ARTICLE VIII JUDICIARY

216. SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA

judicial power and judicial function

Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3rd
Honors (3rd placer). 3 days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the
invalidation of the ranking of honor students. They filed a CERTIORARI case
against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating
honors.
They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion
because they claim that
o
the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before,
except in Grade 5 only.
o That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5
o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during
the summer (gaining unfair advantage)
o The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers.
o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a
much lower rank
o That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word first place was
erased and replaced with second place
o That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each
other to delay his grievances.
The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even
assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (because the
graduation already proceeded).
Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers
since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial
functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions)

ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power?
SC:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of
judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In
order for an action for certiorari to exist,
(TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES JUDICIAL
FUNCTIONS)
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a
tribunal for hearing and determination. , and
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and
render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the
judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)
It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is,
and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
The phrase judicial power is defined:
as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine

when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the
subject matter of adjudication.
The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasijudicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a
LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring therefrom is
brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to
determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of
contending parties.
There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to
assess individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse
still, the petitioners have not presented the pertinent provisions of the Service
Manual for Teachers which was allegedly violated by the Committee.
The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges.
And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and
similar competitions.
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217. NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE

Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled

to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of
CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of
those covered by the title
The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to
explain.
Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a
Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an
ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated
only by the Supreme Court
Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES)
Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of
discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by

the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?
SC: NO.
If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges
equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only
by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since
it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the
Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive
officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over
such officials.
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary
with administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties.
The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or
administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions.
As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not
include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the
Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts
recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.
The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.
Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function,
but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of
Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not

automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the
consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.

218. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS VS. ANG CHO KIO

power to recommend

Ang was convicted and was granted conditional pardon. He was never to return to
the Philippines. In violation of his pardon, he returned. He was recommitted by
order of the Executive Secretary.
He filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC denied. CA also denied it. But the CA
made a recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the
first available transporation abroad.
The Solgen assailed this CA decision, claiming that the recommendation by the
CA should not be part of the decision, because it gives the decision a political
complextion, because courts are not empowered to make such recommendation,
nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers. The Solgen
contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the country is an act of the state
exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the act of
sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the
courts should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the
President.

ISSUE: Whether the CA decision was proper? Can it make recommendations?

SC: NO.
The case in the CA was for habeas corpus. The only issue there was whether the RTC
correctely denied the petition. The CA was not called upon the review any sentence
imposed upon Ang. The sentence against him had long become final and in fact, he
was pardoned. The opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of the decision
of the RTC, and no more.
The recommendatory power of the courts are limited to those expressly provided in
the law, such as Art 5 RPC. (when an act is not punishable by law judge should
report it to the executive).
The CA was simply called to determine whether Ang was illegally confined or not
under the Director of Prisons (for violating the pardon). It was improper for the CA
justices to make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or correction
of the act of the President. The matter of whether an alien who violated the law may
remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the
President, under the principle of separation of powers. It is not within the province of
the judiciary to express an opinion, or a suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom
or propriety of an action by the President, which are purely political in nature.
After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in
the interpretation and application of the law. Judges should refrain from expressing
irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon the
competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.
Summary:

1) Recommendatory powers of the SC under RPC does not include matters which are
purely political in nature. (otherwise it violates separation of powers)
2) deportation of aliens is a political question
3) opinion of judges should be relevant to the question presented for decision.
219. In re LAURETA
power to preserve judiciary s honor

Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal
of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution.
Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly
promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the
limits of legal and judicial ethics.
Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This
case is far from finished by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a
press conference.
Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first
division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty.
Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents.
The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the
minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but
Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not
aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that
Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.
Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again
with more threats to expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting
travesty of justice.
True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the
Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute
Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their
influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.
Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to
the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was
made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption.
The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.
Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.
They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not
intend to dishonor the court.

