Disagreement Feldman fiehard (er), Universi of Rochester Wir, Ted a (Et, nvrstye Nave Dame Pre pubes dle 20% Putahe io Oneal One: Sepanber 2010 Pr SSN 1: 978-019 920007 8, go Osage wa70019220078.0%DIOT 1 We're Right. They're Wrong Peter Van Inwagen Discussions of exclusivism” began wth discussions of gious exclusvism. It was scon recogrized, however, tha, if there was such a thing as religious exclusvism, there wee also such things as philosophical, poltical, and scientific exclsivism (and no doubt other forms 2 wal! "The “exten” cutee ni chaper ha odo wiht, Aragon exci nie sone rarest ae ot ag aha he uh Sue ome vegas exc re possbl, Sane cata eg exci fr eal, i ear eta he ny possible pho evan Int sene, oy aceon can be eee, tli ssn nersond pata lo phil mars. Sutra anges i second scot tclsivarn pricopy and acence. Azan eMart, role ote Manis prvi th ony eae! cou al thhitorcl uebngal socio: ncculres, bt apoptotic in compton are mere erosive "choles, syst leas whore exence io be expand rol on total gourd but tems otha ecnami aren (hich ele concel on th acorn aly apesced te a! ol apres). Same Phosopers and sciests—Fchar Dakin and Danis Dene fr exanpi—seany wor view a cnt wh he Darian acount ot volo oc actly wrong ts dropout deine | shall fist eiscuss religious exclusvim, since religion isthe ara in which the concept of exclusivism was fist aplied, and the area in which our inuitone about his concent are likely ta be the mest clear. When | have done tht, | il ook atthe ways the concept might be ‘extended to or applied in other areas. | wi ot attompt to define the term Yeon, alge project that would take us far fil * 2 nave rece stot ne cancel a regen, An scout ofthe canbe ound "Non Ee Hen Thomas. Sane (a), The Rony of Bett ar te Paty of Fah thes, NV Coral Univery Press, 095), 216-41. The paper repre n Pee van agen, God, Kw ad yatery Essay n Pree They (aca, NY: Covel Unersy Press, 55) ani Kay Janes Ck (od) esc ithe Piseoy of ‘elgon 2nd en (Plot, On: Bosaview Pats, 208). lesnrl decue hese fserston with corso he caper recordmy coneton 1am going to have to assume that we all have some sort cf grasp ofthis term and that we all mean more or ass the same thing by it. But not that in what folows | use the word eben as & count-neun, not as a mass tem. 1 speak not of some phenomenon called "eligor but of varcus institutions called ‘religions. | wil, powever, present some definitions, definitions of my tems of art. Lat us use sm’ as a Gummy term that can be replaced by the name of any religion. | will ay thatthe religion Ism is weakly exclusivs if it requires its adherents to subscribe to the following two theses (or perhaps it woul! be more ealitic to say if these two theses are logical coneaquences ofthe theses that lem requests adherents to suber to) (1) Isms logically inconsistent with al ther regions. Tha isto say, ay system of Balt or thought (besides lsm tse that i logically consistent with Isms nt a aigion. I, for example, Chistianty is weakly exclusivist thn any Chistian who thinks that Berkeley's ‘metaphysic is consistent with Christianity is legcaly commited to the thsis that Berkely's metaphysics net a religion. Andi, according to Hinduism, Hinduism and Islam are both religions, ard iit isa tenet of Hinduism thet one can consistently be both a Hina and a Muslim, than Hinduism isnot a weakYy excliivist reign, (2) According to Im, itis ronal to accept Im. More precisely: is ratinal for people whose epistemic situation is typical ofthe pistomic situations of Ismists to accent Im. More precisely si: people whose epistemic situations typical ofthe epistemic situations ofIsmists and who accept the teachings of lam donot thereby violate any of her epistemic cig: isa least pistomically pomissitiefor such people to accept the teachings of Ism. Two comments: a) By someone who “accepts the teaching of Im," I mean someone who accopts all the theses or propositions that Im requires its adherents to accept. Since lm ‘may well equ other things ofits adherents than that they accept certain propositions, there is obviously adstnction to be made between someone who accepts the teachings of lam and an lami, And, ofcourse, twill be possible fo be an Ismist—n several ‘senses of "bean list” that I can think ot—and not to accept the teachings o Im. (b) No doubt it weld be har to fin an example of araligion (ora system of ble of any kind) that not have this feature, But one might imagine one coulé probaly ‘actually pinto) some defiantly ant-ational religion or philosophy or Wattanschauung that conceded, and even glad in the concession, that it was positively atonal fits adherents to accept its teachings. (Kirkegaard has certainly been accused-ut only, think, by PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (we oxfodscholarshp.com)c) Copyright Oxford Urniversty Pros, 2003-2011. Al Fights Reserved Under the toms ote Ice agreement anndivdualuser may pnt out @ POF of a siglechapa ofa monograph OSO fr personal use or dale ‘22 hp ovlrdschlarshp camsapublervacy_polcy. Suoserbeor: Unveraty of St Andrews; dale: O5 February 2011Disagreement Felden, chard (ta), rivers ol Rocastr Wir, Ted a (Et, nvrstye Nave Dame Pre pubes dle 20% Putahe io Oneal One: Sepanber 2010 those who asice him very much-—of approvingly ascribing this aherents are (typical, at last) rational in accepting its teachings, that religion wil nc be wha | am caling a weakly excusvist religion to belive thatthe acheverts of other re to Christianity.) In any case, ia religion doesnot held that its It ebviously does not flow rom a eigion’s boing weakly exclusivs that it requires its achore religions are necessarily iational. What does follows that, if sm is a weakly exlusvist religion, thase who accep its teachings wil (at least they are logically consistent and capable of itl elementary logical reasorng) reach the following conclusion: “The teachings of allother religions are