Author's personal copy H Siegel, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA (© 2010 Eleevise Ltd, AR rights recurs CCrisical thinking enjoys a preeminent position among the ‘many educational sims end ideals advocated by educators and educational theorists coday. It has enjoyed this staros since the earliest days of philosophical thinking about education, st least in the Western tradition ariginating in Greece nearly 2500 years ago. Although the expression “critical thinking is relatively nev, the underlying ideal ic names ~ often expressed in terms of the cultivation of reason or the fostering of rationality ~ has been regarded asa fundamental educational ideal by most of te histori- cally significant philosophers of thas tradition who turned their attention to education. No other proposed aim of education — caring, civie-mindedness, community, creativ- iy, happiness, Knowledge, obedience ro authority, social solidarity, spiritual fulfillment, the fal6illment of potensial ‘exe. has enjoyed the virually unanimous erdorsement of historically importan philosophers of education that criti- cal thinking, coason, and raconalicy have (Siegel, 2003). contemporary discussions (eg, Nusbaum, 1997; ge, 1988, 1997), critical thinking continues 10 be de fended by many as an important educational aim or ideal Unlike some historical predecessors, contemporary advo- cates of the ideal do not understand reasor as ¢ special psychological facaly; in defending rationality, they do not slign themselves with the historical movement known a ‘continental rationalism, according to which knowledge is based on the perception or intuition afforded by such « faculty, What then, exactly is that underlying ideal? How is the ideal of eriical thinking 10 be understooe? Critical Thinking: What Is It? Key aspects of critical thinking, as currently advocated by contemporary theorists, include (1) the claim thac the notion is essentially normative in character and (2) the claim that extical chinking involves two distinct compo- nents: both (a) skills or abilities of reason asessment and (b) the dispositions to engage in and be guided by such assessments. These are discussed in run next Normativity Advocates of effort ta foster critical thinkirg in schools sometimes conceive it narrowly, in terms of imperting ‘This article crave extensively upon Siegel 2009 and! Ban an Siege 2003. skills which will enable students 0 fanction adequately thee jobs, and in so doing ra be economically produc tive, More often, however, propanents af the educational tim of critical chinking have in mind a broader view of critical thinking as more or less equivalent tothe ideal of rationality, ‘So understood, critical thinking i a sort of good chink ing. Therefore, the notion of critical thinking ie fon- damentally a normative one, thus distinguishing thie understanding of critical thinking from those, common in psychology, which trea the notion as descriptive idencfy- Jing particular psychologiea! processes (Beilin «af, 1999), ‘To characterize a given episode of thinking as critical i to judge that ie meets relevane standards or criteria of accept ability, and is thos appropriately though of as good. Most extant philosophical accounts ofertial thinking, in adei- sion to che account by Balin er af, emphasize such criteria Robert H. Ennis, for example, defines critical thinking as “ceasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe and do” (Ennis, 1987: 10), and offers a detailed lst of bilities skills, and disposiions which think ing (and thinkers) must manifeseif cis (they ar) wo qualify as critical. Matthew Lipman defines critical thinking as thinking that facilitates judgment because it relies on cri- teria, ie self-correcting and is sensitive ro context (Lipmieh, 1991). Richard Paul analyses crcicel thinking in terms of the ability and disposition to critically evaluate belief, theie underlying assumptions, and the worldviews in which they are embedded (Pst, 1990), Harvey Siegel characterizes the critical thinker as one who is “appropristely moved by reasons” (Siegel, 1988: 23), and emphasizes the critical thinker’s mastery of epistemic eriteria which reasons avast smectin order to be rightly judged to be good reasons, thats, reasons that justify belief, claims, judgimenss, and actions Other authors, including John MePeck (1981, 1990), simi- laely emphasize this normative dimension of the concept While these authors’ accounts of critical thinking differ in many