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CubaTerrorListAFFNEG
Cuba Terror List AFF-NEG.........................................................................................................................................................................1
***SOLVENCY***....................................................................................................................................................................................2
A2: Alt Cause Embargo............................................................................................................................................................................3
A2: Cuba is Racist.......................................................................................................................................................................................5
A2: Cuba Economy High.............................................................................................................................................................................7
***1AC***..................................................................................................................................................................................................8
Credibility ADV 1AC (1/3)......................................................................................................................................................................9
Credibility ADV 1AC (2/3)....................................................................................................................................................................10
Credibility ADV 1AC (1/3)....................................................................................................................................................................11
Cuba Relations ADV 1AC (1/3).............................................................................................................................................................12
Cuba Relations ADV 1AC (2/3).............................................................................................................................................................13
Cuba Relations ADV 1AC (3/3).............................................................................................................................................................14
LA Relations ADV 1AC (1/4)................................................................................................................................................................15
LA Relations ADV 1AC (2/4)................................................................................................................................................................16
LA Relations ADV 1AC (3/4)................................................................................................................................................................17
LA Relations ADV 1AC (4/4)................................................................................................................................................................18
Terrorism ADV 1AC (1/2)......................................................................................................................................................................19
Terrorism ADV 1AC (2/2)......................................................................................................................................................................20
***2AC CUBA RELATIONS***.............................................................................................................................................................21
Internal Terror List EXTN......................................................................................................................................................................22
Internal Generic EXTN...........................................................................................................................................................................24
***2AC LA RELATIONS***...................................................................................................................................................................25
UQ Relations Low EXTN......................................................................................................................................................................26
Internal Cuba K2 LA Relations EXTN...................................................................................................................................................27
Internal Obama K2 Relations EXTN......................................................................................................................................................28
MPX Organized Crime Terrorism !.....................................................................................................................................................29
MPX Organized Crime AT: No Means................................................................................................................................................30
***2AC TERRORISM***........................................................................................................................................................................31
UQ Terrorism Now.................................................................................................................................................................................32
Internal Credibility EXTN......................................................................................................................................................................34
Internal Focus EXTN..............................................................................................................................................................................35
MPX A2: No Escalation.........................................................................................................................................................................36
MPX A2: No Motive..............................................................................................................................................................................37
MPX A2: No Means...............................................................................................................................................................................38
MPX War EXTN....................................................................................................................................................................................40
***2AC ANSWERS***............................................................................................................................................................................42
**Counterplans**......................................................................................................................................................................................43
A2: Generic Process CPs...........................................................................................................................................................................44
A2: Gross Condition..................................................................................................................................................................................45
**Disadvantages**....................................................................................................................................................................................46
A2: Cuba Hegemony.................................................................................................................................................................................47
A2: Terrorism DA......................................................................................................................................................................................48
**Politics**...............................................................................................................................................................................................49
A2: Internal Link Obama Gets Blame/Credit.........................................................................................................................................50
A2: Link Cuban American......................................................................................................................................................................51
**Topicality**...........................................................................................................................................................................................52
A2: Economic Engagement.......................................................................................................................................................................53

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***SOLVENCY***

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A2:AltCauseEmbargo
Removing Cuba from the list solves trade relations and is the litmus for economic engagement
IPS 2013
[Jared Metzker, Pressure Building for U.S. to Remove Cuba from Terror Sponsor List, WASHINGTON, Jun 13 2013 (IPS),
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/pressure-building-for-u-s-to-remove-cuba-from-terror-sponsor-list/#sthash.hOfDmX5I.dpuf]ja
Experts here are stepping up calls for the U.S. government to remove Cuba from an official list of state sponsors of terrorism, arguing that the
countrys presence on the list is anachronistic and makes neither legal nor political sense . The calls come just weeks after the U.S. State Department,
which oversees the state sponsors list, released an annual report on terrorism. Its section regarding Cuba varied only slightly from that of the previous year, disappointing those
who had hoped for a step in the direction of normalisation of U.S.-Cuba relations. At a time when the U.S. is best positioned
to help facilitate change in the island and to take advantage of the changes inside the country, this continued inclusion is
actually an obstacle to taking advantage of that window of opportunity , Tomas Bilbao, executive director of the Cuba Study Group, said Tuesday at a
panel discussion at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a think tank here. Bilbao noted the continued influence of a shrinking minority
of anti-Cuba hardliners in the United States who fervently oppose Cubas removal from the list, as well as a lack of political
will on the part of U.S. policymakers to square off with that minority. Nonetheless, he asserted that the time is ripe for the United States to take Cuba off the
list and prioritise helping the Cuban people over harming the Cuban regime. President Barack Obamas administration has overseen some notable policy
shifts, such as a relaxation of laws restricting travel by U.S. citizens with family in Cuba. Certain realities have also been changing within Cuba, including the
abdication of Fidel Castro from power, which make friendlier policies toward the island nation more feasible . Sarah Stephens, executive director of the
Centre for Democracy in the Americas, a U.S. organisation that promotes reconciliation with Cuba, told IPS that delisting Cuba now would enable the U.S. to
support Cubas drive to update its economic model, make it easier to facilitate trade and easier for Cuba to access high
technology items. Doing so, she said, would in turn help Cubans lead more prosperous and independent lives. Debating Cubas qualifications Cuba has been on the State
Department list since 1982, but some analysts maintain that the country did not fit the definition of a state sponsor of terror even then. In order to fit that legal definition, a country must have
repeatedly provided support for international terrorism. According to Robert L. Muse, a specialist on the legality of U.S. policy toward Cuba, there are currently three ostensible reasons for
Cubas inclusion in the most recent list: that it has allowed Basque separatists to reside within its borders, that it has dealings with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and
that it harbours fugitives wanted for crimes committed in the United States. Muse, who spoke Tuesday at CSIS, claimed the first two reasons were void because the countries concerned
actually condone Cubas relationship with their adversaries. Cuba is currently host to negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government, and Spanish leaders prefer that Basque rebels
remain in Cuba and out of Spain. These interactions with rebel groups, in Muses opinion, can hardly be a basis even for criticism. It is only the third justification, that Cuba harbours U.S.
fugitives, which he said could fairly bear description as a reason for keeping Cuba on the list. Cuba has harboured a number of fugitives seeking refuge from the U.S. justice system. The
most prominent is Assata Shakur, an African-American poet and participant in 1970s black liberation movements who was allegedly involved in the killing of a police officer. She was
convicted for the murder but escaped and in 1984 gained political asylum in Cuba, where she has remained ever since. Early last month, Shakur became the first woman to be added to the
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Most Wanted Terrorist list. But Muse notes that this designation was arbitrary and capricious, as neither she nor any other fugitive residing in Cuba
has been accused, let alone convicted, of international terrorism. Politics as usual Both Muse and Bilbao concluded that Cubas

continued presence on the State


Departments terrorism list arises less from these shaky legal justifications than from political calculations. Others have arrived at
similar conclusions for years. In 2002, a former advisor to President Bill Clinton suggested that maintaining Cuba on the list keeps happy a certain part of the voting public in Florida a
politically important state with a large Cuban exile population and it doesnt cost anything. Muse disagreed with the latter part of that statement, however. He noted that by

behaving
arbitrarily in what should be a strictly legal matter, the United States was damaging its credibility on the issue of
international terrorism and diminishing its seriousness of purpose in using the term terrorism in a meaningful manner.

Removal from the list is key to trade with Cuba it is the key first step AND it wouldnt take
Congressional effort
Schepers 2013
[EMILE SCHEPERS, veteran civil and immigrant rights activist, Groups fight to remove Cuba from terrorism sponsors list, March
11 2013, http://peoplesworld.org/groups-fight-to-remove-cuba-from-terrorism-sponsors-list/]jap
Congressman McGovern, who has followed U.S. Cuba policy closely, just got back from a visit to Cuba with a bipartisan

delegation headed by Senator Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont.


for an overall change in U.S.-Cuba policy, of
which removal of Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a useful first step. It would be of symbolic value, but it
would also be a necessary step if current restrictions on trade with Cuba are going to be lifted, because presence of a country on the
State Sponsors of Terrorism list prohibits certain kinds of trade, aid and financial transactions. To get a country off the list, the
administration would have to certify that it is not supporting terrorism and that it agrees not to do so in the future. Cuba was first
McGovern participated in a two hour meeting with Cuban President Raul Castro. He and the other speakers pushed

put on this list in 1982, during the Reagan administration. What was Cuba doing around then that merited this? First of all, it was helping the independent nation of Angola to resist armed
intervention orchestrated by the apartheid regime in South Africa. The South African government wanted to reduce Angola to a client state so that it could not be a rear base for South Africans
fighting to end apartheid and Namibians fighting for their independence. To this end, the South African regime teamed up with Angolan warlord Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA organization.
Savimbi was a particularly brutal example of the warlord type, which did not prevent the U.S. government from supporting him also. Cuban support for the Angolan government started in the
1970s and went through a number of phases, culminating in the crucial siege of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987-1988, in which Angolan and Cuban troops defeated a South African-organized
column. Most analysts think it was this defeat that finally motivated the apartheid regime to seek a negotiated settlement with tjhe African National Congress and the SWAPO freedom
organization in Namibia, bringing independence to Namibia and the end of apartheid in South Africa. In Central America, Cuba provided support such as training for revolutionaries who were
trying to overthrow series of bloodthirsty dictators and their regimes. The United States, on the other hand, was supporting those regimes with money, arms and logistical help. In the case of
Nicaragua the United States was providing this support to the "Contras," right-wing armed groups who specialized in murdering school teachers and labor activists, and who were also involved
in the drug trade. The United States also conducted some direct terrorist activities. To give just one example, in the World Court in the Hague found the United States guilty of placing deadly

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mines in the harbor at the Corinto and two other ports in Nicaragua. The mines caused the deaths of two people and damage to numerous ships and boats belonging to Nicaragua but also to
other nations. Nicaragua filed a complaint with the World Court against the United States; the court ruled for Nicaragua but the United States never even acknowledged this ruling. So Cuba

was put on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list largely because of its support for struggles against tyranny and racism . The United
States at that time was supporting that selfsame tyranny and racism, with money, arms and direct intervention. It was doing this through terroristic methods. Most of these things went on under
Republican administrations, but plenty of Democratic Party leaders, either for their own ideological reasons or out of fear of the Cuban exile lobby in the United States, have, with the exception
of President Jimmy Carter and a few others, not done much to change this. Some have been just as gung ho about attacking Cuba as the Republicans. Apartheid

is gone, Savimbi
is dead, and the civil wars in Central America are over. Cuba has cordial diplomatic and trade relations with all the countries
which were supposedly victims of Cuban terrorism, even those with right wing governments. But Cuba has stayed on the list,
under pretexts I have dealt with in a previous article. The classification of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism when it is nothing of the sort, and
when it is in fact playing a major role in trying to end the civil war in Colombia in negotiations which the U.S. says it supports,
is so absurd that perhaps the current administration can be shamed, pressured or cajoled to drop Cuba from the list. President
Obama does not need permission from Congress to do this; it can be done with the stroke of a pen.

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A2:CubaisRacist
Their evidence is funded by white hacks on the conservative right who use racial issues as a means for
profit and have coopted Cuba as their object it is nothing but lies from the media to prevent meaningful
aid to a country who has done everything it can to help the oppressed prefer our evidence, which cites
actual empirical research
Sawyer 2013
[Mark Sawyer, Professor at UCLA, Beyonce and Jay Z Are Race Traitors for Going to Cuba !?!?,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-sawyer/beyonce-and-jay-z-are-rac_b_3078075.html]jap
While I expected right-wing television and bloggers to go bananas over Jay-Z and Beyonc's trip to Cuba, nothing

prepared me for the idea that somehow by traveling


to Cuba, Beyonce and Jay Z had betrayed their race. That's right. Cuba is a "racist" nation and traveling there is to co-sign anti-black racism. In my appearance on Fox
News this was raised as well as claims of racism against Ch Guevara. Another portion of the argument rests upon the four or five black dissidents in Cuban prisons that
includes at least one rapper. I don't spend much time in the right-wing echo chamber but the ridiculousness of these claims was in many ways beyond my
comprehension. It needed research. At least let me establish where I come from on this. I have been studying issues of race and racism in Latin
America for approximately two decades. Many might cite my book Racial Politics In Post-Revolutionary Cuba as a stand out empirical exploration
of the problem. I am one of a very small group of scholars to have taken the temperature of racial attitudes on the island in relation to racial policies. The broad scholarly
consensus is that Cuba through a combination of redistribution of wealth, improved education systems and open access to health care had moved the
black population on the island closer to parity with whites than any other society in the world. Black life expectancy hovered in the 70s only a couple
years shy of the white life expectancy. Infant mortality rates fell dramatically and Cuba all but eliminated illiteracy. Old attitudes never died and racism still exists on the
island. Cuba proves you can almost reach parity in terms of social indicators but still not kill the attitudes that supported the
enslavement of people of African descent. With those attitudes still spoiling the water, the decline of Soviet support, tourism, and the rise of remittances from white relatives in Miami has
meant racial inequality has been on the rise in Cuba. In spite of that, Cuba remains the one place where blacks are the most patriotic despite being
perceived at the bottom of the pecking order and the more patriotic whites are the less they are likely to express racist beliefs about
blacks. That looks like a successful anti-racist project to me. But, on the minus side Cuba eliminated black organizations that might work to lobby for black interests
even in the context of a one party state. But the criticism of Cuba goes far beyond what the settled scholarly consensus is on the matter. The most unbelievable commentary on
Fox News, was that of Maria Anastasia O'Grady, argued that Cuba is state "Run by Old White Guys, and many of the people who are in jail are
young black people." She then likens Cuba to South Africa of all places. Let's not forget Cuba fought South African supporters in Angola costing Cuban lives. Castro received
the largest cheer at Nelson Mandela's inauguration because of the staunch support during the struggle to end apartheid. Let's not
include the irony of O'Grady making this claim within the United States where one in 15 African-American men are in prison and one
in three black men will expect to go to prison in their lifetime. Black women are also three times more likely to be imprisoned in the U.S. than white women. The
"police state" Cuba as described by "O'Grady" does not imprison nearly as many people as a percentage of the population as the U.S.
and certainly not similar proportions of blacks given population. But further, there is nothing similar to the U.S. embargo on Cuba and
the boycott of South Africa. The South African boycott and divestment was requested by anti-Apartheid activists in South Africa not a distant exile community with few formal ties
to the country. But, the attack of racism goes even deeper. Another portion of it rests upon the claim that Ch Guevara was an unrepentant
racist. I was unaware that Guevara had been leading Cuba in the last few decades but it warranted a closer look. I trolled around on blogs and saw right
wingers tend to string together a series of quotes from across Che's life. The most racist of them is from when Ch was 24 years old. It reflects a Ch
whose views evolved on the issue of race and who eventually saw black liberation as synonymous with ending oppression. The second in
1959 is taken horribly out of context. The quote goes, ""We're going to do for blacks exactly what blacks did for the revolution. By which I mean: nothing." Ch is referring to the
concept that he saw blacks as participating in the revolution not as blacks but as patriots. That is, the Revolution would be universal and color blind. Of course Ch also said when speaking at
the University of Las Villas, "The University must paint itself black, mulato, worker and peasant." Of course, they also lift another quote out of context as Che struggles with attempts to train
Congolese soldiers. The same kinds of concerns he expressed about peasants wherever he went to help foment revolution. If

Ch and the revolution were guilty of


anything, it was a series of sins more consistent with American conservative's current thinking about race than not. The Revolution
was by ideology more color blind than focused on fixing the problem of racial inequality. Further, while the current right in the U.S. does not
want to outlaw all civic organizations, it's painfully obvious they feel America would be better off without groups like the NAACP who advocate for
black interests and Senator Scott of South Carolina a black Republican, refused to join the Congressional Black Caucus. So where
does all the "Cuba is racist" talk come from? Why do we have white commentators accusing Jay Z and Beyonce of betraying their
blackness on television? To understand this phenomena we have to turn to the back alleys of the Cuban exile community and its support of the blockade of
the island. Over the years, their support of apartheid South Africa and a range of other policies alienated Afro-Cubans on the island and AfricanAmericans who were open to Fidel Castro's friendship. In the early 2000's the Cuban members of Congress funded projects located at HBCU's for scholars under to
contract to produce articles on racism in Cuba. Scholars visited Cuba but did no original research and largely summarized the works of scholars like myself without any of the necessary context
and caveats. We were then invited to a conference at Howard University hosted by Ileana Ross-Lehtinen so they could report their "findings" on racism in Cuba and have the validation of top
scholars in the field. As the conservative Miami Cubans have struggled to connect with blacks on the island they have seen talking about racism on the island as a possible entre to AfroCubans. Of course it is dishonest. These same Cubans defend the levels of racial inequality and practices of segregation in pre-Revolutionary Cuba by denying the practices out of
existence. In their minds, the Revolutionary regime has been the only Cuban regime with racial problems. And unlike in South Africa where activists called upon the world to boycott the
apartheid regime, the vast majority of Cuban dissidents see the U.S. blockade of the island as counterproductive. So Jay-Z

and Beyonce walked into a perfect storm. A


right-wing media machine hell-bent on painting the president as a radical socialist. That machine and its allies also happen to have an

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increasingly distorted set of narratives about Cuba unhinged from historical or current social realities. And a new right-wing a la Senator
Rand Paul at Howard, who having lost the black vote badly, now feel emboldened to explain to African-Americans our history and what we
ought to believe if we just had their knowledge. The narrative is if Jay Z only knew Ch he would not visit Cuba. On my appearance on Fox News the host and guests who
clearly know nothing about the island, suggest that Beyonce and Jay Z are dumb, knowing they should not visit Cuba. Clearly two individuals who have amassed hundred of millions as media
moguls are not dumb and also are hardly spokespeople for the superiority of communism. Further, they dismiss what astute observers of all political persuasions note, the embargo is a relic of
the Cold War and has outlived its usefulness. The fact is Americans like Jay Z and Beyonce visiting the island along with more American artists, athletes, students and even tourists is more
likely to bring about political change and reform in Cuba than an embargo that has failed for more than 40 years.

