Public Diplomacy Mark Leonard with Catherine Stead and Conrad Smewing &e The Foreign Policy Centre @ @-@ ef8 2. The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy The phrase ‘public diplomacy’ is often used as a euphemism for _ propaganda. Journalists have portrayed it as a crude mechanism for delivering messages that may or may not reflect the facts. Naomi Klein's vituperative piece for The Guardian is not untypical: “It’s no coincidence that the political leaders most preoccupied with branding were also allergic to democracy and diversity. Historically, this has been the ugly flipside of politicians striving for consistency of brand: centralised information, state-controlled media, re-education camps, purging of dissidents and much worse.” In fact public diplomacy is about building relationships: understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; looking for areas where we can find common cause. The difference between public and traditional diplomacy is that public diplomacy involves a much broader group of Image 1: The Circle of Public Diplomacy Image Issue Public Diplomacypeople on both sides, and a broader set of interests that go _beyo: ‘ond those of the | government of the day. Public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public goods which can create either an enabling or a disabling environment for individual transactions. Work on particular issues will feed off the general image of the country and reflect back on to it — in both positive and negative directions. For example, Britain’s reputation for tradition will help heritage brands such as Asprey’s sell their products, and their advertising campaigns will also reinforce Britain’s reputation as a heritage nation. Equally Norway’s reputation for work in international mediation will help persuade the different factions in Sri Lanka that they are an honest broker, which will in turn add to their reputation for peace. There is a hierarchy of impacts that public diplomacy can achieve: ° Increasing people’s familiarity with one’s country (making them think about it, updating their images, turning around unfavourable opinions) * Increasing people’s appreciation of one’s country (creating positive perceptions, getting others to see issues of global importance from the same perspective) ° Engaging people with one’s country (strengthening ties — from education reform to scientific co-operation; encouraging people to see us as an attractive destination for tourism, study, distance learning; getting them to buy our products; getting to understand and subscribe to our values) The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy* Influencing people (getting companies to invest, publics to back our positions or politicians to turn to us as a favoured partner) In order to achieve these goals, governments need to be clear that public diplomacy cannot be a one-dimensional process of delivering messages. One way of conceptualising public diplomacy is as a grid of three rows and three columns. Table 1: The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy Purpose Reactive Proactive Relationship building (hours and days) (weeks and months) (years) Political Military “Economic Societal Cultural On one axis are the spheres on which it is played out: political/military, economic and societal/cultural. These will carry different weight at different times, and in different contexts. For example in a developed country like Singapore economic messages will be important; in Pakistan political messages will matter more; in Zimbabwe messages about British diversity will act as a counterweight to allegations of racist imperialism; while in European Union countries like France and Germany all three spheres will be important. Events like September 11th can obviously change the priority of different issues and put the political/military sphere at the top of the agenda in all countries. ° Reacting to news events as they occur in a way that tallies with our strategic goals Public Diplomacy* Proactively creating a news agenda through activities and events which are designed to reinforce core messages and influence perceptions ¢ Building long-term relationships with populations overseas to win recognition of our values and assets and to learn from theirs Each of these dimensions operates according to a different time- scale. Reactive news takes place in hours and days, proactive communications and perception changing activity is planned in weeks and months, while building relationships can take years before it generates a return. The dimensions also demand) different skills and organisational cultures. News management | needs to be flexible, reactive and plugged into the government | machine. Proactive communications demands highly developed | communications skills, strategic planning and the budgets, resources and the expertise to organize events that can capture| the imagination. Building relationships depends on earning high | levels of trust, creating a neutral and safe environment, and can | \ often best be done at one remove from government. Each country has a different set of institutions to manage its public diplomacy strategy. Some are part of government, others are independent. Each will have its own mission and priorities, but in order to practice public diplomacy effectively, it important to examine the institutions as a spectrum and see whether there are gaps between the institutions which are not yet filled. In chapter seven, we examine the UK institutions in this way and set out some lessons for how the spectrum can be improved, but first let us examine the three dimensions. The Three Dimensions of Public DiplomacyNews Management The first dimension is the management of communications on day-to-day issues, reflecting the growing need to align communications with traditional diplomacy. The need to ally communications with traditional diplomacy is described by the US diplomat, Christopher Ross, who was brought back from retirement to mastermind public diplomacy with the Muslim world: “I conceive of public diplomacy as being the public face of traditional diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy seeks to advance the interests of the United States through private exchanges with foreign governments. Public diplomacy seeks to support traditional diplomacy by addressing non- governmental audiences, in addition to governmental audiences, both mass and elite. It works very much in co- ordination with and in parallel to the traditional diplomatic effort.” This implies that embassies must plan public diplomacy strategies for all of the main issues they deal with — and explore the communications angles of all their activities. This job is complicated by that fact that it is increasingly difficult to isolate different news stories for different audiences, foreign and domestic. Although most TV, radio and print media are still created with a national or local audience in mind, their networks of foreign correspondents will ensure that messages do get transferred from one region to another. As Secretary of State Colin Powell put it: “During Desert Storm we really were seeing this 24-7 phenomenon, at least in my judgment, for the first time --- Lused to tell all of the members of my staff, ‘Remember, when we are out there on television, communicating instantaneously around the world, we’re talking to five audiences.’ One, the reporters who ask the question — important audience. Second audience, the American people who are watching. The third audience, 170 capitals who may have an interest in what the Public Diplomacysubject is. Fourth, you are talking to your enemy. It was a unique situation to know that your enemy was getting the clearest indication of your intentions by watching you on television at the same time you were giving that message. And fifth, you were talking to the troops. Their lives were on the line.” Paradoxically, so called ‘domestic stories’ like the race riots in Oldham and Burnley, or the outbreak of Foot and Mouth in Britain, or the success of Le Pen in the French elections are often as important as ‘foreign policy’ stories in making an impact on others. Alastair Campbell, the Director of Communications in 10 Downing Street, described this vividly in an interview with the authors: “in relation to Foot and Mouth there was this collision. between domestic and foreign audiences. Part of our message, once we'd focused on it as a crisis management issue being led from the top, was that the Prime Minister was involved, sleeves rolled up, talking to the farmers regularly... I admit that this didn’t cross my mind, you get these dramatic pictures of the Prime Minister wearing yellow suits and walking around a farmyard, and in America they think ‘Christ! He’s got to wear a yellow suit! And he’s the Prime Minister.’ Because that’s all they're seeing. Our media will only ever give a narrow context, go further abroad it gets even narrower. And so, that is the kind of thing you've got to really think carefully about”. As well as unforeseen crises, there are predictable domestic events which come up every year and can play out badly in other countries. Examples include the release of the British Crime Survey which frequently results in erroneous stories such as, “Crime in London is worse than New York”, or the start of the Norwegian whaling season which results in acres of negative press coverage around the world (for Norwegian public diplomacy strategy, on whaling and other issues, see Appendix The Three Dimensions of Public DiplomacyIl). The domestic departments involved in these issues need to provide the foreign service with the notice and the information they need to contextualise the stories. Strategic Communications Governments have traditionally been good at communicating their stances on particular issues, but less effective at managing perceptions of the country as a whole. One of the reasons for this is the fact that different institutions have been responsible for dealing with politics, trade, tourism, investment and cultural relations. But on many issues, it is the totality of messages which people get about the UK which will determine how they relate to us. This is the second dimension of public diplomacy: the strategic messages we promote about the UK. Sir Michael Butler, who was previously the British Permanent Representative to the EU, argues that perceptions of the country generally will shape the diplomatic environment: “We need to have a broad image which is favourably perceived in the key countries where we are based. If your government is perceived as self-interested, reactionary and unhelpful, it will seriously hamper your ability to get your way —as the US is finding at the moment.” And unless there is a lot of work done over a long period of time to create a more positive context, all attempts at communications will be viewed with added suspicion. An official in the White House confessed to me, “We haven’t made any attempts to communicate with ordinary Arabs unless we are bombing them or imposing sanctions on them -I wouldn’t like us if I were them.” In the economic realm, the power of national perceptions is even clearer. As products, investment environments and tourist destinations become more alike, it is becoming difficult to differentiate oneself in terms of quality alone. Tapping into a Public Diplomacydeeper sense of identity can help companies differentiate themselves from their competition. Opinion surveys show that three quarters of Fortune 500 companies actually see ‘national identity’, or place of origin, as one of the key factors that influence their decisions about buying goods and services. Many consumer companies have built on this insight. In the 1990s, the German AEG (Algemeine Elektrische Gesellschaft) ran a publicity campaign in Britain which was based around redefining their initials as ‘Advanced Engineering from Germany’. The centrepiece of their advertising campaign was that it was a ‘German’ company, a national image that represented brand quality. Strategic communication is different from relationship-building. It is a set of activities more like a political campaign: setting a number of strategic messages, and planning a series of activities over a year or so to reinforce them. This is what Charlotte Beers describes as magnification: “An impressive example was delivered by the team in ECA when they arranged to send stunning photographs of Ground Zero by Joel Meyerowitz to open in 20 countries....What I appreciate so much about this program is that it gives us an audience beyond the government officials and elites - the young and people in smaller towns as the exhibit travels to cities around these countries and reaches others through very good press coverage. That's what we mean by magnifying the results from a single event.” It is important for all the public diplomacy organisations to have a stake in the totality of messages which are put out about the country, and a sense of how they can co-operate on promoting them. Chris Powell, the chairman of advertising company BMP DDB Needham argues that these messages must be simple: “Have very few, preferably one, message. People are exposed to The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacythousands of messages every day. They probably recall only a tiny fraction of these. The task is to cut through this fog by imagination and repetition. A contrast between diplomacy and advertising is that in advertising an enormous amount of work goes into the preparation — boiling ideas down into very, very simple concepts, and then repeating that message over and over again until we are all thoroughly bored with it. When you are so bored with it that you feel like giving up, the listener may just have begun to register the message. So stick at it. The Drink Drive campaign has been going for years and is as relevant today as it has ever been because the message is simple, clear and logical.” But to what extent is it possible to have a single message that unites all the different players — from the British Tourist Authority to the Foreign Office? And how relevant will