Comment On The Report of Shrikrishna Commission

Comments On
the Report of
Srikrishna Commission Report
appointed for inquiry into the riots in Mumbai during

December 1992 and January 1993.
COMMENTS ON
SRIKRISHNA COMMISSION REPORT
On behalf of Hindu Vivek Kendra we would like to offer the enclosed comments on the
Srikrishna Commission Report. We give here a detailed comments on the Volume I of the
report. Wherever necessary, we have considered the comments made in Volume II, which
gives details of selected police stations, comments on depositions of some police officers,
journalists and politicians, and the Action to be Taken Report (ATR) of the Maharashtra
government. We have also based our comments on the information given by the Commission
to some lawyers who were involved with the proceedings.
By law, a commission of inquiry is not bound by the rules that are applicable in a court of law,
and hence it does not have a judiciary role. Also, the person heading the commission is not
expected to play the role of a judge, but as one who recommends certain actions for follow up.
The objective of the commission is not only to identify if there are certain persons against
whom action needs to be taken, but also to look at the broader picture so that incidents like
riots are not repeated. Hence, the commission is an important forum, which, if it functions
properly, will lead to an improvement in social harmony.
In our comments there would be repetitions. This is necessary because the same points have
been repeated in the original report. We have tried to keep asking the reader to make cross-
references within our comments to the minimum. The number at the beginning of some of the
paragraphs refers to the paragraph number in Volume I of the report.
Chapter I
In para 2, the Commission deals with the politics of the Hindu-Muslim issue. The views of the
Commission can be summarised as follows: The sense of camaraderie ‘vaporised and vanished
with the two-nation theory advocated by Jinnah’. The provisions in the Constitution
guaranteeing fundamental rights to the minorities were supposed to subside their feelings of
apprehensions. However, they were ‘merely driven deeper into the psyche to fester there and
manifest themselves at periodic intervals.’ As a reaction, the special provisions in the
Constitution with respect to the minorities ‘brought in its wake a resentment against the
minorities on the part of the majority, i.e. the Hindus.’
The Commission should have set out the basis on which it has come to this conclusion.
To have done a proper job, it should have asked opinions from various people. The
above stated views are the standard excuses being given, and it would appear that the
Commission has relied on the opinions of a very small group of people.
On the Ram Janmabhoomi issue, it summarises its view as follows: "Right through the Forties,
a section of Hindus started the clamour for "liberalization" of several mosques, which
according to them, were temples oppressively converted into mosques during Muslim reign.
The Government at the Centre, instead of addressing itself to an acceptable resolution of the
issue, dragged its feet, perhaps with the fond hope that the problem would soon disappear if
swept under the carpet..... Time and again, the Hindutvawadis (as the Hindu communal parties
are popularly called) raised a shrill cry for construction of a temple at Ayodhya at the very
place where the Babri Masjid stood, claiming that it was the hallowed place where Lord Shri
Ram, the embodiment of all that is Indian, was born. This was, of course, stoutly resisted by
the Muslims who refused to give up even an inch....... The issue became contentious and
landed itself in the lap of Courts. Thanks to the inevitable judicial delays, the issue smoldered
in Courts, till the Nineties when the Bhartiya Janata Party revived it to regain lost political
milage. The Rath Yatra Shri L. K Advani, leader of the Bhartiya Janata Party, refocussed
attention the Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute. The inevitable clashes and minor cases
of rioting, which took place along the route of the Rath Yatra, as reported by the newspapers,
were the distant thunderclaps portending the storm to come....... The vacillating attitude of the
Central Government emboldened the sudden installation of the idols of Ram Lalla in the
disputed structure and spawned the demand for permission to carry out pooja therein....... The
Government of India held rounds of unfruitful talks with the representatives of the Babri
Masjid Protection Committee and representatives of the Hindutvawadi parties."
The Commission should have stated on what basis has this been stated. For example,
the ‘vacillating attitude’ that is mentioned above refers to that of the Nehru
government, since the statues of Ram Lalla appeared in the Babri structure in
December 1949. The BJP wanted to put forward its views on the subject to the
Commission. It had even got a date for Shri Ram Naik of the BJP to depose before the
Commission. However, the Commission cancelled the deposition, since it said it was
not going to deal with the issue. Had it heard Shri Naik, it would have found that the
VHP had made serious efforts at negotiations, and that these were frustrated not so
much by the obscurantist Muslim leadership, but by those who call themselves as
secularists.
4 In this para, the Commission has narrated various incidents in Mumbai under the title
"Events of 6th December, 1992."
In para 3.1, the Commission says the destruction of the Babri structure, which began at
1230 hours, was not anticipated by the government. In para 2.9, the Commission has
said that the first news of the destruction started to come in since 1430 hours. Thus, any
event prior to 1430 hours in Mumbai cannot be linked to the destruction.
At 4.2. the Commission talks about a gathering of 155 people at 0010 hours at
Ambedkar Garden, Charni Road, and trouble near Bharat Cafe in Chembur at 0045
hours. At page 12, the Action to be Taken Report (ATR) says that Ambedkar Garden is
in Chembur (not Charni Road) and the gatherng was an annual event of the Dalits who
had come to celebrate Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar’s death anniversary. The ATR also
says that Bharat Cafe is at Ghatkopar and not Chembur, and that there was no record of
any incident at the place.
At 4.3, the Commission says that at 1134 hours there was trouble at Lohar Chawl. The
ATR also denies the alleged trouble at 1134 hours in Lohar Chawl. In the Vol II of the
report, there is no mention of this incident in the details provided on the LT Marg
Police Station, where Lohar Chawl is located.
The programme for 1100-1200 hours, mentioned at 4.4, where various meetings took
place, was part of an all India programme where those who could not go to do Kar Seva
at Ayodhya were asked to gather. It was thus a pre-determined programme and
knowledge of the same was available to all concerned.
At 4.5, the Commission says that at 1233 hours, 300/400 people hold a meeting
opposite Shiv Mandir, Dadar. This is an event that took place before the news of the
destruction of the Babri structure came in.
At 4.6 the Commission says that a crowd is reported near Elphinstone Bridge at 1400
hours. In the details in Vol II of the relevant police station (Bhoiwada), there is no
mention of such an incident.
At 4.7, the Commission says that the Babri structure is demolished at 1230 hours and
the news of the event is widely publicised by the electronic media. The demolition
started at 1230 hours, and was completed around 1700 hours. The first reports in the
electronic media came at 1430 hours, as mentioned in para 2.9.
The cycle rally in Dharavi mentioned at 4.8, has a confusing story. The Shiv Sena says
that they had taken the permission, but the Commission tries to disprove this. However,
the Commission has accepted that the rally was planned by local leaders, and hence not
an overall programme for the city. No other event of this type in other places in
Mumbai in its report. It has converted the rally as a ‘victory’ rally for the whole city.
Although the Commission says that one stone was thrown at a mosque (Vol II, para
10.18, page 51) during the rally, it feels that this was enough provocation for Muslims
to act at other places in the city. This event was not reported in any of the newspapers
of December 7, clearly indicating that it was of a minor nature.
In Vol I, the time of the rally is given as 1640 hours, while in Vol II it becomes ‘about
4:00 pm". Vol I mentions 200/300 people participated in the rally. Vol II does not
mention any number. The news of the destruction of the Babri structure was first
available at 1430 hours. One has to stretch one’s imagination that an event of this type
could have been organised in such a short time. In Vol II, it is mentioned "That neither
the cycle rally nor the meeting (that followed the rally) was held on the spur of the
moment, is clear from the fact that a big stage had been prepared at Kala Killa where
the meeting was to be held." The issue is not whether police permission was taken, but
whether the rally was pre-planned, in which case it cannot be termed as one to celebrate
the destruction of the Babri structure and it cannot be termed as a victory rally.
At 4.9, the Commission says that a crowd collected at Imam Wada, Bhendi Bazar in
Pydhonie jurisdiction at 1952 hours. In Vol II, the Commission says that the first major
incident in this jurisdiction is reported for 2325 hours at Minara masjid, which is
reported at 4.14 as happening at 2322 hours.
At 4.11, the Commission says a crowd of Hindutvavadis collected at Jijamata Lane in

