Professional Documents
Culture Documents
HW2: Game Theory
HW2: Game Theory
Last Name :
ID : _/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
1. Discussion questions
a. Are all dominant strategy equilibria also Nash equilibria? Are all Nash
equilibria also dominant strategy equilibria?
First Name :
Last Name :
ID : _/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
2. Problems
1. Do
2 problem all odd-numbered problems (pages 239-243 WJ) and check you
answer on pages 244-246.
I.
Suppose that a game have the following extensive form; what is the
equilibrium in the game? Can jerry undertake an action to prevent this
outcome?
B
Enter
Stay Out
J1
J2
Maintain current
Agressive if entry
Agressive Maintain
if entry current
(1,0)
(-0.5,1)
(0,1)
(0,1)
First Name :
Last Name :
ID : _/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
II.
There are two movie theaters in town. They agree to charge $p per ticket in
order to maximize joint profit. However each theater must consider whether
to cheat on the agreement and offer 2-for1 ticket price to its customers.
Consider th payoff matric below, depicting their payoffs in a game played
once.
Charge $9
Charge $9
(4000,4000)
(1000,6000)
(6000,1000)
(3000,3000)
i.
ii.
Solve for (if any) the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the game.
First Name :
Last Name :
ID : _/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
iii.