2006 Political Law Case Digests

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005

Facts: UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to

be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins.
The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing
operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which
thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of
Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant
directing the police to seize finished or unfinished products of UNILAB,
particularly REVICON multivitamins. No fake Revicon was however found;
instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml
bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by
UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the
custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court
granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search
warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are
considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the
boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The
court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened,
contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view
doctrine.

Held: It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under
the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant
cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove
that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the
executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial

intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a

particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items
were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the
plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of
officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the
the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their
contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed
that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed
boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew
the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the
petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to
the seized items.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

PEOPLES JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN

G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005

Facts: On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the Peoples Journal

claiming that a certain Francis Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly
shoots wayward neighbors pets that he finds in his domain. It also claimed
that BF Homes residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara,
requested for the deportation of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of such
incident in the future. Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect
and admiration he enjoyed in the community. He is seeking for damages.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a
social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest,
promote the public good and protect the moral public (sic) of the people,
and that the story was published in good faith and without malice.

Issue: Whether or not the news report fall under privileged communication

and therefore protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech.

Held: The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is not protected speech.
In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara
is privileged communication, it lost its character when the matter was
published in the newspaper and circulated among the general population,
especially since the individual alleged to be defamed is neither a public
official nor a public figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the BF
Homes residents did not ask for the deportation of Thoenen, more so because
the letter of the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for verification of
Thoenens status as a foreign resident. The article is also untrue because the
events she reported never happened. Worse, the main source of information,
Atty. Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer.
There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the
intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances societys interest in
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate. Calculated falsehood falls into
that class of utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality The knowingly false statement and the false statement
made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional
protection

CUSTOMS SEARCH

TOMAS SALVADOR vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005

Facts: On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special
Operations Squadron conducted routine surveillance operations at the Manila
Domestic Airport to check on reports of alleged drug trafficking and
smuggling being facilitated by certain PAL personnel. They were ordered to
keep close watch on the second airplane, an Airbus 300 parked inside the
Domestic Airport terminal. At around 11:30 that same evening, three (3)
persons had boarded the Airbus 300. The team did not move, but continued

its surveillance. At 12:15 a.m. the team leader reported that the three (3)
persons who earlier boarded the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their
abdominal areas bulging and then boarded an airplane tow truck with its
lights off. At the Lima Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and
stopped the tow truck. The team leader identified himself and asked the four
(4) persons on board to alight, and approached Aurelio Mandin whose uniform
was partly open, showing a girdle. Then, a package wrapped in brown
packaging tape fell. Suspecting that the package contained smuggled items,
the leader yelled to his teammates, Positive! Thereupon, the rest of the
team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who surrendered without
a fight. The team searched their bodies and found that the three were
wearing girdles beneath their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in
packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while petitioner and Santos
had four (4) each. The team confiscated the packets and brought all the
accused to the PAFSECOM Office.

Issue: Whether or not the seized items are admissible in evidence.

Held: Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and
seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant. These recognized
exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3)
customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk
situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special
mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to
verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in
the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team
on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As
such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search
warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law. Law
enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff
laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any
article, cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to
suspect that the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in
violation of the tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a
warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding or
conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, vs. HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA

G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005

Facts: On July 2, 1996 the accused were arrested fro possession and transport
of marijuana leaves (in bricks). They were charged with the violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, with the information containing the fact that
they were in possession of and were transporting, selling or offering to sell
42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops. The accused was then
arraigned, pleaded guilty and convicted. Subsequently they applied for
probation. Thereafter the prosecutors office filed two motions to admit
amended information (claiming that the marijuana recovered was 42.410
kilos, not grams) and to set aside the arraignment of the accused; the
accused then moved to quash the motion raising the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not double jeopardy attaches.

Held: To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must
be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction
to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has
been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation
of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words,
if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence
may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter
according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. The
inescapable conclusion, then, is that the first information is valid inasmuch as
it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily
the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the
charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
Moreover, an administrative order of the Supreme Court designated Regional
Trial Courts to exclusively try and decide cases of violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, regardless of the quantity of the
drugs involved. (PP. vs. Velasco)

Therefore, the requisites of double jeopardy being present, the defense

attaches.

