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Irish Theological Quarterly Volume 42 Issue 4 1975 (Doi 10.1177/002114007504200406) Palma, R. J. - Robert Grosseteste's Understanding of Truth PDF
Irish Theological Quarterly Volume 42 Issue 4 1975 (Doi 10.1177/002114007504200406) Palma, R. J. - Robert Grosseteste's Understanding of Truth PDF
above).
justified.
JEREMY MOISER
83.
Alcuin, Epistola 11, PL 101,158: nullatenus homo perire poterit sicut
quodlibet. Cf. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo 1,18, PL 158,384.
animal
on
301
De
philosophischen
Beitraege
zur
302
its
own
being
or
course, different
these here.
In speaking of truth
terms as
reettis, and similis. Here we note that he derives terms from Augustine,
Anselm, and the traditional definition of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus.
He operates with all these expressions and the meaning may shift depending
on a particular usage or application.
Grossetestes understanding of truth is made up of four basic categories of
truth: viz., the summa veritas which may be termed ontological truth, the
veritas rerum which I term ontic truth, intellectual or cognitive truth, and
logical or propositional truth. In having these four basic categories Grosseteste
is certainly not offering a striking innovation within the Augustinian tradition,
but what is noteworthy is his persistent concern that these categories be
foundational for all other truth, and the former includes the Verbum Dei or
Senno Patris as ground and norm of created truth. Grosseteste begins his
treatise on truth by citing John 14:b: &dquo;Ego sum via veritas et vita&dquo;. Hic ipsa
Veritas dicit se esse veritatem.3 He shares Anselms concern to distinguish
sharply and clearly between the truth which is foundational and measures and
that truth which is relative and measured. This is very explicit where he states:
Et complectitur haec definitio etiam summam veritatem, quae est rectitudo
rectificans simul cum veritatibus rerum, quae sunt rectitudines rectificatae.99
Elsewhere he states that the human intellect is not determinative of the
principles of being: Non est enim intellectus effectivus principiorum ....10
Grosseteste is very insistent that subordinate truth be kept subordinate. This
concern is expressed repeatedly in a number of different ways and places.
Another facet of Grossetestes doctrine of truth, which could be predicated
of his thought in general, may be considered a corollary of the feature just
cited. This facet concerns the matter of coherence and the attempt to achieve
a grand synthesis or coherent system. As far as I know, Grosseteste has given
us no grand and coherent synthesis or system in the form of a magnum opus
or theological-philosophical summa. Father Daniel Callus argued that he
planned to compose a Summa Tlzeologiae or Summa Sententiarum.l1 One
7.
8.
9.
10.
34.
De Veritate, BW
De Veritate, BW 130.
De Veritate, BW 135.
Comm. Post. II. 6, f.43.
303
could argue that he didnt achieve such because of his wide range of interests
and inquiry, his temperament, and the need to assimilate a vast amount of .
new sources at his disposal. In view of his doctrinal stance, I do not believe
that such assimilation would have been a prerequisite to composing such a
system or synthesis. Over against the above, I would propose that he neither
felt compelled nor was he especially concerned to construct a grand coherent
intellectual or doctrinal system. Furthermore, I believe that he sensed a
certain inadequacy in the face of the ineffable grandeur of the truth. I dont
doubt that he had the ontological foundation required for such a system. He
speaks of an ultimate visio of the truth. However, because of his stress on
ontological and ontic truth, and his firm belief in a radical coherence and
symmetry in the very being of the st~rnrrta veritas, the eternal ratiolies
expressed by the Verbum Dei, and the consequent coherence within the
created order, it could be expected that he felt less of a need to achieve
coherence and synthesis in terms of an intellectual or doctrinal system. This
does not mean_ that the latter is of no importance to him nor that it cannot
be realized in some measure. hlans intellectual effort should mirror something
of the ratio and coherence within the truth of being. In passing, I would also
point out that Grosseteste does not make extensive use of what I term strict
coherence, viz., necessary logical truth. Augustine uses the latter more than
Grosseteste. This difference in appeal to strict coherence brings us to another
facet of Grossetestes doctrine of truth which may be contrasted with another
emphasis found in Augustines understanding of truth.
Grosseteste does not share Augustines urge and need to turn from without
oneself and to turn within oneself in the quest for truth and certitude. Gordon
Leff states that Grossetestes position was founded upon St Augustines
conception of truth as in the mind.12 D.E. Sharp asserts that Grossetestes
theory of knowledge becomes, like that of Augustine, a metaphysics of inner
experience .... , 13 I do not believe that such statements can be accepted
without some important qualifications. It is true that Augustine attaches
considerable importance to the human mind as a locus of truth and to the
reflection of the mind upon itself in seeking knowledge of the truth. He
stresses that the interior truth and teacher must be listened to. 14 Truth is the
interior light&dquo; with which the mind has immediate contact. Truth and
certainty is to be sought within ones own mind. Ratio says: Avertere ab
umbra tua, revertere in te ....16 Elsewhere he says: Noli foras ire, in te ipsum
1948) 180-94.
