 metal stakes; 2 steel
culverts, 10 pairs waders, wader suspenders, 1 portable tank
(600 gallon), shovels, rakes, gloves; 4 trailer-mounted
portable lights, 6 respirators; 4 radios and radio base station
Storage Container4:
Rubber boots, Tyvec Suits, XC rain suits, flotation vests,
work vests, garbage cans, utility brushes, fence posts, rakes,
shovels, brooms, tarps, fencing, plastic swimming pools,
spool 1 rope, waders, wheelbarrows; can liners,
Sol-vex and examination gloves, protective goggles
roll sorbent pad SPC 150, 500 ft. Minimax 17 boom
Source:PXP, 2005a; Santa Barbara County Fire Department; City of Lompoc Fire Department; City of Santa Maria Fire Department; Unocap Emergency Response Plan, May
2000.
gpm gallons per minute
1.
The distance shown is from a fire station/response facility to the LOGP facility.
2.
Specialized Oil Fire Fighting Equipment.
3.
Denotes the equipment that might be on a delayed response.
4.
The full list of contents can be found in UNOCAP Sisquoc to Santa Maria Station & Point Pedernales LOGP to Orcutt Pump Station Emergency Response Plan, Revised
May 1, 2000.
October 2006
5.11-3
Draft EIR
5.11.1.2
Fire Protection Capabilities at the LOGP
The LOGP has a Fire Protection Plan approved by the Santa Barbara County Fire Department
(SBCFD). The LOGP is designed with fire prevention as a prime concern using concepts such as
early ignition detection and fire spread prevention at the basis of the design. The Fire Protection
System is shown in Figure 5.11-2 on the plant plot plan. Sources of open flame are grouped
together and segregated from areas with potentially flammable materials. The electrical
installation was designed to conform to the National Electric Code (NEC) and National Fire
Protection Agency (NFPA) requirements. Potential ignition sources include the heater treaters,
thermal oxidizer, reclaim heater, glycol heater, flare, and occasional vehicles traveling through
the facility. A network of fire and flammable gas detectors located throughout the plant enhances
early fire detection.
Spills and leaks of chemicals, oil and other hydrocarbon materials are cleaned up as soon as
reasonably possible after they are detected. Almost all of the LOGP facility is subject to the SBC
Air Pollution Control District Fugitive Hydrocarbon Inspection and Maintenance Program,
which requires the timely repair of leaking components. Oil and chemical soaked rags are kept in
suitable containers in the facility prior to disposal. Grass and brush within 100 feet of the facility
perimeter is mowed to a height of 6 inches or less.
There is a road immediately adjacent to the LOGP that surrounds the entire facility. Additionally,
there is a road within 1,000 feet of the LOGP that also surrounds the entire facility. Both
roadways are maintained at a minimum of 20-feet wide with paved or all weather surfaces able
to support 20-ton County fire apparatus.
Water is supplied to the LOGP from the existing PXP water system in the Lompoc Field.
Firewater at the LOGP is stored in two water tanks with respective capacities of 210,000 and
420,000 gallons. The tanks are kept full by an automatic level control system. The 210,000gallon tank has a 4-inch National Standard male thread outlet for fire department engine use with
the outlet within 10 feet of the fire engine parking area. The mobile fire equipment includes
twenty-four 20-pound dry chemical extinguishers, seven 10-pound dry chemical extinguishers,
two 5-pound dry chemical extinguishers, one 14-pound Halon extinguisher and one 17-pound
Halon extinguisher, and two portable 150-pound dry chemical extinguishers.
The fire water system includes the water tanks, foam system, pumps, valving, fire monitors and
detectors, hose reels, and fire hydrants and is shown in Figure 5.11-2. Two fire pumps with
diesel engines are designed to deliver 2500 gallons per minute (gpm) each at 150 Pounds per
square inch (psi). The fire pumps and pump controllers comply with all requirements of NFPA
Standard 20. The fire system water mains comply with all requirements of NFPA Standard 24.
All the valves meet NFPA Standards 22 and 24 requirements and are UL listed. The fire hydrants
are UL listed and installed in accordance with NFPA Standard 24. All of the fire monitors have
approved adjustable fog nozzles attached. All of the monitors and hose reels have foam
capability.
The control room is part of the main office structure. A loss of power to the control room results
in the automatic shutdown of the entire facility. The control room is equipped with a smoke
detection system that will initiate facility shutdown. Facility shutdown can also be initiated by
October 2006
5.11-4
Draft EIR
flame or gas detection. Windows and frames on the plant side of the control building are
explosion-resistant.
All of the bermed or diked areas hold at least 1 1/2 times the volume of the largest vessel or tank
within the dike/berm. To prevent fire from spreading, the areas are sloped to prevent spills from
pooling around or under any vessel or tank. All onsite drainage is collected in either the berm
around the 100,000 barrels (bbl) oil surge tank or the retention basin, which is located away from
the process equipment to the south of the facility.
The fire protection system is designed for a worst-case release from the largest vessel, which is
the oil surge tank with 100,000 bbls capacity and 134 feet in diameter, and subsequent fire. The
oil surge tank is protected by a fixed foam system as shown on Figure 5.11-2. There are three
foam chambers mounted on the tank. A header is installed outside the bermed area to control the
foam application. There is a 3,000-gallon atmospheric foam concentrate tank that is kept 1/3 full
of foam concentrate. The concentrate is pumped into a distribution loop, which parallels the
water mains. There is a light water pressure control valve and proportioner at each monitor,
hose reel and the surge tank foam system. The concentrate pumps are run by an electric motor.
Both pumps are a part of the emergency power system. The foam system, including foam pumps,
tank, piping, proportioners, and applicators comply with NFPA Standard 11. An additional 1,200
gallons of foam concentrate is stored in 55-gallon drums.
The incoming and outgoing oil and gas pipelines are equipped with automatic shutdown valves.
These valves will close in the event of high vessel pressure or high levels. The valves also can be
closed by activating the emergency shutdown system in the control room or in the plant. The
incoming oil line automatic valve is located downstream of the first oil/water separator. Each
vessel, tank, and pump is equipped with manual valves, which will isolate individual pieces of
equipment.
The emergency power generator is equipped with both manual and automatic startup,
synchronizing, and shutdown. These functions are provided by a switchgear, which feeds the
essential loads of the facility including flammable gas detectors, the H2S detectors, and the flame
detectors. Essential loads also include the facilitys leak detection August Control System, power
to the control building, power to the instrument air, and the electrical panel for the diesel
firewater pumps.
PXP holds monthly safety meetings at each work site that include fire prevention. The LOGP
also has periodic unannounced fire drills to ensure that the employees know their area of
responsibility in the event of a fire. In the event of a small fire, employees will attempt to
extinguish it using fire extinguishers and/or hose reels. In the event of a major fire, employees
will activate the emergency system shutdown, with subsequent initiation of the ERP. It should be
noted that since 19921 there has not been a fire event at the LOGP that was connected to the
equipment failure or leaks. The only one recorded fire event at the LOGP was a grass brush fire
outside the facility fence.
The LOGP facility is required to operate according to the safety rules contained in the PXP
Safety Inspection, Maintenance and Quality Assurance Program (SIMQAP), as defined by the
1
The SBCFD database goes back only to 1992.
October 2006
5.11-5
Draft EIR
Point Pedernales Project Final Development Plan (FDP) Conditions. This program covers the
LOGP, the three pipelines connecting the LOGP to Platform Irene, and the sales gas pipeline,
and is required to be implemented during construction and operations.
The program is a dynamic document that is required to be regularly updated for new procedures,
safety and maintenance technologies and processes, and then reviewed and approved by the
Countys Systems Safety and Reliability Review Committee (SSRRC), which includes the
SBCFD.
5.11.1.3
Fire Protection at Platform Irene
Figures 5.11-3a and 5.11-3b show the main fire protection equipment on both decks of the
platform. This equipment includes fire and smoke/heat detectors, fire monitors, combustible gas
detectors, fire alarms and alarm pulls, fire extinguishers, hose reels, and breathing apparatus
systems. Foam concentrate is stored in a 300-gallon tank. Foam can be delivered to hose reels,
spraying systems, and to sprinklers, which are strategically located throughout the platform.
Water to the foam system can be supplied by two electrical firewater pumps or by a new vertical
turbine pump with a diesel engine. All three pumps use seawater. In addition, the two electrical
firewater pumps can also utilize water from the 8-inch produced water return pipeline.
Because of the specifics of the offshore location, personnel are instructed to evacuate in case of
any major emergency including a large fire. Survival capsules are provided for these types of
emergencies.
5.11.1.4
Fire Protection at Orcutt Pump Station
The entire Orcutt Pump Station, including all pumps, sumps, equipment and aboveground piping,
is curbed, guttered, and sloped so that any oil spilled will drain into a large pit. The magnitude of
a spill that could occur from a leak at the pump station is approximately 160 bbls (UNOCAP
ERP, 2000), given the pump station flowrate, oil volumes contained in station piping, leak
detection system recognition and response times, and valve closure time (approximately 50
seconds).
Fire water for the pump station is supplied by the water district. The fire system includes 250gallons of fire foam, a foam proportionator, a 1,000-gpm fire pump, a diesel emergency power
generator, and several strategically located foam monitors, fire hoses and hydrants. The single oil
storage tank (23,000 bbls) located at the pump station has sufficient secondary containment and
is equipped with three foam injectors, each with a foam maker.
Risk analysis of the pump station has concluded (UNOCAP ERP, 2000) that the impacts from
accidents such as a fire or oil spill would be limited to the facility itself. The pump station safe
operation is maintained through ConocoPhillips SIMQAP that is updated on a regular basis in
the same fashion as the LOGP SIMQAP.
5.11.1.5
Emergency Response
PXP and ConocoPhillips have implemented a three-tier emergency response organization