EMINENT DOMAIN

REPUBLIC, as represented by the NIA vs. CA and FRANCISCO DIAZ

G.R. No. 147245. March 31, 2005

Facts: Manuel Diaz owned approximately 172 hectares of property devoted to

the planting of palay. The property was located in La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija, and allegedly yielded between 132 to 200 cavans of palay per hectare
every year. After Manuel Diazs death, his son, Franciso Diaz, was appointed
administrator of the property.
In 1972, the National Irrigation Administration bulldozed ten (10) hectares of
the Property to build two irrigation canals. Although the canals when finished
occupied only a portion of the 10 hectares, the entire area became prone to
flooding two months out of every year because of the side-burrow method
NIA used in the construction of the canals. NIA completed the canals without
instituting expropriation proceedings or indemnifying the propertys owners.
Respondent then sought compensation from NIA for the land affected by the
canals, as well as for losses due to unrealized profits. In 1980, NIA belatedly
offered to buy the portions of the Property occupied by the canals pursuant to
NIAs expansion program. The 1980 deeds of sale were never implemented.
Respondent did not receive any consideration pursuant to these deeds. On 20
August 1993, respondent, as administrator of the Property, filed an action for
damages and just compensation against NIA. NIA countered that
respondents right to bring the action had prescribed in accordance with RA
3601, as amended by PD 552. NIA also argued that respondents failure to
pursue the implementation of the 1980 deeds of sale amounted to laches.

Issue: Whether or not prescription or laches bars the respondents right to

just compensation.

Held: The principle of laches finds no application in the present case. There is
nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents claim for
compensation. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should

be compensated if his property is taken for public use.

Eminent domain is the inherent power of a sovereign state to appropriate
private property to particular uses to promote public welfare. No one
questions NIAs authority to exercise the delegated power of eminent domain.
However, the power of eminent domain is not limitless. NIA cannot exercise
the power with wanton disregard for property rights. One basic limitation on
the States power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that,
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
The thirteen-year interval between the execution of the 1980 deeds of sale
and the 1993 filing of the complaint does not bar the claim for compensation.
This Court reiterated the long-standing rule that where private property is
taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto
either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners action to recover
the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.

BAIL
JUDGE NAPOLEON INOTURAN, vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362. May 6, 2005

Facts: Mario Balucero was charged before the RTC of Makati Branch 133, the
presiding judge of which is Napoleon Inoturan, with the violation of BP 22.
Balucero, however, failed to appear during arraignment despite notice.
Inoturan then issued a bench warrant against him. Balucero was
subsequently arrested in Bacolod City, but was released upon posting of a
property bail before the MCTC of Pulupundan, Negros Occidental, which order
was signed by Judge Manuel Limsiaco, Jr. The arraignment of Balucero was
subsequently set, but he failed to appear notwithstanding his receipt of
notices. Inoturan then ordered that the property bond be cancelled and
forfeited. He then ordered Ignacio Denila, the Clerk of Court of the MCTC to
forward the property bond. Unable to comply with Inoturans order, Denila
was cited in contempt and was detained. Denila was ordered released by
Limisiaco. Upon investigation, the Office of Court Administrator found that
Judge Limsiaco ordered the release of the some other accused although they
did not post bail. Limsiaco was administratively charged for gross ignorance
of the law and negligence in the performance of his duties.

Issue: What are the requisites before an order for release can be given in
cases of bail?

Held: Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions herein after specified. It is
thus clear that without bail, an accused under detention cannot be released.
As found by the investigating Judges, accused Balucero did not post bail but
still respondent Judge Limsiaco ordered his release.
A person applying for bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of liberty. Indeed, bail is unavailing with respect to an accused who
has not voluntarily surrendered or has yet to be placed in legal custody. In
this case, Limsiaco issued the Order for the release of accused Balucero on
November 21, 1996 or fifteen (15) days before December 6, 1996, the day he
was actually arrested.
Moreover, Limsiaco acted without authority in approving Baluceros alleged
application for bail. Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that if the accused is arrested in a province, city of
municipality, other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed with any
Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein. Here, respondent should not have approved Baluceros application
for bail. It is only one of the 14 Branches of the RTC in Bacolod City which has
the authority to act thereon.