SC:
The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the
entire court.
There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under
the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the
scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession.
We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, nor
with the complaint filed with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging
remarks such as undue influence, powerful influence in his pleadings. This was

bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the
newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the
radio. Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedings.
In short, SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the
government because of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions
are conclusive upon other branches of government.
220. ECHEGARY VS. SOJ
suspension of execution of decision

Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the
said crime.
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the
issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and
the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the
death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, 4 and passed Republic Act
No. 8177,
Petitioner filed a Petition 8 for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the
Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injection, claiming it
as cruel form of punishment, among many others.
the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the
respondents to COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from notice, and directed the parties "to MAINTAIN the status quo prevailing
at the time of the filing of this petition."

(from poli compendium: The decision sentencing him to death pursuant to RA 7659
became final. Upon motion of the petitioner, the SC issued a TRO restraining his
execution on the ground that there is a possibility that Congress might repeal RA
7659. Respondent argued that the TRO was illegal because in effect it granted
petitioner a reprieve, which was the exclusive prerogative of the President)
SC:
The constitutional provision granting the Presidnet the power to grant reprieves
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of the courts to control the enforcement
of their decisions after their finality. An accused who has been convicted by final
judgment still possesses collateral rights, and these can be claimed in a proper court.
For instance, a convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be
executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of death sentence is an exercise
of judicial power.

221. LINA VS. PURISIMA

power to dispense rules

Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB.

Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans
Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by
Cabanos who acted in gadalej.
It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was dismissed by
Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being notoriously undesirable.
The RTC dismissed the petition because:
o Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President
pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is
beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or reverse.
This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the Courts in
GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.
o The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule upon the validity
or legality of any decree order or act issued by President Marcos, pursuant
to Proclamation 1081.

SC:
The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General
Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The
judge was apparently unaware that the Court has always deemed General Order # 3
as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity
among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine
whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of
the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law
proclamations.
Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there was martial law, it is
still subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the SC.
Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over the case.
Ordinarily, the case should be remanded to the judge to be tried on the merits. Yet,
this Supreme Court, whose power and duty to do justice are inherent, plenary and
imperative, extends to all instances where it appears that final resolution of the
parties involved full opportunity to be heard. Thus, the SC may at its option,
whenever it feels the best interest of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense
with the usual procedure of remanding the case to the court of origin for its own
judgment, and instead, the SC may already resolve the issues and rended the final
judgment on the merits.
SC reinstated Lina to work.

222. TAN VS, MACAPAGAL

judicial review for adjudication

Tan et. al (as taxpayers) filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity
of the LAUREL LEIDO RESOLUTION which deals with the authority of the 1971
Constitutional Convention to declare that it has no power to consider and adopt
proposals which seek to revise the constitution through the adoption of a new
form of government. Under the Resolution, the Con-Con is merely empowered to
propose amendments to the Consti, without altering the general plan.
The SC dismissed it. Tan filed a MR.
The members of the Con-Con claim that Tan has no personal and substantial
interest in the case.

ISSUE: Whther the petitioners had the standing to seek a declaration of the nullity of
the resolution of the Con-Con.
SC: NO.
The rule is, Any person who impugns the validity of the statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
However, there are many instances where taxpayers can nullify laws. But this is upon
the theory that the expenditure of public funds for purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. Hence, it may be
enjoined at the instance of taxpayers.
Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion whether to entertain a taxpayers suit. In
the Gonzales case, it was held that taxpayers must wait before filing the suit until
AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE. It was only then that the matter was ripe
for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The
judiciary will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action (separation of
powers).
Hence, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no
room for judicial oversight. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction.
Here, what is being asked was that the judiciary inquire into the validity of the acts
of the Con-Con. However, it is a pre-requisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed before court may inquire. What the Con-Con did was
merely to propose an amendment to the Consti.
There is no room for judicial review.
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223. TELECOMS VS. COMELEC

locus standi

Telecoms and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils (TELEBAP) is an organization of

lawyers of radio and tv companies. They are suing as taxpayers and citizens and
registered voters. They assail the validity of BP 881 which requires that radio and
tv companies provide free airtime to Comelec for the use of candidates in the
campaign and for other political purposes.
Telebap claims that the law takes property without due process and that it
violates the eminent domain clause which provides for payment of just
compensation.
GMA Network, also filed a similar case.

