208 PHYSICS PHYSICS BOOK II entally” (When I say "as opposed to asceatall | ing of the Kind of case in which a man mig! __ Bis own good bealth because be was 2 doct ‘sue that it was not his own good Beaith be 2 doctor, but thet it was an accident of their being thems: __ the case with all things that are accidentally their own causes,PHYSICS loving. And, so, the shape is the zeal nature: civat wwation 2s @ contrary, where simple coming into Jeing is concerned, i 2 question thet we must look into later. hheve defined the number of ways ia which cen of we tiust 100K into the difereace ‘pathematican ané the natural scientist. For lane suxiaces, volumes, lengths, and Fer it qo know what the sun and the mooa ‘Know anything of their ewential attributes aii nefure) scientists plaialy do inquire he sen end moon, and into Whether tbe ree are epbericel or not ses as these afe studied by mathematicians 23 well a5 by natural scientists, but not by virme of their being mts of naturel b ° ‘and yet not Gury is concemed with the ps pass studies the mathemascal than que mathematical Siage the term “nanire” is vsed im two ways, both of forme and of mation, we must investiga it fo the way in which we fact, two arts that cont 2 that of the man who uses the product and tha? process. Thus, in what has to do with art, we make our matter = FE214 PHYSICS for the purpose of the jobs io what bas to do with nature, 4 fs already there. Further, matter is a relative term; different forms beve different kings of matter, ‘How far, thea, ought the netural scientist to know the form and the essence? Should it not be in the way that the doctor knows the sinew, or the smith bis bronze? That & to say, be ‘Should irnow the purpose of each thing: and his knowledge es {0 Go with things whose forms can be seperated conceptnally, ‘ut are in fect embedded in matter. For man generates man— but the sun does 50, too. As to the stete and nature of what gen be septate is the task of fst pllosopiy to determine = 3. Now that we have drawn these distinctions, we must inguire further into causes, and see what the various Kinds ‘of cause are and how many they are, Since ovr treatment of ‘he subject aims at knowledge, and since we believe ousselves to know anything only when we can say why it is as it is— which i fact means grasping its primary eause—plainly we must try to achieve this with regard to coming-to-be and per Sshing and all natural change, $0 that we may Snow whet their principles aze and mey refer to them everything into which we ineuire. 3m one sense, what is described 2s 2 cause is that out of Which 2 thing comes into being and that which remains present in it Such, fer instance, is bronze in the case of 2 stale, of silver fa the case of 2 cup, as Well as the genera 10 which ‘hese materials belong. In another sense, the form and pattern are 2 cause, that is, to say the account E: i Boox 25 couse of his doing so. All the intermedi ‘come into being nus; they are, howev the one being its matt of one thing as being, contrary: for instance,Dulder or builder who fe actually of which these causes are said ‘instance, sey neither that Polycli- the sculptor is, but, rather, that zuse are only six in number, who is practicing his art exists as such for the same length 2 a5 the man who is being healed exists as such, and it is the same with regard to the man building and the house jon of chance, and why they all, instead, thought seems, thet nothing at all happens by So that these thinkers should at least have made some mentionspre reueasie irs als and plants do net exist 2 things alweys come s usually €o, clearly t bappens by chance can be described same way, and tithis purpose, of if be bad ud not be said to bave e8, of What happens by chance must be ence, chance, too, seems to be part of What and to be cbscure to man; and in 2 sense bem to come to be by chance. All these views gs that €o not happen in this causes in this way are inde- urther, good fortune is with good reason regarded as some- thing insecure, since chance i insecure; for nothing that Bappens by chance can happen either always or usually. Both of Shance and spontaneity, then, are, as we have said, and among these they are causes Sea Ae aes sat Gestapo ance; but anything done to them by chance Spontaneiy, o the otber ‘and, can2 causes, end Zomnally be cavses, and since228 PEYsics to make the cor grow, be sent Petished, and continue t0 do so, as Empedocles says bap- th his “menaced oxen.” id ofzers Hike if, are the ones tat might | are best as she does them: Zeus : ¢ - | | | | i | | being matter, and in another shape, which is the end—and since everyting else bas the end as its purpose, it is in fact i eePRYSICS