atleast partly wrong, and itis rational for us to aleve this about he teachings of al oer religions.” Suppose, for example, that Chistian is a weakly exclsivst igion. Suppose that |, a Christan, consider some other religion—Zoroastianism, et us say, Since my religion i weakly exclusivit, one ofthe teachings of my eligi ie that, given that Zooastriarism i a rligon (which we shall stipulate: that Zorastinism isa religion and that itis rational to belive that itis ar things that canbe objectively established to anyone's satistaction), Zoroastrianism is inconsistent wth my religion. And, on this mater, what my religion teaches is demonstrably ight according to the Zoroastians, for example, evlis an uncrestad power (even i, as some have maintained, this isnot what Zoroaster himself belived}, and, according to Chistians, evils not an uncreated power. | can easily infer rom these things that Zoroastiarism teachas something false (even ido net know that Zorastiarism teaches that evils an unereated power andi fact have not the faintest ides what Zrosstarim teaches) And fis rational for me to accept Christan teaching (wtih fs impli by Christianity ane hich | therefor belove, if Cristian isa weakly exclusivist religion), i is ratinal for me to accept wha ii ational for me to baieve teachings wil be (or its teachings wil logically follows logically from it If, therefore, Chistian is a weakly exclusvist religion, one of imply) that is rational for me to believe that Zorastianism teaches something false. The points easly gonerlized: it isa teaching of any weakly exclusivist religion (or an immediate logical consequence there) that itis rational forts adherents to beliove that ll other regions teach something false, Now a second definition. Let us say that a religion, Im, is strongly exclusivst iis weakly exclusvist and entail that, for any oer religion its nt rational fr anyone who isin an epistemic situation ofthe som in which Isis aches (or its teachings typically find thamselves to accept the teachings ofthat gin. It is consistant wih lem being a strongly exclusviet religion that ft not require ts acherents to believe thatthe adherents of other eligi recessaily or even typically vila the norms of rationality. If Islam isa stonaly exclsivst religion, its adherents must regard ary "Muslim whe apostatizes ard becomes an adherent of some othe eigion (and who had beon in an epistemic position typical of Mustims) 18 iratonal. But, consistently with Islam's being a strongly exclusivist eign, a welLnformed and onhedox Muslim might regard a pagan (or Christian or Jew who had never been propery exposed tothe teachings of Islam (or whose knowledge ofthe word was in some other way incomplete) as at least possibly rational, as not ipso facto rational. It coud even be that a welLnformed and orthodox adherent ofthe strongly exclisivst eign Ism thought that all nor-lsmists were perectly rational. (He might ascribe “vince ignorance” to all non- Ismists, or might think that one is an Isis i and onl if God has bestowed on one an infusion of grace tha sent independert ot (one's epistemic condition prior othe moment ofits bestowal) [But astemerstitude onthe art of adherents of strongly exclusivist religion toward acharents of othr regions is also possible. St Paul ‘thought that paganism—at least the paganism with which he was familar, tha paganism ofthe classical Medteransan word—was cpistemically permissite for no one, ad such a bali is certainly consistent wih strong excusvism in align. If ralgion takes this Postion wth respect to al ther reigions, | wil callit a vay strongly exclusivst region for example, Chtianity isa very strongly ‘exclusive religion, then the teachings of Chitianty ental that n religion but Chistian is epitemicaly permissible fer any human being of any culture in any ea It would follow, of course, tha, if Cistianty isa vary strongly exclusvist religion, then Christianity teaches that, blow the founcng of Chistian, it was not rational for anyone to ‘accept the teachings of any religion. (This might be called cacti strong exclusive. Refinements are possible. A Chistian might think that it was rational to accept the teachings of Judaism betore the Incamaton but net afterwards, and not ational to accept the teachings of any other religion at any tne.) | mention the idea a avery strongly exclsivst eligi forthe sake of logical completeness. | am fay sure that there are none. | do not ony that some religions teach that certain religions ae nt epistemically prmissble for aryone. (Since St Paufs atu toward ci he ‘sistemicimpermissiity of classical paganism.) And I donot deny that incividual adherents of various religions (Christianity and Islam, sical paganism was expressed in what Cristian regard as an nspced tet, itis a defensible position that Christianity teach for example) may have bafaved that no ther raligon than their own was epistemicaly parmissiba for anyone. | do not even want to deny that for some raligins (including my own) it may have been at certain points in history that all adherents ofthese ralgions then alive (or allo them whe hac considered the point) bolioved both that al other religions ware epistemically impermissible for anyone a that this PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (we oxfodscholarshp.com)c) Copyright Oxford Urniversty Pros, 2003-2011. Al Fights Reserved Unde tne tam of he enc g72emen. an indvaal user may pent ou & POF of sng cheplr of a monograph in OSO to persona use (ordeals 0 hip:waw.osordscholarshp combosofpublpvacy poy hi), Suoserbeor: Unveraty of St Andrews; dale: O5 February 2011Disagreement Feldman fiehard (er), Universi of Rochester Wir, Ted a (Et, nvrstye Nave Dame Pre pubes dle 20% Putahe io Oneal One: Sepanber 2010 Pr SSN 1: 978-019 920007 8, go Osage wa70019220078.0%DIOT pistemclogical thesis was a teaching of ther agin. What | do dany—at least stongly doubt whether