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Charles Barber, David Jenkins Medieval Greek Commentaries On The Nicomachean Ethics Studien Und Texte
Charles Barber, David Jenkins Medieval Greek Commentaries On The Nicomachean Ethics Studien Und Texte
Charles Barber, David Jenkins Medieval Greek Commentaries On The Nicomachean Ethics Studien Und Texte
Josef Koch
Weitergefhrt von
Andreas Speer
In Zusammenarbeit mit
BAND 101
Medieval Greek
Commentaries on the
Nicomachean Ethics
Edited by
Charles Barber
David Jenkins
LEIDEN BOSTON
2009
ISSN 0169-8028
ISBN 978 90 04 17393 4
Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
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printed in the netherlands
CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Classical Scholarship in Twelfth-Century Byzantium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anthony Kaldellis
PREFACE
preface
preface
xi
ticular, Trizio argues that even when Eustratios diers from Proklos
position, he articulates his own philosophy in the language of his distinguished forebear. David Jenkins essay questions whether it is appropriate to describe Eustratios as a nominalist. Jenkins shows that this identification is an oversimplification, even as he demonstrates that Eustratios limited his discussion of being to the formal logic of predication.
Charles Barbers paper examines Eustratios extensive writing on art.
In particular, Barber argues that while Eustratios discussion of art in
book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics betrays continuities with his essays on
the icons from the 1090s, these later comments also reveal that Eustratios wished to distinguish art from theology.
The next study is Elizabeth Fishers philologists reading of the anonymous commentary on Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics. The anonymous writer of this commentary has long been considered an incompetent linguist, stylist, and philosopher. Fishers essay shows that, while
not of the highest philosophical order, Anonymous language, style and
learning would not have been out of place in a twelfth-century schoolroom. This knowledge does not, however, allow for a more precise
identification of this particular scholar.
The final two essays are written by George Arabatzis and Katerina
Ierodiakonou and are devoted to Michael of Ephesus. Michael was a
prodigious Aristotelian commentator, who worked in the first half of the
twelfth century and who wrote commentaries on books V, IX and X of
the Nicomachean Ethics. In addition to these books from the Nicomachean
Ethics he commented on the Metaphysics, the Sophistical Refutations, the
Generation of Animals, the Parva naturalia, the Parts of Animals, the Movement
of Animals, the Progression of Animals, the De coloribus, the Politics, the Prior
and Posterior Analytics, the Topics, the Physics, the De caelo, and the Rhetoric.
This breadth of work suggests that there was an extensive interest in
Aristotles writings in the early twelfth century Constantinople. Our
two essays focus on the commentary on book X. Arabatzis argues that
Michael of Ephesus draws careful distinctions between the educated
man and the scientist. In having drawn this distinction, Arabatzis is
able to show that Michael then uses the scientist and the educated
man as models of the classificatory process. Ierodiakonou, in turn,
argues that it is only by a close reading of particular texts and by
attending to the play of particular concepts (such as eudaimonia) that
we can begin to characterize appropriately both Michaels work as a
philosopher and the nature of philosophical thought in twelfth-century
Byzantium.
xii
preface
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many institutions and colleagues contributed to the success of the workshop that produced the papers published in this volume. Financial
support came from the Graduate School of the University of Notre
Dame, from the Medieval Institute at the University of Notre Dame,
and from the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts in the College
of Arts & Letters at the University of Notre Dame. Harriet Baldwin
provided logistical support. Kent Emery, Andreas Speer, Sten Ebbesen,
and Stephen Gersh brought additional lively and intelligent discussion
to the workshop and contributed to a roundtable on Byzantine Philosophy that was joined to the Nicomachean Ethics workshop and that was
organized by Kent Emery under the auspices of the Socit Internationale
pour ltude de la Philosophie Mdivale. Finally, the organizers of this workshop would like to thank all of the participants for their contributions
to this intensive and rewarding weekend of convivial conversation.
ABBREVIATIONS
Mansi
PG
CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP IN
TWELFTH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM
Anthony Kaldellis*
This chapter aims to survey what may justly be called classical scholarship in twelfth-century Byzantium, especially the commentaries on
ancient texts. By discussing the dierent methods, goals, audiences, and
ideological parameters of these largely neglected works, I intend to situate the commentaries on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics into a vibrant
culture of scholarly production and consumption. But the very notion
of classical scholarship in Byzantium calls for explanation and requires
an ideological accounting.
1. Byzantium vs. the Classics
Byzantine classicism, both creative and scholarly, has received a
mostly negative press in modern discussions. It has been denied its
rightful place in the history of classical scholarship largely because its
strengths and contributions have been taken for granted by those who
have delighted in highlighting its shortcomings. This calls for a swing
in the opposite direction. But the ideological obstacles are formidable,
especially the notion that has been widely disseminated in the West
regarding the position of Byzantium in our system of civilizations.
This notion is fatally entangled in the ideological construction of the
enlightened West itself and its leading nations in opposition to designated Others. The eect can be observed in popular perceptions,
where Byzantium stands in conceptual opposition to the classical (both
the ancient and its modern rightful heirs), and in specialized literature on the history of classical scholarship, which practices a special
form of forgetfulness. The two volumes of R. Pfeiers History of Classical Scholarship cover antiquity to the end of the Hellenistic Age and then
the years 13001850 (of course, in the West). The entries on schol* The author thanks Niels Gaul for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of
this study.
anthony kaldellis
arship in the Oxford Classical Dictionary reflect this division while the
Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium has no entries on scholarship. Studies of
the transmission of ancient texts overwhelmingly favor the Hellenistic and modern periods, limiting discussion of the Byzantine period
which was as long as the other two put together and just as crucial if
not more so for the formation of the classical canonto just a few
pages.1 N.G. Wilsons Scholars of Byzantium, the only study devoted to the
issue, is useful and immensely learned but also condescending: virtually
every page contains derogatory comments and unnecessary adjectives.
One can stand in awe of its erudition yet find it an unpleasant read
delivering an unfair verdict. Wilson takes the Byzantines groundbreaking contributions for granted and focuses on their failings. I will do the
opposite.
In modern scholarship, Byzantium as a cultural system has rarely
been studied on its own terms, free of comparison, that is, with its
neighbors and antecedents. I will concentrate here on the most influential of these comparisons, the one with classical antiquity. Byzantine literature, philosophy, and society have until recently been measured and
basically defined against the yardstick of their classical antecedents
and found wanting. Theology is the one exception among textual genres, though normally the modern scholar has to be a believer for the
balance to tilt in its favor. Byzantine art and architecture have established themselves on their own terms. But when it comes to intellectual
history and literary culture, antiquity stands for reason, originality, and
literature while Byzantium is associated with rhetoric, imitation,
and superstition. Countless quotations can be given to this eect from
both Byzantinists and non-specialists. There are historical and disciplinary reasons why this culture has been so closely linked to another
and defined in relation to it. Many Byzantinists were and often still are
trained in Classics before moving to later material. Byzantine history,
including the state, society, and language, emerges gradually during the
course of late antiquity, allowing for the transference of scholarly skills
from one culture to the other, a temptation that occludes many pitfalls. As their written languages were virtually identical, classical Athens
1 E.g., Sandys (1921) devotes 37 pages (out of 1700 in the three volume set) to
Byzantium (namely v. 1, 387424); Groningen (1963) almost none. Reynolds and Wilson
(1991) oer 26 pages (4854, 5878) out of 240, which is an improvement. Dickey (2007),
a major new resource, appeared after this chapter was finished; only targeted citations
to it could be included.
and Byzantium are superficially easy to compare despite being separated by 1,500 years. In part, the Byzantines brought this on themselves by admiring and preserving ancient literature and thought. They
drew attention to the inferiority, belatedness, and derivativeness that
they often felt in the presence of their classical models. In some respects
their cultural practices were fundamentally defined in relation to antiquity.
As a result, Byzantium has been dealt with unfairly, especially when
it is approached by observers whose expertise and commitments lie
elsewhere, and it was precisely such scholars who constructed the field
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and who fashioned the
representations of it that hold sway in the general culture. Classicallyoriented scholars were predisposed, even trained, to view it unfavorably
in comparison to Greece. Moreover, Byzantium generally gained the
attention of Medievalists in the context of its shameful defeats, both
military and ideological, to the Crusaders. One such defeat was the
insistence of the medieval West that the Byzantines were not true
Romans as they claimed but merely degraded GreeksGreeklings
to be conquered as the ancient Greeks were conquered by the ancient
Romans. This suppression of the Roman identity of Byzantium in
favor of a model of Greek degeneration (whether ethnic, cultural,
or linguistic) fundamentally shaped the field and still holds sway.2
Finally, as a culture with a modern progeny, Byzantium was observed
indirectly by European travelers to the Ottoman empire, who as ethnographers were prejudiced against Orthodox society in its oppressed and
degraded state. They naturally viewed Europe as the legitimate heir of
Greece, not Byzantium, which they blamed even for the eects of centuries of Turkish rule. Western travelers sought a genuine encounter
with classical Greece, and imagined it by suppressing all that they associated, rightly or wrongly, with the post-classical culture that had so
sullied and degraded it.3 For these reasons, and others that have to do
with the discipline of philology, Byzantium has been unable to escape
from the shadow of ancient Greece.
The damage done to our view of Byzantium may prove to be permanent unless a serious concerted eort is mounted. Yet we need not
2 Cf. Kaldellis (2007) c. 2 for a rehabilitation of Byzantium as Romania; c. 6 for the
polemic with the medieval West.
3 The contribution of this group to the making of modern notions about Byzantium
has been insuciently appreciated. A good place to start is Augustinos (1994).
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These tools were both practical and ideological. I will briefly discuss
the latter first.
Modern classical scholarship studies ancient Greece at a huge historical remove. Most of us are not Greeks, we do not believe in the
gods of the Greeks, and, despite our interest in or enthusiasm for Greek
things, we also feel the pull of modern systems of society, technology,
and knowledge. The Byzantines were in fact the first culture to consume classical literature from such a detached albeit respectful perspective. They did not see themselves as Greeks but as Romans and Christians. They did not believe in the gods who figure so prominently in
much Greek literature, as Julian had awkwardly pointed out; and they
were loyal to dierent social and political systems, which they did not
trace back to the ancient Greeks. Byzantine classical scholarship was,
therefore, the study of an admired but foreign society. In the polarities of
inside vs. outside, Greek vs. Christian, ours vs. theirs, Greece
was almost always the Other, and could destabilize Byzantine assumptions if it were not kept carefully in check; this threatening aspect has
been a feature of modern classicism too.10
The taming, domestication, and transformation of ancient Greece
from a living culture into a discipline of scholarship was a Byzantine achievement, and could in fact only have been accomplished by
Greek-speaking Christians, inside outsiders. We take it for granted
that Homer can be appreciated by those who do not believe in his
gods, but this assumption is itself a product of Byzantine technologies
of scholarship. It was not held by Julian, or the Neoplatonists, or, for
that matter, most ancient readers. For instance, one commonly finds
modern summaries of the plot of the Iliad that, like many Byzantine
paraphrases of the poems, omit the role of the gods, despite the fact
that Homer signals the crucial importance of Zeus in the first verses.11
As we will see, Byzantine summaries of the Trojan War also tended to
omit the gods, because one could not regard as literature a text that was
religious. But when did it become literature? And when did ancient
artlargely statues of gods and templesbecome art? To be sure,
such approaches can be traced in antiquity. Julian was wrong that
Thucydides was inspired by the Muses, and the aesthetic appreciation
of religious art can be documented for most periods of antiquity.12 But
10
11
12
See Goldhill (2002) for some moments; Kaldellis (2007) for Byzantium.
E.g., Alden (2000) 13.
Bounia (2004).
anthony kaldellis
13 For Julian, Basileios, and the contest over ancient literature, see Kaldellis (2007)
c. 3; for statues and temples, see Bassett (2004).
14 Spivey (1996) 11.
What is going on here? The ideological imperative has again prevailed according to which Byzantium isand must be upheld asthe
antithesis of all that we stand for, e.g., classical antiquity, the Renaissance, Enlightenment, science, scholarship, etc. They had no right to
it and their labor of preservation has no claim on us; we may freely
plunder what they saved, because we cannot eectively steal from
one who has no conception of the worth of what is stolen. It was in
this way that the conquering West, more broadly, conceived its relation
to the New World (to look in one direction) and the Orient (to look
in the other). To ameliorate the debt (or deny it), it has become almost
mandatory in the case of Byzantium to cite palimpsests where a work of
ancient literature was erased to make room for a monastic or liturgical
text. The problem is not that this did not happen (though cases where
the opposite happened are less frequently noted),15 but rather with the
ideological work that this evidence is supposed to do.
A critical evaluation of the polarity Classics-Byzantium is long overdue, for in addition to making antiquity possible in the first place the
Byzantines devised or perfected many of the practical tools of the discipline which we tookand still take for granted. In this chapter, I will
survey, first, the basic tools of classical scholarship in Byzantium and
then highlight the specific forms that they took in the twelfth century.
The rich and vibrant picture that emerges from this survey should lay
to rest the idea that the classics were eectively meaningless for the
Byzantines, that they made no contribution to progress, or that they
never comprehended the spirit of the pagan classics.16 It will also, as
promised, provide a broader context against which the commentaries
on Aristotle can be appreciated more fully.
3. Tools of the Trade
Basic things are most easily taken for granted. In the ninth century, the
book took on the form that it basically still bears today, namely bound
hard-cover pages with margins around a text in minuscule script. The
codex had finally replaced the roll during late antiquity, while the
minuscule bookscript became established ca. 800 ad. Gradually, surviving texts were recopied (transliterated)at least, all that were
15
16
10
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17 Basic surveys of these developments are Hunger (1961) and (1989); Lemerle (1971)
109122; Roberts and Skeat (1983); Wilson (1983a) 6368; Ronconi (2003).
18 Hunger (1989) 25.
19 E.g., Allen (1987) 20, 41, 69, 84, 125, 130, 173; Powell (1991) 10, 4344, 123 n. 15.
See Mazzucchi (1979); Hunger (1989) 128129.