Byculla jurisdiction at 2042 hours. However, in Vol II there is no mention about the
event. Either it was insignificant, in which case it should not have appeared in Vol I, or
it did not take place at all. The first incident mentioned in the Byculla jurisdiction is
said to have happened on Dec 7 at 1100 hours.
At 4.12, the Commission talks about stone throwing at 2110 hours in Jogeshwari. In
Vol II, it says that the first incident was at 1530 hours on January 7.
At 4.13, the Commission says that there is trouble at Kala Killa, Chembur, at 2115
hours. First, the Kala Killa is in Dharavi, and it finds mention in Vol II with respect to
the cycle rally, which has been analysed by the Commission in great details. It is also
mentioned in 4.8, and the time is 1640 hours.
At 4.14, the Commission says that the crowd of 500 people gathered at 2322 hours near
Minara Masjid, became violent, and the police were successful in dispersing it within
four minutes. In Vol II, para 23.7, page 131, it is mentioned that the crowd gathered at
about 2325 hours. Subsequently it goes into great details of the event covering two
pages of the report. It would be difficult to accept that all this happened in a matter of
four minutes. In Vol II it says, "The manner in which the crowd was handled by the
police displays lack of sensitivity on part of the police." There seems to be no effort of
harmonising the two volumes of the report.
At 4.15, the Commission says that there is an attempt at arson in Pydhonie at 2334
hours. Vol II makes no mention of the incident.
At 4.16, the Commission says that at 2344 hours the police fired one round near Minara
Masjid, and that 200 people gathered near Mandvi Head Quarters. Both these fall under
the Pydhonie police station. In Vol II, there is no mention of either events. In fact, at
4.14, it is stated that the Minara Masjid event was successully dispersed at 2326 hours.
At 4.17, the Commission talks about an incident of stone throwing at Bhendi Bazar at
2352 hours. There is no mention of this event in Vol II.
At 4.18, the Commission says there was stone throwing near Momin Masjid,
Mohammed Ali Road at 2350 hours. This incident is not mentioned in Vol II.
At 4.19, the Commission talks about private firing at Bhendi Bazar at 2356 hours. Vol
II does not mention the incident. The Commission has consistently tried to dismiss
most of the instances of private firing.
At 4.20, the Commission talks about firing and stone throwing in Bhendi Bazar and
Dongri at 2358 hours. There is no mention of either incident in Vol II. In fact in
Dongri, the first incident is reported for 2345 hours, and there was a mild lathi charge
with no injuries.
Out of the 18 incidents reported by the Commission, 4 are not relevant since they
happened prior to the news of the destruction of the Babri structure came in. Two of the
four find no mention anywhere in Vol II, one was a pre-determined programme that
took place all over the country, and the police station of the fourth is not covered in Vol
II. Out of the balance 14, eleven incidents find no mention in Vol II. Two are confusing
and one cannot be checked from Vol II since the police station is not covered. The
objective of the exercise of narrating the incidents by the Commission was to give an
indication that there was a spontaneous Muslim reaction. Analysing the information
given by the Commission, this conclusion can be easily disproved.
Vol II mentions four incidents that have happened on Dec 6 but have not been included
in para 4. In Ghatkopar, at 2200 hours, in two incidents, Muslims attacked Hindus with
weapons and damaged temples and property. In Deonar Muslims attacked government
property at 2100 hours, and in another incidentg at 2300 hours they attacked the house
of a local BJP leader. In the latter incident, two temples and a school were also
attacked. Here it is amply clear that the Muslim were violent and organised. Have these
incidents been not mentioned because they go against the so-called spontaneous theory
of the Commission?
It is pertinent to deal here with a part of the testimony of Shri S K Bapat, the then
Commissioner of the Police of Mumbai. He has been one person who has been
particularly castigated by the Commission, the media and many pro-Muslim politicians.
In Vol II, page 157, para 2.14, the Commission has said: "It appears that the State
Government and the police were sold on the theory that the Hindu backlash came on
account of the said gruesome incidents. Though Bapat has been quick to point out these
incidents in his affidavit, he claimed total ignorance with regard to several equally
gruesome incidents in which Muslims were victims, which were put to him in his cross-
examination by Shri Muchala. For example, he seemed either not to recollect, or be
unaware, of the arson of a timber mart in Ghatkopar jurisdiction on 15th December
1992 resulting in four Muslims being burnt alive, an arson in Goregaon jurisdiction on
20th December 1992 in which one of the Muslims was burnt and killed, of the attack on
Muslim hutments in M. P. Mill compound on 2nd January 1993 and large scale arson
of Muslim hutments on 4th January 1993 in Mahim jurisdiction and the morcha led by
Shiv Sena leaders Shri Ramesh More and Shri Gajanan Kirtikar to Jogeshwari Police
Station, en route causing havoc in Chacha Nagar and damaging the Chacha Nagar
Masjid, of the arson of a taxi carrying two Muslims which was burnt causing their
death on 7th January 1993 in Antop Hill jurisdiction and the Devipada incident in
which two Muslim ladies were stripped naked and attacked by a mob and one lady and
her uncle were murdered and burnt. There is legitimate grievance made by the Muslims
that the memory and information of Shri Bapat is either selective or that he had been
selectively fed with only such material to be placed before the Commission as would
suit a particular theory being advanced by the State Government and the police. "
In Vol II, in the respective police stations, except two, the other five are not mentioned.
It is understood that these five were quoted from the Urdu newspapers of the time. The
Commission has accepted the word of the counsel for the Muslims, and did not bother
to cross-check with the records of the police stations. On the basis of apparently
fabricated incidents, the Commission has accused Shri Bapat of bias against the
Muslims.
Of the two incidents, in one, a Muslim was injured, and a mosque was attacked. There
is no mention about the seriousness of the damage to the mosque. If it was significant,
then there would have been details given. It is indeed surprising that the Commission
expects a police officer of the stature of a Commissioner to remember minor incidents.
In case of the other incident, in Shri Bapat’s statement as a witness, he clearly narrates
the details of it. The Commission has tried to pass blame on Shri Bapat where no blame
could be passed. It is difficult to believe that there cannot be anything else but
mischievous intent on part of the Commission. Shri Bapat’s comments on this incident
is: "I remember this incident because of the gruesome nature of the incident."
To understand the fallacy of the spontaneity theory, it is also necessary to point out that
the Commission has accepted that the action to demolish illegal structures and the drive
against the criminals were projected as targeted against the Muslims in Nov 92, and the
Muslims were provoked to act. This could not have happened unless there were
organisations behind the programme.
Chapter II
1.2 The Commission has given four reasons for the Muslim action in the period immediately
after Dec 6. First it talks about the mobilisation of the Hindus for the Kar Seva. Here it also
talks about the propaganda against the construction of the mandir at the Ram Janmabhoomi by
the Students Islamic Movement of India and Bombay Muslim Action Committee. Second it
talks about the formal announcement of the Kar Seva for Dec 6 and the various programmes in
that respect. Third it talks about the Rath Yatra of the BJP. And fourth it talks about the
demolition of the illegal structures by the Mumbai Municipality and the Mumbai Police action
against criminals.
The Commission says that the Muslim action was spontaneous. Then how is the
propaganda by SIMI and BMAC relevant? While SIMI is a well known organisation,
the antecedents of the BMAC are not well established. According to our information,
this is a paper organisation, and the Dec 2 meeting was attended by religious and
secular leaders. It was also attended by criminals, and those businessmen who operate
at the edge of the law, both Muslims. At the meeting it was stated that if the police
remain a spectator, then the Muslims would have no problem in attacking the Hindus.
However, if the police do their job, then it would be difficult to foment trouble. It is
quite clear that this organisation was prepared to create problem, and the myth of
spontaneous reaction has to remain a myth. This committee is no longer in existence,
since its utility of fomenting trouble is over.
The programmes for Kar Seva was an all India programme and were also undertaken in
other parts of Maharashtra as well. It would have been necessary for the Commission to
have inquired why so much trouble took place in Mumbai, and not in other parts of
Maharashtra or the country.
Juxtaposing the Rath Yatra in the sequence of events is mischievous. This had taken
place 1990, that is two years prior to Dec 6, 1992. Furthermore, at the time a petition
was taken out, as a Public Interest litigation to ban the Yatra. The court declined to do
so.
The fourth reason given is incredible. These are secular events, and how the Muslim
community should take affront needs to be explained. The Commission has accepted
that these were not targeted against the Muslim, but against all irrespective of their
religious identity. The Commission should explain how the Muslims can be mobilised
through their religious identity. And how does this conform to its spontaneous reaction
theory.
In accepting the validity of the fourth reason, the Commission has put forward a
dangerous principle that every time normal action has to be taken, the law enforcement
machinery has to take into cognisance that it may lead to communal tensions. Thus, any
miscreant can always threaten such consequence to avoid being punished. We do not
understand how the Commission has not given the issue a serious thought before
accepting the validity.
Two of the persons against whom actions were taken are Shri Hitendra Thakur and Shri
Pappu Kalani, both of whom were MLAs from the Congress party, belonging to the
faction opposing Shri Sudhakar Naik, the then Chief Minister from the same Congress
party. It has been alleged that part of the problems that Shri Naik had within his party
were due to his actions against these two persons.
1.3A(i) On Dec 6, in the context of the destruction of the Babri structure, the Commission says,
"The cry of danger to Islam reverberated in the air."
This issue of Islam being in danger has a history going back to the independence
struggle. It was on this basis that the partition of the country was demanded by the
Muslim League. In the post-independence era, this bogey was continued. To a certain
extent, the Commission has accepted this in Chapter I, para 2.1. The issue of the Ram
Janmabhoomi has nothing to do with this slogan.
Moreover, since the Commission decided to deal with the issue, it should have also
investigated what would have happened if there was a peaceful transfer of the site,
given the just demand of the Hindus.
1.3A(ii) The Commission says that the so-called Muslim reaction turned violent because of the
‘victory’ rally in Dharavi and the police mishandling due to an aggressive posture.
How does ONE rally in Dharavi (Central Mumbai) create a reaction in the Muslim
dominated areas in South Mumbai? See the comments on para 4.8 of Chapter I above.
The ‘aggressive posture’ of the police is a constant refrain by the Commission. In Vol
II, para 16.3, page 94, the Commission says that the Muslim mob turned violent at the
sight of the police! At the same time, the Commission has accepted in para 1.6 (pg 12)
that the police did not fire on the Muslim crowd with an intention to target and liquidate
them.
1.3A(iii) "At this juncture the Hindus had nothing to complain and should have left the matter
to be dealt with by the police as a problem of law and order."
The Commission should have documented in how many cases the Hindus took to
immediate retaliation of the Muslim violence. In fact, the press reports at the time
clearly show that the media had blamed the police for taking ‘harsh’ action against the
Muslims. The Hindu reaction had come a few days after the Muslims acted, clearly
pointing to the fact that the Hindus did leave the matter to the police, and reacted only
when their patience ran out. This refrain of blaming the Hindus comes through again
and again throughout the report.
The Commission’s contention of significant Hindu reaction should be viewed along

