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Iran Iraq
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IRAN-IRAQ
ORIGINS OF IRANIAN-IRAQIRELATIONS
Intriguing as it is, the emphasis on the deep-rooted historical animosity
between Arabs and Persians suffers from two major flaws. First, it overlooks
lengthy periods of cooperation between these two groups, motivated both by
sharedreligiousand culturalaffinitiesand by convergingeconomic interests such
as trade. Second, intensive as it was duringthe Umayyad (661-750)and the early
Abbasid (750-945)caliphates, Iraqi-Persianinteractionwas disruptedin the latter
part of the tenth century, with the de facto demise of the Abbasid Empire, to be
resumed only in the aftermathof WorldWar I.
Thus, from 945 until the early sixteenth century, the vast territoriesoccupying present-day Iran and Iraq were controlled, with occasional intervals, by
successive dynasties, mainly of Mongol and Turkish origins: the Buwayhids
(945-1055), the SelUukTurks (1055-1157), the Hulagu, Timur, and Il-Khan
Mongols (1219-1408), and the TurkomanTurks (1408-1499). With the reemergence of Persia as an independent regional empire under the Safavid dynasty
(1500-1736),the area that is now Iraqbecame the battlefieldfor intermittentwars
between the Ottomansand the Persians.These wars, nevertheless, had nothingto
do with Persian-Arabanimosity; ratherthey were the manifestationof a power
3. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (London: Counterpoint, 1986), p. 125. For a
similar view see also R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 57; Anthony Cordesman, The
Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 645-46; William
0. Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis," in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi, eds., The
Iran-Iraq War (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 37.
struggle between the two empires, colored with strong religious elements, for
hegemony and domination.
In other words, geopoliticalrealitiesformedthe majorimpetusfor the Safavid
policy while ideological-religiousfactors played a supportive role, however
important,by rallying public will behind the regime's strategic goals. Although
religious zeal would occasionally cause Safavid rulers to overlook geopolitical
considerations,to the Persiansthe landmassto their western frontierwas merely
a medium of advance for expansion or, alternatively, a useful buffer zone to
separate Persia's holdings from its major regional rival, the Ottoman Empire.
Withthe mutualdecline of the Turkishand the Persianempiresover the centuries
and the appearanceof new and more menacingthreats from other directionsRussia and Great Britain-these two rivals were graduallydriven toward accommodation. Then followed a long host of bilateral treaties, most notably the
Erzerum agreements of 1823 and 1847. Indeed, the vagueness of these two
agreementson the issue of borderdemarcation,not dispelled by the 1911Tehran
and 1913 Constantinopleprotocols, was to remain a major bone of contention
between Iran and Iraq into the late twentieth century. Just as the geopolitical
factor had figuredprominentlyin Persian-Ottomanaffairs,so has it constitutedthe
frameworkfor twentieth-centuryIraqi-Iranianbilateralrelations. By and large,
this relationship has reflected both the inherent problems and the converging
interests emanatingfrom direct physical contiguitybetween two uneven powers.
To the newly established state of Iraq (1921)geographyposed an existential
challenge. Virtuallya landlockedcountry, whose coastline on the Gulf is only 15
kilometerslong, and surroundedby four countrieswith at least two-Turkey and
Iran-larger and irredentist,Iraq sufferedfrom an inherent feeling of insecurity
from the early days of its statehood. This "encirclementcomplex" is understandable. First, Iraq's major source of income, oil, cannot be exported without the
goodwill of its neighbors, Syria and Turkey, or "without coming so close to
Iranianterritoryin the south that it cannot be said to enjoy territorialsecurity at
all for its principalmeans of survival."4Second, as one of the successor states to
the OttomanEmpire, Iraq inheritednot a few Ottomanprivileges- particularly
favorable border agreements-without at the same time enjoying the imperial
power or statureto supportthese gains. This state of affairsaroused Turkishand
Iranianirredentism,which in turn exacerbatedIraq's feeling of vulnerability.5
The proximity of Iraq's major strategicand economic assets to the Turkish
and Iranian frontiers has been no less worrisome for Baghdad. The northern
oil-richprovinces of Mosul and Kirkuk,for example, lie close to Turkeyand Iran.
whereas Baghdadand Basra are only 120and 30 kilometersrespectively from the
Iranianborder.The Shatt al-Arab,Iraq's only outlet to the PersianGulf, could be
4. Claudia Wright, "Implications of the Iran-Iraq War," Foreign Affairs, vol. 59 (Winter
1980/81), p. 277.
5. Indeed, there is a long-standing Turkish claim for the province of Mosul. Moreover, in 1922
Turkey backed up this claim by military action.
IRAN-IRAQ* 259
Press, 1969),pp. 3-5; Uriel Dann, Iraq UnderQassem (New York: Praeger, 1969),pp. 1-2.