it be to different audiences, from citizens in the Middle East to potential investors in Australia? Many countries have shown the power of having a clear national narrative which can unite the different stakeholders. The most famous example is probably Spain, where Miro’s Espana image signaled a determination to shed the ghost of Franco and become a modern, European democracy. There are two key dangers in not creating a clear narrative. One is the idea of discordant messages. In the case of Britain, it would appear strange if the British Council heavily promoted the UK asa modern, multi-ethnic and creative island, while the British Tourist Authority simply re-iterated national stereotypes about tradition, ceremony and history. One solution to this conundrum that has been proposed is to make a virtue of the paradox and develop an identity around the idea of dynamic tradition ~ playing ona binary identity which was famously described by life-style guru Peter York as “punk and pageantry”. It is Public Diplomacyhowever important to remember that there are ‘givens’ in how we are seen abroad. If the ‘dynamic tradition’ positioning is adopted, the survey data shows that our promotional efforts will need to be weighted towards the dynamic end of the spectrum. as that is the area which people are most sceptical about. There is a danger in this idea of articulated positioning. When Robin Cook established the Panel 2000 taskforce to advise him on the projection of Britain overseas, it debated long and hard which messages should be promoted before deciding on a list of five messages (reliability and integrity, creativity and innovation, Britain’s heritage, free speech and fair play and openness to the world) which roughly corresponded to the interests of the five main public diplomacy institutions and allowed the different partners to carry on performing as they had done before. I have written elsewhere about the fact that perceptions of Britain are out of date and have set out a strategy to attempt to turn them round in Britain™ — the report which launched an international furore about ‘Rebranding Britain’. But there are also pitfalls for any country surrounding national branding. Many people have attacked the idea that something as complex as a national identity can be ‘sold’ in the same way as soap powder. This is obviously true, and clumsy attempts to market countries — even in specific sectors such as tourism — run the risk of reducing the excitement and diversity of a national culture to a homogenous, antiseptic commodity. The clearest example of this is the attempt to sell beach holidays: one image of a white beach and some blue sea is practically indistinguishable from. another. When this happens, the net effect of branding is not to add value but to detract from it as the key differentiator in this sort of commodified market will be price. The Three Dimensions of Public DiplomacyPeople have also pointed out that the only way to fully manage a national brand is to have a totalitarian state, as most of the impressions that people get of a country come from things outside government control — such as meeting British people, buying British products and services, watching films, reading newspapers etc. Because the ‘carriers of the brand’ are so diverse, any attempt to sell a country that does not reflect the reality of that country is doomed to be undermined by people’s actual experience. This reflects the fact that the most successful perception-changing campaigns have been carried through by countries that had undergone dramatic and genuine change — for example Spain after Franco or Ireland in the 1990s — and rooted in a commonly owned national story. Relationship Building The third dimension of public diplomacy is the most long-term: developing lasting relationships with key individuals through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, building real and virtual networks, and giving people access to media channels. This differs from the usual diplomatic practice of nurturing contacts as it is about developing relationships between peers — politicians, special advisers, business people, cultural entrepreneurs or academics. This can take place across the three spheres of public diplomacy and is aimed at creating a common analysis of issues and giving people a clearer idea of the motivations and factors effecting their actions so that by the time they come to discussing individual issues a lot of the background work has been done already. It is important not just to develop relationships but to ensure that the experiences which people take away are positive and that there is follow-up afterwards. Building relationships is very different from selling messages because it involves a genuine exchange and means that people are given a ‘warts and all’ picture of the country. Public DiplomacyResearch by the British Tourist Authority showed that people who come to the UK invariably report that they leave the country with a more positive impression of it than when they arrived. Joseph Nye makes this point eloquently: “It is not that the student goes back converted but they go back with a much more sophisticated idea of our strengths and weaknesses. You complexify their thinking. So they will go back and be critical of American policy on Israel or they will go back and be critical of American policy on capital punishment. But they will have a deeper understanding of why it is that Americans treat gun. control differently than Europeans. This may grow out of the fact that I spent two years as a student in Britain right out of college. It took me about a month to realise, ‘My God, these people are strange!’ At the end of two years I thought I can see Britain’s faults and I can see Britain’s greatness and they are all mixed up together. I think it was in Britain’s interests that 1 would develop a nuanced view of Britain rather than either an Anglophilic idealisation or an Anglophobic characterisation. And I think that aspect of soft power is probably most effective.” Charlotte Beers, the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy in the United States, points to the staggering success of the Fulbright scheme which has been taken up by over 200 current or former heads of state: “Coming from the private sector, it’s hard to find anything comparable to the sheer productivity of our Fulbright and International Visitor exchanges. The $237 million we will spend in 2002, for some 25,000 exchanges, is magnified by the 80,000 volunteers in the U.S. and matching support from many countries like Germany and Japan. Considering that some 50 percent of the leaders of the International Coalition were once exchange visitors, this has got to be the best buy in the government.” Relationship building has traditionally been seen as a process that must be conducted face to face and on a personal level. The The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy20 most effective instruments for building enduring relationships are scholarships, visits and other exchange programmes that require