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    DIscute a partir dos pressupostos da física o status ontológico das entidades teóricas.

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    DIscute a partir dos pressupostos da física o status ontológico das entidades teóricas.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    Download as pdf
    7 views13 pages

    Ontological Status of Theorethical Entities

    Uploaded by

    martinsmariodamata
    DIscute a partir dos pressupostos da física o status ontológico das entidades teóricas.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    GROVER MAXWELL ————— The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities ‘That anyone today should seriously contend that the entities referred to by scientific theories are only convenient fictions, or that talk about such entities is translatable without remainder into talk about sense con: tents or everyday physical objects, or that such talk should be regarded as belonging to a mere calculating device and, thus, without cognitive content—such contentions strike me as so incongruous with the seintise and rational attitude and practice that I feel this paper should turn out to be a demolition of straw men. But the instrumentalist views of out standing physicists such as Bohr and Heisenberg are too well known to be cited, and in a recent book of great competence, Professor Emest [Nagel concludes that “the opposition between [the realist and the in- strumentalist] views [of theories] is a conflict over preferred modes of speech” and “the question as to which of them is the ‘corect position’ has only terminological interest"! ‘The phoenis, it seems, will not be haid to rest. The literature on the subject is, of course, voluminous, and a compre: hensive treatment of the problem is far beyond the scope of one essay. I shall limit myself to a small number of constructive arguments (for a radically realistic interpretation of theories) and toa critical examination ‘of some of the more crucial assumptions (sometimes tacit, sometimes ‘xplicit) that seem to have generated most of the problems in this area? ‘he genesis and patt ofthe content of some ofthe idea expresed herein, mm indlted to-4 sme of sources some of the more infoental se H. Fig til Hypotheses,” Philosphy of Scene, 1735-02 (1950): K- Feyerabend, trpt aba Reslisic Interpretation of Experience ofthe Arto fli) Sct 8.14190 (1988), NOR amon, Paes Bi rene (Cam Iidge: Cambridge University Press 1958): F- Natal, lo. its Kor) Popper, The Tig of Sciemite Discovery (London: Hutcon, 1959); M Sven, “Betton, Hspliations, and Theores,”" in Mimesota Stuis in the Philwophy of Science, 3 Grover Maxwell ‘The Problem ‘Although this esay is not comprehensive, it aspires to be fairly sl contained. Let me, therefore, give a pseudohistorical introduction to the problem with a piece of science fiction (or tional science) Tn the days before the advent of microscopes, there lived a Pasteur- like scientist whom, following the usual custom, I shall call Jones. Re- fecting on the fact that certain diseases seemed to be transmitted from fone person to another by means of bodily contact or by contact with articles handled previously by an aflicted person, Jones began to specu late about the mechanism of the transmission, AS a “heuristic crutch,” the recalled that there is an obvious observable mechanism for transmis sion of certain afictions (such as body lice), and he postulated that all, ‘or mos, infectious diseases were spread in a similar manner but that in ‘most cases the corresponding “bugs” were too small to be seen and, pos- sibly, that some of them lived inside the bodies of their hosts, Jones pro- ceeded to develop his theory and to examine its testable consequences. Some of these seemed to be of great importance for preventing the spread of disease ‘After yeats of struggle with incredulous recaleitrance, Jones managed to got some of his preventative measures adopted. Contact with or prox: imity to diseased persons was avoided when possible, and articles which they handled were “disinfected” (a word coined by Jones) either by :means of high temperatures or by treating them with certain toxic prepa zations which Jones termed “disinfectants.” The results were spectacular: within ten years the death rate had declined 40 per cent. Jones and his theory received their welldeserved recognition However, the “erobes” (the theoretical term coined by Jones to refer to the disease producing organisms) aroused considerable anxiety among ‘many of the philosophers and philosophically inclined scientists of the day. The expression of this anxiety usually began