following the Incident Command approach (see Table 5.11.2). PXPs Incident Commander (IC)
will be the first PXP employee at the scene of an emergency incident and will take command
October 2006
5.11-6
Draft EIR
until relieved by a more senior company employee. After conducting preliminary reconnaissance
and reporting the situation to the IC, the first level of response will be mobilized by activating
the Immediate Response Team. The team made up of PXP employees will be the first to respond
to any incident, regardless of size. For minor incidents, this Level One response will likely be
sufficient. The Point Pedernales onshore pipeline and facility personnel can field two shifts of
the Immediate Response Team with the assistance of the District personnel. In the event of any
emergency, including an oil spill at Platform Irene, the Clean Seas organization will also be
among the first responders. ConocoPhillips would follow the same approach at its facilities. This
approach is detailed in the UNOCAP Sisquoc Pipeline and Point Pedernales Pipeline Project
Emergency Response Plan (PXP ERP 2004, with minor updates in May and August 2005).
The second level of response would be used when the magnitude of the incident or its impacts
indicate the need for additional personnel. In a Level Two response, the District Sustained
Response Team will augment the response with members drawn from the PXP or Conoco
Phillips Santa Maria District employees.
The third level of response is initiated when the size of the incident dictates the need for a major
sustained response effort. In a Level Three response, the Unified Command would be mobilized.
This team is made up of specialists and specifically trained employees from various State and
County agencies and contract companies.
The organization and resources available for each level of response are described in detail in the
Lompoc Oil and Gas Plant Emergency Response Plan (LOGP ERP) revised by PXP in
December, 2004 with minor updates in May and August of 2005, and in the UNOCAP ERP. The
Oil Spill Response Plan developed for Platform Irene (November 2004) details the oil spill
response at the platform and includes available company and outside resources. In the event that
emergency assistance is needed, PXP has formal relationships with other firms and organizations
in the local petroleum industry.
The SBC Area Oil and Gas Industry Emergency Response Plan (P-4 Plan) may be activated
during an emergency that involves more than one onshore facility or involves offsite impacts to
or threatens the public, livestock, property, or the environment. The P-4 Plan would be activated
when the required response to an emergency incident is beyond the capabilities of the
responsible company to mitigate effectively. The P-4 Plan may also be activated at any time that
industry-mutual assistance is required. Mutual aid would be requested via the agreed upon P-4
mutual aid agreement.
The P-4 Plan is to be used by industry in coordinating its response, sharing resources, and
functioning within the governmental command system present at an incident. It is activated at the
discretion of the company or Agency Unified Command in command of emergency response
activities. PXP and ConocoPhillips are members of Clean Seas and can call upon that
organizations resources to assist in the clean up of a spill. If an oil spill were to occur at
Platform Irene or offshore pipelines or at the Santa Ynez River at a time when there is enough
flow to carry oil toward the ocean, assistance would be sought from Clean Seas for containment
and cleanup operations. Other petroleum companies with emergency response capabilities
operating in the Santa Maria Basin can also be called upon if assistance is needed.
October 2006
5.11-7
Draft EIR
Table 5.11.2
Level of
Emergency
1. Initial Response
Minor On-Site
Incident
Level of Emergency Classification
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
2. Sustained
Response On-Site
Incident
3. Major Incident
with Public
Exposure Potential
(off site impacts)
8.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Criteria
Oil spill or produced water spill >1 bbl outside secondary containment
designated for that vessel, system or pipeline, or >5 bbl inside
secondary containment designated for that vessel, system or pipeline,
unless it impacts or potentially impacts state or marine waters, in
which case go to level 3.
Two combustible gas or fire eye alarms.
Verified high level combustible gas (50% LEL) alarm.
Single held detector with a LEL reading >50%.
Smoke investigation.
Fire reported out.
Hazardous material release outside secondary containment designed
for that vessel, system or pipeline.
Bomb or extortion threat.
Oil or produced water spill >5 bbls, unless it impacts or potentially
impacts state or marine waters, in which case go to level 3.
Any toxic gas release >10 ppm by fixed or hand-held monitor.
More than two combustible gas or fire eye alarms.
Fire.
Hazardous materials release requiring hazardous materials emergency
response from emergency rescue personnel or contractors.
Sour gas in sales line.
Earthquake or flooding damages.
Activation of Emergency Shutdown for plant and/or pipeline.
Oil spill or produced water spill impacting or potentially impacting
State or marine waters, or threatened release of oil or produced water
impacting or potentially impacting state or marine waters.
Fire with potential for spreading.
Explosion.
Hazardous materials release or gas leak with off-site potential.
Civil disturbance.
State of War.
Highway 101 closure or impact on other significant access routes or
roads.
Typical Fire
Incident Commander (IC) Dept Response
Highest ranking on-duty
One Engine
operations person until
Code 2
relieved by Fire Department


and potentially:
Responsible party
Sheriffs Department
CHP
Federal On-Scene Coordinator
State On-Scene Coordinator
Notification
9-1-1 and the
facility
notification
1st alarm
3 engines,
Chief Officer
Code 3
9-1-1;
Off duty
personnel;
Community
notification;
Agency
notification
as required
2nd alarm or
greater,
additional
engines and/or
specialized
equipment/
resources
2 Chief Officers
9-1-1;
Off duty
personnel;
Community
notification;
Agency
notification
as required
Source: PXP, 2005b. See Guidance Matrix below for terms definitions.
October 2006
5.11-8
Draft EIR
Table 5.11.2
Level of Emergency Classification
Guidance Matrix for Emergency Incident Transition Definition of Terms

These definitions are provided to define terminology in the guidance matrix for emergency Incident Transition (matrix).
Combustible gas. A gas that burns, including the fuel gases, hydrogen, hydrocarbon, carbon monoxide, or a mixture of these.
Emergency rescue personnel. Any public employee, including but not limited to any fireman, firefighter, or emergency rescue personnel, or personnel of a local
EMS agency or poison control center, who responds to any condition caused, in whole or in part, by a hazardous material that jeopardizes, or could jeopardize public
health or safety or the environment.
Hazardous material. Any material that, because of its quantity, concentration, or physical or chemical characteristics poses a significant present or potential hazard
to human health and safety or to the environment if released into the workplace or the environment. Hazardous materials include, but are not limited to, hazardous
substances, hazardous waste, and any material which a handler or the administering agency has a reasonable basis for believing that it would be injurious to the health
and safety of persons or harmful to the environment if released into the workplace or the environment.
Hazardous material emergency response. Includes, but not limited to, assessment, isolation, stabilization, containment, removal, evacuation, neutralization,
transportation, rescue procedures, or other activities necessary to ensure the public safety during a hazardous materials emergency.
Marine waters. Those waters subject to tidal influence.
Oil. Any kind of petroleum, liquid hydrocarbons, or petroleum products or any fraction or residues therefrom, including but not limited to, crude oil, bunker fuel,
gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation fuel, oil sludge, oil refuse, oil mixed with waste, and liquid distillates from unprocessed natural gas.
Oil spill. Any release of oil or produced water.
Potential release. Threatened release.
Produced water. The water remaining after being separated through oil and gas processing.
Release. Any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment.
Secondary containment. Containment designated for that vessel, system, or pipeline.
Sour gas. Natural gas that contains corrosive, sulfur bearing compounds, such as hydrogen sulfide (H2S) and mercaptans.
Threatened release. A condition creating a probability of harm, when the probability and potential extent of harm make it reasonably necessary to take immediate
action to prevent, reduce, or mitigate damages to persons, property, or the environment.
Toxic gas. Gases which are extremely hazardous and may be fatal if inhaled or absorbed through skin.
Waters of the state. Any surface water or groundwater, including saline waters, within the boundaries of the state.
October 2006
5.11-9
Draft EIR
5.11.2 Regulatory Setting