7. It is interestingto note, however, that these treaties followed decisive Persiandefeats in
two wars initiated by them, not Russia. For the full texts of the treaties see J.C. Hurewitz, ed.,
Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand
IRAN-IRAQ* 261
Tehran by the Iraqi regent, Prince Abd al-Ilah, a treaty of "good neighborly"
relations was signed, and the two countries embarkedon a joint effort to resolve
their unsettled territorialproblems. As late as 1957,only a short while before the
overthrowof the monarchyin Iraq,the two sides reachedan agreementto appoint
a joint commission for the administrationof the Shatt al-Araband to submit the
issue of boundarydemarcationto a Swedish arbitrator.15 Cooperationreached its
peak with the participationof the two states in the BaghdadPact (1955-58).
The overthrow of the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq by General Qasim in July
1958, with its attendant surge of communist power in Iraq and intensified
Iraqi-Sovietrelations, aroused deep concern in Tehran and drove Iran to enter
into a defense agreementwith the United States in 1959.To a certainextent, until
that time bilateral relations had been governed by a spirit of royal solidarity
similar to the one characterizingthe monarchicalpost-WestphalianEuropean
state-system; geopolitical interests apart, neither regime had sought to discredit
its counterpart since both derived their legitimacy from the same principle of
dynastic sanctity. Withthe delegitimizationof the Iraqimonarchicalsystem, Iran
could only hope that the new regimewould also recognize a basic convergence of
interests between the two countries.
Tehransoon realizedthat geopoliticalrealitieswere strongerthan revolutionary rhetoric. To be sure, Qasim's break with his predecessors' pro-Western
conduct and the reorientationof Iraq'sforeignpolicy in the directionof the Soviet
Union was by no means a minor development.As noted by a long-timeobserver
of Iraqi politics, however, "Qasim's foreign policy was governed by essentially
the same forces that shaped the foreignpolicy of the Old Regime." 16 A protege of
the formerprime minister, Nuri al-Said, Qasim apparentlyinheriteda measure of
his patron's awareness of both Iraq's relative weakness vis-a-vis its non-Arab
neighbors and its common interests with them. This awareness was already
reflectedin the proclamationof the July Revolution, which stated Iraq's intention
to cultivate brotherlyties with Arab and Muslim states and to honor previously
signed internationalundertakings.Accordingly,Qasimwas extremelyreluctantto
dissociate Iraq from the BaghdadPact, taking the ultimate step of withdrawing
from the defense organizationon March 24, 1959, only in the face of heavy
internaland external pressures.17
Notwithstandingtwo severe bilateralcrises-December 1959-January1960
and February-April 1961,18-the general pattern of Iraqi-Iranian relations,
namely, Iraq's awareness of Iran's potential and Tehran's inability to transform
its inherent dominance into regional hegemony, was fundamentallymaintained
15. R. K. Ramazani,Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (Charlottesville:University Press of
Virginia, 1975), p. 402.
16. M. Khadduri,Republican Iraq, p. 181.
17. Ibid., pp. 182-4.
18. For a detailed descriptionof the crises see Ramazani,Iran's Foreign Policy, pp. 401-2;
ShahramChubinand SepehrZabih,The Foreign Relations of Iran, (Berkeley:Universityof California
Press, 1974),pp. 172-6; Abdulghani,Iraq and Iran, pp. 15-6.
IRAN-IRAQ* 263
IRAN-IRAQ* 265
Saddam [Hussein] lies in the fact that we consider Saddamthe main obstacle to
the advance of Islam in the region.''23
Interestinglyenough, Iraq's initial response to the shah's departureand the
emergence of Ayatollah RuhollahKhomeiniwas by and large positive. Not only
did the Baath regime not attempt to take advantageof the civil strife in Iran to
revise the Algiers Agreement, but it was also quick to indicate its willingness to
abide by the status quo between the two states. As then-Vice President Saddam
Hussein put it, "A regime which does not supportthe enemy againstus and does
not intervene in our affairs, and whose world policy correspondsto the interests
of the Iranian and Iraqi people, will certainly receive our respect and
appreciation. "'24
IRAN-IRAQ* 267
regime. The same theme was reiteratedtwo days later by the Iranianpresident,
Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr,who also warnedthat Iran would go to war in the event
of further deterioration in the situation on the border.28In April 1980, the
Iranian-Iraqiconfrontationentered a new phase with clashes along the common
frontier;in August these escalated into heavy fightinginvolving tank and artillery
duels and air strikes.