this isthe case—is that this is the teaching of any religion. it not nrequerty happens that athe acherents of aeligion who are alive ata cetain time bese falealy of ‘some proposition, some proposition they all happen to believe, tha it is a teaching o ther eligion) ‘The important forms of religious exclusvism are sttong and weak exclusivism (er, since strong exclusivism entals weak excusvism, song exclsivism and mere weak exclusivism), Again, futher refinements ofthese concep are possible. One might, for example, want to take account of the fact hat, according to Islam, the epistemic position of Christians and Jews, while weaker than that of Muslims, is stronger than tha of Budchists and Hindus—and was stronger belore the Koran was revealed tothe Prophet than twas afterward. But ‘one must at some point eave off making ever fine tinction, howavar congenial ona may find hat occupstion to bef ona is a Pilosepher ‘This, then ie reigius exclusiviem (or ‘alethic" religious exclusviem, religious exclusivam inthe matter ofthe possession of tut). There ‘area least four “areas” othr than religion in wich the concept of atic ‘exclusiviem has cbvieus application: philosophy, politics, at, and science. (Ard | might adda ith: everyay ite.) I wil say something about all fou ios woud ser beak CLs gS sir GHRIBHGEOP POSH Cosco for example wpreserieive plilosophar,Phobo, who accops scan phosepical positon ta, bonowng a device fam our cussion orgs exci, vical sm, Phosbe is | shall saya weak exclavt as reads lami she baoves, it, that tae ae piosptical potions that ae inconsistrt ith sm, andi she baeves, score, tat har om acoptanceo sm is tinal hat er acceptance ot raianaly pemissiefor ht When ay tat Phosbe elves hat theres posophica eons that a nensistn wth my, not mean cnt that st blves that some o th derzens fe Patric haaven are propositions coir wih tm and that some of thse proostons cont isco polos" beret ones actualy eld by anyone don er inthe vod of fx a inpemarece ten that he tks thal hr ar pele we ol psocial otosiconistn wih sm. ete th what Ihav aie natn vary respect praia said when | find weak ogous exclave no sad ams ica inconsistent with al ter osopial poston. Tha sto ay any thasisbesies ls tse that is gall consistent wih lm snot philosophical positon Phiosopical sions are et ically alte cane acter as agons ae logical rate to orn anthro van as hess of taactings ofthe varios tlio are lial te o one ater, since ane posopial poston can ens be cori wth arotterpilsapicl positon: iutioism in tics i coriont with mathematical inti (last suing hat raithris a necessary flshood, and Caresian dus is cosistrt with usm (vith he sare qusficton. wil el, moreover, spank of Philosophical positions themselves as being exclsivs; | shall rather speak of people adopting an exclsivst stance or atitudein respect Cf philosophical postions they ld or statements of philosephical postions do nt general contain clauses deserting the epistemic Situations of people who hod those postions and competing psitions. But the fact that ‘philosophical weak exclusvism ar “eigious weak excluiviem™ ‘are not paral in these two respects raises no important bare to applying the concept of exclusvism to phosopical poston: (ESRERRGHSEEE Almost certainly Well, Phoebe has the ater let, she presumatiy got to by an application ofthe flowing pistemclogical principle or one very ket It one accopts p ad beloves that one's acceptance of pi rational, andi one accepts some immediate and sel-videt logical consequence ofp, and accepts it because one Sees thai isan immediate and sl-ovident logical Cconeequence of p, one shoud algo believe that one's acceptance of that logical consequence i ational” There may be reasons to reject this principle (some woud say it leads to skepticism, but | will not go ito the delicate issues volved the question of whether one should accept this principle. | will assume without futher argument the ganeral thesis of which the flowing these isa special ease: | Phoebe isa philosopher who accepts materialism. andif she believes that her acceptance of materialism is rational then she boboves that it is rational for hero belove that aryone who accepts dualism believes something fas (if heard some philosopher say “| accept materialism, and| believe that itis raonal fr me to accept materialism, but | donot believe that it would be rational for me to balave that all ualists believe something fa rection of hat philosopher.) | would certainly cast a very puzzled glance in the Simi x points can be made about weak exclusivsm in politics, at, and science. Consider hese three theses: ‘The socalled ight to PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (we oxfodscholarshp.com)c) Copyright Oxford Urniversty Pros, 2003-2011. Al Fights Reserved Unde tne tam of he enc g72emen. an indvaal user may pent ou & POF of sng cheplr of a monograph in OSO to persona use (ordeals ‘22 hp ovlrdschlarshp camsapublervacy_polcy. Suoserbeor: Unveraty of St Andrews; dale: O5 February 2011Disagreement Feldman fiehard (er), Universi of Rochester Wir, Ted a (Et, nvrstye Nave Dame Pre pubes dle 20% Putahe io Oneal One: Sepanber 2010 ptvacy supposedly implicit in the US Constitution was made up out of whole coth by twortith-centuy jurists asa legal rationalization of rings they wanted to make on moral grounds ‘Technical facilis not everything: Tolstoy was a greater novelist than Flaubert desrite the clumsiness of his narrative technique Neanderthal Man was a genetic dead end; no modern human being has Neanderthal ancestor (tis last statement, by the way, is—or at last has been—no loss controversial than the “vstius Anyone who accepts any proposition of the sorts these three propositions exemplify—controversial political or aesthetic or ‘scientific propositions—believes (1) that other people accept propositions logically incompatible with that proposition, and (2) that it is ‘SHG Oe