There are numerous codes and standards that apply to fire protection and emergency response for
facilities such as the ones affected by the proposed projects. The applicable rules and regulations
are listed in Table 5.11.3. Fire protection systems associated with the project must be detailed in
the fire protection plan and include systems and design that ensures compliance to a range of
codes and standards. These are specified by the NFPA, American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI), American Petroleum Institute (API), SBCFD Criteria and
Guidelines, and the Uniform Fire Code (UFC).
Table 5.11.3
Project Applicable Standards and Codes
Code/Standard
ANSI B31.4
API RP 500
API Pub 2004
API Pub 2510
API Pub 2510A
IRI IM.2.5.2
NFPA Standard 11
NFPA Standard 15
NFPA Standard 22
NFPA Standard 24
NFPA Standard 25
NFPA Standard 30
NFPA Standard 58
NFPA Standard 70
SBC Code Chapter 15
SBC Permit Conditions
SBC Public Works
Engineering Design Standards
SBCFD Standard 2A
SBCFD Standard 3
SBCFD Standard 6
SBCFD Standard 7
SBCFD
UFC Article 02, Division II
UFC Article 04
UFC Article 09
UFC Article 10
UFC Article 11
UFC Article 12
UFC Article 13
UFC Article 14
UFC Article 49
UFC Article 79
UFC Article 80
UFC Article 85
October 2006
Description
Liquid Petroleum Transportation Piping Systems
Classification of Hazardous Areas in Petroleum Pipeline Facilities
Inspection for Fire Protection
Design and Construction of LPG Installations
Fire-Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of LPG Storage
Facilities
Plant Layout and Spacing for Oil and Chemical Plants
Low Expansion Foam and Combined Agent Systems
Water Spray Fixed Systems
Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection
Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances
Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems
Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
Standard for the Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases
National Electric Code
Amendments to the UFC
Various
Roadways
Fire Protection Water Regulations Flows and Hydrant Spacing
Fire Protection Hazard Area Requirements
Hazardous Materials Conditions
Alarms & Signaling Systems
Evacuation Near Flammable or Combustible Pipeline
Special Procedures
Permitting
Definitions and Abbreviations
Fire Protection
General Precautions Against Fire
Maintenance of Exits and Occupant Load Control
Smoking
Fire Alarm Systems
Welding and Cutting
Flammable and Combustible Liquids
Hazardous Materials
Electrical Systems
5.11-10
Draft EIR
IRI Guideline 17 indicates that fire water supplies should be capable of supplying at least 500
gallons per minute for 4 hours for pumping stations (IRI 17.3.3) and 3,000 gallons per minute for
4 hours to all areas of an oil storage terminal (IRI 17.3.4). These total a supply of 120,000 to
720,000 gallons of water.
Foam is frequently used in combination with the cooling water to extinguish fires associated with
crude oil storage tanks. Foam can be applied to a liquid spill to suffocate a fire or prevent
ignition of the flammable material spill. NFPA Standard 11 is applicable to foam application for
protection of outdoor vertical atmospheric storage tanks containing flammable and combustible
liquids by means of fixed foam discharge outlets. It specifies that application rates of foam
should be at least 0.1 gpm/ft2 of liquid surface area of the fixed-roof tank to be protected. NFPA
11 also states that for extinguishing crude petroleum fixed-roof storage tank fires, the adequate
foam supply should last 30 to 55 minutes, depending on the type of foam outlet (NFPA 11, 3-3).
For floating roof storage tanks, the adequate foam supply should last for at least 20 minutes with
an application rate of 0.3 gpm. For dike fires, NFPA requires a foam supply with a minimum
discharge rate of 0.16 gpm/ft2 (for foam monitors) and minimum discharge time of 30 minutes
for Class I hydrocarbons fires (NFPA 11, 3-7). Minimum foam application rate and discharge
time for non-diked spill for adequate fire protection are 0.10 gpm/ft2 and 15 minutes,
respectively.
Safe equipment spacing requirements for petrochemical plants are given in IRI Guidelines
IM2.5.2, NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, and Standard 30. Specific requirements for spacing of
the vessels containing pressurized LPG are given in the API standard 2510. The applicable
requirements to the proposed project spacing are summarized in Table 5.11.4.
IRI IM2.5.2 also gives guidelines for the overall oil and chemical plants layout. The most
important of these include the following:
There should be at least two entrances to the plant;
The overall site should be subdivided into general areas (blocks) with a maximum size of 300 feet x
600 feet;
Table 5.11.4 a-e
Applicable NFPA, API and IRI Equipment Spacing Requirements
200
350
350
*
*
Atmospheric Storage
Tanks
300
350
350
Pressure Storage
Tanks
50
300
350
250
Process Units High

Hazard
50
400
350
250
Fire Water
Pumps
50
200
200
200
200
350
250
Control
Rooms
300
300
300
300
300
400
300
Service
Buildings
Flares
Loading Racks
Service Buildings
Control Rooms
Fire Water Pumps
Process Units High Hazard
Pressure Storage Tanks
Atmospheric Storage Tanks
Loading
Racks
Flares
a. Inter-Unit Spacing Requirements (feet)
- = there is no spacing requirement

* = see table C (Storage Tanks Spacing Requirements)
October 2006
5.11-11
Draft EIR
5
50
50
Analyzer rooms
5
15
50
50
Emergency controls
25
50
50
50
50
High Hazard Pumps
50
10
15
50
50
Heat Exchanges
30
50
50
30
30
50
50
Fired Heaters
Compressors
Pipe racks
Fired Heaters
Heat Exchanges
High Hazard Pumps
Emergency controls
Analyzer rooms
Pipe racks
Compressors
b. Intra-Unit Spacing Requirements (feet)
0.5 D
D
1.5 D
100 min.
1.5 D
100 min.
Pressure Storage vessels

Drums and Bullets
Floating Roof Tanks

3,000<C<10,000 bbls
Floating Roof Tanks
10,000<C<300,000 bbls
Pressure Storage vessels
Drums and Bullets
Floating Roof Tanks

10,000<C<300,000 bbls
Floating Roof Tanks

3,000<C<10,000 bbls
c. Storage Tanks Spacing Requirements (feet)
Source: IRI, 1993 to 1995, IM2.5.2.

C = tank capacity; D = tank diameter
d. Atmospheric Storage Tanks Spacing Requirements

Between Adjacent Tanks (Shell-to-Shell)
From Property Line that Is or Can be Built
Upon, Including the Opposite Side of a Public
Way With Protection for Exposures
From Property Line that Is or Can be Built
Upon, Including the Opposite Side of a Public
Way No Protection for Exposures
From Nearest Side of any Public Way or from
Nearest Important Building on the Same
Property
Required Distance (feet)

1/6 sum of adjacent tank
diameters but not less than 3 feet
times diameter of tank or 175
feet for tanks over 3,000,000 gal
(72,000 bbls) capacity
Diameter of tank but need not to
exceed 175 feet but no less than 5
feet
1/6 times diameter of tank but no
less than 5 feet or 60 feet for
tanks over 3,000,000 gal capacity
Source: NFPA, 2000.
October 2006
5.11-12
Draft EIR
e. Pressurized LPG Tanks Spacing Requirements

Between Adjacent Tanks (Shell-to-Shell)
Adjoining Property Line
Control buildings
Other buildings
Process vessels
Flares and other equipment with open flames
Fired equipment including process furnaces
Rotating equipment,
except pumps taking suction from LPG tanks
Loading facilities
Required Distance (feet)