complex planning and administration and come with a high unit cost. But as societies become more open and pluralistic, particularly in large transitional economies where the target audiences number several millions, this traditional mode of working is unlikely to reach the critical mass of people necessary to significantly affect the opinions and choices of those audiences. To what extent will the new information and communication technologies enable the relationship building process to be scaled up to include much larger groups of people? In India, the British Council has identified a successor generation target audience of 7 million people aged between 20 and 35, nearly 90% of whom live in 25 cities, whose profile suggests that at different stages of their education and early working lives they would be teceptive to the Council’s information and educational services. At present the Council operates in 11 cities and at any one time provides services to about 120,000 members and visitors to their libraries and information centres. The Council is now planning to use new approaches to online and distance learning and a specially developed online library to extend its services to a much larger clientele. The quality of the engagement with this larger audience will not be of the same order as that achieved through more traditional and expensive face to face programmes — which will continue to play an important role in India. However, by increasing to at least 300,000 over a three year period, the number of people in regular contact with the Council either face to face or online, the Council believes that it will achieve the critical mass necessary to affect attitudes and choices among the wider target groups in key cities. Public DipiomacyThe Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy 21JOSEPH S. NYE, Jr. HIMA TZxY2 TO MEXO EMITYXIAS STHN ITATKOSMIA IIOAITIKH Tledhoyosg QEOAQPOL KOYAOYMITHS Metdgeaon EPPIKO= MHAPTZINONOYAOZ itl EKAOZEIS HANAZHEH A@HNA 2005100 HMA [XY and diapogetixovs anodéutes os Srapogetixd mEQiBAA0- via. H rata toxic Sev sive otabeor, OAAG udu tov moLxth- het avahoya. we To YOGVO xt TOV T6T0. HKOYATOYPA Q HTH HIIAS IEXYOE “Onws E€Qoupe, ou emxeutés ms xovATOVOAS TH Staxwgt- Couv ovyva avéueoa oe vn xa Actix] xovATodea. Toh- dot nagatnontés 8a. cunpavotoay dun aueoimavixr vpn} xXovAtovea Tagcyer ONWaytxyl rzcuc Lox Yio. tug Hyaives Tlohtetes. Pa magddevyua, 0 vroveyds EEwtegumay Kokw Tldoved éxeu met: Axadnuaixgs xo exrotnpovunts cviadrayés dvadqapdr- Gav éva onnavtxd Edo oTV Evioxvon tS OMEQLAEVLATIS aruac Loxvos. Hag’ 6ho nov xdmoLot ALeQunavol OXETTLAI- otés poPovvtay, THY EXoy ExEtvN, OTL OL LoPretixot emoryj- woves xo Tedxtoges THs Ka Tre Mne xov EXLOKEMTOVIAV 4 © Kennan, o Fisenhower xa o wouands cevaupégovectt oto BiBALo ov Yale Richmond, Culaural Exchange and the Cold War, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003, oe. 123, 124, 127.102 HMIA Izxyz tis HITA 60 «pas éxheBav», anévuxav v’ avtidnpdoty St ot emoxéntes Exo1ovay pati tous byt UGvo extoTHHWOVIKGe Www- OTHE CAG Hou TOAUTURES SEE. TlohAot tétoLoL ExLoTIPovES eEertyOnxav oe xogupatous vmoomorxtés tov avOouatvay Sixcrmpdtov xa mS PiAshevOegonoinoys ato cowternd tS Lopietxrjs “Evwons. Zexwodvros tm dSexaetia tov 1950, to Ford Foundation, to Council of Learned Societies xa to Social Science Research Council ovvegydotmuav we 110 CMEQLHAVLAG, HOAEYLA KOLL MAVEMLOTH MLA C& AVTAhrAayes Ornovdaotaev xaL xaOnyyTdV. Ilag’ 6Lo TOV yn DoBretuerj “Evooy a&imoe va. yivet pic xvBeovytiny ovppovia yua tov TEQLOQLOUS THS ExtAONS THY avTOAAAYGV auTodY, TEQimo”U 50.000 Yopretixol emroxéprnxav tic Hyvwpéves TModitetec omy mEQiodo asd to 1958 we to 1988 ws ovyyoagets, Sypo- OLoyEdHot, ExlonpoL, MOvVaLxol, yooEUTES, ABANTES xa axXa- dypaixotl. “Evacg axdpn peyahtteoos agiOuds Aueguaveyv mijyav oT Lopietuxr| “Evwon. 2m dexaetia. tov 1950, udvo 40 we 50 andqportor ad xd- Ge xaiqa petetxav otis avtahAcyés, GAAG pe THY 2éQ050 tou XQvov, efvar Suvaté va evtomvotoby voyugés ToOMTIMES |eml- MIGCEIS AXSUN HOLL O” GUTS TOV MEQogLOLEVO AQLOWS. Exedy} Ol mohitioTinés OAMayES emnQedCouv mV EAtt, Lic 1 Sto on- pavuxés emcpés elvan evdexSpevo va mooxakgoovv sopaer Tox Tagevegyera. Tia magddevyna, o AdeEdvio Tidino- Prep exnoecotmxe Evtova and tig Omovdés TOU KOVTE OTOV TOMTUXG ExtotHpova NréuBivt Tootuav oto Columbia University to 1958. Tehixd 0 TidnoBhep é—race vo. yiver S- evOuvtis evds OnLavt0t dobuatos, péhog tov Tohitix0d Toapetov xan v’ aoxrjoet xaxOoguotixr] piredesOeon ExtEQor oto Lopewixd nyém Muxaujr Pxogunatode. “Evas ovppoum- tis Tov, 0 Oheyx Kadovyaw, nov éywe vynropaduo oréhe- yxos ms Ka Tue Mae, umoonjogs, wikdvtas ex tov aoqahovs,Srey AMEPIKANIKHE HIIAZ IZXYOE 103 20 1997, «Or avtadiayés urrjg&av Sotgetog inmog yia ty ZO- “Retvn} “Evoon. Avodoapénoay tegdotio Qdho oT S14BQw- gq tov Goftettx0t cvonijuatos... Exngéatav ho xcu meQuo- sSteQous ps ty 14Q050 Tov xosvorv»*4. 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DeMQoty 6u mooopéget pata, puyaywyia xox Gxt TANQOPSONON xO dQa 7 nodutnr| exiSoaon cov aoxet etvat por]. BAémouv Tm Lain} xovAtoboa oav Eva. aTOMTAS GLO Yio Tis ULES. Mic tétoie, a00TEO HI}, WOTSOO, Efvat adima1oAsyyt™ exerdy 1 Aainr poyxayoyla mequeyer ovyva vxoovveldntes ELKOVES KCL [VULOTE YLCL TOV ATOLLXLOLG, THY KATALVELLUTLHY] emoyn xo Gddes aEles mou Exouv onwavtxés TOMTLRKES 44 Sxo (S10, o¢).. 22-32. 45 Edward Rothstein, «Damning (Yet Desiring) Mickey and the Big Mac», New York Times, 2 Magt(ov 2002, o&). A17.104 Hila 1ExXYz enimtmoeic. Onwc éxer vnoometset 0 ovyyoapéas Mnev Batevpreoye, 7 apeguavny xovitovec TMEQUOUPEVEL ET- Seratndmta, EQMTIONS, Bic, cevice ZA VALGUS, GAAG Gxt u6d- yo. Anewnoviter, extons, alec mov etvan avoutés, evpetd- Banrec, eSaroumeupévec, avtlOetes MQOs TO xaTEGTHLEVO, mhovoadtounés, Pohovtaguotixés, haiiniatines xo ehevOe- QEC. «AUTO TO MEQLEXSHEVO Eival, GOXETa av xabeepritetar EvVvoind H SXL, TOV PEQVEL TOV KSOLO GTO tapeto. 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Ta xofoyra wats tou TMOWTUOA LATS |UTdOXET netadiSovtar ce 224 ydges oe 11 46 Ben Wattenberg, The First Universal Nation, New York: Free Press, 1991, ced. 213. 47 Carl Sandburg, avapégetar ovo BiBAlo tou Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War, Chapel Hill: University of North Ca- rolina Press, 1994, oeh. 222. +8 Charles P. Pierce, ? John Tagliabue, «U.S. Brands Abroad Are Feeling Global Ten- sion», New York Times, 15 Magtiov 2003, o&h. B3. 