11
some historians of the Greek Bronze Age take this passage of the Iliad,
the only one in Homer in which writing is indicated, as reflecting a
memory of the more ancient system. What is important is that Tzetzes was eager and able to propound a new theory about an important
philological matterhe called such theories his Tzetzian inquires
and that did so successfully on the basis of his detailed knowledge of
Homer.20
Next to the ancient texts on our scholars desk lay dictionaries.
Glancing there, we plunge into the tangled jungle of Byzantine lexicography. Given the near total loss of Hellenistic and Roman-period
dictionaries, the partial state of publication of their Byzantine descendants, and the largely unexplored history of this tradition, it would be
prudent to avoid discussing its development and focus instead on what
was available in the twelfth century. The outline of some high imperial works of Attic lexicography have been reconstructed from the middle Byzantine compilations, for instance Ailios Dionysios and Pausanias from the evidence of Eustathios of Thessalonikes Commentaries on
Homer (see below) and from some of the lexika.21 But the completion of
this major labor, which is now in suspension, must await the publication
of the Byzantine dictionaries themselves, for which the outlook is bleak:
such an eort would require teams of philologists, funding, and can
probably not be carried out in the US, given the structure of academic
careers.
The Lexikon of the patriarch Photios (ninth century) included some
8,000 brief entries. A complete manuscript was discovered in Greece
in 1959, but the whole has still not been published. The Lexikon of
Zonaras was larger19,000 entriesand proved to be more popular,
supplanting its competitors. Over 100 manuscripts survive, which is in
part why we have no comprehensive edition. This massive work dates
to the twelfth or the thirteenth century; its ascription to the twelfthcentury historian and canonist John Zonaras still finds defenders. These
lexika were used for both reading and composition, as a comparison of
rare words in Anna Komnenes Alexiad and the Lexikon of Zonaras has
demonstrated; conversely, the latter cites usages from John Tzetzes and
seems to have culled entries from his commentary on Aristophanes.
20 John Tzetzes, Histories 12.29118 (pp. 469472). For hints in the classical period
regarding a pre-Phoenician script, see Pfeier (1968) 21.
21 Erbse (1950). For Byzantine lexicography, the basic survey is Hunger (1978) v. 2,
3350.
12
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22 Grigoriadis (1998) 183208, quotation from 208. For the manuscript tradition, see
Alpers (1981) 2235.
23 The key study is Reizenstein (1897), and is not likely to be superseded soon; for a
summary, see Hunger (1978) v. 2, 4547; see now Dickey (2007) 8792, 99103. For the
concept of etymology, see Robins (1993) 21, 47.
24 E.g., Tsantsanoglou (1984).
25 Hunger (1989) 137.
13
14
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15
34 Niketas of Herakleia, Verses on Grammar; for the attribution and discussion, Tovar
(1969).
35 For Gregory Pardos in general, see Kominis (1960) esp. 6173 for On the Dialects;
also Bolognesi (1953), a positive verdict; Hunger (1978) v. 2, 2933; Wilson (1983a) 187
190 (typically negative); Dickey (2007) 8283. It is preposterous to judge this work by
the critical standards of modern linguistics and peer-reviewed publication (though this
is frequently done for the purpose of putting down Byzantine scholarship).
36 Kominis (1960) 20 n. 2.
37 E.g., Davies (2002).
16
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17
imbued with the deepest love for the Greek language and became
incredibly familiar with its idiom. He really thought in Greek and could
speak it; to him it was simply not a foreign language at all.39 The pride
of modernity in such scholars must be tempered by the realization that
Byzantine intellectual life consisted entirely of such people, who took
the qualities that are here ascribed to Estienne to a level that few or
no Europeans have ever attained. This is not the place to discuss the
theory and practice of mimesis in Byzantium or counter the polemical
adjectives attached to it (e.g., sterile, artificial). What is important
is that we not forget the practical dimension of the study of ancient
literature in Byzantium: it provided models in the sense that they were
supposed to be imitated, not only appreciated and studied. Gregory
did not write commentaries on Hermogenes merely to make reading
Hermogenes easier but so that the dozens of orators at the court and
theatra of the capital could better put his prescriptions into eect (on an
ethical level, the same may be said of the commentaries on Aristotles
Ethics; see below). Byzantium under the Komnenoi was one of the great
ages of Greek rhetoric, and this was a rhetoric rooted in scholarship.
The principles of Hermogenic style have accordingly been detected
in Eustathios panegyrics, as consciously followed and cleverly adapted
guidelines.40 Students were trained to master the classical language for
their own use, not just to be able to read and appreciate the great works
of the past.41 Their level of attainment and command of the language
far surpassed our Greek prose comp.
In a separate brief treatise on style, Gregory Pardos recommended
four speeches as models for imitation: Demosthenes On the Crown,
Ailios Aristeides Panathenakos, Gregory of Nazianzos Funeral Oration for
Basil of Caesarea, and Michael Psellos Encomium for his Mother, striking,
again, a typical balance between Greeks and Christians.42 He goes
on to cite various ancient authors as exemplars of flowery grace,
sober grace, solemnity, and so on. Many of these same aestheticstylistic categories are employed by Photios in his reviews of ancient
18
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19
20
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interpretation of classical texts, i.e., Byzantine classicism was purely linguistic and had
no meaning.
49 For Psellos and philosophy, see Hunger (1978) v. 1, 2022, 3233 for a summary;
21
and Duy (2002) and Kaldellis (2007) c. 4 for more interpretive approaches; for paraphrasis, Ierodiakonou (2002).
50 Anna Komnene, Alexiad 5.8.3 on Psellos; for her circle, see Browning (1962);
Magdalino (1993) 332; and below.
51 For a fuller study of the context, albeit with dierent emphases, see Kaldellis
(2007) c. 5.
22
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order to praise the emperor John II Komnenos. Such praise was not
limited to the emperors and the aristocracy. Michael Choniates, the
student of Eustathios and later bishop of Athens, was compared after
his death by a nephew to the ancient heroes: whole new Iliads would
not suce for him.52 Homer was in the air, fueling a shift in values
among rulers and writers. Quite possibly, this warrior-aristocracy knew
more about the spirit of Homer than do modern philologists in their
studies. Their zest for war, sex, the hunt, and exquisite artwork was
also reflected in a new form of quasi-vernacular heroic poetry that
centered on the frontiersman Digenes Akrites and explicitly tried to
rival Homers fame.53 Nor was Homer less alive in the imagination of
the sophists. In the hands of politically active scholar-bishops such as
Eustathios, Homers language became a skilful instrument, as praise
and blame sat on a razors edge of subtle irony.54 The accusation, then,
that the classics were eectively meaningless in this society, a mere
instrument of grammar, is false.
On the other hand, the twelfth century witnessed a vast multiplication of the occasions that called for the composition of celebratory
orations. The number of orations and honorands swelled out of proportion to precedent in Byzantium. More works survive and more performers can be named for this period than for any other in the history
of Greek rhetoric (before the nineteenth century, that is). But the aristocracy was not so boorish as to patronize only its own praises. The
sophists indulged in original compositions, such as the romance novels, another genre that was revived toward mid-century, mostly in verse.
References abound to the so-called theatra, a word that signified the
venues for the performance of new works, whether they were physical assemblies or the collective opinion of the educated class.55 All this,
required more teacherswho themselves became the objects of praise
by their studentsand more textbooks and scholia. In fact, many of
the commentaries on the poets that survive from this period had their
origin and fulfilled their purpose in the classroom.
52 For Theodore Prodromos life and the imperial Poems, see Hrandners edition
and introduction (here citing Poem 4.251257; cf. 11.1819); Choniates: Anonymous,
Monodia for Michael Choniates 2 (p. 237). For the Homeric twelfth-century in general,
see Basilikopoulou-Ioannidou (19711972); for Homer in Byzantium in general, see
Browning (1975a); Pontani (2005) 137340.
53 Lasithiotakes (2005).
54 E.g., Sarris (19951997).
55 Mullett (1984).
23
So both the aristocracy and the class of teachers and orators grew
in size and became more self-conscious of their place in society. The
sophists depended on the princes for patronage (though exact prosopographical ties cannot easily be worked out today), while the latter
depended on the former for the glorification and culture that only
Greek paideia could oer. From this mutual, albeit uneven, dependency,
sprung a new type of commentary, Classics for Dummies. Let us
then begin with these and work up to the more technical scholarly
productions, before situating the Aristotelian commentaries against this
broader background.
5. Classics Made Easy
Michael and Elizabeth Jereys have identified the sebastokratorissa
Eirenethe wife of the sebastokrator Andronikos, the second son of the
emperor John IIas the patroness of a large number of contemporary poems. What these works have in common is that they are written in relatively easy Greek, have a simple structure and patronizing
didactic tone, and rehearse information that would have been familiar to any educated Byzantine (e.g., a list of the gods and heroes in
Homer or, as in Constantine Manasses Historical Synopsis, a survey of
world history). It is likely that the writers of these works were working on commission and needed the money (they are sometimes frank
about that); on the other hand, Eirene was likely a foreign lady, possibly
Norman, married into the Byzantine imperial family. Her native language was not Greek and so works such as these would have helped her
to catch up with her peers, though certainly not to the level of someone like Anna Komnene. This reconstruction illuminates the nature of
some of the surviving works by reference to the specific forms of patronage that produced them. Eirene, after all, was not alone. Other foreign
brides also required primers, for example Bertha-Eirene, first wife of
the emperor Manuel, commissioned an introduction to Homer from
Tzetzes.56 And beyond this class of patrons, there were probably many
in twelfth-century Byzantium, both men and women, native and foreign, who required elementary instruction and had the coin to procure
it.
56 Jereys and Jereys (1994); for struggling poets, see Beaton (1987); Magdalino
(1993) 340343.
24
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57 Theodore Prodromos, Oration for Isaac Komnenos; for Isaac in general, see Kindstrands introduction to the Preface; also Hunger (1978) v. 2, 58.
58 Pontani (2007).
25
The imperial couple obviously failed to instill this dread in their children, who included two among the leading scholars of the first half
of the twelfth century. Isaac wrote prefaces and summaries of Homer
while Anna learned all about the myths too (secretly, according to
Tornikios), though armored by her faith. Was it subtle revenge on her
part to compare her parents throughout the Alexiad to Greek gods and
heroes? Certainly, she revered her parents memory. In the Preface to
her Diataxis, she claims that they did not hinder her from learning, but
this statement is oddly defensive, and Anna is an untrustworthy witness
when it comes to her family.60
As for Isaac, he may also be the author of some short summaries of
the Neoplatonist Proklos, the philosopher who had inspired Psellos and
led Italos on the path to condemnation. Even after the stern warnings
in the Synodikon, a son of the imperial family was dealing in Proklos.
It should be noted that the author of these summaries carefully omits
much that was oensive to Christians and somewhat distorts Proklos
thought to make it more acceptable. Still, the desire to Christianize
such a pagan thinker ran counter to the later eort of Nicholas, the
bishop of Methone, who, in the spirit of Alexios and the Synodikon,
wrote a long refutation of Proklos from an explicitly Christian point
of view. There was a debate going on behind the scenes of our texts on
59 George Tornikios, Funeral Oration for Anna Komnene (pp. 243245). See also Jereys
(1984) 205 for the monk Iakobos; for the period in general, Reinsch (2000) 87; for the
trial of Italos, Clucas (1981); for repression, see Browning (1975b); Magdalino (1991).
60 Anna Komnene, Preface to the Diataxis 16 (p. 99); for the authorship, see Buckler
(1929) 910.
26
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this matter that we cannot see. In any case, the evidence for the study of
Proklos and the brazen promotion of Platonic philosophy in the spirit
of Psellos is scant for the later twelfth century, when scholarly attention
turned to the poets and orators.61
The most prolific popularizing classicist in this period was undoubtedly John Tzetzes, whose output was so vast and its publication in modern times still so disordered that we can only discuss a small part of it
here. Consider, for example, three short poems: the Events before Homer
(406 vv.); the Events in Homer (490 vv.); and the Events after Homer (780
vv.). These summarize the events of the Trojan War, framing the Iliad.
They are written in hexameters, which vary from Homeric to modern
Greek in vocabulary and style. But Tzetzes aim here was not to imitate
Homeric morphology, vocabulary, and meter with scholarly precision
(which he probably could do). It was, rather, to provide an introduction
to the world of the Iliad in verses that could be read by a beginner.
Tzetzes tells events from his own point of view and in his own chatty
poetic voice, and even adds material to the Homeric section that is not
in the Iliad. In the Events after Homer, he often cites Kontos, i.e., Quintus of Smyrna (ca. third century ad), whose fourteen books of verse
Posthomerica survive. His physical descriptions of the heroes are adapted
from those in Isaac Porphyrogennetos short treatise or, more probably,
from a common source.
Curiously, Tzetzes wages in these poems a personal polemic against
an Isaac, who appears to have been the governor of the city of Berroia
and had employed Tzetzes, probably as a secretary. In various places in
the poems, the poet alludes to a scandalous episode involving himself
and the governors wife, as a result of which Isaac had ordered Tzetzes
to leave the city on foot. These bitter digressions, dubiously linked
to the Trojan War, illustrate Tzetzes inability to keep his troubles
and comically annoying personality out of his scholarship. It is not
known who this Isaac was; it is too premature to identify him with
the Porphyrogennetos scholar. An Isaac Komnenos is the addressee of
Tzetzes unfriendly Letter 6, though it is not clear that this was actually
sent (see below); the recipient of the letter (in which Tzetzes mentions
Diktys of Crete among other ancient figures) was variously identified
61 Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus Elements of Theology (and Angelous discussion in the introduction of philosophy in the twelfth century) with Isaac,
On the Hypostasis of Evil (for Christian editing, see Rizzos introduction, iiixxiv; for
authorship, Kindstrands introduction to Isaacs Preface to Homer, 1820).
