K a rl M arx and Philosophical Materialism

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matics, continuing with M echanics, Physics, and Chem istry,

and ending with Biology:
Just as one form o f motion develops out o f another, so too m ust their
reflections, the different sciences, necessarily proceed from one to the
other.1*4

T o return to the abstract metaphysical theses and dialec

tical laws mentioned earlier, these are at best a possible way
o f presenting and interpreting the results o f scientific
research. However, they have absolutely no connection
with the method o f natural science itself, which is oriented
towards formal logic and is undialectical in the sense that it
does not reflect the historical mediation o f its objects.
M arx expressly discussed the question o f the relation
between a sciences mode o f research and its mode o f pre
sentation in Capital:
O f course the method o f presentation must differ in form from that o f
inquiry. T he latter has to appropriate the m aterial in detail, to analyse
its different forms o f developm ent, to trace out their inner connection.
O nly after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately
described. I f this is done successfully, i f the life o f the subject-m atter
is ideally reflected as in a m irror, then it may appear as i f we had before
us a mere a priori construction.1**

In the case o f a man-made object like social history,

methods o f inquiry and presentation are, despite all their
formal differences, internally related to each other, whereas
the interpretation o f a nature separated from all human
practice must ultim ately remain a matter o f indifference to
that nature.
T he early Engels took issue with the materialism o f th e
eighteenth century for m erely presenting nature to men as
an absolute, as a replacem ent for the Christian G od.1**
H is own later philosophy could be criticized on predfgly
the same lines. T o the extent that its assertions about
nature are isolated from the living practice o f men, they are
subject to the criticism s in the Theses on Feuerbach against
Feuerbachs view o f nature. For Engels, nature and man
are not united prim arily through historical practice; man
appears only as a product o f evolution and a passive re
flection o f the process o f nature, not however as a produc
tive force. I f the materialist conception o f nature, as Engels