5 feet or of larger tank diameter
75 feet (for 30,000-70,000 gallon tanks)
50 feet
100 feet
50 feet
100 feet
50 feet
50 feet
10 feet
50 feet
Source: API, 1995.
Access roadways should be provided between the blocks to allow access to each block from at least
two directions; and
Road widths and clearances should be sized to handle large moving equipment and emergency
vehicles.
5.11.3 Significance Criteria

The SBCs Environmental Thresholds and Guidelines Manual (as updated through October
2006) does not contain any significance criteria for fire protection or emergency response as a
separate issue area. Therefore, a set of criteria has been developed, with input from the SBCFD,
against which the significance of the proposed project impacts to fire or other emergency
protection can be judged. This document evaluates fire protection impacts for two general major
areas: the general adequacy and design of onsite fire protection systems and the general
adequacy of emergency response capabilities. By examining these two areas, the following
significance criteria were developed. The proposed project would be considered to have a
significant impact in the fire protection and emergency response area if:
The project site does not contain adequate fire water and/or fire foam supplies to meet the
recommended NFPA Standards and the IRI guidelines.
The project equipment layout does not meet the API, NFPA, and IRI recommendations for equipment
spacing (see Table 5.11.4).
The project facilities do not have sufficient capabilities in early fire detection and fire spread
prevention as per the NFPA requirements.
The project site is located more than 10 miles (15 minutes) from an emergency response location with
both hazmat (spill response) or fire fighting capabilities (i.e., a fire station or facility with fire fighting
and emergency response capabilities), accessibility to the site is difficult or limited, and the site does
not have an adequately developed emergency response plan.
5.11.4 Impact Analysis for the Proposed Project

This section characterizes the fire protection and emergency response impacts generated by the
proposed project. Modifications of equipment and operations at Orcutt, Santa Maria, and Sisquoc
October 2006
5.11-13
Draft EIR
Pump Stations are minor and could be handled within the requirements of the ConocoPhillips
SIMQAP, therefore these changes are not expected to have any impact on the fire protection or
emergency response.
Impact #
Fire.1
Impact Description
Due to equipment modifications at Valve Site #2 the
increased potential for upset conditions at the site could
create impacts to fire protection and emergency response
resources.
Phase
Operations
Residual
Impact
Class III
Installation of three new pumps on the emulsion pipeline at Valve Site #2 is not expected to
significantly increase the risk of fire or oil spills. All appropriate fire and oil spill prevention
measures would be undertaken by PXP during the installation as well as during the new
operations, as required in the LOGP SIMQAP, which covers Valve Site #2 and the pipelines
from Platform Irene.
Valve Site #2 can be accessed by emergency personnel and equipment within 15 minutes.
Operation of the new pumps at Valve Site #2 would increase the probability of an oil spill at this
location (see Section 5.1, Risk of Upset/Hazardous Materials). This increase in the probability of
an oil spill would represent an increase in the demands on emergency response services. PXP is
required by the Point Pedernales Final Development Plan (FDP) and LOGP Safety Inspection,
Maintenance and Quality Assurance Program (SIMQAP) to follow a number of measures that
would serve to reduce the impacts of the proposed projects, and therefore decrease the demands
on the emergency response services. These measures include remote controls for the pumps to
allow for automatic shutdown in response to various malfunctions (e.g., high vibration, low
suction pressure, high and low discharge pressure, high bearing and case temperatures, low and
high voltage, and overload). Given the high water content of the produced oil in the emulsion
pipeline, fire is not expected to be an issue in the event of an oil spill.
Because there are sufficient resources to respond to an upset condition and these resources are
located within 15 minutes response time from the valve site, and the likelihood of a fire is low;
the impacts to fire protection and emergency response from the installation of the new pumps at
Valve Site #2 are considered adverse but not significant.
Mitigation Measure
As with any major equipment and operation changes at oil and gas facilities, it is necessary to
alter the fire protection, oil spill, and emergency response plans if the changes affect the contents
of the plans. Therefore the following mitigation measure is required to mitigate the impact to the
maximum extent feasible in accordance with Santa Barbara County (SBC) policies:
Fire-1
October 2006
PXP shall review and revise the Fire Protection Plan, Emergency Response Plan, and
Oil Spill Response Plan that apply to all the facilities which will have equipment or
operations modifications due to the proposed project. The plans shall be submitted to
the SBC Fire Department and P&D for review and approval prior to land use
clearance.
5.11-14
Draft EIR
Residual Impact
Impact Fire.1 is considered adverse but not significant (Class III).
Impact #
Impact Description
Phase
Fire.2
Operation of the new power line to Valve Site #2 could result

in impacts to fire protection and emergency response resources
due to addition of an ignition source into a high fire hazard
area.
Operations
Residual
Impact
Class III
Overhead power lines always pose a fire risk when, during severe wind conditions, a line could
break, fall, and cause a brush fire. The Harris Grade fire that burned 9,700 acres in 2000 was
caused by a spark from a Torch power pole line in the Lompoc Field, which ignited brush under
the pole. Probability of this type of fire could be minimized by clearing vegetation in the vicinity
of the power lines.
Another possible fire from a power line could occur when a pole is impacted by a vehicle,
causing a line break that causes a fire. All of the power poles would be cemented in the ground
and would meet all the design requirements of PG&E regarding exposure to wind. The location
of the power poles would be in a remote area on VAFB that is not subject to high levels of
traffic, which minimizes the likelihood of a vehicle impacting a power pole.
Because of the low likelihood of fire, adequate response capabilities, and adequate response
time, the impacts to fire protection and emergency response resources are considered to be
adverse but not significant.
Mitigation Measure
As with Impact Fire.1, the existing LOGP Fire Protection Plan must be revised to reflect changes
in the project operations. Therefore, the following measure is recommended to mitigate this
impact to the maximum extent feasible in accordance with SBC policies.
Fire-2
The applicant shall update the LOGP Fire Protection Plan to include the power line, in
particular, the Flammable Vegetation Management part of the plan, to minimize
possibility of a brush fire. The applicant shall submit the updated Fire Protection Plan
to SBC Fire Department for review and approval prior to land use clearance.
Residual Impact
Impact #
Fire.3
Impact Description
Increased risk of upset due to increased oil flow rates
through the project pipelines and pipeline facilities
could create impacts to fire protection and emergency
response resources.
Phase
Increased Throughput
Extension of Life
Residual
Impact
Class III
Increased flow rates would increase spill volumes by 114 barrels (bbls). In the worst-case
scenario, rates would increase by 688 bbls, if the SCADA system is not operational (see Section
5.1, Risk of Upset/Hazardous Materials) over current operations, which could result in a larger
October 2006
5.11-15
Draft EIR
area being impacted as a result of a spill. This rate increase could increase the size of the area
that the emergency responders would have to manage. However, the change in spill volumes is
relatively small (3.6 to 10.9 percent), and response capabilities are currently available for spill
volumes that could occur with the proposed project. The increase in spill volume above baseline
volumes would not necessitate increasing the response capabilities in the region. Given the
nature of the crude oil (high water content), it is highly unlikely that a fire would result in the
event of a spill (see Section 5.1, Risk of Upset/Hazardous Materials). The Point Pedernales
Project facilities originally have been designed to handle flowrates higher than expected with the
proposed projects flowrates. The existing facilities Fire Protection and Emergency Response
Plans have been developed for flowrates up to 36,000 barrels per day (bpd) of dry oil; therefore
these plans would be applicable for the expected increase in flow rates. However, the Orcutt
Pump Station is limited by the SBCAPCD PTO 7511 to a throughput of 9,125,000 bbls per year
(which averages 25,000 bpd). If the crude oil flow rate through the pump station is increased,
ConocoPhillips SIMQAP would have to be updated as required to reflect the operation,
maintenance, or safety changes.
With the proposed project, the expected life of the Point Pedernales facilities would be extended,
thereby extending the need to maintain the required fire protection and emergency response
capabilities for these facilities; however, the pipeline facilities represent only a very small
portion of the local response services scope of work. The response services are funded by PXP to
provide the services, and this funding would continue if the facilities life term is extended.
Extension of life of the PXP pipelines is therefore viewed as not significant. Because of the low
likelihood of fire, adequate response capabilities and response time, the impacts associated with
the increased throughput and extension of life are considered to be adverse but not significant.
Mitigation Measures
No mitigation measure has been identified.
Residual Impact
Impact #
Impact Description
Phase
Fire.4
Increased likelihood of upset conditions due to equipment