27
28
anthony kaldellis
the orations that she had to endure for so many long hours. Having
a riposte handy for the sophists when they made an allusion would no
doubt improve her standing in their eyes; an allegorical comment might
even earn her praise for wisdom. An anecdote in Psellos Chronographia
(6.61) illustrates the scholarly demands that were sometimes placed on
imperial women. A subtle flatterer, whom Psellos does not name,
whispered the following half-verse from Homer to Constantine IX
Monomachos concubine Maria Skleraina as she passed by: Surely
there is no blame . . . She then had to ask him to complete the tag: . . .
on Trojans and strong-greaved Achaians if for long time they suer
hardship for a woman like this one (Iliad 3.156157; tr. R. Lattimore).
Note that Psellos does not quote the end of the verse in his account,
assuming that we, his readers, will recognize it, as Skleraina apparently
could not.66
There is no reason to list all the poems and short commentaries
written in the twelfth-century for the benefit of lay patrons. One last
work of Tzetzes must, however, be mentioned, because it has not yet
been studied in detail and is odd enough to warrant comment. This
is in fact his longest and most cited work, the so-called Histories or
Chiliades (Thousands, i.e., of verses). It consists of over 12,000 fifteensyllable (political) verses divided into 660 sections, each covering
some item from ancient history and literature, including people, events,
texts, sayings, facts and words of many kinds, so a chrestomathia of
sorts (assemblage of useful knowledge). The Histories remains to this
day a major source for fragments of lost authors and otherwise lost
antiquarian knowledge (but mythology is mostly absent, conforming to
Tzetzes habit of either confronting it head-on or largely leaving it out).
The style is easy, fluid, and bouncy, and Tzetzes intrudes himself and
his name often, posing, arguing, showing o, and pouting. He knew
how to write in a lively way. I suppose one could read through the
Histories as they are and learn (or review) much about ancient history.
But that is not how this huge text was meant to be used. The Histories
is in fact a running commentary on Tzetzes own 107 Letters, which
are crammed with classical allusions and require all this antiquarian
lore to be understood.67 The Letters are written in a more elevated
For the training and duties of imperial princesses, see Connor (2004) c. 10.
The commentary on the Letters proper begins at Histories 4.780; the entries before
that are a running commentary on the letter to a grammarian that is included in
Histories 4.471779. In general, see Wendel (1948) 19922000.
66
67
29
30
anthony kaldellis
31
composed a deliberately antiquarian poem that begged for commentary, as the Tzetzian poem at the end of the scholia admits; it baited
scholars to show o their knowledge. In his scholion on Aristophanes,
Frogs 897, Tzetzes tells a story which implies that text and scholia were
read aloud by him to an audience of either students or colleagues, some
(or all) of whom had their own copies of the text, and that corrections were made. We need a closer analysis of his account and a better
understanding of how all this unsynthesized and unfocused knowledge
was used in practice, given that it often goes beyond what is needed
to simply understand the text.72 (We will return to this question below,
when we look at Eustathios Homeric Commentaries.)
Questions of scholarly form, moreover, or format, are as important as those of content. What we observe emerging in this period are
useful scholarly editions of the poets that anticipate ours in having a
scholarly introduction that discusses the varieties of ancient poetry, the
life of the poet, and the style of his work; followed by the text with massive scholia compiled by a modern scholar such as Tzetzes who had
a distinctive personal voice (today we would put the commentary at the
back).73 I gather that nothing like this had existed in antiquity. Even if
much of the content on which these Byzantine editions was based
was culled from ancient sources, the synthesis was original, as was the
decision to place all this material together and its precise arrangement.
So, for example, we have, besides the preface to Lykophron, Tzetzes
prolegomena to Hesiods Works and Days, which begin with an attack on
Proklos exegesis, then list the kinds of poetry, and end with a brief life
of the poet (focusing on the relation between him and Homer), all in
Tzetzes typical style and voice; also, Eustathios prologue to the Commentary on Pindar, focusing on topics of literary appreciation, especially
Pindars notorious obscurity (asapheia), and concluding with a summary
of what is known about his life; and the preface to Eustathios Commentary on the Iliad, which defends the study of the poem against Christian objections (ironically, I believe, as Eustathios considered Homer to
be sublime and the objections are rendered irrelevant anyway by the
mass of commentary that follows them); he outlines all the benefits con72 John Tzetztes, Scholion on Aristophanes Frogs 897 (pp. 951955). The story is discussed by Wilson (1975) 6 and (1983a) 192193, but its dynamics elude me, and I think
that Wilson has also not entirely understood what happened. For scholarly gatherings
in the twelfth century, see also Cavallo (2006) 7576.
73 Budelmann (2002) 145 for such an edition of Hesiod.
32
anthony kaldellis
74 For the texts, see the bibliography. For Tzetzes Hesiod, see Colonna (1953); for
Eustathios Pindar, Kambylis (1991); Negri (2000); Hamilton (2003) 132, 176177; for his
Homer, Dickey (2007) 2324.
75 Budelmann (2002) 150152.
76 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Com. ad Hom. Il., preface 2.4042 (v. 1, 3).
33
historical aspects of the poem.77 On the other hand, he ironically dismissed the idea that Christians should abstain from the pagan wisdom
of the ancient poets.78 In the biographical section of his Prologue to the
Commentary on Pindar, he reports on Pindars (pagan) piety as though it
were a virtue; Eustathios and his student Michael Choniates were willing to view pagan piety as praiseworthy and undeserving of Christian
condemnation.79 This was genuine humanism.
One more scholar should be mentioned in this connection, a deacon
named John Galenos, who wrote an allegorical commentary on Hesiods Theogony that runs to 70 pages. It is addressed to young students
of Hesiod rather than to the non-academic laity, and its chief concern
is to protect their piety from the pagan nonsense of the Greeks. In
his preface, he praises Plotinos and Sokrates, despite the fact that they
were pagans (
), for encouraging their listeners to look beyond
the literal sense of things and on to higher realities, and that is what
he does in his commentary, namely to uncover what he calls the hidden truths of the Theogony. In fact, he adds, the poem should not have
been called that in the first place, but rather the Physiogonia. The preface is only a page long; the commentary is keyed by lemmata, though
there are occasionally large gaps between the verses discussed. This is
a problem of the lemma format, but can partly be explained in this
case by the fact that Galenos was not writing a thorough study of the
poem, but was interested only in ameliorating one aspect of it from a
Christian point of view. His Christianization of the Theogony is bold, in
some cases turning the gods into Christian figures and concepts, for
example Zeus is God, the Titans evil, Herakles Jesus. Anything will do
here (Pythagorean number theory, physics, astronomy, psychology) if it
saves appearances. He even praises Hesiod for being grateful to the
Muses, despite their being goddesses; the virtue of piety again overrides
its pagan context. Galenos intention, as he puts it, is to transubstantiate myth into a more divine form, to beautify the ugliness of Greek
myths by making it look more like our Truth. He concludes with an
invocation of Christ the King.80
77 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Com. ad Hom. Il., preface 3.10 . (v. 1, 4); see Cesaretti
(1991) pt. 3 for an extensive discussion.
78 Cf. Kaldellis (2007) 314 on Eustathios and Basil of Caesarea.
79 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Prologue to the Commentary on Pindar 27.
80 John Galenos, Allegories on Hesiods Theogony pp. 295296, 336, 365; see Roilos
(2005) 128130.
34
anthony kaldellis
I conclude this section by looking more closely at the most impressive scholarly labor of this period, Eustathios Homeric commentaries,
but these are so vast and have received so little attention in their own
right that I must restrict the discussion to a few general comments on
their nature and purpose, especially to define their place in the complex world of twelfth-century scholarship. They have been criticized
for being enormous, confusing, unwieldy, and unenjoyable for the student.81 The Iliad has 15,600 verses; Eustathios Commentary on the Iliad
(of which an autograph copy survives) has 3,575 pages in the modern
edition: this works out to an average of four and a half verses per page,
though some verses receive longer treatment (Iliad 1.1 receives eleven
pages) while others are clustered together for collective comment. After
writing the first draft, Eustathios added further scholia in the margins
and then on little slips of paper pasted into his copy.82 But before we
groan at the weight of them, let us not forget that the Iliad is in fact a
long poem, one of the longest. Four verses discussed per page is really
rather dense. Eustathios could have written an even longer commentary.
In his comments Eustathios tries to cover, well, everything: etymology, grammar, syntax, meter, dialect, rhetorical theory (largely based
on Hermogenic categories), and mythology, the allegorization of which
was a chief concern; also the poets meanings; the ethical and literary aspects of the plot and characters; the cultural and historical background of words, phrases, and actions; as well as contemporary Byzantine sayings and customs that illustrate the ancient text, all the while
citing ancient authorities at first or second hand.83 What purpose could
such a work have served? Eustathios provides some hints in the preface,
but this must be read carefully.
Eustathios claims that he was not instigated to write the Commentary
by powerful men but rather by friends ( ), which are
ambiguous words (note that his commentary on Dionysios Periegetes
was dedicated to a certain John Doukas). He then modestly (and, I
believe, ironically) states that the work will benefit not the learned, who
will not be unaware of anything in it (!) but rather young men who are
studying as well as those who have studied but need to be reminded
E.g., by Browning (1964) 16; Reynolds and Wilson (1991) 7071.
Wilson (1984) 110; in general, Hunger (1978) v. 2, 6466.
83 For a sample of Eustathios literary reading of Iliad, book I, see Lindberg (1985);
for the contemporary folkloric aspect, see Koukoules (1950).
81
82
35
of certain thingsthereby negating his first claim that the learned will
not need it! He goes on to say that he has included only necessary
and not superfluous things, which perhaps we can take at face value,
at least at first. Eustathios then lists the categories of analysis for each
verse and explains who will benefit from them, adding that he has also
included ten thousand more things that are useful for life, and not
briefly either, but rather in a rich varietyso again undercutting his
initial disclaimer. When he proceeds to talk about how young students
should use the book, we need not believe that they were the only
readers he had in mind. There is often irony in Eustathios style, in
this as well as in his other works.84 The Commentary can be used in two
ways, he says: one can read through it as a work in itself or read it to
elucidate specific passages of the Iliad.85
In the preface, then, Eustathios says much about his methods and
intents, but he does not always say exactly what he thinks or all of what
he means. We are left with conflicting impressions about the works
intended audience and use: Is it for those who are now studying or
who have already studied? Is it to be read straight through or consulted selectively for individual verses? Eustathios seems to be keeping
his options open, presenting the Commentary safely as a work for teaching but implying that it has many more uses as well. After all, on the
first page of the preface he makes it clear (at length) that Homer has
something good to oer all people, whether they are thinkers or writers or more active in life. He casts his net widely. This, along with
the nature of the book itself, suggests to me that we should not see it
exclusively or primarily as a teaching textbook. Though its compilation
must have been linked to or grown out of Eustathios lectures in Constantinople, the finished product was probably not read out to students
just as it is (far less assigned, given the cost) no more than our own
multi-volume commentaries on the Iliad are meant to be read aloud
to students. Sections of it may have been recited just as they are, but
the Commentaries overall were more of a repertoire of material for teachers to consult before class on any passage of the text or even to have
at hand for reference and student questions. But Eustathios may have
had something even more ambitious in mind, something that extended
beyond the classroom.
84
85
36
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37
poetic commentaries, addressing a more specialized audience, and selfconsciously imitating an ancient tradition of philosophical scholarship.
They are scholarly works, rather than philosophical, in three important
senses. First, in attempting to fill the gap left by the late-antique commentators, Eustratios, Michael, and the rest were subordinating themselves to a larger ongoing project of textual elucidation and clarification; it was this project that defined what and how they wrote.
Second, it was a collaborative project, something for which we have
little evidence in Byzantium since the days of Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos team that produced the Excerpta and other encyclopedic
works.88 In a brief section of his long funeral oration for Anna, George
Tornikios says that it was she who had commissioned these works. The
orator adds that he had personally heard Michael of Ephesus complain
that the all-night labor involved had ruined his eyes.89 And in the preface to his commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Eustratios
hails and praises his learned royal patrona woman, though he does
not name herin terms that are very reminiscent of Tornikios oration; he says that it was she also who had previously asked him to write
the commentary on book I. Anna, in turn, praised Eustratios for his
wisdom, both divine and external (
), in the Alexiad (14.8.9).
Third, as a collaborative project the commentaries theoretically (but
not fully in practice) subsumed the individuality of the contributors;
they were assigned books of the Ethics in a way that made them seem
interchangeable as scholars. It is fitting from this point of view that
some of the contributors remain anonymous.
The new commentaries were placed in manuscripts along with the
old, in the order of the Ethics books. They were more self-standing texts
than the scholia on the poets, but less so than Eustathios Commentary on
the Iliad, being keyed to the original text through lemmata and not
covering every single line of Aristotle. We saw above that John Galenos
commentary on the Theogony jumped across long sections of the poem.
What is the extent of the coverage in the Aristotelian commentaries?
Predictably, they vary. Books I and II of the Ethics are roughly as long
(about 20 OCT pages), but Eustratios commentary on book I has 121
pages in the CAG edition with almost 200 lemmata, while the scholia
on book II have 18 pages with 27 lemmata; only the length of the
average entry remains the same, at about two-thirds of a page. Michael,
88
89
cenko (1992).
Cf. Lemerle (1971) 280300; Sev
George Tornikios, Funeral Oration for Anna Komnene (p. 283).
38
anthony kaldellis
on the other hand, tended to write longer entries for each lemma,
twice as long in fact. For example, his commentary on book IX is
68 pages long with only 50 lemmata, thus half in length compared to
Eustratios on book I but with only one-fourth the number of lemmata.
In other words, Eustratios goes through the text of book I very closely,
leaving few lines without comment, whereas Michael makes longer
jumps from lemma to lemma. This impression, however, is in part
deceptive, because each of Michaels entries actually goes on to discuss
later portions of the text than that quoted at the head. We are dealing
with dierent ways of organizing the material and of breaking the
original text into sections.
Michael is a lucid writer of philosophical Attic Greek. He prefers
short and concise sentences, illustrates the basic points with appropriate
and vivid examples, and is a very competent scholar.90 He stays close
to the text, avoiding digressions and editorials. Moreover, he sticks to
Aristotles ideas and eschews grammatical and historical commentary.
