Riley, Claire, Ashley, Erika

2 June 2015
Period 1/2
Minnesota v. Dickerson
One evening in November, 1989, two police officers observed a man leaving an
apartment that was thought to be a crack house. Once the individual (Dickerson)
spotted the squad car, he immediately turned around and started walking the other way.
The officers then went on to observe Dickerson enter an alley on the other side of the
apartment. At this point the officers stopped Dickerson and ordered him to submit to a
patdown (frisk). The pat down turned up empty for weapons, however, the officer
became suspicious of a small lump in Dickersons front pocket. He later would say that
he suspected it to be a lump of crack cocaine. This suspicion brought the officer to
reach into Dickersons pocket in which he found a small bag containing one fifth of one
gram of crack cocaine. The officers then arrested Dickerson and charged him with
possession of a controlled substance. This case begets two questions. First, may police
officers seize non-threatening contraband detected during a protective patdown of the
sort permitted by Terry? Second, was the officer who conducted the search acting within
the lawful bounds marked by Terry at the time he gained probable cause to believe that
the lump in respondents jacket was contraband?
Was it justifiable for the police officer to conduct a search that went beyond a
frisk even after establishing that Dickerson had nothing on him that would harm either
him or his partner? In order to answer this question, and the two legal questions at
hand, we must find a rule that has been established in a case containing similar
circumstances. Both Minnesota v. Dickerson and Terry v. Ohio are stop and frisk cases,
which is why we can compare them. Terry v. Ohio established three rules that an officer
must follow when dealing with a frisk. The first rule is, due weight must be given not to
his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but to the specific reasonable
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in lights of his experience.(Terry v.
Ohio) The second rule is, The sole justification of the search in the present situation is
the protection of the police officer and others nearby.(page 8, paragraph 2) The last
rule is, Thus, evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a
seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the justification for
their initiation. (page 9, paragraph 2)
According the three rules established in Terry v. Ohio, the police officer in this
case violated Dickersons Fourth Amendment rights. First, we must inquire whether or
not the officer obtained suspicion while observing the events that took place.The officer
was suspicious of Dickerson because he witnessed Dickerson leaving a notorious crack
house and noticed that upon spotting the squad car, he abruptly halted and began

walking in the other direction. (Minnesota v. Dickerson) The second rule states that
police officers can only conduct an outer body search when it is to ensure the police
officers safety. The initial frisk revealed no weapons, but upon feeling a small lump on
Dickerson, The officer then reached into the resident's pocket and retrieved a small
plastic packet containing one fifth of a gram of cocaine. (page 1, paragraph 3) This
search clearly portrays the officers ulterior motive, given that by going into Dickersons
pocket his intent was not solely to ensure the safety of himself and his partner. Rather,
his intent was to seize what he suspected to be contraband. Lastly, we must ask if the
evidence was acquired by a search and seizure that was reasonably related in scope to
the initial justification for the frisk. The respondent was arrested and charged in
Hennepin County District Court with possession of a controlled substance. (page 1,
paragraph 3) The initial frisk conducted was for the purpose of checking Dickerson for
weapons, while the evidence acquired was a small bag of crack cocaine. These two
have no correlation, so the evidence should not be introduced or used against
Dickerson.
The first question we must ask is, may police seize non-threatening contraband
detected during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry? Secondly,
was the officer who conducted the search acting within the lawful bound marked by
Terry at the time he gained probable to believe that the lump in respondents jacket was
contraband? Considering what he witnessed, the officer in this case did have
reasonable suspicion to justify the initial stop and frisk of Dickerson. The pocket search
that followed the frisk was not done solely to protect the police officer and others nearby.
Lastly, the search into Dickersons pocket was not reasonably related in scope to the
initial justification for the frisk because he had already come up clean for weapons.
Police may not seize non-threatening contraband found during a protective patdown
search because that extra search into pockets requires probable cause, not only
suspicion. The evidence may not be introduced because it was wrongfully discovered.
The officer who conducted the search in this case did not act within the lawful bounds
marked by Terry because he deviated from the initial search for weapons.