GES a NE SLSNITRSEPEINEPEENORS ical etropogsts who betave hat Neandertal Man ‘as a gna doa an bere ta th coleapues wo ink ta the moder human gare contains Naan goes arin or —and batove that its rational for thom to believe that those people a | should be supisedi anyone wore to deny ta thse of us wto have opiions abou piosoptica pola, esta, and sciatic imate adop a wakiyexcuss poston tomar then, atest in hose cases in wich thse ‘oprons ae no so saat tue tha hee is no dearest about then. art now stun to a mote contovria queso: what pat dos stg exckaivsm ply in hlosooy. a. pls ard scence? Wey sy ha Gos ado @ SEND esi sane ova one adherence fo postonin ty ofthese aress—and:we may as wall coin to use the device we have ben using ancl this poston ‘sm one adopts esky excuis poston toward ones aerece to lm, are moreover, nk that wo not be tonal for anyonein one's oh triton station fo sop orate fo ary posion hats obviously endurconroveily casio wh lm: ‘Suppose, for example, that Dan isan acherent of Darwinism, of the Darwinian theory of evolution. Dan adopts a strongly excusivist stance toward his adherence to Darwinism if (nation to the requirement of adopting a weakly exclsivst stance toward this position) he believes that anyone whosa epistemic situation or condition isthe same as his and who accepte ary thesis or proposition (cious) inconsistent with Darwinism i rational (hat is, has adopted a postion that is rationally indefensible) Suppose Dan wore to read the folowing words, which! quote rom a book by the English biologist Brian Goodin. Despite the power of molecular gonetics to reveal the hereditary essences of organisms, the large-scale aspects of evolution remain unexpisined, inclung the origin of species. Tare i no clear evidence... forthe gradual emergence of any evolutionary novelty” says Emst Mayr, one of the most eminent of contemporary evolutionary biologists. New types of organisms simply ‘appear onthe evolutionary scene, persist or vious periods of time, and then become extinct. So Dansins assumpion that the toe of lites a consequence ofthe gradual accumulation of small hereditary itferences seems tobe without Significant supper. Some athe process is responsible forthe emergent propetis o lite, those cstnctive features that separate lone group of ergaisms from ancther—fishes ard amphibians, worms and insects, hersetalls and grasses. Cleary something is missing trom bology.* 2 oan Goad, How he Lazar Charged St The Evan of Canplnty (New York Char Sener Sars, 1984) pve What should Dan think about the thesis expressed in his passage, ven is strongly exclusvst stance toward Dansinism? it seem that he must think that Goodin is either ignorant of something evidently rolevat to questions about the mechanisms of evolution something that he, Dan, knoHs—or else is ational, And, since Goodwins professional biologist, and infact a respected bolo 's unlikely that Dan can plausibly ascribe Goodwin's position on Darwinism to factual ignorance It would be fr more plausible for Dan to contend that Goodwin has failed to believe somethin that any rational parson in Goodwin's epistemic situation would believe. And think itis evident that tare are Oarnists who adopt a strongly excusvit stance toward Darwinism. | woud infact go 30 far a8 to say that almost every Darvnist is a strongly exclsivist Danwinist. The merely weakly exclusivist Darwnist is very rare indeed. (| donot mean to ‘suggest that very many Darwinists go about saying that people ike Goodwin are ational. Tat, after al, would not be vary polite. But that, surely, i what they think, or what they would think hey applied their views with rigorous consistency.) \Wnat repens in science cartainly happens in polities. An extteme example is provided bythe case of “Holocaust driers” noone, | bbaleve—no one a allo believes that the Nazis murdered six milion Jews fas also to baieve that those trained historians who deny this thesis (who, say, put the figure far lower, or who attempt to quay the word ‘murde’) subscribe oa thesis that i rationally indensible. But I noed net dotend my contention that ther ae strong exclusvists in pltical matters by reference to an extreme thesis [ke Holocaust drial. Curent red bive" isagreements in American poltics have the same featur. Consider, for example, the propestion “The Americared invasion of rag in 2008 was morally and plticall indefensible PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (we oxfodscholarshp.com)c) Copyright Oxford Urniversty Pros, 2003-2011. Al Fights Reserved Under the toms ote Ice agreement anndivdualuser may pnt out @ POF of a siglechapa ofa monograph OSO fr personal use or dale ‘22 hp ovlrdschlarshp camsapublervacy_polcy. Suoserbeor: Unveraty of St Andrews; dale: O5 February 2011Disagreement Feldman fiehard (er), Universi of Rochester Wir, Ted a (Et, nvrstye Nave Dame Pre pubes dle 20% Putahe io Oneal One: Sepanber 2010 Pr SSN 1: 978-019 920007 8, go Osage wa70019220078.0%DIOT ‘There are many who accept this proposition and many who accept its dial. Gut almast no one who accepts it balieves that an intligent, rational person who was in possession of a reasonable properton ofthe relevant and available facts would accept it eis. Ard almest no one whe denies it belioves that a parson who was intoligent and in possession ofa reasonable proportion ofthe elevant and avaiable facts would accept. In shor, each "sid" in the cspute regard th other side as not ery mistaken adherence to the principle of ron contradiction rquies that much) but iational (more exactly, rational unless igneant of relevant and avaliable facts or so inelectualy Gefcint as tobe excused fram noma epistemic ebligations by the “ought implis car” princi) ‘There ae, therefore, strong exclusvists in scence, history, and poltics. But what about philosophy? What isthe place of strong ‘exclusvism in philosophy’? | wil leave aside questions about the