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A2:CubaEconomyHigh
Cuba economy on the brink now federal action is key to prevent collapse
Ashby, Council on Hemispheric Affairs Senior Research Fellow , 2013,
(Timothy, "Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States The Importance of Trading with StateOwned Enterprises", Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 3-29, PAS) www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/ 4-5-13
Cuba under Ral Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years
have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods.
Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels
previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was time for the gradual transfer of key roles to new generations, President
Ral Castro announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time of the Cuban Revolution. [1] The

twilight of the
Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet
external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process. The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez is likely to undermine the
already dysfunctional Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos , especially
among the islands disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and regional security. To maintain
Cubas social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the U nited States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade
with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned. The collapse of Cubas tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and
neighboring countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees
landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows: Avoid one or more mass
migrations; Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere; Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or
transshipment point for the illegal drug trade; Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States.
[2] All of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba. U.S.

policy specifically supports a market-oriented


economic system [3] toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin , whether from the islands potentially
booming private sectorincluding 300,000 agricultural producersor State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to U.S. interests. Regardless of over 400,000
entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when Cubas private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent
of Cuban workers. [5] A rational

commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system
of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by
helping to provide economic stability and fostering the growth of a middle classboth of which are essential for the foundation of
democratic institutions. Two-way trade must include both Cubas private sector as well as SOEs.

Cuban economy is vulnerable now Venezuelan election makes lifeline susceptible now
AFP, Agence France Press, 2013,
("VENEZUELAN VOTE BAD NEWS FOR CUBA: ANALYSTS", Yahoo News, 4-17, PAS)
au.news.yahoo.com/latest/a/-/latest/16768421/venezuelan-vote-bad-news-for-cuba-analysts/ 4-18-13
HAVANA (AFP) - Venezuela's disputed election result is bad news for the communist regime in Cuba, which became heavily
dependent on oil and hard currency from Caracas under its late leader Hugo Chavez, analysts say. Nicolas Maduro won a much closer
than expected election to succeed Chavez, but deadly protests have erupted after liberal opposition leader Henrique Capriles
demanded a recount. "Cubans can't be cheering this result. They have to be worried that Maduro proved so politically weak. The
opposition has the momentum and will define the agenda," said Michael Shifter, head of the Inter-American Dialogue think tank.
With Maduro entering office with a much weaker mandate than his colorful predecessor, the Castro-led regime may not enjoy the
same economic benefits, potentially threatening the communist island's lifeline. "The sympathy effect for Chavez was fleeting, and
Capriles was able to capitalize," Shifter said. A clause in Venezuela's constitution allows for a possible referendum to revoke a
president half way through his six-year term, a consideration that will weigh on Maduro's foreign policy, after his narrow election win.

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***1AC***

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CredibilityADV1AC(1/3)
Advantage 1 Credibility
Keeping Cuba on the terror list kills US credibility trivializes terrorism
Bolender 5/31
[Keith Bolender, guardian.co.uk, Friday 31 May 2013, Cuba is hardly a state sponsor of terrorism,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/31/cuba-us-terror-sponsors-list]jap
While an attentive US audience watched President Obama outline his plan to wind down America's long war on terror last week, officials in Havana were shaking their heads in bewilderment
and anger over how the issue of terrorism

continues to be cynically manipulated against the island nation. What raised their ire was the recent announcement that
Cuba would remain on the State Department's controversial list of states that sponsor terrorism. The long-awaited annual report on international terrorism from the State Department was
released Thursday, and confirmed what officials had already indicated that Cuba is staying on the list along with Iran, Sudan and Syria . State Department
spokesman Patrick Ventrell confirmed the administration "has no current plans to remove Cuba". The decision came as a disappointment for those who were expecting new Secretary of State
John Kerry, a long-time critic of America's counter-productive policy against the Castro government, might recommend Cuba's removal. The fact he hasn't demonstrates how difficult it is to
change the dynamics of the antagonistic relationship between these two ideological adversaries. Cuba was originally included on the list in 1982, replacing a then-friendly Iraq. The

designation levies comprehensive economic punishments against Havana as part of the overall strategy of regime change that
includes a decades-long economic embargo, unrelenting propaganda, extra-territorial application of American laws. For it's part,
Cuba calls its continued inclusion on the list "shameful" and pandering to a small community of former Cuban citizens who now live in Florida. Cuba also asserts that the US has actually
undertaken actions on the island that have resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians. An official of the country's foreign relations department, MINREX, who asked to remain anonymous,
complained: "It

is ridiculous that the United States continues to include Cuba on an arbitrary list of states that sponsor terrorism,
while it is Cuba that has suffered so much from terrorism originating from the United States." The so-called terrorism against Cuba began
shortly after the triumph of the Revolution in 1959. In the early 1960s a covert CIA program known as Operation Mongoose led to the killing of teachers, farmers, government officials and the
destruction of agricultural and non-military industrial targets. Other incidents involved attacks on villages, biological terrorism including the introduction of Dengue 2 that resulted in the deaths
of more than 100 children in 1981, and a 1997 bombing campaign against tourist facilities in Havana and Varadero that killed Canadian-Italian tourist Fabio Di Celmo and injured dozens. The
most infamous act of terrorism occurred with the bombing of Cubana Airlines in 1976, killing all 72 on board. One of the two recognized masterminds, former CIA agent Luis Posada Carriles,
has a long history of suspected terrorist activities against his former homeland; at one point bragging to the New York Times of his involvement in the hotel bombings. Posada continues to live
a quiet life in Miami, considered a hero among many of the first generation exiles whose anti-revolutionary fervor has yet to diminish. The other architect of the Cubana Airlines bombing,
Orlando Bosch, died peacefully in Miami a few years ago. As a result of these terrorist activities, the Cuban government sent intelligence officers to Florida in the 1990s to infiltrate CubanAmerican organizations in an effort to thwart further acts. The agents, known as the Cuban Five, were uncovered by the FBI and are serving long prison terms. While

Cuba's status
as a state sponsor of terrorism remains unchanged, other countries that might be considered more deserving, such as North
Korea and Pakistan, aren't on the list. What makes it all the more galling for the Castro government are the arguments the
United States has advanced to justify Cuba's inclusion the most egregious stemming from the charge Cuba was not
sufficiently supportive of the US war on terror or the invasion of Iraq, and was unwilling to help track or seize assets allegedly
held by terrorists. A 2004 State Department report asserted that "Cuba continued to actively oppose the US-led coalition
prosecuting the global war on terrorism." In reality, the Cuban side has consistently denounced all forms of terrorism,
including the recent Boston Marathon bombings that brought quick condolences from the island leadership. Other rationales over the
past 30 years to keep Cuba on the list have ranged from its support for left-wing rebels in Latin America, its relationship with the former Soviet Union, treatment of political prisoners and
allowing members from alleged terrorist organizations such as Columbia's FARC and Spain's separatist Basque movement ETA to reside on the island. Even when those issues were resolved,
including the dissolution of the Soviet Union more than 20 years ago, Cuba found its unmerited designation had not changed. One long standing reason, that Havana permits refugees from
American justice to find safe haven on the island, was re-invigorated with a ruling that was timed almost perfectly with the announcement that Cuba would not be taken off the terrorist list.
Assata Shakur, accused of killing a New Jersey state trooper 40 years ago, was suddenly labeled as a most wanted terrorist by the FBI, with a $2m price tag on her head. Shakur, who fled to
Cuba in 1979 and was given political asylum, has consistently maintained her innocence. Categorizing Shakur as a terrorist could potentially endanger her life from those wanting to collect the
bounty, and has led State Department officials to utilize her changed status as justification to keep Cuba on the list. There

is no legitimate reason to use the arbitrary


terrorism list as a political weapon against Cuba. To continue to do so simply exposes the State Department to charges of
hypocrisy and manipulation of a serious threat based solely on ideological differences . Most importantly, it gives insult to all those
who have been actual victims of terrorism.

Misuse of the terrorism list kills US credibility and international leadership makes us seem like a paper
tiger
Lopez-Levy 2013
[Arturo Lopez-Levy, Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate, University of Denver "It's Time to Delist Cuba" (Washington, DC: Foreign
Policy In Focus, May 7, 2013) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arturo-lopez-levy/its-time-to-delist-cuba_b_3232766.html]jap
The misuse of an otherwise effective foreign policy tool should give pause to responsible members of Congress and the
Washington intelligence community. First, it dilutes America's multilateral anti-terrorist efforts by taking eyes and dollars away
from where the real threats are. Second, it sends the wrong message to countries such as Iran and Syria and the groups they
sponsor by diminishing both the substantive and political impact of being listed. Third, it weakens the case for monitoring
countries such as Iran, whose presence on the list is more easily justified. In short, including Cuba undermines the credibility
of the list itself, and has a corrosive effect on U.S. leadership in world.

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CredibilityADV1AC(2/3)
Credibility key to foster foreign cooperation and hegemony
Ikenberry, 2004
[John, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, Liberal Realism: The Foundations of a Democratic Foreign
Policy, The National Interest, Fall]jap
The Bush Administration's disregard for legitimacy has had devastating consequences for America's standing in the world, particularly among
Europeans. The country that for decades was seen to be at the forefront of progressive change is now regarded as a threat to the
international system. During the heyday of American legitimacy amid the Cold War, it would have been unthinkable for a German chancellor to rescue his bid for re-election by insisting that Berlin stand up to
Washington. Not only did Gerhard Schroder do so in 2002, but candidates in other countries--Spain, Brazil and South Korea--have thrived by distancing themselves from the United States. In a world of degraded
American legitimacy, other countries are more reluctant to cooperate with the United States. Over the longer term--and in a thousand
different ways--countries will take steps to separate themselves from the United States, to resist its leadership and to organize their
regions of the world in opposition to Washington. From the perspective of liberal realism, legitimacy is an intrinsic aspect of power. To care about
legitimacy is not to cede American power to the UN or any other party. Instead, it is to exercise American power in a manner that
continues to attract the support of others. Successive American presidents have found ways to do so because they realized that to legitimate American power was to turn coercion and domination
into authority and consent. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau's famous formulation from The Social Contract: "The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into
duty."

Hegemonic decline triggers global nuclear wars


Kagan, 2007
[Robert, senior associate at Carnegie, End of Dreams, Return of History Policy Review,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10]jap
This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the
United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations,

Compared to the
ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world's powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely,
prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible
alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also
comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American
predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The
choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order
will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The
and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations.

return of great powers and great games If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the
kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for
wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably
could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of
competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other.

the Chinese
are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia .
National ambition drives China's foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world,

They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is pass; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including
military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and
not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. Japan,

meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power
-- with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending -- now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is
in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea's nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japan's own national ambition to be a
leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or "little brother" to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to
prevent the other 's rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South
Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a "greater China" and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg
commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe's past than its present. But it also looks like Asia's past. Russian

foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the

nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition . A postmodern Russia simply
seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO, would not insist on predominant
influence over its "near abroad," and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia 's international status in an attempt to regain the lost
glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible
national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security from NATO and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with
resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia's complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the
1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor in Russia 's relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the

India's regional ambitions are more muted, or are


focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself,
more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations.

correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its
nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a panEuropean national ambition to play a significant role in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe
supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to
wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a
nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that

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would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their
national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its "century

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of humiliation." Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist
proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst.
Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional
predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning
with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus .

Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with
China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and
the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to
relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess
indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and

Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international
competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional
as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest
power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but
often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of
these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is
would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system.

easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the
dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor
of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian

Conflict
between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War I and other
major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a
of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond.

foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii
would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe's

stability depends on the guarantee, however


the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely
multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be
distant and one hopes unnecessary, that

preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine
that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest
on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since
the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of
order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing
and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also
offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world's great powers. Even

under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large


powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and
Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan
remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such
conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws
from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a
stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as
the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the
United States from the scene -- even if it remained the world's most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more
overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the
Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in
Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If

the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore
balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the
United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle
East and the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there . The vital interest the United States has in access to oil
and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the
region battle it out. Nor would a more "even-handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to
come to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a
heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the
equation. In

the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two
centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the
competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to
American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively
weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper
involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is
doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American
withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional
predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult
as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

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CubaRelationsADV1AC(1/3)
Relations on the brink Obama removal is the litmus test for Cuba and overall Latin American relations
takes away the enemy noncompliant stigma
CIP 6/16
[Remove Cuba from the terrorist list, http://www.ciponline.org/get-involved/take-action/remove-cuba-from-the-terrorist-list]jap
If the Obama Administration wants to see progress in our relationship with Cuba over the next four years , as the President said in a
Telemundo interview last week, he actually has the opportunity to make that progress possible and bring sanity to our Cuba policy, unlike
most of his predecessors. Well, all of his predecessors with the exception of President Jimmy Carter. There is still much more that the President could do
without congressional approval . We want to focus on one important action that would open the door to other advances . Through his
executive authority, the President has the power to remove Cuba from the State Department's list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. On
March 1st, 1982, Cuba was added to this list because "at the time, numerous U.S. government reports and statements under the Reagan Administration alleged Cuba's ties to international
terrorism and its support for terrorist groups in Latin America," says a 2005 Congressional Research Services report. If

you visit the State Department's website, the


few paragraphs that detail Cuba's designation on the list actually read like reasons to now remove Cuba from the list. Now is
the time for the United States to show its sincerity in pursuing a path toward improved relations with Cuba. It's long overdue
that we join the rest of the world in recognizing that Cuba is not a threat, rather a potential partner in the western
hemisphere. And if not a partner, then at least not an adversary. Taking Cuba off this progress-stifling list would also send a "Johnny come
lately" signal to our Latin American neighbors, who are challenging the United States on Cuba policy, both publically and
privately. If the United States wants to improve relationships with Western Hemisphere countries in one big move, this is the
way to do it.

Cuba doesnt belong on the list their presence kills US-Cuba relations
Goldberg 2012
[JEFFREY, national correspondent for The Atlantic and a recipient of the National Magazine Award for Reporting. JAN 17 2012, It's
Time to Remove Cuba From the State-Sponsor-of-Terrorism List, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/its-timeto-remove-cuba-from-the-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-list/251489/]jap
It's been curious to me for some time that Cuba,

a country that does not sponsor terror groups, is listed by the U.S. as a state sponsor of terror.
Cuba's inclusion (there are three other countries on the list, Iran, Syria and Sudan) undermines the seriousness of the list. Cuba is on the list, of course, because
Castro-haters in the U.S. want it to be on the list, but it is not intellectually or analytically honest to include Havana. The State Department realizes this, of course,
which is why its description of Cuba's "terrorist" activities is written the way it is. From my Bloomberg View column this week: According to the State Department's 2010 report on state
sponsors of terrorism, "Cuba

continued to denounce U.S. counterterrorism efforts throughout the world, portraying them as a pretext to
extend U.S. influence and power." Cuba is a sponsor of terrorism, in other words, because it is critical of America's war on terrorism.
By this definition, many of America's elected officials are sponsors of terrorism. The report goes on, "Cuba has been used as a transit point
by third-country nationals looking to enter illegally into the United States." By this definition, Canada is also a sponsor of terrorism .
And what are the Cubans doing about this problem? "The Government of Cuba is aware of the border integrity and transnational security concerns
posed by such transit and investigated third country migrant smuggling and related criminal activities." Oh, and by the way, the
Cubans also "allowed representatives of the Transportation Security Administration to conduct a series of airport security visits
throughout the island." A very clever cooptation by a terrorist state, apparently. The department's 2009 report acknowledged that Cuba "publicly
condemned acts of terrorism by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates," but still made the point that the government in Havana was
"critical of the U.S. approach to combating international terrorism." When I asked a senior government official about Cuba's
inclusion, the official seemed to acknowledge the ridiculousness of the situation: "We've heard the criticisms about particular
countries that are on the list and shouldn't be and others that aren't but should be ." The official went on, "At the end of the day,
though, the fact that the United States has a list that underscores that some countries rely on terrorism as an instrument of
policy is critically important. Maybe there could be more effective ways of focusing our condemnation, but for dealing with the real malefactors - think Iran
or Syria - that designation is important and helps galvanize the international community to action. It also helps create a bar for
those who would still like to conduct business as usual with them." In other words, Cuba is a fake malefactor. Our
relationship with Cuba is dysfunctional already; this list just makes it worse, and it undermines our claim to seriousness in the
fight against actual terrorism.

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No alt causes for relations being on the list outweighs all other policies to Cuba and removal solves the
Cuban economy and deaths of Cuban children in hospitals denied aid because of the policy
Bolender 2013
[KEITH BOLENDER, GUEST SCHOLAR AT THE COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS POSTED ON APRIL 22, 2013, The
Terrorist List, and Terrorism as Practiced Against Cuba http://www.coha.org/22355/#sthash.Y2cTYX9L.dpuf]jap
Of all the components to the United States hostile strategy against Cuba, nothing raises the ire of the Castro government more
than its inclusion on the State Departments list of states that sponsor terrorism. The designation is seen by Havana as an
impediment towards improving relations and as a cruel hypocrisy that provides political cover for Washington to justify the imposition
of economic penalties along with the perpetuation of anti-revolutionary propaganda. There is an opportunity to eliminate that stumbling block in the next few
weeks, if newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry decides to recommend Cubas deletion from the list to President Obama. Kerry has until the release of the State Departments annual
terror report on April 30 to make the determination of whether Cuba will remain on the terrorist list. High ranking Cuban officials are closely watching this development, indicating the removal
could offer an opportunity to re-engage with the United States. [1] The history of Cubas controversial inclusion goes back to 1982, the same year Iraq was taken off the list by the Reagan
administration. Besides Cuba, only Sudan, Iran, and Syria continue to be labeled as state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea was dropped in 2008, while Pakistan, long the home of Osama Bin
Laden and recognized as a haven for Islamic terrorists, has never been considered. Saudi Arabia, where the majority of the 9/11 terrorists came from, is looked upon as a staunch ally of the
United States. There

are numerous reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real
economic consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or
other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been using Cubas inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for
Havana to conduct normal banking transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments , regardless of which currency is being used.
Furthermore, the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list (which the Castro government has experienced
since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military
dual use, including hospital equipment. For example, the William Soler childrens hospital in Havana was labeled a denied hospital in 2007 by the State Department,
bringing with it serious ramifications. Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain , resulting in the deaths of
children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions. [2] For Cuba, these restrictions are additionally damaging
as the island continues to suffer from the comprehensive embargo the United States has imposed since the early 1960s.