respects, and have their own emphases, they are nevertheless agreed on its estentally normative character (GBailn and Siegel, 2003), ‘Skills/Abllities and Dispositions ‘While some early treatments of critical thinking defined it only in terms of parcicularskils~for example, Ennis early at Intemational Encylopedia of Education (2010), vol. 8, pp. 141-145,Author's personal copy 142 _ Philosophy of Education ~ Philosophical Themes a Alefiniion of it ae “the correct asesing of statements” (Ems, 1962: 83) ~ almost all more recen: philosophical Aiscussion oft Gincloding Ennis? more recent discussions) regards exvcl thinking 2 involving both (1) skills or sbil- ities of reason ssvessment and (2) 2 cluster of dispositions ‘abit of mind and character eats, sometines refered © collectively asthe ertal spi (Siege, 1988). According > the advocates ofthis broader conception oftical thinking, ‘education should have as fandamentalsimche fostering in seadens of (1) the ability to reson well chats, to construct and evaluate the various arguments, and the reasons/ premises and inferences of which they are composed, Which have been oF can be offered in support or ericism of candidate bei judgments, and acti, and (2) che éisposion of inclination to be guided by reasons so eval- tated, thai, acealy 10 belive ude, and ace in accor dance with dhe resus ofsuch reasoned evalutions Seodents (and people generally) are rational, or ressoable or cxiticl thinkers, tothe extent that they believe, dg, and act onthe bass of (competently evalusted) reasons. Thus, being @ critical dinker is a mater of degree. To tegaed cxiticl thinking asa fndamenraleducstonal sim oF idea i 10 bold that the fatering in students ofthe ability wo reason ell andche disposition robe guided by reasns it of ental educational importance. These «wo aspecs of the ideal deserve farther comment The reason assessment component Thinking is critical just co the extent chat ie manifests and reflects due attention to, concern for, and comperence in assessing the probative strength of relevant weasons Tn this respect, critical thinking can be understood asthe educa- tional cognate (Siegel, 1988: 32) of rationality, since both tational thinking and critical thinking are coextensive withthe relevance of reasons (Scheflles, 196%: 107). Beli, judgments, and actions are rational just co the extent that the believer actor has good reasons for so believing, judg ing, or acing; consequently, being able to think critically involves the ability to escertin che epistemic or evidential gootiness of candidate ressons. Consequently, a cenral cask invalved in educating for critical thinking is thet of foster- ing in students the ability to assess the probative strength of reasons. ‘Any such account of efitical dhinking needs ro be sup- plemented by an account of the canstitution af good rea- sons which che proponent of he ideal is obliged eo prewide. How do we determine the degree co which a proposed reason for some belief, judgment, ot ection is a good or forcefal one? What are the guidelines, or principles, in sceordance with which the goodness of candidate reasons ate tobe ascertained? Whar isthe narace of soch principles? How are they themselves justified? Relaced questions arise ‘concerning the criteria by which the goodnes of candidate reasons is determined, How are these eriteria chosen, and. \who chooses them? How are they themselves justified ~ and indeed, can they be justified, even in principle, in « non circular or question-begging way? What is the source of their epistemic authority? Are they absolute or reacve? Are they really epistemic or rather politcal, constituting tools of power and oppression? These questions and others like chem are epistemological in nature; they call for & general account of the relationship between 2 putative reason and the belief, judgment, or setion for which iis 2 reason, Such an epistemological account will have to grap— ple with deep questions concerning the nacure of episte- mic justification, the relationship between justification and truth (and so the neture of trath), the relacivigy (or abso- Iureness) of principles of reason evaluation, and sofort. In this sense, che educational ideals of reason and rationality depend, for their own articulation and justification, on an adequately articulated snd defended underlying epistemol- ‘ogy. For farther discussion see Balin, 1992, 1995, 1998 Siogel, 1988, 1989, 1997, 1998) This also supplies 2 reason for thinking