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The viability of deterrence strategies in the 21st

century

In more quotidian terms, the underlying question is: are

deterrence strategies appropriate for the 21st century global
security environment? The short answer: yes, but not really.
Deterrence strategies can be viable for the 21st century global
security environment, but, unlike the Cold War period, they should
not represent the backbone of todays national securities.
Deterrence strategies are extremely circumstantial and vary from
case to case. Precisely due to this reason, deterrence strategies
have do be constantly updated and re-conceptualised in order to
meet the current security threats. If tailored appropriately,
deterrence strategies are very much viable in the 21st century.
Providing a comprehensive answer first and foremost require
identifying the 21st century global security environment and
defining deterrence strategies. I start by outlining the most relevant
characteristics of todays security arena, and move on to discuss
deterrence strategies. In sustaining my argument, I specifically
employ the example of terrorism and discuss why are deterrence
strategies considered inefficient in this case. I argue there is a need
for a greater intellectual effort to contextualise relations between
states and non-state actors, and to understand how should
deterrence be tailored to meet this threat. I move on to analyse
deterrence of terrorism by punishment and by denial and provide
the appropriate examples to validate my statement.
The 21st century global security environment - the novelty
While the post-World War II security environment was
characterised by a great power dyad, the end of the Cold War left
the world unipolar. Many argued that the 21st century would see
emerging great powers, comparing it to the Congress of Vienna

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world order. But now this comparison seems difficult to digest. In

addition to emerging powers, what strongly characterises the
current global security environment is the multi-dimensional and
non-conventional aspects of conflicts and their horizontal
proliferation (Harknett, 2008). Todays global security environment
accommodates states, non-state actors, international institutions,
conventional warfare, nuclear build-up, terrorism, piracy, cyberwar
etc. States find non-state actors irrational and illegitimate, and
condemn their warring tactics for being unconventional. Both in
academia and in policymaking circles, the emergence of these
unconventional actors and theatres of war points out a wide
conceptual and analytical gap. There seems to be an urgent need to
acknowledge these unconventional threats and adapt current
security strategies to these new patterns.
Deterrence - the basics
Deterrence, both as a practical and theoretical concept,
emerged during the Cold War. It was conceived in response to
nuclear threats, but it also became useful in the context of
conventional force. Deterrence as a strategy is coercive in nature,
but it is different from coercion itself (Freedman, 2004). According
to the dictionary, it implies the action of deterring, which is instilling
doubt or fear of implications in order to discourage a particular
course of action (Oxforddictionaries.com, 2014). The most widely
employed strategies are deterrence by punishment and deterrence
by denial. The first one implies threatening to inflict same or higher
costs on the aggressor than he would benefit from following a
specific course of action (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 23). The
second one focuses on deterring the aggressor by denying the
benefits of him following a specific course of action (Kroenig and
Pavel, 2012, p. 23). As a theoretical concept, deterrence developed
to incorporate specific structural characteristics. The strategies
address costs and benefits for both the aggressor and the deterrer
and so rationality is deemed imperative (Harknett, 2008). Further,
there has to be shared accurate information about each other in
order to successfully approximate the real costs and benefits.

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Incomplete communication could lead to a misevaluation of the

costs and benefits and might lead to ineffective deterrence. The
good flow of information will lead to each side determining the
others capability, which is of paramount importance when
formulating or carrying credible deterrence (Mearsheimer, 1983,
p.46). These structural units underpin the circumstantial character
of the deterrence.
Jeffrey Knopf summarises best the theoretical development of
the concept as the four waves in deterrence research (Knopf, 2010).
During the first wave, in the immediate aftermath of the Second
World War, deterrence emerged as a strategy to efficiently respond
to the threat posed by the atomic bomb. In the 1950s and the
1960s, the second wave of research approached nuclear strategy
from a game theory perspective. During the third wave, which
emerged in the 1970s, deterrence strategy became a more
sophisticated concept which employed statistical and case-study
methods on conventional deterrence (Knopf, 2010, p.1). The first
three waves of deterrence consisted in
the academic and
theoretical efforts to conceptualise the strategy which was the
backbone of the US national security against the Soviet threat
(Betts, 2013). Deterrence as we know it today is a contextualised
concept. The forth wave of deterrence research focuses on
deconstructing its contextualisation, as it is a direct response to
real-world developments (Knopf, 2010, p.1). As opposed to the
previous waves, now it is the academia which tailors deterrence to
meet the contemporary asymmetric threats. It is precisely this
fourth wave of research which seems to bridge the gap between
yesterdays security and todays insecurities.
Preconditions
for
viably
deterring
terrorism
contextualising relations and strategic culture

