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Balance of Payments PDF
Balance of Payments PDF
Macroeconomy
Resources
Blanchard ((2007),
), Macroeconomics: Chapters
p
18,, 19,, 20,, 21
Multinational
l
l Business Finance: Eiteman, S
Stonehill,
h ll Moffett
ff
and
d Pandey
d
((Tenth
h
Edition), 2007: Chapters 3
I t
International
ti
l Financial
Fi
i l Management:
M
t Apte
A t (Fourth
(F
th Edition),
Editi ) 2006:
2006 Chapter
Ch t 4
An exchange
h
rate is,
i simply,
i
l the
h price
i off one
nations currency in terms of another currency, often
termed the reference currency.
Example:
The supply
Th
l curve off a currency shows
h
the
h amount off that
h
currency supplied on the horizontal axis and the price of the
currency, given by the exchange rate, on the vertical axis
In either
h case, imports result
l in the
h countrys
currency being
b
supplied
The d
Th
demand
d curve for
f a currency shows
h
the
h value
l
off the
h
currency that is demanded at each possible exchange rate.
e1
e0
e2
DRs.
Q0
I t
Interpret
t exchange
h
rates
t e1 and
d e2
6
Hints
Think!
Any
y factor increasing
g the demand for currency
y will,, ceteris
paribus, increase the foreign exchange value of the currency,
that is, cause the currency to appreciate.
Any
y factor increasing
g the supply
pp y for currency
y will,, ceteris
paribus, decrease the foreign exchange value of the currency,
that is, cause the currency to depreciate
2)
3)
5)
6)
11
12
13
14
15
Merchandise Trade
Merchandise
M
h di trade
d should
h ld cover all
ll transactions
i
relating
l i
to
movable goods, where the ownership of goods changes from
residents to non-residents (exports) and from non-residents to
residents (imports).
Exports are the credit entries; while imports are the debit
entries
Invisibles
19
20
Other capital
p
includes any
y capital
p
transaction not included in the
above
21
Statistical Discrepancy
22
Official
Offi
i l reserves assets include
i l d gold,
ld foreign
f
i
currencies,
i
SDRs,
SDR reserve
positions in the IMF
The balance on current account and capital account together will result
in the countrys
y reserves of foreign
g exchange
g going
g
g up
p or down
correspondingly
23
Debits
Current Account
1
Exports
Imports
Invisibles
Balance on Current Account
$104,780
($156,334)
$91,481
($50,539)
($10,612)
Capital Account
4
Direct Investment
Portfolio Investment
6
7
Other Investments
Balance on Capital Account
Statistical Discrepancies
Overall Balance
$8,520
($2,787)
$68,115
($55,626)
$62,665
($56,194)
$24,693
$971
$336,532
($15 052)
($15,052)
24
Debits
Current Account
1
Exports
Imports
Invisibles
Balance on Current Account
$104,780
($156,334)
$91,481
($50,539)
($10,612)
Capital Account
4
Direct Investment
Portfolio Investment
6
7
Other Investments
Balance on Capital Account
Statistical Discrepancies
Overall Balance
$8,520
($2,787)
$68,115
($55,626)
$62,665
($56,194)
$24,693
$971
$336,532
In 2005-06, India
imported more
than it exported,
thus running a
current account
deficit of $10,612
million.
($15 052)
($15,052)
25
Debits
Current Account
1
Exports
Imports
Invisibles
Balance on Current Account
$104,780
($156,334)
$91,481
($50,539)
($10,612)
Capital Account
4
Direct Investment
Portfolio Investment
6
7
Other Investments
Balance on Capital Account
Statistical Discrepancies
Overall Balance
$8,520
($2,787)
$68,115
($55,626)
$62,665
($56,194)
During
D
i the
h same
year, India attracted
net investment of
$24 693 million
$24,693
clearly the rest of
the world found
India to be a good
place to invest.
$24,693
$971
$336,532
($15 052)
($15,052)
26
Debits
Current Account
1
Exports
Imports
Invisibles
Balance on Current Account
$104,780
($156,334)
$91,481
($50,539)
($10,612)
Capital Account
4
Direct Investment
Portfolio Investment
6
7
Other Investments
Balance on Capital Account
Statistical Discrepancies
Overall Balance
$8,520
($2,787)
$68,115
($55,626)
$62,665
($56,194)
Under a pure
flexible exchange
rate regime, these
numbers would
balance each other
out.