The standards of relevance in these commentaries are much higher
than what we find in, say, Tzetzes: the works are for those who want to
understand the ideas of Aristotles philosophy. Whether what Michael
wrote is useful or not will depend, as always, on who reads him and
why. Throughout he maintains a sense that Aristotle is immediately
relevant to us, creating a textual space in which the moral world
of the Ethics and of twelfth-century Constantinople do not dier in
their essentials, which is possible to believe on the assumption that in
Aristotle we find discussions of perennial problems of human nature.
On occasion, Michael makes this relevance direct, as when he refers
to those thrice-damned loan-sharks we have (
) to illustrate
a point about contracts (IX; 469.3536); or when he notes that the
education of children in Constantinople is handled haphazardly, by
each man as he sees fit, like Homers Cyclopes (X; 610.1116).
On the other hand, he does not allow Christian values to interfere
with his explication of Aristotles virtues and vices, staying close to the
philosophers spirit and to his text. He sometimes uses Byzantine moral
languagee.g., ! " # $ % & ' )" ' $* , &
" + ' , &. ' # /0 (IX; 484.1820)but
there is nothing here that an ancient thinker would take issue with. At
90 For a discussion of Michaels commentaries on the Politics, see Triantari-Mara
(2002) c. 3.
39
one point, Michael even mentions the rewards given by our God
& + +
+ &to support an Aristotelian
position (IX; 506.3132). He uses Greek exempla for illustration, except
when he cites Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzos as an example of perfect friendship (IX; 462.1920, 479.56; the Christian tradition
was wrong about their relationship, but Michael could not have known
that). His comments are sometimes opaque. In discussing unequal relationships, he has this to say: but the friendship of the father for the
son or of the son for the father are not simply of the same kind or
equal, given that the father is not equal to the sonbut consider this
in relation to our beliefs () )and vice versa (IX; 462.2124).
What exactly does he want us to consider? It may have been something that he could not have said openly in a period when intellectuals
were in danger of being tried precisely for considering such problems
again.91
One final passage from Michael illustrates the verbal skill of these
scholars who had to weave together the classical and Christian traditions. Commenting on the phrase that one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, Michael notes that there were things that the Greeks
were not permitted to sacrifice to Zeus . . . who was the father, according to the Greeks (
3), of both men and gods; likewise, we
do not owe everything to our fathers, for we will not obey if they should
call on us to turn away from the living God (+
+) or betray
our fatherland (IX; 473.713). The paradox of a father forcing his son
to betray his fatherland is nice, but note also that, having used a famous
Homeric verse for Zeus, Michael appropriately then quotes a Biblical
expression for the God of his Byzantine readers.
In turning from Michael to Eustratios, I want to conclude with a different point about the purpose of the commentaries, one partly linked
to this constant juxtaposition of Greek and Christian texts, exempla, and
ideas. Eustratios, as is well known, had close personal experience of theological repression. His teacher Italos was condemned in 1082 and he
himself in 1117. He probably wrote the commentaries after that; at any
rate, in the preface to the commentary on Ethics VI he refers to old age
and illness. His condemnation in 1117 involved the charge of employing
Greek philosophy to clarify the faith and lapsing into heresy. This is
91 Browning (1975b); Clucas (1981) 38, 6773. For Father-Son rhetoric and the
Kappadokian Fathers, see Van Dam (2003).
40
anthony kaldellis
not the place to ascertain the truth behind this or to follow Eustratios
subtle negotiation of (Greek) philosophy and (Christian) theology in his
various works. In any case, the accusation of philosophizing according
to the Greeks was very unfair in that it was dicult if not impossible to rebut, as the entire intellectual and ecclesiastical class of Byzantium was acquainted with and relied on Greek thought to some degree.
For example, in a doctrinal letter against the Armenian Monophysites,
Eustratios had cited as his theological sources the wise thinkers among
the Greeks and those who dogmatize about God on our side.92 But,
as we have seen, this juxtaposition was common among the scholars,
philosophers, churchmen, and humanists of the twelfth century. Consider two of Eustratios own enemies within the Church, from dierent periods. Leo of Chalcedon, a sti-necked hardliner on the matter
of icons and opposed by Eustratios on the emperor Alexios behalf in
the 1080s, cited the legal status of temples in antiquity in his defense
of ecclesiastical property; for his part, Alexios had cited Perikles use
of the treasury of Athena to justify his confiscations (at least so says
Anna).93 And Niketas of Herakleia, one of Eustratios chief accusers in
1117, wrote, as we have seen, poems on the epithets of the gods in the
form of liturgical hymns. It was not possible to avoid doing such things
in an intellectual culture whose roots were so diverse and so tangled.
We noted above the same juxtaposition of passages from both pagan
and Christian authors in Gregory Pardos commentary on Hermogenes
as well as in his prescriptions for what authors one should imitate. The
study of rhetoric, as we saw, was not entirely theoretical, as it is with
us, but was supposed to help Byzantine orators imitate the classics: it
was practical. So too ethics. The twelfth-century philosophical commentators hoped and expected that their texts would help readers not
merely to understand Aristotle better but also to become better people
by applying his Ethics to their lives. Eustratios is explicit about this in
the preface to his commentary on book I (2.1 .). Ethics is a branch
of practical philosophy and can morally benefit individuals, cities, or
even whole nations. And one may find many exempla in books, both
ours (
) and those that are outside (
). For many good
92 Eustratios of Nicaea, Refutation (pp. 163164); for his condemnation, see Joannou
(1954); for Christian and Platonic passages in the Ethics commentaries, see Mercken
(1973) 12*13*.
93 Glavinas (1972) 110111; cf. Alexios in Anna Komnene, Alex. 6.3.3 (this may be an
elaboration or addition to the speech by Anna herself).
41
men lived well among both the barbarians and the Greeks. He goes
on to name Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Job, Moses, Jesus the son of Nun,
and, if you want, Solon among the Greeks. But enough about them
(I; 3.264.8).
8. Conclusions
Classical scholarship flourished in twelfth-century Byzantium; it had
a diverse and extensive social background; its constituent branches
grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, manuscript editions, etc.were interconnected at all levels; and it was pursued by serious and intelligent
scholars who had a sound knowledge of Greek history and literature.
Byzantine scholars, in short, were not interested only in the preservation of ancient texts but they wanted to understand them, to come
to terms with their otherness, to find a way to integrate their virtues
into their Christian society. They were willing to consider a wide range
of strategies to make that possible. As a result, one can actually learn
much about antiquity by studying the works of these scholars in a way
that would not have been possible in the West for many centuries. This
was because it was during the middle and late period of Byzantium
that the basis for all subsequent Classical Studies was established. Much
has been written about how methodologies, critical tools, and scholarly
habits were transported from Byzantium to Italy in the Renaissance,
active skills to complement inert manuscripts, the form to go
along with the matter. I will mention here only Robert Grosseteste,
a scholar of a slightly earlier period (the thirteenth century), who translated the new commentaries on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics and other
Greek works into Latin using, among other aids, the Souda and the Etymologicum Genuinum.94
More importantly, in ways both ideological and practical the Byzantines basically invented what we recognize today as Classical Studies.
Whether we like it or not, it was they who made most of the key
decisions, and their choices about what to keep and what not were
essentially what ours would have been.95 In part, that is because we
94 Mercken (1973) c. 2; Dionisotti (1988). For the Byzantine scholars role in the
Renaissance, see the studies by D.J. Geanakoplos, N.G. Wilson, J. Monfasani, and
others.
95 Littlewood (2004) 19.
42
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43
101
102
Peter Frankopan
One of the great challenges posed by study of the age of the Komnenian Emperors is that of trying to work out what kind of Empire
Byzantium was in the late eleventh and the twelfth centuries. Was this
an Empire that was introverted or one which looked to the outside for
inspiration? Was it an Empire which was buoyant or one struggling to
stave o imminent destruction by the forces which surrounded it? Was
it an Empire which was becoming more and more liberal or one which
was increasingly repressive and dogmatic? The answer, of course, is that
it was both and it was neither. Under the Komnenoi, Byzantium was
highly stratified, and yet individuals of low and obscure origin could
and did rise to the summit; it was closed in some ways, and yet open to
outsiders in others; it was deeply conservative, and yet it was also open
to new ideas. One of the reasons for this ambivalence is that there are
competing images at play for the period which started with the usurpation of Alexios I in 1081. The evidence for the century or so which
followed is abundant and often colorful, and as such allows for a wide
range of perspectives. The skill, then, is to set out conclusions which are
both suitably nuanced, but which do not simply park contradictory or
dicult source material on one side in order to drive home expansive
arguments which raise as many problems as they solve.
A case in point is that of assessing the interest in, value and importance of philosophy in Byzantium in the twelfth century, a topic that
is not as straightforward as might first seem. The aim of this paper
is to try to provide a context for the commissioning of Eustratios of
Nicaeas commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, or, to be more precise,
his commentaries on a part of that work. It will seek to provide a literary, cultural and political context for the observations on Aristotles
work, which proved enormously influential not least in Western Europe
and to Western European political thought.
Eustratios makes it clear that his commentary on the Ethics was not
his own idea. Rather, as he tells us at the start of his observations on
46
peter frankopan
Book I, he was prompted to write by a person of high status in contemporary Constantinople. Refusal was out of the question, according to Eustratios, since this individual had been his benefactor in the
past, including through some very dicult times.1 The author gives
little else away as to the identity of his patron, saying nothing more
about who this individual was, or what their motivation was for seeking a guide to the Ethics. At the start of his commentary on Book VI,
however, he returns to the subject of his patron, whom he describes
this time as a high-ranking member of the imperial family, addressing
her as '
, ' ., '
' ..2
Although Eustratios does not provide the name of the empress
in question, there is little doubt that he must be talking about Anna
Komnene, the eldest daughter of Alexios I Komnenos, sister of John II
and aunt of Manuel I.3 Anna was the author of one of the most famous
all medieval texts and one of the most celebrated Byzantine histories,
the Alexiad, which covers the reign of Alexios I from his seizure of
the throne in 1081 to his death in 1118. This cavernous text provides
ample opportunity to pick out areas and themes of specific interest to
the author. These certainly include philosophy in general and perhaps
Aristotle specifically, who is quoted directly or indirectly on a handful
of occasions in the Alexiad.4
Coupled with Annas own composition is the reputation that she
acquired during and shortly after her lifetime from other intellectuals in Byzantium. Theodore Prodromos called her wise Anna, absolute intellect, home of the Graces, and referred to her as the fourth
Grace and as the tenth Muse, stating that she loved both truth and
philosophy.5 We learn of her love of literature, her unquenchable thirst
for truth, and, again, her keen interest in philosophy from an oration
47
delivered by George Tornikios in her honor some time after her death
in the early 1150s.6
It is helpful too, then, that Annas reputation is confirmed by two
authors hostile to the Komnenoi, for this allows us to allay concerns
that Prodromos and Tornikios praise is biased by their own panegyrical praise for the porphyrogennetathat is to say, that their record
of Annas intellectual curiosity should be read primarily as a rhetorical
device in the portrayals of the imperial princess. That Choniates praises
Anna for her philosophical interests is significant therefore; so too are
Zonaras comments about her natural intelligence and the sheer hard
work which led to her mastery of the Greek language.7
Zonaras also reveals that Anna not only engrossed herself in books,
but also surrounded herself with scholars or learned men, and, moreover, took discussions with them very seriously.8 This strikes a chord
with Tornikios oration too, for the author of this speech specifically
talks of a group of scholars who surrounded Anna and who were
engaged in intellectual pursuits.9 So striking is this image that modern historians have come to talk of a circle or salon of Anna Komnene.10
Tornikios goes further than Zonaras, though, for while the latter
presents Anna Komnene as being surrounded by intelligent men, Tornikios suggests that she did not simply allow a circle of intellectuals
to gather around her, but lay at the very heart of this group. It was
Anna, according to Tornikios, who prompted, cajoled and inspired
those around her. It was Anna, says George, who sought out individuals
and prompted them to work on Aristotle and Plato, on Euclid and
Ptolemy.11 She was no passive patron, therefore, indulging those around
her with funds and scholarly comforts; rather, her patronage was active,
at times even aggressive. One scholar from Ephesus, certainly Michael
of Ephesus, whom she commissioned to work on Aristotle, complained
that Annas relentless goading to provide commentaries had made him
lose his sight, as he had been forced to work through the night by
6 Lettres 221323. For the dating of the speech to c. 1155 and Annas death to c. 1153,
see 21 f.; cf. Browning (1962) 4.
7 Historia 10.1316; Epitome Historiarum v. III, XVIII.26.1215, p. 754.
8 Epitome Historiarum v. III, XVIII.26.15 f., p. 754.
9 Lettres 281 .
10 Browning (1962) 8 (although Browning does not emphasise the word, preferring
the less contentious circle); Magdalino (1993) 332.
11 Lettres 281.
48
peter frankopan
49
Lettres 283.912.
Browning (1962) esp. 7 f.; Wilson (1996) 181 .; Magdalino (1993) 332.
In his introduction to his commentary on Book VI, Eustratios writes: )'
. ) )
"
#
+ 8" 8
, ' ,
" : &C . . . In EN
256.26257.3.
19 See Mercken (1991) 13*17*.
50
peter frankopan
at the very least.20 Meanwhile, his limited output on Aristotle might sit
easily with a hypothesis that he did not have the chance to produce
more than the two books that survive, whether because of infirmity, old
age or death. In this respect, we might also note that George Tornikios
does not mention Eustratios by name. This could be because the latter
had been involved in scandal, as we shall see.21 It was not long after
Tornikios delivered his oration in the early 1150s, though, that we find
Eustratios name being used in a context which suggests that the stigma
which may have been attached to it had dissipated somewhat.22 So
perhaps another explanation for his omission from Tornikios speech
is that he was not part of living memory (as Michael of Ephesus
obviously was), and had been alive too long ago to have a resonance
with Tornikios or Tornikios audience.