12.
G. Leff, Medieval Thought (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962) 187.
13.
D.E. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century (London:
Oxford University Press, 1930) 34-5.
14.
De Magistro 11.38-12.40.
De Vera Religione 55
15.
.113, CCSL 32:259-60.
16.
Soliloquia II.19.33, Migne, PL 32:901.
304
corrumpi potest.8
Although several other features of Grossetestes doctrine of truth are
worthy of consideration, only a couple of additional facets can be discussed
here. Like Anselm, Grossetests wrestles with the question whether truth is
single or multiplex, a question tied up with the whole matter of the
pluralitatem et distributionem of the name of truth, the application of
concepts, universals, etc. One would miss what is at stake here if one were
simply to dismiss the issue as arising from linguistic confusion and a lack of
critical acumen regarding language and meaning. For Anselm and Grosseteste
something very important is at stake here. Both Anselm and Grosseteste are
very concerned to point out that the summa veritas has its own unique status
which is radically different from that of created and contingent entities.
Grosseteste wants it clearly understood that when we speak of a true created
entity, we do not thereby intend to attribute to it divinity.9 He states: Item:
in nullo communicant creator et creatura. Univoca autem in aliquo communicant. Ergo creator et creatura in nullo univocantur.20 While Grosseteste
17.
18.
19.
305
seeks to guard against sheer equivocation, he stresses that words like ens and
veritas cannot be applied to particular beings without diversity in intentio .
He even believes that the sense of terms applied to the summa veritas must be
intuited and perceived in the summa veritas himself. The supreme truth has
its own unique status and is always in view no matter what kind of truth is
being discussed. Grosseteste makes this point when he says: But perhaps the
name of truth is nowhere applied except to signify in some way, at least
adjacently or obliquely, the supreme truth as form of the name. For as the
truth of a thing can not be understood except in the light of the supreme
truth, so perhaps it is not to be hypostasized through the name of truth
except when it bears the significance of the supreme truth 21
Grossetestes epistemology is very much determined by and bound up with
his doctrine of truth. There is a type of realism in his epistemology which
corresponds to his emphasis on created singulars and the twofold plenitude of
being of created things. He holds that the human knower can have direct
knowledge of things themselves and their truth. The cognitive subject comes
to know things themselves, not merely an image, a concept, or a phantasm
which represents the thing. A phantasma may be required as a means to an
end, but it is transcended inasmuch as intdlectus, enim, et scientia
apprehendunt res in puritate essentiae suae, sicut in seipsis sunt 22 By virtue
of such factors as divine illumination, the intelligibility of truth, right willing,
etc., one can directly perceive the degree of being and truth of the singular
thing. In the light ~of the supreme truth one can view the truth of things.
In conclusion, certain consequential deficiencies in Grossetestes doctrine
will be pointed out. By virtue of the fact that only the immutable and
intelligible really deserve to be termed truth, although everything that is may
be termed true insofar as it is, it follows that the mutable, the contingent, and
the sensible are relegated to an inferior position. Grosseteste refers to
contingent reality as corruptible truth: Item: in futuris et contingentibus
videtur esse veritas corruptibilis. Veritas autem, quae Deus est, nullo modo
est corruptibilis.23 Truth&dquo; is most properly applied to what is wholly
abstracted from time, change, and even the possibility of change. The
immutable-mutable and eternity-time dichotomies affect Grosgetestes view
of the corporeal and the contingent, and the latter is consequently viewed
more as a sacramental and symbolic order which simply reflects that which
really deserves to be termed truth, viz., eternal immutable truth. Moreover,
the inherent value and intrinsic worth and efficacy of mutable entities and
historical events are brought into question. It also follows that such as Gods
redemptive acts in history tend to be eclipsed and taken less seriously than
they should be.
De Libero Arbitrio 16, BW 217.
R. McKeon (ed. and trans.), Selections from Medieval Philosophers Vol. I (The
Modern Students Library; New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1957) 275. This is
De Veritate, BW 139.
McKeons translation of Grossetestes statements in
20.
21.
22.
23.
Comm. Post
. 1.19, f.27.
De Veritate, BW 130.
306
24.
Comm.
1.2, f.2.
Post.