$24,693
$971
$336,532
($15 052)
($15,052)
27
Debits
Current Account
1
Exports
Imports
Invisibles
Balance on Current Account
$104,780
($156,334)
$91,481
($50,539)
($10,612)
Capital Account
4
Direct Investment
Portfolio Investment
6
7
$8,520
($2,787)
$68,115
($55,626)
Other Investments
Balance on Capital Account
$62,665
($56,194)
Statistical Discrepancies
Overall Balance
$971
In the real
world, there
is a statistical
discrepancy.
$24,693
$336,532
($15 052)
($15,052)
28
Debits
Current Account
1
Exports
Imports
Invisibles
Balance on Current Account
$104,780
($156,334)
$91,481
($50,539)
($10,612)
Including that,
the balance of
payments identity
should hold:
BCA + BKA = BRA
Capital Account
4
Direct Investment
Portfolio Investment
6
7
Other Investments
Balance on Capital Account
Statistical Discrepancies
Overall Balance
$8,520
($2,787)
$68,115
($55,626)
$62,665
($56,194)
$24,693
$971
$336,532
($15 052)
($15,052)
29
Summary
A surplus in the BOP implies that the demand for the countrys
currency exceeded the supply and that the government should
allow the currency value to increase in value or intervene and
accumulate
l
additional
ddi i
l foreign
f
i
currency reserves in
i the
h Official
Offi i l
Reserves Account (by selling domestic currency for foreign
exchange)
30
Convertibility of Rupee
IIndian
di
rupee is
i fully
f ll convertible
ibl on current account. This
Thi
means that there are virtually no restrictions now on the
purchase and sale of foreign exchange for trade in goods and
services.
Rupee moved in the range of Rs.39.89 (end March 2008) 49.96 (as
on October 24) per US dollar,
dollar falling over 21% during the period,
period
being the second-worst performing currency in Asia after the Korean
won.
Depreciation
D
i ti
iin rupee reflects
fl t FII outflows,
tfl
bearish
b
i h stock
t k market
k t
condition, high inflation and higher crude oil prices, that generate
higher demand for dollars.
The rupees fall was also aided by the dollars rise against the pound
and euro the pound fell to a six-year low against dollar on October
24
32
When the
Wh
th rupee was appreciating
i ti
in
i 2007-08,
2007 08 it was widely
id l
believed that the upturn was here to stay.
33
However, the RBI actively trades on the market, with the stated
goal of containing volatility, and influencing the exchange rate
35
36
Indias
di inflation
i fl i spurtedd to double
d bl digits
di i in
i June 08 higher
hi h
than the rate of economic growth on the back of high crude oil
and commodityy pprices.
37
The
h larger
l
fiscal
fi l deficits
d fi i translated
l d into
i
larger
l
current account
deficit, with marginal or zero crowding out of private
investment.
Huge
g trade deficit has pput downward ppressure on rupee.
p
38
The most obvious reason behind the recent rupee depreciation is the global financial crisis
and the ensuing massive unwinding of foreign portfolio investors (US $ 7.3 billion during
2008-09, up to October 10) to fund their domestic liquidity requirements. This was in
contrast to net FII inflows (US $ 18.9 billion) during the corresponding period of 2007-08.
As and when FIIs are attracted to the market by expectations of a price increase that tend
to be automatically realised, the inflow of foreign capital generates an appreciation of the
rupee.
p
It is worthwhile to note that during 2007-08 rupee has appreciated vis--vis the dollar by
more than 10% This increased the return earned in foreign exchange, when rupee assets
are sold and the revenue converted into dollars.
dollars
The investments turn even more attractive triggering an investment spiral that would imply
a sharper fall when any correction begins.
If any set of developments encourages an unusually high outflow of FII capital from the
market, it can impact adversely on the value of the rupee and set off speculation in the
currency that can in special circumstances result in a currency crisis
39
IIn th
the recentt global
l b l financial
fi
i l crisis,
i i the
th spreadd between
b t
three-month
th
th LIBOR and
d
the 90-day US treasury bill attained unprecedented values rising sharply from
1.24 percentage points on 11/09/2008 (failure of Lehman Brothers) to a peak of
percentage
g points
p
on October 10.