If it is dicult to draw any firm conclusions about when the commentaries were commissioned (other than in the first half of the twelfth
century), which order they were tackled in, and how or indeed if they
were divided up, then at least we can say something about whom Anna
turned to in order to address the texts in question. Michael of Ephesus,
for one, may not have been an entirely original thinker, and indeed his
limitations have been stressed, perhaps a little unfairly, by at least one
modern scholar who argues that his interest in the biological works and
his unfailing observations on physiology and psychology may indicate
that he was a physician.23 However, whatever he may have lacked in
vision, he made up for in terms of his diligence, for his output was
prodigious, an indefatigable accumulator who paid for his hard work
with his eyesight.
Eustratios of Nicaea, in contrast, had an impressive pedigree as a
theologian, prominent as a leading authority on icons during the trials
of Leo of Chalcedon in the 1080 and 1090s, and, later, on the errors
of the Latins as well as on the Armenian heresy.24 Eustratios is modest
about his abilities in his commentaries, stating that he had turned his
51
25
52
peter frankopan
53
54
peter frankopan
Angold (1995) 73 .
Browning (1975b) 16; also, for Michaels presentation of Aristotle, philosophy and
theology in his inaugural lecture, see Browning (1961) 181 f., 189 f.
42 Browning (1975b) 16; Timarion 71 .
40
41
55
56
peter frankopan
57
use of Plato. In other words, to judge from the Alexiad alone, independent of Eustratioss dedication and the speech of George Tornikios, it
would be fair to say that there is nothing in the Alexiad that would suggest that the author of the text had devoted a considerable amount of
time, energy and resources to overseeing work on Aristotle or on the
Ethics.
The significance of this should be stressed by noting that Annas
commissioning of the commentaries certainly pre-dates the composition of the Alexiad; that is to say, therefore, that the omission of discussion of Aristotle, of the Ethics and of philosophy in general is all
the more surprising. We can assert this time-line with some confidence.
First, Tornikios states that Anna brought her intellectual interests fully
into the open following the death of her father in 1118.51 Secondly, to
judge from the formulaic speech, it would seem that Annas philosophical investigations certainly preceded the death of her own husband,
Nikephoros Bryennios, at the end of the 1130s.52 Moreover, the presumptions we can make about Eustratios age again points clearly to
the fact that Annas patronage naturally dates to 1120s and perhaps the
1130s. By contrast, then, we learn that Anna only began work on the
Alexiad after the death of Bryennios and, indeed, only took up her history of Alexios reign following the accession of Manuel I Komnenos
in 1143, a statement which sits comfortably with the subtext provided
by this Emperors reign which runs right through the course of the
text.53 That is to say, therefore, that Annas interest in and concern with
Aristotle were well-established by the time that she came to write an
account of her fathers reign.
The invisibility of Aristotle in the Alexiad should prompt the question
of why Anna had sought out commentaries in the first place, and what
she hoped these would teach. One thing is clear: they certainly did
not teach her a great deal about Aristotle. Of the seven references to
the Nicomachean Ethics in the Alexiad, three are inaccurate. Moreover, in
more than one case, Anna has misunderstood the fundamentals of what
Aristotle was saying. In the case of John Taronites, for example, Anna
seems to equate her cousins flattery of the Emperor with Aristotles
Lettres 269271.
Ibid. 295.
53 There seems little reason to doubt Annas comment that she began work in
earnest during the reign of Manuel I Komnenos, Alex. XIV.7.v.4751, pp. 451452. For
the context of Manuel, see Magdalino (2000) 1543.
51
52
58
peter frankopan
54 Alex. XIII.1.iii.2228, pp. 384385. Anna appears to think that by indulging and
flattering her father, Taronites was a true dialectician (), meaning this
approvingly. Not only does Aristotle use this word in a negative sense, but he specifically
states that tyrants appreciate weak menlike Taronites in other wordswho praise
them, EN, VIII.6, p. 1157.
55 Alex. XIV.7.iii.1317, p. 450.
56 Lettres 269271, 283.
59
Ibid. 301.
Dyck (1986) 113120; Buckler (1929) esp. 197 f.
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over, something which she implicitly promoted herself through her own
patronage of the commentatorswas his improper use of the Greek
language, his failure to stick to the rules of grammar, and his lack of
literary style. Anna was less interested in the wider philosophical questions about the eternity of matter, or about the relationship between
the human and the divine Christ, than she was about the integrity of a
Hellenic ideal in Byzantium. This was why she paid little attention to
detailed discussion and barely referred to the former in the Alexiad, but
focused closely on the latter, repeatedly articulating characteristics that
she considered to be truly Byzantine, and those that she did not.
In this context, then, there is an obvious and striking consistency
to Annas account of her fathers reign that is significant here. For
the author of the Alexiad, all foreigners, or more specifically, all nonByzantines, were barbarians. The term is used indiscriminately about the Turks and steppe nomads; and tellingly, also applies
it willingly to Christians, frequently referring to Latins, whether Crusaders or not, as barbarians.59 And in fact, Anna does rather more, for
as Jonathan Shepard astutely noted, she identifies characteristics common to all those outside the sphere of Constantinople, regardless of ethnic origin, linguistic or social background, or indeed religious persuasion. Latins, Turks and nomads (the three major groupings of peoples
in the text) are all untrustworthy, avaricious, immoral and inconsistent.
In other words, then, an important part of the Alexiad is as much about
setting up an ideal in terms of the figure of the Emperor Alexios Komnenos, as it is about establishing a strong sense of behavior, ethics and
norms which are specifically not Byzantineand consequently underscoring those which are.
And of course, Anna was not alone in her promotion of Hellenism,
nor conversely in her treatment of the world outside Byzantium. The
attempts to reconcile the classical (pagan) scholars with Christianity
had moved on a long way since John Chrysostom dismissed the ancient
philosophers views uniformly as ashes and dust, comparing their
throats to an open grave with everything inside it reeking of foulness,
and calling their teachings worm-eaten.60 By the eleventh century, we
can even find John Mauropous not just defending Plato, as his friend
John Xiphilinos had done, but praying for his soul and that of Plutarch
59
60
61
62
peter frankopan
moted. For Anna Komnene, the age of Classical Greece brought with
it parallels with Byzantium in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries
that were appropriate and natural. It is no coincidence, then, that Latin
scholars of both republican and imperial Rome are entirely ignored in
Annas own writing as well as by her circle of scholars (at least by implication); not for nothing either, then, that Tornikios too excludes these
from her funeral oration. In death, as in life, Anna Komnene was a
Hellenist.
Linos G. Benakis
This paper is primarily technical in nature. It will argue that when
one begins to examine a less investigated area of the field of Byzantine
Philosophy, research in the primary sources must still precede every
interpretative act and critical approach. Here, research in the primary
sources means:
a. The gathering of texts. This is not always an easy task, although the
publication in recent decades of new critical editions of texts by
Byzantine philosophers has made it more feasible.1 Older editions
of Byzantine philosophers, some of which have been reprinted,
also remain useful, some unexpectedly so.2
b. The study of texts in relation to their sources. Namely, the identification
of sourcesdistinguishing between instances of mere borrowing
and instances of a more critical incorporation of such sources into
Byzantine textsthe identification of original elements, of direct
or indirect influences, of tendencies in the use of source materials,
etc. Here, the ever-expanding secondary bibliography needs to
be consulted with caution, since some studies contain errors of
interpretation which may be more or less obvious.3
This paper will, therefore, necessarily consider both the external evidence and, as far as possible, the internal evidence regarding our texts.
While its nature and methods remain to be justified, this paper will
have served its purpose and satisfied its writers aims if it stimulates
an interest among new scholars in conducting research and writing
about this highly productive area of Greek philosophy, one that has
1
Benakis (1991).
One such is the collection of texts by Nikephoros Blemmydes edited by Dorotheos
Voulismas and published in Leipzig in 1784, where the treatise On Virtue can be found.
3 There is, for example, the case of the article by Giocarinis (1964), where Eustratios
seems to be a defender of the Platonic theory of ideas, when in fact the opposite is
true, as is evident from the texts cited. It is also inexcusable for A. Lloyd to speak of
nominalism in Eustratios in the article cited in note 10, when he himself concludes that
Eustratios method may be defined as a form of conceptualism!
2
64
linos g. benakis
been somewhat neglected. I am certain that they will find such research
richly rewarding, whether they engage in technical research work or a
more broadly conceived examination of the most significant problems
of Byzantine philosophy.
As a starting point, one external fact of particular importance to
our topic is the large number of manuscripts containing the Nicomachean Ethics which have been preserved from the Byzantine period.
There are approximately 120 manuscripts, to which one might add 45
manuscripts of the Major Ethics and 25 of the Eudemian Ethics. In order to
put these numbers into perspective I cite the corresponding numbers of
manuscripts of other key works by Aristotle. There are 160 manuscripts
of the Categories from the Byzantine period, 140 of the De interpretatione,
120 for the Prior Analytics, 120 for the Physics, 60 for the Metaphysics,
60 for the De caelo, and 40 for the Poetics. I have discussed the Politics
elsewhere.4 It is, therefore, essential to consider these numbers when
considering the knowledge and interest of the Byzantines in the moralpolitical ideas of Aristotle.5
Of even greater importance is an examination of the internal elements that constitute this interest, so that one might then understand
the relation between our Byzantine authors and the political thinking of the state philosophers of antiquity. The same point can apply
to the Ethics, where the identification of elements of Aristotles moral
teaching in the works of Byzantine philosophers might be considered in
relation to the presence of moral problems and issues within both academic teaching and within a Byzantine Lebensphilosophie that was firmly
embedded in Christian dogma.
There are numerous Byzantine commentaries on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics. Among the earliest of these was that of Michael of Ephesus
(eleventh-twelfth century), who can be found in the circle of philosophers associated with Anna Komnene and who wrote commentaries
on book V and on books IX and X of the Nicomachean Ethics.6 A first
edition (by contemporary criteria) of these commentaries appeared in
65
Venice in 1541.7 We must not overlook the fact that Michael of Ephesus was an experienced commentator, with extensive commentaries on
Aristotles work: including books VVIII of the Metaphysics, the Parva
Naturalia, the Sophistici Elenchi, the De partibus and the De motu animalium, which, fortunately, were included in the publishing endeavor of
the Prussian Academy.8 The commentaries by Michael of Ephesus on
Physics, De caelo and the Rhetoric have not been preserved. For details of
his knowledge and treatment of the Politics see my article mentioned
above. In addition, the recent secondary literature on Michael is reliable.
In the same period, Eustratios of Nicaea (c. 1050c. 1120) composed
commentaries on books I and VI of the Nicomachean Ethics.9 Eustratioss commentaries were also included in the 1541 Venetian edition.
Parts of them were also, surprisingly, included in E. Pargiters 1745 London edition entitled Aristotle of Morals to Nichomachus I. For the importance and impact of Eustratios commentaries on Aristotles work in
the West one should consult a significant series of articles by Mercken, Sorabji, Lloyd, Trizio, and Benakis.10 According to Sorabji, the
esteemed scholar of the whole tradition of Greek commentaries on
Aristotle, Eustratios of Nicaea introduced Platonic, Christian and antiArabic elements into his texts, whereas Michael of Ephesus can be seen
to have mainly followed the existing commentaries by Alexander of
Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria. Also of significance for any assessment of Eustratios is the study by Lloyd, which
argues that Eustratios Aristotelian commentaries were the most interesting of any of those produced by a Byzantine philosopher, as the
subject of his discussion was not limited to the philosophers style or
definitions, but rather addressed the philosophers views and his teachings. Indeed, Eustratios appears to have been a competent philosopher in the tradition of Michael Psellos and John Italos, whose student
he was. One finds within his work a combination of Aristotelianism
and Neoplatonism. This is evident in his resolution of the problem of
general concepts (the universalia), in which resolution Lloyd also finds
7 Aristotelis Stagiritae Moralia Nichomachia cum Eustratii, Aspasii, Michaelis Ephesii nonullorum aliorum Graecorum explanationibus, ed. B.B. Felicianus, Venetiis 1541.
8 In metaph., In GA, In PN and In PA.
9 In EN.
10 Mercken (1990); Sorabji (1990) 2021; Lloyd (1987); Trizio (2006); Benakis (1978
1979).
66
linos g. benakis
that Eustratios has resolved the problem of conceptual realism (conceptualism) that can be found in the Alexandrian commentators, i.e. those
of the school of Ammonius and thence of all Byzantine scholars.11
In his study, Lloyd does not treat Eustratios work on the Ethics systematically. There is undoubtedly fertile ground for future research
here. One strand that remains noteworthy is Eustratios influence on
Western Christian philosophy. Here, it should be noted that the first
Western commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, that by Albertus Magnus (Cologne 12501252), appeared approximately 130 years later than
that by Eustratios. Eustratios was already known in the West by that
time, first through James of Venice (approx. 1130) and primarily
through the translation and use of his commentaries, particularly on
Logic, by Robert Grosseteste in England. The latter called Eustratios
Commentator Graecus or simply Commentator (compared to the
plain Philosophus reserved for Aristotle). On the subject of Eustratios
influence in the West, we have the reliable studies by H.P.F. Mercken
on Robert Grossetestes Latin translations of the Greek commentaries.12
Mercken is also the author of a paper, Ethics as a Science in Albert the
Great and Eustratios of Nicaea,13 where the key issue, as to whether
a scientia moralis rather than a practica moralis was possible in the Middle Ages, is examined on the basis of the first Latin commentary on
the Nicomachean Ethics, that of Albertus Magnus. Albertus only wrote on
books I and VI. It is in these books that Aristotle deals with issues of
method in the Ethics and it is where he discusses the intellectual virtues,
of which science or scientia is one. Eustratios, of course, had commented
on these same books and his authority is invoked by Albertus, who
refers to him as Commentator Graecus. Clearly, an area of enquiry that
then arises from this relationship and that deserves greater attention
would be an investigation of the extent to which Albertus Magnuss
views on the scientific understanding of ethics were influenced by the
writings of his Byzantine predecessor.