pat, questions about what may have been the attitude of philosophers in the past concerning these who took other philosophical postions than thers, and concentrate on philosophy asi is now. (Are by Philosophy as is now, I mean analytical hosopty ast is now. Generalizations about “philosophers” in what follows are restcte to this main, the only domain about which | have any real infrmation) Are there philosophers who would endorse instances cf the fllowing ‘schema inthis schema, p represents the name of some substantive philosophical thas free will and determinism, and s0 on | accept p, and | regard al trained philosophers who are in my epistemic position (that is, who are aware of the arguments and other ptilosophical considerations | am aware of) and who accept the denial of p as irational. Sucre lescovers are ir olat on of their epistemic obligations. They are comparable to ordinary, educated people of the present day who believe that cigarete smoking does not ‘nominalis ‘tFaiarism, the compatiilty ‘cause lung cancer or that the positions ofthe stars and planets at the moment of one's ith determine one's a. | doubt whether mary philosophers would say anything along these lines. The more interesting question is whether philosophers generally bbaiove things that commit them to something ke this position, [And there are indeed some very plausible propositions that would seem to have ths consequence. For example, Here is one consequence ofthis proposition. If Alice says that Tad bel that the St Joseph Rivers polluted is rational, and Wired ay that if Ted bolived (in these vary circumstances) thal the St Joseph Fiver was not polluted, this belet would be rational, Alice and \Wintted cannot both be rg. Asi + incl: 1, forsome proposition, a person accepts nether that proposition no is denial, ands trying to decide whether to accept that proposition to accep its deial, oto continue to accept nether, it cannot be true both that it weld be atonal or him to accep that Proposition and that it woud be rational for him te accept its denial [A past tense version: a person has just accepted a carainpropestion (has just reached the conclusion tha that propositions tue), andi it was rational for that person to accept that proposition it cannot be tha i would have been rational for him te accept its denis, ‘These principles, ae, as | sai, very plausibe, Why’? What under thee plausibity, thnk, must be some such argument a thi. Loosely speaking a body of evisence cart nave the power confer analy on bah poposion ans Sena. Ac ly. ‘eral foros a scot» popeion at a cain moment and ony i om ttl vida nse ‘that moment bear this impersonal ‘cone rationality on relation to that proposton. This i a plausible argument, but one might find cifcuties wit t. Suppose that Eis logically inconsistent, but n avery subtle way, and thatthe person whose evidence E is could not be expected to see this inconsistency. Suppose that, asa resut of the inconsistency, ‘hore exis (platoncally speaking) avail derivation of p fom E and a valid derivation ofthe denial fp from. Might trot be that, if the person wore aware ofthe former derivation (but not the later it would be rational for him to accept p, ae that, fhe were aware of the lator derivation out not the fermer), it would be ational for him to accept the denial of? This objection may be metas follows: ‘rareness of one ofthe derivation (ifthe person has iti apart ofthe pereoris total evidence. Tha is, Es a persons total evidence, PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (we oxfodscholarshp.com)c) Copyright Oxford Urniversty Pros, 2003-2011. Al Fights Reserved Under the toms ote Ice agreement anndivdualuser may pnt out @ POF of a siglechapa ofa monograph OSO fr personal use or dale ‘22 hp ovlrdschlarshp camsapublervacy_polcy. Suoserbeor: Unveraty of St Andrews; dale: O5 February 2011Disagreement Feldman fiehard (er), Universi of Rochester Wir, Ted a (Et, nvrstye Nave Dame Pre pubes dle 20% Putahe io Oneal One: Sepanber 2010 Pr SSN 1: 978-019 920007 8, go Osage wa70019220078.0%DIOT ‘and he then becomes auare that p may ba valiy deduced ftom E,E is no longer his total evidence: his total evidence is ow (at least) E ls the proposition that pcan be validly deduced from E. Therefore, in he two ctcumstarces we have imagined, the person does not have the same total evidence. (And, of course, ihe were aware ofboth derivations, i woud cartinly not be tre that it would be rational forhim ether to accept porto accept its denial) 1 the argument we re considering is comet, it confers valty not only on sinle-prson’ principles tke those I have set out, but onthe fotiowing principe | two people have the same evidence, andif one of them accepts a cetain ropesion and the other accep its denial at least one of ‘thom isnot rational: either isnot ational forthe ane te accept that preposition, or ncusive iis ot rational forthe certo accopt its evil is not har to see that, this principe is corect, than weak exclusiviem entails strong exclusivsm. ‘Suppose, for example, that | am a platonic relist and that my atitude toward my platonic realism is one of weak exclusvism. And ‘suppose that my coleague Salis @nominalist and that her epistemic circumstances, as thy bear on the nominalsmeaism question, ‘are the same as mina (That, she and are aware oll the same relavantexta-philosoptical facts and theres, the same fats of everyday fe and the same scientiic orap2t facts and sciontitic theories; she and I, moreover, are aware othe same philosophical considerations that are relevant othe nominalsm realism debate: he same distinctions, the same arguments, and soon) Can it be that Sally postion s rational? Is it rational or her to ‘exclusvist realist, then | balove tha is rational for me to accept realism. And, since the evidence relevant to the rominalism-realsm Gspute thats at Says cisposal isthe same as the evidence at my