Petitioner: Elvira Yu Oh

Respondent(s): Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Petitioner purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders, Inc. Due to her
failure to pay the purchase price, the company filed civil cases against her for specific
performance before the RTC of Pasig. On September 17, 1990, petitioner and Solid Gold
through it general manager, Joaquin Novales III entered into a compromise agreement to settle
said civil cases. It was approved by the trial court provided that petitioner shall issue a total of
ninety-nine post-dated checks in the amount of PHP 50,000.00 each, dated every 15th and
30th of the month starting October 1, 1990 and the balance of over PHP 1million to be paid in
lump sum on November 16, 1994 (the due date of the 99 th post dated check). Petitioner then
issued ten checks at Php 50,000.00 each for a total of Php 500,000.00 drawn against her
account at the Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC). Novales then deposited each of the ten
checks on their respective due dates to the company bank account. However, said checks were
dishonored by the EBC for the reason Account Closed. Dishonor slips were issued for each
check that was returned to Novales. On October 5, 1992, Novales filed 10 separate informations
before the RTC of Quezon City charging the petitioner with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Nonetheless, RTC convicted her of ten counts of violation of BP 22. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not appellate court was mistaken in not granting retroactive effect to RA 7691 in
view of Art 22 of the RPC.
(2) Whether or not notice of dishonor is indispensable in this case.
HELD:
(1) No. RA 7691 is not a penal law and therefore, Art 22 of the RPC does not apply in the present
case. A penal law is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties
for its violations. It also defines crime, treats of their nature and provides for its punishment. RA
7691 is a law that vests additional jurisdiction on courts, thus, it is substantive. The court further
held that it cannot be given retroactive effect.
(2) Yes. It is necessary that a notice of dishonor be received by the issuer and the prosecution
has the burden of proving the fact of service. It thus stated in section 2 of BP 22. It is essential
for the drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her checks so she could make arrangements for
its payment within the period prescribed by law (5 days).
Hence, SC reversed the decision of the CA and acquits the petioner.

People of the Philippines vs Cayat

Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin
FACTS:
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any
other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was
caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay
P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the
constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination
or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant
challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification.
The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics
that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable
race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy
towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those
privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before
the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by
appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of
their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the
basis of true equality.

City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio

Police Power
FACTS:On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE
ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels
and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light
district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use
women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only
regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a
valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized
that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an
invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

CASE DIGEST ON In Re: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI [35 SCRA 429 (1970)]

Facts:
Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-profit corporation contests
validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8 saying it violates due process rights of association, freedom of
expression and is an ex post facto law
Issues:
1.
WON it violates three rights?
No. Its set up to prevent prostitution of electoral process and equal protection of laws.
2.
WON it is an ex post facto law?
No. Ex post facto law defined:
a.
makes criminal an act done before law was passed and punishes act innocent when
done.
b.
aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was
c.
inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed
d.
alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different tests
e.
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of right which when done was lawful
f.
deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.
Held: Petition denied. Constitutional act.
Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws. Penalty in law imposed to acts committed
after approval of law