with the ATR (pg 19, para 34) where the following table for police firing is given:
Police Firings Killed Injured
Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims
December 153 30 133 93 189
January 308 80 90 326 146
This table clearly shows that the Hindus did, by and large, leave ‘the matter to be dealt
with by the police as a problem of law and order’ in December. The January figures
also clearly shows that when the Hindus came out on the streets to retaliate, the police
did not distinguish the religious identity of the rioters. This point has to be borne in
mind in discussing the alleged bias of the police.
Here it is pertinent to mention that the Commission in an indirect way accepts that the
order to the police not to shoot at the Muslim rioters did aggravate the problem. In 1.3
C (ii), the Commission accepts this contention in the following words: "Perhaps as a
matter- of political prudence, the Chief Minister advised the Commissioner of Police to
instruct his officers and men to "go easy" with the firing. These instructions were
conveyed by B.C. Message No.414 dated 8th December 1992 instructing the police to
control the rioting mobs by using tear gas and lathi charge without resorting to firing."
Both the then Police Commissioner of Mumbai and the then Chief Minister of
Maharashtra have denied that the message was authorised. Whatever may be the case,
there seems to be some impression in the minds of the police that the political masters
would not stand behind them. Here, the issue is not merely the alleged message, but
also the propaganda conducted in certain sections of the media and some politicians
about the police deliberately targeting the Muslims. The Commission has dealt on this
issue in para 1.4.
1.3A(v) "In the jurisdiction of Deonar there was a sharp counter reaction by Muslims who
stoned the house of a local Bharatiya Janata Party leader."
The Commission should have explained whether the ‘reaction’ was justified. Why does
the Commission not pontificate that the Muslims should have left it to the law and
order machinery to deal with the situation instead of ‘reacting’?
1.3A(v) "The situation was getting uglier with attacks on Hindu temples in this area. Efforts of
the police to control the situation brought forth forceful violent reaction from Muslims against
them. Large scale firing resulted, which perhaps justified to quell the violent riots, was
construed as an unwarranted act of suppression by police of what the violent Muslim elements
thought was their legitimate protest."
If the police action was justified then how does it become an ‘unwarranted act of
suppression’ of a ‘legitimate protest’? Such type of rationalisation of Muslim actions
abounds in the report. We have seen it earlier when the Municipal action against illegal
construction, and police action against criminals, was turned by the Muslim leadership
into a communal issue.
This incident is related to an attack by the Muslims on two temples and a school, as
mentioned in Vol II, para 9.6, page 37. Is it that the Commission accepts that attacking
temples and schools by the Muslims as legitimate protest?
1.3B(i) "From 7th December 1992 onwards there was a qualitative transformation in the
situation. Large mobs of Muslims came on the streets and there was recourse taken to violence
without doubt. This time the Muslim mobs appear to have come out with the intention of
mounting violent attacks as noticed from their preparedness with weapons of offence. There
were violent attacks on the policemen in Muslim dominated areas like Bhendi Bazar and its
vicinity. The jurisdictional areas affected were mostly Muslim dominated or mixed localities in
which the misguided and irresponsible Hindu youths aggravated the situation by engaging the
rioting Muslims, leading to a situation where the police found it difficult to restrain both
sections; when the police did it by force, the police came to be attacked by both Hindu and
Muslim mobs."
A ‘spontaneous’ and peaceful action of 6th December turns into a violent one with
‘preparedness and weapons of offence’ the very next day! Most of the so-called
spontaneous events mentioned in para 4 of Chapter I appear to be a fiction of
imagination of the Commission. The fact that the Muslim actions started only on
December 7 has to imply that the Muslim action was organised. Here the meeting of the
Bombay Muslim Action Committee on December 2 is important. See comments on
para 1.1 of Chapter IV.
The Commission talks about Hindus engaging the Muslim crowd obviously bent on
destruction. Does it mean that every time Hindus must just take a beating without
reacting? Kindly refer to the table given in the explanation to 1.3A(iii) and the
comments thereon.
1.3B(ii) "By this time the protest had degenerated into a full scale communal riot between
Hindus and Muslims. Eleven temples in different jurisdictions were damaged, demolished or
set on fire. The Hindus did not fall behind and damaged Mosques and Madrassas in different
jurisdictions. BEST Buses in the Bombay Central Bus Depot and BEST Bus stops became easy
targets for the Muslim mobs and were damaged and/or set on fire."
The police records show that there were a total of 42 temples destroyed and 4 mosques.
Why has the Commission not given the full information where Hindus are at the
receiving end?
1.3B(iii) "Two Constables in Deonar jurisdiction were killed with choppers and swords by the
rampaging Muslims. While one lay on the ground bleeding to death, the body of another was
dragged and thrown into the garbage heap from where it was recovered seven days later. One
constable was done to death in Byculla jurisdiction. Several police officers and policeman who
bravely attempted to stem the tide sustained injuries in mob action."
On this day, in the whole city, three police personnel were killed and 216 injured.
1.3B(iv) "A police officer carrying on his duty received a bullet injury in his head and died
subsequently, though it cannot be said with certitude that it was a case of private firing."
The Commission consistently denies the issue of private firings. It is done on the basis
of non-capture of private weapons by the police. The police’s explanation that they
were not able to mount combing operations immediately after the private firings due to
other pressing matters and lack of manpower is not accepted by the Commission, even
though the Commission has accepted that there is an overall shortage of manpower to
handle even routine activities. However, the existence of sophisticated weapons in the
underworld, which is dominated by the Muslims, is common knowledge both prior to
the December 6 events and afterwards. These are the tools of the trade for the
underworld which is dominated by the Muslims.
1.3C(ii) With respect to Dec 8, the Commission says, "The police firing resulted in the death of
a large number of Muslims as compared to Hindus. A clamour went up that the police were
deliberately targeting Muslims for attack. Perhaps as a matter of political prudence, the Chief
Minister advised the Commissioner of Police to instruct his officers and men to "go easy" with
the firing. These instructions were conveyed by B.C. Message No.414 dated 8th December
1992 instructing the police to control the rioting mobs by using tear gas and lathi charge
without resorting to firing."
In the same para, the number of people killed in police firing is given as 21 Hindus, 31
Muslims, and three others. It is clear that it was the Muslims who were attacking both
the Hindus and the police. Yet the slightly larger proportion of Muslims killed was
enough to raise a cry that the Muslims were being deliberately targeted. In para 1.4, the
Commission has clearly identified that the ones who raised this cry were not only the
politicians but also the media. The Commission is silent on who should be held
responsible for raising this cry and misleading the government.
From the police statistics, it would appear that in police firing the number of Hindus
dead was 6 and of Muslims was 52. The injured figure given is 21 Hindus, 37 Muslims,
and 3 others. Has the Commission taken the injured figure for deaths? This is a grave
error on part of the Commission. The police figures would confirm the violence that the
Muslims were indulging in and that the Hindus had ‘left the matter to be dealt with by
the police as a problem of law and order’. The police figures would demolish the
Commission’s theory of peaceful Muslims, and also the charge made against the
Hindus in para 1.3A(iii).
1.3(D) For the 9th Dec, the Commission accepts that the ‘situation improved for the better’.
This would show that the police had taken a proper stand in controlling the situation,
and the charge of excessive force made by the media and some politicians does not
hold water. The improvement in the situation is also accepted by the Commission for
the days after 9th Dec.
1.4 "Media had criticized the police for having used unnecessary and excessive fire power,
going far as to suggest that Muslim were intentionally targeted and selectively killed. This
refrain was repeated by political leaders and ministers, past and current. The explanation of the
Commissioner of a Police that the aggressive and violent mobs in the initial stages comprised
Muslims and, therefore, Muslim casualties were higher, does not appear to be as far fetched as
it has been made out by Muslims, nor can it be dismissed offhand."
It was this that created a lot of confusion in the minds of the police of the way they
should be taking action against the rioting Muslims. It had also made the Hindus feel
that the government would not protect them. Yet, the Commission has not taken the
whole episode seriously enough. It should have named the media and the politicians
who were responsible. This has been one of the serious lapses on part of the
Commission. The Commission has also used a very guarded language in dealing with
the issue.
1.5 "Considering it from all aspects, the Commission is not inclined to give serious credence to
the theory that disproportionately large number of Muslim deaths in December 1992 was
necessarily indicative of an attempt on the part of the police to target and liquidate Muslims
because of bias."
In para 1.4 immediately above this para, the Commission mentions that the media has
criticised the police for using ‘unnecessary and excessive fire power’ and
‘intentionally’ targeting and ‘selectively’ killing the Muslims. It is clear from the
Commission’s findings that these atrocious charges were absurd. However, the
Commission does not find any reporter and/or publication guilty in this respect. One
has to ask the Commission why it has chosen not to appropriate the blame in the right
direction. The Commission had accepted that because of such media reports, the hands
of the police were tied. There is an implicit assumption that this made the police not to
take firm action against the Muslim rioters, who were targeting not only the
government property but also the Hindus. At the same time, the Commission expects
that the Hindus should have kept quiet and let the police handle the situation, knowing
fully well that the police were not allowed to do their task. It was imperative for the
Commission to have gone into the issue of biased media reporting in this case.
It is pertinent to note that in case of the killings of the Mathadi workers on January 5,
the Commission identifies two Sena leaders for making speeches which are alleged to
have turned ‘a case of simple murder into a communally motivated murder’ (Vol II, pg
133, para 23.14).
1.6 "The Commission is of the view that there is evidence of police bias against Muslims
which has manifested itself in other ways like the harsh treatment given to them, failure to
register even cognizable offences by Muslim complainants and the indecent haste shown in
classifying offences registered in "A" summary in cases where Muslim complainants had
specifically indicated the names and even addresses of the miscreants."
This sentence is so obviously in complete deviation from para 1.5, that one wonders
how it has come into the report. If there was a bias on part of the police, then they
would have resorted to indiscriminate killings, which the Commission says did not
happen. It needs to be pointed out that in Vol II, it is rare that the Commission accepts
the police version, while it accepts almost all the statements given by the Muslims
against the police.
1.6 "That there was a general bias against the Muslims in the minds of the average policemen
which was evident in the way they dealt with the Muslims, is accepted by the officer of the
rank of Additional Commissioner, V.N. Deshmukh."
The charge of bias is on the basis of the testimony of one police officer whose political
opinion is clear from the following: "Deshmukh has no hesitation in calling Bharatiya
Janata Party and Shiv Sena as communal parties as the records show that they have
been preaching communal hatred." (Vol II, para 4.14, page 162.)
To establish such a major charge on the basis of only one officer’s opinion does not
show a proper application of the principle of natural justice. And that too from a person
with a strong political leanings as accepted by himself. We have been given to
understand that another officer, Shri AA Khan, has deposed that the police are not
biased. Similarly, other police officers like AS Samra, RD Tyagi and SK Bapat have
also said that the police are not baised. This type of selectivity does no justice to the
Commission. The deposition of Shri Khan and Shri Samra, who have placed the police
in favourable light, has not been covered in Vol II.
7. The heading is "12th Dec 1992 to 5th Jan 1993".
The first event recorded is for Dec 20. Does this mean that nothing of consequence
happened between Dec 12 and Dec 20?
1.7(i) "On 20th December 1992 two Muslims were locked inside a room and the room was set
on fire in Goregaon jurisdiction as a result of which they suffered severe burns resulting in the
death of one."
This event does not find mention in Vol II. However, the police records do show such
an incident having taken place.
1.7(ii) The Commission has dismissed the stabbing of a mathadi worker on 24th/25th
December as an action of an alcoholic, even though he is a Muslim.
Given the atmosphere that existed at the time, it was quite easy to believe that there was
a communal angle. During this period there were stabbing of Hindus in many parts of
Mumbai, and there was very little police action to try and control the situation. This
happened in a Muslim dominated area, and there was a reaction from the Hindus the
next day, when shutters were downed. There is also a clear signal that the Hindus tried
to undertake a peaceful protest, given that there were very few incidents in the two days
immediately following the stabbing.
It has to be also mentioned that in Vol II, para 11.16, page 62, the date given is
December 26. Such mistakes abound in the report, and one wonders if it was not
prepared in haste.
1.7(iii) The Commission defends the calling of Azans (by using loudspeakers) from the
mosques, and the Namaz on the streets by terming them as ‘minor irritants’.
Why does the Commission time and again rationalise and justify Muslim behaviour
which irritates the Hindus? Calling these happenings as ‘minor irritants’ clearly shows
a lack of respect for the sensibilities of the Hindus. The issue of Azans is a major one
all over the country. Last year, the High Court in Calcutta has taken cognisance of the
nuisance value of this obnoxious system, which does not exist in other parts of the
world. It is surprising that the Commission is not aware of this. See also comments on
para 1.2 of Chapter IV. It is also surprising that the Commission is not aware that the
Mumbai High Court had in the past asked the government that the Namaz on the streets
should be restricted.
1.7(iii) "The Mahaartis were started from 26th December 1992 and kept adding to the
communal tension and endangering the fragile peace which had been established. Some of the
Mahaartis were later used as occasions for delivering communally inciting speeches and the
crowds dispersing from the "Mahaarti" indulged in damage, looting and arson of Muslim
establishments in the vicinity and on their way. The Mahaartis continued unabated throughout
January 1993 and came to an end only by or about the first week of February 1993."
What is it that made the peace so fragile? The Commission has accepted in the same
paragraph that the Mahaartis were in response to ‘a sudden spurt in attendance at Friday
Namaaz in Mosques’.
There were a total of 462 Mahaartis starting from Dec 26. Out of these, up to Jan 5 the