modifications at the LOGP and potential increase of wet
oil and sour gas quantities processed at the facility could
create impacts to fire protection and emergency response.
Operations
Increased Throughput
Extension of Life
Residual
Impact
Class III
The LOGP facility has a fire detection system that is designed to detect flame sources early. The
major vessels and equipment spacing satisfies the applicable requirements.
The grading under the LPG/NGL vessels is sufficiently sloped towards the retention basin
outside the southern boundary of the facility to prevent liquid pooling under the vessels. Other
storage tanks, vessels, and equipment are provided with secondary containment dikes to prevent
fire spreading to other areas of the facility.
The LOGP facility is within the required response time (less than 15 minutes) from several fire
stations: Lompoc Station No. 51 (SBC) and City of Lompoc Stations No.1 and No.2. Combined
October 2006
5.11-16
Draft EIR
with the resources onsite, these fire stations have sufficient fire fighting and emergency response
capabilities. The facility has an emergency response plan that is approved by and coordinated
with the SBCFD. The site has good access for the fire and other emergency vehicles.
The LOGP facility has a sufficient supply of water and foam for fire fighting purposes, which
was determined in the Torch Fire Protection Plan for LOGP (May 1998 revision) and updated by
PXP in March 2005.
Equipment spacing at the LOGP facility satisfies the American Petroleum Institute (API),
National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA), and Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI) recommendations.
The most important or hazardous equipment and the applicable distances are listed in Table
5.11.5. This table shows that the facility satisfies the applicable spacing requirements.
Table 5.11.5
Equipment or
Vessel
Oil Storage Tank
100,000 bbls b, c
LPG Storage
Tanks d
Flare a
Firewater Pumps a
Equipment Spacing at the LOGP

Distance from Other Equipment,
feet
200 facility fence-line and any
vessels or equipment
>200 flare,
150 heater treaters
95 LPG loading racks
>300 any buildings at facility
>150 gas processing equipment
>300 LPG loading racks
>300 any equipment
Minimum Required
Distance, feet
175
Requirement
Satisfied?
Yes
100 any open flame

source
50 - loading racks
50 control building
100 other buildings
50 process equipment
300
300 flare
200 - loading racks
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: a, b, c, d letters correspond to the specific tables in Table 5.11.4.
The LOGP facility would continue to require response services for a longer period of time than
projected in the approved Point Pedernales Project. This constitutes an extension of life impact.
However, the response services are funded by PXP to provide response services to the LOGP
and other related facilities. This funding would continue to be provided if the life of the facilities
is extended.
Equipment changes that are connected with the increased oil and gas throughput are minor and
would not have significant impact to the fire protection or emergency response. The LOGP
facility along with its fire protection system was designed to process a maximum of 36,000 bpd
of dry oil, therefore operation at higher oil and gas processing rates would not have a significant
impact on fire protection or emergency response. Also, the facilitys Fire Protection and
Emergency Response Plans were developed for maximum flowrates of 36,000 bpd of dry oil,
therefore these plans would be applicable for the expected increase in oil flow rates. Because of
adequate facility design, sufficient response capabilities and response time the impacts on the fire
protection and emergency response resources for the LOGP facility are considered adverse, but
not significant.
Mitigation Measures
No mitigation measures have been identified.
October 2006
5.11-17
Draft EIR
Residual Impact
Impact Fire.4 is adverse but not significant (Class III).
5.11.5 Impact Analysis for the Alternatives

Detailed descriptions of the various alternatives have been provided in Chapter 3.0. This section
provides a discussion of the fire protection and emergency response impacts of the various
alternatives.
5.11.5.1 No Project Alternative
With the No Project Alternative, Impacts Fire.1 through Fire.4 would not occur because there
would not be changes at Valve Site #2, including installation of a new power line, and no
changes in oil flow rates over current conditions (i.e., baseline).
5.11.5.2 VAFB Onshore Alternative
The VAFB Onshore Alternative would require the construction and operation of a drilling and
production facility on southern VAFB. The onshore drilling and production site would be located
directly west of Space Launch Complex 5 (SLC-5) on southern VAFB. SLC-6 is located south of
Honda Canyon, south of the alternative drilling and production site. The alternative drilling/
production site could impose severe safety considerations on some VAFB operations, especially
during launch windows (see Risk of Upset/Hazardous Materials Section 5.1.5.2). The fire
protection and emergency services impacts are as follows:
Impact Fire.1, Valve Site #2 upset conditions, would not apply to the VAFB Onshore
Alternative. Impact Fire.4, LOGP risk of upset, would be the same as for the proposed project.
Impact Fire.2 - Power Line Operations would introduce risks similar to the proposed project
due to the new power line route from the new substation to the VAFB onshore site. Possible fire
from a power line could occur when a pole is impacted by a vehicle or blown down by high
winds, causing a line break that causes a fire. Such was the case for the December 22, 1977
Honda Canyon fire. This fire, which eventually burned approximately 9,000 acres, injured 65
people and took 4 lives, started when hurricane-force winds blew a power pole and transformer
down in a dry brushy draw on south VAFB near Honda Ridge Road (http://lompoconline.com/
Ron_Fink/fire.html). As a result of this tragedy, significant changes were made in the wild fire
management program at VAFB. In addition to the Santa Barbara County Fire Department, there
are ten other fire agencies providing fire protection within the County of Santa Barbara: Of the
eleven fire protection agencies, only the USDA Forest Service, Santa Barbara County Fire
Department and the VAFB Fire Department have wildland fire protection as part of their primary
mission. Both the USDA Forest Service Los Padres National Forest and the DOD VAFB Fire
Department staff 20-person inter-regional Hotshot handcrews. Hotshot crews are highly
trained and organized wildland firefighting crews that are extremely versatile. Currently, VAFB
Fire Department response capabilities include 5 Type 1 engines and 1 truck company at 3
locations, 1 Hazmat squad, 5 Airport crash/fire/rescue companies, 3 Water Tenders, 1 hand crew
and 1 truck company (6 locations). VAFB also participates with the City of Lompoc in a Mutual
Aid agreement.
As discussed for the proposed project, the risk of fire from overhead power lines could be
minimized by clearing vegetation in the vicinity of the new power lines. All of the power poles
October 2006
5.11-18
Draft EIR
would be secured to cement foundations and would meet all the design requirements of PG&E
regarding exposure to wind. The location of the power poles would be in a remote area on VAFB
that is not subject to high levels of traffic, which minimizes the likelihood of a vehicle impacting
a power pole.
Because of the low likelihood of fire, adequate response capabilities, and adequate response
time, the impacts to fire protection and emergency response resources are considered to be
adverse but not significant (Class III). Mitigation Measures Fire-1 and Fire-2 would apply to
mitigate this impact to the maximum extent feasible in accordance with SBC policies.
Impact Fire.3 - Pipeline Risk of Upset would not occur offshore but would increase onshore.
The new pipelines and drilling/production site associated with this alternative would generate
risks to public safety and Base personnel (see Section 5.1.5.2, Risk of Upset/Hazardous
Materials). In the event of an oil spill, there would need to be emergency response capabilities
similar to what is required for the proposed project. Catchment basins would need to be included
in the pipeline design in accordance with Mitigation Measures OWR-5 and OWR-12. Impact
Fire.3 would stay the same as for the proposed project, adverse but not significant (Class III).
Impact #
Fire.5
Impact Description
Pipeline construction could create short-term impacts to
fire protection and emergency response.
Phase
Construction
Residual
Impact
Class II
Construction of the new onshore pipeline and power line would be short-term and is not
expected to have significant impacts on emergency response resources. The Applicant would be
required to follow all fire and oil spill prevention measures, and other safety precautions required
by regulations for excavation.
The construction of the pipeline would require hot work for welding, which has the potential to
start fires. In addition, movement of the construction equipment could result in sparks that have
the potential to start fires. Although the pipeline construction would occur within high fire
hazard areas, it would be near existing roadways and UPRR right-of-way, reducing the
likelihood of a spark-generated fire and providing adequate emergency response accessibility.
Further, a VAFB fire station is located on Coast Road, in close proximity to alternative facilities.
Mitigation Measures
Fire-3
All construction equipment shall be equipped with the appropriate spark arrestors and
functioning mufflers. PXP shall submit the pipeline construction procedures to the
SBC Fire Department for review and approval prior to land use clearance.
Fire-4
A fire watch with appropriate fire fighting equipment (i.e., hydrants, water truck, etc.)
shall be available at the project site at all times when welding or grinding activities are
taking place. Further, welding or grinding shall not occur when sustained winds
exceed 15-20 mph, as determined by SBC Fire Department, unless an SBC Fire
Department approved wind shield is on site. PXP shall submit the pipeline
construction procedures to the SBC Fire Department for review and approval prior to
land use clearance.
October 2006
5.11-19
Draft EIR
Fire-5
All rubber-tired construction vehicles shall be equipped with appropriate fire fighting
equipment, such as shovels and axes or pulaskis, to aid in the prevention or
containment of fires. PXP shall submit the pipeline construction procedures to the
SBC Fire Department for review and approval prior to land use clearance.
Residual Impact
The residual impact for Impact Fire.5 is considered significant but mitigable (Class II).
5.11.5.3
Casmalia East Oil Field Processing Location
Impacts Fire.1 to Fire.3 would be the same as for the proposed project.
Impact Fire.4 LOGP Upset: The part of Impact Fire.4 that is related to increased throughput
would be eliminated because the processing facilities that pose the greatest risk of upset and
demand for emergency resources would be moved to Casmalia. Because there still would be
pumps and compressors at the LOGP site beyond the currently projected life of the Point
Pedernales facilities, and these remaining facilities would have fire protection and emergency
response requirements, the part of Impact Fire.4 related to extension of life would remain,
though greatly reduced in magnitude.
Impact Fire.5 Construction Risk of Upset: Construction of the Casmalia Alternative pipeline
would be short-term and is not expected to have significant impacts on emergency response
resources. The construction of the pipeline would require hot work for welding, which has the
potential to start fires. In addition, movement of the construction equipment could result in
sparks that have the potential to start fires. Since the pipeline construction would occur within
high fire hazard areas, the impact due to construction is considered significant but mitigable
(Class II) with the implementation of Mitigation Measure Fire-3, Fire-4, and Fire-5.
Impact #
Fire.6
Impact Description
Construction of Casmalia site facilities and dismantling of
the LOGP could create short-term impacts to fire protection
and emergency response.
Phase
Construction
Residual
Impact
Class III
Increased truck traffic involved in materials and equipment deliveries and the removal of refuse
from dismantling of the LOGP could increase the likelihood of road accidents. During the LOGP
dismantling, open-flame cutting (if used) of equipment and piping that were used for oil
processing would increase the likelihood of fire. Open flame work (e.g., welding) at the new
facility site that is located in a high fire hazard area could also increase the likelihood of fire.
Trenching to install new pipelines would increase risk of damaging other hazardous pipelines or
power cables and could result in a fire or explosion. The California Fire Marshal Report on
hazardous liquids pipelines states that third-party damage is one of the leading causes of pipeline
failure (see Section 5.1, Risk of Upset/Hazardous Materials). However, PXP is required to
follow California Code of Regulations, Title 1, Division 5, 4215-4217, regarding notifications
of the Underground Service Alert (USA) prior to beginning excavations, markings of the existing
pipelines in the vicinity of the project site, and other safety measures during excavations.
Dismantling the old facilities is expected to have similar impacts as constructing the new
facilities at Casmalia site. Both constructing and dismantling would be short-term, however. Any
October 2006
5.11-20
Draft EIR
adverse impacts would be mitigated by appropriate construction techniques and safety measures;
therefore, the impact would be adverse but not significant.
Mitigation Measures
Fire-6
For the new facilities, PXP shall follow all appropriate fire protection and safety
measures outlined in the Point Pedernales Project Final Development Plan (FDP),
Systems Safety and Reliability, Part P. PXP shall submit the construction procedures
to the SBC Systems Safety Reliability Review Committee (SSRRC) for review and
approval prior to land use clearance.
Residual Impact
Impact Fire.6 is adverse but not significant (Class III).
Impact #
Impact Description
Phase
Fire.7
Operation of the new oil and gas facility at Casmalia East