something like this “In order to account for the facts, Jones must assume that his crobes are too small to be seen. Thus the very postulates of his theory preclude Vol. 11, H, Feigh, M. Scriven, and G. Marvel, eds. (Minneapolis: Univesity of Minnosts Pes 1958); Willd Sela, "Empeiom and the Pilsophy of Mind,” In Minnesota Stules inthe Philosophy of Scene, Vo. H. Fig and M. Seven, ts. (Minneapolis: Univenity of Minnerotn Pes, 1986), and “The Language of Theorie" Curent Issues the Philosophy of Science, H.Fegl and G. Marvel, coh (New York: Hat, Rinchart, and Winston, 1961) 4 ‘THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THEORETICAL ENTITIES their being observed; they are unobservable in principe.” (Recall that ‘no one had envisaged such a thing as a microscope.) ‘This common prefa- tory remark was then followed by a number of different “analyses” and interpretations” of Jones’ theory. According to one of these, the tiny organisms were merely convenient fictions—facons de parlerextremely useful as heuristic devices for facilitating (in the “context of discovery”) the thinking of scientists but not to be taken seriously in the sphere of cognitive knowledge (in the “context of justification”). A closely related view was that Jones’ theory was merely an instrument, useful for organ- izing observation statements and (thus) for producing desired results, and that, therefore, it made no more sense to ask what was the nature of the entities to which it referred than it did to ask what was the nature ‘of the entities to which a hammer or any other tool refered.? “Yes,” a philosopher might have said, “Jones’ theoretical expressions are just ‘meaningless sounds or matks on paper which, when correlated with ob- servation sentences by appropriate syntactical rules, enable us to predict successfully and otherwise organize data in a convenient fashion.” These philosophers called themselves “instrumentalists.” ‘According to another view (which, however, soon became unfashion- able), although expressions containing Jones’ theoretical terms were genuine sentences, they were translatable without remainder into a set (perhaps infinite) of observation sentences. For example, “There are robes of disease X on this article’ was said to translate into something like this: ‘If a person handles this article without taking certain pre: cations, he will (probably) contract disease X; and if this article is fist raised to a high temperature, then if person handles it at any time afterward, before it comes into contact with another person with disease X, he will (probably) not contract disease X; and.” "Now virtually all who held any of the views so far noted granted, even, insisted, that theories played a useful and legitimate role in the scientific fenterprise. Their concern was the elimination of “pseudo problems” ‘which might arise, sa, when one began wondering about the “reality ‘of supracmpirical entities,” ete. However, there was also a school of ‘thought, founded by a psychologist named Pelter, which differed in an have bortomed the hammer analogy from E. Nagel, “Science and (Fee's) ic Realumn™ Philosophy of Ssenee, 17:174-181 (1950), bat it shoold be led oat that Profesor Nagel makes i lar that he does not necesanly sbscxibe fw which he fe explaining Grover Maxwell intersting manner fom such postions as these. Is members hel at while Jone cobs ight ery well exist and enjoy “fll blown reality” they shuld not be the eonem of medial reach at al The inst that if Jones ha employed the couect methodology he woul lave di covered, even soont and with mugh les effort all of the obsaration lavsreting to disease contacto, tansmision et withotintodae ing spertaous links (the robes) nt the canal cain. ‘Now, let any reader find himself waxing impatient, lt me hasten to eamplusize tat this ere parody i nt intended to convince anyone, or evento cst seis doubt upon sophistated vais of any ofthe reductionist poston eveatred (seme of Hem not too seve, 1 Would contend) above. Tam well aware Ut there ae Hoel x tits and theoretial ent, some of whose conceal and theoretical statuses die in important respects fom Jone robes (0 shal discuss tome ofthese ter) Allow me. then, to bring the Jonezan prelude to our examination of meray to «hasty enon, ‘Now Jones had the god fortune to ive to see the invention ofthe compound micrescope His robes wee “observed” in gat dete and it boame posible to enily the speci kind of microbe (fr so they began to be called) which vas raponsible fr eich diferent dieae Some philesphesfely admitted enor and were converte to realist peatons concerning theo, Others reorted to subjective Weim or toa thowughgoing phenomena, of