Iran's activities in general, and the protractedand escalating border fighting
in particular,led Iraqi decision makers to the conclusion that Baghdad had no
alternativebut to contain the Iranianthreatby resortingto arms. Faced, for the
second time within a decade, with Iran's determinationto reshape the regional
status quo according to its own design and with the bitter memory of armed
conflicts with Iranin the early 1970s,the Baathleaders seriously doubtedthat the
Iraqi political system could sustain anotherprolonged, exhausting confrontation
with Iran. Added to these concerns was the view of the nature of the new
theocratic regime with its uncompromisingand revolutionary goals and the
growing evidence that the Iranianregime was set upon destabilizingthe Baath.
Consequently, the Iraqigovernmentgraduallycame to realize that the only way
to contain the Iranianthreat was to exploit Iran's temporaryweakness following
the revolution and to raise the stakes for both sides by resortingto armedforce.
CONCLUSIONS
Iranian-Iraqirelations in general, and the outbreak of the Iran-IraqWar in
particular,illustratethe validity of the general rule that "vicinity, or nearness of
situation,constitutes nations [sic] naturalenemies."29These factors also describe
the limits of this rule. On the one hand, the elements of competition and rivalry
inherentin almost any neighborlyinteractionhave not been absent from IranianIraqi relations, as evidenced by the various crises and wars between the two
states. On the other hand, notwithstandingthe ethnic and religious divisions
among Persians and Arabs, the periods of convergence and cooperationbetween
twentieth-century Iran and Iraq have exceeded by far those of hostility and
antagonism.
This state of affairs stems from the markedgeopolitical inequality between
Iranand Iraqthat moderatedthe acuteness of the inherentsources of antagonism
and generated a mutually recognized modus vivendi. This compromise was
maintainedfor nearly five decades and was characterizedby Baghdad's awareness of Iranian geopolitical superiorityand by Tehran's inability to impose its
hegemony over Iraq. Moreover, even after the disappearanceof the balance of
weakness and the consequent Iraniandrive for regional hegemony, Iraq, after a
28. Guardian, April 3, 1980; Financial Times, April 12, 1980; International Herald Tribune,
April 10, 1980; Daily Telegraph, April 9, 1980.
29. Alexander Hamilton, as quoted in Martin Wight, Power Politics (Harmondsworth, UK:
Penguin, 1979), p. 157.
brief period of resistance, proved willing to abide by the new status quo
established by the Algiers Agreement.
It was only after 1979 when the revolutionaryregime in Iran had begun its
determinedthrustto replace the regionalsetting with the hithertounprecedented
idea of an Islamic order-a thrust that inscribed on its ideological flag the
overthrow of the Baath regime-that Iraq no longer felt able to live with Iran's
position of superiority because of the simple fact that acquiescence could
eventually lead to the regime's demise. In the Iraqi view, then, the geopolitical
relationship between Iraq and Iran was transformedby the revolution from a
.'mixed motive game" into a zero-sumgame. The shah, for all his militarypower
and ambitiousobjectives was perceived by Iraqisas rational,even if unpleasant.
Certainly his goals from the late 1960s onward were opposed to Iraqi national
interests, and he could satisfy them only at Iraq's expense. With the exception,
however, of the 1969plot, the shahwas not so muchinterestedin topplingthe Baath
regimeas he was in preventingIraqfrom competingmilitarilywith Iran. Once the
shah'saspirationsfor Gulfhegemonywere recognized,a deal-disadvantageousas it
was for Iraq-was struckand both partieswere expected to live up to it.
Paradoxically,the Gulf war, the most acute direct outcome of Iran's attempt
to export its revolutionary message, introduced a fundamental, though not
precipitous, shift in Iran's perceptionof its regionalrole toward the direction of
the shah's geopolitical world view. With Iran's ill-equippedarmedforces unable
to breach the Iraqi line of defense, the civilian populationdecisively exhausted,
and the economy largely devastated, most of the Iranian decision makers
increasinglybecame disillusioned with the far-reachingaspirationsto shape the
Gulf along Islamic lines; they opted insteadto agree to a cease-fireon the basis of
the 1975 status quo. As Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,then speaker of the
Iranianparliamentand the strongestpoliticalfigurein Tehranafter Khomeini,put
it in February 1986at one of Iran's brightestmoments in the war, the capture of
the Faw Peninsula, "We do accept that half of the Shatt al-Arabbelongs to Iran
and the other half to Iraq. We do accept the thalweg which is internationallaw.
We seek nothing more than that."30
In short, Tehran'sacceptanceof United Nations SecurityCouncilResolution
598 and its insistence duringthe peace talks on the perpetuationof the 1975status
quo depict a keen awareness on the part of the revolutionary regime of the
reemergenceof the balance of weakness in Iranian-Iraqirelations and, therefore,
the consequent need to scale down, however temporarily,Iran's regional ambitions. Whetherand for how long this newly established balance will survive still
remainsto be seen.
30. Tehran Domestic Service, February 24, 1986, in BBC Summary, February 26, 1986,
ME/8193/A/3, emphasis added.