number was 52. Thus most of the Mahaartis happened in the Hindu retaliation phase.
Yet these Mahaartis have been construed as a provocation by the media, certain
politicians, and to an extent by the Commission. Most of the Mahaartis have taken
place after the Hindu backlash commenced.
Time and again the police have deposed that very few of the Mahartis witnessed
communal speeches. But the Commission has chosen to disregard these depositions. To
establish the charge made by the Commission, it should have given the number of
Mahartis that were conducted, in how many cases were communal speeches given, and
after how many were there violence and when. In the DB Marg Police Station police
jurisdiction (Vol II, para 8.6, page 32), out of the 11 Mahartis, only one witnessed
violence after the event. This too was in the second phase of the January riots when the
Hindu backlash had commenced.
1.7(iv) "The last week of December 1992 and first week of January 1993, particularly between
1st to 5th, saw a series of stabbing incidents in which both Hindus and Muslims were victims,
though the majority of such incidents took place in Muslim dominated areas of South Bombay
and a majority of victims were Hindus."
The Commission should have given the numbers of stabbing incidents, and in how
many cases were the Hindus the victims. The reticence comes through whenever the
issue is of Hindus as victims. According to the police information there were 134 cases
of stabbing in the first week of January, and 99 casualties were Hindus. While the
Commission goes into great details in cases were the Muslims are the victims, there is a
marked glossing over of the magnitude where the Hindus are the victims. It should also
be recognised that these stabbing were going on for two weeks, prior to the murders of
the Mathadi workers, and the Radhabai Chawl incident.
1.7(iv) "The killers had not been then identified in several cases, though it was presumed, at
least in the cases where the Hindus were victims, that the killers were Muslims. The motive for
the stabbing appears to have been to whip up communal frenzy between Hindus and Muslims.
Some of the Muslim criminal elements operating in South Bombay, like Salim Rampuri and
Firoz Konkani, have been identified as the brains behind the stabbing incidents. That they were
criminals was underplayed by Hindus; that they were Muslims was all that mattered, and a cry
went up that the Muslims were bent upon a second round of riots."
The Commission is very quick to identify the Hindus as aggressors wherever the
Muslims are the victims. In the opposite cases, there is an attempt to almost deny the
communal identity of the aggressors. If the fact that 99 Hindus were stabbed had been
mentioned, it would have been very difficult for the Commission to say with a straight
face that it was done by two criminals who incidentally happened to be Muslims.
The identity of Konkani was discovered only in his confession statement when he was
arrested in a murder case (that of a senior BJP leader Ramdas Nayak) in 1995, two
years after the stabbing incidents had happened. At the time it was treated by all
concerned as Muslims attacking Hindus.
Furthermore, it is obvious that the Commission accepts that it is quite easy to ‘whip up
communal frenzy’ where the Muslim community is concerned.
1.7(vi) "On 2nd January 1993 a number of Muslim hutments in M.P. Mill Compound in
Tardeo jurisdiction were set on fire. On the same day there was an incident in Dharavi
jurisdiction in which two Muslims were assaulted with iron rods by Hindus."
In Vol II, neither event is mentioned in the details of the respective police stations.
However, the MP Mill incident is mentioned at para 2.14, page 157, with respect to the
statement on Shri S K Bapat, the then Commissioner of Police. Hence, the Commission
has relied on an allegation made by the Muslims, but one which is not recorded in the
police station.
1.7(viii) "On 4th January 1993 a big mob of Hindus led by Shri Gajanan Kirtikar, Shri Ramesh
More and other Shiv Sena activists took a morcha to the Jogeshwari Police Station
complaining of lack of security for Hindus. Some of the people in the morcha attacked Chacha
Nagar Masjid and the Muslims in the vicinity and injured them. Several Muslims huts in
Magdum Nagar in Mahim jurisdiction were set on fire by Hindus."
Does this not establish the Hindu insecurity? Kindly note the date of the morcha.
Similar sentiments had been expressed all over the city by many Hindus. Also this is
yet another instance where the Hindus asked for police to do their job in protecting the
Hindus from being targeted.
As far as the attack on Muslims is concerned, Vol II, para 14.20, page 84, says that one
Muslim was injured. The extent of damage to the mosque is not indicated. The
Magdum Nagar incident is not mention in Vol II.
1.7 (ix) On the issue of the opinion of the Commission on the murders of four Mathadi workers
these are summarised in Vol II, pg 133, 23.14, where it says that ‘a case of simple murder’ was
converted ‘into a communally motivated murder’.
In trying to explain away the magnitude of the incident, the Commission has once again
exposed its bias. It is very difficult to argue with such blatant statements, and there are
many of them in the report.
1.8(i) The casualties for Jan 6, 1993, are given as follows:
Killed Injured
Stabbing 1 1 13 1
Mob violence 7 1 9 8
No information is available for casualties in arson or police firing.
1.8(ii) "The situation in Mahim went out of control at 2100 hours (Jan 6). Hindus attacked
Muslims in Muslim pockets in Mahim area led by Shiv Sena Corporator, Milind Vaidya, and a
Police Constable Sanjay Gawade, openly carrying a sword. There were serious riots in which
frenzied mobs of Hindus and Muslims attacked each other."
Reading the section on the Mahim police station in Vol II (para 19.18), it is clear that
there were attacks on Hindus, just prior to January 6. Also in Para 19.20, it has been
clearly stated that the two persons mentioned above were arrested on the spot. This
clearly shows that even in case where there was a Hindu reaction, the police did take
the appropriate action. If the Commission had mentioned these facts, then it would have
to do away with the theory of rationalising the Muslim actions, and also about the
police bias.
1.10 The information provided by the Commission for the events on Jan 7 is as follows:
Killed Injured
Stabbing 16 4 41 12
Mob violence 2 - 10 2
Arson 2 - 5 2
Police firing - - 6 5
Burning - 2 - -
Total 20 6 62 21
The attacks on Hindus is quite clear. Also the report mentions that the above
happenings are in 16 police station, most of which are Muslim dominated areas, and the
fiction that this was the handiwork of two Muslim criminals should remain as a fiction.
The table also establishes that the police have attempted to be fair in dealing with the
violence. In fact, given that the Hindus have been on the receiving end from the
Muslims, there really should have been more Muslim casualties in the police firings.
1.10 "A taxi in which two Muslims were travelling was set on fire in Pratiksha Nagar, Antop
Hill jurisdiction resulting in the two Muslims being burnt alive."
In Vol II with respect to the Antop Hill Police Station (pg 6+), there is no mention
about such an incident. The closest one gets is at 2.14 (pg 7) where it talks about three
(not two) Muslims being burnt in a Maruti car (not a taxi) on Jan 14 (not Jan 7). This is
yet another example of inconsistency in the two volumes.
1.11(i) "During the wee hours of 8th January 1993, at about 0030 hours, some of the Hindu
residences in a chawl popularly known as Radhabai Chawl in Jogeshwari jurisdiction were
locked from outside and set on fire by miscreants. one male and five female members of a
Hindu family (Bane) and their neighbours were charred to death and three other Hindus
sustained serious burn injuries. One of the victims was a handicapped girl. This incident was
sensationalized by the media by giving exaggerated and provoking reports."
This was the major incident of the whole episode, and one that provoked the maximum
anger of the Hindus against the Muslims. It is obvious that the Commission has tried to
minimise the magnitude of the incident, because those killed were Hindus. It is also
pertinent that no angry adjectives are used to describe the incident. The ATR has the
following to say on the subject: "This was such a horrifying, cruel and gruesome
incident that even an ordinary person would have got highly excited and would have
lost his mental balance. Government is surprised as to how the Commission does not
acknowledge this incident with adequate gravity and, on the control, blames some
parties for inciting religious frenzy and alleges that some Marathi newspapers gave
exaggerated reports and sensationalised the issue. Government cannot accept these
conclusions because the news items were indeed based on facts."
In the Vol II of the report (14.25, pg 85), this incident is covered in less than 25% of a
page. In contrast the coverage given to incidents where Muslims are attacked is quite
extensive, even in cases where there are individual attacks on the Muslims, and where
there is injury and not deaths. The whole emphasis is to downplay the communal angle
in the Radhabai Chawl case, and blame the votaries of Hindutva for the so-called
playing up the incident. The Commission has refused to look at this incident in context
of the overall attacks that were taking place against the Hindus, and has treated it as an
isolated incident.
1.11(ii) This para starts with the sentence "The Hindu ‘backlash’ commenced."
One does not understand why the word ‘backlash’ is in quotes. Perhaps the
Commission wants to maintain the fiction that there was no ‘backlash’ as such. The
backlash is accepted by the police, by the government (both of the time and the
present), and by the Hindutvavadi political parties. In fact in para 1.12(ii), narrating the
events of 9th January, the Commission has said that ‘the Shiv Sainiks mobilised
themselves for retaliating against the Muslims.’
If the Commission is correct, then how did the trouble which was in 16 police stations
areas on January 7 went up to 32 on January 8? The figures of casualties for Jan 8 are
as follows:
Killed Injured
Stabbings 11 15 29 30
Mob violence - 6 11 17
Arson 6 2 2 5
Police firing 9 18 20 24
Total 26 41 62 76
Even though the Hindus were still being attacked, it is clear that the Hindu retaliation
had started and the Muslims were now getting to be at the receiving end as well.
1.11(iii) "That the rioters had become defiant and the authority of the police was considerably
eroded, appeared clear when a crude bomb was hurled at the Police Commissioner's car from
one of the buildings in Pydhonie jurisdiction and exploded on the road."
The authority of the police was eroded because they were not permitted to take the
necessary action. The reasons for this has been stated by the Commission earlier. Had
there been a proper maintenance of the law and order, then the severity of the whole
situation would have been far less. For this the blame should not be laid on the police.
It should be laid on the then political masters, and the media which projected the police
action in a perverted manner.
1.12 (i) The Commission reports the summary of the events for Jan 9 as follows:
Killed Injured
Stabbing 8 18 27 33
Arson 3 6 4 6
Total 27 52 102 100
This is another evidence of the Hindu retaliation.
1.12(ii) "The Shiv Sainiks mobilized themselves for retaliating against the Muslims. The
shakhas in different jurisdictional areas turned into centres of local commands. The attacks on
Muslims by the Shiv Sainiks were mounted with military precision, with list of establishments
and voter's list in hand."
That the Sena mobilisation started on Jan 9 clearly establishes that there was a
retaliation of the events that had happened in the previous fifteen days. It is also clear
that the Hindus did not react immediately, but did so when their patience was stretched
to the limit. Between Jan 1 and Jan 7, out of 134 stabbing casualties, 99 were Hindus.
The incident of going around with the voters’ list is mentioned in only one case in Vol
II at the Antop Hill Police Station jurisdiction. This cannot be taken as a rule.
Moreover, as the ATR has also commented (para 14(8), pg 15), ‘group of young
persons’ in Vol II (para 2.6, pg 7) becomes Shiv Sainiks in Vol I. Just as the
Commission has converted one so-called victory rally at Dharavi (para 1.3A(ii)) as
victory rallies, the Commission is guilty of blowing up one incident to make it look like
it was the rule. In case of the Muslims, the Commission does exactly the opposite.
1.12(iii) "Police suspected terrorists to be holed up on the terrace of Suleman Usman Bakery in
Pydhonie jurisdiction. Operation launched against the alleged terrorists by the Special
Operation Squad (SOS) under the direction of Joint Commissioner of Police, R.D. Tyagi, and
extensive firing by the SOS resulted in deaths of nine Muslims. The police failed to apprehend
even a single so-called terrorist, nor did they seize any fire-arms, sophisticated or otherwise,
from which firing was done at them as claimed."
The Suleman Bakery is not under Pydhonie but Dongri police station, as mentioned in
Vol II, where the incident is covered in great details, and goes on for three pages. At the
same time, the Radhabai Chawl incident is covered in less than 25% of a page.
The police version is completely disbelieved, while the Muslim version is completely
accepted. The Commission goes out of the way to disprove the police case, as it has
done in many other incidents as well. There were 9 Muslims who were killed in the
action, and 78 were captured. If one were to accept the Commission’s contention of
bias and indiscriminate firing, surely there would have been more killed.
In Shri Bapat’s affidavit, he states that after the operations, the police found four
empties of AK47, one slug of AK47, two live cartridges of AK47, one empty of 7.62
SLR and two empties of 9mm pistols. Surely, the Commission does not want to say that
police planted them!
1.13 (i) The Commission gives the following summary of the casualties of various events on
Jan 10.
Killed Injured
Stabbing 10 39 24 42
Arson 1 5 1 1
Total 35 76 115 97
In para 1.13(ii), the report has stated that the police were given orders to fire. This had
removed the confusion that was existing in the minds of the police. In The Times of
India (Jan 10, 1993), it says, "However, in view of the unprecedented riots last night,
Mr Naik, it is learnt, has issued strict instructions to the police to be ‘tough and no
nonsense’. He is believed to have assured the city police commissioner that he would
answer allegations in the press, if any, of ‘police excesses’." As will be seen from the
above table, there were significant Hindu casualties in police firing. Also, when the
Hindu retaliation commenced, the police treated the Hindu reaction as a law and order
issue, once again demolishing the Commission theory of bias against the Muslims. The
police ‘bias’ against Muslims of December that was made so much hue and cry by the
media and certain politicians does not exist. As the police have been saying, when they
see a rioter on the street they do not distinguish the communal identity of the person.
Since it was the Hindus who were at the receiving end, the media, of course, did not
raise a hue and cry about a community being specifically targeted by the police. Shri
Naik did not have to face any awkward situation in this case!
1.14 The Commission gives the following summary of the casualties of various events on
January 11.
Killed Injured
Stabbing 11 44 23 58
Arson 2 12 - 7
Total 36 82 80 112
1.15(i) "A gruesome incident occurs in Devipada in Kasturba Marg jurisdiction." This incident
relates to an assault on two Muslim women, one of whom is killed. The uncle is also killed in
his attempt to rescue them.
The Commission rightly calls this incident ‘gruesome’. However, in dealing with the
murders of the mathadi workers and the Radhabai Chawl incident, the Commission
does not use any ‘angry’ adjectives. In fact, the Commission has tried to pass off these
incidents where Hindus are the victims as minor and of little significance in the whole
events that have happened.
(From Jan 13 onwards, the situation started to improve considerably. The figures for
subsequent days are given in the table enclosed.)
1.24 The report summarises the casualties for December and January as follows:
Dead Injured
Hindus 275 893
Muslims 575 1105
Unknown 45 38
Others 5 -
Total 900 2036
The causes of the deaths are summarised as follows:
Police firing 356

