Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Engl 5183 Graduate Project Edit Carter
Engl 5183 Graduate Project Edit Carter
Engl 5183 Graduate Project Edit Carter
David
L.
Murphy
&
Clifton
W.
Scott
Captain Eyre Shaw of the London Metropolitan Fire Bridge, in 1873, made the
following statement after visiting several fire departments in the United States:
The day will come when your fellow countrymen will be obliged to open their
eyes to the fact if a man learns the business of a fireman only by attending fires, he
must of necessity learn it badlyI am convinced that where study and training are
omitted, the fire department will never be capable of dealing satisfactorily with
great emergencies.
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I dedicate my part of this effort to the best man I will ever know my
Dad James E. Murphy (1928-2011)
Formatted: Right
Will Carter, Jr 4/23/14 11:47 PM
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Will Carter, Jr 4/23/14 11:47 PM
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Will Carter, Jr 4/17/14 9:51 PM
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Table
of
Contents
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References..
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Foreword
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I'm a great believer that any tool that enhances communication has
profound effects in terms of how people can learn from each other, and how
they can achieve the kind of freedoms that they're interested in.
Bill Gates
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If you think taking care of yourself is selfish, change your mind. If you
don't, you're simply ducking your responsibilities.
Ann Richards
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There are many obvious problems that are routinely associated with
hazardous, ineffective tactical operations such as:
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Haphazard safety
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Equipment failures
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Given your own experience, would you also generally agree that firefighters
are pretty lucky based upon the amount of near-misses and close calls you have
witnessed while performing routine fire department functions?
As first responders, dont we see the same screw-ups over and over without
apparent changes being made? Why do they continue to occur?
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Read the latest edition of any fire related publication, what is usually the subject of
the lead headline? Why do we so often wait until someone is hurt or killed before
we seek to make simple changes to policy and procedures and then provide the
necessary training?
Perhaps our reluctance to really reflect on our near-misses in conversation is
a big part of the problem. Those conversations are tricky and, in the short term, it
may just be easier to move on. But, if there is no intervention, one can expect that
these occurrences will continue to happen. We believe one of the simplest but most
far-reaching ways to stop the cycle is to conduct more and better After Action
Reviews (AARs), identify the weak links, and then act upon the findings. We will
never eliminate danger in the fire service, but we should at least strive to minimize
the occurrence and severity of the inevitable when it eventually does happen.
Chapter 1
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Efforts and courage are not enough without purpose and direction.
John F. Kennedy
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Every fire department has its own culture of doing things and its own way of
communicating about what its doing. The challenge and the opportunity is that
how we talk doesnt just reflect what we have done, but also shapes what we will
do in the future.
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What is an AAR really? Over the years, we have concluded that terms like
After Action Review and especially Post Incident Critique have a specific and
rather unfortunate meaning in the fire service, one that is inconsistent with the type
of strategic exercise we are describing. Thats why any time we talk about AARs
we begin by saying what an AAR is not. Although they are often well intentioned,
what is often labeled an After Action Review or Post Incident Critique in the fire
service is actually pretty far afield from the purposes for which these exercises
were originally designed.
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Anybody can become angry - that is easy, but to be angry with the right
person and to the right degree and at the right time and for the right purpose,
and in the right way - that is not within everybody's power and is not easy.
Aristotle
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An AAR exercise can vary a great deal from department to department. But,
what generally passes for an AAR, often called a Post Incident Critique, in the fire
service typically goes something as follows
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A large meeting is held in which leaders attempt to force down the throats of
their followers this rather convenient version of the story. Although it is
billed as a forum or an open discussion in which anyone can freely
express their point of view, this meeting generally features mostly oneway, top-down communication that seeks to silence. Oh, sure. A couple of
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folks might push back a little, but generally, most members go along to get
alongat least while they are on the front stage of a battalion- or
department-wide meeting.
Most participants recognize these faux reviews as the highly political
spectacles that they are. They view them with suspicion, and rightly so.
Little or nothing is learned, and reviews are mocked by a significant portion
of those who witnessed it. Lesson learned? Strategic post incident
communication is punitive, political bull@%&#.
A similar incident resulting from the same mistakes will happen again fairly
soon further reinforcing the diminished legitimacy of these forums. The
AAR facilitator/Incident commander should sincerely strive to not let the
AAR meeting be viewed as a punitive gathering. You simply cannot beat
people into submission.
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We call these things After Action Reviews or Post Incident Critiques, but
these discussions clearly arent accomplishing the purposes for which they were
intended. The problem is that we teach firefighters all the wrong lessons when we
run After Action Reviews. They learn that their point of view doesnt really matter
much, even if they were directly involved in the incident, and that AARs are just
phony meetings where firefighters either say what they know not to be true or
choose to say nothing at all about what they know is true. They learn that they
dont have to think critically and reflectively about their thoughts, actions, and
communications during an incident, but that someone above will do that for them;
therefore, why make the effort?
In many cases, firefighters have observed or experienced events and
behaviors that run contradictory to the preferred story of an AAR presentation.
They know not to say anything about it and a bitterness begins to set in because
individual views dont seem to matter.
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A training exercise
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Although each of the following points will get more attention in the chapters
that follow, lets being with what is meant by AAR. Over the years, we have come
to define AARs as formal or informal discussions among a small group of
participants that happen shortly after a major or minor incident and that involve
relatively open talk about what went well, what went poorly, what almost went
poorly, and what can be learned from it.
Lets note a few important things about that AAR definition:
First, AARs are best understood as small group discussions. It is almost
impossible to have a deep, reflective discussion about an incident if more than, say,
eight or ten people are involved. With larger numbers come more
misunderstandings, more politics, more agendas, and more blaming. Big reviews
like these either make us really angry or really bored.
Second, AARs happens after incidents both major and minor. We learn a lot
from a range of incidents, regardless of whether we recognize it and regardless of
whether those lessons are good or bad. We can learn better and better lessons if we
are willing to see AARs as not just something that happens after major mistakes
are made, but rather something that we do as a matter of habit; therefore,
consciously, mindfully, and after our successes, our near misses, our major
blunders, and our calls that were just okay.
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Where do we begin in the quest to becoming a safer and more efficient fire
department? First, we must have the buy-in of those in charge, the Fire Chief and
all officers. From the very beginning, we must all be willing to fully examine and
honestly critique our current operations, written policies, tactical procedures, and
most importantly ourselves. It is also imperative that all members of the
organization understand what actually constitutes an effective After Action
Review.
In simplest terms, an AAR is a continuous improvement exercise to:
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Discussion Questions:
1. Are After Action Reviews, formal or informal, currently being
performed in your department? Do they match the general
description or format of AARs provided above? Why or why not?
2. List and discuss examples of incidents where an informal AAR
would be appropriate.
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Chapter 2
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A man who carries a cat by the tail learns something he can learn in no
other way.
Mark Twain
While a potential for injury or improvement does exist for every call, not
every incident may warrant an AAR. A department can utilize an AAR for every
structure fire and any other incident that was deemed non-routine such as a
technical or difficult rescue. Every incident of potential positive or negative
consequence can be discussed either formally or informally.
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Incident Commanders are wise to review incidents that went well and those that
did not. Remember, the primary point of an AAR is a learning exercise in the
effort to make things better the next time for all involved. As the incident
commander or company officer, you feel like you fully understand what went well,
poorly, or almost poorly; however, your crew may not. They may not have seen
everything you saw; therefore, they may not have made the same connections.
10
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