Another Byzantine commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is the
Anonymous commentary on books II to V.14 This text is a compilation of mainly Alexandrian commentaries made by a Byzantine
scholar, probably of the thirteenth century. There is a further anony11
12
13
14
67
15
16
17
18
19
In EN 8.
Heliodoros of Proussa, Paraphrasis.
This paraphrase is known from Hatch (1879).
George Pachymeres, Paraphrasis.
See Nicol (1968).
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linos g. benakis
69
26
NEOPLATONIC SOURCE-MATERIAL
IN EUSTRATIOS OF NICAEAS COMMENTARY ON
BOOK VI OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
Michele Trizio*
Eustratios of Nicaeas acquaintance with arguments and formulas depending directly or indirectly upon Neoplatonic sources is not entirely
a new issue. For instance, Zervoss famous 1920 monograph on Psellos
briefly sketches some notes on Eustratios Neoplatonic background and
explicitly mentions Proklos as his source while linking this influence
directly to the Psellian legacy.1 However, it was with Giocarinis and
Steels studies on Eustratios defense of the Platonic ideal Good in his
commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics that the Neoplatonic
influence on Eustratios became evident.2 In particular, Steel found
direct evidence of a dependence upon Proklos commentary on the
Parmenides, as well as the presence in Michael of Ephesus commentary
on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics of Damaskios commentary on the
Philebus, probably one of the few traces of the influence of this latter
work in Byzantium.3
Until now scholars have devoted their attention mainly to Eustratios
commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, whereas the aim of the
present paper is to investigate the role played by Neoplatonic sources
in his commentary on book VI of that same work. Here, although the
commentator does not deal directly with the Aristotelian criticism of
the Platonic theory of knowledge, Eustratios still seems to regard the
Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition as a reliable set of sources for the
exegesis of the Aristotelian text.
* I would like to thank Charles Barber and Dave Jenkins for their scrupulous editing
of the present paper.
1 Zervos (1973) 225227.
2 Giocarinis (1964). Cf. also Podskalsky (1976) 519; Lloyd (1987) 350; Steel (2002).
3 Cf. Steel (2002) 5457.
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michele trizio
1. The Objects of Physics, Mathematics and First Philosophy
Trizio (2006).
In EN 293.1020.
6 In EN 267.1822.
7 Cf. for example Inst. 75: J . )CL + &" = In EN 267.1922 L ? * 7 &' $ M ' * &7 )
&, L ? = * * ' * . + * . , M
' . # .
8 For a sample of this structure, cf. Trizio (2006) 4153.
5
neoplatonic source-material
73
74
michele trizio
neoplatonic source-material
75
explicitly rejects the Platonic views on mathematical objects as intermediate entities between the Ideas and the sensible particulars. According to Alexander these objects do not exist per se, independently from
the actual conditions (primarily matter and movement) in which they
subsist (; ) ;*
=* =) but by thought (&
)P).17
Eustratios provides a more detailed and dynamic accountechoing
a passage from Ammoniuss commentary on the Isagoge18that begins
the abstractive process in the imprint of sense-perception data on the
imaginative faculty () CL P), which has already received them
without matter and bodily circumstances (& ' &). Senseperception oers those imprints to the imagination, which preserves
them in itself, like on a tablet (), and submits them to the dianoia.19
Here Eustratios refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias image of the blank
tablet as an analogy for the material intellect ( =. +) to describe
the imaginative facultys state of receptivity towards sense-perception
data.20 Notably, Eustratios description of imagination as a blank tablet
reflects the Aristotelian analogy between sense and sense-perception
data, on the one hand, and intellect and object of intellection, on the
other.21
Therefore, Eustratios discussion of mathematical objects seemingly
corresponds to the standard Peripatetic view.22 Such an interpretation
can be found in contemporaries of Eustratios, like the approximative
account of it given by his former master John Italos.23 However, there
are elements in Eustratios description of the status and graspability of
mathematical objects which seem to belong to a dierent tradition. As
it has been said, the general cognitive process sketched by our com-
76
michele trizio
L ; A &L.
neoplatonic source-material
77
due to the logoi which constitute the essence of our soul. Thus, Syrianus explicitly says that geometrical objects are in the imagination, but
they are located there insofar as they are parasitic () upon
the logoi present in the dianoia, since that which derives from abstraction
cannot be considered suciently accurate.28
Proklos commentary on book I of Euclids Elements further associates
the dianoia and the eye of the soul. Ordinary mathematics, as distinguished from Pythagorean mathematics,29 is here described as the path
of knowledge (* .) because it has the same relation to
knowledge as education has to virtue. In this respect the function of
mathematics is to prepare the dianoia and the eye of the soul ( H
L L) for the turning toward the upper realm.30 Proklos adds that
if the eye of the soul remains closed, we would not be able to attain
our proper perfection. This perfection is obtained through what Proklos calls mathesis, namely the recollection of the logoi eternally present in
our soul ( & ) CL . &), mathematics being the
science that brings us to this recollection. It is due to the investigation
of mathematical objects, then, that we awaken this innate knowledge,
purifying the dianoia and ridding ourselves of ignorance.31
I believe that there is no other way to explain Eustratios reference to
the eye of the soul than by linking it to the function of the dianoia within
the cognitive process according to the Neoplatonists. Indeed, Eustratios account ignores the deeper Proklean arguments related to the
topic of projectionism as the true account of mathematics. For example, Proklos argues that projections take place in the dianoia, but the
dianoia cannot operate because of its weakness regarding the concept
of an unextended formnamely the geometrical logoi in the souland
so needs to project it into the imagination.32 Thus geometry deals with
universal concepts but only in terms of their being distributed (") to the imagination, which means that the dianoia must somehow unfold them. The same is true for numbers, where the final projection takes place in opinion, doxa, which is thus elevated in its role and
28 Syrianus, In Metaph. 91.2934; see also In Metaph. 95.2936, where Syrianus explicitly states that sense-perception cannot be considered as a solid basis for the knowledge
of mathematical objects. On Syrianus theory of mathematics, see Mueller (2002).
29 On this distinction, see Mueller (1987) in part. 317.
30 In Euc. 20,1017.
31 In Euc. 46.1347.6.
32 In Euc. 54.1455.13; 141.219.
78
michele trizio
In Euc. 95.2196.11. On the distinction between the dierent faculties dealing with
geometrical and arithmetical objects, see Cleary (2002).
34 In EN 320.2129: # * ' 8" ' * ) &" " N
N
, &* + ; Q , ' + ,
. * ) &" #
) ' , I ) ; N " F ' = ; =. ' A X N , D
6 L )
V ' F ) /CL 0 .
=", &* N F #
J ' . # ;CL '
), H ' " ) ' #
'
V.
33
neoplatonic source-material
79
, N ) ) + \. + L ) 7 '
) L '
L ' ) ;
, =. ,
' &., [ & F,
' & ) L & , *
H L )
F, : ? # )? * * , , ?
., , ? * * )' +, ' E )
" &, *
? )" /, ' * ,, ' =" +
+ +
N . In Alc. 188.1115: M ? ' * .
) , , $
; ' = $
+, ) ? N M , ,,
? L
' 0 ! 0 &. See also Theol. Plat.
1,7.18; In R. 1,18.22. Eustratios reference to later-born concepts as inferior to senseperception data strongly echoes In Prm. 980.1013.
80
michele trizio
cepts and the functioning of the process of concept formation. Eustratios explicitly states that even according to the Platonists one cannot
get rid of what is derived from sense-perception data. Eustratios evidently follows a Proklean model since, according to Proklos, mathematics begins precisely with reminders and reminiscence coming from
without (F
) and ends with the logoi existing within the soul (#
0 F .). Mathematics is awakened (&) by the lower
realities but it strives for the higher forms.37 Abstraction in itself cannot
account for the very knowledge of mathematical objects, but it serves
the purpose of activating the recollection process. This Proklean doctrine constitutes the framework of Eustratios account of the knowability of mathematical objects.
1.2. The Objects of Physics
In two of the passages from this section of the text Eustratios addresses
the status of the objects proper to natural philosophy. These passages
are extremely interesting because they take two dierent approaches
to the topic at hand. In the first one (348.722), Eustratios provides
the reader with a mere explanatory account of the objects of physics,
namely material forms and sensible particulars (* F '
V). In this sense, the one who intends to deal with physical realities
cannot investigate them according to the logical method (N )
as in the case of mathematical abstractionbut according to the the
method proper to physical examination (&* ). In considering the physical objects one cannot get rid of matter. Eustratios further
argues that the natural philosopher somehow employs logical methods (, ,
.). However, it is clear that it is not the same
logical procedure that characterizes mathematics. On the contrary, it
consists in deriving the universal determination (
.) through discernment of the common element among the particular individuals ()'
).38 Such an account might disappoint the reader since it
simply proposes by way of explanation that which can be found in Aristotle himself 39 and avoids mentioning the widely attested terminological
distinction between mathematical objects, which are said to arise from
37
38
39
In Euc. 18.1020.
In EN 348.722.
Aristotle, Physica II,2,193b31 .
neoplatonic source-material
81
82
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In EN 348.2324.
neoplatonic source-material
83
48 In Prm. 1036.912; 1051.381052.3. Here Proklos claims that the method followed
by Parmenides is not an empty logical exercise but a laborious game, which concerns
the nature of things.
49 In EN 348.2426.
50 Aristotle, Physica I,1,184a1725.
84
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neoplatonic source-material
85
86
michele trizio
neoplatonic source-material
87
way Eustratios justifies the Aristotelian claim that sophia, like physics,
requires experience. In other words, to grasp what is prior by nature
we must start from what is prior to us, and it is this anagogical process
that allows the contemplation of the separate substances and the First
Cause.
Everything in this description is taken from Proklos. The term ) used by the author to describe the mode of knowledge which
allows us to grasp that which is prior by nature is found in Proklos
in regard to the knowledge of the intelligibles.58 The very same expression that which is secondary to describe that which comes after what
is prior in nature might also be traced back to a Neoplatonic context.
For example, it is used by Proklos within the general description of
the hierarchic nature of the causative process.59 The amazed admiration for sensible particulars mentioned by Eustratios, which is meant to
arouse in us the knowledge for the higher realities, can also be found
in Proklos. As a matter of fact, Eustratios speaks about our being
astonished ().) by the characteristics of sense-perception
data. Precisely this term occurs in Proklos for his description of the
eects of beauty on souls during their conversion to the Good.60 Thus,
according to Eustratios, our astonishment at the features and characteristics of sense-perception data leads us to a kind of anagogic ascension in the order of causes that always requires a tracing back to the
next proximate cause. The words used in this argument are taken
from a passage of Proklos commentary on the Parmenides (879.1719)
where Proklos describes the ascent to reason-principles in nature as the
upwards procession from the element that is common to individuals
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which we proceed upwards towards the One and First Cause. This exact expression
also occurs in Proklos in order to describe the declining procession to the last terms of
the causation process. See for instance In Alc. 112.15, where beauty and greatness are
said to come from above, from the most primary principles all the way to the visible
world through all the intermediate realms (* " .). See also
the account of the dierent . in Theol. Plat. 3,20.9 . Needless to say,
is an important term for the Neoplatonists in general. Syrianus, for example, mentions
five main .: divine, intellective, psychic, natural, and sensible. They are all said
to be filled by the Dyad with the numbers proper to them; cf. Syrianus, In Metaph.
112.35113.3. Ammonius uses the term to describe the three primitive orders
or realms of the natural substances, which he identifies with the divine, the intellective
and the psychic one; cf. Ammonius, In Int. 24.2229.
63 In EN 320.710: ? G ' N H ", Q
;, c _ 7 & G H, Q ; M H ) &
; R G H [)].
64 Aristotle, Metaphysica IV,1,1003a2126.
65 Aristotle, Metaphysica VII,1,1028a2920.
66 Cf. e.g. Asclepius, In Metaph. 226,6 .
neoplatonic source-material
89
In EN 320.1319.
Cf. e.g. Syrianus, In Metaph. 80.1618; Ammonius, In Int. 27.3233; Asclepius,
In Metaph. 1.78; 1.1718; 4.13; 134,1012; Elias, In Porph. 20.2122; Simplikios, In
Ph. 364.1516; John Philoponos, In APo. 331.1011. Nevertheless, that the subject of
Aristotles Metaphysics was a theological one had been already argued by Alexander
of Aphrodisias; cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaph. 171.511. For a detailed study
on Alexanders view, cf. Genequand (1979); Kremer (1961) 577; 105129; 142172; 209
216; Verbeke (1981); OMeara (1986); Steel (2005).
69 Psellos, Orat. min. 37.210211; Phil. Min. II 69.1516; Italos, QQ 26.1617.
70 In EN 346.3639.
71 Cf. Trizio (2006) 4753; 53, 60.
72 In EN 322.1219; 323.2223. It might be useful to compare the whole set of
arguments provided by Eustratios with two similar passages taken from Asclepius
commentary on the Metaphysics, e. g., 3.214.3 and 361.2833.
67
68
90
michele trizio
2. The Doctrine of the Intellect
neoplatonic source-material
91
soul do not attain perfection through a learning process since they are always united to
their objects of knowledge and never leave them (;" & ;).
76 Inst. 194.30: N F * J, T + 7 F.
77 On this Neoplatonic theory, cf. OMeara (1986) 1213. That the knowledge of
the intelligibles is somehow not properly coordinated () with the discursive
reason is clearly stated in an argument expounded by Proklos in In Prm. 949.11
19. Cf. Steel (1997) 293309, 295297. The term common notions (' F)
to describe the starting points of discursive reasoning and the principles of scientific
demonstrations might be traced to Syrianus, In Met. 18.910; 21,3134; Proklos, In Euc.