Stabbing 347
Arson 91
Mob action 80
Private firing 22
Others 4
Total 900
The Commission has admitted to 22 deaths due to private firings. However, when one reads
the Vol II, there is a consistent doubt that is placed on the veracity of private firings. The
Commission has pointed out that there have been no arms seizure, and has refused to accept
the police version that this was due to the fact that sufficient force was not available to
undertake the exercise. In its habit of being inconsistent, the Commission has also accepted
that the police are understaffed to the extent of 30% for normal duties.
1.25 "After studying the conclusions of the expert panel the Commission is inclined to accept
the report and conclusions drawn by the panel of experts from the Tata Institute of Social
Sciences (TISS). Class conflict, Economic Competition, Decline in employment opportunities,
Changing Political Discourse are some of the immediate causes of urban riots in different
studies undertaken by sociologists."
Our reading of the report of the experts from TISS is that except for ‘Changing Political
Discourse’ none of the other factors are important. There seems to be an effort on part
of the Commission to down play the essential findings of the TISS, since it does not
conform to the leftist propaganda of the past to explain the occurrence of riots.
Probably for the first time, some experts, and that too from an institute that is well
known for its leftist leanings, have come out with debunking a theory that the people
always knew to be false. These factors have been used only to cover up the deficiencies
of the ‘secular’ politicians and intellectuals.
1.25E(ii) On the issue of the Changing Political Discourse, the TISS findings say, "Originally
confined to the forward caste and the middle class in Mumbai, Hindutva has recently gained
currency and fashionableness and its appeal cuts across economic strata and linguistic
divisions."
It has to be accepted that the ideology of Hindutva has come to the centre stage only
since the mid-80s. Even the Shiv Sena adopted this programme at that time. Until this
change took place, the destiny of the nation was being guided by the leftists, who
projected that they had all the answers to the problems being faced by the nation. They
were the ones who had control of the levers of power, not only political but also
intellectual. Many of the latter are still clinging on to the positions that they have
allotted themselves, and are living off the funds provided to them by the society. What
the TISS findings do not touch upon is why the ideology of Hindutva has gained
currency amongst all the sections of the society. Controlling the intellectual space
enables them to undertake a propaganda against the votaries of Hindutva. Yet the
people seem to be not listening to them. A recent poll in one of the many national
weeklies which are editorially controlled by the leftists, clearly show that the people of
Mumbai are not satisfied with findings of the Commission.
The TISS findings can also be disproved when one considers that the riots took place
only in Mumbai, while the ideology of Hindutva has ‘gained currency and
fashionableness’ in other parts of Maharashtra and the rest of India.
1.25E(iii) "Unlike elsewhere in the country the Muslims have not acquired sufficient political
clout, nor have they been able to increase their representation in B.M.C. or in the Legislative
Assembly. This has contributed to the Hindutva idiom gaining ground."
It is not correct to say that it is ONLY in Mumbai that the Muslims have not acquired
sufficient political clout. This has happened in many other places in India, and they
have not resulted in the violence of the type that has been seen in Mumbai. One will
have to find other reasons for explanation, which reasons the Commission has chosen
to ignore and instead rationalise and justify the so-called anger of the Muslims. The
non-Hindutva politicians and academics have been projecting (and they still try and do
it) that they are the protectors and benefactors of the Muslims.
This analysis of TISS is also an exhibition of the mind set of vote bank politics,
because it makes a clear assumption that it is only through political clout that the
Muslims will be able to address their problems. The fact of the matter is not that the
Muslims have not been able to ‘acquire sufficient political clout’ but that they have lost
whatever clout that they have had. This clout was available to them because the
votaries (political and otherwise) of the so-called secularism have used them for their
own agenda, and not to create an environment whereby the Muslims benefit
economically and socially.
1.26(i) In the Commission’s opinion: "The immediate causes of the communal riots on 6th
December 1992 were: (a) the demolition of Babri Masjid, (b) the aggravation of Muslim
sentiments by the Hindus with their celebration rallies and (c) the insensitive and harsh
approach of the police while handling the protesting mobs which initially were not violent."
With respect to (a) an honest inquiry was needed to find out whether there were efforts
made by the Hindus to come at a negotiated solution. And also an inquiry was needed
why the negotiations had failed. This inquiry would have revealed that there is a very
strong historical case for the Hindus to ask for the site back, since it is considered holy
by the Hindus for the last at least 3000 years, when there was no Islam around. Not
only did the Commission not make the inquiry, but prevented the votaries of Hindutva
to present their point of view.
As far as (b) is concerned, the Commission bases its whole conclusion on one event,
namely the cycle rally at Dharavi. While an explanation for the same has been provided
by the Sena and the police, the Commission has chosen to ignore it. And this cycle rally
seems to have been given importance much, much later, and not at the time.
As far as (c) is concerned, the Commission has taken it upon itself to rationalise and
sweep under the carpets the real reasons. Even while accepting that the police were not
specifically targeting the Muslims, it has come to this conclusion. Had the police been
biased as claimed in para 1.5 (pg 12), they could have easily used the opportunity of the
Muslims being on the streets to do the things a biased person would do
1.27(i) "As far as the causes for January 1993 phase of the rioting is concerned, the
Commission does not accept the theory that it was merely a backlash of the Hindus because of
the stabbing, Mathadi murders incidents and the Radhabai Chawl incident."
The Commission would like the people to believe that the Sena acted entirely on its
own, and that there was no provocation of the Hindus. And that the Hindu anger was
created by the Sena out of thin air. We think that this has severely eroded the credibility
of the Commission.
This is from a paper which the Commission would not like to dismiss out of hand. "The
Maharashtra govt has cited incidents in three areas in Bombay as the causes for January
riots. The first is the fatal stabbing of two Mathadi workers with a sword and chopper
by a gang of goondas at Vijay Laxmi godown in Dongri. The second is the killing of 37
people, following 138 cases of stabbing in Dongri, Pydhonie, Nagpada, and VP Road
police station jurisdictions in 48 hours, after January 6. The burning to death of four
members of a family in Radhabai Chawl at Jogeshwari on the night of January 7 and 8
is mentioned as the third main reason..... Though the Mahrashtra govt has not said so, a
clear inference which can be drawn from the incidents mentioned is that the attacks by
the minority community provoked the riots." (The Times of India, Feb 18, 1993.)
Kindly note that the Maharashtra govt at the time was of the Congress party.
1.27(ii) The Commission says that the stabbing incidents that happened between Dec 12 and
Jan 15 were the handiwork of a couple of criminals (who incidentally happened to be
Muslims). The Commission says that ‘the communal passions of the Hindus were aroused to
fever pitch by the inciting exaggerated accounts of the Mathadi murders and the Radhabai
Chawl incidents.’ Here the Commission particularly blames Saamna and Navakal. The
Commission says that at least from Jan 8 the Shiv Sena leadership in general, and Balasaheb
Thackcray in particular, assumed the leadership of the retaliation. Subsequently the criminal
elements took over, and when the Sena felt that the retaliation was sufficient, it issued an
appeal for peace.
One has to really stretch one’s imagination beyond the maximum limit to think that 136
stabbing incidents in the first week of January, out of which 99 were Hindus, were the
handiwork of two criminals.
If only the mathadi workers’ murders and the Radhabai Chawl incidents had happened,
without the others that preceded it, probably one could agree with the Commission. But
one has to see the situation as a whole. And one should, in any case, understand the
horrific element in the Radhabai Chawl incident. Given the situation of attacks on the
Hindus in the first week of January, the killings of the Mathadi workers and the
Radhabai Chawl incident, one has to see the whole thing as part of a concerted
programme of targeting Hindus. It is difficult to understand why the Commission has
taken it upon itself to play down this incident.
As far as the media is concerned, the Radhabai incident has been reported in all the
papers, and not only the two that the Commission names. Again, one has to see it in
terms of the straw that broke the camel’s back, and not in isolation.
With respect to the writings in Saamna, we are sure that the Commission is aware of
the Public Interest Litigation that was filed by two so-called conscious citizens of the
country residing in Mumbai. The High Court said that it did not agree with the litigants
that the writings broke any law of the land. In the judgement on the petition, the High
Court judges opined that Balasaheb was referring to Muslims who were working
against the nation, and not the whole community. An appeal was made to the Supreme
Court, which did not even admit the same. All this had happened before the
Commission finished its hearing and started to write the report.
That Balasaheb and the Shiv Sena took the lead in channelling the Hindu anger is
something that is accepted by everybody, including Balasaheb. However, without a
genuine Hindu anger, no organisation would have been able to create it. The
Commission has accepted that the backlash has started from Jan 8, and the Sena
mobilisation from Jan 9.
1.28 "Effete political leadership, vacillation for political reasons and conflicting orders issued
to the Commissioner of Police and percolated downwards created a general sense of confusion
in the lower ranks of the police, resulting in the dilemma "to shoot or not to shoot" Four
precious days were lost for the Chief Minister to consider and issue orders as to effective use
of Army for controlling the riots."
The effete and vacillating leadership was reflected in the way the January stabbing by
the Muslims were handled. Due to the media pressure, the government had given orders
not to shoot at the rioters then. Even while all the stabbing of Hindus was going on in
late December and early January, there was no effort made by the police, under
pressure of the political leadership, to control them. There is also a clear case that there
has been internal bickering in the then ruling party, namely the Congress. The
Commission has reported at many places in Vol II about the interference of Congress
ministers, both in the state and the centre, in the working of the police. In Vol I of the
report, the Commission has not mentioned the persons who were responsible for the
interference, and not recommended any action that should be taken against them.
"The assertion by All India Congress Committee general secretary Janardhan Poojari in
Hyderabad today that the Bombay riots were cause of infighting within the Maharashtra
unit of the party is being echoed by senior Congressmen here. According to a UNI
report, Poojari said that "some disgruntled elements within the Congress" were fanning
communal violence in order to seek the removal of Chief Minister Sudhakar Naik."
(The Sunday Observer, Jan 10, 1993.)
Then there is the case of compensation to the families victims of the riot. For political
reasons, the amount that was given was announced by the state government as Rs 1
lakh. This was increased to Rs 2 lakhs by the central government. Both of them were of
the Congress party. This compensation was given even to the criminals who had
instigated the riots, and not only to innocent bystanders, and those who were provoked.
This compensation was also doled out in a public function, giving it political overtones.
This created a great deal of demoralisation amongst the police, who were less inclined
to do their duty.
The role of the so-called secular media in December has also got to be analysed. Their
reporting and placing of the blame on the police for killing the rioters was biased. The
Commission has blamed the two Marathi papers for reporting the news. But it has
completely ignored the so-called secular media for perverting the news about an alleged
police bias, as well as the Urdu press.
1.29 "The built-in bias of the police force against Muslims became more pronounced with
murderous attacks on the Constabulary and officers and manifested in their reluctance to firmly
put down incidents of violence, looting and arson which went on unchecked."
Here the Commission is talking about not putting down the Hindu reaction firmly.
However, even from the Commission’s own report of the number of Hindu casualties
during the retaliation phase of the January riots, it is clear the police took firm action
when the confusion of the December order was removed, and orders to fire were given
on Jan 10, that is within 48 hours of the start of the retaliation. There is also The Times
of India report, quoted above, that the then Chief Minister gave clear indications to the
police that he was behind them if there was any criticism on their action as had
happened earlier. In Vol I, the Commission has mentioned that the media and the anti-
Hindutvavadi politicians has unfairly criticised the police for taking harsh action
against the Muslim rioters during the first phase of the December riots. It is also to be
mentioned that in Vol II, in its report on individual police stations, the Commission
criticises the police for dealing harshly with the Muslim rioters, who were supposed to
be peaceful at the beginning and became violent only when the police started to take
the necessary action.
On the issue of bias, the Commission has contradicted itself, as has been pointed out
earlier.
The first part of the above statement is quite confusing.