4.58 p
Prior to financial crisis, it was cheaper for Indian multinationals (both financial
and non-financial) to establish global treasury operations in London primarily for
fund raising
raising.
When LIBOR rose sharply reflecting the rise in credit risk in London the rates
at which Indian firm borrowed went up.
Indian firms who were borrowing in London found themselves structurally short
of dollars. They responded by borrowing in Indian short-term money market,
converting funds into dollars, using the proceeds to meet external debt obligations.
Increased both the demand for domestic liquidity and that for foreign exchange,
exerting downward pressure on the rupee exchange rate.
40
Resilient Dollar
41
Resilient Dollar
The
h dollars
d ll
appreciation
i i can be
b explained
l i d as follows:
f ll
The US has been the worlds most dynamic economy since 1990s,
andd with
ith the
th US economy in
i trouble,
t bl prospects
t elsewhere
l
h looked
l k d att
least as bleak. US financial markets continue to be of crucial
importance to the rest of the world: More than $4 trillion of reserves
are held
h ld in
i US currency
With global financial crisis, there is a flight to safety and investors all over the
world are buying US treasury bills even at near zero interest rates. Thus there is a
huge demand by US dollar and it is appreciating against all floating currencies.
Forced Depreciation
Many argue that the rupee depreciation against US dollar during 2008-09 was
engineered by RBI through its faulty exchange rate management policy during
2007-08.
After the cut in the interest rates in the US since mid-2007, there has been a
sharp increase in interest rate differentials with India. This could be expected to
lead to a sharp inflow of capital into India and a rupee appreciation.
February 2008 saw the US dollar weaken against world currencies. But this is
not what happened in India the month saw Indian rupee to depreciate.
Forced Depreciation
However, data from RBI suggested quite the opposite. There has been a sharp
increase in the foreign exchange reserves of the RBI. In the month of February,
reserves increased by 11.7 billion dollars. This suggests that RBI was going all
the way to pushing the rupee to depreciate.
But why? One possible answer is that too much money was coming in trying to
take advantage of one way bet and interest rate differentials with respect to the
US.
As an example,
p during
g the first few months this yyear, in an environment of rising
g
oil prices and a higher import and subsidiary bill, RBI started buying dollars
aggressively to engineer a depreciation. Apart from the fact that a rupee
depreciation is inflationary, the current account deficit position worsened,
putting further downward pressure on rupee.
44
FOREX Reserves
(in billions of US
dollar))
January 2008
89.9
293.2
February 2008
90.8
301.2
March 2008
101.8
309.7
April 2008
108.8
314.2
May 2008
122.6
314.6
June 2008
131 5
131.5
312 1
312.1
July 2008
132.8
306.2
45
Many economists argue that while RBI intervention slowed the depreciation, it
initially abstained from the large-scale sale of dollars that could have moderated
the depreciation. Such a sale was feasible given that initially outflows were
much
h llower than
th huge
h
reserves, which
hi h even increased
i
d since
i
FDI inflows
i fl
continued to be robust.
48
For example, suppose the RBI has announced that it was going to
fix the exchange rate at 0.022 dollar per rupee. It would then stand
ready to give Re. 1 in exchange for 0.022 dollars or to give 0.022
dollars in exchange for Re. 1 to carry out this policy, RBI needs to
maintain a reserve of rupees (which it can print) and a reserve of
dollar (which it must have purchased previously).
52
Independent
monetary
policy
Free capital
flows
Fixed
exchange
rate
53
54
The pegging remained until July 2005, the time that the Chinese
central bank decided to peg the yuan to a basket of currenciescurrencies the
U.S. dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen being some of the
currencies included in the basket. As announced then, the central bank
of China was allowing
g the value of its currency
y to be partially
p
y
determined by supply and demand. The value of the Chinese currency
has been rising since then, even though the appreciation is not enough
in the eyes of its competitors such as the U.S. and Europe.
This appreciation of the yuan is indeed lower than what it could have
been. The pegged yuan is now on a managed float system in which
the central bank of China intervenes in order to change the direction of
its value.
value Chinas competitors and some analysts think that Chinas
intervention is too manipulative arguing that the managed float is a
little too dirty. U.S. producers complained that Chinas cheap
55
yuan gave Chinese producers an unfair advantage.