TITLE OF THE CASE: SALVADOR V. MAPADATE OF PROMULGATION: November 28, 2007SUBJECT

AREA: Civil Procedure; Criminal LawKEY DOCTRINES/CONCEPTS: Special Civil

Action for Certiorari (Rule 65) vs. Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45);
Prescription; Ex Post Facto Laws
FACTS:
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issuedAdministrative Order
No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad HocFact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans. Behest loans areloans granted by government banks or GOCC at the
behest,command, or urging by previous government officials to
thedisadvantage of the Philippine government. The Committeewas tasked to
inventory all behest loans and determine thecourses of action that the
government should take to recover these loans.By Memorandum Order No. 61
dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee were expanded to include all nonperforming loans which shall embrace behest and non-behestloans. Said Memorandum also
named criteria to be utilized asa frame of reference in determining a behest
loan S e v e r a l l o a n a c c o u n t s w e r e r e f e r r e d t o t h e C o m m i t t e e f o r investigatio
n, including the loan transactions between MetalsExploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine
Eagle Mines, Inc.(PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The
Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under
Memorandum Order No. 61because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were
known c r o n i e s o f t h e n P r e s i d e n t F e r d i n a n d M a r c o s ; t h e l o a n w a s undercollateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at thetime the loan was
granted.Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of theFact-Finding
Committee, and representing the PCGG, filedw i t h t h e O m b u d s m a n a s w o r
n c o m p l a i n t f o r v i o l a t i o n o f Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No.
3019, or the
Anti-G r a f t a n d C o r r u p t P r a c t i c e s A c t ,
against the respondentsMapa, Jr. et. al.The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint
on the ground of prescription. It stressed that Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019
asoriginally enacted, provides that the prescriptive period
for v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e s a i d A c t ( R . A . 3 0 1 9 ) i s t e n ( 1 0 ) y e a r s . Moreo
ver, the computation of the prescriptive period of a crimeviolating a special law like R.A.
3019 is governed by Act No.3326 which provides that prescription shall begin to
run fromthe day of the commission of the violation of law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof andthe institution of the judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. Corollary thereto, the Supreme Court in
thecase of People vs. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12
th
Supp., 50, ruledthat when there is nothing which was concealed or needed tobe
discovered because the entire series of transactions were by public instruments, the
period of prescription commenced torun from the date the said instrument were executed.I n
t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e l o a n s w e r e e n t e r e d i n t o b y v i r t u e o f public documents
(e.g., notarized contracts, board resolutions,approved letter-request) during the period
of 1978 to 1981.Records show that the complaint was referred and filed with the
Ombudsman on October 4, 1996 or after the lapse of morethan fifteen years from the violation
of the law. Therefore, theoffenses charged had already prescribed.Also pointed out was that the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committeeo n B e h e s t L o a n s
w a s c r e a t e d o n O c t o b e r 8 , 1 9 9 2 u n d e r Administrative Order No.
13. Subsequently, MemorandumOrder No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was
issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in
determiningb e h e s t l o a n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , i f t h e s e O r d e r s a r e t o
b e c o n s i d e r e d t h e b a s e s o f c h a r g i n g r e s p o n d e n t s f o r a l l e g e d offenses

committed, they become ex-post facto laws which areproscribed by the Constitution.The
Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but theOmbudsman denied it on July
27, 1998.
ISSUE 1: WON THE PRESENT PETITION FOR REVIEW ONCERTIORARI SHOULD
BE DISMISSED FOR BEING THEWRONG REMEDY IN ELEVATING THE CASE TO THE
SC.DECISION: No.RATIO:
A petition for review on
certiorari
under Rule 45 is not theproper mode by which resolutions of the
O m b u d s m a n i n preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reviewed by
theS C . T h e r e m e d y f r o m t h e a d v e r s e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e Ombu
dsman is a petition for
certiorari
under Rule 65.H o w e v e r , t h o u g h c a p t i o n e d a s a
P e t i t i o n f o r R e v i e w o n Certiorari
, the SC treated the petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents
reveals that petioner imputesgrave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for
dismissing t h e c o m p l a i n t . T h e a v e r m e n t s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t , n o t
t h e nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of theaction.
ISSUE 2: WON THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC.
(e)A N D
( g )
O F
R . A .
3 0 1 9
H A S
A L R E A D Y PRES
CRIBEDDECISION: No RATIO:
It is well-nigh impossible for the State to have
knownt h e v i o l a t i o n s o f R . A . N o . 3 0 1 9 a t t h e t i m e t h e q u e s t i o n e d t r
a n s a c t i o n s w e r e m a d e b e c a u s e t h e public officials concerned connived or conspired
withthe beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, the prescriptiveperiod should be computed from the
discovery of thec o m m i s s i o n t h e r e o f a n d n o t f r o m t h e d a y o f s u c h commission.
ISSUE 3: WON ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.
13A N D M E M O R A N D U M O R D E R N O . 6 1 A R E EX- POST FACTO LAWS
DECISION: No.RATIO:
T h e S C d i d n o t s u s t a i n t h e O m b u d s m a n s d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t Administrative
Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition against
ex post facto
laws for ostensibly
inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their issuance and which
was innocent when done.The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullificationof a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
theC o n s t i t u t i o n , n o t a d o u b t f u l o r a r g u a b l e i m p l i c a t i o n . Fur
thermore, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertainquestions on the constitutionality of a
law. The
Ombudsman,t h e r e f o r e , a c t e d i n e x c e s s o f i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n i n d e c l a r i n g unco
nstitutional the subject administrative and memorandumorders.In any event, the SC held that
Administrative Order No. 13 andMemorandum Order No. 61 are not
ex post facto
laws.An
ex post facto
law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of
the law and whichwas innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action;or (b)
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it waswhen committed; or (c) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the