ISSUE: Whether Telebap and GMA have locus standi

SC:
Telebap No standing as CITIZENS.
A Citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of government, that the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
In this case, it has not shown that they will suffer or have suffered harm as a result
of the operation of BP 881.
Telebap No standing as REGISTERED VOTERS.
No interest as registered voters since this case does not concern their right to
suffrage. Their interest in BP 881 should be precisely in upholding its validity.
Telebap No standing as TAXPAYERS.
No interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the execise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must
specifically show that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain direct injury as a resulf of the
enforcement of the questioned statute.
Telebap No standing as CORPORATE ENTITY
No standing to assert the rights of radio and television companies which they
represent. The mere fact that Telebap is composed of lawyers in the broadcast
industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of
the affected companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown
that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third
party cannot assert his constitutional right.
GMA7 has standing.

Since GMA operates radio and tv broadcast stations, they will be affected by
the enforcement of BP 881. It suffered losses amounting to several millions in
providing Comelec time in connection with the 1992 and 1995 electoins. Now, its
stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year (1998
elections). GMAs allegations that it will suffer losses again is sufficient to give it
standing to question the validity of BP 881.

224. JOYA vs. PCGGG

locus standi private funds

Petitioners are artists (Joya, Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Malang, Ang Kiu Kok,
Polotan, Kasilag, Almario, et. al). They seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding
with the Auction Sale by Christies of New York of Old Masters Paintings and 18th
and 19th century silverware seized from Malacanang during people power. They
claim that the items are part of protected cultural properties and part of Filipino
CULTURAL HERITAGE and hence cannot be disposed. They contend that the items
are PUBLIC PROPERTIES collectively owned by Filipinos. And that they have legal
personality to protect and preserve the countrys ARTISTIC WEALTH.
They allege that some of the items were in fact donated by private persons, and
that the real ownership of the paintings belongs to the foundation or
corporations, only that the public has been given the chance to view and
appreciate the items on exhibit.
First, the PCGG wrote to President Aquino to request authority for the
consignment agreement between the Philippines and Christies
COA however made an audit and found that the agreement was of doubtful
legality, and that it was highly disadvantageous to the Philippines.
The Director of National Museum issued a certification that the items were NOT
part of protected cultural properties.
President Cory also approved it.
The sale proceeded earning $13M.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have locus standi

SC: NO LOCUS STANDI.
The rule is that before the court may inquire into any matter,
1) the question must be raised by the proper party
2) there must be an actual case or controversy
3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
The courts will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before
it by a party who has legal standing. LEGAL STANDING means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as the result of governmental act. INTEREST means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved. Moreover, it must be PERSONAL and not based on a
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third or unrelated party.
The exceptions to this rule are : 1) CITIZENSs SUIT, 2) TAXPAYERs SUIT

IT IS NOT A TAXPAYERS SUIT. A taxpayers suit can only propsper if the

governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes misapplication of funds, which may be enjoined at
the instance of a taxpayer.
MOOT AND ACADEMIC. For the court to exercise its power of adjudication, there
must be an actual controversy, one which involves a conflict of legal rights. The case
must not be moot or academic. A case is moot and academic if the purpose has
become stale. Since the purpose of this petition is to enjoin the sale, the case has
become moot since the sale has long been consummated.
However, it should be emphasized that the Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or
legal standing when PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST IS INVOLVED.

225. KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

locus standi

Kilosbayan is an organization of civil spirited citizens, priests, pastors, nuns and

taxpayers. They are joined by some members of Congress. (Tanada, Joker A.)
They assail the lease of lottery equipment by the PCSO on the ground that it was
similar to the one earlier nullified by the SC.
There was a lease contract between PCSO and Phil. Gaming Mgt. Corp. The
equipment lease agreement covers online lottery equipment to be leased to
PCSO. The agreement was invalidated by the SC for it violated the Charter of
PCSO.
An Amended Lease Agreement was later made providing for 4.3% of the gross
sales as consideration.
PCSO and PGMC claim that the Amended Lease Agreement is a different lease
contract. They claim that the Agreement did not have to be submitted for public
bidding because it fell within the exception under EO 301. They also claim that
the power to determine whether the Agreement is disadvantageous belongs to
the Board of Directors of PCSO. Thus they question the petitioners standing.
PCSO and PGMC claim that the petitioners have no standing since they are not
parties to the contract, and have no personal or substantial interest likely to be
injured by the enforcement of the Contract.
Petitioners however contend that the earlier case sustained their standing to
challenge the validity of the first contract, and as such, that is now the law of the
case (that they have standing).

