Jennifer Fendrick

PUBP-710 Final Paper

Jabhat al Nusra: Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?

Introduction
The United States has designated Jabhat al Nusra, also known as the Nusra Front,
the al-Qaeda offshoot currently operating in Syria, as a terrorist organization (Gordon,
Barnard). However, al Nusra has carefully cultivated its image in Syria as a localized
fighting force, as well as a humanitarian organization, having fought the Assad regime
alongside more moderate groups like the Free Syrian Army (FSA), while providing Syrians
with bread, medicine, and shelter. Thus, many Syrian reject this Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) appellationindeed, many deeply resent it.
This paper will explore the question of whether Jabhat al Nusra is deserving of their
designation as a terrorist organization. I submit that, in spite of their extensive
humanitarian work, local roots, and broad support base among the Syrian populationand
in spite of the lack of unanimity on what, exactly, terrorism is the Nusra Front does
qualify, in the broadest sense, as a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, this designation
does little to contribute to the advancement of U.S. strategic objectives in the region, and
may ultimately set them back.
Following a brief examination of the groups history, the paper will look at al
Nusras current status in Syria. It will then examine the broader question of who, or what,
is a terrorist, and whether or not al Nusra meet the criterion for such a designation. Finally,

it will provide a critical assessment of American policy towards al Nusra, and whether it
fits with the U.S.s overall strategic objectives in the region.

Brief History of Jabhat al Nusra

Jabhat al Nusra, which was founded by members of the late Abu Musab al
Zarqawis Islamic State in Iraq, has long sought to downplay their affiliation with al
Qaeda, portraying themselves as localized rebel group whose primary interest is in ousting
Syrian President Bashar al Assad (Hassan, Lister). Since its inception, Jabhat al Nusra has
remained shrouded in secrecy, operating, at least from the US point of view, in an
intelligence black hole. Most analysts believe the group was formed in late 2011, possibly
when then-Islamic State in Iraq (ISI, later the Islamic State) emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
sent an ISI operative, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, to create new jihadist1 cells in Syria
(Stanford). The State Department, meanwhile, claims that an al Qaeda emir, Abu Dua,
issued strategic guidance to al Nusras emir, Abu Muhammad al-Joulani, and tasked him
to begin operations in Syria (Nuland).
In April 2013, Baghdadi unilaterally announced that ISI and Nusra had effectively merged,
and that both groups would be operating under a single banner: The Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham, or ISIS (Hassan). Al Nusras emir, Joulani, responded by renewing his
groups allegiance to al Qaeda leader Aymen al Zawahiri, and rejecting Baghdadis
pronouncement (Cafarella). In doing so, al Nusra had no other choice buy to publicly
acknowledge its connection to al Qaeda.
1 While the term jihad can denote an internal, peaceful struggle against sin, also known as
greater jihad, this paper uses the term to refer to the external, physical struggle against the
perceived enemies of Islam, or lesser jihad.

The growing rift between ISIS and al Nusra reflected profound tactical, if not
ideological, differences between the two groups. While both sides sought to install a
Caliphate in the Levant, al Nusra has followed a gradualist approach, while ISIS favors a
more confrontational style. For al Nusra, the Caliphate was a longer-term goal, while ISIS
who declared that the territory it had captured in Syria and Iraq was the new Caliphate in
July 2014relied on immediate, and spectacular, victories (Caillet). In the interim, al
Nusra is pursuing a regional Islamic Emirate a localized Islamic state that will later be
part of a larger Caliphate (Benotman, Blake; Caillet).

Jabhat al Nusra in Syria

Though al Nusra never denied its jihadi-Salafi roots, the group initially sought to
distance itself from its al Qaeda origins, so as not to alienate the local Syrian population.
Al Nusra has borrowed heavily from Abu Musab al Suri, a prominent al Qaeda cleric who
emphasized, among other things, a more pragmatic approach to waging jihad (Hassan). In
February 2014, Sami al-Aridi, a Nusra member authorized by the groups leader, Joulani,
to speak on behalf of the organization, tweeted a list of commandments written by al-Suri
on the appropriate way to conduct jihadincluding such edicts as, beware of targeting
neutrals in the confrontation, even if they are infidels. (Cafarella). The group has also
claimed to represent a homegrown fighting force, a claim that is not without merit: unlike
ISIS, which relies heavily on foreign fighters, more than two-thirds of Jabhat as NUSras
fighting force is drawn from Syria itself (al-Monitor).
Al Nusra has effectively won over the hearts and minds of many Syrians by
presenting itself as the dependable, trustworthy, alternative to the FSA. Where the FSA has

appeared to be corrupt, disorganized, and inefficient, the Nusra Front has painstakingly
cultivated the opposite impression. For instance, at the outset of the civil war, as Syrians in
Aleppo province started to run out of bread, the FSA took over its four primary bread
factories. With only two of the factories in operation, the group often hoarded the bread
for its own fighters, and occasionally looted local bakeries (McEvers). Then, in December
2013, al Nusra seized the grain compounds. It provided the factories with fuel and offered
them protection, and more bakeries began to open. They erected a parallel governing body
that dispensed severe penalties for crimes such as looting. As Abu Kamal, a bakery owner,
observed, Jabhat al Nusra is not only providing a religious alternative, it is trying to
provide an alternative for the government, an alternative for the transitional revolutionary
council, and also an alternative for the international community (Ibid).