disposal, it cannot be—by the principle we have just set cut—rationl forme to accept reafsm and for Saly to accep nominaism. Hers a second argument forts conclusion, an argument that appeals to ‘single person principe Is rational forme tobe areal. t woud, thereto, be rational for Sally tobe reais, since the evidence she and! have thats relevant to he nominalism-eaism question isthe same. (SSS NTs inept itis Aonal Nore pan whose total evidence is E to accept p, then it would be rational for anyone whose total evidence was E to accept p. But this principle is, | (SSISVERSEWOUSIEOMBRE) Gut is rational for Sally to accopt nominal (onthe evidence she has) than it would be both rational for her to accept nominalsm and raonal or her to accep realism on the same evidence. And this is ruled out by the ‘single person" Principles. Therefore it isnot ational for Sally o accept nominal. The conclusion ofthis argument is easiy generalized: if any ofthe pistemclogical principles we have lad out is valid, then weak exclusivsm entails strong exclusivism. And, | remind you, almost all Dilosophers adopt a weakly exclusivist stance toward the philosonhical propositions they accept. Let us look atthe consequences of this fact. Suppose you area philosopher who accepts various philosophical propositions that are ‘ejected by other rained philosophers. (And his isthe normal case. Very ow ofthe philosophical propesiions that are accepted by some Plilosopher are accepted by al philosophers) Let lsm be any such proposition and et Nis be its denial. you accept any of he above Principles, you must, after due reflection onthe fact that they imply that weak exclsivism entalsstong exclusivism, reach one ofthe following conclusion. onap22 (1) tis pot, alter al, rational for meto accept sm. (2) Its not ational for any trained philosopher to accept Nm. {@) Some trained philosophers who accept Nim ar in epistemic circumstances that are inferior to mine inthe matter of deciing what to bliove about Im and Nism (4) Some ofthe philosophers who accept Nism are less inteligent than me (or labor under some other relevant cognitive eisadvantage lack of philosoptica talent, poraps) Let me make some remarks about (2) anc 111 accept option (3), | must conclude that atleast some ofthe philosophers who accept Nism are unaware of or have not fly grasped some relevant argument or analysis or itincton lam aware of and understand. And | must suppose that the fac that they are in some '50ch inferior epistemic circumstances isnot something for which they can be Hamed, that ther condition is nota result of thor having fad to util some epistemic obigation. (Here is an analogous situation in ordinary ie: you blleve that Jane is honest ad I hrk she is ‘2 crook. Up til a moment ago, you and | had the sme evidence inthis matter and we both believed, rationally, given this evidence, that she was honest. A moment ago | stumbled, by merest chance, upon a well-hiden document that demensrates beyond ary possibilty of oubt that she has been derauting her employers, a document that no one could blame you for rot being aware ot, PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (we oxfodscholarshp.com)c) Copyright Oxford Urniversty Pros, 2003-2011. Al Fights Reserved Under the toms ote Ice agreement anndivdualuser may pnt out @ POF of a siglechapa ofa monograph OSO fr personal use or dale ‘22 hp ovlrdschlarshp camsapublervacy_polcy. Suoserbeor: Unveraty of St Andrews; dale: O5 February 2011Disagreement Felden, chard (ta), rivers ol Rocastr Wir, Ted a (Et, nvrstye Nave Dame Pre pubes dle 20% Putahe io Oneal One: Sepanber 2010 [As to (4 i accept his option, | shall not bolieve that al the philosophers who disagree wth me are ational. shal, however, excuse thom trom the charge of nationality, only because of my allegiance tothe "ought implias can” principle. Athough each ofthese Pilosophers i laboring under he burden of some cognitive deficiency, each of them i doing the best he can accorsing to his own cm lights. And this same deficiency, in each case, binds the philosopher who labors under it to the fact that he is in this respect, cognitively cefcent. In any real situation, al these options can seem extraersnarly unappeatng| wil mention a case that | have used for similar purposes on ‘ther occasions. | ask you to consider the case of David Lewis and me and the problem of fea wl am an incompatlist and David was ‘8 compatibiist. David and had many conversations and engaged in a rather lengthy corespondence on the matter of compatibiism and incompatsism, and, ‘on the basis of these exchanges—not to mention his wonderul paper ‘Are We Free to Break the Laws am convinced beyond ll Possibiiy of doubt that David understood perectly althe arguments for incompatiblsm that | am aware land all other philosophical Considerations relevant othe free-wl problem (philosophical éstnctions and phlescptical analyses, for example). It seams dificult, therefor, to contend that, inthis matter, he was in epistemic ctcumstances inferior to mine. What, afterall, could count as the Ingrasents of a person's epstomic circumstances (nsofar as these cumstances ae relevant to philosophical questions) but that persons awareness of and understanding of philosophical aguments (and analyses and distinctions and soon)? I philosopher A and Pfilosopher B are both investigating some pilosophical problem, andi each is aware of (and understands perfectly ll the arguments anc Getnctione and analysee—and so on—that the other is aware of, how can the epatemic postion of one ofthese plosophars vie avis this problem be inferior to that ofthe ther? And one could hardly maintain that David was stupid or lacking in philosophical ability or that he labored under any ther cognitive deficiency relovant to thinking about the pablem of fee wil. (Net, at any rte, unless ll human beings labor under his deicioncy,) At the same