240.1114; Ammonius, In Int. 7.1622; Asclepius, In Metaph. 158.1113; John Philoponos,
In APr. 2.2427. For a survey on the Neoplatonic usage of the expression common
notions it might be useful to refer to Proklos, Theol. Plat. v. 1, p. 155, n. 4. In regard
to the more techinical meaning of the expression common notions, it is interesting
to note that, beginning probably with Alexander of Aphrodisias, common notions are
sometimes identified tout-court with the axioms upon which the sciences are based. Cf.
e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Top. 18.1921. This is also what Eustratios does in In
EN 319.89 and in In APo. 45.2733.
92
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Cf. e.g. In Alc. 99.1319; Theol. Plat. 1,125.38; Inst. 129.2628. Other occurrences
of the term & are listed in Ierodiakonou (2005b) 81, n. 30. The terms &
and & occur as well in Ps.-Dionysios; cf. e.g. De divinis nominibus 147.12; 191.5;
201.12. However, none of the passages of Ps.-Dionysios in which these terms occur can
be linked to Eustratios argument since they only refer generically to the lower degrees
of perfection found in the last terms of the causation process and not to concepts found
in the human soul.
79 In EN 317.2425.
80 In Alc. 224.19, in part. 89.
81 In EN 317.33; see also 276.3738. For Neoplatonic occurrences of the term to
describe the lower lives or potencies of the enbodied soul, see Proklos, In Prm. 818.33
35; Priscianus Lydus, In de An. 219.3234; 242.4; 246.37.
82 In EN 217.3033.
83 For this Neoplatonic doctrine, see Steel (1978).
78
neoplatonic source-material
93
probably referring to Aristotle, who believe that the soul is just a series
of acts, potencies or lives inseparable from the body. Furthermore,
according to Proklos, the embodied soul organizes the vital functions
of the body through potencies or lives such that simply declaring that
the soul is only the animating principle of the body would be wrong.
Eustratios echoes Proklos doxographical account as he speaks about
other lives which are responsible for the bond between the soul and
the body, which some call acts. He simply takes this expression
from Proklos without regard to the fact that in Proklos the whole
argument has been rejected.84 This passage, as do many others from
the commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, seems to show
that for Eustratios Proklos is not only a source, but source-material, i.e.,
a kind of terminological repertoire, which he freely employs in order
to construct his own arguments. A highly educated Byzantine reader
would probably have immediately noticed that the whole of Eustratioss
commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics is constructed in
this way. It is an amazing piece of philosophical rhetoric, in which the
author deepens the interpretation of the Aristotelian text by a careful
line by line reconstruction of the source material oered by Proklos
works. Eustratios seems to regard the original context and doctrinal
framework of Proklos arguments and formulas as secondary since he
uses Proklos vocabulary mainly as a means to construct coherent and
consistent arguments, which pay more attention to form and style than
to content.
Returning to Eustratios view on the status of the human intellect,
the condition according to which the soul acts discursively is not a
definitive one. In fact, these lower potencies or lives can be somehow
transcended so that the soul regains its essential purity. However, even
when this happens, claims Eustratios, the soul cannot grasp the intelligibles in the same way as the + ;. The operational gap
between the human and the separate Intellect remains, as the intellectual and non-discursive operation of the soul is neither simultaneous
94
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nor eternal (; &
. ; ) #). The soul can grasp the intelligibles by means of direct apprehensionthe above mentioned )that are singular and distinct acts of intellection, in the sense that
one follows the other. In this way the intelligibles can be grasped one
by one (
d) and in time () .D) insofar as time is that which is
involved in the process of passing from one intelligible content to the
other ( & /" # V).
This latter argument can be safely traced back to Proklos.85 If the
Nous and the divine souls which attend upon the gods act and think
with no interruption, then the particular souls, which exist within a
realm of becoming and division, act and think in a discontinuous way.86
In the first entities, intellection is co-extensive with their essence; in
the second, intellection is other than their essence.87 This separation
between essence and activity characterizes the particular souls. They
remain eternal in their essence, but they act within a temporal dimension.88 The terms and the formulas employed by Proklos are clearly
reflected in Eustratios own arguments.89 In fact, he explains that the
soul qua soul (I ? ) acts by unfolding (&") the intelligible contents within the realm of discursive reasoning, i.e., by means of
syllogisms, passing from the order of the premises to the order of the
conclusions ( # ) ).90 However,
the soul, when participating in the Intellect (I ? " +), acts
by means of direct apprehensions, insofar as it already possesses in itself
the principles and the definitions (* &* ' 0 M) as echoes
of the Nous (I + &), and it recollects the projections of the
innate reasons of the soul in the dianoia. When it becomes intelligent,
i.e., capable of intellectual operation, it acquires an intellection that is
finally coordinated to the nature of the intelligible and no longer simply
discursive even though it is not simultaneous and immediate like the
knowledge proper to what Eustratios calls Intellect by existence (
85
neoplatonic source-material
95
@).91 Intriguingly, this distinction between the soul qua soul and
the soul as participating in the intellect, I ? and I ? " +, seems to be drawn directly from an argument in Proklos
In Euc. 16.1016; In Prm. 987.3739. When the soul becomes intelligent it grasps the
intelligibles by means of direct apprehensions (G )/, , )) = In Prm. 704.2834; In Alc. 246.1518; In Ti. 2,313.1315. Even after the
souls self reversion, it will grasp the intelligibles in a dierent manner than the Intellect. The soul cannot grasp the intelligibles all at once and simultaneously (N &
.
' +) = In Prm. 1165.2425: 2 * M ;N (scil. the soul) 3 , + +
> & * ' ;* " P .
92 In Ti. 1,246.57.
93 In Ti. 1,245.2831.
94 Cf. e.g. Theol. Plat. 4,43.2022; In Ti. 1,219.13; 2,219.45.
95 This idea can be traced back to the tradition of the Neoplatonic commentators.
Cf. Tempelis (1997) 317320.
96 In EN 303.2526.
96
michele trizio
state or condition that does not belong to something essentially or substantially (H) but only in a participatory or dispositional manner.97
A similar consideration can be made for the notion of
@,
which Eustratios associates with that Intellect that he also defines as
;, or +, referring to the Supreme Intellect.98
In fact, the concept of
@ is to be found in Proklos within
a threefold distinction of the modes in which characters exist, namely
in their causes ( #), substantially or existentially (
@),
and by participation (* "
).99 Sometimes, however, Proklos simply refers to the opposition
@* "
independently
from the general description of the triadic structure of reality in order
to draw a more general distinction between the substantial inherence
of a character or property as opposed to possession through mere participation in the same character.100 Eustratios seems to refer precisely to
this latter opposition when he compares the Intellect
@, i.e.,
the Intellect which is essentially such, with the intellect by disposition
or habit (
V), which is said to be adventitious and participated.
Eustratios confirms this himself by making it clear that
V, by
disposition, means * "
, by participation.101
Elsewhere, Eustratios elaborates a similar argument when he refers
again to the idea that the soul, even after transcending the discursive
dimension of its knowledge, cannot grasp the intelligibles in the same
way as that found in what Eustratios defines as the supreme Intellect ( +). The intelligent soul can only grasp them one by
In R. 1,28.1720. In this passage Proklos says that every god is essentially or
substantially (H) good insofar as he is constituted in his substance (;")
according to the good and does not possess it as something acquired ()) or
as a disposition (I V). In fact, continues Proklos, that which is good in this latter way
is neither essentially nor truly good (D H) but has only participated in the good (+
&
+ "). See also In Ti. 1,352.1922. If knowledge among the gods belongs to
them essentially and substantially ( ;), and if their intellection is not acquired
()), then they will know what they know in a way coordinated to their essence.
However, it is also true that in the Inst. Proklos clearly states that since the substance of
every god is supra-substantial goodness, he has goodness neither as a disposition (
V) nor substantially or essentially ( ;) but in a supra-substantial manner. Cf.
Inst. 119.1619.
98 In EN 314.16; 317.27.
99 Inst. 65; 140.1718. On this topic, cf. Steel (1994). Cf. also Giocarinis (1964) 176,
n. 39.
100 Cf. e.g. In Alc. 104.78. Here the gods are said to be self-sucient
@,
whereas the other things are self-sucient only * "
.
101 In EN 303.1617.
97
neoplatonic source-material
97
103 In EN 47.411, where the author quotes In Prm. 807.29808.11. See also Giocarinis
(1964) 191, n. 86, and Steel (2002) 5253.
104 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,3,1139b1517.
105 Respectively in In EN 314.10 and in 303.26.
106 In Prm. 1187.411188.3. Cf. Psellos, Theol. I 4.2829.
98
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6 L * + " L ' * . )+ L ) A
' N A N ) ) ) F . The expression + =?
;N " " is freely borrowed from In Ti. 3,269.1520, where Proklos
discusses the way in which the Indivisible is present in the particular souls.
neoplatonic source-material
99
109
110
111
112
113
In EN 317.3032.
Cf. e.g. Inst. 11.8; 21.1518; 29.34; 132.2930; Theol. Plat. 5,103.56.
Cf. n. 57, 61, and 62.
Cf. n. 35.
Ibid.
100
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neoplatonic source-material
101
this argument remains a Christian one. Had man, claims the commentator, not transgressed the rank and the law which he received from
the Creator, he would have remained in his state of perfection. Since
he preferred to strive for the lower realities and to enjoy life according
to the senses, he fell from the condition of perfection to the realm of
coming to be and passing away.
In this argument it is dicult to distinguish pagan from Christian
sources. Eustratios refers to the Platonic, but also Christian image, of
mans intellectual eye ( H) as closed and completely veiled
(" ' ) because of the loss of the state of
perfection.120 He then clearly refers to typically Christian terminology
when he claims that the eye of the soul was made turbid by the thicker
and mortal flesh (L " '
L), which echoes a
passage from Gregory of Nazianzos in which the author describes, like
Eustratios, the loss of the Adamic condition.121
Despite these Christian elements, Eustratios aim seems to be neither moral nor eschatological but mainly epistemological. As a matter
of fact, the main consequence of the fall and the loss of mans perfect
and original condition is that human knowledge now depends on senseperception. However, he remarks once more that sense-perception
plays the relevant role of awakening us from the sleep induced by
the generation process.122 The terminology changes once again when
Eustratios provides a basic account for the process of induction: from
particular individuals we inductively ()) form or assemble
together common notions (* * )), which are able to produce scientific conclusions.123 The common notions are immediate insoFor the expression H see Synesios, Epistulae 154.86; Syrianos, In
Metaph. 25.6; Proklos, In Prm. 1128.32; Ps.-Dionysios, De caelesti ierarchia 50.1314; Maximus the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium, 59.112; John of Damascus, Dialectica 1.27;
Photios, De spiritus sancti mystagogia 77AB; Epistulae et Amphilochia, 284.278; Psellos, Omni.
doc. 95.7.
121 Gregory of Nazianzos, Or. 45 633A; This passage by Gregory is quoted literally in
In EN 276.16. For other related passages, see Bianchi (2005) 30, n. 46.
122 In EN 297.3233: & ? ' ; E CL "
.
This expression is freely borrowed from Platos Phaedo, where the process of generation
is said to be in one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up: Plato, Phaedo, 71d:
' * ;, N ? ' X, N &
.
123 In EN 297.3338. Cf. also n. 99, where the common notions are said to be the
product (#, )) of the (inductive) activity of our intellect, dierent from
those concepts which on the contrary are echoes in our intellect of an absolutely
existing Intellect ( & ) /D + G = +). For
similar formulas related to the formation of universals by induction from individual
120
102
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neoplatonic source-material
103
104
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neoplatonic source-material
105
universality as such. Eustratios resolutely remarks that necessary realities, the objects of science, are independent from ones thinking activity.140 Plato and the Neoplatonic tradition seem to be the direct sources
of this interpretation of Aristotle M F +
,. The objects of
science, claims Eustratios, exist by absolute necessity; they are eternal
and non-generated and therefore above time.141 They are true beings
( H), whereas contingent realities are never truly beings (H
;" H) for they do not possess the ontological status that Platos Timaeus ascribes to true beings, i.e., to remain always self-identical
and unchanged (* &' * * ;* ' I F).142 Eustratios is most probably referring to Timaeus (27d528a4) where one can
find the distinction between what is intelligible by means of rational thought ( ? N * . .), which remains
unchanged, and that which can only be an object of opinion, namely
a non-rational activity. The object of opinion, says Plato, is subject to
becoming and perishing, and it is never truly a being (H ? ;" H).
The terminology used by Eustratios, however, suggests that he read
Plato while aware of the interpretation and formulas that he found in
Proklos work. Eustratios quotes a passage from Proklos commentary
on the Parmenides in which the author seems to refer to the same passage
from Platos Timaeus discussed above (27d528a4): the explanation of a
sensible particular is neither stable nor fixed but merely conjectural,
while the knowledge of intelligibles is stable and irrefutable. This is
because the intelligibles are true beings ( H).143 The expression is the same as the one employed by Eustratios, who adds that
by true beings he means that which remains always self-identical
(* &' * * ;* ' I F).144 It is clear then that what
Eustratios defines as that which exists by absolute necessity, what Aristotle himself had defined in the lemma as the object of science ( ).), is none other than the separate intelligible forms.
Eustratios attributes a certain causative power to these realities.
These forms, above generation and time, are the medium through
In EN 292.2833.
On this point see Trizio (2006) 5361.
142 In EN 293.1519.
143 In Prm. 994.2632.
144 For the expression * &' * * ;* ' I F see first Plato, Phaed.
80b2; Resp. 484b4. But also Proklos, In R. 1,72.5; In Alc. 21.13; In Prm. 906.2223. Cf.
also Trizio (2006) 5859.
140
141
106
michele trizio
In EN 294.1416.
In EN 294.1619. For the term , shadows, see Plato, Resp. 510a1; 515a7.
147 In EN 293.38: & ' ;.. = Inst. 97. The entire argument that Eustratios advances in order to prove the existence of transcendent causes seems to depend
on this proposition.