What is Terrorism?
According to terrorism expert Walter Laqueur, there are at least 100 definitions of
terrorism buried in the pages of various legal codes and scholarly texts. He concluded that
the only general characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence
and the threat of violence. Yet terrorism, as Jongman notes, is not the only enterprise
involving violence. So does war, coercive diplomacy, and bar room brawls. There are,
however, a few commonalities among these myriad definitions.
The targeting of civilians is one element that unites many of these disparate
definitions. In a nonbinding 1996 UNSC declaration, the United Nations defined terrorism
as any criminal act intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general
public, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,

religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them (United Nations). Many
of these laws do not only consider whether a group has carried out such attacks in the past,
but if they have the intention and capability to carry them out in the future. When
identifying possible candidates for its FTO designation, for instance, the State Department
looks at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future
acts of terrorism (Dept. of State).
Many characterizations of terrorism also involve resistance to power. Among the
numerous definitions of terrorism or terrorist activity in U.S. law, several allude to
disruption or coercion of the government. According to 18 US Code 2331, international
terrorism must include three primary elements: first, violent acts that are dangerous to
human life; second, it must be intended to influence the policy of a government by
coercion, or through violence; and lastly, it must occur outside the U.S. (FBI).
Finally, as far as the United States concerned, terrorist activity must be seen as
threatening its citizens or interests. If al Nusra is, indeed, simply an extension of al Qaeda,
then the threat that the group poses should be considered in light of the al Qaeda threat. As
Daniel Byman notes in Agbiboas piece, appeasing al Qaeda is difficult in theory and
impossible in practice, because of the groups broader agenda of rectifying perceived
grievances through global jihad.
Agbiboa also points out than Islamist groups are more likely to perpetrate lethal
attacks on civilians, compared to terrorists groups associated with other religions.2 He
traces this to the notion of lesser jihad, or holy war, that is enshrined in Islamic doctrine, as
well as the Islams veneration of the practice of istishhad, or martyrdom in the name of
2 Citing the Terrorism Knowledge Base, Agbiboa claims that between 1968 and 2005, 93.6% of
terrorist attacks and associated casualties were perpetrated by Islamist terrorist groups (Agbiboa,
cited in Piazza).

Islam (Agbiboa, Piazza). Ultimately, however, it is important to separate those who merely
believe in a strict interpretation of Islam, or Salafism, from those who are engaged in a
violent holy war.

Is Jabhat al Nusra a Terrorist Organization?

Despite having effectively ingratiated themselves with the local population (indeed,
most of their fighters are locally sourced), al Nusra does, broadly speaking, appear to meet
the definition of a terrorist actor. They have targeted civilian facilities (albeit those
associated with the Assad regime, whom they are
trying to depose), and have given refuge to a group
that is purportedly intent on launching attacks on
civilian, Western targest, Khorasan (Hassan, Lister,
Biename). They have also openly pledged
allegiance to al Qaeda, the group behind numerous
high-profile attacks on civilian targets, and whose

Combating Terrorism Center 1

terrorist bona fides are beyond question (Joscelyn).

Thus, on December 11, 2012, the US State Department officially designated Jabhat
al Nusra as a terrorist organization (LaFranchi, Nuland). In theory, this designation makes
it illegal for Americans to provide any financial backing for the group, and is designed to
stigmatize and isolate the group on the local and internal level (Dept. of State).
In her statement, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland claimed that
since November 2011, al Nusra was behind nearly 600 attacks on city centers throughout
Syria, where numerous innocent Syrians were killed. She accused al Nusra of portraying

itself as a legitimate Syrian opposition group, while it is, in fact, an attempt by AQI [al
Qaeda in Iraq] to hijack the struggles of the Syrian people for its own malign purposes.
Nuland also asserted that al Nusra shares the same leadership structure as al Qaeda, whose
emir, Abu Dua, is in control of both al Qaedas operations in Iraq and al Nusra (McCants).
Abu Dua himself was designated by the State Department and United Nations as a
terrorist in 2011.
Many opposition groups in Syria, including elements of the US-backed FSA,
protested al Nusras terrorist designation (LaFranchi, Gordon, Barnard). Upon hearing that
the group had been placed in the FTO column, Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, the then-president
of the Western-backed Syrian National Coaltion, gave a speech deriding the decision,
saying, There is nothing wrong with fighting in the name of Islam (LaFranchi). A
coalition spokesman added, We will work with everybody on the ground who has an
agenda which includes ending the suffering of the Syrian people. (Ibid). A group of 29
opposition groups, including several with American backing, signed a petition, No to
American intervention, for we are all Jabhat al Nusra, and encouraged their followers to
raise the groups flag in solidarity (Sherlock).
These groups viewed the US blacklisting of al Nusra as legitimating the Assad
regimes continued bombing campaign on rebel strongholds. Assad had long claimed that
all these groups were terrorists (Abu-Nasr), and designating Jabhat al Nusra, with its
largely local contingent of fighters, as such was seen a severe blow to the rebels fight
against the regime, and their quest for international legitimacy.
Nevertheless, in spite of the groups success in portraying itself as a homegrown,
anti-Assad insurgency (a not altogether disingenuous representation), al Nusra has engaged