SC:
The law of the case is not applicable in this case because this case is NOT a sequel
to the previous case. It is not its continuation. This proceeding is essentially different
from the 1993 Lease Contract. Hence, a prior case that petitioners had standing to
challenge that 1993 Contract does NOT PRECLUDE their determination of their
standing in the present suit.
Concern for stability in decisional law does not call for adherence to what has
recently been laid down as rule since the previous ruling sustaining petitioners
intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST. (It seems here that the real issue is not lack of legal standing
but whether they are real parties in interest.) Standing is not even an issue in this
case since standing is a CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, and here no
constitutional question was actually involved.

Standing has constitutional underpinnings. It is very different from questions relation

to whether a party is the real party in interest. Party in interest ensures that only
certain parties can maintain an action, Standing requires partial consideration of the
merits, as well as broader public policy concerns.
The question in standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largele depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
NO STANDING. Here, petitioners have not in fact shown what particularized interest
they have for bringing the suit. It does not detract from the high regard for
petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of the required to
maintain an action. It is true that the present action involves not a mere contract
between private individuals but one made by a government corporation. HOWEVER,
THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THAT PUBLIC FUNDS ARE BEING MISSPENT SO AS TO
MAKE THIS ACTION A PUBLIC ONE, and justify the relaxation of the requirement that
an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Because this is an action for annulment of contracts, the real parties in interest are
those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily
or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can
show the deteriment which would positively result to them from the contract even
though they did not intervene in it.
The phrase present substantial interest means such interest of a party in a subject
matter of action as will entitle him to recover if the evidence is sufficient. Petitioners
here DO NOT HAVE SUCH PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST in the Lease Agreement
as would entitle them to bring this suit.
Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public
bidding can be raised in an appropriate case before the COA, or before the
Ombudsman.
Requisites of TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE:
1) public funds involved
2) utter disregard for the constitution
3) lack of party who can bring a suit.
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226. PHIL ASSOC. COLLEGES VS. SEC OF EDUCATION

justiciable controversy / locus standi

Petitioners assail Act 2706 requiring the inspection and recognition of private
schools. It makes it obligatory upon the Secretary of Educ to inspect said schools.
They contend that the law deprives the school owners of liberty and property
without due process, and they deprive the parents of their natural right and duty
to rear their children.
They claim that requiring previous governmental approval before they could
exercise their right to own and operate a school amounts to censorship of prior
restraint.
Solgen countered that the matter has no justiciable controversy. The government
argues that the petitioners suffered no wrong, nor allege any, from the
enforcement of the statute. The government insists that for the past 37years the
DepEd has supervised and regulated private schools with the general
acquiescence of the public. Solgen claims that there is no cause of action because
all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating schools already.
There is no threat that the permits will be revoked, hence they have suffered no
wrong.

Issue: Is there a justiciable controversy?

SC: NONE.
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if it is
directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of parties concerned.
When the private schools are actually operating by virtue of the permits issued by
the Secretary, who is not shown to have threatened to revoke their permits, there is
no justiciable controversy that would authorize the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of said Act.. Mere apprehension that the Secretary might under the
law withdraw the permit of the petitioners DOES NOT CONSTITUTE JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY.
An action must be brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual and positive
relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, no matter how intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true
where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for then there come into play
regard for the courts duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues UNLESS
AVOIDANCE BECOMES EVASION.
*the textbooks were also not shown by petitioners. They claimed that the Board
prohibited certain types of textbooks.

227. DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB

effects of constitutionality
**Justice Fernando ponente kaya wordy at magulo**

Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature
5 years later.
15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM.
Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also
claims that she obtained an injunction against the sheriff.
PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of
issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted.
o E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium
o RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium
The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was
likewise nullified.
Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the
payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of
validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was later
declared unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of contractual
obligations clause in the constitution).
PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since
during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As
such, the action has not yet prescribed.

ISSUE: Has the action prescribed?

SC: NO.
The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity,
cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must
have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary,
in an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect.
Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is
now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be
reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative
act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of
judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law
of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.
The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT
DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an
operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.

During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not
run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such
adjudication of invalidity.
(read orig)..
228. PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ
transfer of venue to avoid miscarriage of justice

This is the case of Bingbong Crisologo. A group of armed men set fire various
inhabited houses in Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Bingbong was charged but pleaded not
guilty.
AO 221 the Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Anover of San Fernando La
Union, to hold special term in Ilocos Sur.
AO 226 Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Gutierrez (Vigan) to transfer the
case to Judge Anovers Court in La Union.
Prosecution moved that Judge Gutierrez allow a transfer of the case to the La
Union Circuit Court by virtue of said AOs and for security and personal safety of
the witnesses.
The accused obviously opposed the transfer of the case, claiming that the
transfer of the case would be railroading them into a conviction.
Judge Gutierrez denied the transfer.
Prosecution now imputes gadalej on Judge Gutierrez.

SC:
The Secretary of Justice has no power to assign cases to be heard. Any such power
even in the guise of AOs trenches upon the time-honored separation of the
Executive and Judiciary. The law creating the transfer of cases to Circuit Criminal
Courts should be effected by raffle.
Nevertheless, the COURT WILL ORDER THE TRANSFER. There is a justified refusal by
the witnesses in Ilocos Sur to testify where they felt their lives would be endangered.
Judge Gutierrez failed to consider the possibility of miscarriage of justice may result.
The witnesses had earlier manifested of the imperious necessity of transferring the
place of trial outside of Ilocos Sur, in the interest of truth and justice, and the State
is to be given a fair chance to present its side.
Here, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses
will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial
process. The exigencies of justice demand that the general rule should yield to
occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor.
Anyway, regardless of the place where the case is tried, the prosecution will always
be obligated to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On of the incidental and inherent powers of the courts is that of TRANSFERRING THE
TRIAL OF CASES from one court to another of equal rank, whenever the imperative
of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice so
demands.
*judicial power includes the transfer of cases. It is one of the incidental or inherent
attributes necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by
appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality
needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government.*

229. PNB Vs. ASUNCION

power to promulgate rules / procedural vs. substantive rights

PNB granted credit accommodations and advances to Fabar Inc, for the
importation of machinery and equipment. The outstanding balance was P8.4M
The credit accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of
Barredo, Borromeo (respondents). For failure to pay their obligations, PNB
instituted a collection suit against Fabar and the Barredo, Borromeo.
Before the case could be decided, one of the respondents, BARREDO, died.
So the court issued an order of dismissal of the case, since money claim is a
personal action, it is extinguished upon death, and that the remedy is to file a
claim with the estate during settlement proceedings.
The case was dismissed against ALL defendants.
PNB filed a MR claiming that the dismissal should only be against the deceased
Barredo. Hence they file this certiorari.

SC:
According to the Rules of Court, nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding
against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in
enforcing collection in case a creditor choose to pursue his claim against the estate of
the deceased solidary debtor.
What is applicable in this is Art 1216 of the Civil Code. The creditor has the right to
proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom
he will enforce collection. In case of death of one of the solidary debtors, the creditor
can choose to proceed against the surviving debtors, without necessity of filing a
claim in the estate of the deceased debtor.
To require the creditor to proceed against the estat would deprive him of his
substantive rights under the Civil Code. If the Rules of Court (Rule 86) would be
applied literally, in effect, it would repeal the Civil Code (Art 1216), because the
creditor would have no chose but to proceeed against the estate of Barredo only.
Obviously, this would diminish the PNBs right under the Civil Code to proceed
against any one, some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not
sanctioned by the principle that, SUBSTANTIVE LAW CANNOT BE AMENDED BY
PROCEDURAL LAW. The rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over the Civil Code,
the former being merely procedural, while the latter substantive.
Moreover, the Constitution provides that the rules promulgated by the SC should not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