Chapter III
1.1 "As far as the December 1992 phase of the rioting by the Muslims is concerned there is no
material to show that it was anything other than a spontaneous reaction of leaderless and
incensed Muslim mobs, which commenced as peaceful protest, but soon degenerated into riots.
The Hindus must share a part of the blame in provoking the Muslims by their celebration
rallies, inciting slogans and rasta rokos which were all organized mostly by Shiv Sainiks, and
to a marginal extent by BJP activists."
At various places the Commission has mentioned about various Muslim organisations,
and in many cases it has criticised the police for not seeking intelligence information on
them. It has also said that the police stations should have a Urdu reading member to
keep a tab on what is written in that press. Under the circumstances, it is not clear how
the Commission has denied any role to the Muslim organisations for their role in
fomenting the riots. Also see our comments on para 4 of Chapter I.
On the issue of the action of the Municipality against the illegal structures and the
action by the police against the criminals, the Commission, even while accepting that
they were not targeted against a particular community, says, "Some of the Muslim
extremists and fundamentalists seized upon this opportunity to canvass that their
religious interests were at stake and that Muslims were being subjected to systematic
attack. This call to religion found a ready response amongst the Muslim youth. This
explosive mixture was ready to be ignited." (Para 1.2(iv) Ch II, pg 9). If this is correct,
then obviously there were some organisations that were behind the cause of further
alienation of the Muslim community.
Stray incidents by the Hindu community have been converted by the Commission into
a rule, and it is on this basis that it blames the Hindus for the retaliation that they have
taken. If the Muslims had not acted, and if the government had taken firm action, would
the retaliation have taken place? The Commission has also not gone into the reasons
why the media, political leaders and ministers, has falsely reported that the Muslims
were targeted in December. It has mentioned some politicians belonging to the
Congress party and who were ministers at the time, for interfering with the police
functioning in Vol II, but not in Vol I. It has not held any reporter or publication for this
distortion. In fact, it has accepted in totality the evidence presented by media persons
who have been guilty of the exaggeration of the police bias.
One journatlist, who is in the anti-Hindutva bandwagon, wrote the following prior to
the report being made public: "The evidence before (the Commission) also destroyed
the theory put forward by ‘progressive intellectuals’ and Muslims that the violent
outburst by Muslim youth after the demolition (of the Babri structure) was not
communal but aimed only at government property and personnel. Muslims attacked as
many as 57 temples between December 6 and 8 and killed six policemen." (Jyoti
Punwani, "Judging by silence", The Telegraph, April 25, 1998.)
1.2(i) "Turning to the events of January 1993, the Commission's view is that though several
incidents of violence took place during the period from 15th December 1992 to 5th January
1993, large scale rioting and violence was commenced from 6th January 1993 by the Hindus
brought to fever pitch by communally inciting propaganda unleashed by Hindu communal
organizations and writings in newspapers like "Saamna" and "Navakal". It was taken over by
Shiv Sena and its leaders who continued to whip up communal frenzy by their statements and
acts and writings and directives issued by the Shiv Sena Pramukh Bal Thackeray. The attitude
of Shiv Sena as reflected in the "TIME" interview given by Bal Thackeray and its doctrine of
"retaliation", as expounded by Shri Sarpotdar and Shri Manohar Joshi, together with the
thinking of Shiv Sainiks that "Shiv Sena’s terror was the true guarantee of the safety of
citizens", were responsible for the vigilantism of Shiv Sainiks. Because some criminal
Muslims killed innocent Hindus in one corner of the city, the Shiv Sainiks "retaliated" against
several innocent Muslims in other corners of the city."
The Commission has mischievously divided the events of January to indicated that the
first phase was over by Jan 5. Looking at paras 1.8 and 1.10 of Chapter II, page 14, it is
clear that even on Jan 6 and Jan 7, the Hindus were at the receiving end. On Jan 7, the
Commission reports that stabbing incidents accounted for 16 Hindus dead and 41
injured, against 4 Muslims dead and 12 injured. The Radhabai Chawl incident
happened at 0030 hours on Jan 8. Further more, it is at Chapter II, para 1.11 (relating to
the events of Jan 8) at section (ii) that the report says, "The Hindu ‘backlash’
commenced." Various inconsistencies in the report have been mentioned earlier.
On Jan 6, there were 18 stabbing incidents, in which there were 14 Hindu casualties
and 2 Muslim. On Jan 7, there were 54 stabbing incidents, in which there were 57
Hindu casualties and 16 Muslim. On Jan 8, there were 66 stabbing incidents, in which
there were 40 Hindu casualties and 45 Muslim. From then onwards, the Muslim
casualties increased.
The Commission talks about the writings in Saamna and Navakal. But nowhere does it
make any mention about the writings in the Urdu papers. The lawyers for Shiv Sena
had asked the Commission to get the necessary papers, and review them by getting
them translated. While it did this exercise in case of Saamna and Navakal, it refused to
do so in case of the Urdu papers. In addition, the Commission has not taken into
cognisance of the role of the English media and some so-called secular Marathi media
in exaggerating the actions of the police in controlling the December riots. That there
was this exaggeration is accepted by the Commission in Chapter II, para 1.4, page 12.
The Commission does not mention specific sections of the media which falsely accused
the police of targeting the Muslims when they were on the streets in December.
The Commission has come to its conclusions of the Shiv Sena ideology on the basis of
the interview in TIME magazine. This interview consisted of about ten questions, with
a question of about eight words, and an answer to each in ten words. This is what the
American media calls sound bites. There is no chance to develope one’s thinking in
such a short space. Balasaheb has been interviewed in the Indian media quite
extensively. The words of Balasaheb is supposed to have used in the Time magazine
interview should have been compared with what he said in these other publications. In
the judgement on a petition to prosecute Balasaheb for his views as expressed in
Saamna, the High Court judges opined that what Balasaheb was referring to were
Muslims who were working against the nation, and not the whole community.
Moreover, there is a great deal of inconsistency in the then TIME magazine reporter’s
version of why she could not produce the original tape. She said (Vol II, para 7.2, page
171) that she had destroyed the same, when she changed her job from the magazine to a
TV channel. However, according to the police office, Shri V N Deshmukh (Vol II, para
4.15, page 163), she had said at the time that she had sent the tape to the magazine in
the USA. The Commission has commented that ‘there was no follow-up action taken in
this matter at all to compel her to produce the audio cassette.’ Given the nature of the
interview, and the controversy it had created at the time it had appeared, one would
have thought that it would have been prudent on the part of the reporter to have kept a
transcript of the full interview. It is obvious that either the police officer or the reporter
is telling a lie. The Commission should have identified the guilty person in such an
important issue. It is pertinent to point out that the Commission has held both the
reporter and the police officer in high regard as far as their depositions are concerned.
The Commission refuses to accept the accept as valid the doctrine of retaliation in
terms of responding to events that have happened at another place. Under the same
criteria the Commission should have come down heavily against the Muslims for
responding to the destruction of the Babri structure which had happened in Ayodhya.
Hence, it was not at all justified for the Muslims of Mumbai to have come out on the
streets and destroy temples in Mumbai. Yet the Commission has completely
rationalised the actions of the Muslims in Mumbai, and has said that they were
spontaneous and initially peaceful.
1.2(ii) "There is no material on record suggesting that even during this phase any known
Muslim individuals or organizations were responsible for the riots, though a number of
individual Muslims and Muslim criminal elements appear to have indulged in violence,
looting, arson and rioting."
This is an example of white washing the role of the Muslim community and many of its
organisations, which have been instrumental in creating a ghetto mentality amongst the
Muslims. And if there was no Muslim organisation that was responsible for the riots,
why has the Commission mentioned about the intelligence failure with respect to the
Bombay Muslim Action Committee? And why does the Commission feel that the
police should have a Urdu reading person at some of the police stations to keep a tab
about the writings in this section of the media? In trying to rationalise, the Commission
has become inconsistent.
Chapter IV
1.1 "The intelligence apparatus failed to gather crucial intelligence about the closed door
meetings held by Bombay Muslim Action Committee on 2nd December 1992 in Madanpura
and by Shiv Sena at Sena Bhavan on 29th December 1992. On several occasions police station
concerned did not even have persons knowing Urdu to interact with Muslims and feel the pulse
of Muslim community or even to read and understand Urdu writings. This also led to their
inability to keep themselves apprised of the communal Urdu writings circulating in the city."
If the Muslim action was spontaneous, then why was there a need to keep a watch on
the Bombay Muslim Action Committee? According to our information, this is a paper
organisation, and the Dec 2 meeting was attended by religious and secular leaders. It
was also attended by criminals, and those businessmen who operate at the edge of the
law. At the meeting it was stated that if the police remain a spectator, then the Muslims
would have no problem in attacking the Hindus. However, if the police do their job,
then it would be difficult to foment trouble. It is quite clear that this organisation was
prepared to create problem, and the myth of spontaneous reaction has to remain a myth.
This committee is no longer in existence, since its utility of fomenting trouble is now
over.
In his deposition to the Commission, Shri Shreekant Bapat, who was the police
commissioner of Mumbai at the time of the riots said, "During a meeting at the Chief
Minister’s residence, (the then) Union Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad had questioned why
the police should interfere if the Hindus and Muslims were fighting amongst each
other. I politely told him that the police are expected to maintain law and order and
cannot remain mute spectators." (The Times of India, March 20, 1997)
As far as the comments on Urdu writings, we are surprised that the Commission has
chosen to ignore them. It could have taken a suo moto action to find out the extent of
communal writings in the Urdu papers. The fact that the Commission feels compelled
to make the comment that some police stations should have a Urdu reading person
clearly indicates that the Commission at least suspects that there was communal
writings in this section of the press. Even though the Shiv Sena lawyers asked the
Commission to call for the relevant Urdu publications of the time, this request was
denied. The Sena lawyers said that they have no knowledge of Urdu, and hence it will
be impossible for them to know what was written. The Commission had asked for the
writings in Saamna and Navakal to be made available to the Commission.
The Commission should have said that the keeping a track of Urdu writings should be
the task of a central intelligence gathering machinery of the government and so avoid
duplication. Whatever is appropriate information, the same could be passed on to the
concerned police station.
1.2 "The Mahaartis were erroneously treated as purely religious activity and given full
freedom, despite evidence that they were being used for political purposes......"
Whether the Mahaartis were for political purposes or religious is really not the issue.
As the Commission itself has noted (Vol I, Chapter II, para 1.7(iii), page 13) it was in
response to the Namaz on the street and the call of Azan on the loudspeakers from the
mosques, which has disturbed the people surrounding the mosques. The Commission
has accepted that the Mahaartis started from Dec 26, 1992, that is a good 20 days after
the start of the riots.
There were a total of 462 Mahaartis starting from Dec 26. Out of these, up to Jan 5, the
number was 52. Thus most of the Mahaartis happened in the Hindu retaliation phase.
Yet these Mahaartis have been construed as a provocation by the media, certain
politicians, and to an extent by the Commission.
The Commission has failed to look into the issue of why the Mahaartis stopped. In Feb
93, a meeting was convened by the government in which it was decided that the
Mahartis would stop, and simultaneously so would the Namaz on the streets. While the
first has happened, the second is still continuing. Even when the Sena-BJP government
came to power in March 95, and the issue of additional FSI to the mosques was solved
to the satisfaction of the Muslim community, the Namaz on the streets still continue.
The Commission should have also gone into the issue of when the Azan through
loudspeakers commenced, and the reason for granting the permissions for it. If the
Commission had done its job, it would have come across another example of Muslim
vote-bank politics. The tragedy is that the appeasement of the communal Muslim
leadership seems to be accepted by the community as well as those who go under the
label of secularist.
In Chapter II, para 1.7(iii), pg 13, the Commission says that the issue of Namaz on the
streets and the Azan over the loudspeaker are ‘minor irritants’. This establishes the bias
of the Commission. For the last over one year, there is a case going on in Calcutta on
the issue of noise pollution caused by the Azan over the loudspeakers, and using
loudspeakers in Hindu religious public functions. While the Calcutta High Court
restrictions have been applied on the Hindu functions, the mosque issue is still open. It
is understood that the Muslim religious leaders are egged on to disobey the High Court
orders by the so-called secular political parties. In Mumbai, the High Court here had
also asked the government quite a long time ago to do something about the nuisance of
the Namaz on the streets. Why has the Commission ignored this?
The contention of the Commission is that because the Mahaartis obstructed the traffic,
it was a nuisance, and hence suitable action should have been taken. Applying the same
criteria, Namaz on the streets also obstructs traffic. But for the Commission this is a
minor irritant.
1.4 "The police were hopelessly outnumbered as the strength of the police staff was inadequate
by about 30% to 35% even to handle day to day problems. A fortiori it was hopelessly
inadequate to handle extraordinary situations which arose during December 1992 and January
1993."
Even while the Commission accepts the undermaning of the police, it has consistently
not accepted this reason for not taking up follow up action when it deals with the
individual police station in Vol II. In particular, after an incident of private firing, the
Commission has refused to accept the police version that they were unable to do a
quick combing operation, and hence not locate the weapons used, because of lack of
manpower. See para 1.10 below. Also this contradicts para 1.3 where the Commission
says that the police were not able to effectively implement the prohibitory orders.
1.7 "The wireless communication equipment were not foolproof. This enabled communally
affected policemen to successfully break into and intrude upon the police channel and transmit
abusive, conflicting and confusing talk on the police wireless channels during the height of the
communal riots when accurate communication on wireless channel was imperative."
This incident happened from one police station, only once and from a remote police
outpost which sees no communal disturbance. Listening to the taped conversations, it is
also clear that the control room was telling that police station to get off the air. As soon
as the identity of the station was discovered, the necessary disciplinary action was
taken. It is because of the Commission’s bias that it has not dealt with this angle of the
whole issue. As in many other cases, the Commission has come to perverse conclusions
on the basis of a single instance. However, where the Muslims are in bad light the
Commission has rationalised their actions. It would have done credit to the
Commission to have acknowledged that the police did take disciplinary action once the
source of mischief was located.
1.9 This deals with the alleged ineffectiveness of the army.
The Commission has dealt with the issue of contradictions within the then political
leadership of the governing party. It is not that the army was ineffective, but that they
were not given clear cut instructions. Even at the time, there have been news paper
reports about the in-fighting in the governing party due to which the army was not
called out in time. Here is an attempt by the Commission to underplay the role of some
of the politicians, who should have been held guilty of dereliction of their duties.
1.10 "There was no serious combing operations carried out even in cases where private firing
was suspected. The excuse was that soon after the occurrence of the suspected private firing
the police personnel on hand was small and by the time their strength had been augmented and
combing was carried out it was too late to apprehend miscreants or unearth fire-arms.
Consequently, though the police claim that there were so many instances of private firing,
some even from sophisticated fire arms, they have not been able to seize any but one country
made pistol."
The Commission contradicts itself once again. In 1.4, the Commission accepts that
there is undermanning even in normal times. It is obvious that the Commission has pre-
judged the whole issue, and has gone about collecting ‘facts’ which would conform to
this judgement. There is also a need to recognise that the private firing has mostly taken
place in Muslim dominated areas, where the criminals operate. Also, it is well known
that these groups have sophisticated arms. However, in dealing with the individual
police stations, the Commission has mostly dismissed that private firing took place.
Hence, according to this conclusion of the Commission, the results of the search would
have not disclosed anything.
1.13 "Police officers and men, particularly at the junior level, appeared to have an inbuilt bias
against the Muslims which was evident in their treatment of the suspected Muslims and
Muslim victims of riots."
In Chapter II, para 1.5, page 12, the Commission says: "Considering it from all aspects,
the Commission is not inclined to give serious credence to the theory that
disproportionately large number of Muslim deaths in December 1992 was necessarily
indicative of an attempt on the part of the police to target and liquidate Muslims
because of bias."
There is thus a major contradiction here. If there was a police bias to the extent that it
affected their performance of their duty, then with the Muslims out in the streets, it
would have provide them with a good opportunity to exhibit this bias. Even when the
facts are given to them, the Commission persists in sticking to its pre-conceived
notions. The way the police took action against Hindu rioters after Jan 10 (when clear
instructions to fire, with the necessary political support, were given) it is clear that the
police does not consider the religious identity of the persons.
1.15 The Commission has consistently maintained that whenever the Muslims came out on the
streets the initial objective was peaceful. However, they were always provoked into being
violent.
In one case of the Kherwadi police station (Vol II, para 16.3, page 94), the Commission
says that the provocation was the sight of the police by the Muslim mob. This is yet
another example of bias and pre-conceived notions. As a rule, the Commission has
always said that the Muslim mobs that came on the street had peaceful intentions, but
became violent for no fault of theirs.
1.16 "The adverse criticism of the police in handling the December 1992 phase of the rioting,
which was aired in the media and from platforms by political leaders caused considerable
demoralization of the force. Apart from demoralizing the force, it also induced a knee jerk
reaction from the government at the political level with the Chief Minister instructing the
police that his officers and men should ‘go slow’."
The Commission has not identified the names of the politicians, the reporters or the
publication which have made the adverse criticism. In Chapter II, para 1.4, page 12, the
Commission has accepted that these criticisms were unwarranted. Given the bias of the
Commission, it is not surprising that the persons/institutions have not been identified.
In fact, the Commission has accepted the testimony of a journalist who was one of the
main person who made the adverse criticism.
1.16 "A specific broadcast message was issued on 8.12.1992 instructing the men not to fire
while dealing with communal mobs. This order was very much in existence till countermanded
by B.C. Message No. 457 on 10th January 1993. This order caused immense confusion
amongst the police ranks since, in the interregnum, the officers and men. were not sure how to
handle the mobs. Consequently, some of them continued to fire, but large number of officers
did not fire, resulting in prolongation of the violent incidents."
The authenticity of this message has been challenged by the then Police Commissioner
for the city and the then Chief Minister of the state. Whatever may be the case, there
would appear to be some cause of confusion in the minds of the police force. It is
obvious that they were influenced with the unjustified criticism by the media and some
politicians of their action in the first phase of the December riots. There is also a need
to understand the tactics that were used to target Hindus in the first phase of the January
riots. This was to indulge in individual stabbing, which would have been very difficult
for the police to handle, since the culprit would have gone away as soon as the crime
was committed. It would appear that the Hindus had to take to self-defence, and hence
the retaliation had started. The order which erased the confusion in the minds of the
police came only after the Hindu retaliation had started. And during this phase the