POLICE POWER

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC.,
respondent.
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005

Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia,
that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be
prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the
common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b)
all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable

starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all
jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the
city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the
ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police
power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of
police power, i.e. lawful subject and lawful means.

Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised

its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of
relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest
warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper
exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the
issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang
Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are
characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary
to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the
terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees,
rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found
by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine
exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the
law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its
reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If
the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even
tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

COMMISSION OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE, VIOLATION OF REVENUE REGULATION

NO. 4-93

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al vs. LILIA B. ORGANO

G.R. No. 14995, February 26, 2004

Facts: Respondent Lilia B. Organo is a revenue collection officer of the BIR,

Revenue Region 7, Quezon City. On May 13, 1997, then BIR Commissioner
Liwayway Vinsons-Chato filed with the BIR a formal administrative charge
against petitioner for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
Respondent filed a verified answer, in which she admitted that she had no
specific authority allowing her to receive withholding tax returns and check
payments. She alleged in her counter-affidavit that her duties as collection
officer consisted merely of collecting delinquent accounts and performing
other tasks that her supervisor would assign to her from time to time; and
that her acceptance of the withholding tax returns and check payments for
transmittal to BIR-authorized banks was a mere assistance extended to
taxpayers, without any consideration.
The administrative case against respondent was transferred to the Office of
Ombudsman, which adopted the proceedings, evidence/exhibits presented
at the administrative proceedings before the BIR. In due course, it rendered
its decision finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is liable for grave misconduct.

Held: The Court held that by accommodating and accepting withholding tax
returns and checks payments respondent disregarded as established BIR rule.
Revenue Regulation No. 4-93 requires payments through the banks precisely
to avoid, whenever possible, BIR employees direct receipt of tax payments.
Yet, respondent was not deterred from making accommodations that
circumvented this provision.

To compound matters, her acts were essential ingredients paving the way for
the commission of fraud against, and consequent damage to, the
government. Her claimed ignorance thereof cannot erase her liability.
Obviously, she disregarded the established practice and rules. In the face of
her silence, the fact that the checks ended up in an unauthorized BIR account
eloquently speaks, at the very least, of her gross negligence in taking care of
collections that should not have passed through her hands in the first place.
Because of her complicity in the transgression of the cited BIR regulation as
well as her gross negligence, respondent is administratively liable for simple
misconduct and is suspended for six months.

POWER OF COA

RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003

Facts: The Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted
to themselves RATA, rice allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and
year-end bonus and cash gifts, as authorized by Resolution No. 313 of the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The COA disallowed and ordered
the refund of these allowances as they are not allowed by P.D. No. 198, the
Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.

Issue: Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance

not authorized by law even if authorized by the LWUA.

Held: Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the
government agencies, including government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCC) with original charters. The COA is vested with authority
to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. A Water
District is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created pursuant to special
law, PD 198. The COA can disallow allowances not authorized by law, even if
authorized by the LWUA.
Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good faith,
without knowledge that payment had no legal basis, the allowances need not

to be refunded.

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN
APPLICABLE

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION (NTC)
G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003

Facts: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Petitioners filed
with the RTC a petition to declare the circular as unconstitutional. A motion to
dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on
certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.

Held: 1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers

and (b) quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative
or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. To be
valid, such rules and regulations must conform to, and be consistent with, the
provisions of enabling statute.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions,
the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them for their official action and exercise of discretion in a
judicial.
2. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative body contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is the duty of the Courts

of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there haw
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The NTC
circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.
Hence, the action must be filed directly with the regular courts without
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.
3. Where the act of administrative agency was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, exhaustion of administrative remedy is required,
before going to court.
4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases
involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In such
case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 ( THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1998) PENALTIES WHICH
ARE FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE;