53 Rob Kroes, «American Empire and Culture Imperialism: A View from the Receiving End», Diplomatic History 29, Kakoxzatgu 1999, oer. 468-474,TIHTES AMEPIKANIKHS HMIAZ IZXYOZ 107 odtim| tous. “Eva raedderype ttav n Snuoxgatxy avomodounon THES Evodays peta to Aetitego Hayxdopu0 Tldaepo. To ZxgSi0 Magoad za to NATO ritav xaBoeroTt- 2G GQYAVA OLXOVOULATS ZOU OTEATLOTLAT|S LOXLOS TOU OTd- yevay omy exttevén avtos axerBds tov aotedéopatos. Zv- véPahe, duos, xo n Aaixr xovAtotoa. Tia nagddevypa, o Avotoioxds totogixds Péwyohvt Boryxvidutveg unoomeiter Gt ’. Me my Q0- 50 tov yedvov, o A€vov unegiayvoe tov Agw. “Oxws ovvopioe tv Ratdotaoy Evas OTORLASS, «G0 on- haven xi ov trav n otgotiaTtixn Sévaun xo 7 TOM eo g€uBaon tov Hvmpéve Tohttevdy yu ™m Snwoveyia tov MQOtTOBECEWW TWV GALEQZAVIKGY ExLTUYLGV OTH WuxXoosT0- Lewy Evoedan, n CPEQLACVUA] OLLOVOLLL] ZOU TOAUTLOTUXI REN Trav mov xEQdiWE Ts RAOSIES XC THC OxEepets THS ThELo- wnelas tov véwv veo ms Snpoxeatias Sutixov visov... Kd- Ge pogd nov avéBawe oto owyx Eva. yvrjoto xaTavautind RQOISY, Titav OAKES ov MLBAVSTITES StL O TEayLaTUAdS UO- HOAs Oa vToyWQovoEr*®. O Vuyxods TdrEpos xeQdrOn- ne amd Evo Utyuc oxANOrIs xaL TirtLag LoYtio. H oxhnor loys SHMLOGeyNoE to aveyoua mS ex8ounrjs OTQaTLATLAIIS LaXGOS, OAha atric Loxtis SéBQwde to Gopetxd _TooEN HO ex vay — i gow. Kau dev trav anoxrevound apeguavines Gres ou ayes TTLAE Loywos — nagdderypa 0 QdAog tov BBC xa twv Maths. 57 A xagéygapos avnj Baottetat oto xeiuevo tov Matthew Cohut, «The Role of American Soft Power in the Democratization of Czechoslo- vakia», Axgiivos 2003, Kennedy School of Government. $8 Wagnleitner, «Empire of Fun», o¢h. 506.TIHrES AMEPIKANIKHS HMIAz [=xYO 111 ADAG Oa. trav 24805 V’ ayvonBet o odhog tov onofo diadec- duce n éAEn ms apeotmavixris Laitarig novATOvOAs OTN Suct- pSEPMON TOV Ftt0V LEQOUS THS e&(owons. “Oy udvo eixe axéon 7 Aan xovATOUQa We THY emiteven TOV OTOXOV TS AWEQLKCVLAI|S TOALTLAT|S OT] Avtxr Evedan, ahAG vajeEe ZOL ONMAVTLAT] YLO. [LLC GELOd GLa OT6XWV, petakd tov onoiwv q UTOVOLEVTH tov xaBEGtuTOS TOU axaotyauvt om Nota Apour, 7 aENON TOV aQLBLO TOV Syuoxoatixdy zvPeQvyoewv oT Aativixr Aueouer xa o& meguoxés Ts Avatomurs Actas, 7 avatgom tov xabeordd- tog tov Middoepits om Legpia, n aleoy yo pidedevdEgo- \ xoinon oto Tod xan OgYavwoN evs avorytov dreBvotc o1- HOVOLLXOG OVOTHLOTOS, YL VA ZOTOVONECOVHLE Leguxovs Wd- vo ad tous ot6yous. Hoéypatt, stav 7 Noto. Agotnt] Q0- Banportdrav to 1971 av a exétgene Vo hevtoveyyjoet THAE- deacon om yea, o Adumegr Xéottox, évas ovvmenttxds oayv vrovoy6s Taxvdgopet@v xa Tnreyoapetwy, tHV axégoupe ag otuBoho tov duTtx00 ex@uatopot mov «Oa odn- yovoe omy e&axgeiwon tov VOTLOAPOLZAVLKOT TOALTLGHOD HL THY LATAQQEVON TOV aragrydivT»°’. Anodeiymxe ou et- x SixL0. Karé tov (10 T9600, avditatos xmQuads tov Today &€5m- oe to 1994 éva qetha evavtiov tav Sogupogiudy mAEomtt- YOY MATOY, Exed1 Oa ovvéBarav omy ELoayaryy] [Las prN- vig aAhoSamjg xovATOVQAS ZO OT SiaSooy twv nOxdv aodeveray ms Atione™. Ki autds anodeiymuxe St etye Simo. Meta and wa Sexaetia, watines SradmAcioers oT Texeod- 59 «TV Finally Approved by South Africa», New York Times, AgQtog 28, 1971. 6 Peter Waldman, «Iran Fights New Foe: Western Television», Wall Street Journal, 8 Avyototou 1994, oe. 10.112 Hota [xyz Vy axoAOVONHoaY TH HEeTadoon LSLOTAGY aLEQUavLxciV THAE- omtndy exxopstdv. Ot atabuol Goxrocy tig weTASSoEts TOUS ot YAGoE pagot ya tous Ioavots ts Staomoeds oto Aog Ayttehes, GAG agydtega xdrumtav THY LoavLAr TOALTURI Coo} oe 24oen Péon xcu petebdav Etar oto Ioav zANQopo- oles o1 omotes Sev rftav dia0Eomes exel we dAdo ted20%!, Av ritav Ldvo pa. avtidoaotmr] WeLovdtnta mou WokGvOnxe and Sutixés EEC. Onws magatjonce évac xaOyyntis, «oe MyGteQo and wo Sexaetia weth to Advato tow Ayiertohey, Xopeivi, avtot ov pwtiovEvor exavactates —oi moGyV vea- Qot Petegdvor tov moAguou xau TS EavaGotaonc— amaLtoU- Gav TEQLaStEQES EhevOegtes xa TOAITIXG Sixcudpatar®. uy Kiva, nagd m hoyoxevota, apeoumavinés evdijoeis TaQapidatovv ta oGvoga uéow tov Internet, GhAwv péowv evnpéomons xa exmadevtindy avtadhayov. To 1989, Si0- Snhwrés powmtés omy Thatela Tiavavuev xataoxetacay €va opofmpa tou AyGAwatos ts EkevOeotag. Mic SiaSnad- Tow eine of Eévo Synoctoyed@o mag Stav eEavaynatdrav V axoter tous nyétes tov tomimot’ Koppouviotot Kouuc- TOS va. WQUOVTAL Evavtiov THs ALLEQLAr{s, TeWyovdoCE voE- 0G otlyouc tou Moun Nrthay xdvovtas état tm Roupy exa- véotao ts. “Evac Gkkog gendoteg magationce Gt «toh- dot Motevovv mH¢ y TESOPaTH TaQovOla Taw tov XOA- youvt Ge xwveltxotc xwnyatoyod@ous, pati we ta DVD zou xvxhopogoty magavoua, exer cuuPdArer onwavtnd oto xé- VIQLOWA tS Laytdeas tov amkdv KwéCwv modutcv yo cwe- On OAAaryT»®. ©! «Prodding the Clerics», The Economist, 12 lovhiov 2003, ced. 24. © Azar Nafisi, «The Books of Revolution», Wail Street Journal, 18 lov- vtov 2003. 3 Jehangir Pocha, «The Rising Soft Power of India and China», NewTIHTES AMEPIKANIKH® HIIAZ IZXYOE 113 “‘Onws wébaue oto ze~adaio 1, n haixi] xovAtOvOG, emeL- ij Sev Bofoxetan ud deco xuPeovntix6 éheyyo, Sev maQd- YEL TAVITA TA AxOLBYH TOALTIRG cuTOTEhEopaTa OV (ows vet emOuuet n xuBéovyon. Tia magdSeryya, om Sidoxera tou Tlohéuov tov Biewa, 9 aueoavini xvBeéovnon efye moh- hots cohtinovs otdyous ot omofor MeQueAdupavayv té600 TH oroatiotixy viny ext tov xompovvicLot Oto Bietvaq doo xa THY TOMA Vixy Ext TOV ZOLLOUVLGLOG OTV Kevtowxr Ev- Qdmn. H haixr xovdrovion Scv PorOnoe va maoayGobv to exvOupnté aroteh€ouata Ce GYEG [LE TOV TEGITO OTXO, cLh- 1G PoOnoe va raQaZBowtv oe oX€on Le to Sevtego. Ta wa- eddeypa, o Pdwyokvt Bayxvaditveg meQuyoedper tug Poutn- tints Siadnrdoeis omy Avotota evavtiov tov Hohguov tov Buewau: «AradSndoape we usthou tev xo Ti-GEQT xeLL THE we wégos oe xaOotinés Siawagtuetes xaL Ge TagatETapEevEs poumtixés ovoxepetc. To onpavtxdtego ytav St yuaotav mont exetvot tov xatahapatvape TL OFLatvEe Va UTOQOUME va Stadnrdvoupe evevtlov evdg moAg€uou oe eumdAEyN mE- ei0d0 yoots va xatamjyoupe of otgatodimeto. Oguopévot etyape, extons, extyvoon tov yeyovetos Gti elyape LEBEL tig elonvinés moaxtixEés SnuoKoatiarjc Siapaotvotacs xa cvet- Beons ard TO GuEQLxavIxd xivnLa atomxdv SixctOpLatwv xaL TO xivyWa evavtloy tov uno eEoropL0v. Eto xd- tw-xdtw, dev toayovSovouue T «ALEebvi», HAAG tocyoudsr- cape to «We Shall Overcome». Ta xivijuata Siapagty- efas efvar Eva xoupat Aatixrig xovATOEGS OU uTOgEl vO. TMoocEAxvaEL TOMAOtg E€vous OTHV avVOLYTH VooTeOTia. TH Perspectives Quarterly 20, Xeiusvas 2003, oe. 6, Rick Lyman, «China Is Warming to Hollywood's Glow», New York Times, 18 ZenteuBgtov 2003, och. BI. 64 Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization, oe). xi.114 HMIA IZXYE Hvmpévov Toduweusy ty (ic dea xov ot exfonpes moAutt- nés TOAXTLKES TOUS aTWBOUY. H haizy xovatotion uxoget va. éxet avtuparingés exunre- Gets o Svamogetixés ouddes péoa omy (1a yea. Aev mQ0- OPEQLEL LL OMOLGLOEGPY THY YstLas LoYvoc. Ta Plyteo mov ehxtouv tous Egnfouc Ioavotc me00PGAAOVV tous Ioavots wovrddes. “Ero. 1 oméxPeva mov mooxadel 1 apegumavixi} haixy xovdtovec tows va. Svoxoneter tis Hvwpéeves Moatet- e¢ V’ anoondoovv PoayumedPeoua ta exiBuunta csmoteAé- pata and thy xveiaeyxn TaEN, eved y EAEN tg Aciiurjs xoUA- toveas evoagotiver os P4OOS YOSVOU THY EMLOLENTY GALA? betas twv véwv. Kaw weoumés pogés ou emuntaicets ptogel VO VIOVOUEVSOVV LAXEOTEdBEGLOUS AWEQLXAVLXOtS OT6- Xous. ZtHv Tovexia, oippova yw’ Evav Totexo Syoovoyed- po, «yn SidS00n tS apEeQumavinrs Aaixiic xovAtoveus, xv- eims petaEd ms aveitegns wecatag tEns xa exupaverand petaSu ths xardteons taEys tov toventxod Aaov, éxer Snt- OVveyrfoel LLa avtiBeon omy eohoyia y onofa otettet THY xovatovea aut. H avayévyyoy tou ~ovtapevtadiopov to. TEhEvTata YOSvia, O OMOLos amoTEAEt ULC. COPAO CELA yu TO XOGULKG “OGTOS, Elvar UTETOvVYH yLa tT SyWLOVEYla ToU OifyHatos OVELEGG. OTHY EFQUEQLXAVLOUEV TOOVOMLOVYO TE- Ey, Thy xatditegn pecata taEH xa tovs GrMyots»®. Qotdc0 axdun xa THY TEQLOSO LETG THY 11H LemtenBotov, xa TAQG, TOUS MEQLOQLOLOUS OTIS ExSdoELS BiCac, Wi. EoEVVE TOV StE- veoynOnxe ad to Beetovixd Duupovao peta&v 5.000 por- Tmt oO” Evvid HOVOOVAWAaVInEs YES sbelEE Gtt OL Hvweé- veg Tlodtteies eFaxohov8ovoay v’ amotedovy THY TOdTH ETL- 65 Guliz Buken, «Backlash: An Argument against the Spread of Ame- rican Popular Culture in Turkey», oto BifACo tov Wagnleitner xau May, Here, There and Everywhere, o&}. 