crimewhen it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than the lawrequired at the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the defendant. This Court added two (2) more to thelist, namely: (e)
that which assumes to regulate civil rights andremedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprivesa person accused of
a crime of some lawful protection to whichhe has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.The
constitutional doctrine that outlaws an
ex post facto
lawgenerally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal lawsare those acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain acts andestablish penalties for
their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly donot come within
the shadow of this definition. AdministrativeOrder No. 13 creates the Presidential
Ad Hoc
Fact-FindingCommittee on Behest Loans, and provides for its compositiona n d f u n c t i o n s . I t
d o e s n o t m e t e o u t p e n a l t y f o r t h e a c t o f granting behest
loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merelyprovides a frame of reference for
determining behest
loans. N o t b e i n g p e n a l l a w s , A d m i n i s t r a t i v e O r d e r N o . 1 3 a n d Mem
orandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as
ex post facto laws.

Case Digest: U.S. vs. Ah Chong

G.R. No. L-7929 March 19, 1910
Facts: Because of the many bad elements happening at Fort McKinley, Ah Chong, a cook,
locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was
awakened by someone trying to open the door of his room. He called out twice, Who is there,
but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and
called out again, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at the precise moment, he was struck
by the chair and believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and
fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate.
Issue: Whether or not Ah Chong was guilty of murder.
Ruling:
Under Article 11 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that to justify the act, there
should be:
First.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed;
Second.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third.
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Ah Chong was not held liable for the death of his roommate. The Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts conviction of homicide, saying that Ah Chong committed a mistake of fact. He
would not have stabbed his roommate had he known the identity of the person who entered the
room. If the person who opened the door had really been a robber instead of his roommate, he
would not be criminally liable if he had stabbed that person in self-defense.

People vs. Oanis

July 27, 1943 (74 Phil 257)

PARTIES:

Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines

Defendants and appellant: Antonio Oanis, Alberto Galanta

FACTS:

Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped
convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the
suspected house then proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping
with his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively fired at him
which resulted to the victims death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson,
an innocent man.

ISSUE:

1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest
performance of their official duties.

2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty.

HELD:

1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. Ignorance facti excusat
applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the
supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real
Balagtas.

2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts
in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to
justify this: (1) the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office, (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first
requisite is present.

CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v. BINDOY [56 Phil. 15 (1931)]

Facts:
On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas wife. She refused
and Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife
and attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The disturbance attracted the
attention of Emigdio Omamdam. In the course of the struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging
himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latters hand, with such violence that the point
of the bolo reached Omamdams chest, who was then behind Bindoy. The trial court held that
Bindoy was guilty of the crime of homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that the death of
Omamdam was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.
Issue: WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the ground of
accident.
Held: Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised
Penal Code
Ratio:
1.
There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed
Omamdam.
?
No evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas.
?
No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdams presence.
?
No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam.
On the contrary, they were nephew & uncle, & were on good terms with each other.
2.
The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and
Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go,
the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who was therefore hit in the
chest, without Bindoys seeing him, because Omamdam had passed behind him. The testimony
of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
3.
If, in the struggle, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of
doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would be liable for his act, since whoever willfully
commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done is
different from that which he intended.
This is not the case here. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. He was only trying to defend his
possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. His conduct was
perfectly lawful.