230. SANTERO VS. CAVITE

rules of court vs. civil code

Pablo Santero was had 2 sets of children from 2 different wives. He died.
The respondents were the Santero Children, the children by the 2nd wife, although
she was not married to the father.
A motion for allowance was filed by the Santero children, through their
guardian/mother Diaz. The filed the motion for support, education, clothing, and
medical allowance. This was granted by the court.
This was opposed by the other set of Santero Children (petitioners), the children
by the 1st wife, who was also not married to the father.
They claim that the wards are no longer schooling and have
already attained the age of majority.
Diaz countered that the reason why the children were not enrolled was due to
lack of funds. She cited Art 290/188 of the Civil Code (on support), as well as
Rule 83 of the Rules of Court (allowance to the widow and family in estate
proceedings).
The allowance was granted by the court.
Another motion for allowance was filed by Diaz for 3 additional children. These 3
additional children were already of age, but Diaz claims that all of her children
have the right to receive allowance, as advance of the shares in their inheritance.
Again, this was opposed by the other Santero Children (petitioners), claiming that
the children are employed and married, and that there is insufficient funds. They
claim that under the Rules of Court, they are no longer entitled to allowance.

SC:
The controlling provision should be Art 290/188 of the Civil Code (support) and not
Rule 83 of the Rules of Court (allowance to widow and family).
The fact that respondents are of age, and are gainfully employed, or married is of no
moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to
allowance under Art 290/188.
While the Rules of Court limits allowances to the widow and only the minor children,
the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without
distinction. Hence, even the children who are no longer minors are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father. Since
the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and the
children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the
deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which is a
procedural rule.

231. DAMASCO VS. LAGUI

speedy disposition of cases.

Atty Damasco was charged with grave threats. He pleaded not guilty but was
convicted only of light threats. He was order to pay a fine of P100.
Damasco filed a motion to rectify and set aside the dispositve portion of the
decision. He claims that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily
included in the grave threats charge, as the lighter offense had already
prescribed when the information was filed. (light offenses prescribe in 2 mos, but
the information was filed 70 days after)
The lower court denied the motion, explaining that since the Court had acquired
jurisdiction to try the case because the information was filed within the
prescriptive period for grave threats, the same cannot be lost by prescription, if
after the trial what has been proven is merely light threats.

SC:
Prescription of a crime is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an
act prohibited or punished by law. While it is a rule that an accused who fails to move
to quash before pleading is deemed to waive all objections, this rule cannot apply to
the defense of prescription, which under Art 69 of the RPC extinguishes criminal
liability. To apply the suggestion could contravene said Art, which is part of
substantive law.
This position is further strengthen by the Rules on CrimPro, which added the
extinction of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the
effects of a failure to assert a ground of a motion to quash.
The claim that when an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense
includible within a graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of a lesser offense
if it has already prescribed can only be done through an overhaul of some existing
rules on crimpro to give prescription a limited meaning (ie, a mere bar to the
commencement of criminal action and therefore waivable).
BUT this will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the
Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of rights.. such rules shall not diminish, modify or increase substantive
rights.
THE ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED! PETITION IS GRANTED! (Damasco wins.)
Last saved by pat
CHAMP Page 19

3/14/2015

232. PEOPLE VS. LACSON

Lacson et al were charged with multiple murder for shooting and killing 11 male persons
who were members of the Kuratong Baleleng. SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that
the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a "rub-out" or summary execution and
not a shootout.
The Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11 Informations for MURDER, against
respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of
them were charged as principals. 10
Upon motion of the Lacson, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for
reinvestigation. The participation of Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial
Court.12Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty.
On March 29, 1999 Judge Agnir issued a Resolution 25 dismissing Criminal Cases because:
o with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of
the private complainants, there is no more evidence to show that a crime has been
committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof.
On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of
Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding
the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this
indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the
matter.
Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy,
filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the
State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation.
Judge Pasamba denied the TRO (meaning the case could continue). The decision stated
that the preveious dismissal of Criminal Cases is not one on the merits and without any
recorded arraignment and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The
arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective
since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is
the People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and
remains to be the complainant.
Thus, June 6, 2001 11 information for Murder were again filed before the RTC Judge
Yadao.
Lacson now assails the decision of Judge Pasamba mainly on the ground of : illegality of
the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints
which had been dismissed over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was
issued. He claims, under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the
petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or
more) cannot be revived after two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued.

