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Kick Tolerance Misconceptions and Consequences For Well Design
Kick Tolerance Misconceptions and Consequences For Well Design
Jerome Schubert,
SPE, is an assistant
professor in the
Harold Vance
Department
of Petroleum
Engineering at Texas
A&M University. He has more than 30
years experience with Pennzoil, Enron
Oil and Gas, the University of Houston
Victoria Petroleum Training Institute,
and Texas A&M University. Schubert
earned BS, ME, and PhD degrees in
petroleum engineering from Texas A&M
University. He is a coauthor of Managed
Pressure Drilling and the author of
more than 35 technical papers. Schubert
serves on the JPT Editorial Committee
and has served on several SPE
committees and as a Technical Editor
for SPE Drilling & Completion. He serves
as Faculty Advisor for Pi Epsilon Tau.
Schubert is a registered professional
engineer in Texas.
WELL CONTROL
Procrastination: Is it too many things going on at once that causes us to rush
to meet deadlines, or makes us forget to complete important tasks in a timely manner,
or even try to do too many things at once, resulting in nothing getting done correctly?
You probably are wondering how this relates to well control. In our work schedules,
we all are faced with situations in which we are required to complete multiple concurrent tasks. This often is the case when we rush to finish drilling a problem well so that
we can get the drilling rig moved to the next location and turn this well over to the
completions team. Multiple activities must be completed concurrently that, individually, are relatively simple, but each activity requires the attention of the driller, tool
pusher, company man, and others on the crew. When one of these tasks begins to go
awry, our attention may be on something else, and we can miss important warnings
until it is too late to avoid a disaster.
What is the point? Once again, I will use the Macondo blowout as an example. To
leave the well in a position to be completed by another crew, mud had to be removed
from the riser and top of the well and be replaced with seawater. A spacer was pumped
between the mud and seawater to prevent mixing of the seawater and mud. This is a
simple enough operation, it seems, but when seawater is being pumped into the well,
mud has to be pumped onto a workboat to prevent the pits from running over, and the
spacer is being dumped overboard; keeping track of how much of each fluid is going
where becomes a daunting task. Could this have been a contributing factor in not recognizing the beginning of the kick? JPT
84
Introduction
Even though kick tolerance is a critical and fundamental concept for the
drilling industry, there is no standard
used by operators, drilling contractors,
or training institutions. Hence, there
are several definitions of kick tolerance
and different ways of calculating it. This
lack of consistency may be why the subject is not well understood and, therefore, is sometimes used dangerously.
Definitions of kick tolerance may be in
terms of pit gain, mud-weight increase,
or underbalance pressure.
Another point of disagreement is
on how the predicted pore pressure
should be used in calculations. Some
companies use a value greater than the
mud weight, while others use a value
greater than the predicted pore pressure. Despite the variations, the goal
is consistent: to use a procedure that
ensures safe drilling of a well. Often,
Kick-Tolerance Calculation
Current Approach
The first step of a simplified kick-tolerance calculation (i.e., constant temperature, constant density, and no compressibility) is to define the maximum
vertical height of a gas influx Hmax at the
casing shoe (assumed to be the weakest
point in the open hole). Hmax is determined on the basis of fracture gradient;
mud weight; kick-fluid density; predicted pore pressure; and adjusted maximum allowable annular surface pressure
(MAASP), which is reduced by a safety
margin. What is conceptually wrong is
that if the bottomhole-assembly (BHA)
length is greater than Hmax, the kick
cannot be circulated out of the wellbore because it will reach the top of the
drill collars with a kick height greater
than Hmax, which would induce losses
at theshoe.
Misconception 1:
Kick Volume Around the BHA
To address this point properly, an
extra calculation must be performed if
This article, written by Senior Technology Editor Dennis Denney, contains highlights
of paper SPE 140113, Kick-Tolerance Misconceptions and Consequences for Well
Design, by Helio Santos, SPE, Erdem Catak, SPE, and Sandeep Valluri, Safekick,
prepared for the 2011 SPE/IADC Drilling Conference and Exhibition, Amsterdam, 13
March. The paper has not been peer reviewed.
Misconception 2:
Safety Margin
The safety margin can lead to an overly conservative solution. This conservative approach can lead to the use of
unnecessary casings and liners in the
well design, especially in deep water.
