Political Theory Essay:

Why has Rawls Theory of Justice had such a huge impact on thinking about equality and justice

Ciarn hUltachin
Rawls invigorated political philosophy with the publication of A Theory of Justice (1971),
which attempts to marry liberal preoccupations with individual autonomy with a social
democratic focus on justice. This essay will summarise Rawls theory and elaborate on his
conception of justice as fairness. This requires an examination of his much-contested
notion of equality and its application in liberal theory. He ambitiously sought to redefine the
parameters of liberalism by adopting egalitarian concerns into a social contract framework
that any person could subscribe to. To appreciate Rawls impact, it is crucial to place his
theory in context. It was hailed as the first substantive attempt to overcome the antinomy
between utilitarianism and intuitionism that paralysed philosophical debate for much of the
twentieth century. Politicians and policy makers alike welcomed his justification of certain
market inequalities, as a sophisticated validation of their welfare state liberalism. Yet despite
his theoretical and procedural innovation, an analysis of Rawls record, reveals his abject
failure to seriously repackage liberalism. Drawing on critiques of his sparse conception of
equality, it will demonstrate the inherent weakness of Rawls enterprise and the severe
limitations of his liberal egalitarian conception of justice.
Rawls devised the original position to demonstrate that peoples just inclinations can also be
proven fair, in a deft reformulation of the social contract conception of the state of nature. He
jettisons the weak contractarian logic, which rests its normative conclusions on a hypothetical
historical contract that we are meant to accept, irrespective of whether popular consent was
actually given. In a novel twist, Rawls conjures a thought experiment, which any rational
individual can undertake, and who he asserts, after rational deliberation will settle on his
conception of justice. He proposes whipping us out of society to deliberate upon its basic
structure, shrouded by a veil of ignorance (1971: 136) about our personal attributes, social
circumstances and conceptions of morality. We cling to no selfish positions but roughly
understand how the political and economic world works. He professes that under rigorously
fair conditions, free from personal bias, parties to the original position will rationally agree to
his principles of pure procedural justice(1971:85).
Modelling rational choice theory, Rawls predicts that in uncertain circumstances people would
behave like the parties to the original position and maximise their worst possible distribution,
by adopting his general conception of justice. He stipulates, all social primary
goodsliberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respectare to be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any of these goods is to the advantage of
the least favoured (1971: 303). Kymlicka highlights the fresh approach in Rawls general
conception. We treat people as equals not by removing all inequalities but only those that
disadvantage someone. If certain inequalities benefit everyone, by drawing out socially useful
talents and energies, then they will be acceptable to everyone (2001:55).
To understand Rawls impact on philosophical and political debate, it is important to note the
stranglehold that utilitarianism had on his intellectual contemporaries. He rejects the principle
of organising society for the greatest good of the greatest number. Rawls warns it risks
sacrificing the individual to raise the accumulated lot of the masses, as satisfaction
maximisation is its only yardstick of justice. He has equal disdain for the dominance of
intuitionism amongst utilitarianisms critics. Rawls agrees that a theory of justice must reflect
our basic intuitions, but he critiques intuitionism for failing to devise a framework, which justly
prioritis s our competing intuitions (Kymlicka, 2001).
Accordingly, he embeds his theory in the liberal tradition by ranking individual rights as
paramount. He develops two principles of justice that arrange the elements in his general
conception. The first principle of justice (1971: 60) guarantees the protection of political
liberties such as freedom of speech and association, the right to vote and stand for office and
the right to a fair trial. The second principle or difference principle (1971:75), justifies
social and economic inequalities, only if they lift the absolute position of the worst off in
society and are attached to a fair system of equal opportunities. For Rawls, equal basic
liberties take precedence over socio-economic considerations; liberty can only be restricted
for its own sake.

Political Theory Essay:

Why has Rawls Theory of Justice had such a huge impact on thinking about equality and justice