ISSUE: The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations
against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng
gang. The rule of provisional dismissal took effect only on December 1, 2000 (in between the
period of dismissal and revival). More specifically, 1) whether the provisional dismissal of the
cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after
notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and
(4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.
SC: NO. NOT BARRED.

1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves
for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of
the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in
the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from
subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy
for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a
positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning.7 Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal
of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.8 The mere inaction or silence of the accused to
a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case 9 or his failure to object to a provisional
dismissal10 does not amount to express consent.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first
paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the cases.
Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said
criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses. The respondent did not pray for
the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of the cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or
expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal the cases or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the
victims at least three days before said hearing. There is as well no proof in the records that
the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the
second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new
Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
Even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal,
and all the heirs of the victims were notified before the hearing the two-year bar in Section 8
of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively against the State.
To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his coaccused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and
diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. Under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the
criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had two
years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal within which to revive the
said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year

and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period for
the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code
was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. In case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code
and the new rule, the former should prevail.
The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying
the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the
State to prosecute the accused.35 The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.36 It is but a limitation of the
right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been
filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. If a
criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within
the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby
diminished.40 But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of
limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same.
Also, It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so
would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the Court. In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the timebar of two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
A mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The
possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the
chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy
and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and
disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. 55 He may also lose his witnesses
or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his
capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system. 56
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not
for the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the twoyear period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his
copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally
dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new
rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the
State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to
revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new
rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two
years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This
is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent
injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful
results in the administration of justice.

(read orig.)

Last saved by pat

7/17/2005 4:10:21 PM

233. MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ

administrative supervision of inferior courts

Abrera was from the Public Attorneys Office. He alleged that Maceda, the Judge
of RTC-Antique, falsified his certificate of service. Maceda was said to have
certified all criminal and civil cases have been decided within a period of 90 days.
Abrera claims that in truth and in fact, no decision has been rendered in 5 civil
and 10 criminal cases.
Macedas defense is that he had been granted by the SC an extension of 90 days
to decide the said cases. He also argues that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over him since the offense charged arose from the performance of his official
duties, which is under the control and supervision of the SC. (He claims that the
Ombudsman encroaches on the SCs power of supervision over inferior courts).

ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction? What is scope of SCs power of supervision?

SC:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for
serious misconduct and inefficiency, AS WELL AS criminally liable to the State under
the RPC for felonious act.
However, in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the SC
with regard to his certificate of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The SCs administrative supervision includes all courts and all court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the CA, down to the lowest MTC clerk. By virtue of this
power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter to the SC for determination
whether the said certificates reflect the true status of his pending case load, since
only the Court has the necessary records to make such determination. The
Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, to submit its records, or to allow its
personnel to testify on this matter.
Should a judge, having been granted by the SC an extension of time, report these
cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with,
much less resolved by this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present
criminal case that requires the resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must DEFER ACTION on said
complaint and REFER THE SAME to this Court for determination whether said judge
or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

234. NITAFAN VS. CIR

salaries of judges

The judges here seek to perpetually prohibit the CIR from making any deduction
of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitute a decrease or diminution of their salaries which is
contrary to the Constitution mandating that their salaries shall not be decreased
during their term. They also contednt that this is anathema to an independent
judiciary.

ISSUE: Are the salaries of judges exempt from income tax?