RENATO HERRERA v. ELMER BOHOL

G.R. No. 155320. February 5,2004

Facts: Renato F. Herrera, former Director III at DAR Central Office, approved
the request for shift of item number of Plaridel Elmer J. Bohol, a Senior
Agrarian Reform officer at the BARIE. The shift or item number from 577-1 of
Fund 108 to 562-3 of Fund 101 resulted to Bohol ontaining his salary under
Fund 101. When Bohol was informed that he could not draw his salary under
such item anymore because his item was recalled and was given to another
person, he charged Herrera before the Office of the Ombudsman, with Grave
Misconduct and/or Inefficiency and Incompetence. The Ombudsman found
Renato Herrera guilty of simple misconduct and was suspended for one
month without pay. Such decision was contested by Herrera and he even

appealed to the CA on the ground that he did not fail to take measures to
correct respondents recall; but, such petition was just denied by the CA.A
petition for review was raised to the SC stressing that one month suspension,
as stated in the Ombudsman Act of 1998, is appealable considering that it is
not among those enumerated as final and unappealable.

Issue: Whether or not the provision in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1998, providing suspension of not more than one months
salary is final and unappealable.

Held: Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770 states that: any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more
than one months salary shall be final and unappealable
Salary suspension is an effect of work suspension following the no work, no
pay principle. It will be the employee concerned who will be suspended and
such suspension without pay,being final, and unappealable, is clearly
expressed the law. RA No. 6770, therefore, is a legal and clear basis of
denying the petitioners appeal.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY;HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT OR A SUPERIOR

OFFICER SHALL NOT BE CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE WRONGFUL ACTS.OMISSION
OF DUTY, NEGLIGENCE FOR MISFEASANCE OF HIS SUBORDINATE.UNLESS HE
HAS ACTUALLY AUTHORIZE BY WRITTEN ORDER OF THE SPECIFIC ACT OR
MISCONDUCT COMPLAINED OF

ALBERTO V. REYES, ET AL. v. RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL (BULACAN), INC.ET.

AL,.
G.R. No. 154499, February 27, 2004

Facts: In a letter dated May 19,1999, addressed to then BSP Governor

Singson, RBSMI charge the petitioner with violation of RA No. 6713 ( code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). The
Monetary Board (MB) of the BSP created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate
the matter.
The ensuing investigation disclosed that sometime in September 1996,

RBSMI, which had a history of major violations/exceptions dating back to

1995, underwent periodic examination by the BSP. The examination team
headed by Principio noted serious 20 exceptions/violations and deficiencies of
RBSMI.
Through Resolution No. 96, the MB required RBSMI to submit within 15 days a
written explanation with respect to the findings of the examiner. It also
directed the Department of Rural Banks DRB), to verify, monitor and report to
the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) on the
findings noted, until the same shall have been corrected.
Meanwhile on June 13,1997, the MB approved Resolution No. 724 ordering
RBSMI to correct the major exceptions noted within 30 days from receipt of
the advice, and to remit to the BSP the amount of P2,538,483.00 as fines and
penalties for incurring deficiencies in reserves against deposit liabilities.
More than a year after, however, the RBSMI asked for a reconsideration of MB
Resolution No. 724 insofar as the imposition of fine amounting to P
P2,538,483.00.On January 21, 1999, the MB adopted Resolution No. 71,
authorizing the conditional reversal of sixty of the dispute on the findings on
reserve deficiency. Subsequently, on April 7, 1999, the MB approved the
interim reversal of the entire amount of the penalty pending the outcome of
the study on the legal and factual basis for the imposition of the penalty.
The above incidents, particularly the alleged brokering by Reyes and the
petitioners unsupported recommendation to impose a penalty of
P2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency, prompted the respondent to file
the letter-complaint charging the petitioners with unprofessionalism.
In the Decision if March 14,2003, this Court found Deputy Governor Reyes
and Director Domo-ong liable for violation of the standards of
professionalism prescribed by RA 6713in that they used the distressed
financial condition of respondent RBSMI as the subject of a case study in one
of the BSP seminars and did the brokering of the sale of RBSMI. The Court
modified the decision of the CA by reducing the penalty imposed from the a
fine equivalent to six monthssalary to a fine of 2 months salary for Reyes
and one month salary for Domo-ong.
The court exonerated petitioner Proncipio of the Administrative charges. The
exoneration is subject to RBSMIs Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the Superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the
wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence or misfeasance of his
subordinate officer.