that epistemology should ieself be tsughe in schools (Siege, 2008). The critical spirit Having the ability to determine the goodness, or probetive force, of candidate reason fr belie, judgment, o acion may be necessary, but cannot be sullicien, for eritical thinking, since a given thinker may have che ability but not (or aotsystematically or routinely) use it Accordingly, most theorise of critical chinking argue thet, along with the sil or ability to ases the probative force of reasons, cticcal thinkers mast also have relevant disposiions. The primacy dispositions are those of valuing good ceasoning anid it fruits, and of seeking reasons, assessing them, and governing beliefs and actions in accordance with the re sults ofsuch assessment. In addition, mosctheorstsoutine ‘subset of dispositions or tats which are also necessaey for cfitical chinking, inckuding open-mindedness, fair- mindedness, independent-mindedness, ineelleceual mod sey and humility, an inguising attude, and respect for ochersin group inguiry and deliberation (Bain eral, 199% Hare, 1979, 1985). This ewo-companene conception of critical thinking ~ according 29 which critical thinking encompasses both 4 eason-assessment component and a Aispasivonal, cftical-picit component ~ is endorsed by rose theorists. The second aspect of the deal ~ the disposition or inclination actually co be guided by the result of the reasoned evaluation of reasons — has broader philosophi- cal implicaons Here, the ideal recommends noc simply the fostering of sills a abilities of reason assessment, but also the fostering of a wide range of actrodes, babies of mind, and charecer tats, choughe co be choracterisic oF the rational or reasonable person (Sebefiles, 198% Siegel, 1988), This extends the ideal beyond the bounds of the Intemational Ercyctopedia of Education (2010), vol 6, pp. 141-148‘Author's personal copy cognitive fo, so understood, the ideal is one of «certain sore of person. In advocating the fostering of particular Aispesons, atirudes, and charscter trait, os well a6 of panicalar sills and abilities, the proponent of this educational sim denies the legitimacy, or at least the eciveatignl relevance, of any sheep distincion between the cognitive and the affecve, or the rational and the emotional. The ideal calls for the fostering of cetain Stills and abies, and foe the festering of « cercain sort of character. is thus a general ideal of «certain sore of pecton, which sort of person itis the task of education ¢o help © create, This aspect of the educational ideal of tatonality aligns i withthe complementary ideal of anron- ‘omy, since a rational person will ~ at least ideally ~ also be sn autonomous one, capable of judging foc himself/herself the jsedness of candidate beliefs and the egimacy of condidate values Critical Thinking as a Fundamental Educational Ideal AAs noted above, the cultivation of reascn has been regarded by many philosophers of education in the West- cer tradition asa fundamental aim, and overriding ideal, of education. Today, che fostering ofcricical thinking (and s0 rationality) is often regarded in the same way. To s0 regard i sto hold thee educational activities oughe ro be designed and conducted in such 2 way thatthe conserac~ tion and evaluation of reasons {in accordance with rele~ vant criteria) are paramount, throughout che curriculum, As Israel Schefller puts the poi Cnc though i ofthe frstimporcance in te concep sion and orgenzation of educations activites (SchefMen, 1981), Resionaliy fsa matter of resem, and to eke it a8 fundamental educational idl isco make at pervasive at posible the fee and eitcal quest for restos, in all reals of soy (Scheflles, 1989-62, emphasis i riginal) “The fundemental tit co be encouraged is thetof reason sbleness.. In erining our seudents co reason we erain ‘hem oe extcal (1989: 142,143). ‘To so take it isto regard the fostering ofthe abilities tnd dispositions of critical thinking in students as che prime educational directive, of central imporeance to the design and implementation of curriculum and edvca- tional policy. Its to hold chet educational activities should be designed and conducted in such way that the con- suction and evaluation of reasons (in accordance with relevant criteria) are paramount, throughout the curticu- lm, Thisis not ro say that other ains and ideals might not also be of serious importance, bur that none ourranks the Critical Thinking 143 primary obligation of educational efforts end