site could create long-term impacts to fire protection and
emergency response.
Operations
Extension of Life
Residual
Impact
Class II
Operating the new oil and gas facility at Casmalia site could create significant impacts to the fire
protection or emergency response resources due to the increased demand that an oil and gas
processing facility would have on fire protection services in the southern Orcutt/Santa Maria
area. The facility would generate potential fire hazards due to releases of crude oil, produced gas
and natural gas liquids. The facility would also generate toxic gas hazards due to a potential
release of produced gas or acid gas, which could be generated as part of the produced gas
treatment process.
Under this alternative, the majority of the LOGP facility would be dismantled. However, crude
oil shipping pumps and produced gas compressors would still remain at the site. Therefore, fire
protection and emergency response requirements would still remain at the LOGP site, but they
would be substantially reduced. A new processing facility at Casmalia would shift the primary
emergency response capabilities from the Lompoc area to the Santa Maria area. The new site is
within 8 to 10 miles from the fire stations in Santa Maria, which can provide response to the
Casmalia site within 15 minutes. Fire stations located in Lompoc (17 to 18 miles from the new
site) would serve as secondary response services. The Orcutt/Santa Maria fire stations currently
do not have resources to be the primary responder to an oil and gas processing facility
emergency situation other than fire (e.g., HazMat teams, spill response capabilities).
The new facility would also extend the life of the remaining Point Pedernales facilities. Because
the existing response resources could not provide adequate emergency response to the Casmalia
area, impacts to fire protection and emergency response resources are considered to be
significant.
Mitigation Measures
Mitigation Measure Fire-6 is applicable to operations of the new facilities as well as for
construction. In addition, the following mitigation measures are required.
October 2006
5.11-21
Draft EIR
Fire-7
The new facility shall be designed in accordance with all applicable fire protection and
emergency response standards. The new facility should be designed with all early fire
detection and prevention of fire spread as the basis of the fire safety design. The
facility should have adequate supply of water and oil fire fighting foam as per the
National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) requirements (i.e., Standards 11, 15, 22, 24,
25). The facility layout should provide sufficient access for emergency response
vehicles and provide adequate equipment spacing as per the American Petroleum
Institute (API) and Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI) guidelines (IRI IM 2.5.2). The new
facility should have fire detection monitors positioned in the locations most likely to
be affected by fire. All appropriate equipment such as crude oil storage tanks should
have sufficient secondary containment. Grading under liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
storage vessels should be sloped to allow any spilled flammable liquids to flow
outward from the vessel and into an impoundment area. The applicant shall submit all
appropriate documentation for the new facility to the SSRRC for review and approval
prior to land use clearance
Fire-8
Fire protection, oil spill, and emergency response plans of the new facility shall be
developed or adjusted using the similar LOGP plans and coordinated with the SBC
Fire Department. These plans shall address the fire prevention measures at the facility,
the fire suppression systems, the specific hazards at the facility, and fire and
emergency response training and planning. The Fire Protection, Oil Spill Response,
and Emergency Response Plans shall be submitted to the SBC Fire Department for
review and approval prior to land use clearance.
Fire-9
The facility operators/owners shall provide funding to the SBC Fire Department to
provide adequate staffing and equipment for the Santa Maria Fire Station to address
the emergency response requirements of the Casmalia oil and gas processing facility.
The facility operators/owners shall enter into an agreement with the SBC to provide
the reasonable share of funds for fire protection and emergency response. The
operators/owners shall provide documentation of the monetary deposits into the
appropriate funds prior to land use clearance.
Residual Impact
With incorporation of the measures listed above and Mitigation Measure Fire-3, Impact Fire.7
would be reduced to a less than significant level (Class II).
Impact #
Fire.8
Impact Description
Operation of the sour gas pipeline to the new plant at
Casmalia East site could create long-term impacts to fire
protection and emergency response.
Phase
Operations
Residual
Impact
Class II
This alternative would require that a new sour gas pipeline be built from the LOGP to the
Casmalia oil and gas processing facility. This pipeline would have similar hazard zones to the
sour gas pipeline from Platform Irene to the LOGP. However, the risk to public safety that is
associated with this pipeline would be greater (see Section 5.1, Risk of Upset/Hazardous
Materials). The pipeline would be in close proximity to a number of residences in southern
Orcutt. The pipeline would present both fire and toxic hazards that would place additional
October 2006
5.11-22
Draft EIR
requirements on fire protection and emergency response. For a major portion of this pipeline, the
Santa Maria Fire Station No. 22 would be the primary responder. The Santa Maria fire stations
do not currently have resources to be the primary responder to an oil and gas processing facility
emergency situation (e.g., HazMat teams, oil spill response capabilities) (see Table 5.11.1).
Because the adequate response resources are not available, this impact is considered to be
significant.
Mitigation Measures
Mitigation Measure Fire-9 would apply, along with these additional measures.
Fire-10
The sour gas pipeline shall be equipped with a leak detection system that is capable of
detecting leaks as small as inch. The pipeline shall be equipped with remotely
operated block valves to limit the volume of material release in the event of a leak or
rupture. The applicant shall submit documentation for the pipeline controls design to
the SBC SSRRC for review and approval prior to land use clearance.
Fire-11
The pipeline shall be constructed following all applicable standards for sour gas
pipeline service. The applicant shall submit all pipeline documentation (e.g. route,
materials of construction, operation procedures) to the SBC SSRRC for review and
approval prior to land use clearance.
Mitigation Measure Risk-3 (see Section 5.1, Risk of Upset/Hazardous Materials) requires that
the route of the LOGP-Casmalia pipeline to be not closer than 2,500 feet from southern Orcutt.
Residual Impact
With incorporation of the mitigation measures listed above and Mitigation Measure Risk-3, the
residual impact would be considered less than significant (Class II).
5.11.5.4 Alternative Power Line Routes to Valve Site #2
Impacts Fire.1, Fire.3, and Fire.4 would stay the same as for the proposed project. The
magnitude of Impact Fire.2 would greatly decrease as installation of a portion of the power line
below ground, as opposed to above ground, would eliminate addition of a new ignition source to
a portion of the power line route, which is located in high fire hazard area.
5.11.5.5 Replacement of Oil Emulsion Pipeline from Platform Irene to LOGP
Impacts Fire.1 and Fire.2 would not occur because Valve Site #2 modifications would not be
needed. Impact Fire.4 would be the same as for the proposed project. Impacts Fire.6, Fire.7, and
Fire.8 (Casmalia construction and operations) would not apply to this alternative.
Impact Fire.3 Pipeline Risk of Upset would stay the same as for the proposed project as
discussed below. The replacement pipeline would be designed, maintained and operated using
the LOGP SIMQAP. Since the replacement pipeline would follow the same right-of-way as the
existing pipeline, the same catchment basins would be available to contain spills in the vicinity
of Santa Ynez River. The pipeline valves would use the same valve sites, and the same control
and leak detection system would be in place. The existing pipeline operation has a risk of fire or
oil spill. However, these risks are a part of the baseline for this analysis. The replacement
pipeline would have greater wall thickness and fewer anomalies due to corrosion and erosion,
therefore, the replacement pipeline is expected to have a decreased spill probability (~10
October 2006
5.11-23
Draft EIR
percent). However, the potential spill volume would be the same and in the event of an oil spill
there would still need to be emergency response capabilities similar to what is required for the
proposed project. Therefore, Impact Fire.3 would stay the same as for the proposed project,
adverse but not significant (Class III).
Impact Fire.5 Construction Risk of Upset: Construction of the replacement emulsion pipeline
would be short-term and is not expected to have significant impacts on emergency response
resources. There is a potential of encountering and damaging the existing Point Pedernales
pipelines during excavation; however, the pipelines would not be in operation during
construction. The applicant would be required to follow all fire and oil spill prevention measures
and other safety precautions required by regulations for excavation. This would include draining
the existing pipelines prior to beginning the excavation work for the new pipeline.
The construction of the pipeline would require hot work for welding, which has the potential to
start fires. In addition, movement of the construction equipment could result in sparks that have
the potential to start fires. Since the pipeline construction would occur within high fire hazard
areas, the impact due to construction is considered significant but mitigable (Class II) with the
implementation of Mitigation Measure Fire-3, Fire-4, and Fire-5.
5.11.565 Alternative Drill Muds and Cuttings Disposal
Onshore activities under these alternatives are the same as for the proposed project. Therefore,
Impacts Fire.1 through Fire.4 would be the same as for the proposed project.
5.11.6 Cumulative Impacts