Cuba is key to global ecosystems AND relations are critical to solving global environmental collapse
Conell, Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Associate, 2009,
(Christina, "The U.S. and Cuba: an Environmental Duo?", Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Scoop, 6-15, PAS)
www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0906/S00198.htm 4-15-13
The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be an Environmental Duo? Cubas abundant

natural resources need to be protected with heightened vigilance Lifting


the trade embargo would open up the possibility for a constructive partnership between Cuba and the U.S. by developing compatible
and sustainable environmental policies With the support of the U.S., Cuba could become a model for sustainable preservation and
environmental protection on a global scale Through accidents of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource. The United
States should capitalize on its proximity to this resource-rich island nation by moving to normalize relations and establishing a
framework for environmental cooperation and joint initiatives throughout the Americas. Cuba is the most biologically diverse of all the
Caribbean Islands. Since it lies just 90 miles south of the Florida Keys, where the Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico intersect, the U.S. could play
a key role in environmental conservation as well as the region in general. However, when it comes to environmental preservation, the Obama
administration is obstructing progress and hindering any meaningful cooperation with its current U.S.- Cuba policy. Climate change and
environmental degradation are two of the most pressing contemporary issues. If President Obama is sincerely committed to environmental sustainability, he must forge
international partnerships to implement this objective. Where better to begin than in the U.S.s own backyard, where Cuba has a huge presence. Only then can Cuba and
the United States move forward to find joint solutions to environmental challenges. Environmental Riches and Implications Cubas glittering white sand

beaches, extensive coral reefs, endemic fauna and diverse populations of fish compose the Caribbeans most biologically diverse
island. Based on a per hectare sampling when compared to the U.S. plus Canada, Cuba has 12 times more mammal species, 29 times as many
amphibian and reptile species, 39 times more bird species, and 27 times as many vascular plant species. Equally important, adjacent ocean
currents and the island nations close proximity, carry fish larvae into U.S. waters, making protection of Cubas coastal ecosystems
vital to replenishing the U.S.s ailing fisheries. Therefore, preserving the marine resources of Cuba is critical to the economic health of
North Americas Atlantic coastal communities. The U.S. and Cuba also share an ancient deepwater coral system that stretches up to
North Carolina. The islands 4,200 islets and keys support important commercial reef fish species such as snapper and grouper as well as other
marine life including sea turtles, dolphins and manatees in both countries. Fifty percent of its flora and 41 percent of its fauna are endemic, signifying
the importance of protecting the islands resources in order to safeguard the paradisiacal vision that Christopher Columbus observed when landing on the island in
1492. Oro Negro and Dinero The recent discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the Florida straits in Cuban waters has attracted foreign oil exploration from China
and India, both eager to begin extraction. Offshore oil and gas development could threaten Cubas and Floridas environmental riches .
Together, Cuba and the U.S. can develop policies to combat the negative results coming from the exploitation of these resources . The
increased extraction and refining of oil in Cuba could have detrimental effects on the environment. Offshore drilling is likely to increase with the discovery of

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Excavation increases the possibility of oil spills, which would in turn destroy the surrounding
ecosystem, including fisheries and coral reef formations. The amount of pollutants released into the air from refining crude oil and the
amount of wayward oil residuals would also increase with drilling and extraction. Those conversant with the very sensitive habitat issues are calling for immediate
consultations aimed at anticipating what should be done. However the U.S.s enormous oil usage and its development requirements will cultivate economic growth on the island. Washington must work
with Cuba to create an ecological protection plan not only to establish an environmentally friendly public image, but to make it a
reality as well. Degradation of the environment will deprive Cuba, in the long run, of one of its most important sources of present and future revenue: tourism. Consequently, it is in the mutual interests of the U.S.
petroleum deposits in the Bay of Crdenas and related areas.

and Cuba to develop a cooperative relationship that will foster tourism and growth in a sustainable manner. Sustainability through Collaboration In many parts of the country communism has inadequately acted as a seal to
preserve elements of Cubas past as the centralized government prohibited private development by not giving special permission. A number of tourist resorts already dot the island, but Cuba has been largely exempt from mass
tourist exploitation due to frozen relations with the U.S. Although the island remains underdeveloped, Fidel Castro has used his unchecked power to back policies, which have been heedless to environmental considerations,
thus damaging some of the islands pristine ecosystem that once defined the island. Roughly the size of Pennsylvania, Cuba is the largest Caribbean island, and if preservation and conservation measures are planned and
carried out in a cognizant manner, it could become a paradigm for sustainable development at the global level. The Obama administrations recent easing of travel restrictions on Cuban Americans visiting relatives on the
island could be of immense importance not only to Cuban families, but also to the preservation of Cubas unique and increasingly threatened coastal and marine environments. Such a concession on Washingtons part would
mark a small, but still significant stride in U.S.-Cuba relations, yet the travel restrictions still remain inherently discriminatory. The preposterous regulations that allow only a certain category of Americans into Cuba signify

The 50-year-old U.S. embargo against the island has resoundingly failed to achieve its purpose. Obamas
modifications fall short of what it will take to reestablish a constructive U.S.-Cuba relationship . Cubas tropical forests, soils, and
maritime areas have suffered degradation as a result of harmful policies stemming from a Soviet-style economic system. Cubas
economy could be reinvigorated through expanded tourism, development initiatives and an expansion of commodity exports,
including sugarcane for ethanol. U.S. policy toward Cuba should encourage environmental factors, thereby strengthening U.S. credibility
throughout the hemisphere. An environmental partnership between the U.S. and Cuba is not only possible, but could result in development models that could
serve as an example for environmental strategies throughout the Americas . The U.S. has the economic resources necessary to aid Cuba in developing effective policy, while
only a meager shift in U.S. policy towards Cuba.

the island provides the space where sustainable systems can be implemented initially instead of being applied after the fact. Cubas extreme lack of development provides an unspoiled arena for the execution of exemplary
sustainable environmental protection practices.

Ecosystem collapse risks extinction


Coyne, University of Chicago Ecology Professor, and Hoekstra, Harvard Evolutionary Biology Associate
Professor, 2007,
(Jerry and John L., Hoekstra is a curator of mammals at Harvard's Museum of Comparative Zoology, "The Greatest Dying", Truthout,
9-24, PAS) archive.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatest-dying 4-16-13
Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil
formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident,
humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than
15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by
single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will
diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster. In many ways, oceans are
the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the
intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so
does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species
extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion. In fact, the global
But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us.

value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems - those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace - has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross domestic product of all countries combined. And

Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed . Yet that is where we're heading if species
extinction continues at its current pace. Extinction also has a huge impact on medicine. Who really cares if, say, a worm in the remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct? Well, those
that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber.

who suffer from cardiovascular disease. The recent discovery of a rare South American leech has led to the isolation of a powerful enzyme that, unlike other anticoagulants, not only prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots. And it's not just this one

Plants, too, are


pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example, has given us quinine (the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and breast cancer), and aspirin. More than a quarter of the
medicines on our pharmacy shelves were originally derived from plants. The sap of the Madagascar periwinkle contains more than 70 useful alkaloids, including vincristine, a powerful anticancer
drug that saved the life of one of our friends. Of the roughly 250,000 plant species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been screened for pharmaceutical properties. Who knows what life-saving drugs remain to be
discovered? Given current extinction rates, it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years . Our arguments so far have tacitly assumed that
species of worm: Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins, including antistatin (a potential anticancer agent), decorsin and ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin (another anticoagulant).

species are worth saving only in proportion to their economic value and their effects on our quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained, especially in Americans. That is why conservationists always base their case on an economic calculus. But we biologists
know in our hearts that there are deeper and equally compelling reasons to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and intellectual values that transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures? And what
could be more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our evolutionary cousins, and realizing that we all got here by the same simple process of natural selection? To biologists, and potentially everyone else, apprehending the genetic kinship

our future is bleak if we do nothing


to stem this sixth extinction. We are creating a world in which exotic diseases flourish but natural medicinal cures are lost; a world in which carbon waste accumulates while food sources dwindle; a world of sweltering heat, failing crops, and
impure water. In the end, we must accept the possibility that we ourselves are not immune to extinction. Or, if we survive, perhaps only a few of us will remain, scratching
out a grubby existence on a devastated planet. Global warming will seem like a secondary problem when humanity finally faces the
consequences of what we have done to nature: not just another Great Dying, but perhaps the greatest dying of them all .
and common origin of all species is a spiritual experience - not necessarily religious, but spiritual nonetheless, for it stirs the soul. But, whether or not one is moved by such concerns, it is certain that

15

GMU Debate
[File name]

[Name]

LARelationsADV1AC(1/4)
Advantage 1 Relations
Relations are set to rebound in the status quo but U.S. policy on Cuba is preventing cooperation on
regional issues
White, Center for International Policy Senior Fellow, 2013,
(Robert E., Former United States Ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador, "After Chvez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With
Cuba", New York Times, 3-7, PAS) www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latinamerica.html?pagewanted=all 4-4-13
FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the
Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America. Yet for a halfcentury, our

policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and
missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the
United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share
the American goal of prosperity. Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chvez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its
supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Ral, Cubas current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President
Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress. An

end to the Cuba embargo would send a


powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change
throughout the Americas. I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John
F. Kennedys creative response to the revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel
dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century. Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it
captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance for Progress, a
kind of Marshall Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions of dollars to this effort. In
hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even nave, but Kennedys focus on Latin America rekindled the promise of the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and transformed
the whole concept of inter-American relations. Tragically, after Kennedys assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and la noche mas larga the longest
night began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled
Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism. During
my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand
by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran militarys responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and
forced out of the Foreign Service. The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A.,
with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up
their crimes. After our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND Corporation, what had gone wrong.
RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the insurgents were rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, we
pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest. Over the subsequent
quarter-century, a

series of profound political, social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America
and, with them, longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States . The organization, which is headquartered in Washington and
which excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chvez. He promoted the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States which excludes the United States
and Canada as an alternative. At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chvez said that the most positive thing for the independence of our continent
is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire. Mr. Chvez was masterful at manipulating Americas antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the
United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and labor. Like its
predecessors, the Obama administration has

given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences.
Americas leading statesman at the time, Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama
to normalize relations with Cuba. Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to
renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime. After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to
After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin

accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on
the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero. And even

now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Ral Castros announcement that he
will retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues . The fact that two of the three CubanAmerican members of the Senate Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further
the potential for a recalibration of Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.) Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a
small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive? The

re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chvez,


give America a chance to reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades. The president and his new
secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and Jos Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization
of American States. The message should be simple: The

president is prepared to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help. Such a simple
request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge . It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy
that would help Cuba achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments. If, however, our
present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States versus Latin America. While
Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of
Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical
footnote.

16

GMU Debate
[File name]

[Name]

LARelationsADV1AC(2/4)
Cuban policy is the bellwether of United States-Latin American relations all countries look to Cuba for
direction on U.S. policy
Pascual et al., Brookings Foreign Policy Director, 2009,
(Carlos, "Cuba: A New Policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement", Brookings, April, Pg. 1-2, PAS)
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf 4-16-13
U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere. Our nearly
50-year old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the island and has left the
United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become a bellwether, indicating the extent to which the United
States will act in partnership with the region or unilaterallyand ineffectually. inevitably, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government
will be necessary if the United States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This paper proposes a new goal for U.S. policy toward Cuba: to support the emergence of a
Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it
cannot be imposed; it must come from within; the type of government at the helm of the islands future will depend on Cubans. Our policy should therefore
encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the
interests of the United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that promote the well-being of each individual and the growth of
civil society. To engage the Cuban government and Cuban people effectively, the United States will need to engage with other governments, the private sector, and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). in so doing, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemispheres and our own desire to encourage the Cuban
government to adopt international standards of democracy, human rights, and transparency. Engagement does not mean approval of the Cuban governments policies,
nor should it indicate a wish to control internal developments in Cuba; legitimate changes in Cuba will only come from the actions of Cubans. If the United
States is to play a positive role in Cubas future, it must not indulge in hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a dialogue on issues that would
advance democracy, justice, and human rights as well as our broader national interests. Perversely, the policy of seeking to isolate Cuba, rather than achieving
its objective, has contributed to undermining the well-being of the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba and Latin America. It has
reinforced the Cuban governments power over its citizens by increasing their dependence on it for every aspect of their livelihood.
By slowing the flow of ideas and information, we have unwittingly helped Cuban state security delay Cubas political and economic evolution toward a more open
and representative government. And, by too tightly embracing Cubas brave dissidents, we have provided the Cuban authorities with an excuse to denounce their
legitimate efforts to build a more open society. The Cuban revolution of 1959 is a fact of history that cannot be removed or unlived, but, over time, Cuba will change.
As the Cuban people become inexorably linked to the region and the world, they will themselves come to play a larger role in the way they are governed. Mortality
and timenot U.S. sanctionshave already begun the process of change. A new generation of Cuban leaders will replace the Castro brothers and those who fought
in the Sierra Maestra. Although Cuba is already undergoing a process of change, the Bush administrations decision to cling to outmoded tactics of harsh rhetoric and
confrontation alienated leaders across the region. Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the Obama administration because it offers a unique
opportunity for the president to transform our relations with the hemisphere . Even a slight shift away from hostility to engagement
will permit the United States to work more closely with the region to effectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba. By announcing
a policy of critical and constructive engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the president can prove that he has been listening to
the region. He can underline this commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans, and engaging in dialogue with the regime,
as promised during his campaign. By reciprocally improving our diplomatic relations with Cuba, we will enhance our understanding of the island, its people, and its
leaders. However, while these measures will promote understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relationship between our
countries, they are insufficient to ensure the changes needed to result in normal diplomatic relations over time.

U.S.-Latin American relations are key to solve organized crime


Cardenas et al., Brookings Latin America Initiative Director, 2008,
(Mauricio, "Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations", Brookings, November, Pg. 24, PAS)
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america
%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF 4-8-13
Crime and insecurity are growing scourges in the Western Hemisphere. The LAC region has only 9 percent of the worlds population, yet it has 27 percent of
global homicidesabout 140,000 a year. Crime, especially organized crime, poses a serious threat to public security and undermines public institutions
and the legitimate business sector. Organized crime in the hemisphere today encompasses a variety of criminal enterprises, including narcotics trafficking, money laundering, alien smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping, and
arms and counterfeit goods smuggling. The United States stands at the crossroads of many of these illicit flows. Violent youth gangs, such as the Mara Salvatrucha, have a presence in the United States. Some 2,000 guns cross the United StatesMexico border
from north to south every day, helping to fuel violence among drug cartels and with the army and police. About 17,500 persons are smuggled into the United States annually as trafficking victims, and another 500,000 come as illegal immigrants. The United

The nations of the Western


Hemisphere have adopted a variety of international instruments to tackle organized crime. Virtually every country in the Americas has ratified the 2000 UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime. Most of the hemispheres countries have also signed and ratified international agreements that deal with the trafficking of persons, the smuggling of migrants, illicit firearms trafficking and the illicit drug trade. Yet a
significant reduction in crime in the hemisphere remains elusive. The narcotics trade remains at the core of organized crime in the hemisphere. This is by far the most lucrative of illegal trades,
States remains both a leading consuming country across the full range of illicit narcotics and a country with major domestic production of methamphetamines, cannabis, and other synthetic narcotics.

generating hundreds of billions of dollars a year. Its immense cash flow, vast employment opportunities, and sophisticated networks feed other kinds of criminal activity and allow drug traffickers to adapt with extraordinary speed to governments counternarcotics
efforts. The drug trade is also singularly adept at corrupting judicial, political, and law enforcement institutions. In Mexico, open war between the cartels and all levels of government has killed 4,000 people so far in 2008 aloneabout as many casualties as the

This violence already threatens to spill into the United States and to destabilize Mexicos political
institutions. Because it lies at the core of regional criminal activity, this section focuses on the illegal drug trade. A hemisphere-wide counternarcotics strategy encompassing consuming, producing, and transshipment countries is required to combat not
United States has sustained in almost six years of war in Iraq.

only the illegal drug trade but also other forms of crime.