It has been widely accepted that when
calculating kick tolerance, a safety margin should be applied to the MAASP to
reduce the chance of inducing fractures
during a well-control event. MAASP is
calculated on the basis of fracture pressure at the casing shoe (assumed to be
the weakest point in the open hole) and
current mud weight above the casing
shoe. In most cases, the safety margin
comprises three components: chokeoperator error, annular frictional pressure loss, and chokeline frictional pressure loss. Some companies and publications call for the use of only the first
two terms as safety margin. Although
each well section is different, many procedures establish a fixed value for the
safety margin to be used when calculating kick tolerance. Typical values are
150 or 200 psi. A value of 100 psi is
assumed for the choke-operator error
and the remaining for the frictionalpressure-loss component. Because the
physical principle and rationale behind
the annular frictional pressure loss and
For a limited time, the complete paper is free to SPE members at www.jptonline.org.
JPT JANUARY 2012
85
Misconception 3:
Simplification
Current kick-tolerance calculations are
based on many assumptions and simplifications. The belief is that these simplifications represent the worst-case scenario, thus leading to a safe well design.
Afterflow Effect. Usually, for the sake of
simplicity, the afterflow effect is ignored.
Therefore, kick tolerance is considered
equal to the maximum allowable pit gain.
In reality, the formation continues to
flow until the casing pressure increases
enough to equilibrate the bottomhole
pressure to the sandface pressure at the
point of influx. Accordingly, when determining maximum allowable pit gain,
the additional flow into the well after
shut-in must be considered. This afterflow volume may be significant, especially for deep wells with large bores.
Some companies use a fixed value (e.g.,
10 bbl). This simplification can lead to
a conservative result. However, companies not taking this effect into account
may encounter dangerous situations. In
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Combined Correction
Effects on Kick Tolerance
Because some effects increase the kick
tolerance while others reduce it, it is
important to combine all the effects to
identify the overall effect on kick tolerance. The consequences are not consistent, illustrating why it is important to
take all effects into account. It has been
argued that the overall conservative
nature of the single-bubble model will
eliminate any detrimental effect produced by simplifications. Because the
magnitude of each simplification and
conceptual error is different, the change
of the final result cannot be predicted. If
it is clear that a conservative approach
is being used, the consequences might
be only economical, with the end result
being an overengineered well. However, when the scenario leads to increased
risk, as is the case with calculating the
kick volume on bottom, this simplification should not be acceptable. JPT
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88
Introduction
The detection of inflow from a formation is one of the primary safety aspects
of drilling operations. Even with a closed
wellbore and with the use of MPD technology, kick detection and the subsequent well-control procedures must
remain in place. The rig crew can get a
false sense of security that with MPD,
the well is controlled at all times and as
such there is no further need for well control. The causes of kicks are not removed
when MPD operations are being conducted. The procedures and risk assessments for MPD operations must include
kick-detection and well-control methods
andprocedures.
MPD Operations
Fig. 1 diagrams the MPD flow process.
The RCD is installed on top of the annular preventer and closes the wellbore
around the drillpipe. The outlet from
the RCD is split between the main return
flowline and the MPD choke manifold.
The MPD manifold is installed in parallel
with the rigs main flowline and in parallel with the rigs conventional rig choke
manifold. This setup allows conventional circulation and circulation through
the MPD manifold. Backpressure can be
applied to the well at any time by use of
the MPD manifold. Any gas being circulated out through the MPD manifold
can be vented safely through the mud/
gas separator. If the surface pressure
exceeds the RCD pressure ratings, the
entire well-control setup can be switched
quickly to standard drilling well-control
equipment. During tripping operations,
This article, written by Senior Technology Editor Dennis Denney, contains highlights
of paper SPE 143099, Kick Detection and Well Control in a Closed Wellbore, by Steve
Nas, SPE, Weatherford, prepared for the 2011 IADC/SPE Managed Pressure Drilling
and Underbalanced Operations Conference and Exhibition, Denver, 56 April. The
paper has not been peer reviewed.
circulation with the trip tank can be performed through the MPD manifold or
through the existing flowline.
When MPD equipment is used, it
is important that the secondary wellcontrol equipment, such as blowout preventer (BOP) and rig choke manifolds,
remain ready for operations. The secondary well-control equipment should
not be used for routine drilling operations during the MPD operations.