time, ! am unsling to say tht my oun allegiance te incompaibism is atonal. can ‘ony conclude that | am rational in accepting incompatilim and that David waa rational in aocepting compatibilsm. Ang, therefor, we have at least one case in which one philosopher acceps a philosophical proposition and anether accopis its denial andin which each is perecty rational. It is, moreover, 3 c35@in which the epistemic cicumstances of neither pilosopher, as thy touch on the question whether o accep this propstion aris denial, are infor to the efstomic cicumstances of the othe. (And in which nether philosopher labors under the burden of any cognitive deficiency from which the others fee. I know that Davi labored under no such deficiency. ike to think that! do nt) And, therfore, the epistemological principles | have ni ct, he principles that allowed us to deduce strong cexclusviem from weak exclusiviem, must be wrong. ‘This conclusion seems to me tobe inescapable—if one's eistomic cicumstances those relevant to pilsptical inquy) ar indeed efined entity by the philosophical considerations” arguments, distinction, and so on) one is aware of and understands. A moment 90, | asked, ‘Petoscally,“l philosopher A and philosopher B are beth instigating some philosophical problem, andi each i aware of (and understands perfectly) all he arguments and distinctions and analyses the others aware of, how can the epistemic postion of one of these philosophers vis-vis ths problem be inferior to that ofthe other?” ft seems to one thatthe thetrcsl question fs unanswerable, this must be because one rgards evidence, the stuf of which one's epistemic condtion is made, as essentially pubic It must be because one rgards evidence as “vidence"in the couroom-andaboraiary sense. And, in matters philosophical, public evidence is that lich is expessile in language. A piace of evidence fra philesoptical proposition i tis public evidence, is something that could be expressed as abt of text (apart ofan essay or book or letter), and one who ha read and understood the bit of text that embodied it would have" that piece of evidence; ft would be & component of his cr her epistemic conton. Iti, however, reasonable to suppoee that this conception of ‘evidence (if evidence is indeed the stu of which one's epistemic contin is made, i A and Bare inthe same epistemic conto ust nthe cage that they “have” the same evidence) is overly retritve. One of the reasons that constitute the reasonabloness of supposing ths is that there seem tobe plausible examples of ‘having evidence” that do ot conform tothe courtroom-andaboratery paradigm of evidence. | sometimes know that my wie is angry whan no one alee does, for ‘example, ad I cannot explain to aryone how | know tis! cannot give what Pato would call an “account of what undedies my conviction that she is angy. I seems to me tobe plausible to say that in such cases my belt that my wifes angry s rounded in some body of evidence, evidence that fas entry within my mind and that | cannot pu into words. A second example is provide by the case of the chicken sexe, beloved of epistamelogists in the far-off days of my graduate studies. (Can anyone tell me whether there are chicken ‘Setar? Those of my students who were raised on farms have given conflicting testimony on this matter) Mathematicians ae fen Intuitively certain that some mathematical popostions tue, although they ae unable to prove it. (Godel, | understand, was convinced PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (we oxfodscholarshp.com)c) Copyright Oxford Urniversty Pros, 2003-2011. Al Fights Reserved Unde tne tam of he enc g72emen. an indvaal user may pent ou & POF of sng cheplr of a monograph in OSO to persona use (ordeals 0 hip:waw.osordscholarshp combosofpublpvacy poy hi), Suoserbeor: Unveraty of St Andrews; dale: O5 February 2011Disagreement Felden, chard (ta), rivers ol Rocastr Wir, Ted a (Et, nvrstye Nave Dame Pre pubes dle 20% Putahe io Oneal One: Sepanber 2010 thatthe power ofthe continuum was aleph2.) Since they often atr do discover procs ofthese proposition, it seems likly that, pir to their iscovery ofthe proofs, they had some sot of evidence forthe uth of those proposition. ‘Ther ao, therefore, arguments by example for the conclusion that, in everyday fe, at least and perhaps in mathematic, evidence is not ‘always ofthe public sot, that some evidence isnot exportable, that some evidence cannot be passed from one person to another. Art whats tue of “everyday” evidence (and persaneof mathematical” evidence) may algo be ue ofthe evidence that grounds phlosoptical Convictions. Some ‘philosophical’ evidence, too, may nol be exportable. | can give an argument forthe thesis that some phlosopical evidence has this feature, The argument takes the form ofa calactcal challange to any philosopher who denies it. Consider, fr example, the body of pubic evidence that can appeal ton suppor of incompaiilism (arguments and other pilosophical considerations that can be expressed in sentences or iagrams on a blackboard or other cbjects of intersubjective awareness). Davi Lewis "had" the same evidence (he had seen and he remembered and understood these cbjects) and was, nevertheless, a compat. If know, a | do, that ‘David had these features (and tis feature, too: he was abrillantplesophen), that he had thse features is itslf evidence that is (r soit ‘would seam to me} relevant othe uth of incompatibiism. Should this new evidence net, when I cartuly consider it lead me to witcraw ey assent o incompatibiism, to retreat into agosticism on the incompaibilsmicompatibiism issue? This isa question | have scussed elsewhere, Hore | wil oer oly the following bret argument. One's evidence is supposed in some way to drect the formation of (one's bali. It was rational for David tobe a compatibist, therefor, it must be that his evidence didnot cect him away from Compatibsm. If it id not rect him away from compaitlsm, it not crt him foward incompatlsm. But my evidence is his evidence, It must therefore be that my evidence does net cect me toward incompatibsm. How then can it be rational for me to be an incompatiiist? ‘The cticulty of firing anything to say in response to this argument, taken together with my unwilingress to concede ether that | am ‘ational in bing an incompatist or that David was iational in being a compatiist,trmpts me te suppose tat | have some sor of inter, incommuricable evidence (evidence Davi cid not have) that supports incompatilsm. 