One relevant example of 21st centurys security threats is

terrorism. Needless to mention, there are obvious reasons why
deterrence seems inappropriate in the context of terrorism. Terrorist

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groups are said to be un-deterrable because they are irrational

actors who lack a return address for retaliation and do not fear
death (Betts, 2013). However, I argue that these remarks are based
on a very rigid understanding of conventional deterrence. One
mistake, I believe, is that deterrence strategies are expected to
work against Al Qaeda in the same fashion they worked against the
Soviet Union. However, contextualising the relationship between
targeted states and terrorist groups will reveal why deterrence
cannot be the main strategy against terrorism, but still be viable.
In conventional relations, states acknowledge each other as
legitimate units of the international system. Contrary, in
unconventional relations such as terrorism, targeted states do not
acknowledge terrorist groups and, in fact, wish to eradicate them. In
conventional relations, states use deterrence to maintain a status
quo marked by no military or nuclear conflict. However, applying
deterrence in unconventional relations implies that states would be
content on maintaing the status quo of terrorist groups. But what
about suicide bombers whose status quo is by default carrying an
explosion? Deterring the terrorist groups from carrying attacks does
not imply the eradication of the organisation and so further
counterterrorism policies are required to achieve this end. But this
does not rule out the viability of deterrence against terrorism
completely. Drawing on Knopfs fourth wave of deterrence research,
a more broadly conceptualised deterrence becomes one viable
strategy in countering terrorism. Efforts have been made towards
bridging the conceptual and analytical gap between deterrence and
terrorism.
Deterring terrorists by limiting calculations of costs and
benefits to material aspects resulted in failure. Labelling terrorists
irrational lies in the inability to understand the fundamental
strategic logic of terrorism and the sources of their motivation
(Lantis, 2009, p. 477). Terror tactics translate in the strategical use
of limited resources to achieve a cause. An example which supports
the strategic employment of terror tactics is Ayman al-Zawahiris

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letter to Abu Musab al-Zarkawi, the former being second most

important person in Al-Qaeda and the latter being the head of AlQaeda in Iraq. In 2006 Al-Zawahiri warned Al-Zarkawi that his
indiscriminate use of violence will result in counterproductive
consequences (Knopf, 2010, p.18). Acknowledging this as a valid
type of warfare provides incentives for rational engagement with
non-state actors.
Moreover, even religious interpretations behind Al-Qaedas
behaviour or behind martyrdom can most certainly be rationally
approached and deterred. In these cases, for a deterrence strategy
to be viable, it must take into into consideration immaterial aspects
such as identity, motivation, norms etc (Lantis, 2009). Therefore
constructivists plead for the incorporation of strategic culture in
deterrence analysis. Approaching these groups with a reasonable
amount of respect and recognition, as well as positive incentives to
address historic grievances reveals a wider range of costs and
benefits (Lantis, 2009, p. 478). Tailoring deterrence to address nonstate actors requires a broader conceptual horizon which moves
beyond the rationale of nation-states. I will assess the two most
relevant deterrence strategies, by punishment and by denial,
respectively, and show how they are relevant in countering
terrorism.
Deterring terrorism by punishment
Accurate knowledge on the location of terrorists safe havens
can sometimes make retaliation by force possible. There can and
have been cases when terrorist groups have been directly punished,
with the best examples being George W Bushs operational war on
terror or Israels offensives against Hamas. Nevertheless, direct
violent engagements are strongly discouraged (Kroenig and Pavel,
2012, p. 26). Show of force can trigger strategic victimisation which
might, in fact, act as an incentive for some groups to radicalise and
join forces (Trager and Zagorcheva, 2006, p. 101) (Knopf, 2010,