17

GMU Debate
[File name]

[Name]

LARelationsADV1AC(3/4)
Organized crime causes Latin American regional stability undermines institutions
Bagley, Miami University International Studies Professor, 2001,
(Bruce, "GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: THE RUSSIAN MAFIA IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN", University of Miami School of International Studies, 11-15, PAS) www.as.miami.edu/internationalstudies/pdf/Bagley%20GLOBALIZATION%202.pdf 4-8-13
The dangers and risks to Latin American governments and societies that emanate from expanding Russian mafia activities within and outside their
national borders are usually more indirect than direct, although nonetheless real because of their obliqueness. In Colombia, for example, Russian mafia arms-forcocaine smuggling operations have unquestionably upgraded the FARC guerrillas arsenal and enhanced their firepower vis a vis the Colombian police and armed
forces, thereby contributing to the intensification of the countrys internal conflicts. The fact that the Russian mafia appears equally willing to sell arms to Colombias rightwing paramilitaries
may underscore their lack of ideological involvement in Colombias decades-old civil strife, but it in no way mitigates the profoundly negative consequences that their illicit activities hold
for Colombian political stability and state security. The Russians international

money laundering services are provided in a similarly non-partisan fashion -- for a


price, they will launder drug trafficker, guerrilla or paramilitary money on an equal opportunity basis. In doing so, of course, they facilitate
the clandestine movement of the narco-dollars that help underwrite the on-going violence in Colombia.82 Even for those Latin American countries not engulfed in civil
wars such as the one raging in Colombia, Russian illegal arms trafficking and arms-for-drugs deals in alliance with local criminal gangs significantly increase the
firepower available to violent elements of society and make them more difficult and dangerous for law enforcement to control. Brazils favelas, for instance, have
become virtual war zones, at least in part as a result of Russian drug and arms trafficking links with local criminal organizations in that country. Likewise, the Central American
maras have become progressively better armed and threatening to social stability and state security throughout the Isthmus as a result of their linkages with Russian (along with Mexican,
Colombian and North American) transnational organized crime groups. The Russian mafia is not, by any means, the only source of weapons in the region. The United States itself is a
major purveyor of small arms throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and elsewhere in the world.83 But given

the political chaos and relative availability of


black-market arms in Russia and most other former Soviet Bloc countries, Russian crime groups enjoy significant comparative advantages in this clandestine market and, thus,
have emerged as major players in the international illicit arms trade .84 The consequences for Latin America and the Caribbean are visible on a daily basis in the
surging rates of gang warfare and violent crime registered in every major urban area in the region. Independent of the arms black-market, the Russian mafias criminal strategies
and tactics for penetration into the region are inherently, even if indirectly, threatening to institutional stability and state security. Russian crime groups do not
normally seek to displace the local criminal organizations ensconced in each Latin American or Caribbean country, but rather to cooperate with them in order to facilitate their own illegal
operations and to elude detection and arrest. In doing so, they clearly strengthen the local crime groups with which they affiliate by providing them with expanded markets in Europe and
Russia for contraband such as cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines, by sharing new smuggling routes into (and networks of protection and distribution in) these lucrative markets, and by
helping to launder the profits derived from their illicit enterprises through Russian channels at home and abroad. The Russian mafias marriage of convenience with the Arrellano Felix
cartel based in Tijuana, Mexico, illustrates the dangerous potential of such alliances. The May 3, 2001, 12 ton cocaine seizure on the Russian and Ukrainian-crewed Svesda Maru constituted
the largest cocaine bust in U.S. maritime history. The money and arms obtained by the Arrellano Felix mob through their linkages with Russian crime groups unquestionably make the
Tijuana cartel wealthier, more able to purchase Mexican police and political protection through bribery, and better armed and equipped to ward off rival gangs or to resist Mexican and
U.S. law enforcement efforts mounted against them. The Russians preferred tactics

of bribery, blackmail and intimidation tend to exercise corrosive


pressures on key private and public sector institutions, thereby undermining individual states abilities to preserve the stable economic
and social environment, effective law enforcement capacity and level playing field required to promote legal business activity and attract foreign investment
essential to long-term economic growth. Traditional and longstanding patterns of patrimonial rule, personalism, clientelism, and bureaucratic corruption throughout Latin America have
encouraged and facilitated Russian crime groups resorts to these favored tactics (as they have for domestic criminal organizations as well). Time and again, many (although certainly not
all) police and customs officials, military officers, judges, politicians, and businessmen have proven susceptible to such enticements in large and small countries alike throughout the
region.85 The Russian mafias

expanding presence in Latin America and the Caribbean does not currently constitute a direct security threat to either the individual states of
the entire regions growing economic, social and political turmoil and
insecurity and thus poses a major challenge to economic growth, effective democratic governance and long-run regime stability
throughout the hemisphere.
the region or to the United States. It does, however, contribute indirectly to

18

GMU Debate
[File name]

[Name]

LARelationsADV1AC(4/4)
Latin American instability will cause great power war theyre the largest risk of escalation
Grygiel 9
[Jakub, George H.W. Bush Assoc Prof, IR, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Intl Studies, Johns Hopkins U, Vacuum Wars: The
Coming Competition Over Failed States, American Interest, Jul/Aug 2009, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?
piece=622]jap
The prevailing view of failed states is, to repeat, not wrong, just incompletefor it ignores the competitive nature of great power interactions. The traditional understanding of power vacuums
is still very relevant. Sudan, Central Asia, Indonesia, parts of Latin

America and many other areas are characterized by weak and often collapsing states
that are increasingly arenas for great power competition. The interest of these great powers is not to rebuild the state or to engage in nation-building
for humanitarian purposes but to establish a foothold in the region, to obtain favorable economic deals, especially in the energy sector,
and to weaken the presence of other great powers. Lets look at just three possible future scenarios. In the first, imagine that parts of Indonesia become increasingly
difficult to govern and are wracked by riots. Chinese minorities are attacked, while pirates prowl sealanes in ever greater numbers. Bejing, pressured by domestic opinion to help the Chinese
diaspora, as well as by fears that its seaborne commerce will be interrupted, intervenes in the region. Chinas action is then perceived as a threat by Japan, which projects its own power into the
region. The United States, India and others then intervene to protect their interests, as well. In the second scenario, imagine that Uzbekistan collapses after years of chronic mismanagement
and continued Islamist agitation. Uzbekistans natural resources and its strategic value as a route to the Caspian or Middle East are suddenly up for grabs, and Russia and China begin to
compete for control over it, possibly followed by other states like Iran and Turkey. In a third scenario, imagine that the repressive government of Sudan loses the ability to maintain control
over the state, and that chaos spreads from Darfur outward to Chad and other neighbors. Powers distant and nearby decide to extend their control over the threatened oil fields. China, though
still at least a decade away from having serious power projection capabilities, already has men on the ground in Sudan protecting some of the fields and uses them to control the countrys
natural resources. These scenarios are not at all outlandish, as recent events have shown. Kosovo, which formally declared independence on February 17, 2008, continues to strain relationships
between the United States and Europe, on the one hand, and Serbia and Russia, on the other. The resulting tension may degenerate into violence as Serbian nationalists and perhaps even the
Serbian army intervene in Kosovo. It is conceivable then that Russia would support Belgrade, leading to a serious confrontation with the European Union and the United States. A similar
conflict, pitting Russia against NATO or the United States alone, or some other alliance of European states, could develop in several post-Soviet regions, from Georgia to the Baltics. Last
summers war in Georgia, for instance, showed incipient signs of a great power confrontation between Russia and the United States over the fate of a weak state, further destabilized by a rash
local leadership and aggressive meddling by Moscow. The future of Ukraine may follow a parallel pattern: Russian citizens (or, to be precise, ethnic Russians who are given passports by
Moscow) may claim to be harassed by Ukrainian authorities, who are weak and divided. A refugee problem could then arise, giving Moscow a ready justification to intervene militarily. The
question would then be whether NATO, or the United States, or some alliance of Poland and other states would feel the need and have the ability to prevent Ukraine from falling under Russian
control. Another example could arise in Iraq. If the United States fails to stabilize the situation and withdraws, or even merely scales down its military presence too quickly, one outcome could
be the collapse of the central government in Baghdad. The resulting vacuum would be filled by militias and other groups, who would engage in violent conflict for oil, political control and
sectarian revenge. This tragic situation would be compounded if Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two regional powers with the most direct interests in the outcome, entered the fray more directly
than they have so far. In sum, there are many more plausible scenarios in which a failed state could become a playground of both regional and great power rivalry, which is why we urgently
need to dust off the traditional view of failed states and consider its main features as well as its array of consequences. The traditional view starts from a widely shared assumption that, as
nature abhors vacuums, so does the international system. As Richard Nixon once said to Mao Zedong, In

international relations there are no good choices. One thing


is surewe can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled.6 The power vacuums created by failed states attract the interests of
great powers because they are an easy way to expand their spheres of influence while weakening their opponents or forestalling their
intervention. A state that decides not to fill a power vacuum is effectively inviting other states to do so, thereby potentially decreasing
its own relative power. This simple, inescapable logic is based on the view that international relations are essentially a zero-sum game: My gain is your loss. A failed state creates a
dramatic opportunity to gain something, whether natural resources, territory or a strategically pivotal location. The power that controls it first necessarily increases its own standing relative to

the anarchy of the world is due to the backwardness of weak states; . . . the modern nations have
lived in armed peace and collapsed into hideous warfare because in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Central and South America there are
rich territories in which weakness invites exploitation, in which inefficiency and corruption invite imperial expansion, in which the
prizes are so great that the competition for them is to the knife.7 The threat posed by failed states, therefore, need not emanate mainly from within. After all, by
other states. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1915,

definition a failed state is no longer an actor capable of conducting a foreign policy. It is a politically inert geographic area whose fate is dependent on the actions of others. The main menace to
international security stems from competition between these others. As Arnold Wolfers put it in 1951, because of the competitive nature of international relations, expansion would be sure
to take place wherever a power vacuum existed.8 The challenge is that the incentive to extend control over a vacuum or a failed state is similar for many states. In fact, even if one state has a
stronger desire to control a power vacuum because of its geographic proximity, natural resources or strategic location, this very interest spurs other states to seek command over the same
territory simply because doing so weakens that state. The ability to deprive a state of something that will give it a substantial advantage is itself a source of power. Hence a failed state suddenly
becomes a strategic prize, because it either adds to ones own power or subtracts from anothers. The prevailing and traditional views of failed states reflect two separate realities. Therefore,

First and foremost, if we


take the traditional view, failed states may pose an even greater danger to international security than policymakers and academics
currently predict. Humanitarian disasters are certainly tragedies that deserve serious attention; yet they do not pose the worst threats to U.S. security or world stability. That honor still
belongs to the possibility of a great power confrontation. While the past decade or so has allowed us to ignore great power rivalries as the
main feature of international relations, there is no guarantee that this happy circumstance will continue long into the future. Second, there
is no one-size-fits-all policy option for a given failed state. Humanitarian disasters carry a set of policy prescriptions that are liable to be
counterproductive in an arena of great power conflict. It is almost a truism that failed states require multilateral cooperation, given
their global impact. But the traditional view of failed states leads us not to seek multilateral settings but to act preemptively and often
unilaterally. Indeed, it is often safer to seek to extend ones control over failed states quickly in order to limit the possibility of
intervention by other great powers.
we should not restrict ourselves to one view or the other when studying our options. The difference is not just academic; it has very practical consequences.

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TerrorismADV1AC(1/2)
Cuban presence on the state sponsor list dilutes its meaning only removal reinvigorates the effectiveness
of the list solves for state sponsored terrorism
Kayyem 2013
[Juliette Kayyem | GLOBE COLUMNIST, Diluting the terror watch lists, APRIL 29, 2013,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/04/28/making-terror-lists-matter-cuba-not-state-sponsorterrorism/X2NW0rfYm5A2eJT5VZEuHI/story.html]jap
SINCE THE attacks on the Boston Marathon, and the investigation of the Tsarnaev brothers, there has been much discussion about terror watch lists. When Russian
intelligence officials warned both the FBI and CIA that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was a potential threat, he was put on a massive list known as TIDE. The initial FBI
investigation found nothing to warrant his entry into more exclusive, and therefore more intrusive, groupings such as the No Fly List or the
Selectee List. It seems more confusing than it ought to be and not, it appears, perfectly synched, as each intelligence agency works under different standards and legal
guidelines. This week, another terrorism watch list will be announced, known as the state sponsors of terrorism list. It is a formal designation that began in December 1979 and serves as the
State Departments ranking of countries that repeatedly provide . . . support for acts of international terrorism. Nations currently on the list include Iran, Sudan, and Syria. It also includes
Cuba. Whatever

historical complaints or ideological rifts the United States may have with its close neighbor, Cuba should be off
the state sponsor list. It is time to take our terror designations seriously. The state sponsor list is not just name-calling , though
there is an element of shaming in the public condemnation. Countries are subject to strict sanctions, including a ban on arms-related sales, controls
over commercial exports, and prohibitions of economic assistance. Cuba seems to be on the list because, as previous State Department assessments have
determined, it supports revolutionary movements in Latin America and gives direct support in terms of training and arms to guerrilla groups and, note the turn of phrase here, their terrorist
operations. Cubas support includes safe haven to members of Columbias Revolutionary Armed Forces, known as FARC, which has waged an insurgency there but is now engaged in peace
negotiations. None of this has to do with the United States and its direct safety and security. Sure, the FARC and other guerrilla groups have destabilized the region, but that has nothing to do

The term state sponsor of terrorism means nothing if Cuba is on the list. The state sponsor list is
no longer about terrorism. Pakistan, for example, is not on it. Domestic politics, not terror, explain Cubas status as our
neighborly pariah. The continuing isolation of Cuba is inexplicable in modern times. It is no longer legitimate to simply claim that the electoral map
with terrorist threats to the United States.

with a powerful anti-Castro lobby based in Florida is a sufficient explanation, as if only the politically naive would think otherwise. Even if such blatantly political justifications were
valid, the Cuban-American community is actually quite divided about overtures to a nation whose progress and fiscal security can benefit the entire region. The Boston Globes Bryan Bender
reported this year that Secretary of State John Kerry was reviewing the policy, hoping to thaw relations with Cuba and make the terrorist state sponsor list be about terrorism. Its not clear if

necessity to remove Cuba from the list is immediate . We need to rationalize these terror lists,
term state sponsor of terrorism means nothing if Cuba is on the list: It simply says we
kind of dont like you and will find any reason to make it hurt. An over-inclusive list, as we are seeing in the Boston case, can
be as damaging as an under-inclusive one. The Obama administration can make a powerful symbolic statement about Cuba and
begin a slow thaw that starts with freeing the island nation from the same designation we give to Syria or Iran . Alone, that is
enough . But the United States can also make a significant safety statement about terrorism generally: States that support
those who pose a direct threat to the United States will suffer. Unfortunately, if the United States continues to use one of the
most powerful tools in its national security apparatus a figurative arsenal of sanctions to treat a nation as a terrorist
threat when it is not, we so dilute the term that it matters little to the countries that we hope to isolate. Cuba is a lot of things, but it is not a
direct national security challenge to the United States or its citizens. If Cuba remains on that exclusive list this week, we will do more damage to
ourselves than any Castro brother ever did.
Kerrys views will prevail. Today, however, the

whether they designate individuals or countries. The

Removing Cuba from the list bolsters US international sanction efforts makes our counter terrorism
policies credible
Bosworth 2013
[James Bosworth is a freelance writer and consultant who runs Bloggings by Boz. Will Kerry push to remove Cuba from terror list?
Keeping Cuba on the terror list may be limiting US credibility in designating others as terrorism supporters, writes a guest blogger.
February 22, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2013/0222/Will-Kerry-push-to-remove-Cuba-fromterror-list]jap
The third reason is just as important: Removing

Cuba restores some credibility to the state-sponsors of terrorism list and US counterterrorism policy. It is hard for the US to credibly argue about which groups and countries should be sanctioned for
supporting terrorism when we keep a country like Cuba on a terrorism list for politics unrelated to real counter-terrorism
issues. The rest of the world takes US counter-terrorism policy less seriously because Cuba's inclusion shows the US plays politics
with its own terrorism designations. Parts of the hemisphere take US warnings about Iranian influence less seriously because
the US places Iran and Cuba on the same level when it comes to counter-terrorism issues. Having a misguided Cuba policy in
the mix with those debates undermines the US position on issues related to Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. Keeping Cuba on the
state sponsors of terrorism list harms US national security by distracting attention and resources from real threats and

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harming US credibility on counter-terrorism cooperation. Taking Cuba off the list isn't just the right and smart thing to do for US-Cuba policy; removing
Cuba will contribute to better focused counter-terrorism efforts in the hemisphere and globally.

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[Name]

TerrorismADV1AC(2/2)
Removal opens communication lines with Cuba that facilitate bilateral counter terror measures that are
key to solve terrorism
Alfonso et al 6/11
[Mara Isabel Alfonso, PhD, CAF (Cuban Americans for Engagement), -Americans Oppose Designation of Cuba as a Sponsor of
Terrorism, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=94590#sthash.romGzOsd.dpuf]jap
We feel strongly that the original

reasons for adding Cuba to that list no longer exist. If you apply the criteria described by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
of Cuba from this serious tool of U.S. foreign policy is
long overdue. We also believe that removing Cuba from the terrorist list would advance the process of other mutually-beneficial bilateral
communications between Cuba and the United States. This is of the utmost importance to the United States. The Boston marathon
tragedy highlights the importance of international cooperation against terrorism. The issue must not be politicized. As proud
Americans, committed to the security of our nation, we urge the State Department to conduct a serious professional evaluation of Cubas presence on this list. Dealing with
terrorism requires policy and leadership divorced from politics and distractions. Removing Cuba from the state sponsors of
terrorism list will enable the United States to look at the current challenges and opportunities posed by Cuba. The island is a
country in transition, not a national security threat. Recently Cuba has provided new opportunities on the island for private enterprise, the removal of travel
restrictions, an open market for housing and cars, among other things. Although we know there is much more to be done , it is imperative that the United States
maintain an open line of communication with Cuba while this transition continues to evolve. Thus, we firmly denounce the
statement by the three Cuban-American members of Congress, who have falsely claimed to represent all Cuban Americans .
Recent polls in the Cuban-American community, and in the nation as a whole, demonstrate that current policy is not the wish
or position of the Cuban-American community, or of the American citizenry in general . A summary of recent polls may be viewed here:
in taking North Korea off the list in 2008 no support for terrorism in the last twenty years the removal

http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Polling_Data_On_Engagement_with_Cuba_02_2012.pdfis We, therefore, request that you take into consideration the views of the majority of our
community and our nation regarding this important issue, and not just the views of two or three members of Congress. They

do not represent us.