SC:
NO.
The clear intent of the Con-Com was to delete an express grant of exemption from
payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to give substance to the
EQUALITY AMONG THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.
The Court has since then authorized the continued deduction of withholding tax from
the salaries of all the members of the Judiciary. The Court has discarded the doctrine
in Perfecto vs. Meer which exempted them from payment of income tax.
The Court thus reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly
subject to the general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the
payment of such taxes does not fall within the constitutional protection against the
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
(there was a discussion on the intent of the framers.. Fr. B in the deliberations
proposed an amendment that the salaries shall not be diminished but may still be
subject to the general income tax.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed disclosed that the true intent of
the framers of the Constitution was to make the salaries of the Judiciary taxable.
In the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining
the government, they must all share in the burden of general income taxation
equitably.
Last saved by pat
6/17/2009 5:03 PM

235. VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA

security of tenure

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Sec 14 of the Peoples Court Act.
Section 14 provides: SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position
under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may
not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused
is a person who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
"If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges,
in Rule 126, section I of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability
the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case
is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance,Judges-at-large
of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section
one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of said Court, in order to form a
quorum or until a judgment in said case is reached."

They claim that:

(a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than those
provided in section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.
"(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess
the qualifications set forth in section 4, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure
other than impeachment, contrary to
Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(d) It deprives the' Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional
prerogative to confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court.
"(e) It creates two Supreme Courts.
"(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13,
Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(g) it is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme
Court who rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation.
"(h) it denies the equal protection of the laws
"(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation.
"(j) it amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the
Philippine Constitution.
"(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the 'packing' of the
Supreme court in certain cases, either by Congress or by the President."

The Solgen countered that:

"1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.
"2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an
additional qualification :for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend
section 6, Article VIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines.
"3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article Vill of
the Constitution 'apply to permanent "appointees"--not to temporary 'designees.'
"4. Section 5, Article Vill of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations
under section 14, commonwealth Act No. 682.
"5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected
to sit and vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned.
"6. It does not create an additional 'Special Supreme Court,'
"7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the - Supreme Court but merely
supplements the Rules of Court.
"8. It is not a bill of attainder.
"9. It is not an ex post pacto law.

"10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme
Court affected or to the treason indictees; concerned.
"11. It does not amend any constitutional provision.
"12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court."

ISSUES:
1) Whether the Congress had power to add to the pre-existing ground for
disqualification of a Justice.
2) Whether a person may act as Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed
by the President and not confirmed by the CA, even only as DESIGNEE
3) Whether the manner of designation by the President can constitutionally sit
temporarily as Justice of the SC.
SC:
NO. NO. NO.
1. NO. If section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court who held any
office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission, would be disqualified
from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person
who likewise held an office under the PEC. In other words, what the constitution
ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the
Court, the challenged law would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. IN short,
what the constitution directs, the section 14 prohibits. This is a clear repugnancy to
the fundamental law.
Whatever modification the legislature may propose must not contravene the
provisions of the constitution.
Thus, the disqualification added by Sec 14 to those already existing at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution is arbitrary, irrational and violative of the
constitution.
2. NO. No person not so appointed by the President WITH the consent of the CA,
may act as Justice of the SC. The designation made by Section 14 does not comply
with the requirement of appointment. An additional disqualifying circumstance of the
designee is the lack of confirmation or consent by the CA. So, it may happen that a
designee under Sec 14 sitting as a substitute Justice of the SC, and participating
therein in the deliberations and functions of the SC, does not possess the
qualifications of regular members of the SC.
NO temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Constitution. The phrase
unless otherwise provided for by law does NOT authorize any legislation that would
alter the composition of the SC, no matter how brief a time it may be imagined. In
principle, what matters is not the length or shortness of the alternation of the
constitutional composition of the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability
of that constitution so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent
and unaltered.
3. NO. No matter how brief or temporary the participation of the judge, there is no
escaping that he would be participating in the deliberations of the the SC, and his
vote would count as much as that of any regular Justice. A temporary member
thereof is a misnomer, for that is not a position contemplated by the constitution.
The Constitution is clear that the CJ and the Justices who compose the SC have to be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the CA. Mere designation under Sec 14,
does not satisfy said requirement.

The designees cannot be such members in view of the fact that they have not been
appointed nor confirmed.
SEC 14. NULL AND VOID.