instiutions to foster critical shinking (Siegel, 1988; 136-137). Justification of the Ideal Why should the fostering of critical chinking be thought to be so important? There are at least four reasons for thinking so. Fest, and mose importantly, ssiving to fester cticcal thinking in students is the only way in which seudents are treated with respect as persons. The moral requirement 10 treat students with respect as persons requires that we strive to enable them to think for them- selves, compecently and wel sather than to deny them the Fandamental ability to determine for themselves, 0 the ‘greatest extent possible, the concours oftheir own minds and lives. Acknowledging them as persons of equal moral worth requires that we treat students as independent centers of consciousness, with needs and interess not less importanc than oor ow, who are at least in principe capable of determining for themselves how best to live and who to be, As educators, treating them with respect involves striving to enable them co jodge such matters for themselves. Doing so competently requires judging in accordance wich the criteria governing critical thinking. Consequently, eeating seudents with respect requires fos- tering in dhem the abilities and dispositions of esitical thinking. ‘A second reason for regueding critical thinking as a Fundamental educational ideal involves education's gen- erally recognized task of preparing smodents for adule- hood. Such preparation cannot properly be conceived in terms of preparing students for preconceived roles; rather, ‘ie must be understood t involve studenc sel suiciency and self-dieecton, In tis, the place of critical thinking is manifest A third reason for regarding the fostering of critical thinking as a central aim of education is the role ic plays in the rational cradiions, which have always been atthe center of eduestional activities and efforts ~ mathematics, science, lterarre, ar, history, et. All these traditions incorporate and rely upon critical thinking: ‘mastering. ot becoming initiated into the former both requires, snd is basic to the fostering and enhancement ofthe latter. A fourth reason involves the place of careful snalysis, good thinking, and ressoned deliberation in democratic life, To the extent thet we value democracy, ‘we mast be committed tothe fostering of the ails and dispositions of critical thinking, for demoeracy ean flour- ish ust othe extent that ts ctizenty is sufficiently critical (Siege, 1988, ch. 3). ‘These four reasons have been spelled out at greater length by several auchors (eg, Bailin, 1998 Roberson, 1998, 1999). They are sufficiently powerful co justify regarding critical thinking as « fandimental educational Intemational Encyclopedia of Education (2010), ve. 6 pp, 141-145,Author's personal copy {44 _ Philosophy of Education - Philosophical Themes: ideal Before to foserertcal thinking sim a the promo- tion of independent thinking, personal cotonons, and reasoned jucgmentin thought and action; tese particlae sien are themselves in keeping wich brosder conceptions of knowledge, reasons, and persons for example, that al Iinowledge is fallible, that it is possible w objecively csloate the goodnesy of reasons ad tha personal auton- ‘omy isan impoctan value (Bali, 1998 208). These aims, axl the broader conceptions in terms of which they are grounded, aze philosophically contentions, 6 no sur pris, then, char they-~and the edueasona deal of eical ‘hinking itself - have been challenged Criticisms of the Ideal ‘There are many extant criticisms and thoughefl critics of| the idee! of exiticsl thinking. Critics charge that critical thinking: 1. privileges the values and practices of dominant groups in society and devalues those of group: traditionally lacking in power, 2, privileges rational, linear thought over intuition; 5. is aggressive and confroncationsl rather than collegial and collaborative; 4, neglects or downplays emotions, 5. deals in abstraction and devalues lived experience and concrete particularity; 6 is individualistic and privileges personal autonomy. over cornmunity and relationship; and 7. presupposes the possibility of objectivity and thus does not recognize an individval’s situacedness (for discussion and references, see Bailin, 195; Bai Siegel, 2003) “These eitcisms, often made from feminis and/or post modernist perspectives, must in the end be considered on their own merits, However, itis of considerable comfort co fiends ofthe ideal thar there isa general