Nuclear terrorism ensures great power conflict


Ayson 10 (Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of
Wellington (Robert, July. After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33,
Issue 7. InformaWorld.)
some sort of terrorist attack, and especially
nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them.
In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a
catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the
so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example , in
the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be
brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in
supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example , how might the United States react if
it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, 40 and if for some reason
But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that
an act of

Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the
debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it [is] detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its
analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and

suspicion would shift immediately to

American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all)
state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the
United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at

Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a
backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would
officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed
what stage would

conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear
terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United
States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with

in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be
place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is
just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the
temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of
nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the
terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being
far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched
Russia and/or China. For example,
expected to

but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison
claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced
consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

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***2ACCUBARELATIONS***

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InternalTerrorListEXTN
Removal is a signal of goodwill that spills over to broader cooperation AND doesnt link to politics
massively bipartisan
Herald Tribune 6/16
[U.S. Urged to Drop Cuba from Terror List, http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=703430&CategoryId=14510]jap
WASHINGTON The

United States should remove Cuba from its list of countries that sponsor terrorism as a gesture of goodwill so that progress can
be made on a broad range of matters of bilateral interest, political and academic leaders said on Thursday. There is no evidence that Cuba is
sponsoring terrorist groups, Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) said during a forum organized by the Washington Office on Latin America. McGovern, who recently met for more
than two hours with Cuban President Raul Castro, on Thursday urged the Barack Obama administration to seize the moment to improve relations with Cuba. When
asked by Efe about how many Democrats and Republicans in Congress support that request, McGovern said that there is a growing consensus and that if
there were a secret vote, it would be overwhelming in terms of its support for removing Cuba from the list. Also speaking at the WOLA
event was Wayne Smith, former Chief of Mission at the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba, who said that the United States is the one who is isolated in the
international community because of its measures against the island . Ambassador Anthony Quainton, who was involved in Cubas original designation as a
State Sponsor of Terrorism, said that the time has come, for our mutual interests, to remove Cuba from the list. The U.S. government included Cuba on the list in 1982, arguing that Havana
supported insurgent groups in the Americas. In its latest annual report, the

State Department once again accused Cuba of harboring members of


terrorist groups like Colombias FARC or Spains ETA, as well as fugitives sought by U.S. law enforcement. McGovern
pointed out Thursday that Bogota, Washingtons closest ally in the hemisphere, appreciates Cubas constructive role as the
host country for the Colombian governments peace talks with the FARC. EFE

Plan solves Cuban relations and economy and facilitates general Latin American relations Latin
America views our Cuban policies as reflective of our overall Latin American policy
Reuters 5/31
[Jeff Franks, HAVANA | Fri May 31, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorismidUSBRE94U05020130531]jap
(Reuters) - In

what has become an annual ritual, the United States on Thursday kept Cuba on its list of "state sponsors of terrorism" and Havana reacted
angrily, calling it a "shameful decision" based in politics, not reality. Cuba said in a statement that the U.S. government was pandering to the
Cuban exile community in Miami against its own interests and the wishes of the American people. "It hopes to please an anti-Cuban group,
growing smaller all the time, which tries to maintain a policy that now has no support and doesn't even represent the national
interests of the United States," said the statement issued by Cuba's foreign ministry. Iran, Sudan and Syria also are on the list, which is published annually by
the U.S. State Department. Cuba has been on it since 1982. The terrorism designation comes with a number of sanctions, including a prohibition on
U.S. economic assistance and financial restrictions that create problems for Cuba in international commerce, already made
difficult by a U.S. trade embargo imposed against the island since 1962. The State Department's explanation for Cuba's inclusion on the list discounted most of
the reasons from previous years and said "there was no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary training
to terrorist groups." In the past, the report fingered Cuba for harboring rebels from the Marxist-led FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and members of Basque
separatist groups. This year, it noted that Cuba is sponsoring peace talks between the FARC and the Colombian government and has
moved to distance itself from the Basques. Washington's primary accusation was that Cuba harbors and provides aid to fugitives from U.S. justice. Cuba does not
deny that it has fugitives from the United States, but said none had been accused of terrorism. Robert Muse, a Washington attorney who
specializes in Cuba issues, said there is no legal basis for designating Cuba as a terrorist sponsor because of the presence of the fugitives .
He said they remain on the island because the Washington has refused to honor a longstanding extradition treaty with Cuba . Earlier this
month, the FBI placed one of the fugitives, Joanne Chesimard, on its most wanted terrorist list 40 years after she was convicted of killing a New Jersey state trooper. Chesimard, a former
member of a black militant group, has been in Cuba since 1984. Cuba rejected the notion that she or anyone else on the island was involved in terrorist activities. "The

territory of
Cuba has never been used and never will be to harbor terrorists of any origin, nor to organize, finance or perpetrate acts of
terrorism against any country in the world, including the United States," it said. Geoff Thale, program director at the Washington Office on Latin
America think tank, said President Barack Obama can take Cuba off the terrorist list at any time and should do so because it is "clear that
the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism." Removing Cuba from the list would
improve relations with Cuba and all of Latin America, which sees U.S. policy toward Cuba "as a reflection of U.S. attitudes
toward the region as a whole," Thale said.

Removal spurs a broader reset of Cuban relations and allows for dual use military equipment and
advanced medical technology exports to Cuba The terror list prevents exports and relations now
Mckenna 2013
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[Name]

[Peter McKenna is professor and chair of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island and the editor of Canada Looks
South: In Search of an Americas Policy. It's time to take Cuba off the terror list, April 3,
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/analysis/its-time-to-take-cuba-off-the-terror-list-201190801.html]jap
In some ways, the U.S.-Cuba relationship -- even under the presidency of Barack Obama -- is still locked in a Cold War time warp. For a host of illogical
reasons, including Havana's 2009 imprisonment of Alan Gross, a subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development who acted illegally in the country, Washington can't seem to
bring itself to break diplomatic bread with the Cuban government. But there is some chatter in the halls of the U.S. State Department that newly minted Secretary of State John Kerry is
seriously contemplating removing Cuba from an arbitrary list of countries that export or promote terrorism. By law, he has to make that determination and recommendation to the president
before his department publishes its annual report on terrorism April 30. Keeping

Cuba on that list prevents dual-use military technology, which could


include advanced medical equipment, from reaching the island. It also compels Washington to vigorously oppose any loans to
Cuba from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Interestingly,
Kerry has a record of endorsing moderation in Washington's irrational and punitive Cuba policy, including his unease with millions of U.S. dollars for secretive democracy-building programs in
Cuba. He no doubt believes the

time is ripe, as is the political situation in south Florida, for the U.S. to work toward normalizing its
relations with the Cuban government. Cuba has been on the terror list since the list was first pulled together back in 1982. At that time, the reason for doing so was based
on Havana's material support for revolutionary movements and guerrillas in various Latin American countries throughout the 1960s and 1970s. That support no longer exists. In the case of
Cuba's ties to the struggling Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Spain's Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) movement, there is no evidence that it has provided them with
arms or paramilitary training. In fact, the

Cubans have recently sought to curtail their relationship with ETA members residing on the
island. Further, Cuba is now playing an important mediation role in seeking to resolve the long-standing internal conflict between
the FARC and the Colombian government. No matter how you slice it, the rationale for not delisting Cuba is pretty thin . As a
recent editorial in the Los Angeles Times opined: "By all accounts, Cuba remains on the list -- alongside Iran, Sudan and Syria -- because it disagrees with the United States' approach to
fighting international terrorism, not because it supports terrorism." It's worth mentioning that the

Cuban government strongly condemned the terror attacks of


2001, offered to send medical supplies and health-care professionals in their aftermath, and acquiesced in Washington's plan to
house suspected terrorists at its Guantanamo Bay naval facility. Surely if North Korea could be removed from the bad-boy list in
2008 by the former George W. Bush administration -- and that Pakistan has never made it onto the list, even though it had sheltered Osama bin Laden for years -- it is
long overdue to scratch Cuba's name off. Cubans have certainly strengthened their case for doing so under the leadership of Ral Castro, who has introduced economic
and social reforms, permitted Cubans to travel freely abroad (including vocal dissidents), opened a constructive dialogue with the Catholic Church and released dozens of political prisoners.
The Canadian government, fresh from Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird's visit to Havana, should be using its good offices to convince the Americans to delist Cuba. If successful, it would
have the salutary effect of bolstering Canada's brand and profile in the region -- a wise move, given that the Harper government has made the Americas a centrepiece of its foreign-policy
thrust. Removing

Cuba from the terror list would also go some way toward resetting the U.S.-Cuba relationship on a proper
diplomatic footing. This symbolically important step, in conjunction with a series of other confidence-building measures, such as the release of Gross, might
eventually lead to the lifting of the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba and restore Washington's credibility in the
hemisphere. Such a move would obviously be in the best interests of Cuba, the U.S. and the wider international community .

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InternalGenericEXTN
Squo allows for conflicts to continue in courts that threaten cooperation and Cuban stability
Lopez-Levy 2013
[Arturo Lopez-Levy, Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate, University of Denver "It's Time to Delist Cuba" (Washington, DC: Foreign
Policy In Focus, May 7, 2013) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arturo-lopez-levy/its-time-to-delist-cuba_b_3232766.html]jap
Characterizing Cuba as a terrorist state--and more generally implying that the island in any way poses any threat to U.S. security-hinders the United States' ability to develop a strategic vision for post-Fidel Cuba. The list encourages hostile actions against
Cuba in American courts, thereby aggravating conflicts and blocking new exchanges. The island is a country in transition that is
carrying out market-oriented economic reforms without changing its centralized, one party system. This situation calls for policies of
engagement completely different from those required for dealing with a terrorist threat.

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***2ACLARELATIONS***

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UQRelationsLowEXTN
U.S.-Latin American relations are low now Chavez funeral shows
Hakim, Inter-American Dialogue Senior Fellow, 2013,
(Peter, President Emeritus, "Post Chavez: Can U.S. rebuild Latin American ties?", Inter-American Dialogue, 3-27, PAS)
www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3272 4-22-13
Virtually every Latin American country sent a high-level delegation to show its esteem for Chavez , who, during his 14 years in office, regularly
vilified the United States, disparaged its leaders and campaigned tirelessly to end the U.S. role in the region. The presidents of Latin Americas six largest nations including the closest
U.S. regional allies, Mexico, Colombia and Chile traveled to Caracas for the burial ceremonies. Never in Latin America, as many commentators noted, has a deceased
leader been given a grander memorial not even Argentinas adored Juan Domingo Peron back in 1974. This extraordinary acclaim for Washingtons most virulent adversary
in the Americas was probably not intended as a deliberate snub. There were other reasons that so many of Washingtons friends ended up applauding a committed antagonist of the United
States. Some leaders, concerned with politics back home, were seeking to appeal to constituencies on the left, who idolized Chavez. Some who have benefited from the financial largesse
distributed by the president of oil rich-Venezuela are eager for his successor to continue that support. Still others were reluctant to stand apart or isolate themselves from their neighbors so
they became part of the crowd. Yet the

fanfare accompanying Chavezs funeral suggests a troubling degree of indifference to the United States in
Latin America as if Washington no longer counted. Aside from his ability to hold onto power and sustain the devotion of so many Venezuelans,
Chavezs accomplishments hardly warranted this level of attention. His autocratic rule and reckless spending merit no praise from
Latin Americas democratic and fiscally responsible leaders . Make no mistake, however, the foreign leaders came mostly to praise Chavez, not just to bury him. To be
sure, after his presidency, Venezuelans are considerably less poor and unequal than when he came to power in 1999 though many other Latin American nations did the same, or better, than
Venezuela in this period. They achieved this without a huge oil windfall and without pushing the economy toward shambles and undoing the countrys democratic and civil institutions.
Chavez does, though, deserve credit for Petrocaribe, a program that supplied discounted oil (and low-interest loans to buy oil) to poor and energy-deficient countries in Central America and the
Caribbean. Cuba got the largest subsidy some $4 billion to $6 billion a year without which the island might today be facing a humanitarian crisis. But 13 other nations, some in great
need, were also assisted and are grateful. This is the kind of aid program that Washington should consider emulating for the regions low-income countries. The Chavez funeral is not the
only reason for unease about Washingtons relations with Latin America. Two months ago, Cuban ruler Raul Castro, another determined U.S. adversary, was elected to head the Community of
Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC), a new organization that includes every nation in the Western Hemisphere except the United States and Canada. Next years meeting is
scheduled to be in Havana, though CELACs charter requires that members be governed democratically. At the 2012 meeting

of the Summit of the Americas (every country


on two topics: drug policy and Cuba. Both are sources of longstanding tension between the United States and Latin America. The assembled Latin American heads of state closed the meeting by
warning Washington that, unless Cuba is included in future summits, they would no longer participate . The problem is not that Latin America has
of the hemisphere except Cuba), the discussion, despite Washingtons objections, focused

retreated from democratic rule. Though democratic governance has deteriorated in some countries, it is still the overwhelming regional norm and getting stronger in many places. The
commitment of Latin Americans to democracy. however, now largely applies to their own countries. What they have given up on is the idea of collectively defending democratic practice in
countries other than their own. Regional

solidarity is now a higher priority than democracy, a reflection of the many ideological and political
differences among Latin American nations.

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InternalCubaK2LARelationsEXTN
Cuba dominates U.S. hemispheric policy status quo policies undermine ability to have strong regional
cooperation
Cardenas et al., Brookings Latin America Initiative Director, 2008,
(Mauricio, "Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations", Brookings, November, Pg. 28-29, PAS)
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america
%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF 4-8-13
U.S.-Cuban relations have disproportionately dominated U.S. policy toward the LAC region for years. Tensions generated by U.S. policies toward
Cuba have affected the United States image in the region and have hindered Washingtons ability to work constructively with other
countries. For this reason, addressing U.S. policy toward Cuba has implications that go beyond the bilateral relationship and affect U.S. relations with the rest of the LAC region more generally. Political change in Washington, combined with recent
demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community and recent leadership changes in Cuba itself, offer a valuable opportunity to change course. Though the reforms enacted recently in Cuba have thus far been mostly cosmetic, they could create
openings for grassroots political and economic activity. The removal of restrictions on access to tourist facilities and on the purchase of mobile telephones and computers may have an important psychological impact and increase contact with the outside world.
Also, the Cuban government has recently lifted all wage caps, started to allow performance bonuses for certain salaried professions, liberalized the sale of farming equipment, and begun to lease idle state lands to increase agricultural output. These reforms may

Economic developments in Cuba will affect U.S.-Cuban relations. Today, the United States is Cubas
fourth-largest trading partner; in 2007, it sold the island $582 million worth of goods (including shipping costs). Cuba is currently exploring its prospects for energy production in both sugarcane-based ethanol and of shore oil. Spanish,
improve labor incentives, purchasing power, and productivity.

Canadian, Norwegian, Brazilian, Indian, and other international oil companies have secured contracts to explore drilling possibilities off the Cuban coast. If the ethanol and oil industries become fully operational in five to seven years, revenues of $3 billion to $5
billion annually could significantly strengthen the Cuban economy and reduce the governments vulnerability to external political pressure. With stable inflows of hard currency from oil sales, the Cuban government would have more funds to use at its discretion,

Demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community in the United States add
to the prospects for reorienting U.S.-Cuban relations. The Cuban American population is getting younger demographically, and its
priorities regarding Cuba have shifted from a traditional hard line to a focus on the day-to-day existence of those living on the
island. According to 2007 polls by Florida International University, Cuban Americans are increasingly opposed to current U.S. policy, particularly restrictions on family travel, caps on remittances, and limitations on the sale of medical and other vital
supplies to Cuba; 64 percent of those polled support a return to the more liberal policies of 2003. The Cuban American community has historically played a central role in U.S. domestic politics, with strong influence in the state of Florida. This shift
in public opinion may ease the path toward reorientation for policymakers in Washington. The view of this Commission is that U.S. policy should be
reframed to enable legitimate Cuban voices to shape a representative, accountable, and sustainable transition to democracy. The Cuban people
further eroding the effects of the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba.

should be empowered to drive sustainable change from within by facilitating the free flow of information and expanding diplomatic networks to support human rights and democratic governance.

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InternalObamaK2RelationsEXTN
Obama policy on Cuba is key to Latin America relations
Tisdall, The Guardian Foreign Affairs Columnist, 2013,
(Simon, "Death of Hugo Chvez brings chance of fresh start for US and Latin America", The Guardian, 3-5, PAS)
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america 4-4-13
Hugo Chvez's

departure furnishes Barack Obama with an opportunity to repair US ties with Venezuela, but also with other Latin American states
whose relations with Washington were adversely affected by Chvez's politics of polarisation and the Bush administration's viscerally
unintelligent reaction. In particular, the change of leadership in Caracas could unlock the deadlock over Cuba, if the White House can
summon the requisite political will. Possibly anticipating a transition, Washington quietly engineered a diplomatic opening with Caracas last November after a lengthy standoff
during which ambassadors were withdrawn. Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, telephoned Nicols Maduro, Venezuela's vice-president and Chvez's
preferred successor, and discussed, among other things, the restoration of full diplomatic relations. "According to US officials, the Venezuelan vice-president offered to exchange ambassadors
on the occasion of the beginning of President Barack Obama's second term. Jacobson, in turn, is said to have proposed a step-by-step approach to improve bilateral relations, starting with
greater co-operation in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and energy issues," Andres Oppenheimer reported in the Miami Herald. There is much ground to make up. "Relations between the
United States and Venezuela have ranged from difficult to hostile since Chvez took office in 1999 and began to implement what he calls 21st-century socialism," wrote a former US
ambassador to Caracas, Charles Shapiro. "Chvez blamed a failed 2002 coup against him on the United States (not true), nationalised US companies, insulted the president of the United States
and blamed 'the empire' his term for the United States for every ill In foreign affairs, the government actively supports the Assad regime in Syria, rejects sanctions on Iran and generally
opposes the US at every turn." Despite such strains, economic self-interest always prevented a complete rupture. The US remained Venezuela's most important trading partner throughout
Chvez's presidency, buying nearly half its oil exports. Caracas is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the US. In fact, the US imports more crude oil annually from Mexico and Venezuela than
from the entire Persian Gulf. This shared commerce now provides a formidable incentive and a launch platform for a fresh start. Whether the opportunity is grasped depends partly on Maduro,
a Chvez loyalist but a reputed pragmatist with close ties to Ral Castro in Cuba. Yet it

depends even more on Obama, whose first term, after a promising start,
ended up perpetuating Washington's historical neglect of Latin America. He now has a chance to do better. The political climate seems propitious. Economic and
cultural ties are also strengthening dramatically. Trade between the US and Latin America grew by 82% between 1998 and 2009. In 2011 alone, exports and imports rose by a massive 20% in
both directions. "We do three times more business with Latin America than with China and twice as much business with Colombia [as] with Russia," an Obama official told Julia Sweig of the
US Council on Foreign Relations. Latinos now comprise 15% of the US population; the US is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country (after Mexico). Despite this convergence,

high-level US strategic thinking about the region has continued to lag, Sweig argued. "For the last two decades, US domestic politics have too
often driven Washington's Latin America agenda whether on issues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by the
supposedly crucial 'Cuban vote' in Florida," she said. Obama could change this dynamic if he tried and one way to do it would be to unpick the Cuban
problem, which continues to colour the way Latin Americans view Washington. "Having won nearly half of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2012, a gain of 15 percentage points
over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If he were to do so, he would find a cautious but willing partner in Ral Castro, who needs rapprochement with Washington to
advance his own reform agenda," Sweig said. A move by Obama to end travel restrictions and the trade embargo on Cuba would be applauded across the
region, explode old stereotypes about gringo oppressors, and help build confidence with Venezuela , the Castro regime's key backer, she suggested.

President key to signal


Doherty, New America Foundation National Security Studies Program Deputy Director , 2008,
(Patrick C., "An Obama Policy for Cuba", New America Foundation, 12-12, PAS) http://newamerica.net/node/8668 4-7-13
With these three objectives accomplished, Cuba policy will once again be back in the hands of the executive branch, which can begin
a deliberate process of negotiations to normalize relations. While some will say such a policy amounts to "free concessions" to the
Castro brothers, we look at it differently. Fidel and Raul Castro are at death's door. Change is coming. Everyone seems to realize it but
the United States. A new, decisive policy toward Cuba, wrought by the new "change" president, will send a clear signal to the world
that America is back. Moreover, such change will liberate U.S. relations with Latin America and open the door to dealing effectively
with our own hemisphere's many challenges.

