Evan

Jovanny
Steve
Nyla
Illinois vs. Wardlow
On September 9th, 1995, a four police car caravan, was going to an area that was known for
drug trafficking. The caravan eventually rounded a corner where the respondent Wardlow was
standing with an opaque bag. When respondent Wardlow looked in the direction of the police
cars he began to flee. Respondent Wardlow ran through an alleyway and a gangway until he hit
the street where the last police car in the caravan pulled over and officer Nolan exited his car
and stopped the respondent. Nolan, immediately after stopping respondent Wardlow, began a
patdown search of Wardlow. After concluding his patdown of Wardlow, Nolan, turned his
attention to the bag that Wardlow was carrying. Officer Nolan squeezed Wardlows bag and felt
a heavy, hard object similar to the shape of a gun (I vs. W). Officer Nolan then arrested
respondent Wardlow. An Illinois trial court convicted Wardlow of unlawful use of a weapon by a
felon. This conviction was eventually overturned when the court concluded that Nolan didnt
have reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop pursuant to Terry vs. Ohio (I vs. W).
Was the officer's stop and frisk of Wardlow justified under Terry v Ohio?

In the ruling of Brown v Texas 1979, it states that the Fourth Amendment requires that "such a
seizure be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require
such action, or that the seizure be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral
limitations on the conduct of individual officers". This ruling also comes from Terry v Ohio 1968
where they ruled that an officer must have reasonable suspicion in order to detain an individual.
The Rules we are applying to this case requires us to address three different Rule questions.
The Rule questions we will be applying are Brown v. Texas, U.S v. Bond, and Terry v. Ohio. In
this case Illinois v. Wardlow , Defendant Wardlow fled upon seeing an unmarked vehicle driving
through the area known for heavy narcotics trafficking unknown to the petitioner is that the
vehicle was a police patrol unit. The police officers had no clear evidence that Wardlow was
committing a crime, it is a citizen's right to avoid police contact. While in court Officer Nolan
testified that he was in uniform that day, but he did not recall whether he was driving a marked
or unmarked car. Wardlow could have seen an unmarked car as a threat to his safety and
began to flee because he thought that his life or belongings could have been in danger. The fact
that Wardlow was in a high crime area and the fact that he fled does not mean that he was
committing or was about to commit a crime. Even so, when the frisk happened they found
nothing which should have ended their search. However, they continued to search his bag and
then arrest him which is unlawful because if they wanted to search his bag they should have
arrested him first, though they would not have been able to arrest him because they had
absolutely no evidence that he was committing a crime after they frisked his person. If anything,

they had reasonable suspicion at best which only warranted a frisk, which they did. They should
not have proceeded to search his bag because they did not have any factual evidence.
The officers had absolute no solid facts that Wardlow committed any crime. So to
conclude that the search was not a violation of Wardlows rights is unreasonable due to the fact
being that one, Officer Nolan cannot remember whether or not he and his partner were in a
marked or unmarked patrol vehicle. Two being in Florida v. Royer, the fact that the petitioner ran
away from the police does not give them reasonable suspicion. Due to the Neighborhood being
classified as bad, the occupants must know that it is bad. So when Wardlow saw an unmarked
vehicle following him, he took flight not knowing that the vehicle had police officers inside. We
can make this type of assumption because of the fact that Officer Nolan cannot remember
whether the caravan was in marked or unmarked patrol vehicles.