Ciarn hUltachin
Macpherson is magnanimous in his appraisal that Rawls has done a new service to political
theory by sketching the lineaments of a harmonious society of fully human beings (1973:
347). Writing from a Marxist perspective, he highlights the dichotomous view of the individual
that Rawls continually grapples with. He suggests that Rawls considers a classless society,
which is beyond justice an impossibility, due the extent of conflict of interests between
individuals with differing conceptions of the good. This leads Rawls to champion the virtues
of competitive markets, which encourage economic efficiency, by delivering the level of social
goods that people desire.
An aspect of Rawls theory that many found imaginative was his careful construction of the
original position so that all people, even the most selfish, can embrace his principles. Rather
than appealing to utopian ideals of humanity, he warns that it is in every persons interest to
alleviate the position of the worst off in society, as misfortune can fall upon anyone. Yet,
much of the criticism of Rawls arises from his use of the original position and whether the
phantom entities who inhabit it, actually represent his view of our essential humanity.
Communitarians offer a caustic diagnosis of Rawls conception of justice. They view it as
fundamentally flawed, alleging that he places the idea of the atomised individual at the heart
of society (Mulhall & Swift, 1992). In a Theory of Justice, Rawls leaves his beliefs about what
constitutes individuals and their relationship with society wide open to interpretation, although
he indicates that the original position is just a procedural model for settling issues of justice.
On the other hand, Macpherson says that Rawls seems to endorse Aristotles view of man as
a participative citizen as essentially a doer, exerter and enjoyer of the exercise of his
capacities, rather than as an infinite consumer (1973: 343). Furthermore, Macpherson
emphasises Rawls dualistic conception of society where conflict is always present, although
his theory rests on the premise that political consensus is tangible and achievable. We have
to notice that in his [Rawls] extensive treatment of ends he develops a model of a well
ordered society which is so fundamentally harmonious that it seems to contradict the
postulate of conflicting ends (1973:346).
Rawls (1971) development of the concept of equal opportunities was welcomed as going far
beyond the traditional endorsement of meritocracy that held sway with his contemporaries.
He acknowledges that people should not be held responsible for social disadvantages of birth
that are a result of brute luck. Instead, he argues that people should be rewarded in life for
the effort they display in making their choices. He has a corresponding distaste for rewarding
people on the basis of merit. According to Rawls, our talents are morally arbitrary attributes
that are a result of accident of birth or parental wealth and are not linked to our choices. He
dismisses the minimal conception of equal opportunities based on talent for a deeper version
that aims to reward aspiration linked to effort. But this does not lead him to propose depriving
people of their talents, or a wholesale redistribution of resources, to compensate those
disadvantaged by fate. Instead, he rather timidly, develops his critique of equal opportunities
as an intuitive justification of his difference principle.
Rawls argues that people can expect to gain financially from their talents only if they work as
part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of
society (1971:75). This reveals the inconsistency at the heart of his thinking, where initial
hints of radicalism, become cumbersome justifications for the economic status quo. Dworkin
(1981) concurs with Rawls disregard of meritocracy as the ideology of the talented. In a
similar vein he proposes a conception of justice, which values achievement over ascription
that is ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive. For Dworkin justice involves
insulating people from lucks negative effects and making their personal achievement or
failure rest solely on their choices and ambition. Yet, the dynamic of his thinking replicates
Rawls moral crusade, as the unambitious replace the untalented as the authors of their own
misfortune. Far from offering a critique of inequality, Armstrong insists that the logic of their
philosophy has become the search for the one inviolable principle which will produce
legitimate inequalities (2002: 4).

Political Theory Essay:

Why has Rawls Theory of Justice had such a huge impact on thinking about equality and justice

Ciarn hUltachin
By including the right to social respect in his list of primary goods, Rawls offers a promise of
significantly improved state welfare provision that goes beyond the mere satisfaction of
peoples basic material needs. But he resists the opportunity to develop the proposal and
explain how social esteem can be measured and incorporated into his distributive model.
Instead, the level of ambiguity in his writing has led to criticisms over his attempt to
compartmentalise basic political freedoms and prioritise them over issues of economic justice.
Callinicos recalls Luxembourgs observation of the vacuous nature of political liberties where
a hard core of social inequality and lack of freedom remain hidden under the sweet shell of
formal equality and freedom (2000:49). Adopting Luxembourgs analysis we can argue that
wealthy people can exercise their basic liberties to a far greater extent that economically
deprived people, by using their financial clout to gain power and advantage.
In contrast, Berlins conclusions are classically liberal. It is important to discriminate between
liberty and conditions of its exercise. If a man is too poor or too ignorant to make use of his
legal rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon him is nothing to him, but it is not thereby
annihilated (1969: 1iii). Rawls responds that lack of means generally is only a constraint on
the worth of liberty which is not the same for everyone. Some have greater authority and
wealth and therefore greater means to achieve their aims (1971:204). In his Tanner Lectures
(1982) he clarifies his position by saying that although economic differentials affect libertys
worth; they dont compromise the actual right to exercise it. Daniels (1975) retorts that in the
original position choosing equal worth of liberty is just as rationalas choosing equal basic
liberty.
There are a bewildering number of interpretations of Rawls difference principle and the level
of economic inequality it justifies, but what cant be denied is that it has stirred fierce debate.
Callinicos and Cohen are positive about the scope that the difference principle offers them to
launch a comprehensive theoretical attack on the levels of inequality in modern societies,
despite Rawls reluctance to support their endeavours. It is significant for Callinicos that
Rawls calls for the fair value of all political libertiesBut, in actually existing liberal
democracies, Rawls notes, disparities in the distribution of property and wealth that far
exceed what is compatible with political equality have generally been tolerated by the legal
system (Callinicos, 2000: 49).
Bensaid (2002) refers to Van Parijs strategy of adopting the difference principle into Marxs
theory of historical materialism. In his conception, when a mode of production looses its
legitimacy, due to its excessive level of capitalist exploitation, it stops satisfying the difference
principle. In this situation, Van Parijs proffers that the difference principle be used to establish
a new mode of production, which enable conditions of absolute equality, unless inequalities
allow people to have more resources and power than they would have under equality of
outcome. But Bensaid himself is dubious that Rawls theory can deliver any real benefits, as
the conditions of the disadvantaged across the world has deteriorated rapidly since Rawls
published his theory more than a generation ago.
Faced with the effects of crisis, deregulation, and the attenuation of social security policies,
its current success assumes a tonality, that is at one nostalgic and unreal: in what way are
flourishing social inequalities to the greatest advantage of the worst-off? How can it be
argued that offices and positions are opened to the excluded? And how can it be claimed
that equality of opportunity exists for those without rights? (Bensaid, 2002: 149).
Treanor (2002) is scathing in his criticism of Rawls, insisting that he should feel ashamed of
his role as a paid apologist for the worlds rich elites. He alleges that Rawls job is to skilfully
conceal their gross abuses of power and privilege and disguise it as academic political
philosophy. He reserves his worst contempt for Rawls difference principle, which he argues
offers zero protection to the poor against the neo-liberal rights aggressive onslaught of
untrammelled capitalism and war.
Rawls principle allows any social inequality not conflicting with the basic liberties, because
there is always a thinkable worse alternativeRawls does not say that the least favoured
should have a large advantage, or an equal advantage, or an advantage chosen by