248b.TIHTES AMEPIKANIKH® HIIAS IZXYOE 115 hoyy yua véous ad my Atyunto, Ty Touguia xou tm Zaov- Sua AoaBia yu omovdds tous oto e€wteguns®. H aupi6v- pio. etvan pio ovvnOropevn, aytiSoaon évavtt tov Hyvapévav — Tlokreuy Hel GHOV UTEQYEL AUPLOvula vMdQKOU mE QLOG- “ua via mooondBEtEs PErtimoys TS AvaAOYias Tov DeTLXdV Evatt Tov aovytindy SiaotaoEwy. Tehind, ta Seyava m¢ haixic xovAtobeas Sev siivan otc- und. AV 1] ELQQOT TS aEQUKAVIRI|s KOVATOTOAS B avENnDEL | Ou weuGel ovo HEhhov eivar aBEPouo. Ev wéger 70 amott heopa 0a EEGOTHVEL ad To Hata mdG0 OL avudypogiretc mohitunés TEdind Oa Eexerdicovv nat Oa xataotioovv TC AVUSQGCELE MOOS THY ALEQLKCLVINT] XOVATOTEG GOVNTIXOTE- oes. Oa cEaombet, exlons, and addayés oto xQ0 Ts avEe- Edomms ayogds mov dev Exovv xaud oon pe TOdiTUA. Tra nagdderypa, ol apeoimavixes xuvnpatoyeaixés tauvies eEaxohovOotv va. moayLatomoLoty to 80% toy eoddwv TS uuvnuatoyoaguniis Blownxavlas 6 GAo Tov XGOLO, GAAG nN apeginavinr THAEsQaon yvwoter ta tehevtata YESVLG [Lc ragaxpr om dieOvi ayood. H mredgaon anevOvvetar oF uta teQuoddtedo Siaomaopevy @yYORE xt 1 LxcLvorOtHoN OE Tomine exizedo gyn amoderytel ONMAVTLXSTEQN YLA THV TQO- o€yyton cOvixcv axgoatnetov an’ 6,ti Lo BLaotuxt patie OMY auEoLxavinr xovATOBEE THY OmOLa moCGPEOEL Eva TUT 26 apeguiavixd meoidv’’, H Nielson Media Research éxev Stamotawoet Sti to 71% Twv xogupatwv Sena TEoyeapud- tov org 60 xdEs SmOU Eye n EQEVVE, Elyav TAQAXBEL OTIC 6 Meena Janardham, «Mideast: U.S. May Be Unpopular, but Stu- dents Still Head For It», Inierpress Service, 5ia8€ouro oto: http://www.ips news.net. 67 Neal Gabler, «The World Still Watches America», New York Times, 9 Iavovagtov 2003, ced. A27.116 HMIA IZxYz (ies tic YcQEs, avtutQ0OMmEVovTAS ULA OTADEQI HERON oF OXEON Le ta TQOHYOCWEVA YESvic. Or aities Patvetar va ovvdéovtar meQuoodtego we adAayes tou Eyouv exéhOet orig ayoess xa tis O1novomies TOY KOQGVY XOL ATOGXOTOUY OTNV uavoroinon Twv tommdv AQOTINOEMV TAQd GE TOAUTINES ovtidedceus®®. Eximhéov, 1 aogedpnon ms aueomavinris haixtig xovA- toteas and Eéva axeoanjora fows Hv xave vo. poudter we VOV KULYG MYSTEQO EEWTLAY XOL ZOTE OUvErELCL ALYSTEQO EA- nvowxy. Kétt tagdpovo cvvéBy pe mV vodoyr| AOU exupt- da&av ot Evemmator to 190 cudva ota odov pe Oéua THY apEeoimavixr Ayoua Avon zat dy to apeguicvind MTV éxer xacer Edapog Ge oxEon wE tommove wuNtEs Tov. “Eva eidi- KOS EXTILG STL «nN TELYXOOMLOAO(NON tHS AWEQLZaAvLAI|s Aai- urs xovdtoteac, Gmuc my E€ooupns xo Tm WereTauE orjueoa, lows anoderytel AAQOSKS HaWSpEvO, Eva Cra pe deOvi} eniSoacn yuo Goo Sidomuc xoeidteta Hote va meoxahEoet Ma. tomxr avt(Soaon, 1 omofc. Samotéver moves MEOUTOBE- GELS UTOQOTY VA MEOCGAQUOOTOUV EmITUXWS Oe TOMES OUV- Oijueg xc tEOGSoxlEs»®”. Av 1 andhEra tov e&wtx0 otol- xelov Aer eivan SoPagr 1 SxL ad dacopy ANYadV Anas vaXOg etvat Svoxoho va neoPAEpBet. tug mAcontunés evdijoeis, wotdoo, éxer exéASet pa ou- Qs TOA GACY. Zt Sidexera tov TMokguov tov KoA- mov, to CNN xa to BBC efyav eketOego 10 meSfo diapd9- PHONS XOL TaQovotaons tov Gendrov. Tia tagddevypa, n © Suzanne Kapner, «U.S. TV Shows Losing Potency Around World», New York Times, 2 lavovagtov 2003, oth. i, «Anti-Americanism and Tele- vision», The Economist, 5 Angihfov 2003, o€).. 59. ® John G. Blair, «First Steps Toward Globalization», oto Bipilo tv Wagnleitner xc May, Here, There and Everywhere, o¢).. 291.TIHPES AMEPIKANIKHE HMIAS IESXYOE 117 eLofodr| tov Iodx oto Kouféit toy Atyovoto tov 1991 xQ0- PAyOnxe ws eveoyera igaxwrs emDettnd™TAS xc YL OS HI- von exavaxtmons ms anorecbelons exagyias tov Koupeért, 6nwg éprenav to Oéuce ot Ioomuwol. (H IvSla eupavice pe tov (S10 tedmo my evoBod tTHS OV aexata exagyia ts, Txoa, xa SteOvijs avtSeaon mov tQOXAONxE rita c.or}- Lavin). Zmyv zeofoSo tov Mokguov tov Igéx, to Ad. TEatioa no Gra xavaha itav OVOLAOTLAOL AVTAYWVLOTES OTOV TOS- wo TEOPOMIs tov Oepctoy. Pia wagdderypa, n (roe ecuxdve. vetaxtvnons otoatiwtixdv duvapewv Oa pstogovoe va. TEgL- youget and to CNN ws «Q0ghaon oupLLaxmdy Suvanewve Hf at6 to Ad TCatloa we «mgoéiaon tov evoporewv». To te- ind amoréheoua tc wa we(won tS GwEQuiavunrig rrtLas LoyGos OTHY TEQLOYT xaTa To 2003 GE ObyxELOH LE To 1991. Téa y Taddta éyer aopactoer va. Squrovgyroet Sind | TNS TOAVYAWGGO HEONTIAS ELSNOEOYQAPLXS Have. Du- | unégave ou «to Ad Teatiga etvar n andde1Sy Gti to Wovo- AGALO CUTS UTOLEL VO. OTAGEL RAL OTL UTAQXEL HLA TEAYPATL- uy avayxn yuo evdrjaeic mov Sev efvat ayyho-apeguavi- négr™. Oguopévor avadutés TLOTEVOuY StL «1 AHEQLKAVLAT woLaoyia OTYV TAYXOOPLG EMLZOWOVLEHT QOr] Eiva ALyStE- Q0 LoxXVEH] aa’ Soo rtav Oto MaQEADGy. AvtiBeta, 7 SevEVv- vouevy avnouxia Sev opethetar ov Tadd avtibeon yuo THY UTEQPOMAT CUEQLKAVLA TOMTLOTIAY EMLQQOT AVE TOY KS- GLO, GARG oT exadnxtLm| TaXTNTO. We THY OTOLa EexoUAG- ve ou Hvopéves TMlomtetec tig Brounyavies Laixrig xovdtov- Qac tous oe E€vous ayooaotés»”?. 7 Jo Johnson, «Paris Deputies in Tune with Plans for State to Fund 24-Hour “French CNN», Financial Times, 15 Matov 2003, o¢}.. 10. 7 J, Mitchell Jaffee zou Gabriel Weimann, «The New Lord of the Global Village?», oto Bi8kio voy Wagnleitner xa May, Here, There and Everywhere, oeh. 291.118 HIIA Isxy3 A&iCer va onpermbel St eve or apeormavines etaiotes eFaxohovbowv va xvoiaoxovy and drown mayxdopag eupé- evas Eeurogdy onuatoy, or adhayés oto ySQO THs ayoeds EXOvV MEOKahEGEL Evav evtgwOpEvo HOVULATLONS EuoeL- xoW onpartov. TIQw a6 ua Sexaerica emugatovae n doy OTL XAOg TA EUTOQIXG EuTdd.LA xaTEQoEAY, OL EUTOQLRES ploues moyxdopias eupererac Oa meQLOMELomOLOoY Tis TO- mines Plques. TIHV MOayWaTLAdTTA, xaAdC OL avNnovYies OXETIAG [LE THY TORAH GUTOVOLLC Exouv eEovsSeteQwOel and TEXVOAOY LES OL OMOLES EMITOENOVY OTIS AVEQXS[LEVES OLLOVO- utes vo enttuyyavouv omy magayoyr e&eSuxeupévov me0i- OVTMV, N TUTOOMNON TwY EuTOOLXGY ONUGtoV Exel TeDEl UM au@popiftnon. H Coca-Cola efvan Wioxnjitoue éva tov 200 ONUdtov (TOV OVxVG Sev OVVdEOVTEL PAVERG [LE TH UNTELEN etargia), 1 McDonald’s Siapogonotel to Wevot tg xatd me- Quoxés xo n MTV Exer avidedoet ue Siapopetixa mQ0- YOapWata ad Svapogetinés xaos”. Axdun xo OW osd TA MOMTUKE Molxotal mov axohovOnoay tov 6AEUO TOU Iodu, ou tdéoe1g TS ayoRds nEQudgitav tmHY xvELAExia tov CLECMavixdy euToQLndy onpatav. Or mnyés Aaixric xovA- TOUQAS TOV UTOQOY Ve TAEAYEYOUV AWEQLKAVLAT Yatra. LoXG e(vou onpavuxés, oAAG Sev efvau xaBdrOU OTaTInES. ESQTEPIKES AEIES KAI IOAITIKES Ou Hympéves Mohitetes, dams xan Ghiec ydoes, expod- Covv tus a&leg tous we doa xdvouv, xa8d¢ xa WE Sou Eve. Tloditinés ates dws n Snpoxoatia xc ta avOgdnuwa St- Richard Tomkins, «Happy Birthday, Globalisation», Financial Ti- ‘mes, 6 Matov 2003, o¢2. 