Hindu casualties with respect to police firing was higher than the Muslim.
There is an obvious inference that one can draw that if the confusing order not to fire
had not been given on Dec 8, the situation would have been controlled much more
quickly and caused much less damage to life and property. It is due to the
Commission’s bias that it has not extended its argument in this direction. It is also due
to the Commission’s bias that it has not come out strongly against the media and the
politicians who have alleged that the police have specifically targeted the Muslims in
December, when in fact, even as per the Commission’s own admission that this is far
from the truth.
There is a need to specifically point out that the order was rescinded, or clarity on the
action to be taken was restored, immediately after the Hindu retaliation had started in
January 93. And going by the Commission’s own findings it is clear that the situation
was brought under control quickly. If the police were not constrained, then the attacks
on Hindus in the first week of January 93 would not have taken place, and hence there
would have been no need to retaliate.
Here the Commission has contradicted itself with the paragraph immediately prior to
this, when it has said, "Though there were some marginal violence like stone throwing,
it should have been controlled by use of persuasion and minimal force." There is a clear
opinion that the Commission has expressed that there was no need to fire on the rioters.
1.18 "The police, by their own conduct, appeared to have lost moral authority over the citizens
and appeared to evoke no fear even in the minds of the criminal elements."
The moral authority was lost not because of the police action, but the way the media
and some politicians projected the police action in a bad light for their own vested
interests. As far as the criminal elements are concerned, the Commission has accepted
as valid that one of the reason for the violence was the action taken by the police
against criminals prior to December 92. This action was projected by the communal
leadership and the so-called secularists as being targeted against the Muslims.
1.19 "The police firing was, on several occasions, ineffective and large number of rounds are
said to have been fired without producing any visible effect. The police firing at least on two
occasions appears to be unjustified, excessive and resulted in killing innocent citizens, one in
the Suleman Bakery incident in Pydhonie jurisdiction and the other in the Hilal (Hari) Masjid
in RAK Marg jurisdiction. The ensuing deaths on these two occasions were not justified at all."
This is really contradictory. On the one side, the Commission says that firing was
ineffective, and then says that there was an excessive use of force. In case of the
Suleman Bakery incident, while 9 were killed, 78 were taken as prisoners. If there was
an excessive force, the numbers killed would have been much higher. The Commission
has refused to look at the issue on the basis of a larger picture.
1.20 "Even after it became apparent that the leaders of Shiv Sena were active in stoking the
fires of communal riots, the police dragged their feet on the facile and exaggerated assumption
that if such leaders were arrested the communal situation would further flare up, or to, put it in
the words of the then Chief Minister Naik, "Bombay would burn"; not that Bombay did not
burn even otherwise."
We have no comments to make on what is patently a political statement.
1.21 "Though the police did take action in some cases against newspapers by registering
offences. under section 153A of Indian Penal Code, such cases were kept pending for
inordinately long time for want of sanction by the government. A large number of vituperative
and communally inciting writing in newspapers was ignored by police, emboldening the
writers of such material to greater heights of abuse, incitement and calumny."
Here it is pertinent to point out that two so-called concerned citizens of the country
residing in Mumbai. The High Court said that it did not agree with the litigants that the
writings broke any law of the land. In the High Court judgement, an opinion was given
that a proper reading of the articles and editorial in Samnaa would clearly show that the
objects of ire were not Muslims in general, but those who were working against the
interest of the nation. It is indeed surprising that the Commission has chosen to ignore
this judgement, and expressed a contrary opinion. An appeal was made to the Supreme
Court, which did not even admit the same. All this had happened before the
Commission finished its hearing and started to write the report. Moreover, the
Commission is silent on what was written in the Urdu papers. And so were the two
‘concerned’ citizens.
1.22 "Despite knowledge of the fact that the force had been infected by communal virus, no
effective curative steps were taken over a large period of time as a result of which communal
violence became chronic and its virulent symptoms showed up during the two riot periods."
The Commission should have pointed out that this so-called virus was bred during the
time when there was an allegedly secular government. Under the circumstances the
Commission should have specifically blamed the governments that were in power
before the Shiv Sena-BJP were elected in March 1995. It should also have been the job
of the Commission to have investigated why the so-called effective curative steps were
not taken.
The Commission also had the opportunity to inquite whether the communal virus exists
while the present government is in power. After all, the Shiv Sena-BJP government
claims that it has been able to maintain harmony and that there was only one communal
incident during its reign.
The Curious Yuvraj Mohite Story
Author: Hindu Vivek Kendra
Publishers: Hindu Vivek Kendra
Date: October 98.
One of the important person whom the Srikrishna Commission, on the riots of Dec 92 and Jan
93, has relied on to make its judgement about the involvement of Balasaheb Thackeray and the
Shiv Sena in the Jan 93 riots is Shri Yuvraj Mohite. He has been identified as a "senior reporter
of the Marathi eveninger, "Mahanagar" edited by Nikhil Wagle, and an active social worker of
Rashtra Seva Dal." (Para 9.1, page 172. All references are to Vol II to the report.)
Mahanagar's mission statement is to take on the Shiv Sena. It says that it does intellectually,
but there are some who doubt that there is intellectual honesty in its efforts. Its writings have
frequently provoked Shiv Sena, and there have been physical attacks on the office of the
publication. These attacks have been projected by the publication to enable it to take the role of
a martyr, amongst the so-called intellectuals. Shri Mohite has confirmed in both his affidavit
and his witness statement, that Balasaheb refuses to even talk to a reporter of Mahanagar. Shri
Mohite has, in his affidavit, made it clear that he does not empathise (to use a mild word) with
either Balasaheb or the Shiv Sena. And the Commission has recognised this lack of empathy.
This by itself does not disqualify Shri Mohite as a reliable witness. However, if there is a doubt
on the veracity of what he has to say, and he is not able to substantiate his submissions through
additional sources, then obviously, his word cannot be taken to be correct. If it is done, then
obviously justice has not been served.
Shri Mohite came to be involved in this episode (Paras 9.3 to 9.5, pp 172-3) in the following
manner:
On 8th January 1993 at about 1900 hours, Shri Mohite peeps into the office of the then Mayor
of Mumbai, Shri Chandrakant Handore who seemed to be distressed about the riots. Shri
Handore is a member of the Republican Party of India. The Congress party had an alliance
with RPI in the municipal elections, and together were the ruling combination. The Mayor
wants the Hindu political leaders and the Muslim leaders to sign a joint appeal to the people to
exercise restrain and maintain peace, an idea welcomed by the Chief Minister. Since it is late,
there is no staff around. Shri Mohite himself writes out a draft of the appeal in duplicate. The
Mayor informs the media about his plan. The Mayor invites Shri Mohite to come along with
him to get the leaders to sign. Shri Mohite agrees since it would make a good story. They are
accompanied by the Mayor's Personal Assistant. They first go to the house of Shri Haji Mastan
to obtain his signature. They then proceed to the residence of the Shiv Sena chief, Balasaheb
Thackeray, where they arrive at 2130 hours.
While waiting to talk to Balasaheb and get his signature on the appeal, Shri Mohite says (Paras
9.6 to 9.11, pp 173-4) the following was supposed to have transpired at the residence of the
former: Over the phone Balasaheb was "directing the Shiv Sainiks, Shakha Pramukhs that they
give tit for tat and ensure that "not a single landya would survive to give oral evidence." He
also said that the riots had "started from the bastis of "landyas" and that he would deal with
them properly and put and end to their arrogance." Generally, Balasaheb was supposed to be
giving telephonic instructions to attack the Muslims and even to kill them, if necessary. The
Sena leaders who came in person were also given the same instructions. Balasaheb wanted the
Mayor to convey to the Chief Minster to control the Muslim areas, confiscate their arms,
dismiss Shri Javed Khan, a Muslim minister in the state cabinet, and transfer two police
officers Shri A A Khan and Shri Mundkur On the phone Balasaheb told Shri Vijaysingh
Mohite-Patil, a minister in the state government, that in "his view Shri Sharad Pawar was
behind the riots and because of his encouragement the "landyas" had become bold." Balasaheb
was annoyed because Shri Mastan had signed the appeal first. After reading the appeal,
Balasaheb refused to sign it, and said that he would like to see what the Government does in
trying to maintain the peace.
At Para 9.9, page 174, Shri Mohite said that he was at first openly taking down notes. But
when a senior Sena leader asked what he was doing, he wrote the notes in a surreptitious
manner. Shri Uddhav Thackeray, Balasaheb's son, also told him not to write down anything.
As they left the residence of Balasaheb, the Mayor told him to forget what he had heard.
However, Shri Mohite insisted that he would tell his editor the whole episode.
The subsequent events, mentioned in paras 9.12 and 9.13, pp 174-5, are as follows:
Jan 8, 93, 2315h The Mayor drops Shri Mohite near his newspaper office at Mahim. Jan 9, 93,
0200h The editor, Nikhil Wagle, comes to the office and Shri Mohite reports what happened.
The editor says that the Chief Minister must be contacted and informed what happened. Shri
Mohite contacts the Mayor, who is not ready to go to the Chief Minster.The editor phones the
Minister of State for Home, Shri Babanrao Pachpute, to inform him what transpired at
Balasaheb's residence. The minister informed him that he would take urgent steps in the
matter. Jan 9, 93, 0900h Shri Mohite writes out his article so that the same could be printed in
the newspaper. This was allegedly not done since it would vitiate the atmosphere further. Later
this is called the first draft. (This is as per the witness statement of Shri Mohite. However, the
Commission report (para 9.13 pg 175) says that it was prepared in the first week of Feb.) Begin
Feb 93 Shri Mohite prepares a second and a longer draft of what transpired at the Balasaheb's
residence on Jan 8, and is given for translation into English. (However, the Commission report
(para 9.13 pg 175) says that both these events happened in the end of Feb.) April, 93 English
translation was given to Shri Mohite, and the material was handed over to an advocate, Shri
MP Vashi, for preparing an affidavit to be filed before the Commission. Shri Vashi takes an
unduly long time and the date for filing and the date for doing so expires. Shri Mohite
reminded Shri Vashi a number of times to get the affidavit ready. April 6, 93 An editorial
appears in "Mahanagar" narrating what is supposed to have happened on January 8. The
editorial says that the full details would be given at an appropriate time. April 7, 93 Mahanagar
carries a news item that the Mayor has threatened Shri Mohite for disclosing the whole set of
events that were supposed to have happened at Balasaheb's residence. October, 93 The
affidavit is finally ready. Since the time for filing given by the Commission had been extended,
the same is filed.. June 97 Shri Mohite is examined before the Commission.
In this episode, besides Balasaheb and Shri Mohite, a number of persons could have confirmed
the events that are alleged have happened. It is indeed strange that the Commission has chosen
not to verify with them the story propounded by Shri Mohite. For example, the then Mayor was
not called to corroborate Shri Mohite's story. Given that the Mayor wa= s from a party which is
politically opposed to the Shiv Sena, one would have thought that he would support Shri
Mohite, even if the whole thing was fabricated. Since the Commission believes Shri Mohite's
story, an additional corroboration would have further boosted the prime objective of the
Commission of damning the Shiv Sena. Also, does the alleged conversation not show that
Balasaheb is immature to speak the words in front of a political opponent? Shri Mohite has
alleged that the Mayor had threatened him of dire consequences, when the editorial was
written. The Commission has accepted the words of Shri Mohite without checking with the
Mayor.
The following additional questions can be asked of Shri Mohite on his story: He says that he
had to write the appeal in his own handwriting because there was no staff available at the
Mayor's office. However, it is a normal practice that the Mayor's staff leave only when the
Mayor has left. Assuming that the staff left because of the problems in the city. But there was
the PA to the Mayor who was present, and he could have taken a dictation. The Mayor and he
went to the house of Shri Haji Mastan first. Why him? It is well known that Shri Mastan was a
leading smuggler during his time. However, Shri Mastan claimed that because of the call given
by Jayprakash Narayan, he gave up the profession. Subsequently, he has involved himself in
politics in trying to make an alliance between the dalits and the Muslims. If the media was
informed about the plan to get the signatures on the peace memorandum, and it did not fructify,
has someone wrote about it on Jan 9 or soon thereafter? Mahanagar also did not use the
information to write a story the next day, or soon thereafter. Would it not be a sensational story
to write about, particularly since the paper has identified Balasaheb and Shiv Sena as their
sworn enemies? Purely on the principles of journalism, this would be a real scoop, and would
have made a great headline the next day. The alleged reason that it might vitiate the
atmosphere has not been the concern of Mahanagar in the past. At the time, many of the so-
called secular newspapers had held Balasaheb guilty of the instigating the riots by Jan 93 itself,
something that was done by the Commission after five years of study. Why could it not be
confirmed with Shri Mohite-Patil whether Balasaheb phoned him on Jan 8 between 2200h and
2300h, and confirm what was supposed to have been said in the conversation? Given the
antipathy of the Congress against Shiv Sena, surely Shri Mohite-Patil would want to support
Shri Mohite in this case, particularly if it happens to be true.
The editor of Mahanagar is supposed to have spoken to the Minister of State for Home, Shri
Babanrao Pachpute at 0200h on Jan 9. It is obvious that the editor gave the story tremendous
amount of importance to contact a minister at such an hour. Why was no action taken against
Balasaheb at the time? Or at least why was no propaganda made against Balasaheb? As it is
there was a canard against Balasaheb not only in the English media but also by his political
opponents. If the Sena leaders saw him taking down notes, surely they would have confiscated
them, given the nature of the alleged conversation. As per the Commission, Shri Mohite makes
an article on the basis of his notes a full month after the incident is supposed to have taken
place. He first prepares a draft which is nine pages long, and then revises it, when it expands to
twenty-two pages. Both these have been reproduced as exhibits, but neither are dated.
However, there is an inconsistency here between the statement of Shri Mohite and the
Commission. He says that he prepared the first draft on Jan 9, that is immediately after his
alleged meeting with Balasaheb, and the second a month later. It takes two months to make a
translation into English. It takes Shri M P Vashi six months to prepare an affidavit. Shri Vashi
is politically active with the Janata Dal, and is ideologically opposed to the Sena. He has
contested elections against the Shiv Sena, and was one of the important legal personality who
had filed various election petitions against the Shiv Sena for allegedly using religion to obtain
votes. He would have immediately realised the importance of the alleged story, and would
make haste in filing an affidavit. He took a risk on banking on an extension. The editorial of
Mahanagar on April 6 says that the full details of the episode would be given at the appropriate
time. By then, Shri Mohite's story was written about two months prior. Shri Mohite also says
that he did not press Shri Vashi on the affidavit since the date for submission had expired. This
would have been the right time to give a detailed account, so that the event comes to the
knowledge of the public. The Commission had already been formed, and it would be a good
tactics to get someone else to bring to the notice of the Commission about the article, and it
could have then be taken on record. It is indeed strange that Shri Mohite took a chance of not
being able to get his word to the Commission.
There is a curious feature in Shri Mohite's second draft of his article, which was pointed out by
the advocate for the Shiv Sena. He said that from the Mayor's office, they would have first
gone to get the signature of Shri Ziyauddin Bukhari, an elected politician of the Maharashtra
Muslim League. There is an addition here which refers to Shri Bukhari as one "who had been
recently murdered." Shri Mohite had said that he had prepared the second draft in the
beginning of February, and given to translation at the end of the month. In his witness
statement, he said that after giving the draft for translation, he had not made any changes in it.
Shri Bukhari was murdered on April 12, 1993. When confronted with the date of the murder,
Shri Mohite changes his position and says that he did make some changes in the draft that was
with the translator. The reason for the change, according to him, was to ensure that the detail is
incorporated in the translation. By itself, this feature would make Shri Mohite an unreliable
witness. Also, the so-called changes would explain the delay' in getting the translation and also
filing of the affidavit. But, for the Commission it saw no reason for not accepting the testimony
of this witness.' (Para 9.17, page 176.)
The manner in which the Commission has dealt with the submission of Shri Mohite is in line
with the bias that it has exhibited all along. It has not inquired with any of the persons
mentioned in Shri Mohite's story about its veracity. From a strategic point of view, such
support would have helped the Commission to make its case strong. And it should not have
had any fear of contradiction since it was convinced that Shri Mohite was telling the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth.
At Para 9.16 page 175, the Commission says, "There is further corroboration of the probability
of the truth of Shri Mohite's testimony in the documents produced by him." The documents
were the two drafts that were written by Shri Mohite. Even a non-legal person can see the
circularity of this argument. The Commission has accepted Shri Mohite's word also because an
editorial was written in Mahanagar on April 6, 1993, nearly three months after the event is
supposed to have happened. The report in the same paper on April 7 of an alleged threat by the
Mayor to Shri Mohite seems to have clinched the matter for the Commission.
At Para 9.16, page 175, the Commission says, "The Editorial also said that the full details of
the incident would be published in Mahanagar issue at the appropriate time." There is no
mention whether the details were published. Given the nature of the story, surely it should have
appeared at least along with the editorial. In any case, given the sins that Balasaheb was
supposed to have committed, and the Mahanagar's prime reason for existence, a damning story
is an opportunity which would not be missed.
In one of its comments, the Commission has said that "like a veteran General, (Balasaheb)
commanded his loyal Shiv Sainiks to retaliate by organized attacks against Muslims." (Vol I,
Chapter II, para 1.27.) If it has done so on the basis of Shri Mohite's story, it should have been
subjected to greater scrutiny than what the Commission has done.
Legally, Shri Mohite's story would not stand in any court of law. Even from a logical point of
view there are far too many holes in it, to make it appear credible. And given the fact of lack of
empathy of Mahanagar for Shiv Sena in general and Balasaheb in particular, these large
number of holes make the story doubly doubtful. On such flimsy basis, we see the Commission
operating time and time again.
Srikrishna Commission Report: Perception of Hindus and Muslims
Comment of Hindu Vivek Kendra
Author: Hindu Vivek Kendra
Publishers: Hindu Vivek Kendra
Date: October 98.
We are enclosing here with excerpts from the report prepared by the Tata Institute of Social
Science. TISS was asked by the Srikrishna Commission to undertake an analysis of the
causative factors for the riots from the perspective of socio-economic, demographic and
political factors.
The enclosed excerpts did not find mention in the final report of the Commission. It narrates
the responses of Hindus and Muslims not to the causes of riots as such but their perception of
the society and relationships. The Hindu responses closely represent what is branded as the
Hindutva view point. The TISS report says, "We were a bit surprised that right across the
occupation status categories, the Hindus, whom we interviewed, held almost similar views."
The fact that the authors of the report are surprised is very much surprising. Does this not
indicate their alienation from the way the society is thinking? And yet this institute is
considered to be a premier one in its field.
Amongst the Muslims there is a clear indication of the rejection by the masses of what is
projected as their leaders. Yet, the Commission has given importance to these leaders. In this
respect, too, we think, the Commission has failed in the larger task that has been allotted to it,
and has come to conclusions on the basis of people who have very little empathy for the
society that they are supposed to be working in.
Growing attraction of the Hindutva