Case Digest: Amado Alvarado Garcia vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 171951

28 August 2009

FACTS:

The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down
to which Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand
on him. Two days later, the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chys sister, Esquibel.
Chy was about to come out of his house and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched
him. Chy continued to parry the blows and when he found an opportunity to escape, he ran
home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the mauling. He also complained of
difficulty in breathing. He was found later unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating.

Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as
violent in nature as to have caused the death of Chy. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of
homicide. The autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the
victim could not have caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the victims
heart is healthy. What could have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions concerning
the violence inflicted upon him.

ISSUE:
Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should be appreciated

RULING:

The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim
does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by
law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised
Penal Code. Nevertheless, said circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner.
The fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically
caused the actual death of the victim, if the latters heart is in good condition.

Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should be in the minimum period,
that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

Complex crime
PEOPLE vs TOLING

FACTS: Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita Samar.
They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in
Manila. Jose's three children had stayed in Manila also since 1964. Antonio decided to go to
Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give him money. To have
money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos.
Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five
pesos for his expenses.
Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed
the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his pants. It was then noontime After buying their tickets,
they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at
six o'clock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The coach
had one row of two-passenger seats and another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat
faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers were seated side by side
on the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated
between Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a
woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal.
There were more than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were
standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was
sleeping with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat
across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat
woman, who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the
opposite seat were seated a woman

G.R. No. 162540

July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO,
Petitionervs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent PERALTA, J
A petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft,
and its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of
P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc.,
and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the
Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the
sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega
Foam.Later, Rowena Rica blanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from
an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was
to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Rica blanca then called and relayed the message through accused Anita Valencia, a former
employee/collector of Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could
be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at
Mega Foam.Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and
instructed Rica blanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told
Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Rica blanca,
petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's
accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.Thereafter,
Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed
petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. Baby
Aquino further testified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the phone to tell her that the
BDO check bounced. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted
the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega
Foam P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the dishonored check.Dyhengco filed a Complaint
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its
agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with
fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked
to pretend that shewas going along with Valencia's plan.Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband,
and Valencia then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only
Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that
she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the
premises was theP10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca
divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the
whole time. A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle. RTC
rendered its Decision finding them

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and sentenced each
imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS,as minimum , to
SIX(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS,as maximum .The three appealed
to the CA and the decision of the trial court was MODIFIED , in that:(a) the sentence against
accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4
months
arresto mayor medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. Hence,the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone,
Issue:
Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.
Held:
As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,
the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the
accused is to gain from the thing stolen . This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the
law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the
thing stolen.In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to
Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently
dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually
produced. The Court must resolve the issue in the negative. Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly
instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod (see doctrines laid out in Intod) , the
Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a
man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but
gets nothing since the pocket is empty. Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above
example of factual impossibility given in Intod.In this case,petitioner performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.Petitioner's evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed
her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only
due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner
at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by
petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored,
and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.The fact that
petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash
replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People
that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code there is only one
operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of personal property
of another. As of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam,
she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft,had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case . Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as
replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the

drawee bank.Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the
cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that
petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain. Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have
the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent
scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the
Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate
the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been
another possible source of criminal liability.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED . The Decision of the Court of Appeals, are MODIFIED .Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is
found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4,paragraph 2, and
59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
six(6) months of arrresto mayor , and to pay the costs.

BALEROS, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case Digest

RENATO BALEROS, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 138033 January 30, 2007

FACTS: At about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila,
the accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth
soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, tried to rape the victim by lying on top of her with the
intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts
being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.