8.KE®AAAIO TETAPTO XPHIIMOTIOIONTAD THN HIIIA IZXY Ou xvPeovijoets yonoworovovy oTEaTUDTLXI] LOXT YUa va Siatundaovv amethés, va wodeuroovv xa, Ww’ Eva. cvvdva- GUS txavérmtas xan TUNE, Va exvbyovv emiOvLNTE amotEné- opata pac a éver Loyixd yoovind Sudampa. H ovxovopwny} Sivan evo ouyva xati to EEfoou Gpeoo. Or xvpEQvijoets wogoUv va. taydoouv E€vous teametinotc Loyaguacpots soa. GE [Lc VUXTEL XL UTOQOGV Va SWQOdSOxrGOvY 1] Va TIQO- GHEQOVV Gpeca OLxOVOLLx] Por|GeLa (TaQ’ GAO TOV OL OLKO- voulnss xvEdoELS YOELACOVTOL GUYVE AQEXETS YSVO La V" anodaHoouv, av tehind anoddoovv, ta emOvupnté amotehé- oporta). H rma voxvc a&vorovettor Svoxokdtega. yratt, Ss ze(Sape oto xepadato 1, mos and tig Paoines anyes TS dev Bofoxovtat utd tov éreyyo tov uvBEQEVIGEwV, XO TA OmoteA€ouata tous cEaotavtat xvElws a6 THY amtodoxT EX LéEous TOV axeoatmelwv ota onofa amevOtvovtaL. Emuthé- ov, OL mmyés Yattas Loxtos ovyva Aectoveyobv gupeca d1a- LOEMAVOVTES TO TEQIBGALOV yLct LucL OVYAEXOLLEVN] TOALTLXI] Hou Weoinss Poess YOeLaCovtar YOGvia yi va TaQayHowy ToL. exLOULNTa atotehEopata. Dvoird, ov dvapooss avtgs elvan H€pu Evtwoys. Ovre GAOL Ot NGAELOL OTE Gres OL OLOVONIXES TAQEUPaoELS TA- odyouy dueca ta emOuuntd anotek€opata — anddersny 4 Sidoxera xan y Tehixy aotuy(a tov Tohkgwou tov Buetvap 4194 HMIA IEXYE TO YEYOVOS Ott OL OLLOVOULXES ZVODOELS EXOLV LotORIxd cTtO- Sdoer ta emduoxopeva aotergopata WGvo oto eva teito TwV VIOHETEwY OTIS OMOLEs SoxtLGoTxON! 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To 170 xa to 180 audva, n Tadao. rQ0wOyoe MY xovATOva tmE O" Sky THY Evgeiny. Ta 1 «The Limited Power of the Purse», The Ailantic Monthly, NoéuBQuos 2003, ced. 54. Tia pia xAaorxa} wehém, Bhéxe Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott xen Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2n €4- 800n, Washington D.C.. Institute for International Economics, 1990. 2 Equat umoyoew@pévos omy Jane Holl Lute exeiSx} worgdomxe wot pov aut] MY Gxoyn Ge ja aQoVvGicGN ato Aspen Strategy Group tov Atyovoro tov 2003.XPHZIMOMOIQNTAS THN HIIA IZXY 195 yoddixe Sev gywav pdvo n yidoou ts Suthmpatiag ahha. yonomonorovvtav xa oe pegs Eéves aviec, mmc ExetvEes ms Pwotac xa ts Tewotas. 2m Siudexeva tg Taddaric Exavdotaons, 7 Todita exdiwe va magaxdéprper tic Eéves xvPeovioets xa v’ anev0vv0el evdéms otovs TANPvOROS TOV YWOGY TOUS TEOPGALOVTAS THY ENAVaCTATINH EoAoyia ams. Meta my rfrta ms oto Pakhonemound T1dhep0, 9 yada un xoPEovnons emdiwe v’ avaotmAdoet 10 yxOEHLOpEVvO xU- Q0¢ tov EOvoug TOOPAALOVtAS mM YAdoou xa TH AoYOTEXVLa tg uéow ms Alliance Francaise, oxofa SyoveyrOynxe to 1883, Onws vroygappice 0 totogixds Pitoagvt Tes, «1 ToQoPoMy tTHS yahALerig xovATOGEAS GTO e€wtegid Evie yw’ AUTO TOV TOSTO ONHAVILXS OLUTULLAS INS YaAAUms Sithopor tag»? Inadia, Tequavia nou Ghdes ySoes Eomevoav vo. TH wupnPovy gvovtacs wotttoUta yua va TEOPGAOUV THY KOVA- TOU TOUS OTO sEwtEoInd. H éxonEn tov Modtov Mayxooptov Mokguov ovvodetitn- HE CTS [LA GOTOUMLAIH EmTayvvoN TeOCGTABELGY YLa. aAvd- TTVEN Hatias LXGOS, XxADGS OL TEQIDGOTEQES uuBeovijoeis Sn- povieynoav yeapefa yun va meonayavSicouv tous Ot6XOUS tous. Ot Hywpéves Modttetes Gy wdvo Symioveynoay Sud Tous yougeto, aad om Sidexera To TEdTOV YOQSvOV TOW and MY apegixavinr efood0 oToOV M6hEHO aTOTEAOVGGY %E- VrQINd ato THY TOCOMABELAY dhAOV yoodV, xABdC Boe- ravia xar Tequavia. avtayovicovtav ya va. Snwougyijdouv evvoings evrumdoeig omy apLegimavun xotvi youn. Taga- TMOGVTAS Ta AVTITAQAYMYLAE ATOTEAEOPWATA TS YEQuUAYLATS patuuris moomaydvbac, 1 Bgetavia 1a, xatdpege noite ga. eoTidlovtas TIg MELOMGOELES UNS OMY apEQinavim} cAie rete 3 Richard Pells, Not Like Us, New York: Basic Books, 1997, oe. 31-32.196 HIIA IEXY= XONSiponoidvras pa. rria TEoGEeyyton. Mia. axadnuatxy pede ms moomayavbas ms MOAEuLarjc MEQUSoOU avegege: «H Aauregr axtiopohia ths agrotoxeatinrs SudxoLons Arav aoxery yia va OeQuéver woAAgs TayMpEvEs QEMOUITAL- mavinds nagdies xo va TEOKAAEGEL EVBOVOLAGEG yi TH YEh- QA TOU UNOEOVGE Va TAOGYEL TETOLA AELOMOEMELA, ZOMPSTN- TOL KALL TQOONVELEL»* Ou Hyvmpéves Moduteles to00x%Wenoav oxetixd xa8vote- oENLéva omy Léa HS XYONSILOTOMONS TAnEOMPoELdy xaL novatoteag yin SutAMpatixovs oxomovtc. To 1917, o Tode- 5e0¢ Tovvrooov Oviioov Syuoveynoe tv Exttgomy Tevi- xdv TAnoo@oeusy, n onota dievdvvdtav and to pfho tov, toy Sypocioyedpo Toogrt Koud. Aovieré tov Kota, cic, Atav «pia tegdotua exrxe(Qnon atHV TEOCHOHON TANQoPo- QLSV, n HEyaitEQn TEQUTETELA TOV xdopLoV oT Sio~prpt- on»? O Kola exépeve étt ot SQaotnELstHTES Tov yeapetou tov dev anoteAovoay moomayavda xan rita ames exmo- Sevtinés xan evnucomnnés. AAG ta yeyovora. duépevday tis agvijoeic tov. Metakd drwy, o Koh ogyéveve meoumyy- oeic, c&€Si5e PuAAGia ya «to Evayyéhvo tov yevotiavi- CUO», SnLoveynoE Eva EdeyYSuEvo aNd THY xUBEEVTON Sy- LooLoyeagixd ToeaxtooEio, Yodvtite Hote ol TAQaywyol xt- vytatoyoapimdy tavuiv va hapBévovv onévio mOAE WKS UMHS ua PEdvute Hote oL tales Vv’ ametxoviTovv Detixd my Aueounr® H Eniteomr Pevuxciv Tajgopoeuiv me0xdAe- G€ NOEs UROWles Oto KoyxQgoo xa Gtov apEQuavind 106 4 Harold Lasswell, oto BipA(o tov Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda in the 20th Century, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, o¢h. 37 5 Creel dmg exer xatagwotoret oto PiBdMo ts Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, New York: Hill & Wang, 1982, ae. 79. © Exo (810, oeh. 100.XPHEIMOMOIONTAS THN HIIIA ISXY ISf AL KATAOYONXE QCGWS pETa tTHV endvodo mM¢ ELerivs. H epgavioy tov eadtogevov ot Sexaetia tov 1920 od%{- MoE MOAAES xuBEovricetc Oto otiBo twv Eevoyhwoowv exo- paca ott omy Sexaetia tov 1930 o1 xoppouviotés om Zopre- Tun” “Evoon ? Rar OL Pactotes oy TeQuavia, xav ty Irovto, _avrayovEovtav vo. teowBroouv evvoinés endvec toy o~ adv zat tov EoAoyuiv tous om xoLi yvaun Ghhov yo- gay Extic ams tc EEVGyhMaoEs gadiopanvines EXTOUNES, vic. TEAELOMOMOE XAL TLS MOOMayavSLoTIMES é. OYCUPL tawvises. To 1937, 0 Boetavds v0veyos E€teounav, Avtovi Ivtev, ouvetSntomoinoe yuo tus véeg emnowovtes mg « whox. Tevixdtega, x00 o Puxods IIdkepos mQ0XYMQovoE, umyoée évas Suaxmeuopds avdpeca o’ Exetvous MOV Ta40d0- VIGV UTEQ TOV AOYOV Leow TOMITIOTINYS SuTAWpaTias —tE- yn, BipAia, avtadAdayés- ta onola etyav pia Peadvxtvyth ex(SQaon, xt exetvous MOV TadGOVTAY UTEQ TOV LEDWV TOL- xelas evnuéomons (oadispovo, xwnnatoyedpos, xwnwato- yeapnpéva exixaroa) ta omofa vmdoxovtay anecdtcocs HOLL ogatés emdocoeis!