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FEDERALIST. No. 1
General Introduction
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 2
JAY
FEDERALIST No. 3
JAY
FEDERALIST No. 4
JAY
FEDERALIST No. 5
JAY
FEDERALIST No. 6
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an
enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state
of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now
proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more
alarming kind--those which will in all probability flow from
dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic
factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances
slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more
full investigation.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously
doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or
only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which
they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with
each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an
argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are
ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of
harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties
in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course
of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience
of ages.
The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There
are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the
collective bodies of society. Of this description are the love of
power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion--the jealousy of
power, or the desire of equality and safety. There are others which
have a more circumscribed though an equally operative influence
within their spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of
commerce between commercial nations. And there are others, not less
numerous than either of the former, which take their origin entirely
in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests,
hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the communities of which
they are members. Men of this class, whether the favorites of a
king or of a people, have in too many instances abused the
confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public
motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to
personal advantage or personal gratification.
The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a
prostitute,1 at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of
his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the
SAMNIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
MEGARENSIANS,2 another nation of Greece, or to avoid a
prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a
supposed theft of the statuary Phidias,3 or to get rid of the
accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the
funds of the state in the purchase of popularity,4 or from a
combination of all these causes, was the primitive author of that
famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the
name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after various vicissitudes,
intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian
commonwealth.
The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,
permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,5
entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid
prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the
favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he
precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the
plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and
independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his
counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a
sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy,
it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once
the instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female,6 the
petulance of another,7 and the cabals of a third,8 had in
the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a
considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often
descanted upon not to be generally known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in
the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic,
according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.
Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from
which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of
instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature
will not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either
of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a
reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with
propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among
ourselves. If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to
be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a
civil war.
But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in
this particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing
men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace
between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other.
The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of
commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to
extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into
wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to
waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will
be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of
mutual amity and concord.
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true
interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and
philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in
fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found
that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a more active
and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote
considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in
practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the
former administered by MEN as well as the latter? Are there not
aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust
acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular
assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment,
jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities?
Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed
by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of
course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those
individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change
the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and
enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not
been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has
become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned
by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of
commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the
appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let experience, the
least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer
to these inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of
them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as
often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring
monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better than a
wellregulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and
conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the
very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her
arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before
Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of
Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.
Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of
ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope
Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league,9
which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty
republic.
The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts
and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe.
They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the
sea, and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the
opponents of Louis XIV.
In the government of Britain the representatives of the people
compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been
for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations,
nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the
wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous
instances, proceeded from the people.
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular
as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of
their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their
monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their
inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the
State. In that memorable struggle for superiority between the rival
houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame,
it is well known that the antipathies of the English against the
French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite
leader,10 protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by
sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views
of the court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great
measure grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of
supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular
branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and
navigation.
From this summary of what has taken place in other countries,
whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what
reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce
us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members
of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not
already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle
theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the
imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every
shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden
age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our
political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the
globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and
perfect virtue?
Let the point of extreme depression to which our national
dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere
from a lax and ill administration of government, let the revolt of a
part of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances
in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in
Massachusetts, declare--!
So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with
the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of
discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion,
that it has from long observation of the progress of society become
a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation,
constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer
expresses himself on this subject to this effect: ``NEIGHBORING
NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their
common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and
their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood
occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all
states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their
neighbors.''11 This passage, at the same time, points out the
EVIL and suggests the REMEDY.
PUBLIUS.
1 Aspasia, vide ``Plutarch's Life of Pericles.''
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 ] Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public
gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the
statue of Minerva.
5 P Worn by the popes.
6 Madame de Maintenon.
7 Duchess of Marlborough.
8 Madame de Pompadour.
9 The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of
France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and
states.
10 The Duke of Marlborough.
11 Vide ``Principes des Negociations'' par 1'Abbe de Mably.
FEDERALIST. No. 7
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 8
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 9
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 10
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 11
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 12
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 13
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 14
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 15
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 16
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 17
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 18
FEDERALIST No. 19
FEDERALIST No. 20
FEDERALIST No. 21
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 22
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 23
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 24
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 25
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 26
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 27
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 28
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may
be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own
experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of
other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise
in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and
insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body
politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that the
idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we
have been told is the only admissible principle of republican
government), has no place but in the reveries of those political
doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental
instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national
government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be
employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it
should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia
of the residue would be adequate to its suppression; and the
national presumption is that they would be ready to do their duty.