Renato Baleros, Jr. moved for a partial reconsideration of a SC decision acquitting him of the
crime of attempted rape but adjudging him guilty of light coercion. It is Baleros' submission that
his conviction for light coercion under an Information for attempted rape, runs counter to the en
banc ruling in People v. Contreras where the Court held: The SOLGEN contends that Contreras
should be held liable for unjust vexation under Art. 287(2) of the RPC. However, the elements of
unjust vexation do not form part of the crime of rape as defined in Art. 335. Moreover, the
circumstances stated in the information do not constitute the elements of the said crime.
Contreras, therefore, cannot be convicted of unjust vexation.

ISSUE: Whether Renato Baleros, Jr. is guilty of unjust vexation.

HELD: Yes. He argues that the Information against him does not allege that the act of covering
the face of the victim with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical caused her annoyance, irritation,
torment, distress and disturbance. The SC wish to stress that malice, compulsion or restraint
need not be alleged in an Information for unjust vexation. Unjust vexation exists even without
the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that the term is broad enough to include
any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would
unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.

The paramount question in a prosecution for unjust vexation is whether the offender's act
causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to
whom it is directed. That the victim, after the incident cried while relating to her classmates what
she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved
beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed, by the acts of the Baleros.

ARTICLE IV: IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES

PEOPLE VS. DOMASIAN
FACTS:
Ponente: Justice Cruz, 1993
Petitioner: Pablito Domasian-the kidnapper

Dr. Samson Tan he was a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enricos father.
Respondent: People of the Philippines, Solicitor-General
Victim: Enrico Paulo Agra
Witnesses: Enrico Agra
Tirso Ferreras Enricos Classmate
Alexander Grate Tricycle Driver where Agra and Domasian rode, he speculated that the
latterwas a kidnapper and reported the incident to the tanods.
Events:
Enrico was walking with a classmate when a man, Domasian, approached him and asked for
his assistance in getting his fathers signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed and rode with him in a
tricycle. Enrico became apprehensive when instead of going to the hospital; he was forced by
petitioner inside a mini-bus, holding him firmly all the while.They rode another tricycle and
alighted from where they walked in a market. Domasian talked to a jeepney driver and handed a letter
address to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boys father. They then boarded the tricycle of Grate,
which aroused his the latters suspicion and reported the incident to the barangay tanods, together with
Grate, they went after Domasian and Enrico.They were able to recover Enrico, Domasian
escaped. Afternoon of that day, a ransom note arrived to Dr. Agra, asking for 1 million pesos in
exchange of his son, Enrico, who was able to return home earlier that day, after having been
recovered from Domasian. Dr. Agra identified the handwriting in the letter as Dr. Tans, and this was confirmed
by an investigation made by the NBI.
Filling of the Case:
Regional Trial Court convicted Domasian and Tan of Kidnapping
ISSUES: Convictions of Reclusion Perpetua are subject to review by the Supreme Court.?
Domasian petitions that he was forced to confess the crime in violation of his constitutional
rights?
Tan petitions that his act of crime, if indeed proven, only constituted an impossible crime?
WON the act committed by Dr. Tan constitutes an Impossible Crime?
RULING: The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed. Article 4 Section 2 of
the Revised Penal Code States: Criminal Liability shall be incurred By a person committing an
act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment, or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
On the matter of Conspiracy : the acts done by Domasian and Tan were complementary to each
other. Kidnapping of Enrico by Domasian, and Ransom note of Tan, with one end goal in
mind,which is, the ransom of 1 million pesos from Dr. Agra. Court held that even before
the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already
been committed. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not
extinguish the offense,which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico
of his liberty.
Edgar Esqueda vs People of the Philippines G.R. No. 170222
Facts:
A petition for review on certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court regarding the affirmation of the Court of Appeals to
the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Dumaguete City on Criminal Case Nos. 14612 and
14609 of herein respondents common-law spouses Gaudencio Quiquinto and Venancia Aliser respectively against