It is one of the paradoxes of the modern Indian politics that the forces of Hindutva have been
able to achieve since 1985, what could not be achieved in their life time by Hedgewar,
Savarkar and Golwalkar. As said earlier, the leaders of Jana Sangh in fifties caused more
amusement than evoke serious following or response. But, since 1985 the appeal went home
and the Hindu psyche started getting consolidated and increasingly large number of the Hindus
became vulnerable to the communal appeals. Certain political factors have helped the process.
We were a bit surprised that right across the occupational status categories, the Hindus, whom
we interviewed, held almost similar views. There were variations only on minor points.
(i) Almost all the Hindus felt that the Governments, and the Congress Government in
particular, have been appeasing the Muslims, who used to constitute a vote bank of the
Congress. The Hindu respondents mentioned the following instances of appeasement: the
reversal by the parliament of the Shah Bano Judgment, the Muslim blocking the public roads
on Fridays for namaz, the banning of Salman Rushdie's book, use of loudspeakers on the
Masjid minarets, the Centre's compromise on the question of the release of the kidnapped
daughter of a Central Minister, the Muslim reaction against the proposed cooperation between
the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan and Anjuman -I-Islam in Bombay, the Muslim opposition to
Vande Mataram, creation of Malappuram district in Kerala, etc. One top level south Indian
engineer said:
"Why not a common civil code? why reverse the Supreme court judgment? The Shah Bano
episode hurts. Nobody has ill-treated the Muslims. There is so much equality. In which non-
Muslim country would you find this?"
Another corporate executive said: "The Shah Bano case was the turning point. The Rajiv
Gandhi amendment to the Cr.P.C. regarding the Muslim divorcees came as a shock. This
enraged me." He also added that the Maha Arati launched by the Shiv Sena in Bombay was a
"damn good" idea. The less educated Hindus also expressed similar sort of feelings by
referring to "large families of the Muslims", "separate rights for their community", etc.
(ii) Many Hindus felt that the growing corruption and criminalisation of politics made them
turn to the Hindutva. One of the respondents said that yet another turning point in the Hindu
psyche was the sullying of the clean image of Rajiv Gandhi. This created a political vacuum
which was partially occupied by the Hindutva forces. People became fed up and their
resistance to communal appeals also broke down.
(iii) A good number of Marathi-speaking respondents, particularly of the middle and lower
occupational strata said that the Shiv Sena in Bombay has helped the common Marathi
speaking persons. The party's leader had, they felt, captured the imagination of the youth.
Some appreciated the work of the Shiv Sena "Sthaniya Lokadhikar Samitis".
One South Indian engineer said that Thackeray's means and the way he spoke could be faulted,
but the Hindus generally felt that here was one person who spoke openly what was in his mind
and what was in the minds of the Hindus. "Other pseudo-secular politicians were double-
tongued". Writing twelve years ago, Gupta (1982: 91) records how the Shiv Sena took up the
causes of Bhyandar salt workers, better bus services to the villages, storage facilities for
fishermen, and the plight of those peasants in New Bombay, whose lands were acquired.
(iv) The Pakistan factor also could have contributed to the breakdown of the resistance of the
Hindu mind to the communal appeals. One non-Marathi speaking engineer said when the
Pakistan-abetted terrorists started indiscriminate killings of the Hindus first in the Punjab and
then in Kashmir, and media, particularly the television, gave wide coverage to these events, the
Hindu mind started getting consolidated. Incidentally, one highly erudite Muslim journalist
also held the same view.
(v) Many Hindu respondents felt that whereas the Muslims are driven by an unusual sense of
religious zeal, and are highly united among themselves, Hinduism is a tolerant religion. This is
not a new theme. But the alleged fanaticism of the Muslims and the alleged tolerance of the
Hindus are being vehemently articulated now.
Most of the Hindus who gave their opinion on the matter, felt that India was an exemplary
secular state. Some argued that Hinduism itself was secular. The general trend of the opinion
was that in no other non-Muslim country did the Muslims enjoy so much freedom. But, a few
felt that we are a pseudo-secular state; to be secular we should behave like Indians first and
Indians last.
(vi) Unfortunately, many Hindus suspected the loyalty of the Muslim to India. Invariably, they
applied the litmus test of cricket. There was the unvarying refrain that many Muslim celebrated
by bursting crackers a Pakistan cricket victory over India. When asked whether they had
actually seen a single Muslim bursting crackers, one or two said yes. One respondent said that
even a murder had taken place on the issue of bursting of crackers. The others swore that they
had heard this from very reliable friends. One emphatically said that he had seen a joyous
sense on the face of the Muslims, whenever Pakistan beat India in cricket.
In this way the very Hindus who used to ignore the Muslims in the fifties, or make a snide
remark or two against the Jana Sangh and the RSS, have almost become obsessed with the
Muslim question.
The Muslim Psyche
(i) In regard to the vexatious questions of the uniform civil code and the Shah Bano case, the
Muslim opinion appeared to be divided. Some persons, regardless of their social status, argued
in favour of a uniform civil code. Many dodged the question. Still, some others maintained
that, if different communities have to co-exist in the country, different civil codes are
necessary.
Again, some Muslims discreetly suggested that the Shah Bano case was politicized, and that it
should not have been entertained by the Supreme Court. It should have been decided within the
community. Almost an equal number felt that the judgment was right and the humanitarian
angle should have prevailed over the religious angle. One argued that the Muslim women
experienced considerable insecurity because of the Muslim personal law.
(ii) A large number of the Muslims felt that there is discrimination against the Muslim, that the
insecurity among them is growing, and that the Hindu psyche had changed. There is a general
feeling among the Muslim that their under representation in the Government bureaucracy and
in the professional field is the result of direct or indirect discrimination against them. One of
our Muslim respondents said that the Muslim were forced to form their own neighborhood for
housing as a result of the discrimination against them. Many of the cooperative societies,
according to him, either openly or covertly deny them membership with excuses, such as that
the society is for the vegetarians. One said that the stereotypes against the Muslim persisted. A
few felt that the political vacuum in the country is being occupied by the growing Hindu
fundamentalism. Some hastened to add that they themselves had not experienced any
discrimination or insecurity and that their Hindu friends had not changed their attitudes
towards them as individuals.
In contrast, the Hindus attributed the under-representation of the Muslim in certain prominent
walks of life to the closed nature of their own community. Some Muslim also shared this view.
It is worth quoting the remarks of one top Muslim executive in an engineering company. He
said: "The system - political institutional - as a whole is secular. The question of discrimination
simply does not arise. Where are the Muslim candidates applying for jobs in a company like
this? In fact, I have been instructed to broad base my recruitment. But, the Muslim prefer to be
petty shop keepers."
(iii) The growing feeling of insecurity among the Muslim is partly the result of the successive
communal riots in India since the 1960's. They have also generated a feeling among the
Muslims that they have to protect themselves by resisting attack on them. The riots have also
created a feeling among the Muslims that they are not accepted in India as part of the nation.
This feeling has got strengthened with the Hindus' suspicion of the loyalty of the Muslims to
the nation.
(iv) It is interesting to note that most of the Muslim respondents feel that the Muslim League or
the Muslim elite do not represent the Muslim masses. Many called the Muslim League
fundamentalist. The few rich and modern Muslim are totally isolated from the Muslim masses.
The vast majority of the masses of the Muslims are poor and are under the sway of the Mullas
and politicians. Both these leadership religious and political have been interested in
maintaining the separate identity of the Muslims and exploiting it. The have not been interested
in getting the Muslims into the modern social system, if not blocked it. These were the views
expressed by the Muslim respondents.
On the whole one finds that the picture that emerges is a mixed one. We find Muslim speaking
in different voices (which is not a bad thing in itself). But on three counts there is a good deal
of unanimity: (a) almost all of them agree that the Muslim League and Muslim elite do not
serve the community a whole, (b) the Muslims are experiencing insecurity and discrimination,
and (c) there is a lot of hesitancy in endorsing uniform civil code.
The change in Hindu and Muslim psyche show that, in spite of the cosmopolitan character of
Bombay city, the ethnic difference between the Muslim and Hindus in Bombay has persisted.
Differences in religious rituals, food habits, dressing styles and the general occupational
pursuits as well as certain negative stereotypes have kept both the groups different and even
separated. Some type of physical segregation between the two groups also can be noticed in
housing, whether it is in slums and chawls or in middle class cooperative societies.

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Srikrishna Commission Report

appointed for inquiry into the riots in Mumbai during

At 4.11, the Commission says a crowd of Hindutvavadis collected at Jijamata Lane in

The Commission’s contention of significant Hindu reaction should be viewed along

Police Firings Killed Injured

Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims

December 153 30 133 93 189

January 308 80 90 326 146

7. The heading is "12th Dec 1992 to 5th Jan 1993".

1.8(i) The casualties for Jan 6, 1993, are given as follows:

Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims

No information is available for casualties in arson or police firing.

Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims

Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims

Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims

Total 27 52 102 100

This is another evidence of the Hindu retaliation.

Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims

The causes of the deaths are summarised as follows:

Police firing 356

The first part of the above statement is quite confusing.

1.9 This deals with the alleged ineffectiveness of the army.

We have no comments to make on what is patently a political statement.

Growing attraction of the Hindutva

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