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[Name]

MPXOrganizedCrimeTerrorism!
Organized crime is a critical source of terrorist support
Zaitseva, Center for International Security and Cooperation Visiting Fellow , 2007,
(Lyudmila, Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking, Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Iss. 5, August, PAS)
The merging of international terrorist organizations with transnational organized crime is one of the most serious threats that our society
faces today. The debate about these emerging alliances has been ongoing for some time now.[1] Experts agree that there are clear overlaps between international terrorist and
organized crime networks. In her Congressional Testimony delivered in September 2005, Glenn E. Schweitzer stated that organized crime had entered a new phase of complicity with terrorist
networks: Terrorist

and criminal organizations rely on the same global transportation, communication, and financial infrastructures for
illegal ploys. They take advantage of the same breakdowns in authority and enforcement in states under siege. They both seek increasing shares of the fortunes generated from narcotrafficking and other crimes.[2] The most obvious example of such linkages is narcotics smuggling operations in Central and South America and Asia, where
drug proceeds are used to finance terrorist activities. The overlap between drug industry and terrorism, widely known as narcoterrorism, is most pronounced in Colombia,
where two major terrorist groupsthe Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia (AUC)receive more than half of their operational
funding through cocaine production, taxation and distribution.[3] The former Taleban regime in Afghanistan, which was providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda, had also profited from the local opium
and heroin trade. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines have both been involved in drug trafficking.[4] Weapons smuggling,
kidnappings and financial crime have also been widely used by these and other terrorist groups to raise proceeds for their activities.

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[Name]

MPXOrganizedCrimeAT:NoMeans
Organized crime can massively boost international nuclear terrorism
Investor's Business Daily, 3-4-8, "Let Colombia Win," l/n
Some city in the world owes thanks to Colombia, which

blew away a terrorist seeking uranium for a nuclear bomb.

on Saturday
Instead of thanks, we see
only fury at Colombia over its incursion into Ecuador. Colombia's armed forces and national police performed one of the most spectacular anti-terror strikes in history, taking out FARC chieftain Raul Reyes, the No. 2 terrorist in the Marxist cocaine-trafficking guerrilla group. Using American training and satellite technology,

Colombia's well-trained armed forces seized


uranium to expand into international terrorism

the hit took out a member of the FARC's inner circle for the first time, ending all illusion of safety at the top. Identified by his Rolex watch, the Marxist thug had a $5 million price on his head. Better still,

computers with

A FARC plan to buy

three of his

some surprising contents:


50 kilograms of
. Colombia's victory followed a series of powerful blows against other FARC
leaders. As defections from the group rise and the terrorist leadership is decapitated, a picture emerges of a war being won after nearly 50 years of fighting. But outside Colombia, do we hear "congratulations"? No. We hear complaints from nations such as France, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and Italy that Colombia's forces
went into Ecuador chasing a terrorist, violating its "sovereignty" -- even though, as documents show, Ecuador helped Colombian guerrillas make themselves at home in that country. Colombia apologized for the incursion, and had every right to expect understanding. But instead of a spotlight on Ecuador for harboring terror
camps, critics focused on Colombia's trespassing. Those who've trumped up this false charge have much to answer for in their involvement in the FARC. Foremost among them, Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez screamed outrage, calling Colombia a "criminal" state for rubbing out the Rolex revolutionary. He then advocated
the overthrow of Colombia's democratic government and sent 10 tank divisions and 6,000 troops to the Colombian border. He ordered Ecuador to do the same, raising the specter of war. That's bad enough. But Reyes' computers tell an even worse story -- that Chavez has been a state sponsor of terror, secretly funneling $300
million to the FARC. Ecuador, too, was surprisingly neck-deep in "commitments" to the FARC. These are acts of war. This changes the idea of Venezuela and Ecuador as upstanding members of the international community. We have no illusions about what they've done to their own democracies, but those who criticize only
Colombia happily preserve the fiction. More specifically, to countries such as France and Argentina, Chavez has masqueraded as a neutral "mediator" in Colombia's conflict, persuading them to think he was an honest broker whose only interest was in freeing FARC hostages. In fact, he's the FARC's banker, safe-haven provider
and advocate, urging Europe to take the FARC off the internationally recognized list of terrorist groups in exchange for the release of hostages. Europe has bought into Chavez's pretense of neutrality because it has always favored appeasement and payoffs over risky fighting as a means of winning wars and freeing hostages. It
never works. And yet, at the exact moment of Colombia's victory, Europe suddenly seems interested in mediating a peace process between the FARC and Colombia, as if the two were moral equals and victory were impossible without concessions to terrorists. Chavez's involvement shows just how morally questionable that

In light of its success -- and


the nuclear threat to the world the FARC poses -- Colombia deserves the right to give victory a chance .
approach is. Colombia's critics in Europe, Latin America and elsewhere are playing a discredited peace game at the very hour of Colombia's victory. In so doing, they negate the only solution likely to free hostages and bring peace, which is fighting for it.

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***2ACTERRORISM***

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[File name]

[Name]

UQTerrorismNow
Al Qaeda is still a threat
Boot,11
(Max, National Security at CFR, August 8, A False Sense of National Security Los Angeles Times, http://www.cfr.org/nationalsecurity-and-defense/false-sense-national-security)jap
Washington Post reported, that Al Qaeda is "on the brink of
collapse." Such predictions have been made many times before, and each time have been disproved by this terrorist group
with its alarming ability to regenerate itself. It does not take much in the way of resources to carry out a terrorist strike (the Sept. 11 operation cost an estimated
$500,000), so Al Qaeda does not need much infrastructure to pose a threat. Moreover, Al Qaeda is not the only terrorist
organization we have to worry about. Other Islamist extremists are capable of planning attacks with scant direction or
assistance from Al Qaeda Central. These organizations range from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Haqqani network, the Afghan Taliban, the
U.S. government officials are probably premature when they rush to proclaim, as the

Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hezbollah, Kataib Hezbollah and Hamas. None of these groups have pulled off anything on the scale of Sept. 11, thank goodness, but several of them have
undoubtedly killed far more people and dominated far more territory than Bin Laden ever did. Al Qaeda in Iraq managed to take over a substantial portion of the Sunni Muslim areas of
Iraq before suffering devastating defeats in 2007 and 2008, but it continues to set off bombs. Hamas has taken over the Gaza Strip and is rapidly building up its arsenal. Hezbollah is the most
powerful force in Lebanon and has more missiles than some nation-states. The Pakistani Taliban is steadily undermining the government in Islamabad with one atrocity after another. Lashkare-Taiba has almost sparked war between India and Pakistan with its terrorist attacks in India and undoubtedly will strike again. Kataib Hezbollah, along with other Iranian-backed Shiite
terrorist groups, is asserting its power in Iraq as the U.S. prepares to withdraw. By

focusing too much on Al Qaeda and its charismatic founder now


resting at the bottom of the Arabian Sea we risk not devoting sufficient resources or attention to these other threats, which
are less publicized but ultimately may be just as dangerous. We have already seen one sign of this premature triumphalism: President Obama ordered 30,000
"surge" troops to come home from Afghanistan by September 2012 against the advice of his military commanders. The battle against the Haqqani network and Taliban two of the most
dangerous terrorist groups in the world is far from won. It will be much harder to defeat Bin Laden's allies in Afghanistan with the U.S. force reduced by a third before the end of next
summer's fighting season. Defenders of the administration's Al Qaeda-centric approach may argue that only Al Qaeda has shown the will and capacity to strike the American homeland. But
other groups are targeting us as well, and sooner or later they may succeed: Faisal Shahzad, who tried to blow up a car bomb in Times Square last year, was trained and funded by the Pakistani
Taliban. Also in 2010, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula tried to mail bombs to the U.S. that could have blown up passenger aircraft in midair. All

it would take would be one


such terrorist success to dispel the current complacency.History, I fear, may be repeating itself. President George W. Bush and his Defense
secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, appeared to be transfixed by early military successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in particular the successes of the Special Operations Command. Remember the
hoopla over the "horse soldiers," the Green Berets on horseback who called in the airstrikes that toppled the Taliban in the fall of 2001. Or the hype over Saddam Hussein being pulled out of
his spider hole by soldiers of the same Joint Special Operations Command that killed Bin Laden. This

created a mind-set of triumphalism embodied in the


famous "Mission Accomplished" banner displayed behind Bush when he welcomed the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln home from the Persian Gulf.Sen.
Obama later mocked Bush for prematurely claiming victory. But now President Obama, or at least his aides, may be making
the same mistake.

Shura Council and Zawahiri ensure accelerated recruitment and new attack strategies
Scheuer, 2011
(Michael, 22 years at the CIA, The Zawahiri Era The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/zawahiri-era5732)jap
It would be reckless to assume al-Zawahiri has learned little and changed nothing since the mid-1990s. He does succeed bin
Laden with potentially debilitating personality traits and leadership quirks, but he would have to ignore the advice and
experience of his lieutenants as well as the guidance of al-Qaedas top decision-making body, the Shura Council, and then
deploy and intensify his negative traits and idiosyncrasies with an eye toward deliberately destroying al-Qaeda and throwing
away his own lifes work to undermine the promising opportunities he inherited from bin Laden . It may well be that al-Zawahiri will never be
bin Laden, but there is also zero evidence that he is a reckless, supremely egotistical fool bent on self- and organizational immolation. Any leadership flaw, al-Zawahiri has written, could
lead to an historic catastrophe for the entire ummah, and he has three able, organization-bred and combat-experienced lieutenantsAtiyah Abd al-Rahman, Abu Yahya al-Libi and Abu Basir
Naser al-Wayhashiwho will keep him focused. (Al-Zawahiris deputy is likely to be one of the three, probably Atiyah, who was bin Ladens operations chief.) Having inherited a sound and
expanding organization and the very media-marketable memory of bin Ladens ministrations and exploits, prudently managed, al- Zawahiris

assets are more than


sufficient to keep al-Qaeda in a position to help feckless U.S. politicians promote Americas financial ruin for decades to come .
And worse. AL-ZAWAHIRI IS at least as committed as bin Laden was to acquiring a nuclear device to use in the United
States; assisting the Afghan Taliban to reestablish its Islamic Emirate ; continuing to recoup al-Qaedas fortunes in Iraq in order to keep inserting fighters
into the Levant states and to prepare for Iraqs inevitable Shia-Sunni civil war; and using al-Qaeda and other mujahideen media to incite the coming generation of Muslimsespecially in the
English-speaking worldto join the jihad. Like his predecessor, al-Zawahiri believes martyrdom missions inflict the most damage on the enemy at the least cost to the insurgents. Al-Qaeda
sans bin Laden will change, but merely because long-planned strategies are reaching maturity. Under

an al-Zawahiri-led al-Qaeda, the portfolio of attack types


will expand, meaning a program of less deadly but more frequent bombings in the West. Though bin Laden long preferred large-scale terrorism in
the United States and wanted the attack that followed 9/11 to be even bigger than those on the blessed Tuesday (and there is no reason to doubt planning for a large follow-up continues;
indeed, material from bin Ladens Abbottabad house shows such intent), the data found depicts bin Ladens interest in infrastructure targets, surface transportation and prominent individuals.
Iraq is the laboratory for this change in plan. Already under way in that Mesopotamian theater is al-Qaedas slow but steady campaign to recover from al-Zarqawis wild festival of
indiscriminate, bisectarian murder. It was, of course, the negative impact of al-Zarqawis savagery against Sunni Iraqis that allowed the U.S. surge to temporarily succeed: no al-Zarqawi
slaughter, no alienated Sunnis, and so no basis for the Awakening. (Without an al-Zarqawi-like figure in Afghanistan for U.S.-NATO forces to exploit, a similar effort was impossible.) But alQaeda was not eliminated by the surgeit merely dispersed to areas in Iraq and the Levant to refit and begin a comeback. The resurgence now approaches. Forced by the al-Zarqawi-led
brutality to clarify appropriate target sets, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri proffered their mea culpas, reenfranchised Iraqis and delegitimized the Western narrative. The two men praised al-Zarqawi
for killing U.S. and coalition soldiers while also explicitly noting that the indiscriminate killing of Sunni and Shia Iraqis was wrong in Islamic terms, was not al-Qaeda policy and would not

34

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recur. Bin Laden in particular managed to simultaneously substantively reject the Wests Islam-forbids-the-killing-of-one-Muslim-by-another-in-all-cases-whatsoever spin on al-Zarqawis
behavior. (Interestingly, the Obama administration, its European allies, and much of the U.S. media and academy still peddle this nonsense, most recently pointing out bin Ladens continued
concern about the issue right before he died. Well, no kidding; trying to undo what al-Zarqawi did had been at the top of bin Ladens agenda since 2006.) Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri correctly
pointed out that there are Muslims on all continents and in all countries; the Wests incorrect, absolutist interpretation of Islamic law on this issue would allow it to use domestic Muslims as
human shields and negate the ability of the Islamic world to respond to Western attacks. To reduce the Wests contention to its rightful status as a patent absurdity, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri
might have asked if the Christian Gods thou-shalt-not-kill commandment is an absolute in all cases whatsoever. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri went further still. If al-Qaeda, its allies and those it
inspires were going to wage their jihad effectively, they would have to kill Muslims. Thus, the remaining job was to define those Muslims who were religiously permissible targets. The two
men did this job splendidly. In the Salafist interpretation of Sunni Islamic law, Muslims who actively support an apostate regime or an infidel occupier sacrifice the protection afforded by their
faith; their lives and wealth can be taken. Soldiers, bureaucrats, security and intelligence officers, and elected or appointed government officials serving apostate regimes or foreign occupiers
are therefore legitimate targets. It is individuals in these categories who have been al-Qaeda in Iraqs primary victims as it tries to recoup al-Zarqawi-caused losses, and there has been little to
no negative reaction from Iraqs Sunni community or other Islamic regimes and scholars outside Iraq. Al-Qaedas focus on these categories of Muslims as legitimate targets is likely to harden
into an organization-wide policy and will be supported by rapid and cogent rejections from senior leaders of further Western contentions that one Muslim cannot kill another. This

leaves
a reinvigorated al-Qaeda with an expanded and well-defined target set. Armored in emboldened doctrine and rejuvenated
recruits, al-Qaeda has now moved on to the training and implementation stage of its next attack pattern . As al-Qaeda in Iraq works to
reclaim lost ground and allies, it is using attacks that fit the definition of targetable Muslims and cover the gamut of smaller operations. Oil pipelines, storage tanks and electrical-distribution
assets have been sabotaged; military, security and police bases, stations and recruiting offices have all been hit by bombings and/or small-group assaults, as have national and provincial
government ministries; and assassinations of government officials, bureaucrats, senior security officers and Sunni tribal chiefs working with the Baghdad regime have become part of daily life.

Iraq today has allowed alQaeda to practice, refine and teach (via the Internet) its host of revised tactics. Given the multinational makeup of al-Qaedas force
in Iraq, there is no reason to doubt that those who graduate from this school will be sent abroad to ply their lethal trade.
(It is worth noting that Fort Hood and at least four U.S. military recruiting posts have been attacked by domestic Islamists in the last few years.)

Zawahiris new goal is acquisition of a nuclear bomb risk of al Qaeda nuclear attack is high
Kanani, 2011
(Rahim, Editor of World Affairs Commentary, New al-Qaeda Chief Zawahiri Has Strong Nuclear Intent Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rahimkanani/2011/06/29/new-al-qaeda-chief-zawahiri-has-strong-nuclear-intent/)jap
Rigid, arrogant, unpopular and lacking the necessary charisma to reenergize a battered global terrorist organization, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri has been continually regarded by U.S. officials and
veteran terrorism analysts as incapable of following in the footsteps of Osama bin Laden. Perhaps, but underestimating his ability to orchestrate widespread terror is a dangerous consequence
of marginalizing his learned skillset, for we must not discount his former position as al-Qaedas deputy chief and operational commander for years. We

should be especially
worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism under Zawahiris leadership. In a recent report titled Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and
Against Nuclear Weapons, which I researched for and contributed to, lead author Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of
Energy, argues that al-Qaedas

WMD ambitions are stronger than ever. And that this intent no longer feels theoretical, but
operational. I believe al-Qaeda is laying the groundwork for a large scale attack on the United States, possibly in the next
year or two, continues Mowatt-Larssen in the opening of the report issued earlier this year by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. The
attack may or may not involve the use of WMD, but there are signs that al-Qaeda is working on an event on a larger scale than the 9/11 attack. Most will
readily dismiss such claims as implausible and unlikely, and we hope they are right, but after spending months with Mowatt-Larssen, who also served as the former head of the Central
Intelligence Agencys WMD and terrorism efforts, scrutinizing and cross-referencing Zawahiris 268-page treatise published in 2008 titled Exoneration, the analytics steered us towards
something far more remarkable than expected. As I read the text closely, in the broader context of al-Qaedas past, my concerns grew that Zawahiri has written this treatise to play a part in the

Zawahiris fatwa in
2008 may have started the clock ticking for al-Qaedas next large scale strike on America. If the pattern of al-Qaedas modus
operandi holds true, we are in the middle of an attack cycle. Among several important findings, Zawahiri sophisticatedly
weaves identical passages, sources and religious justifications for a nuclear terrorist attack against the United States previously
ritualistic process of preparing for an impending attack, states Mowatt-Larssen. As Osama bin Ladens fatwa in 1998 foreshadowed the 9/11 attack, Ayman

penned by radical Saudi cleric Nasir al Fahd. Indeed, the language used, research cited, and arguments put forth are nothing short of detailed and deliberate. Reading as both a religious duty to
kill millions of Americans and a lengthy suicide note together, this piece of literature is something we

must take seriously with Zawahiri now at the helm of alQaeda. The time may have come for al-Qaedas new CEO to leave a legacy of his own. Concluding the authors note, Mowatt-Larssen states, Even
if this theory proves to be wrong, it is better to overestimate the enemy than to underestimate him. Conventional wisdom holds that al-Qaeda is spentthat they are incapable of carrying out
another 9/11. Leaving aside whether this view is correct, for which I harbor grave doubts, we will surely miss the signs of the next attack if we continue to overestimate our own successes, and
dismiss what terrorists remain capable of accomplishing when they put their minds to it.