Held: The immunity of public officers from liability for nonfeasance,

negligence or omissions of duty of their official subordinate and even for the
latters misfeasance or positive wrong rests, according to MECHEM, upon
obvious considerations of public policy, the necessities of the public service
and the perplexities and embarrassments of a contrary doctrine. These
official subordinates are themselves public officers though of an inferior
grade, and therefore directly liable in the cases in which any public officer is
liable, for their own misdeeds or defaults.
Under the Admin Code of 1987, which provides that head of a department or
a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of
duty, negligence, misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually
authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.

ELECTION LAW

RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO
P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

Facts: In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed
the duly elected President of the Philippines. The second-placer in the
elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed an election protest before the Electoral
Tribunal. When the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment, his
widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces filed a motion to intervene
as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She claims that there is an urgent
need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband to ascertain the
true and genuine will of the electorate in the interest of the Filipino people.
The Protestee, GMA asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the
proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is
personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. Protestee also
contends that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the
registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the
presidency may contest the election of the president.

Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during

the pendency of the latters protest case?

Held: Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may
contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may
be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or
to the protestee, hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a
real party in interest. Note that Mrs. FPJ herself denies any claim to the office
of President but rather stresses that it is with the paramount public interest
in mind that she desires to pursue the process commenced by her late
husband. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in
determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. In such
intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be
in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this
protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome
should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the
highest number of votes.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR.,
ET AL.
G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004

Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed R.A. 8046 (An act authorizing the
COMELEC to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election
system and pilot-test it in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and for other purposes). On December
22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. 8436 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to
use an automated election system in the May 11, 1998 national or local
elections and in subsequent national and local electoral exercises, providing
funds therefore and for other purposes).
On October 29, 2002, COMELEC adopted its Resolution 02-0170 a
modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings
for the three phases of its Automated Election System: namely, Phase I-Voter
Registration and Validation System; Phase II-Automated Counting and

Canvassing System; and Phase III-Electronic Transmissions.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 172, which allocated the
sum of P 2.5 billion to fund the AES for May 10, 2004 elections. She
authorized the release of an additional P 500 million, upon the request of
COMELEC.
The COMELEC issued an Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid. There
are 57 bidders who participated therein. The Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC)
eligible. Both were referred to Technical Working Group (TWG) and the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
However, the DOST said in its Report on the Evaluation of Technical Proposals
on Phase II that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in
technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, the COMELEC en banc
issued Resolution No. 6074, awarding the project to MPC.
Wherefore, petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines
wrote a letter to the COMELEC chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. They protested
the award of the contract to respondent MPC. However in a letter-reply, the
COMELEC rejected the protest.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

awarding the contract to MPC in violation of law and in disregard of its own
bidding rules and procedure.

Held: The Court has explained that COMELEC flagrantly violated the public
policy on public biddings (1) by allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in the
bidding even though it was not qualified to do so; and (2) by eventually
awarding the contract to MPC/MPEI. It is clear that the Commission further
desecrated the law on public bidding by permitting the winning bidder to
alter the subject of the contract, in effect allowing a substantive amendment
without public bidding.

SPECIAL ELECTION

ARTURO TOLENTINO AND ARTURO MOJICA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

SENATOR RALPH RECTO AND SENATOR GREGORIO HONASAN

G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004

Facts: Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as VicePresident of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed
Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special
election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14,
2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC
proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators
to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full
term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked
13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed
the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution
No. 01-005.

Issue: Whether or not the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be
nullified: (1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and (2) for
not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Held: (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special
election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the
happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of
notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a
nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the
failure to give notice of the special election is whether want of notice has
resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the
result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial
number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to
fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the
COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a
nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates

and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such
requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of
R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if necessary, and
state among others, the office/s to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special
election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the
Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as
introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by
which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However,
upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the
resolution by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF COMELEC

BAYTAN ET AL. VS. COMELEC

GR No. 153945. February 4, 2003

Facts: Reynato Baytan registered as a voter in two precincts and the

COMELEC En Banc affirmed the recommendation of its Law Department to file
information of double registration in violation of the Election Code. Baytan
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari on the grounds, among
others, that there was no probable cause and that election cases must first
be heard and decided by a Division before the COMELEC En Banc can assume
jurisdiction.