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p.12). Current research toys with the idea of directly punishing

terrorists themselves, but not through massive use of force. Such
deterrence strategies imply attacking high-value targets, such as
demolishing houses of suicide bombers families post-martyrdom or
attacking families and supporters. While most of them are subject
to debate due to obvious reasons such as domestic liberal
constrains, other have already been proven inefficient. Israels
demolition of martyrs houses during the Second Intifada has, in
fact, seen the number of suicide bombers increase from 167 to 225
in 2003 (Vira, 2011, p. 6).
When engaging with groups such as Al-Qaeda it is important to
bear in mind that, unlike nation-states, they are not single entities
(Knopf, 2010, p.10). Nowadays terrorist groups represent systems
or networks which incorporate actors performing specific functions.
In this case, deterring terrorism by punishment requires a deep
understanding of the internal organisation of such networks. While
it is true that terrorist groups are extremely difficult to be punished
because they do not have a return address, there are many actors
in the system which do (Betts, 2013). For instance, for Al-Qaeda to
function it requires leaders, lieutenants, financiers, logisticians,
facilitators, foot soldiers, recruiters, supporting population
segments, and religious or otherwise ideological figures (Knopf,
2010, p.10). In the case of non-state actors effective deterrence by
punishment is unlikely to target the group itself.
There are many functional parts of a terrorist system which
can be successfully deterred from participating in or supporting
terrorist activities. Because non-state actors lack legitimate
financial sources, they are partly dependent on external financiers
to support them. In most cases, financiers are not eager to sacrifice
their lives, so they will be more prone to deterrence. Punishment in
such cases can vary from imprisonment to financial sanctions,
depending on their legal status (Knopf, 2010, p.10). In the
aftermath of 9/11 in Saudi Arabia, enhanced scrutiny on donors has

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led to successfully deterring financing of some terrorist activity

(Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 26).
Deconstructing non-state actors might reveal that some states
are greatly involved in finance and support networks. In this case, it
is easier for targeted states to apply conventional deterrence
strategies against state supporters of terrorism. Bushs famous
statement after the 9/11 event, youre either with us or against us,
made it a lot easier for the US to punish or deter states which were
actively supporting terrorist networks (Edition.cnn.com, 2001). One
very relevant example in this case is Pakistan, which post-9/11
started cooperating with the US in fighting Al Qaeda (Quinlan,
2012). Taking action against a state could also imply toppling
existing regimes which are outspokenly supportive of terrorist
organisation, such as the overthrow of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan (Knopf, 2010, p. 11). A relevant concern in todays
security agenda is nuclear terrorism and efforts are increasingly
being made to deter nuclear states from providing terrorist with
nuclear arsenals. Although this debate is far too expansive to be
covered in the current paper, one interesting deterrent states came
up with is nuclear forensics. The ability to determine the general
isotopic composition and age of the fissile materials used to make a
bomb would carry severe consequences for states which turn out to
be involved in the potential attack (Knopf, 2010, p. 21). This
technique provides strong incentives for states to abstain from
providing terrorists with nuclear assets.
Furthermore, radical clerics represent a fundamental part of
jihadi groups in both gaining legitimacy for their actions and as
recruitment means. In such cases, effectively punishing radical
clerics could successfully deter further mass radicalisation. One
example which proves the deterrent effect of such practices is UKs
stern decision to ban the glorification of terrorism after the 2005
London bombings (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p.26). In fact, it turns
out that after the successful implementation of imprisonment

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policies against radical clerics, very prominent ones have left the UK
or renounced the radical overtones (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p.26).
However, dealing with the non-rational elements of terrorist groups
will require more than imprisonment of radical clerics. Strategic
deterrence which focuses on long-term results require more indepth engagements with terrorist actors.
Deterring terrorism by denial
I will assess two main ways by which targeted states can deny
terrorists the benefits of their action. The first one implies
preventing individual attacks from being carried and the second one
is achieving their delegitimisation as groups by denying their
political objectives. States can successfully deter terrorism by
persuading terrorists that their attacks are likely to fail (Kroenig and
Pavel, 2012, p. 29). Deterrence by denial in the operational and
tactical sphere can be successfully achieved by means of
strengthened homeland security. Based on glaring mistakes made
by domestic security authorities, the US government has been
strongly criticised in the aftermath of 9/11 for not having been able
to prevent the attack. As evidence shows, the 9/11 hijackers took
flight lessons in the US and carried tests trips on the very same
flights they later hijacked in order to check the security levels
(Knopf, 2010, p. 12). As it turned out, these procedures were
extremely lax. Had it been otherwise, they could have been
identified, arrested and the attack could have been prevented.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the US government focused on
enhancing homeland security practices such as the improvement of
domestic intelligence, hardening key targets, randomised
screening, periodic surges in security levels at key sites etc
(Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 30). The main purpose of these
practices is to make terrorists renounce carrying an attack based on
the facts that strengthened defence systems will most certainly
lead to failure. As an example, in 2003 an Al-Qaeda affiliate was
planning to attack a US military base in Turkey, but as the base