rely available 1 all acempts to reject the ideal, one that appears to be effective against ther all, and which is marifesed in che discussions of each of the specific critiques considered. above. Ths reply; if success, establishes the impossbl ‘of cational rejecting ceason — and so preserves the legiti- macy of regarding its cultivation as an educational idea. ‘This discassion concludes by rehearsing the reply and assessing i effectiveness, Suppose that one wishes to reject the ideal of rea- son, One can reject it without thought or aggument — indeed, one can reject it without ever recognizing or addressing the question of whether it should be rejected — lor one can reectiton the basis of some reasoned challenge toit(cg, thacit fosters patriarchy, ids and aber oppression, depends upon a problematic individualism, rests on an inadequate conception of objectivity, or whacever) fn the formercase, one’s rejection does noc threaten te legitimacy of the ideal, since no challenge is made. It is the lanes, philosophical sore of rejection that genuinely challenges the idea's cogency. However, ifsuch a challenge is made, i will be force- fal, and saccessfal, just eo the extent tht itis based upon good reasons for eeecting the ideal. The challenger is tnguing, in effect, char there is good reason eo reject the ideal of reason. Any such argument against reason, if suecesfil, will self be an instance ofits successfil appti- cation or execation. That i, the reasoned rejection ofthe ideal is itself an instance of being guided by it In this sense, the ideal appears to be safe ftom successfal chal- lenge: any successful challenge will have o rely upo any challenge which does noc cannot succeed. While challenges co che ideal might succeed in refining our understanding of i none can succeed in overthrowing ic Thus the ideal cannor be successflly challenged. ‘Transcendental arguments like ehis one are novori~ cusly contcoversial philosophically; I cannot provide a general defense of them here, However, I should note that the argument does not prove too much. It does not suggest that other ideals are nor important. Nor does icsoggese thar people canno live contrary to although thar they can (and do) does nothing co challenge the legitimacy of the ideal, or the claim that they ought 10 bbe guided by it. The argument obviously will noe be persuasive 10 one who reject reason, but offers no acgu- eit agai it Bie such an argumeni-s reject ails as a critique, since it offers no criticism of the ideal or argoment in favor of ts rejection. ‘The proponent of rationality and ie cultivation must, tobe consistens, regard challenges to as centally impor tant, and must regard the obligation to take such chal- lenges seriously a8 integral to raionalicy ise. Insofar, deep criticisms of the ideal, and reasoned consideration of both its praiseworthy characteristics and its indefensi- ble ones, ae exactly what the ideal itself recommends. ‘Whether the ideal survives extane criticisms will always be, in some sense, an open question; uch exvicisms may well succeed in altering our understanding of it Nevertheless, there is e limit beyond which any proposed criticism of rationality cannor go without undermining itself In so fa, the ideal of rationality (atleast in some formolaton of it), cannot be coherenty rejected (Siegel, 199, 1997, ch. 5, Bpilogue; 2003). This seljuscifying feature of rationality mighe itself be thought ro provide some reason for regarding its cultivation as desirable. However, the main purpose served by the fondamental reply just rehearsed is noc that of justifying the ideal direcly ~ that skis more directly pesformed by the four ceasons (cespect, preparation fo adulthood, nitia- tion into the rational traditions, and democratic life) offered in favor of the ideal above, Rather, the main pur- ‘pose sto make plain just how difcul iis to challenge che Intemational Eeyeopeata of Education (2010), al 6, pp. 141-146Author's personal copy ideal. Once the unchallengablity of reason is cleas, the Aesicabiliy ofits culation — on the basis of those four reasons (and quite possibly others aswell) ~ is manifest, Bibliography Balin, §. 1932, Cul, democracy and re univers, rehenge 2a), 65-68. Balin, S. (1988, ctcal inking biased? Cleator ond ‘inpicatons Educstone! Moy 482). 187-17, sae 5.1903 Faction, krowedge an rea! Mirerg, Cat 0, (ec Eaten, Knowledge and rth Beyond the Postnode Impasse, pp 204-220. 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