Held: 1. It is well- settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution
of election offenses rests in the sound discretion of the COMELEC. Generally,
the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC, absent a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the
exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same.
2. Under Sec. 2, Art. IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The administrative powers are

found in Sec 2. (1), (3) to (9) of Art IX-C. The Constitution does not provide on
whether these administrative powers shall be exercised by the COMELEC en
banc or in division. The COMELEC en banc therefore can act on administrative
matters, and this had been the practice under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. The prosecution by the COMELEC of violations of election laws
is an administrative power.
3. The exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to
Sec.3, Art.IX-C which expressly requires that all election cases, including preproclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and
the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.

IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

BAROT VS. COMELEC ET AL.

GR No. 149147. June 18, 2003

Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections Barot was proclaimed the 10th winning
candidate for councilor of Tanjay City, Negros Oriental. On May 29, 2001 the
Chairman of the Board of Canvassers sent a Memorandum to the COMELEC
requesting for authority to correct the Certificate of Canvass and to proclaim
Tabaloc, instead of Barot, as the 10th winning candidate for Councilor, by
errors committed by the Board of Canvassers. The COMELEC considered the
Memorandum as a petition, and after notice and hearing, granted the
request. Tabaloc was proclaimed the 10th winning Councilor. Barot filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for and prohibition.

Held: 1. Rule 27, Sec.5, par (b) of the COMELEC Rules provides that a petition
for correction must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of
proclamation, impleading the candidates who may be adversely affected
thereby. Rule 1, Sec.4 of the COMELEC Rules also provides that in the
interest of justice and in the order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters
pending before the Commission, these rules or any option thereof may be
suspended by the Commission. The filing of the petition beyond the 5- day
period was upheld in the interest of justice, it having been clearly shown that
it was Tabaloc and not Barot who was the 10th winning candidate for
councilor.

2. The COMELEC had the authority to consider the Memorandum of the

Chairman of the Board of Canvassers, after notice and hearing, may even
motu propio correct errors committed by in the tabulation of the votes.

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY

NAVARRO VS. COMELEC

GR No. 150799. February 3, 2003

Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections and
during the canvassing, he petitioned the Board of Canvassers (BOC) to
exclude the election returns contained in nine (9) ballot boxes on the ground
that said boxes were not secured by the required 3 padlocks. The BOC
denied the petition and petitioner appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELEC
en banc denied the appeal and ordered the BOC to proceed with the
canvassing and proclaim the winning local candidates. Petitioner lost in the
election.

Held: 1. Lack of the required number of padlocks on the ballot boxes is not a
proper issue in a pre-proclamation controversy. The issues that may be raised
in a pre-proclamation controversy are enumerated in Sec 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code, to wit:
a. Illegal composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers;
b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects,
and appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in
other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and
236 of this Code;
c. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

d. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were

canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the
aggrieved candidate or candidates.
This enumeration is exclusive.
2. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election
returns on their face and the COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond
the face of the returns and investigate the alleged election irregularities. In
the case of Baterina, et al. v. COMELEC, 205 SCRA 1, the following facts were
shown: (a) failure to close the entries with the signatures of the election
inspectors; (b) lack of inner and outer seals; (c) canvassing by the Board of
copies not intended for it; (d) lack of time and date receipt by the Board of
the election returns; (e) lack of signatures of petitioners watchers; and (f)
lack of authority of the person receiving the election returns. It was held that
while said facts may, indeed, involve violation of the rules governing the
preparation and delivery of election returns for canvassing, they do not
necessarily affect the authenticity and genuineness of the subject election
returns as to warrant their exclusion from the canvassing. Above facts are
clearly defects in form insufficient to support a conclusion that the election
returns were tampered with or spurious.
3. The COMELEC en banc validly ordered the proclamation of the winning
candidate even during the pendency of the appeal to the COMELEC from the
BOCs denial of the petition for exclusion of the questioned election returns.
RA 7166, Sec 20 (I) provides as follows:
(i) The BOC shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by
the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objection brought to it on
appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation in violation hereof shall be void
ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of
the election.
Above-quoted provision applies only where the objection deals with a preproclamation controversy.

IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

COMELEC VS. TAGLE, ET AL.

GR No.s 148948 & 148951, February 17, 2003

Facts: In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, candidate for Mayor
Florentino A. Bautista filed a complaint against Mayor Federico Poblete et al.
for vote buying in violation of Sec 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election
Code. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99 of the RTC
of Imus, Cavite. Subsequently, a complaint for vote-selling in violation of Sec
261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code was filed with the Prosecutors Office as
witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus,
Cavite filed separate Informations for vote-selling against said witnesses. On
appeal, the COMELEC en banc declared that the witnesses in Criminal Case
No. 7034-99 were exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to 4th
paragraph of Sec 28, RA No. 6646, otherwise known as The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 which grants immunity from criminal prosecution to
persons who voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those
liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. The Law Department of the COMELEC
moved to dismiss the Informations against the said witnesses but the RTC in
Imus, Cavite denied the motion to dismiss.

Held: 1. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of votebuying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from
criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. Sec 28 of RA
No. 6646 concludes with the following paragraph:
The giver, offeror, the promissory as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient
and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, that any person,
otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and
willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or
proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the
offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were given:
Provided, further, that nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal
prosecution for perjury or false testimony.
2. To avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers,
especially by the latters opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn vote-sellers
who denounce the vote-buying that they could be liable for perjury or false
testimony should they not tell the truth.
3. The prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 are exempt from
criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the last
paragraph of Section 28, RA 6646. At the time when the complaint for voteselling was filed with the office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents
had already executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of

vote-buying. It cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily given
information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Crim.
Case No. 7034-99.
4. The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation
of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute
the same. The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or
their respective assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as
deputies of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints
involving election offenses and to prosecute the same. This authority may be
revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment,
such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the
COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it believes that the
successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. When the
COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, it in effect
withdrew the deputation granted by the COMELEC.

PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING

PANGKAT LAGUNA VS. COMELEC ET AL.

G.R. No. 148075. February 4, 2002

Facts: On January 30, 2001 then Vice Governor Teresita Lazaro succeeded to
the office of the Governor of Laguna when then Gov. Jose Lina was appointed
Secretary of the DILG. Upon assumption of office as Governor, Lazaro publicly
declared her intention to run for Governor in the coming May 2001
elections. Subsequently, she ordered the purchase of trophies, basketballs,
volleyballs, chessboard sets, t-shirts, medals and pins, and other sports
materials worth P4.5 millions. Gov. Lazaro bidded 79 public works projects on
March 28, 2001. Pangkat Laguna, a registered political party, filed a petition
for disqualification of Gov. Lazaro for premature campaigning.

Held: 1. The act of Gov. Lazaro in ordering the purchase of various items and
the consequent distribution thereof of Laguna, in line with the local
government units sports and education program is not election
campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly
prescribed under the pertinent provisions of Sec 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

2. Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish the allegation that public funds

were released, disbursed, or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period
provided under the law and implementing rules. Absent such clear and
convincing proof, the factual findings of the COMELEC cannot be disturbed
considering that the COMELEC is the constitutional body tasked to decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections.

PUBLIC CORPORATION / PUBLIC OFFICERS

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS; SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN; MAJORITY OF ALL

THE MEMBERS REQUIRED TO CONSTITUTE QUORUM

MANUEL ZAMORA VS. GOV. JOSE CABALLERO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 147767. January 14, 2002

Facts: Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Compostela Valley, filed before the RTC a petition to invalidate all acts
executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions held
on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum. Said sessions noted the
resignation letter of Board Member Sotto, declared the entire province under
a state of calamity and approved the Governor to enter into the contract with
the Allado Company. Zamora, the petitioner, argued that the Sanggunian,
during its February 26 session, conducted official business without a quorum
since only 7 out of the 14 members were present. He further questioned the
February 8 sessions validity arguing that only 7 members were present and
the failure to provide written notice to all members at least 24 hours before
the holding of the special session. Respondents argued that Board Member
Sotto was in the United States during such sessions and that the actual
number of Board Members in the country was only 13 which, they claimed,
should be the basis for the determination of a quorum. Such petition raised
by Zamora was dismissed by the RTC but reversed and granted by the
Supreme Court.