5.11.6.1
Offshore Oil and Gas Projects
Potential offshore oil and gas development projects within the proposed project area could
include the Rocky Point, Lion Rock, Point Sal, Santa Maria, Purisima Point, Bonito and Sword
Units, and Lease OCS-P 0409. The hazardous nature of these facilities would require welldeveloped fire protection and emergency response services. These new oil and gas facilities
could require significant additions to existing response services in the VAFB and Lompoc area;
however, with project-specific requirements such as expanded or new fire protection and
emergency response facilities, services and personnel, cumulative impacts would not be
considered significant. Although the proposed project would prolong the life of the Point
Pedernales Project, and thus its need for such services, with project-specific mitigation measures
for the other potential offshore oil and gas-related projects in the area, its incremental
contribution to cumulative impacts would not be considered significant. The other offshore and
onshore oil and gas development projects discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively, are a
substantial distance away from the proposed project; consequently, no overlap with their related
fire protection and emergency response services would be anticipated to occur.
5.11.6.2
Onshore Projects
The potential onshore development projects discussed in Section 4.4 would put additional strains
on existing fire protection and emergency response services; however, the proposed projects
contribution to this impact is not expected to be significant. The fire protection services in
Lompoc and Santa Maria are adequate to service the onshore developments. In addition, as
October 2006
5.11-24
Draft EIR
presented in Section 4.4, a new County fire station and sheriff substation, to be located near the
intersection of Burton Mesa Boulevard and Harris Grade Road, are currently under review. This
would provide sufficient fire protection capabilities to service the additional onshore
developments in the proposed project area. Therefore, the cumulative impacts on fire protection
and emergency responses resources from the future onshore development would not be expected
to be significant.
5.11.7 Mitigation Monitoring Plan
Mitigation
Measure
Fire-1
Fire-2
Fire-3
(VAFB
Onshore,
Casmalia,
and
Emulsion
Pipeline
Replacement
Alternatives
only)
Fire-4
(VAFB
Onshore,
Casmalia,
and
Emulsion
Pipeline
Replacement
Alternatives
only)
October 2006
Party
Responsible
For
Verification
Method of
Verification
Timing of
Verification
PXP shall review and revise the Fire Protection

Plan, Emergency Response Plan and Oil Spill
Response Plan that apply to all the facilities
which will have equipment or operations
modifications due to the proposed project. The
plans shall be submitted to the SBC Fire
Department and P&D for review and approval
prior to land use clearance.
The applicant shall update the LOGP Fire
Protection Plan to include the power line, in
particular, the Flammable Vegetation
Management, part of the plan to minimize
possibility of a brush fire. The applicant shall
submit the updated Fire Protection Plan to SBC
Fire Department for review and approval prior
to land use clearance.
All construction equipment shall be equipped
with the appropriate spark arrestors and
functioning mufflers. PXP shall submit the
pipeline construction procedures to the SBC Fire
Department for review and approval prior to
land use clearance.
The plans shall

be reviewed
prior to Land
Use clearance.
Compliance
with the plans
shall be
verified by
annual drill
and audit.
SBCFD
Prior to Land
Use clearance.
Compliance
with the Fire
Protection Plan
shall be
verified
through regular
drills.
SBCFD
Prior to Land
Use clearance.
Review during
construction
SBCFD and
EQAP monitor
A fire watch with appropriate fire fighting

equipment (i.e., hydrants, water truck, etc.) shall
be available at the project site at all times when
welding or grinding activities are taking place.
Further, welding or grinding shall not occur
when sustained winds exceed 15-20 mph, as
determined by SBC Fire Department, unless an
SBC Fire Department approved wind shield is
on site. PXP shall submit the pipeline
construction procedures to the SBC Fire
Department for review and approval prior to
land use clearance.
Prior to Land
Use clearance.
Review during
construction
SBCFD and
EQAP monitor
Mitigation Requirements and Timing
5.11-25
Draft EIR
Method of
Verification
Timing of
Verification
Party
Responsible
For
Verification
All rubber-tired construction vehicles shall be

equipped with appropriate fire fighting
equipment, such as shovels and axes or pulaskis,
to aid in the prevention or containment of fires.
PXP shall submit the pipeline construction
procedures to the SBC Fire Department for
review and approval prior to land use clearance.
Prior to Land
Use clearance.
Review during
construction
SBCFD and
EQAP monitor
For the new facilities, PXP shall follow all