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[Name]

InternalCredibilityEXTN
Plan solves US counter terrorism credibility we look like fools because we make decisions based on
political meandering and grudges
Obejas 2011
[Achy Obejas, award-winning author and WBEZ reporter, U.S. Terror List 2011: Cuba, seriously? August 26, 2011,
http://www.wbez.org/blog/achy-obejas/2011-08-26/us-terror-list-2011-cuba-seriously-91116]jap
the Obama administration still managed to release its 2010 State Department report on
countries that sponsor terrorism, the so-called terrorist countries list. On it: Iran, Sudan, Syria and, holding the all-time spot since 1982, Cuba. Off it: Pakistan and Afghanistan. Now look at the reports opening graf: Al-Qaida
Busy with dealing with Libya, Gadhafi, earthquakes in New York and hurricanes in D.C.,

(AQ) remained the preeminent terrorist threat to the United States in 2010. Though the AQ core in Pakistan has become weaker, it retained the capability to conduct regional and transnational attacks. Cooperation between AQ and Afghanistan- and Pakistan-based

What kind of credibility can such a report have when its own description of the preeminent
terrorist threat to this country names two countries not on the list? And Cuba? The reports first mention in its focus on the Western Hemisphere is actually
laughable: In July, Venezuelan officials arrested and extradited the Salvadoran Francisco Chavez Abarca in connection with
the bombings of Cuban hotels in 1997. In other words, Cuba as victim, not perpetrator, of terrorism. Just a tad ironic? In fact, this is pretty much the nut on Cuba
militants was critical to the threat the group posed. Seriously?

in the whole report: Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982, the Government of Cuba maintained a public stance against terrorism and terrorist financing in 2010, but there was no evidence that it had severed ties with elements from the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and recent media reports indicate some current and former members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) continue to reside in Cuba. Available information suggested that the Cuban government maintained limited contact
with FARC members, but there was no evidence of direct financial or ongoing material support. In March, the Cuban government allowed Spanish Police to travel to Cuba to confirm the presence of suspected ETA members. In other words, Cuba may still have
relations with FARC but were not sure the extent. It doesnt look like theyre giving them money or anything else. And while some Basque terrorists continue to live in exile in Cuba, Cuba is cooperating with Spain about them. Cuba has been used as a transit point
by third-country nationals looking to enter illegally into the United State. The Government of Cuba is aware of the border integrity and transnational security concerns posed by such transit and investigated third country migrant smuggling and related criminal activities.
In November, the government allowed representatives of the Transportation Security Administration to conduct a series of airport security visits throughout the island. Look carefully at the last sentence: the TSA is a U.S. government entity in other words,

Cuba is cooperating with the U.S. on airport security. That sounds like a warmer, fuzzier relationship than we have with our
close allies Pakistan and Afghanistan. And heres the rest: Cuba did not pass new counterterrorism legislation in 2010. The Cuban government continued to aggressively pursue persons suspected of terrorist acts in Cuba. In
July, Venezuela extradited Salvadoran national Francisco Antonio Chavez Abarca to Cuba for his alleged role in a number of hotel and tourist location bombings in the mid to late 1990s. In December, a Cuban court convicted Chavez Abarca on terrorism charges and
sentenced him to 30 years in prison. Also in December, the Cuban Supreme Court commuted the death sentences of two Salvadorans, Ren Cruz Len and Otto Ren Rodrguez Llerena, who had been convicted of terrorism, and sentenced them both to 30 years. In

Cuba is prosecuting people who have committed terrorism against the island, much like we in the U.S. prosecute terrorists who have sought to harm us. Cuba did not
, Cuba is busy trying not to sink economically into the sea. Can not
attending conferences actually be a basis for being considered a terrorist state? And lastly: Cuba continued to denounce U.S. counterterrorism efforts throughout the world,
other words,

sponsor counterterrorism initiatives or participate in regional or global operations against terrorists in 2010. Basically

portraying them as a pretext to extend U.S. influence and power. We can argue all day long about the second part of the sentence but why is this even in the report? Does criticizing the U.S. serve as a basis for being labeled a terrorist? If thats so, most of the world

its inclusion on this list in the past may have been justifiable
but when President Obama and Secretary Clinton release a report such as this, it does nothing but diminish U.S. credibility
and demean our status. Get real: Take Cuba off the damn list. The South Florida vote isnt gonna come because of this. (Hint: Jobs. And then maybe.)
including many of our Western European allies would have to be included. God knows theres plenty to bitch about with Cuba and

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[Name]

InternalFocusEXTN
Removing Cuba from the terrorist list allows for the United States to better address terrorism
Johnson et al., National Security Program Director, 2010,
(Andy, Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, Kristina Lilac, "RE: End the Embargo of Cuba", Third Way, 9-16, PAS)
content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf 4-11-13
Cuba also remains on the State Departments state sponsor of terrorism list along with Iran, Syria, and Sudan,5 despite claims by
experts such as former National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism Richard Clarke that Cuba is only on the list for
domestic political reasons.6 A 1998 report by the US Intelligence Community determined that Cuba does not pose a threat to US
national security,7 yet the State Department continues to keep Cuba on the list. By normalizing relations with Cuba and removing
Cuba from the list, the State Department could better focus on actual state sponsors of terror and instead use resources in the Western
Hemisphere bureau to initiate a new path for engaging Cuba.

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[Name]

MPXA2:NoEscalation
Balance of power guarantees nuclear escalation
Primakov, 09
[September, Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian
Academy of Sciences; member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. This article is based on the scientific report for
which the author was awarded the Lomonosov Gold Medal of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2008, The Middle East Problem
in the Context of International Relations]jap
The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the
Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union
supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at
that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation . On the other hand, the
Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such devel- opments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the
wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairos decision to nation- alize the Suez Canal Company) the United
States contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed along with the Soviet Union for the
cessation of the armed action. Wash- ington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the posi- tions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet
Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other
to cool down their clients. When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at
the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct nego- tiations on
behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken
identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intend- ed to help the crew of the attacked ship
and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian

publications of those years argued that it was the


Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S.
reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite
tense. Sentiments both in Washing- ton and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real
action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations
and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, Pres- ident Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overre- acted but that this had
been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by
Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to demonstrate Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israels refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader
Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the
superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded
that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The

U.S.
military opera- tion in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi
counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East pro- cesses. I do not
belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a
techno- logical level that would let it make such a decision (the Japanese model) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such
circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic conse- quences for the whole world. The
transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional con- flicts, which increases the latters danger and reduces
the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a
preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However,

fears have increased that such a strike


can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President
Obamas position does not com- pletely rule out such a possibility.

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MPXA2:NoMotive
Al Qaeda wants nukes- New leader proves
Word Press ,10
( Nov 17, Al QaedasNuclearAmbitions:Ayman al-Zawahiri promises to make his next smoking gun a mushroom cloud
http://sigmundcarlandalfred.wordpress.com/2010/11/17/al-qaedas-nuclear-ambitions-ayman-al-zawahiri-promises-to-make-his-nextsmoking-gun-a-mushroom-cloud/)jap
American authorities managed to foil al Qaedas latest plot to attack via hidden explosives in mail parcels but the long-term question remains unanswered: How can they ensure that they
stay one step ahead of the terrorist group? The good news is that theres no need to wonder what the terrorists strategic and tactical goals are one need only listen to what their leaders have
already told us. The bad news is that we no doubt wont like what we hear. Al

Qaedas leaders yearn to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction


against the United States; if they acquired a nuclear bomb, they would not hesitate to use it. Indeed, such an attack would be
meant to serve as a sort of sequel to the 9/11 plot. The evidence for those intentions arent hidden in encoded communications or classified intelligence. Quite the
opposite: Theyre hidden in plain sight. Just as Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa to declare war on the United States in 1998, his deputy,
Ayman al-Zawahiri, issued a fatwa a decade later to herald a prospective next stage in the conflict. If we take him at his word,
some day jihadists will use weapons of mass destruction to change history once and for all.

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Evidence from bin Ladens compound proves capability to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan
Lake, Washinton Times, 5-5-11
(Eli, Evidence at bin Ladens home raises nuclear concerns http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/5/evidence-at-binladens-home-raises-nuclear-concern/)jap
Intelligence analysts are sifting through phone numbers and email addresses found at Osama bin Ladens compound to
determine potential links to Pakistani government and military officials while U.S. officials and analysts raise concerns about
the safety of Pakistans nuclear materials. According to three U.S. intelligence officials, the race is on to identify what President Obamas top counterterrorism adviser,
John Brennan, has called bin Ladens support system inside Pakistan. These sources sought anonymity because they are not authorized to speak to reporters. My concern now is that we
cannot exclude the possibility that officers in the Pakistani military and the intelligence service were helping to harbor or aware of the location of bin Laden, said Olli Heinonen, who served as
the deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 2005 to 2010. What

is to say they would not help al Qaeda or other


terrorist groups to gain access to sensitive nuclear materials such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium? The U.S. has
worried quietly about the infiltration of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and military for years. Those concerns
heightened in recent months when the CIA learned that bin Ladens compound in Abbottabad was a stones throw from
Pakistan's military academy. Politico first reported this week that CIA Director Leon E. Panetta told members of Congress that bin Ladens clothing had two phone numbers
sewn into it at the time of the raid. Those numbers and other contacts found at the compound are key clues in an effort to determine what elements of Pakistans national security establishment
provided support to bin Laden and al Qaeda. I can tell you that concern about al Qaeda and other terrorists infiltration into the ISI is not new on the part of the Congress or the [George W.]
Bush and Obama administrations, said Rep. Steve Rothman, a New Jersey Democrat who serves on two House Appropriations subcommittees that fund defense and foreign aid. Mr. Rothman
has attended top-secret briefings on the Abbottabad raid and the impact of the raid on Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a matter of course, and for good reason, the materials that were removed
from bin Ladens home in Pakistan are being run down for leads that could assist the United States in apprehending individuals or entities who have sought to harm Americans or who have
enabled others to harm Americans, he said.

Another U.S. intelligence official told The Washington Times that other phone numbers and
emails were recovered in the raid. Mr. Rothman said al Qaeda operatives in 2009 came within 60 kilometers of what is
believed to have been Pakistans nuclear arsenal, though he could not elaborate on the incident. Two years ago, al Qaeda
came close, too close for comfort, Mr. Rothman said. That resulted in new safeguards and new measures taken by the
United States and Pakistan and others to minimize any possibility of anyone acquiring the Pakistani nuclear weapons or
material. Pakistan is neither a member of the IAEA nor a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nonetheless, it has agreed to some IAEA safeguards on its civil nuclear program,
but nothing comprehensive. Analysts estimate Pakistan to have more than 100 nuclear weapons. The latest estimate by Princeton Universitys International Panel on Fissile Materials, which
takes account of the worlds nuclear material, estimates that Pakistan possesses between 1.6 tons and 3.8 tons of weapons-grade uranium and between 132 pounds and 286 pounds of
plutonium. Up to now, the Pakistanis have said the nuclear material is under military and ISI control and particularly the plutonium and highly enriched uranium, Mr. Heinonen said. These
are from facilities that are not under A Feb. 19, 2009, cable from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad said the nuclear arsenal is under the control of the secular military, which has implemented
extensive physical, personnel and command and control safeguards. Our

major concern has not been that an Islamic militant could steal an entire
weapon but rather the chance someone working in [Pakistani government] facilities could gradually smuggle enough fissile
material out to eventually make a weapon and the vulnerability of weapons in transit, said the cable, which was released
Wednesday by the anti-secrecy website WikiLeaks.

Still a huge threat


Brookes 2011
[Peter Brookes is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, Al-Qaeda neither down nor
out globally, Tuesday, September 13, 2011, http://www.bostonherald.com/news/opinion/op_ed/view/2011_0913alqaeda_neither_down_nor_out_globally/]jap
On the eve of Sundays 9/11 anniversary memorials, White House counterterrorism boss John Brennan told the A ssociated P ress that al-Qaeda is on a steady
slide, on the ropes and taking shots to the body and head. But is al-Qaeda really facing the agony of defeat? While Brennan may be spot-on if hes referring to
al-Qaedas core that part of the terror group linked with 9/11 and holed up in Pakistans tribal areas it may not be true for al-Qaeda globally. Of
course, the recent killing of Osama bin Laden was a major body blow to the terror group, especially from an inspirational and ideological standpoint. Its also awesome
that a U.S. drone took out Atiyah al Rahman in Pakistan last month, offing al-Qaedas new No. 2 right after hed replaced Ayman al Zawahiri, the Egyptian who moved
up to replace Osama as No. 1. But al-Qaeda these days is increasingly decentralized and as dangerous as ever . For instance, theres al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula, home-based in Yemen. Many counterterror specialists believe AQAP is actually the most dangerous element in al-Qaedas global
network. Among its leaders is Anwar al Awlaki, the U.S.-born Yemeni cleric who had contact with the 9/11 hijackers and has been linked to the Fort Hood shooter and
the Detroit underwear bomber. AQAP may already control territory in Yemens South, even as the central government teeters on collapse in the Arab Springs
aftermath just what the group needs to plan and train for its next terror plot. AQAP is also increasingly networked with al Shabab, an alQaeda wing that is a growing problem in Somalia, a lawless country probably best known for its bands of modern-day pirates. The State Department has called al
Shabab the most significant threat in East Africa. Experts worry that it will train foreign fighters, wholl return home to Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya and
Uganda and beyond, including the United States. West Africa, meanwhile, is seeing the rise of a new al-Qaeda club called Boko Haram (Western education is
sinful), operating in Nigeria, Africas largest U.S. oil supplier and most populous country. Boko Haram was fingered for the August suicide attack on a UN building in
Abuja, killing more than 20 people. Also seemingly on the offensive: Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which is testing local security forces as U.S. troops withdraw. Of course, there
are others with al-Qaeda ties, too, including the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban (which trained the Times Square bomber) and Lashkar e Taiba (responsible for the
Mumbai attacks). So while Brennan makes a seemingly fair point about al-Qaedas core, the struggle against Islamist intolerance and violence unfortunately doesnt

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appear to be over quite yet. With
cronies.

[Name]
no fewer than 40 terror plots here since 9/11 the last thing we should be is complacent about al-Qaeda or its

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MPXWarEXTN
Terrorism causes Extinction tensions rise
Sid-Ahmed 4 Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Al-Ahram Weekly political analyst, 2004, Al-Ahram Weekly, "Extinction!" 8/26, no. 705,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm
What would be the consequences of a nuclear

attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and
frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the
expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate . It would also
speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the
attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war , from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which
ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole
planet, we will all be losers.

Even a 1% risk of nuclear terrorism demands action


Bunn 10 Matthew Bunn, (Prof., Government, Harvard U.), DEBATING TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM:
CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSES, CONTEXTS, AND RESPONSES, 2010, 179.
Even a 1 percent chance of nuclear terrorism over the next ten years
would be enough to justify substantial action to reduce the risk, given the unimaginable scale of the consequences. No one in his right mind
would operate a nuclear power plant upwind of a major city that had a 1 percent chance over ten years of blowing sky-high -- the risk would
be understood by all to be too great. But that, in effect, is what countries are doing -- or worse -- by managing the world's nuclear
stockpiles as they do today, and by not doing nearly as much as they should to address the multifaceted threat of nuclear terrorism.
The fact is that estimates and models of fundamentally unknown probabilities only go so far.

Nuclear terrorism undermines the nuclear taboo


Bin 9 (5-22-09 About the Authors Prof. Li Bin is a leading Chinese expert on arms control and is currently the director of Arms
Control Program at the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University. He received his Bachelor and Master Degrees in
Physics from Peking University before joining China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) to pursue a doctorate in the technical
aspects of arms control. He served as a part-time assistant on arms control for the Committee of Science, Technology and Industry
for National Defense (COSTIND).Upon graduation Dr. Li entered the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics
(IAPCM) as a research fellow and joined the COSTIND technical group supporting Chinese negotiation team on Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT). He attended the final round of CTBT negotiations as a technical advisor to the Chinese negotiating team.
Nie Hongyi is an officer in the Peoples Liberation Army with an MA from Chinas National Defense University and a Ph.D. in
International Studies from Tsinghua University, which he completed in 2009 under Prof. Li Bin. )
The nuclear

taboo is a kind of international norm and this type of norm is supported by the promotion of the norm through international social exchange. But
at present the increased threat of nuclear terrorism has lowered peoples confidence that nuclear weapons will not be used. China and
the United States have a broad common interest in combating nuclear terrorism. Using technical and institutional measures to break the foundation of nuclear terrorism
and lessen the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack can not only weaken the danger of nuclear terrorism itself but also strengthen
peoples confidence in the nuclear taboo, and in this way preserve an international environment beneficial to both China and the United States. In this way
even if there is crisis in China-U.S. relations caused by conflict, the nuclear taboo can also help both countries reduce suspicions about the nuclear

weapons problem, avoid miscalculation and thereby reduce the danger of a nuclear war.

Terrorism is the highest risk of extinction


Rhodes 9 RICHARD RHODES He has been a visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and currently he is an affiliate of the Center for
International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Rhodes is the author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), which
won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award. It was the first of four volumes
he has written on the history of the nuclear age. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (1995), Arsenals of Folly: The Making
of the Nuclear Arms Race (2007), and The Twilight of the Bombs (forthcoming in autumn 2010) are the others. Reducing the nuclear
threat: The argument for public safety 14 DECEMBER 2009
The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed
PDF them in 2005. This group of 85 experts judged that the possibility of a WMD attack against a city or other target somewhere in
the world is real and increasing over time. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by
2015 doubled to 20 percent median. There was strong, though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a

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terrorist organization than by a government. The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or
manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It
is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11
attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-

"For the
foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear
national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded:

explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us
to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely:

A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a


retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators . That response would surely initiate a new
round of nuclear armament and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think
of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq,
that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

Probability of nuclear terrorism in the next ten years is greater than fifty percent greatest threat to
America
Chuck Freilich, April 2010, The author was a Deputy National Security Adviser in Israel and is now a Senior Fellow at the Harvard
Kennedy School, where he has just completed a book on national security decision making processes in Israel. He is also an Adjunct
Professor at New York University, The Armageddon Scenario: Israel and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, The Begin-Sadat Center
For Strategic Studies (Bar-Ilan University) Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 84
According to reports since 2003, the threat of nuclear terrorism is growing. For example, the 2003 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism warned that the risk of nuclear terrorism has
increased significantly and that it posed one of the greatest threats to the national security of the US and its allies. The 2006 report stressed that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism
poses one of the gravest threats. The

2008 report of the Congressionally appointed Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism warned that the danger of nuclear terrorism is growing and, in the absence of urgent and decisive
international action, that nuclear or biological terrorism is likely to occur somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. Presidents George Bush and
Barack Obama have both termed nuclear terrorism the greatest threat facing the United States. Indeed, President Obama will even convene a global summit
focusing on the threat of nuclear terrorism in April 2010. The Director of National Intelligence, John Michael McConnell, testified before Congress in February 2008 that al-Qaeda and other
terrorist groups continue to seek nuclear weapons.3 Former

US Secretary of Defense William Perry has warned that the probability of a nuclear
terrorist attack in the next 10 years e xceeds 50 percent , a view shared by Harvard expert Graham Allison.4 US Defense Secretary Robert Gates
stated in January 2010 that "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear"5 would keep him awake at night.