petitioner Edgar Esqueda and one John Doe of 2counts of Frustrated Homicide.The private respondents were
awaked on of before 11 o clock in the evening on March 3, 1999 by the accused petitioner who concealed their
identities as members of roving patrol in their place and asking for a drink from the household. One of the
respondents, Gaudencio Quiquinto opened the door and went outside while his lived-in partner Venancia
Aliser followed him and stayed by the door. They found two men outside, one is positively identified as
the accused petitioner while the other is not identified. The accused petitioner allegedly stabbed Gaudencio
immediately. Aliser tried to ran away but was allegedly stabbed and fell on the ground and was continually inflicted
mortal wounds against the victims.The defense anchored on alibi and denial. Presented three witnesses, Claudio,
Viviana and Domingo testified before the court that the accused was out sea fishing during the time of the crime.
Issue:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the latter guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and
totally disregarding the latters defense.
Held:
The Honorable Court did not disregard the defense of the accused petitioner in rendering its decision. The presented
alibis and denial by the defense are essentially weak against the positive identifications made by the respondents. For
an alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he is somewhere else and it is physically impossible for him to be in
the scene for the crime. Physically impossible refers to the distance betweenthe place where the crime has transpired
and the place where it was committed, also the facility of access between the two places. Using the testimonies of
the witnesses as evidence, the accused petitioner failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to went to
the scene of the crime atthe time of the incident. In this case, the defense of alibi failed. The positive identification
destroys the defense of alibi giving to such effect to be weak, given as the identification was made with resound and
credible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO MENDOZA Y BUTONES

G.R. No. 152589 & 152758. January 31, 2005

Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-appellant of our
Decision dated 24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No. 152758. In said decision, we
modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in Crim.
Case No. 6636-G finding accused-appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code and instead, we adjudged him guilty only of attempted rape. We,
however, upheld the ruling of the court a quo with regard to Crim. Case No. 6637-G finding
accused-appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced accusedappellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.
Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find no
sufficient basis to modify our earlier decision convicting accused-appellant of attempted
rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to commit rape when the offender
commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. Upon the other hand, Article 366 of the Revised Penal
Code states: (a)ny person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other person
of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be
punished by prision correccional. As explained by an eminent author of criminal law, rape
and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature. There is, however, a fundamental
difference between the two. In rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman whereas this
element is absent in acts of lasciviousness. In this case, the series of appalling events which
took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble home of private complainant
and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter intended to ravish his very
own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private complainant before the trial court,
accused-appellant, taking advantage of the cover of darkness and of the absence of his wife,
removed her (private complainants) clothing and thereafter placed himself on top of her.
Accused-appellant, who was similarly naked as private complainant, then proceeded to kiss
the latter and he likewise touched her breasts until finally, he rendered private complainant
unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These dastardly acts of accused-appellant
constitute the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission
of the offense after the preparations are made. Far from being mere obscenity or lewdness,
they are indisputably overt acts executed in order to consummate the crime of rape against
the person of private complainant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of
Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly
weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds
which caused his death.
The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe
beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate
her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of
killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not the battered woman syndrome as a viable plea within the concept of
self-defense is applicable in this case.
Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of
the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to
use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probablenot necessarily immediate and actualgrave harm to the accused, based
on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of
the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

PEOPLE v. CASTANITO GANO

G.R. No. 134373 February 28, 2001

FACTS:
Accused was convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced to the penalty of
death. The core issue now before us is whether the three (3) killings should be appreciated as
separate aggravating circumstances to warrant the imposition of the penalty of death.
ISSUE: WON the 3 killings should be appreciated as separate aggravating circumstances to warrant
the imposition of death penalty?
HELD:
The SC found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide, but imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s
should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances
under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13
of the same Code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is specific paragraph (paragraph
10) providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the
robbery) would result in an anomalous situation where from the standpoint of the gravity of the
offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However,
the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender and no
person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.