Causes of Kicks
A kick is defined as any influx that constitutes a well-control emergency. Normally, this means use of the BOP to shut
in the well and, subsequently, removing
the influx by use of a choke on the annulus to maintain sufficient backpressure
to prevent further entry. In MPD, the
well-control emergency may not apply
because the system is already set up for
this occurrence.
The pressure in the wellbore can be
controlled with surface pressure, but if
the formation pressure is greater than
the pressure in the wellbore and a formation is permeable, then the well will kick.
Loss of primary well control usually is
caused by the following.
Insufficient drilling-fluid density
(insufficient BHP)
Failure to keep the hole full while
tripping
Swabbing while tripping
Lost circulation
Kick Detection
Detecting a kick early and limiting its volume by shutting in the well are critical to
secondary well control, and they could
mean the difference between a manageable situation and one that leads to loss of
control. Immediately following an influx,
the BHP in the annulus is reduced to
some extent by the influx and by the
added lift energy given by the formationfluid flow. This effect leads to a decrease
For a limited time, the complete paper is free to SPE members at www.jptonline.org.
JPT JANUARY 2012
89
Main Flowline
Bleedoff
Valve
Shale
Shakers
Rig Choke
Manifold
Gas to vent
Mud/Gas
Separator
Trip-Tank Fillup
Trip
Tank
Trip-Tank
Pump
Kick Detection in
Closed Wellbores
Closing in the wellbore with an RCD,
in principle, does not change the physics of kick detection. Although the level
in the well is not visible, the increase in
return-flow rate and increases in pit levels remain the most-reliable indicators
of a kick. The use of mass-flow meters
in combination with accurate standpipepressure sensors enables use of an automated kick-detection system on some
MPD systems. This system works during
drilling conditions, but when tripping or
making connections, the flow out of the
well often is the only reliable indicator of
a well-control issue.
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Ballooning
Borehole ballooning or breathing, or
loss/gain, is the result of slow mud losses while drilling ahead followed by mud
returns after the pumps have been turned
off, such as during a connection or flow
check. Usually, any flow during these
periods is cause for concern because it
may be caused by an influx of formation
water, liquid hydrocarbons, or gas. Any
influx from the formation can result in
a well-control problem, the magnitude
of which depends on the influx volume
and composition. However, if the flow is
the result of mud returns, well control is
not an issue.
To be safe, the suspected influx can
be circulated out using the choke, but this
method is time consuming and wasteful,
particularly if the influx is only returning mud. The normal cure is to increase
the mud weight and ensure an adequate
overbalance in the absence of circulation.
If the mud weight is increased and the
influx is only mud, the situation will get
progressively worse with a rise in mud
weight and, therefore, the equivalent circulating density (ECD). Mud losses will
continue, and, eventually, the fracturepropagation pressure will be exceeded,
resulting in total losses.
Handling a Kick
Well control can be described as maintaining BHP within a window having
upper and lower pressure limits. On the
low side, the margin normally is bounded by pore pressure and wellbore stability, whereas on the high side, it can be
bounded by differential sticking, lost circulation, and fracture pressure. A kick is
detected in a closed wellbore by use of
the mass-flow meter. With an MPD system installed, there are two choices to
circulate out the influx.
With MPD Equipment. The MPD choke
manifold makes it possible to continue circulating, increase the backpressure
on the well until the flow in and flow
out are balanced, and then circulate out
the influx using the drillers method.
This procedure will work if the forma-
With Rig Equipment. If a kick is detected, conventional well-control procedures can be used as follows.
1. Pull up and space out the drillstring.
2. Stop the pumps.
3. Close the BOP.
4. Record the shut-in drillpipe pressure and the shut-in casing pressure.
The shut-in drillpipe pressure will
provide the level of underbalance (formation pressure), while the shut-in casing pressure will give an indication of the
kick size and density. The pit levels can
be measured to confirm the influx.
Kick Volume and Intensity. The kick
volume is the volume of formation fluid
that entered the wellbore. The volume
gained at surface will provide an indication of this volume. The kick intensity is defined as the pressure difference
between the hydrostatic pressure in the
well and the formation pressure.