Political Theory Essay:

Why has Rawls Theory of Justice had such a huge impact on thinking about equality and justice

Ciarn hUltachin
themselves. Simply an advantage compared to a worst alternative. In this way, Rawls
deletes one by one, the types of justice claim in the real world claims of equality, claims
to minimum standards, claims of some hope of social improvement. (Treanor, 2002).
Walzer (1983) critiques Rawls from the margins of the liberal egalitarian paradigm. He is
sceptical of Rawls methodology of abstract theorising that disassociates itself from
democratic debate and the real opinions of citizens. Justice and equality can conceivably be
worked out as philosophical artefacts, but a just or an egalitarian society cannot be. If such a
society isnt already herehidden, as it were, in our concepts and categorieswe will never
know it concretely or realise it in fact (1983: xiv). Eschewing claims to monopolise rationality,
Walzer rejects Rawls mission to establish one universal distributive principle that is
applicable to all resources in society. Rather, he proposes that we should interpret the
distributive principle based on the particularity of each resource and the social meaning that
people attach to it in their society.
Walzer proposes a system of complex equality, involving distinct spheres of justice, where all
resources are distributed under separate criteria. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieus (1998)
analysis of late modernity draws parallels with Walzers scheme, where people negotiate life
in separate social fields, each with its own discourse, rules and forms of cultural capital.
Bourdieu indicates that capital in one field can be traded in another, which leads to disparities
in wealth and power in society. Walzer considers this unjust and advocates the strict policing
of the boundaries of the different spheres in society to prevent any group gaining unequal
status and power. Moreover, Mulhall & Swift point to Rawls impact on Walzers thought:
His demand that the political theorist attend to the particularity of social meanings reflects a
commitment to the values of tolerance and respect for alien cultures that is impeccably
liberalalthough his emphasis on preventing conversions between goods seems to conflict
with Rawlss attempt to give absolute priority to individual freedom, the general idea of a
separation of spheres has a respectable liberal ancestry (Mulhall & Swift, 1992: 155).
Upon reflection, Rawls theory of justice has had a tremendous impact upon thinking about
justice and equality. In displacing the hegemony of utilitarianism, he transformed the arena of
political debate by using the social contract device to give lexical priority to our moral
intuitions about justice. He single-handedly resuscitated the discipline of contemporary
political theory with his nuanced brand of moral philosophy that charts a common path
between concerns for individual liberty and equality. With the difference principle, he shifts
liberalisms focus upon the latter, by appearing to justify the existence of economic
inequalities, only if they raise the over-all access to liberty of societys least advantaged. Yet
more than a generation after its publication his theory has obviously failed to bridge the gulf
between the academy and the street and instigate real improvements in the lives of the
worlds poorest members. It seems that cries of apologist ring true and echoing Armstrong
(2002), Marion Young (1990) and Treanor (2002), there is a crucial need to devise an interdisciplinary, systematic theory of injustice, which unites academics and activists in a
concerted effort to tackle the roots of global inequalities that Rawls abstractions left
untouched.

Political Theory Essay:

Why has Rawls Theory of Justice had such a huge impact on thinking about equality and justice

Ciarn hUltachin

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