Issues: 1) Whether or not Section 53 (a) of the LGC provides and specifies
applicable rule regarding the determination of a quorum.

2) Whether or not Sanggunian Members who are abroad should not be

included in the counting of the entire Sangguniang body.

3) Whether or not the approved decisions during the sessions, alleged to be

without quorum, is deemed to be valid.

Held: Section 53 (a) of the LGC states that : A majority of all members of the
Sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to
transact official business. Quorum is defined as the number of members of
a body which, when legally assembled, will enable the body to transact its
proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it
power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. When required to
constitute a quorum, majority means the number greater than half or more
than half of the total.
As further stated, it requires the majority of ALL members of the Sanggunian.
Quorum should, thus, be based on the total number of members regardless of
whether or not a member is said to be abroad.
Therefore, in cases where decisions have been made during sessions deemed
to have not met the required quorum, such sessions and decisions shall be
considered void.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT; 3-TERM LIMIT

RAYMUNDO ADORMEO VS. COMELEC, ET AL.

G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002

Facts: Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, reelected in 1995, but lost to Tagarao in 1998 elections. Tagarao was recalled
and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections, Talaga won and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for
Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections, and a petition for cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has served as Mayor
for three consecutive terms.

Issue: Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms.

Held: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office. He must also have been elected
to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification
can apply.
In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2
years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted
by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that
unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the
purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowedthis
comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas applies only to members
of the House of Representatives. Unlike government officials, there is no
recall election for members of Congress.

PUBLIC OFFICERS; ANTI-GRAFT

MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA VS. HON. PRIMO. MIRA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 148944. February 5, 2003

Facts: City Mayor Garcia was charged by Ombudsman Special Prosecution

Officer Jesus Rodrigo Tagaan for violation of the Anti-Graft Law as a result of
his having entered into a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt
batching plant for three years. The joint affidavits of State Auditors Cabreros
and Quejada alleged that petitioner entered into the contract without
available funds appropriated to cover the expenditure in violation of Sections
85 and 86 of P.D. 1445 or the State Audit Code of the Phil.; that petitioner
exceeded the authority granted him by the Sangguniang Panlungsod; and
that the contract is manifestly disadvantageous to the City. Note however
that thereafter, Special Prosecution Officer Tagaan resigned from his office
and his name was withdrawn as complainant in the case. Instead of filing a
counter-affidavit, Garcia filed with the Supreme Court a petition to prohibit

the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation on the ground

that there is no sufficient complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint/affidavits filed against Garcia is sufficient

in form or manner.

Held: For purposes of initiating a preliminary investigation before the Office of

the Ombudsman, a complaint in any form or manner is sufficient. The
Constitution states that the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of
the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the government. In Almonte vs.
Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, we held that even unverified and anonymous letters
may suffice to start an investigation. The Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who,
through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay, or dismiss
investigations against them. The joint affidavits of State Auditors Cabreros
and Quejada contain allegations specific enough for petitioner to prepare his
evidence and counter-arguments.
The fact that Special Prosecution Officer Tagaan already resigned from his
office and that his name was withdrawn as complainant in the case is of no
consequence. First, Tagaans report and affidavit still form part of the records
of the case. He can still be called by subpoena, if necessary. Second, Tagaan
was only a nominal party whose duty as special prosecutor was to investigate
the commission of crimes and file the corresponding complaint whenever
warranted. Since the illegal acts committed are public offenses, the real
complainant is the State, which is represented by the remaining
complainants.

PUBLIC OFFICERS; APPOINTMENT; CONFIRMATION BY COA

ATTY. ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBEN LISTA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003

Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by
the President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and

they assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office,
which requires confirmation of the COA.

Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the
constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the law or act is
invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot
even be classified as a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest as
such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing
power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred
from the Department of National Defense to the Office of the President, and
later to the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).