* Im Sudoxeva tov Pvyoot Modépov o1 vroomountés av- tay tov Sto aveipewv avraywviCovtray yu Tov TEdMO HE tov onoio Oa égene va exevSvoer n xvBEEvHoN OTHY Tra wox5. Ot «Qeadtotéc» Sev wetaxwovvtay ad MY GUECH TEO- nayav8a, eve o1 «Seadoréc» vroonjeitay Sty aAAayy ov- uxequpogds twv Eévov efveu mic, ovradiaxr Suadwacaota mou TVETEL vu peLpLeron oe YOSVIa'® Yarjg&ay, extons, Svaycyes 12 Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, eh. 215-217 3 Terry Deibel zou Walter Roberts, Culture and Information: Two200 HIIA IEXYE OXETIXG LE TO MdGO EhEDHEQa and xvPEOVHTIXG EAeyyo Oa éengene va. efvat ta vrootneitGueva and thy xvPéovnon mooyodupata. Tedixd, ovugwva pe tov Pdwyodkvt Ba- YUVAGITVED, TH CLUEOLKAVLAG EEMTEOLNA TOALTLOTLXG TOO- yodupata «arogeogiOnxav péoa om Sivy pas exvOetumjs avtxonpouviotimis eEwtegumrs WoAttixIjc». Tia tagadery- Ha, Lua zorevduvnjoia odnyla ty eoyy exeivn TEOGSLGEL- Ce St ot PiBAoOrxEs pas oto cEWteoixd «moémEt va eivor avnxemevixes, adhd, ad my Gdn tAeved, o fS10g 0 OgI- OUds To PIBALOOyXGV pas Eivor Tos MOSxELTAL YyLCL_ PLBALO- Orjnec evduxrjc oxomidtytas. To HAMITEQO TOV umoootpe va. edniCoupe ott Oa ucvoupe eivat va emniyoupe xa vo. Suom- Qrooupe THY pevdalceyon tS avTiRelLevinGtHtaS» 4 Yojoyé Wa Kern} yoopy avéyeoa omy my moonayavda. O Xévor TCE o Nestegos, évac a€wopa- toOUXOS Tou vTOUEyELOU BEwteguecv, unoyeaupioe Sut ta wE- QLOSIxG TOV AvTiMETamTav emixEitind THY xUBEEVTON TeOov- Lav xa Ta PipAtwv oyeTixG we QaTOLOTIXG Déwata evtumM- ofatay tous avayvaotes oto eEmtegixd pe Thy «aELomotia mS Vhyg tous». EmOgoeig ex usQous tov yeoovounoti TEd- Cep Maxdovur mooxGAcoay Eva ovvtOLO duaoTHUGA VoTEoLas xa hoyoxetotac, ahAd véec xatevduvnjates odnyfe¢ to 1953 anoxoréomoay tig tooQoomtes!> Ot ovyxeotceis autés ovvextotmnav mAEG tug Sudpoges avadwwoyavdcets tov aneoixavixdy Oeoucv Synudowas d1- TAwpatias xatd ta. exdpeva yodvia. H Stapevic ws Q0¢ to Foreign Policy Functions, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976, eh. 14- 15. 14 Wagnleitner, Cola-Colonization, o£). 58. 15 Mary Niles Maack, «Books and Libraries as Instruments of Cultural Diplomacy in Francophone Africa During the Cold War», Libraries and Culture 36 (Xeyusvas 2001), o€). 66.XPHEIMONOIQNTAS THN HMIA IZX¥ 201 n600 Gueoa Vf Euueoa Exoere va moCOMAArGEL n xUBEOVHON va ehéyEet ta péou. Hriac woxvos ms Sev efvar Suvatd va. Av- Oei axdhuta, exetdy xan o1 Svo mhEvees MQOPAAAOVY Paouna emixeloruata. Ext 46 (46 xQdvio peta to 1953, to KevtQ%d 6Q-_ yoo Syudsovas Suthoportas § Hrov to Tectogelo T ToQe(O TTANQApo- otGv Hyopévov Molteuiv (USIA). @ovy ms Apeovais 4 EvtTaYOnxE O° GUTS TO 1978, xa Oty Sexaetia tov 1980 y xv- Béovnon Pévyxav nocomGOynoe va cvvdéoet xa tug SVO vI- Qeotes We TOUS GpEGous OTSXoUS THE xUBEOVHONS!® To 1999, 7 USIA xaragyiOnxe xa ot Aertougytes Ms TEOU|MOay oTHV agHobisrta tov vrovgyeiou E€wteguady, étov Oa Betoxo- vray mhyoiotega Ota. xEVTOG Ars Twv aopdoEwy, EVE 1 Povy ms Aucoueris war Grow eSerSezevpevor otaOpot me- OLEOXOVIAY OTHY OWOSLSTHTA [LAS VEas StxopLaTLAIS vIT- Qeoiac, to LupPovMo AvevOvvtdv Padvopwviac. Uyweea, 7 Povi ms Apegurjs petadider oe 53 yidooes xan 0” Eva aRQOATIIQLO | 91 exatopnpvelwv avOgdmuv'!7 ~~ SHuavtxdteoy and tig avtigodtyHTEs THS aAvadLoEyava- Ong Hrav y XONAR MOoteQaLSmHTA MoV S6OnxE OTHY YTLA Loyd nord mH petamohewimy meQtoSo. Efvar adyOea Sw amo- yoouyras 0 Hodedeos Aikevydoveg eine ui Oa Exgeme va elxe aparoéoer YOYUATA Ud Tov TQECHMOAOYLOLS tv EVG- Tov dSvveuemy yuo. va evioxsoet thy USIA, adAG n avao- ed avty Sev rtav ovuPodmy. Kamovocg mapatmennis vsto- yodupioe: «Kavévas medeSQoc, we Oavi eGaigeon tov Nrovdut Aitevydoveg, dev Oeconoe onnavix6 to SievOvvay ms USIA. Emy Kofon tay Koupawxcdy Mugariioy, o [Siev- 16 Carnes Lord, «The Past and Future of Public Diplomacy», Orbis, Xewudvas 1998, o€h. 49-72. 17 Rosaleen Smyth, «Mapping US Public Diplomacy in the 21st Cen- tury», Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 3, 2001, oh. 429.202 HMIA IExyz Bvuvajs ms USIA “Evtovaovt P ) Maooou dev avayiyOnxe. Exwoyoe ™ Godon 6 Oehe va elvan omy anoyeiwon, dxt omy avayxaotxy eooyEetmon»'!® Axdun xar ova péoa. tov Wvxeo00 Tlokguov orm dexaetia tov 1970, 4 Tadhia “OLY PeQuavto S68evaw xequoodtega and tig Hvopéves Moktrel- £6, GE AMONUTOUS ALBUS, yLO THY TANEOHPORLAx] TOALTLRN ROL THY TOALTLOTLXT ELXOW@Via TOUS Hat Nn Boetavia xou H Taxwvia EddSevav mEQuoodtega ws MOGOOTS THY TEOTOAO- youd tous, 0,23 xa 0.14%, avtiotowya, oe ox€on pe TO 0,11% toW Avwpevov Todteusv To 1975, n «nyéuda Sbva- Ly tov ehevOeQou xdopov» xatatacodtav méunty peTaey tov Paoxdv Autixciv oupudyov oe xuBeovytiay exévdvon oe myés Yves voxvoc!? Meta. to tékog tov Puyo Tokguov, or Auegunavot ev- SuapEoovtay TEQLOOSTEQO yi TEOLKONES SaMAVaV xaL GxXL yuu exevdvoeg omy rtia LOX’. Amd to 1963 ws to 1993, 0 OLoomovoiaxds m0VMOAOyLOUGS SexamEVvtamAaoLaotHxE, GAG 0 MEdUmoAOyLOLGS Ths USIA averOyxe W6vo xatd 6,5 ooés. H USIA eixe meQuoadtegovs a6 12.000 vmardrjhous OTHY XOEKPHO THs OTA Léa THs Sexaetiag tov 1960, ahAG Ldvo 9.000 to 1994 nar 6.715 tus MaADApOVES TNS VITAYOYTS MHS oto unoveyeto E€mtequxdy”” H yma woxts parvdrtav avaho- oym. Avdyeca ato 1989 xo to 1999, o npoinokoy onde mys USIA, TOGAQHOOUEVOS Oyo AINBOQIOLOG, fpeunenmE x0 nord 18 Leo Bogart, Cool Words, Cold War, Washington, D.C.. American University Press, 1995, ced. xvii, xxix. 19 Deibel and Roberts, Culture and Information, 8). 23. 20 Bogart, Cool Words, Culd War, veh. xxiv, xu Leo Bogart, «History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001)», Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, undoyet omy wotocedtSa: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/8518. htm.XPHYIMOMOIQNTAZ THN HMIA IEXY 203 _ 10%. Evid OL YONMatodotovpevEs astd THY xUBEQVON eadio- uvixés exmoumés Epravay xa8e PSondda o10 [106 coptett- 26 TANBVOL xaL Oto 70% ws 80% tov mnOvopot ts Avo- toms Evocinns orn didgxeto. tou Wuyoo TMokguov, omv agyy tov véov auiva, UOis To 2% TH Agdpwv éxovye ™ Povij ms Apcouajs?? Ormdgor yr TV amootohy ths USIA omy Ivéoynoia, m peyahvtegn povcovlpavinr yea tov %0- ouov, TEELOE{OTXAN GTO [LLdd. ATS to 1995 ws to 2001, or axadnuainés nau mommotimes cevecr ayes peOnuay a6 45.000 oe 29.000 to xQdvo, xa TOME MOMMOTIAG ZEVTOD HOLL BipALioOrnes ExActcav? To 2003 n Mayxdopra Yimeeota. tov Fixe 150 Exatopptord oxgoareés TH Bd5oudda 0’ 6Ao tov ZOOUO, EVO N Pov ms Aveounris elye Mydtega 6-100 exo- rouptoue2? Ehay.oror Aueguiavol edeuzvay v? aytthappevo- Via Ott We [ice exavaoraon tS TreoPogtas o e€EMEN, 1 Heri. toys axoxtovce TEQLOasTEgN onnacia. Mévo peté to Dentéuforo tov 2001 avaxchuyay ex véov ov Apeguiavot m GHOVSAISMTO. TS enévdvons ora péon Htias Loxboc, GANG you TG averagxd’ to 2003 n Buvi ms Aueownaris wEQLEXO- we xata 25% us ayyh.spuves evacopmés ms?* 21 Anthony J. Blinken, «Winning the War of Ideas», o10 BipACo wu Alexander T J. Lennon, The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks, Cambridge, Mass.. MIT Press, 2003, 0). 287 22 Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, «How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy», Heritage Foundation Backgrounder no. 1645, Washington D.C.. Heritage Foundation, 2003, S.a8éoip0 omy wroaehtda: http://www. heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/dg1645.cfm, oe). 4. 23 British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC World Service, Annual Re- port 2002-2003, «Review of World Service and Global News», dia0éouo omy \otoceAida: http://www.bbe.cv.uk/info/report2003/pdfiworldservice. pdf, ofh. 4. 24 Sanford J. Ungar, «The Voice of America, Muffled», Washington Post, 10 Nozufetov 2003, aed. A25.