H
How
Chi
China k
keeps yuan undervalued?
d
l d?
China first sells its sterilization bonds at relatively high interest rates
(typically around 4 percent) and then uses the revenue to buy U.S.
US
Treasury bonds that are paying less than 2 percent interest. In this
way, China loses money on much of its U.S. bond investments while
helping to finance the U.S. trade and budget deficits and keeping U.S.
interest rates low. China is willing to endure these losses because it
views them as a small price to pay for creating new jobs in Chinese
export industries, albeit at the expense of American workers.
56
Thus a countrys interest rate equals the world interest rate plus a risk
premium
premi
m (whose
( hose si
sizee depends on in
investors
estors perceptions of the political &
economic risk of holding that countrys assets and on the expected rate of
depreciation or appreciation of the countrys currency, i.e., r = r* +
57
58
35
30
25
20
15
10
7/10/94
8/29/94
10/18/94
12/7/94
1/26/95
3/17/95
Mexicos central bank had maintained a fixed exchange rate with the
U.S. dollar at about 29 cents per peso.
5/6/95
59
35
30
25
20
15
10
7/10/94
8/29/94
10/18/94
12/7/94
1/26/95
3/17/95
5/6/95
IIn the
th weekk before
b f
Christmas
Ch i t
1994,
1994 the
th central
t l bank
b k abandoned
b d d the
th fixed
fi d
exchange rate, allowing the pesos value to float. In just one week, the peso
lost nearly 40% of its value, and fell further during the following months
60
61
In the early 1990s, Mexico was an attractive place for foreign investment.
The passage of NAFTA reduced trade barriers among United States, Canada and
Mexico and made many people confident about the future of the Mexican economy.
Another factor: The Federal Reserve raised U.S. interest rates several times
during 1994 to prevent U.S. inflation. (r* > 0)
62
We have already seen why an increase in a countrys risk premium causes its
exchange rate to fall (refer to slide 99-100).
One could
O
ld also
l use the
h M-F
M F model
d l to show
h that
h an iincrease in
i r** also
l causes the
h
exchange rate to fall. The intuition is as follows: An increase in foreign interest
rates causes capital outflows: investors shift some of their funds out of the country
to take advantage of higher returns abroad. This capital outflow causes the
exchange rate to fall as it implies an increase in the supply of the country
countryss currency
in the foreign exchange market.
Mexicos central bank had repeatedly promised foreign investors that it would
not allow the peso
pesoss value to fall,
fall so it bought pesos and sold dollars to prop
prop
up the peso exchange rate.
Doing this requires that Mexicos central bank have adequate reserves of dollars
63
$28 billion
A
August
17
17, 1994
$17 billi
billion
December 1, 1994
$ 9 billion
December 15,
15 1994
$ 7 billion
Defending the peso in the face of large capital outflows was draining
the reserves of Mexicos central bank.
(August 17, 1994 was the date of the presidential election.)
64
During 1994, Mexicos central bank hid the fact that its reserves were being
depleted.
Why Mexico
Mexicoss central bank didn
didntt tell anybody it was running out of reserves?
If people had known that the reserves were dwindling, then they would also have
known that the central bank would soon have to devalue or abandon the fixed
exchange
h
rate
t altogether.
lt th
They
Th would
ld have
h
expected
t d the
th peso to
t fall,
f ll which
hi h would
ld
have caused a further increase in Mexicos risk premium, which would have put even
more downward pressure on Mexicos exchange rate and made it even harder for the
central bank to defend the peso.
p
65
The Disaster
Investors are SHOCKED! they had no idea Mexico was running out of
reserves.
investors
,
i
t dump
d
their
th i Mexican
M i
assets
t andd pull
ll their
th i capital
it l outt off Mexico
M i
Dec. 22: central banks reserves nearly gone. It abandons the fixed rate and lets
e float.
66
The U
Th
United
i dS
States stepped
d in
i (in
(i its
i own interests)
i
) to help
h l its
i
neighbour to the south
1995: U.S. & IMF set up $50b line of credit to provide loan
guarantees to Mexico
Mexicos
s govt.
govt
After a hard
Aft
h d recession
i
in
i 1995,
1995 Mexico
M i began
b
a strong
t
recovery from the crisis.
67