which thre were two principal vars. According to one, the one “keltimate” ebsenation language ad fits descriptive terms ony the which refed to sense dt. The other maintained the stronger thes that all "Tata satements were translatable without remainder into the sese datum language. In ether cas any two nonsense data (eq, theaetical entity and what would ondiily be called an “obsonable physi objet") ad vitally the tame tats, Others contived means of modifying thi views much les data One goup maintined that Jones cobs actualy never had teen tnobserabl in principle, for, they sai, the theory did not inply the imposility offing «means (eg, the micoenpe) of observing them. A more ral contention wns thatthe cobs were not observed atall it as argued that what was sen by means ofthe mirscope wat jst shadow or an nage athe hana corporeal oxo. 6 ‘THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THEORETICAL ENTITIES ‘The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy Let us tum from these Stina philosophical postion and consider some ofthe actual ons to which they oughly corespond. Taking the lst one fst, itis interesting to note the following pesage from Bag tmann: "Buti only fat point out that if this methodaogeal and terminological amas the thes tat thee are no atoms) i srt adhered to, even sas and mieroscopie objet are nat pia thing in iter sense, but merely by courtesy of language and pictorial imagitation. "This might scem ankward. But when T look. through a mnicoscope al Tse a patch of color which eres though the Bld ikea viadow over wall And a shadow, though ral i etal not a pil thing”* T should ik to point out that i i a the case tat fei nai is strictly adhered to, we cannot observe psi things through oper flsss, or ven through cndnary spectacles, and one begins to wonder About the satus of what we see trough an ordinary windowpane. And hat about distortions due to temperature gadients however sal And, thas ays presenti the ambient ai? Teal des “seem ale ward” to say that when people who wen glses describe what they see they are talking about shadows, while thse who employ unaided von tak about pital things~or that when we look though a window. yan we can only infer that i ning, while if we rave te window, tre may “observe rectly” that it i The point Tam making is hat here isin pincpl » continuous seves begining with looking Hough + vaccum and containing thse as members: loking through window. Jane, looking through gles, leoking though bine, looking through a low-power microscope, looking through a high power mre scope et, inthe order given, The impertant sonequence i that 30 fr, we ae left without cite which would eable ws to daw a hon. anbitary line between “observation” and “theory” Certainly, we will tite nd it convenient to daw sch tosomeestetarbiary ine; but its potion wil vary widely from contest to etext. (Por cample we are deterinng the resolving characteristics of a etan microscope, We would certainly daw the ine beyond nda spectacle, probably al of Py hs 2-a8, 988 8) tape a Rg ae Pha pyof Science, Th, Fgh and M. Broibech; ed (New York Appleton Cent Mts, 1953), pp. 262-887 i a Grover Maxwell Iejond simple magnifying gases, and posiby beyond another micro- Scape with a lower power of esoltin.) But what ontological ice does 2 mere methodologialy convenient observational theoreti dichotomy at? Does an entity attain physi thinghood and/or “el existence” in tone contest only to lose it in another? Or, we may ask, recalling the con- finuity fom obsenable to unobseable is what stn Enough spect lesa “ttle bit less el” or dos it “exit to a slightly les extent” Ban What is observed by unaided ision?® Howeset it might be argued tat things seen through spectacles and inet loo like ordinary physical object, while those sen trough microscopes and telescopes look like shadows and patches of light. can only reply that this doesnot seem to me to be the cae, yatclry ‘then Tooking at the moon, or even Satur, though a tekescope or when looking at a smal, though “iecly observable,” physical objet through 2 ow: power microscope Thus again, a contin peas “But” it might be objected, “thcry tellus tht what we see by means ofa microscope is areal image, which is certainly distinct from the object on the stage” Now fist of al it shouldbe remarked that it seems od that ove whois espousing an austere empiricism which re- quires a sharp obsewationllanguage/theorctial language. dst {and one in which the former lnguage has privileged status) should heed a theory in order to tll hin what i observable. But, leting this yas what i to prevent ws fom syng tat we sil observe the object con the stage, even though a “real image” may be involved? Otherwise, we sal be strongly tempted by phenomenalstic demons, and at this point we ave considering a phyical-object abseration language nither than asenedatum one. (Compare the traditional puzzle: Do I see one posal jet or two when T punch my eyeball? Does one objet split Into two? Or do I sec one objet and one image? Ete.) ‘Another argument forthe continuous transition from the obsrable to the unobservable (theoreti) may be adduced from theoretical com- uation, Te om inte senda lng arbi oss gue (Che Be erTiet ee empl Resacg ad sone as mes fs {i'moe dict to refute than one which pats to take an “obsenable physica bjt view awe that demelising the Sw men with which Tam ns to desirable preliminary "therapy" Some nonvealst interpret. fnow dang tion of theres which embody the prenpposition tht the obrenable theoretical “tinction ie shaep and ontology tru scem to. me to ental postions which aed to sch stow ten tater ekesly 8 ‘THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THEORETICAL ENTITIES siderations themselves. For example, contemporary valency theory tells us that there isa virtually continuous transition from very small mole- cules (such as those of hydrogen) through “medium-sized” ones (such as those of the fatty acids, polypeptides, proteins, and viruses) to ex: ‘tremely large ones (such as crystals of the salts, diamonds, and lumps cf polymeric plastic). The molecules in the last'mentioned group are macro, “directly observable” physical objects but ae, nevertheless, genu- ine, single molecules; on the other hand, those in the frst mentioned group have the same perplexing properties as subatomic particles (de Broglie waves, Heisenberg indeterminacy, etc.). Are we to say that a large protein molecule (eg, a virus) which can be “seen” only with an electron microscope isa litte less real or exists to somewhat less an ex- tent than docs a molecule of a polymer which can be seen with an ‘optical microscope? And does a hydrogen molecule partake of only an infinitesimal portion of existence or reality? Although there certainly is 1 continuous transition from observability to unobservability, any talk of such a continuity from full-blown existence to nonexistence is, clearly, Let us now consider the next to last modified position which was adopted by our fictional philosophers. According to them, it is only those entities which are in principle impossible to observe that present special problems. What kind of impossibility is meant here? Without going into a detailed discussion of the various types of impossibility, about which there is abundant literature with which the reader is no doubt familiar, I shall assume what usually seems to be granted by most philosophers who talk of entities which are unobservable in principle— ile, that the theory(s) itself (coupled with a physiological theory of perception, I would add) entails that such entities are unobservable. ‘We should immediately note that if this analysis of the notion of un- lobservability (and, hence, of observability) is accepted, then its use as ‘a means of delimiting the observation language seems to be precluded for those philosophers who regard theoretical expressions as elements of ‘calculating device—as meaningless strings of symnbols. For suppose they ‘wished to determine whether or not ‘electron’ was a theoretical term. First, they must see whether the theory entails the sentence ‘Electrons fae unobservable’ So far, so good, for their calculating devices are said to be able to select genuine sentences, provided they contain no theo- ‘etical terms. But what about the selected “sentence” itself? Suppose 9 Grover Maxwell that ‘electron’ is an observation term. It follows that the expression is a ‘genuine sentence and asserts that electrons are unobservable. But this ‘entails that ‘electron’ is not an observation term. ‘Thus if ‘electron’ is an observation term, then it is not an observation term. ‘Therefore itis not an observation term. But then it follows that ‘Electrons are un- ‘observable’ is not a genuine sentence and does not assert that electrons are unobservable, since it is a meaningless string of marks and does not assert anything whatever. Of cours, it could be stipulated that when a ‘theory “selects” a meaningless expression of the form ‘Xs are unobserv- able; then °X’ is tobe taken as a theoretical term. But this seems rather arbitrary. Bat, assuming that wellformed theoretical expressions are genuine sentences, what shall we say about unobservability in principle? I shall begin by putting my head on the block and argue that the present-

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