1 succumb to this temptation, i low even that itis possibe that Ihave such evidence, then the above demonstration that weak cexclusviem entails song exclusive fas. | can, consistently, balieve that itis rational forme to accept lam and rational for other philosophers to accent [Nism. I can, without logical inconsistency, maintain that the Nismists ae, though no faut of thos, in epistomic cumstances that are (vie-vi the lamiNism question) nfo o mine, Owing to some neural accident (| might ea) | havea kind of insight into the, oh | dnt know, eniaiment relations among various ofthe proposition that igure inthe IsmNsm debate that is devied tothe Nsmist. | see, Perhaps, that pertais q (although | am unable io formulate his insight verbally) and they are unable to see that p entails ¢. Ar tis insight really is due to a neural quik (fo borow a phrase Rory used for a ferent purpose) It isnot that my cognitive facies function better than this. Theis areas reliable as mine. But thers are not identical wth min ‘and, in this case, some accidental feature of my cognitive architecture has enabled me to see the entaimant hat is hien trom the Nismists. Inthe end, though, this ia, tempting asi eta mes hard to beleve, Ate al | accept ots of pilosophical propositions that are denied by many abl, well-trained philosophers. Am | Yo balove that in every casein which I belive something many ctherphilesophers deny (ard this comes downto: in every casein which | accept some substantive pilosophical thesia), | am night and thay are wrong, and that, in every such case, my epistamic circumstances are superior to theirs? Am Ito believe that in very such case tis is because some ‘ural qu has provided me wih evidence tht is inaccessible to them? It | do believe this, I must ask myself, i tthe same neural quite in each case o a ferent one? It itis the same one, it begins to look mare a case of “my superior cogitve architecture" than a case of “accidental feature of my cogntive architecture." fits diferent one in each case—well, tha is quite coincidence, init? Al these evidence providing qiks come together in just one person, and that person happens ioe me, It seems more plausible to say (to revert fo the example of David Lewis and myselthat David and | have the same evidence inthe ‘attr ofthe prablem of fee wil, and to concede that tis entals that either we are both rational either of us is. ‘The postion that we are both rational, however, is hard to defend. It suppose that we ae beth rational, | hear W. K. Cilfors ghost whispering an indignant protest. Something along thse Ines (Citford has evidently acquired, post mortem, afew tums of phrase not current in the nineteenth century): If you and Levis are both rational in accepting cortracctory propositions on the bass of idetical evidence, then you accept one ofthese PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (we oxfodscholarshp.com)c) Copyright Oxford Urniversty Pros, 2003-2011. Al Fights Reserved Under the toms ote Ice agreement anndivdualuser may pnt out @ POF of a siglechapa ofa monograph OSO fr personal use or dale S00 tp:Swent.oxorscholrshp.comPsofpublvacy pote Mn, Suoserbeor: Unveraty of St Andrews; dale: O5 February 2011Disagreement Feldman fiehard (er), Universi of Rochester Wir, Ted a (Et, nvrstye Nave Dame Pre pubes dle 20% Putahe io Oneal One: Sepanber 2010 Propositions —incampatbiism—on the basis of evidence that does not rect you toward incompatiiam and away from compat, (For, t,t would have dracted him away tom compas, and it would not have been cational for him ta be a compatibit,) But of al the forces in the human psyche that dect us toward and away trom assert to propositions, only rational attention to relevant evidence tracks the rath Both experience and reason confim tis. And, i you assent to a proposition on the basis of some ner push, seme ‘ll to belive," if may coin a ptrase that does not track the tut, then your propositional assert nat beng guided bythe nature of the things those propositions are abou. you could decide what o believe by tossing a coin, it that would actualy be affective, then inthe ‘matter ofthe lkethood of your baits being tue, you might as well doit that way = a pilosopher who holds particular views, asa ctizan who casts his vote according tothe dictates of Her confess my precicamer Certain political bai, as an adherent of one religion among many. (For, ahough | have been aking bout philosophy for sometime ow, what | have said is equally applicable to polities and religion) | am unviling to listen othe whispers of Clifords ghost; that i, 1 am nwiling to become an agnostic about eveything but empiicaly verifiable matters of fact. (Infact lam unable to do that, and s, | think, is almost everyone ese; as Thoreau sad, nether man nor mushrooms grow so.) And am unable te believe that my gnosticism, soto cali is atonal. am, | say, unviling to listen to these whispers. But | am unable o answer them. PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (we oxfodscholarshp.com)c) Copyright Oxford Urniversty Pros, 2003-2011. Al Fights Reserved Unde tne tam of he enc g72emen. an indvaal user may pent ou & POF of sng cheplr of a monograph in OSO to persona use (ordeals 0 hip:waw.osordscholarshp combosofpublpvacy poy hi), Suoserbeor: Unveraty of St Andrews; dale: O5 February 2011