in activities that fall within the general confines of a broad definition of terrorism.
Within the first few months of their incorporations, al Nusra was behind several
spectacular suicide bombings that killed scores of civilians affiliated with the Assad regime
(Lister). These tactics quickly chipped away at their support base amongst the wider
opposition movement, however, and they soon shifted to a more pragmatic model
(Hassan).
One of the most tangible link between the Nusra Front and what most analysts
would agree constitutes terrorist activity lies in Nusras support for the Khorasan group
(though the facts surrounding Nusras actual level of support remain murky, at best)
(Biename, Taylor). Khorasan is comprised of a number of veteran senior al Qaeda
operatives whom the United States has accused of conspiring to attack major Western
targets, including airliners (Taylor). James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, said
in September 2014,in terms of threat to the homeland, Khorasan may pose as much of a
danger as the Islamic State (McCoy).
Finally, it is worth noting that, while al Nusra may qualify as a FTO, the process for
designating groups as such is decidedly inconsistent. Many other groups operating in
Syria, including Jund al Aqsa, Ahrar al Sham, and Suqor al Sham, openly embrace the
concept of lesser jihad, and believe they are waging a war to secure a hardline Islamic state
(Joscelyn)3. Furthermore, al Nusra is not the only group to target civilians, not by a long
shot. Over the course of the civil war, the Syrian regime has repeatedly deployed chemical
weapons, including Sarin gas, against civilians, killing thousands (Charbonneau). It has
3 Indeed, one of the founding members of Ahrar al Sham was Abu Khaled al-Suri, an associate of
the al Qaeda mastermind ab Musab al-Suri. Starting in mid-2013, Abu Khaled was also asked by al
Qaeda leader Zawahiri to mediate between ISIS and al Nusra, and to parley al Nusras relationships
with remaining Salafi elements in Syria (Cafarella, Lister, McAnts).

also used starvation as a weapon of war, depriving entire cities of food for months at a time
(Kerry).

U.S.. Policy Towards al Nusra

Strictly speaking, Jabhat al Nusra does meet the criteria for a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, especially given their support for the Khorasan group, and their connection
to al Qaeda. This, however, may be beside the point: designating al Nusra as a FTO,
without bolstering remaining moderate groups in Syria, is ultimately counterproductive to
Americas mission in the region. The U.S. cannot afford to ignore the Nusra Front; should
the group prevail in a post-Assad Syria, they will could make good on their promise to
install a hardline Islamic State, and may well use the country as a base from which to
launch attacks on perceived adversaries and enemies of Islam, near and far. Thus far,
however, the FTO designation has only served to anger local Syrians, and push many of
them further into Nusras camp. The United State must act quickly to arm, train, and equip
the remaining moderate rebel groups, as well as ratchet up its humanitarian efforts.
Unfortunately, many of the many of these so-called moderate groups are often led by
brutal, corrupt warlords who are more interested in amassing wealth than defeating Assad
(Breslow).
The United States must careful to avoid designating a Salafist organization
operating in Syria as a terrorist group, simply because it adheres to this ideology. Indeed,
any FTO designation risks alienating the local population, as was the case following the
U.S.s al Nusra designation. It is important to separate Salafism from jihadism, and it is

encouraging to note that the U.S. is considering arming the Army of the Mujahideen, a
coalition of Islamist rebels in Syria (Amos).
Given al Nusras extensive humanitarian work in Syria, and their widespread
support among the local population, including many of the more moderate rebel groups
(particularly in the south), the U.S. must be prepared to fill the vacuum created by their
absence.4 Any successful counterterrorism strategy should include an extensive
humanitarian element, including disbursement of aid that is clearly marked as originating
from the United States.

Conclusion
Al Nusras actions do, indeed, conform to many definitions of terrorism, including
the United States. As such, U.S. cannot ignore al Nusra: as it becomes more entrenched in
Syria, a democratic transition becomes less feasible, and the group could eventually pose a
threat to American interests. However, given al Nusras level of support among the Syrian
public, the United States should refrain from engaging them outright. The group continues
to be one of the principal bulwarks against Assad and, as such, remains extraordinarily
popular among the Syrian people. Instead, for now, the U.S. should focus on train-andequip programs for Syrias ever-shrinking moderate opposition. Until these groups are
capable of providing an acceptable alternative to al Nusra, U.S. military, economic, and
rhetorical attacks on the Nusra Front will only serve to further alienate the local
population.

4 Al Nusras relationship with moderate rebel groups is complicated: in northern Syria, al Nusra
has been fighting several FSA-affiliated rebel groups, evicting them from much of southern Idlib
province over the last few months. However, in Quneitra and other southern provinces, the groups
continue to cooperate.

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