2011 Case Digest in Succession.

GONZALO VILLANUEVA (represented by his heirs), petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 172804

January 24, 2011

Second Division

Carpio, J.

FACTS:
Gonzalo Villanueva, represented by his heirs, sued Spouses Branoco to recover a parcel
of land. The former claimed ownership over the property thru purchase from Vere, who in turn,
bought the property from Rodrigo. Gonzalo declared the property in his name for tax purposes
soon after acquiring it. In their answer, the Spouses Baranoco similarly claimed ownership over
the property thru purchase from Rodriguez, who in turn, acquired the property from Rodrigo by
way of donation. The Spouses entered the property and paid taxes afterwards.
The trial court ruled in favor of Gonzalo and declared him owner of the property, and
ordered the Spouses Branoco to surrender possession to Gonzalo. The trial court rejected
Spouses Branocos claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which
Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere. Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold
the property to the Spouses, she had no title to transfer. On appeal, the CA granted the
Spouses appeal and set aside the trial court's ruling. it held that the deed of donation is one of
inter vivos. In his petition, Gonzalo seeks the reinstatement of the trial court's ruling.
Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription,
having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract between Rodrigo and Rodriguez is a donation or a devise?
RULING;
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a
perfected donation inter vivos.
First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not
be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the
irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title.
This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's acceptance of
the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3
May 1965. Rodrigo's acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti,
not in futuro, as only donations inter vivosneed acceptance by the recipient. Indeed, had
Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the
testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or
entity the properties here donated x x x" or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly
waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property,
evident from Rodriguez's undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy
Alve during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed's stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on
[Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to
Rodrigo's beneficial title. Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was
unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor's death, such as the donor's
love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises,
nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers." Thus, the
CA committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo's statement of "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.

Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo's post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere
as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of
donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give
license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while
founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property
dispositions counsels against licensing such practice.
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in
1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor
of another." Thus, Rodrigo's post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere's
successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand,
respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's title which they may
invoke against all adverse claimants, including petitioner.

In re: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA

PALAGANS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,
petitioner,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 169144

January 26, 2011

Second Division

Abad, J.

FACTS:
Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, died single and childless. In
the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC, a petition for the probate of
Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. However, Manuel
and Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid
nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testators full
understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to
act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria and Sergio, were on separate
occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to
take their deposition, which it granted. The RTC directed the parties to submit their
memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed
by a court in the Philippiines.
The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b) appointing
Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in
the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Manuel and Benjamin
appealed to the CA arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.
cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. The appellate court, in its decision,
affirmed the order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will,
subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule
76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of
its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed?
RULING:
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign
will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will
of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court
of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule
77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over
the matter can be established.

ATTY. RICARDO B. BERMUDO, petitioner,

vs.
FERMINA TAYAG-ROXAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 172879

February 2, 2011

Second Division

Abad, J.

FACTS:
Atty. Bermudo, as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of the
estate of Hilario and for the allowance and probate of the latter's will. The testator instituted

Roxas as his only heir but several persons, who claimed to be Hilario's relatives, opposed the
petition. The RTC rendered a decision, allowing the will and recognizing Roxas as Hilario's sole
heir. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
When the decision constituting Roxas as the sole heir became final, Atty. Bermudo who
also served as counsel for her in the actions concerning her inheritance, filed a motion to fix his
legal fees and to constitute a charging lien against the estate for the legal services he rendered.
The RTC granted him fees equivalent to 20% of the estate and constituted the same as lien on
the estate's property. Roxas appealed the order to the CA. The CA rendered a decision that
modified the RTC Order, limiting Atty. Bermudo's compensation as administrator to what Section
7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court provides and making his lawyer's fees 20% of the value of the
land belonging to the estate.
Atty. Bermudo subsequently filed a motion with the RTC for execution and appraisal of
the estate on which his 20% compensation would be based. The RTC granted the motion and
ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo P12,644,300.00 as attorney's fees with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum. Roxas challenged the order before the CA through a petition for certiorari.
Using a different valuation of the land of the estate, the CA ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo
a reduced amount of P4,234,770.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6% per annum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorneys fees?
RULING:
Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorney's fees but only to
compensation as administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.
But Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as
Roxas' counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest
all the way up to the SC to defend her rights to her uncle's estate. And Atty. Bermudo
succeeded. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as administrator of
the estate. Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney's fees.

EDUARDO AGTARAP, petitioner,

vs.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, respondents.
G.R. No. 177099

June 8, 2011

Second Division

Nachura, J.

FACTS:
Eduardo filed with the RTC a petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his
deceased father Joaquin. The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on without any known

debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia, and
second with Carida. Joaquin and Lucia had three childrenJesus (dead), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin and Caridad had three
children--Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of
his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements. Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin,
had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating for himself
P26,000.00 per month since April 1994. Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative
need to appoint him as special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets
and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a regular administrator. In addition, he prayed
that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin
who would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the
named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c) entitling the
distributees the right to receive and enter into possession those parts of the estate individually
awarded to them.
The RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing and directing Eduardo to
cause its publication. Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in the
petition, and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator. Joseph, Gloria,
and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia's death, they became the pro
indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with the
exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant was built with the exclusive money of
Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as administrator
on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the
lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that the best
interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular administrator.
estate.

The RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquin's

Consequently,
it
issued
him
letters
of
administration.

After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective
proposed projects of partition, the RTC, issued an Order of Partition, and held that the 2 parcels
of land are conjugal properties of Joaquin and Lucia. On appeal, the CA dismissed the appeal.
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective
proposed projects of partition, the RTC, issued an Order of Partition, and held that the 2 parcels
of land are conjugal properties of Joaquin and Lucia. On appeal, the CA dismissed the appeal.
Both Eduardo and Sebastian maintains that the certificates of title of real estate
properties subject of the controversy are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad
Garcia, and as such are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are not
subject to collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a separate proceeding for that
purpose. According to them, the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was
not vested with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership, which properly
belongs to another court with general jurisdiction. Sebastian further alleged that Joaquins
estate have already been settled in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax. Moreover,
Eduardo alleges that the CA erroneously settled, together with the settlement of the estate of
Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention of
the principle of settling only one estate in one proceeding. He particularly questions the
distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite the fact that a
proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing
all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from Joaquin's estate. He states that this
violated
the
rule
on
precedence
of
testate
over
intestate
proceedings.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the parcels of land belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and
Lucia notwithstanding their registration under their registration under the existing certificates of
title as registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, casado con Caridad Garcia?

RULING:
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA,
the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the
owners of the properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration
in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant
consideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple
possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily conclusive of a holder's true ownership of
property. A certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be
used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership. Thus, the fact that the properties were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that
the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. The phrase "married to Caridad
Garcia" in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the registered owner,
and does not necessarily prove that the realties are their conjugal properties.