With these two parameters, the decision can be made whether to handle the
kick with the MPD system or to close the
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International Association
of Drilling Contractors
www.iadc.org
tion rates, and pressures must be continued by the rig crew, as in all drilling operations. Although a well is drilled with
MPD techniques and can be controlled
with the MPD system, the driller must be
able to take over at any time in the wellcontrol process.
It has been seen in several MPD
operations that well-control preparations by the drill crew were not being
performed because the crew relied on the
MPD provider to conduct well-control
operations. Upon entering a well-control
circulation and the system needing to be
switched to lower pump rates and a different pressure, this lack of preparation
can cause significant issues during the
well-control operations.
MPD Operators
and Well Control
If the detected influx is small and has a
low kick intensity, it is possible to circulate the kick out using the MPD equipment. The drillers method normally is
used for this, and the MPD operator must
hold the drillpipe pressure constant while
the driller circulates the kick out. Once
the influx reaches the surface equipment,
the MPD operator must divert any gas
away from the main flowline to a suitable
mud/gas separator.
This process assumes that all MPD
operators have the experience and
understanding required for well-control
operations. Before any MPD operations
are conducted, it must be verified that
all MPD personnel operating the choke
understand the procedures and actions
required when a kick is detected. The
MPD operator must understand the wellcontrol situation fully. Both the MPD
operator and the driller must maintain
a close watch on the surface pressures to
ensure that these remain within the limits of the equipment being used.
Advantages of using the MPD equipment for well control include that the
pipe can be moved up and down and
can be rotated and that stuck-pipe incidents, often associated with well-control
operations, can be avoided. If something
goes wrong at any time during an MPD
well-control situation, the driller must
be able to stop the pumps and shut in
the well using the BOPs and then continue the well-kill operation using the rigs
chokemanifold. JPT
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Well-control
equipment
Practices address
reduced reaction time
Introduction
Operators are aware of these behaviors, and the industry has developed
unique practices for drilling vugular carbonates safely. Rigs having surface BOPs
address the risks by use of a rotating
control device (RCD). RCDs have been
used in a similar fashion at the surface
on marine risers with subsea BOPs. The
RCD has been installed at the top of the
riser above the slip joint, and a tensionring system is under development that
will enable the RCD to be placed below
the slip joint. In subsea applications, the
pressure that can be applied below the
RCD is more limited than on land locations, usually to the rating of the slip
joint or marine riser. In some cases, the
rating is adequate for the given well. In
This article, written by Senior Technology Editor Dennis Denney, contains highlights
of paper IPTC 14423, Kick Mechanisms and Unique Well-Control Practices in
Vugular Deepwater Carbonates, by F.E. Dupriest, SPE, ExxonMobil, prepared for
the 2011 International Petroleum Technology Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, 1517
November. The paper has not been peer reviewed. [Note: Conference rescheduled to
79 February 2012.] Copyright 2011 International Petroleum Technology Conference.
Reproduced by permission.
other situations, the pressure limitations of the riser system or RCD may not
provide the robust capability needed.
Because the conference was rescheduled, the complete paper will be free to
SPE members at www.jptonline.org during March and April 2012.
94
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Swap Management
The industry is trained to manage kicks
by circulating through a choke and
applying sufficient backpressure for
the pressure in the annulus to become
overbalanced to the flowing zone. This
method is ineffective with a vugular loss
because the BHP will remain equal to
the pore pressure in the vugs regardless
of the backpressure observed at surface. In addition, if losses are complete,
there is no flow and pressure cannot
be applied. The influx can be stopped
permanently only by plugging the loss
zone to stop the flow cell. The common
practice of filling the annulus continu-
ously, which has been learned empirically, is a correct one. But filling the
annulus does not stop the flow. Actually, continuous introduction of heavy
mud across the carbonate ensures that
the imbalance that drives the flow cell
is maintained and that the influx will
continue to occur. Because there is no
operational technique to allow the BHP
to be elevated above the pore pressure
in the exposed vugs, and the mud that
is pumped to fill the annulus drives even
more influx, the kick response should
be first to determine the fill rate that
exceeds the swap rate and then to maintain this fill rate until the vugular zone
can be plugged. This method is referred
to as swap management. It does not
stop the influx, but it does allow the
annulus pressure to be controlled at the
desired level during treatments or while
drilling ahead.
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