You should prioritize the sheer magnitude of a nuclear terrorist attack probability doesnt apply to our
scenario
Graham Allison, 2007, Professor of Government, and Faculty Chair of the Dubai Initiative Harvard Universitys Kennedy School
of Government, Symposium: Apocalypse When?, The National Interest, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-7276950/Thethree-nos-knows.html
MUELLER IS entitled to his opinion that the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is "exaggerated" and "overwrought." But analysts of various political persuasions, in and out
of government, are virtually unanimous in their judgment to the contrary. As the national-security community learned during the Cold War, risk

= likelihood x consequences.
Thus, even when the likelihood of nuclear Armageddon was small, the consequences were so catastrophic that prudent policymakers
felt a categorical imperative to do everything that feasibly could be done to prevent that war. Today, a single nuclear bomb exploding
in just one city would change our world. Given such consequences, differences between a 1 percent and a 20 percent likelihood of
such an attack are relatively insignificant when considering how we should respond to the threat. Richard Garwin, a designer of the hydrogen bomb
who Enrico Fermi once called "the only true genius I had ever met", told Congress in March that he estimated a "20 percent per year probability [of a nuclear
explosion--not just a contaminated, dirty bomb--a nuclear explosion] with American cities and European cities included." My Harvard colleague Matthew Bunn
has created a model in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science that estimates the probability of a nuclear
terrorist attack over a ten-year period to be 29 percent--identical to the average estimate from a poll of security experts commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005.
My book, Nuclear Terrorism, states my own best judgment that, on the current trend line, the chances of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next decade are
greater than 50 percent. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has expressed his own view that my work may even underestimate the risk.
Warren Buffet, the world's most successful investor and legendary odds-maker in pricing insurance policies for unlikely but catastrophic events, concluded that nuclear
terrorism is "inevitable." He stated, "I don't see any way that it won't happen."

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***2ACANSWERS***

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**Counterplans**

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A2:GenericProcessCPs
Only two ways to do the plan both are Presidential
Sullivan 2005
[Mark P. Sullivan Specialist in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Cuba and the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List, CRS Report for Congress, May 13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32251.pdf]jap
Under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, a countrys retention on the terrorism list may be rescinded in two ways. The first
option is for the President to submit a report to Congress certifying that 1) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and
policies of the government of the country concerned; 2) the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and 3) the
government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. The second option is for the
President to submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days before the proposed recision will take effect, justifying the recision and
certifying that 1) the government concerned has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month
period; and 2) the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

Presidential removal normal means Obama has already paved the way for the announcement
Kasperowicz 2013
[Pete Kasperowicz - Reporter for The Hill's Floor Action Blog, 05/30/13, State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list,
http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements]jap
Critics of the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism have long argued that the State Department has always had a thin
case for listing Cuba at all. A Washington lawyer with expertise in Cuba and international law, Robert Muse, told The Hill that none of the three reasons
listed by State are enough to satisfy the legal requirements that must be met to list a country as a state sponsor of terrorism. Muse said arguments about harboring U.S. fugitives are especially
weak, since U.S. law says designations must be made against countries that "repeatedly provided support for international terrorism." As such, Muse said the fact that fugitives from U.S. justice are living in Cuba is not enough to trigger a mention in the report unless

The Obama administration


has left the door open to taking Cuba off the list at some point in the future," Muse said. One fugitive from U.S. justice now living in Cuba is Joanne Chesimard, who killed a New
those fugitives have committed international terrorist acts. Muse also said the other two reasons have been so diluted that the Obama administration could be setting the stage for removing Cuba from the list. "

Jersey state trooper in 1973 and fled to Cuba. Earlier this month, the FBI put Chesimard on its "most wanted" list of terrorists, although State's report does not name her specifically. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) said in reaction to the report that it rightfully keeps

"The report reaffirms that the Cuban dictatorship provides safe haven to foreign terrorist organizations
such as the FARC and ETA and harbors fugitives wanted in the United States, one of them being Joanne Chesimard who is
wanted for the murder of a New Jersey State Trooper," she said. Decisions by the government to remove countries from the list of
state sponsors of terrorism can be made at any time by the president. These decisions are independent of the Country Reports
on Terrorism, which always review actions from the prior year. To remove a country from the list, the president must give
notice to Congress by submitting a report outlining why this change is being made.
Cuba on the list, and noted Chesimard.

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A2:GrossCondition
Removal of Cuba from the terrorism list increases U.S. leverage leads to resolution on Gross
Financial Times, 2012,
(Marc Frank, Financial Times Correspondent, US relations with Cuba unlikely to warm, whoever enters White House: Foreign
policy, 9-26, PAS) Accessed on ProQuest 4-18-13
Although pro-embargo forces are expected to remain a strong influence in Congress even if Mr Obama wins, some advocates of a new
Cuba policy hope he will use executive privilege to get round them. One factor may be if Cuba is taken off the list of state sponsors of
terrorism for helping to broker peace talks between the Colombian government and the country's Marxist Farc rebels. If the Farc lays
down its weapons, that could help lead to Mr Gross's release and open the way for further advances. "With the peace talks of the
Colombian government with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [Farc] under the partial sponsorship of Cuba, it will be
very difficult to keep Cuba on the terrorism list," Tony Zamora, a Miami-based lawyer, anti-embargo activist and Bay of Pigs veteran,
says. The first round of peace talks is due to begin in Oslo on October 8 and to continue in Havana.

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A2:CubaHegemony
No link Cuba is a small player doesnt hurt U.S. regional hegemony
Johnson et al., National Security Program Director, 2010,
(Andy, Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, Kristina Lilac, "RE: End the Embargo of Cuba", Third Way, 9-16, PAS)
content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf 4-11-13
Opponents to lifting the embargo have raised a number of objections. None of them withstand scrutiny. Peter Brookes, a former
deputy assistant secretary of defense under George W. Bush, said that lifting the embargo could lead to Cuba becoming a regional
power, arguing that the US [doesnt] need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America,
the Caribbeanor beyond.14 While Venezuela, for example, has challenged the US on some interests, its anti-American
leadership has not been able to present a serious counterweight to the US or have a significant impact on US security. Given that
Venezuela is a much bigger economic player than Cuba due to its oil revenues, it is highly unlikely that Cuba would pose a
significant geopolitical challenge to the US, even if significant sums of money enter Cubas economy.

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A2:TerrorismDA
No link Cuba does not contribute to terrorism
CFR, Council on Foreign Relations, 2010,
(Backgrounder, "State Sponsors: Cuba", 3-23, PAS) www.cfr.org/cuba/state-sponsors-cuba/p9359?breadcrumb=%2Fissue
%2F458%2F 4-13-13
Does Cuba support terrorism? The U.S. government says yes, but many experts are skeptical. The State Department placed Cuba on
its list of states that sponsor terrorism in 1982, citing Fidel Castro's training and arming of communist rebels in Africa and Latin
America. But intelligence experts have been hard pressed to find evidence that Cuba currently provides weapons or military training to
terrorist groups. In 1998, a comprehensive review by the U.S. intelligence community concluded that Cuba does not pose a threat to
U.S. national security, which implies that Cuba no longer sponsors terrorism. Critics argue that Cuba's place on the state sponsors list
is a remnant of the Cold War and that it distracts from current counterterrorism initiatives. In the 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism,
the State Department reported that Cuba "no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world"
but affirmed that "the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists."

Cuba has minimal support agreements with Iran and Syria


CFR, Council on Foreign Relations, 2010,
(Backgrounder, "State Sponsors: Cuba", 3-23, PAS) www.cfr.org/cuba/state-sponsors-cuba/p9359?breadcrumb=%2Fissue
%2F458%2F 4-13-13
Does Cuba have ties to states designated by the State Department as sponsors of terrorism? Yes, but the full extent of their
cooperation is not known. Cuba retains decades-old bilateral agreements with blacklisted nations such as Iran and Syria, and much
anti-American rhetoric has passed between Fidel Castro and leaders in those countries. However, imports and exports from these
countries make up only a minority of total Cuban trade.

No real reason to keep Cuba on the list they are working against terrorist groups
Richter 2013
[Paul Richter, Cuba still on U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, May 30, 2013 Los Angeles Times,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/30/world/la-fg-terror-list-20130531]jap
WASHINGTON

Cuba further distanced itself from terrorist activities last year but the U.S. government still considers it a state
sponsor of terrorism along with Syria, Iran and Sudan, according to the State Department's annual report. The report for 2012, released Thursday, says the government in
Cuba last year reduced support for Basque separatists in Southern Europe, joined a regional group that seeks to block
terrorism financing, and sponsored peace talks between Colombia and an armed rebel group. The report finds "no indication
that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary training to terrorist groups ." Countries listed by the State Department as state
sponsors of terrorism face economic and political sanctions, including U.S. opposition to any aid from the International Monetary Fund and other major financial institutions. The report says
there was a sharp uptick in Iran's sponsorship of terrorism around the world, including attacks or attempted attacks in India, Thailand, Georgia and Kenya. Critics contend that Cuba's

inclusion on the list is not justified and reflects the views of members of Congress who are fiercely opposed to the communist
leaders in Havana. State Department officials are not considering delisting Cuba, which has been under a U.S. economic embargo since 1962. "The report makes it
clear that the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism ," said Geoff Thale, program director at the
Washington Office on Latin America, a liberal advocacy group. "Cuba is clearly on the terrorist list for political reasons." Cuba still shelters about two dozen
members of the separatist group Basque Homeland and Freedom, or ETA, one of the groups on the terrorist list, according to the report. But Havana has been reducing its support for the group
and no longer provides it with travel documents, the report says. Cuba also has provided haven for members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, another organization
on the terrorist list. But in November, Cuba began hosting peace talks between the Colombian government and the rebels. Washington

had faulted Cuba for doing too


little to prevent money laundering and international terrorist financing. But last year Cuba joined the Financial Action Task
Force of South America, an intergovernmental group that seeks to enforce U.S.-supported standards on such illicit activities.
Cuba's shift reflects changes in the country's leadership and a preoccupation with domestic economic problems, analysts say.

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**Politics**

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A2:InternalLinkObamaGetsBlame/Credit
Kerry takes the blame/credit
Lopez-Levy 2013
[Arturo Lopez Levy, Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate, University of Denver, Kerry's Cuba Sanity, 04/19/2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arturo-lopez-levy/kerrys-cuba-sanity_b_3112491.html]jap
President Obama's designation of John Kerry is also consistent with the political changes that have occurred in the CubanAmerican community, expressed by the elevated Cuban diaspora vote for Democrats in the last election. Like Kerry, and as thenSenate candidate Obama stated in 2004, most Cuban-Americans believe that the embargo has failed and that it is time to
influence the processes of economic reform and political liberalization that began in Cuba after the retirement of Fidel
Castro. Once public opinion turned against the war in Vietnam, the political leadership in the U.S. found it had no choice but to
follow suit. Kerry is better positioned than anyone to be a leader and see that point of departure when it comes to U.S. policy
and Cuba.

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A2:LinkCubanAmerican
Cuban American Congress people dont represent the Cuban American public they are all for it and
already fighting Congress for it
Alfonso et al 6/11
[Mara Isabel Alfonso, PhD, CAF (Cuban Americans for Engagement), -Americans Oppose Designation of Cuba as a Sponsor of
Terrorism, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=94590#sthash.romGzOsd.dpuf]jap
We, the undersigned, are Cuban Americans opposed to the statement by three Cuban-American members of Congress, sent to
Secretary of State John Kerry on April 29th, regarding keeping Cuba on the State Departments list of state sponsors of
terrorism. See: http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/bipartisan-congressional-group-asks-administration-keep-cuba-state-sponsor-terrorism. Their expressed views do
not represent those of the majority of Cuban Americans. We feel strongly that the original reasons for adding Cuba to that list no
longer exist. If you apply the criteria described by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in taking North Korea off the list in 2008 no support for
terrorism in the last twenty years the removal of Cuba from this serious tool of U.S. foreign policy is long overdue. We also
believe that removing Cuba from the terrorist list would advance the process of other mutually-beneficial bilateral communications between Cuba and the United States. This is of the utmost
importance to the United States. The Boston marathon tragedy highlights the importance of international cooperation against terrorism. The issue must not be politicized. As proud Americans,
committed to the security of our nation, we urge the State Department to conduct a serious professional evaluation of Cubas presence on this list. Dealing with terrorism requires policy and
leadership divorced from politics and distractions. Removing Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list will enable the United States to look at the current challenges and opportunities
posed by Cuba. The island is a country in transition, not a national security threat. Recently Cuba has provided new opportunities on the island for private enterprise, the removal of travel
restrictions, an open market for housing and cars, among other things. Although we know there is much more to be done, it is imperative that the United States maintain an open line of
communication with Cuba while this transition continues to evolve. Thus,

we firmly denounce the statement by the three Cuban-American members of


Congress, who have falsely claimed to represent all Cuban Americans. Recent polls in the Cuban-American community, and in
the nation as a whole, demonstrate that current policy is not the wish or position of the Cuban-American community, or of the
American citizenry in general. A summary of recent polls may be viewed here:
http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Polling_Data_On_Engagement_with_Cuba_02_2012.pdfis We, therefore, request that you take into consideration the views of the majority of our
community and our nation regarding this important issue, and not just the views of two or three members of Congress.

They do not represent us.

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**Topicality**

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A2:EconomicEngagement
Being on the state sponsor list means no economic engagement if our aff isnt topical, no Cuba aff is
Sullivan 2005
[Mark P. Sullivan Specialist in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Cuba and the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List, CRS Report for Congress, May 13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32251.pdf]jap
The state sponsors of terrorism list is mandated under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (P.L.
96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)), under which the Secretary of State makes a determination when a country has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism. Cuba has remained on the list since 1982, and at present there are five other countries on the list Iran, Libya, Syria, Sudan,
and North Korea. Under various provisions of law, certain trade benefits, most foreign aid, support in the international financial
institutions, and other benefits are restricted or denied to countries named as state sponsors of international terrorism . Under the
authority of Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, validated licenses are required for exports of virtually all items to countries on the terrorism list, except items specially allowed by
public law, such as informational materials, humanitarian assistance, and food and medicine. Being

listed as a sponsor of international terrorism also restricts


bilateral assistance in annual foreign assistance appropriations acts, as required most recently in Section 527 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-447, Division D). Section 502 of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2462) makes a country ineligible for the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) if it is on the Section 6(j) terrorism list. Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2371) also prohibits assistance authorized
under the act to the government of a country that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Likewise, Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22
U.S.C. 2780) prohibits

the export or other provision of munitions to a country if the government has repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism.1 Cubas retention on the terrorism list has received more attention in recent years in light of increased support for legislative initiatives to
lift some U.S. economic sanctions under the current embargo. Should U.S. sanctions be removed , a variety of trade and aid restrictions would
nonetheless remain in place because of Cubas retention on the terrorism list. At this juncture, however, sanctions have not been removed and Cuba
remains subject to a comprehensive U.S. trade and financial embargo (pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961). In addition to the terrorism list
sanctions imposed by the Export Administration Act, Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2781) prohibits the sale or export of defense articles and defense
services if the President determines and certifies to Congress, by May 15 of each year, that the country is not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts. This list has been
issued annually since 1997, and currently includes Cuba, as well as Iran, Libya, North Korean, and Syria.2

Haas, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Director, 2000,


(Robert N., Vo. 42, No. 2, Summer, Pg. 114-115, PAS)
Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible
incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans or economic aid. Other equally
useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have
impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the
institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in todays global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve
the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders or the
termination of these benefits.

Lifting the Cuba off the terrorism list would increase economic engagement
Claver-Carone, U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC Director, 2013,
(Mauricio, Former U.S. Treasury Department Attorney-advisor, Former George Washington University Law Professor, "Cuba Sees an
Opening", The American, 4-2, PAS) www.american.com/archive/2013/april/cuba-should-remain-designated-as-a-state-sponsor-ofterrorism 4-4-13
Cubas Castro brothers have spent billions of dollars over the last decade seducing U.S. farm bureaus and agri-business to lobby Congress to support lifting sanctions on Cuba. Recently
recognizing that Congress is unlikely to support unconditional changes, and perceiving a possible opening with the new Secretary of State John Kerry, Castro

lobbyists have shifted

their focus to the Obama administration and a related goal: the removal of Cuba from the State Departments list of state sponsors of terrorism . Kerry
supported unilaterally easing sanctions on Cuba during his Senate career, and speculation that the State Department is considering removing Cuba from the state sponsor list which also
includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria has been spurred by news reports citing contradictory remarks from anonymous administration sources. Some high-level diplomats have suggested Cuba be
dropped from the list, according to the Boston Globe. But the State Department's spokesperson Victoria Nuland clarified in late February that it had no current plans to change Cuba's
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, that has not slowed efforts by those seeking rapprochement with the Castro regime, as a final decision will not be officially revealed until
April 30. Cuba has been on the state sponsors of terrorism list since 1982 due to its hostile acts and support of armed insurgency groups. While being

on the list of terrorist


sponsors imposes sanctions such as prohibiting the United States from selling arms or providing economic assistance, removing Cuba from that list would
have little effect on these sanctions, as these were separately codified in 1996. However, it would certainly hand the Castro brothers a major and unmerited diplomatic victory. The Castros
have long protested and sought to escape the ostracism associated with the terrorism listing, while refusing to modify the egregious behavior that earned them the designation. They are also
hoping the change could improve their standing among otherwise reluctant members of Congress and lead to an unconditional lifting of sanctions in the near future.

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