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strengthened its security systems, the attack was called off

(Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 29). Long term, strengthened
homeland security might affect the morale of terrorist networks
because lack of publicity will decrease financial sponsorship and
fail to attract the required amount of attention or new recruits
(Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 30). Short-term benefits, such as social
unrest, over-sensationalisation by media outlets and major
disruption in social routines, can also be denied. For example, after
an attack on a resort in the Sharm el-Sheikh, Egyptian authorities
have covered the venue with a white sheet (Kroenig and Pavel,
2012, p.31). As there was nothing sensational to report on, the
attack did not get the expected amount of attention. Although it is
difficult to measure the viability of such deterrence strategies, they
are likely to contribute to strategically deterring terrorism on the
long term.
Strategic deterrence aims at preventing terrorists from
achieving their goals. Attempting strategic deterrence thereby
encourages researchers and policymakers to recognise and
acknowledge that terrorism does entail rational objectives. In cases
where terrorist groups are motivated by ideological rather than
political factors, deterrence strategies should concentrate on
deterring the expansion and spread of the ideology. In other words,
states should try and prevent terrorist organisations from achieving
their strategic goals, while looking to delegitimise their authority.
The most relevant and detailed example in this case is Al-Qaeda. Its
long term political goals focus on expelling the US from the Middle
East and then toppling the apostate regimes in order to establish a
state according to Sharia (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 32).
Moreover, Al Qaeda gained popularity in the Islamist world by
successfully crafting and exporting a radical interpretation of the
Quran and the Hadith. In this case, the most successful deterrence
strategies encourage the US to resist withdrawal demands and
develop stronger anti-terrorist military and strategic partnership
with key states in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE,
Kuwait and the UAE (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 33). Although the

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success of such strategies is yet to be demonstrated, they require

long term commitment on convincing terrorists that they will not
prevail (Knopf, 2010, p. 14). Another strategic deterrent to the long
term success of terrorism is delegitimisation of their actions and
rhetoric. In this regard, states concentrate their efforts on forging
avenues for constructive dialogues with the moderate clergy and
the wider Muslim public (Lantis, 2009, p. 477). While this strategy
will most likely deter public support and discourage new recruits, it
might also be the only viable option for delegitimising martyrdom.
Conclusion
The blind, straightforward comparison between past and
current theatres of wars has led policymakers and analysts to
conclude that deterrence strategies are by default unfit for the nonconventional threats. As the 21st century unraveled novel security
threats and actors, there was a widespread belief that the emerging
security environment required completely new security strategies.
Moreover, there was an unfounded rejection of acknowledging,
analysing and deconstructing
non-conventional and emerging
actors. It was only later, after failed wars and military campaigns,
that researchers and policymakers started reconsidering old
security strategies in light of the new security threats.
This paper looks specifically at the case of jihadi terrorism in
order to argue that deterrence strategies, when tailored
appropriately, remain an integral part of the counterterrorist
agenda. Analytical rigidity and conceptual limitations proved
detrimental to most counterterrorist efforts. However, a fourth wave
in deterrence research suggested the tailoring of strategies to
acknowledge non-state actors as rational and to take into
consideration their strategic culture. Researchers have focused on
both deterrence by punishment and by denial from direct, indirect,
tactical, operational and strategic perspectives. Some deterrence
strategies have already turned out viable and examples include
targeting component parts of the terrorist network, state
supporters, punishing radical clerics and enhanced homeland

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security. Strategic deterrence has also been forged with the main
aim to delegitimise their extremist interpretation, but it has yet to
be proven viable or not. A major downfall of deterrence strategies
remains the inability to accurately measure their success. However,
if proven right, long term deterrence strategies against terrorism
might in fact lead towards its very extinction. All in all, deterrence
strategies remain valid against terrorism, a vivid threat dominating
the 21st century security agenda.

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