An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause, eventually
endangers all government. Regard to the public peace, if not to the
rights of the Union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion
had not communicated itself to oppose the insurgents; and if the
general government should be found in practice conducive to the
prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe
that they would be disinclined to its support.
If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole
State, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different kind
of force might become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts
found it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders
within that State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of
commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought proper to have
recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State of New York had
been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the
inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for success in such an
enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not
have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force
for the execution of her design? If it must then be admitted that
the necessity of recurring to a force different from the militia, in
cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the State
governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the
national government might be under a like necessity, in similar
extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not
surprising that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the
abstract, should urge as an objection to the proposed Constitution
what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend;
and what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an
inevitable consequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale? Who
would not prefer that possibility to the unceasing agitations and
frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges of petty
republics?
Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in
lieu of one general system, two, or three, or even four
Confederacies were to be formed, would not the same difficulty
oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies?
Would not each of them be exposed to the same casualties; and when
these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same expedients
for upholding its authority which are objected to in a government
for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition, be more
ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the case
of a general union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due
consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is
equally applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we
have one government for all the States, or different governments for
different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire
separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to
make use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to
preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just
authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them which
amount to insurrections and rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a
full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against
military establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole
power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the
representatives of the people. This is the essential, and, after
all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the
people, which is attainable in civil society. [1]
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents,
there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original
right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of
government, and which against the usurpations of the national
rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success
than against those of the rulers of an individual state. In a
single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become
usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which
it consists, having no distinct government in each, can take no
regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumultuously
to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except
in their courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms
of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition in embryo.
The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it
be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of
opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early
efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their
preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession
of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where
the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a
peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the
popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance
increase with the increased extent of the state, provided the
citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them.
The natural strength of the people in a large community, in
proportion to the artificial strength of the government, is greater
than in a small, and of course more competent to a struggle with the
attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. But in a
confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be
entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always
the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand
ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these
will have the same disposition towards the general government. The
people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly
make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they
can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. How wise
will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves
an advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system,
that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies,
afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by
the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked
under pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies
of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will have
better means of information. They can discover the danger at a
distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the
confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of
opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the
community. They can readily communicate with each other in the
different States, and unite their common forces for the protection
of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have
already experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign
power. And it would have precisely the same effect against the
enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the
federal army should be able to quell the resistance of one State,
the distant States would have it in their power to make head with
fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be
abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and the moment the
part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its
efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.
We should recollect that the extent of the military force must,
at all events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a
long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army;
and as the means of doing this increase, the population and natural
strength of the community will proportionably increase. When will
the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain
an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the
people of an immense empire, who are in a situation, through the
medium of their State governments, to take measures for their own
defense, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of
independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a
disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources of
argument and reasoning.
PUBLIUS.
FNA1-@1 Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.
FEDERALIST No. 29
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 30
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 31
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 32
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 33
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 34
FEDERALIST No. 35
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 36
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 37
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 38
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 39
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 40
The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined
and Sustained
From the New York Packet.
Friday, January 18, 1788.
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 41
General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
For the Independent Journal.
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 42
The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 22, 1788.
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 43
The Same Subject Continued(The Powers Conferred by the
Constitution Further Considered)
For the Independent Journal.
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 44
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 45
The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State
Governments Considered
For the Independent Fournal.
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 46
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 47
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 48
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 49
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 50
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 51
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 52
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 53
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 54
The Apportionment of Members Among the States
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 55
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 56
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 57
The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the
Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 58
Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the
Progress of Population Demands Considered
MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 59
HAMILTON
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 61
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 62
The Senate
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST. No. 63
HAMILTON OR MADISON
FEDERALIST No. 64
JAY
FEDERALIST No. 65
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 66
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 67
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 68
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 69
FEDERALIST No. 70
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 70
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 71
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 72
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 73
The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
From the New York Packet.
Friday, March 21, 1788.
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 74
The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning
Power of the Executive
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, March 25, 1788.
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 75
The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 76
The Appointing Power of the Executive
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, April 1, 1788.
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 77
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 78
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 79
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 80
The Powers of the Judiciary
From McLEAN's Edition, New York.
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST. No. 81
HAMILTON
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 83
HAMILTON
FEDERALIST No. 84
FEDERALIST No. 85
Concluding Remarks
From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.
HAMILTON