appropriate fire protection and safety measures
outlined in the Point Pedernales Project Final
Development Plan (FDP), Systems Safety and
Reliability, Part P. PXP shall submit the
construction procedures to the SBC Systems
Safety Reliability Review Committee (SSRRC)
for review and approval prior to land use
clearance.
The new facility shall be designed in accordance
Fire-7
(Casmalia with all applicable fire protection and
Alternative emergency response standards. The new facility
should be designed with all early fire detection
only)
and prevention of fire spread as the basis of the
fire safety design. The facility should have
adequate supply of water and oil fire fighting
foam as per the National Fire Protection Agency
(NFPA) requirements (i.e., Standards 11, 15, 22,
24, 25). The facility layout should provide
sufficient access for emergency response
vehicles and provide adequate equipment
spacing as per the American Petroleum Institute
(API) and Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI)
guidelines (IRI IM 2.5.2). The new facility
should have fire detection monitors positioned
in the locations most likely to be affected by
fire. All appropriate equipment such as crude oil
storage tanks should have sufficient secondary
containment. Grading under liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG) storage vessels should be sloped to
allow any spilled flammable liquids to flow
outward from the vessel and into an
impoundment area. The applicant shall submit
all appropriate documentation for the new
facility to the SSRRC for review and approval
prior to land use clearance
Prior to Land
Use clearance,
and regularly
during
operations.
Compliance
with the new
FDP shall be
verified
through regular
facility audits.
SSRRC (includes
SBCFD)
Prior to Land
Use clearance.
Through
review of the
facility
documentation,
such as facility
plot plans,
P&IDs, etc.
SSRRC
Mitigation
Measure
Fire-5
(VAFB
Onshore,
Casmalia,
and
Emulsion
Pipeline
Replacement
Alternatives
only)
Fire-6
(Casmalia
Alternative
only)
October 2006
5.11-26
Draft EIR
Mitigation
Measure
Fire protection, oil spill, and emergency

response plans of the new facility shall be
developed or adjusted using the similar LOGP
plans and coordinated with the SBC Fire
Department. These plans shall address the fire
prevention measures at the facility, the fire
suppression systems, the specific hazards at the
facility, and fire and emergency response
training and planning. The Fire Protection, Oil
Spill Response, and Emergency Response Plans
shall be submitted to the SBC Fire Department
for review and approval prior to land use
clearance.
Fire-9
The facility operators/owners shall provide
(Casmalia funding to the SBC Fire Department to provide
Alternative adequate staffing and equipment for the Santa
only)
Maria Fire Station to address the emergency
response requirements of the Casmalia oil and
gas processing facility. The facility
operators/owners shall enter into an agreement
with the SBC to provide the reasonable share of
funds for fire protection and emergency
response. The operators/owners shall provide
documentation of the monetary deposits into the
appropriate funds prior to land use clearance.
The sour gas pipeline shall be equipped with a
Fire-10
(Casmalia leak detection system that is capable of detecting
Alternative leaks as small as inch. The pipeline shall be
equipped with remotely operated block valves to
only)
limit the volume of material release in the event
of a leak or rupture. The applicant shall submit
documentation for the pipeline controls design
to the SBC SSRRC for review and approval
prior to land use clearance.
The pipeline shall be constructed following all
Fire-11
(Casmalia applicable standards for sour gas pipeline
Alternative service. The applicant shall submit all pipeline
documentation (e.g., route, materials of
only)
construction, operation procedures) to the SBC
SSRRC for review and approval prior to land
use clearance.
Fire-8
(Casmalia
Alternative
only)
Party
Responsible
For
Verification
Method of
Verification
Timing of
Verification
Prior to Land
Use clearance.
Compliance
with the plans
is verified
through regular
drills.
SBCFD
Prior to
issuance of the
FDP.
Review of
monetary
deposits into
the appropriate
accounts.
SBCFD
Prior to Land
Use clearance.
Review prior
to construction
and operation
SSRRC
Prior to Land
Use clearance.
Review prior
to and during
construction
SSRRC
5.11.8 References
API. 1998. Recommended Practice 14C, Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design,
Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production
Platforms. March
____. 1995. Standard 2510, Design and Construction of LPG Installations. 1995 Edition.
____. 1989. Publication 2510A, Fire-Protection Considerations for the design and Operation of
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities. April
October 2006
5.11-27
Draft EIR
____. 1994. Design, Construction, Operation, Inspection and Maintenance of Tank and
Terminal Facilities, API Standard 2610.
____. 1999. Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, API Standard 653.
California Code of Regulations. Title 1, Division 5.
City of Lompoc Fire Department; City of Santa Maria Fire Department. 2000. Unocap
Emergency Response Plan, May.
http://lompoconline.com/Ron_Fink/fire.html, A Burning Memory: The Darkest Day in the
History of the Vandenberg AFB Fire Department and the Birth of the Vandenberg AFB
Hot Shots.
IRI. 1993 to1995. Guidelines for Loss Prevention and Control.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). 2000. National Fire Codes, 2000 Edition.
____. 1997. Fire Protection Handbook, 18th edition.
Nuevo Energy Company. 1999. Lompoc Oil and Gas Plant Safety Inspection, Maintenance, and
Quality Assurance Program (revised January 2002).
____. 1999. Safety Inspection, Maintenance, and Quality Assurance Program. Lompoc Oil and
Gas Plant (revised January 2002).
PXP. 2005a. LOGP Fire Protection Plan. March.
____. 2005b. Emergency Response Plan. Platform Irene Production Pipeline from Beach to
Lompoc OGP and LOGP. August.
____. 2004. Oil Spill Response Plan. Platform Irene and Point Pedernales 20-inch Wet Oil
Pipeline. November.
____. 2004 (updated May and August 2005). Emergency Response Plan. December
Santa Barbara County, Planning and Development Department. 1995. Environmental Thresholds
and Guidelines Manual.
Tosco Refining Company. May 2000. Unocal Sisquoc Pipeline Project: Fire Protection Plan.
____. 2001. Safety Inspection, Maintenance, and Quality Assurance Program. March 28.
UNOCAP. 2000. UNOCAP Sisquoc to Santa Maria Station & Point Pedernales Lompoc Oil and
Gas Plant to Orcutt Pump Station Emergency Response Plan. May.
October 2006
5.11-28
Draft EIR
Figure 5.11-1
Fire Station Locations and Emergency Response Facilities
Figure 5.11-2
Fire Protection Equipment - Lompoc Oil and Gas Plant
Figure 5.11-3a
Fire Protection Equipment - Platform Irene Production Deck
Figure 5.11-3b
Fire Protection Equipment - Platform Irene Drill Deck
October 2006
5.11-29
Draft EIR

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5.

11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

Fire Protection and Emergency Response

5.11.1 Environmental Setting

Fire Fighting Capabilities in the Project Area

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

1596 Tiffany Park

5003 Depot Ave.,

450 Pioneer St.

11. Lompoc Oil

Engine (1500gpm), brush fire engine, 1

Emergency or Spill Response Capabilities

Type A pumper with foam capability, 2

Sorbent boom; sorbent pads, empty sand bags, rakes, shovels,

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

13. Orcutt Pump

14. Santa Maria

1580 Battles Rd.

400 gallon foam system 2

5 Type 1 engines and 1 truck company at 3

Emergency or Spill Response Capabilities

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

Fire Protection Capabilities at the LOGP

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

The SBCFD database goes back only to 1992.

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

Fire Protection at Platform Irene

Fire Protection at Orcutt Pump Station

PXP and ConocoPhillips have implemented a three-tier emergency response organization

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

Level of Emergency Classification

Highest ranking on-duty

Highest ranking on-duty

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

Level of Emergency Classification

Guidance Matrix for Emergency Incident Transition Definition of Terms

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

5.11.2 Regulatory Setting

Project Applicable Standards and Codes

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

There should be at least two entrances to the plant;

Table 5.11.4 a-e

Applicable NFPA, API and IRI Equipment Spacing Requirements

Process Units High

a. Inter-Unit Spacing Requirements (feet)

- = there is no spacing requirement

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

High Hazard Pumps

b. Intra-Unit Spacing Requirements (feet)

Pressure Storage vessels

Floating Roof Tanks

Floating Roof Tanks

Floating Roof Tanks

c. Storage Tanks Spacing Requirements (feet)

Source: IRI, 1993 to 1995, IM2.5.2.

d. Atmospheric Storage Tanks Spacing Requirements

Required Distance (feet)