148 In EN 294.1925: F A * * ' # &
* ' &"
' D .D * =, ' & + . ? L 7 ;L F ,
N ) \. ' M =" CL, J + ? #
' P
, ), ? P ' D L
&"D \ ' )
145
146
of Alexandria, Strom. 8,8,23,6.56; Gregory of Nazianzos, Or. 38 321B; Hermias Alexandrinus, In Phdr. 41.10; John Philoponos, In Nic. arith. introd. 18.6. See also In EN 278.15
18, where the author claims that those who become mad for fame (,), those
who enjoy themselves (
,), and those who pursue pleasures () all strive
only for sense-perception data, being incapable of reverting (N ).) upon
that which is graspable by the intellect ( ? D ). For the expression #
' P see e.g. Themistios, In APr. 95.2728; Proklos, In Prm. 892.1011;
John Philoponos, In APr. 271.1516. For the expression L
&"D \ see John Philoponos, In APr. 276.26: ) * N "
' * ' 56. The expression D 7D "D , which
echoes In EN. 106.2223, seems to occur under similar forms in many patristic authors,
as well as in many pagan Neoplatonists. However, it might be useful to refer in particular to Psellos, Phil. min. I 36.350353.
neoplatonic source-material
107
with generative and noetic power, being the archetype of the perishable
realities and the cause of our knowledge. The commentator avoids
any reference to the status of these intelligbles as divine thoughts, as
he did in his commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.150 On
the contrary, he simply stresses that they exist as such, independently
from ones investigation or thinking activity, that is to say, that their
universality does not depend on thought. They are prior to our intellect
although, as has been said before, it is not clear whether or not they are
also prior to the absolutely existing Intellect.
Eustratioss argument seems to be a more or less direct refutation
of a well-known passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias De anima, in
which the author seems to state that universals are thought-dependent
entities.151 Universals are intellect when they are thought (' . )'
+ M L), but when they are not thought Alexander seems to
state they no longer exist (# ? N ,, ;? F F), that is to
say, that outside the thinking activity they vanish (E
" +
+ ;* +
). It might be possibile that by claiming
that the intelligible forms, the true beings, exist independently from
ones thinking activity and investigation, Eustratios is really criticizing
this passage of Alexanders De anima. What is certain is that he rejects
the idea that universals are thought-dependent entities. The commentator definitely allows the existence of later-born concepts, i.e., concepts resulting by induction from sense-perception data. But they are
only a means of bringing the soul from its birth-induced state of ignorance to true knowledge, the one related to the self-subsisting separate
forms, which, as already discussed, Eustratios describes in Proklean
terms. Therefore, this passage deserves to be mentioned alongside all
the arguments elaborated in Late Antiquity, expecially by the Neoplatonists, against a thought-dependent theory of universals and in favor
of their priority to our intellection.152
Eustratios position cannot be labelled as either nominalistic, i.e.,
the view according to which universals are just names independent
from things but dependent on thoughts, or conceptualistic, i.e., the
view that universals exist through thought. These two views, respecIn EN 40.2224; 41.2627.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De An. 90.211. However, scholars still debate this
and other related passages by Alexander. Cf. e.g. Tweedale (1984); De Libera (1999);
Sharples (2005).
152 On this subject, cf. Sorabji (2001); OMeara (2001).
150
151
108
michele trizio
153
neoplatonic source-material
109
4. Conclusions
Far from being inconsistent, Eustratios position is simply Proklean in
admitting that later-born concepts, derived by induction from senseperception data, only play the role of awakening our innate knowledge,
bringing the human soul to the direct apprehension of the separate
forms. By reading Eustratios commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, one realizes how dicult it is to locate Eustratios within
the traditional scheme that is used to define Byzantine literature of the
XI and XIIth centuries. To label him as a Christian, as a Neoplatonist,
or as a Christian Neoplatonist does not fully account for the very complex character of this Byzantine commentator. In the present paper I
have tried to avoid these kinds of characterizations and to have instead
focused upon Eustratios methodology and his textual approach, in particular, his peculiar way of constructing his arguments from his mainly
Neoplatonic sources.
Eustratios acquaintance with Neoplatonism should be understood
in light of the authors erudition and personal interest in Neoplatonic
literature. The arguments expounded by the commentator seem to be
carefully constructed even if at first glance they appear to be drawn
piecemeal from Proklos own arguments and formulae. Just as the
modern reader may notice the erudition of this author, he may also
remark that this commentary was surely written for highly educated
readers. Eustratios suggests this himself when he rhetorically concludes
one of the many Neoplatonic explanations of the nature and function
of the process of concept formation by writing that one could probably
consider us redundant for having extended this explanation too far,
and so deviating from our initial purpose. But, taking our cue from
the words of Aristotle, we prolonged this argument so that it might be
useful to the ., i.e., to those who are fond of learning and
literature.157
157
In EN 294.2528.
EUSTRATIOS OF NICAEAS
DEFINITION OF BEING REVISITED
David Jenkins
In 1954 Pericles Joannou published two short articles in Byzantinische
Zeitschrift on Eustratios of Nicaea, our commentator of books I and VI
of the Nicomachean Ethics.1 In the first of these articles, Joannou edited
and commented briefly on an extended scholion attributed to Eustratios, in which he interprets a particularly enigmatic passage from John
of Damascus second oration on the dormition of the Virgin Mary.
Joannou argued that the scholion, which he titled the Definition of
Being, showed Eustratios to be Byzantiums first nominalist, a conclusion he supported with his second article, a similar edition and commentary on the semeioma from the synodical proceedings against Eustratios in 1117. In 1990 the four manuscripts which contain the Definition
of Being were reedited and a new reading was published by Klaus
Alpers, who put forward arguments that better established its attribution and date.2 However, Alpers did not address the philosophical content of the scholion itself but hoped to leave competent scholars a better
philological foundation upon which to do so.
The frequent citation of Joannou in subsequent overviews of Eustratios life and works suggests that his conclusion regarding Eustratios
nominalism has gained at least a tacit acceptance.3 In his entry on
Eustratios in the Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium Alexander Kazhdan
claimed that Eustratios developed the concept of the universalia as
pure names, whereas he regarded only the individual as existing.4 On
the other hand, A.C. Lloyd made a qualified use of these documents
as evidence of Eustratios commitment to the Aristolelian logic of universals since he considered Joannous interpretation of the Definition
of Being to be questionable.5 Linos Benakis had deeper reservations
1
2
3
4
5
112
david jenkins
113
114
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Whereas the One is both transcendent and the cause of all, particular
being exists in being and is caused. Only the One descends apart from
and to everything, creating and not allowing itself to be acted upon;
particular being is fated to its own particular relatedness within existence. This is the fundamental point that Eustratios elaborates throughout the scholion. However, he makes one critical qualification: he does
not equate God with the Neoplatonic One. For Eustratios, God too is
a particular being. He begins his commentary on the passage in this
way:15
Nothing whatsoever is called a being that does not exist, and there is
nothing whatsoever that is not a being by nature or does not exist. For
how does something exist if it is not a being? For example, God is a
being, as is fire, air, water and earth, all of these things exist by nature
and are said to be; and not only these things, but all beings in so far as
they are.
the first part of the passage as: Nothing can exist without being a particular thing, with the
exception of the Unique considered from the point of view of the One (Nichts kann existieren ohne
ein Einzelnes zu sein, mit Ausnahme des Monos unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Hen
betrachtet). Joannou (1954a) 360, n. 1.
15 Joannou (1954a) 366.14: ; F _ ., : N =, ' ; F , :
N H, " Q => * =, # N H ); I ) >
_ =
., _ j +, _ &, _ @, _ L, + H '
">
115
is not as one since he is both God and man. Even God Himself is
not as one since the divine is known to be of three persons. Further,
fire, air, water and earth are also not as one since there are clearly
dierent kinds of each.16 The clause because no being is beyondbeing is understood to mean that a particular being (H) is not beyond
or prior to its being in general (X). Again, this distinction applies
to God Himself, whose particularity as God does not precede His
being in general or vice versa.17 Eustratios then extends his assertion
of particular being to the clause no being descends apart from and
to everything, creating and not allowing itself to be acted upon: there
is no being, including God, that exists in isolation from other beings
or is unparticipated by some other. Everything descends, creating
and being created. God too exists among angels and human beings
and is placed next (
) to all creation, found complete in
everything. He even makes us gods by adoption, thereby allowing us to
become what He is Himself by nature. Fire, air, water and earth are
likewise intertwined, both creating and being created by one another.18
Finally, the scholion ends with Eustratios applying all four of these
points to Mary. First, she is a particular being. Second, she is not as
16 Joannou (1954a) 366.718: * + . * + ; I d
), # ' O ). A *
' A A
. & ;
/ O
7. A * N ' A $ ' A . . . & ;
+, Q , I d ). &" * ' ) CL JC ' =,
+ . . . & ; &N I O
' F. , * ) ? P '
.D ' , , . . . ; @ I d ). * " ' '
l ' L
. . . ; L I d ). L * ? &7 ' L 7
' L " . . .
17 Joannou (1954a) 367.15: * + O F H; V, M
H ), . ' O ". *
., m &, ' O " &n,
' ; D
D _ + O, c O + H. & ;? V
H + /+ O, R O + /+ H. Asserting that
God is a being is not inconsistent with the thought of John of Damascus. While John
acknowledged that the substance of divinity is beyond substance he also claimed that
substance comprehends God. In his Institutio Elementaris, he clarifies this point by saying,
substance is the highest genus, which supernaturally (=) comprehends the
uncreated divinity as it intellectually () and comprehensively ()
encompasses all of creation (Institutio Elementaris 7.25).
18 Joannou (1954a) 367.916: " ; F H ;", Do N
;D H. ' ; F , : N , Q " '
" B.
' ; F H, : , ' ; N ,, Q : N " ;., = A
.. * ., # ' =? ), &* ' &" ' &
7,
' C CL
, Q = ) ". ' , )?
.,
) , , ? = )+, Q
+ )l
". ,
Q " )' ., : U.
116
david jenkins
one since she is both a virgin and a mother. Third, these attributes
exist in general when they come to exist in Marys particularity and are
in no way beyond being. And finally, Mary is both celebrated by the
angels and saints and illuminates them in turn with her brilliance, in
this way aected by others just as she aects them.19 So, in each case,
we see that Eustratios characterizes a particular being by its relation to
something else. Whether in relation to other beings as causes or eects,
or to substantial predicates or universals, a particular being is never an
isolated and pure unity.
Joannou concludes his own analysis of the scholion by saying that
here we see how the doctrine of universals first penetrated theology
in Byzantium before it was taught by Abelard several decades later in
the West.20 He argues that in the case of Eustratios this penetration
was of a decidedly nominalistic bent, which can be distilled to three
points: 1) the restriction of existence to particular being reduces the
ontological status of the universal to a mere concept; 2) essence and
existence are indistinguishable, i.e, a particular beings participation in
being in general is simultaneous and coextensive, and 3) the identity of
a particular beings essence and existence, i.e., its definition by means
of its substantial predicates or universals, determines its particularity
and distinguishes it from other particular beings, an identity in which
God too participates.21 If we collapse points 2 and 3, we are left with
two fundamental issues: the ontological status of the universal and the
identity of essence and existence. Let us proceed then to the first of
these.
While his emphasis on particular being might appear to suggest that
Eustratios was, in the words of A.C. Lloyd, like Aristotle, turning the
117
118
david jenkins
119
universal ) , " is precisely the three genera of logic that Ierodiakonou identifies when she clarifies Eustratios understanding of "
and J (In APo. 194.26), namely, as wholes subsequently abstracted after
the parts ()' , ,; ) &"); as seen commonly in the parts
at the moment of perception ( ) ;,
); and
as wholly existing in each particular () ,
V). These genera
of logic are therefore all in the parts, but dierentiated as existing, perceived or abstracted.32 What Ierodiakonou correctly identifies as critical
is the fact that Eustratios assigns definite existence only to the whole
existing in each particular (I" =), while he grants partial
existence to the whole seen in the parts (=, & ;
/.) and no existence at all to the whole abstracted from the parts (;
=).33 These ontological distinctions lead her to conclude that for
Eustratios apart from Gods thoughts, only individuals exists and that
such a position clearly dierentiates him both from the nominalism
which Joannou has ascribed to him and from the conceptual or moderate realism which Benakis has talked about in connection with the
Neoplatonic tradition.34 In other words, on the one hand, his denial of
the abstracted wholes existence disqualifies him as a conceptual realist,
and on the other, his granting of existence to the whole existing in each
particular and of partial existence (subsistence) to the whole commonly
seen in particulars distances him from a nominalism that sees every universal as a mere concept. I would say that this is a fair characterization
of the position on universals that Eustratios developed in his later commentaries and does qualify the nominalism Joannou claims to see in the
scholion. Nevertheless, even if we argue that Eustratios was or became
less nominalistic than Joannou would have believed, his later position
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david jenkins
on universals does dier from the conceptual realism of the Alexandrian Neoplatonists for precisely nominalistic reasons: we can at least
say that Eustratios was always more nominalistic than the Alexandrians
in this regard.
Let us turn now to Joannous second characterization of the Definition of Being: the identity of what he calls essence and existence.
Although Joannou acknowledges that Eustratios admitted a conceptual
distinction between essence and existence, or between being in general and particular being, he rightly points out that Eustratios denied
any temporal precedence or material distinction to essence.35 Particular being was simultaneous and inseparable from its being in general.
If we assume, as I think we can, that Eustratios thought in more or
less Neoplatonic terms, we might consider looking at this issue from
within a simplified representation of Neoplatonism which will allow
us to correlate this identity with our discussion of universals.36 For
this purpose I will borrow the first six propositions of Proklos Elements of Theology, which describe and relate the most comprehensive
elements of his thought: the One, unity, the unified and the not-one
(matter). These elements can be understood as the possible combinations of two distinctions, namely, an unparticipated and participated
unity and a non-participating and participating plurality where the
unparticipated generates the participated and unity is prior to plurality.37 This generation is conceptualized as a procession that meets its
own return in the shared participation of unity and unified plurality. If we assume for the sake of representation that the relationship
between the unparticipated and the participated is horizontal and that
between unity and plurality is vertical, we might expect the following
scheme:38
35
Freilich gibt Eustratios den Begrisunterschied zwischen Sein und Dasein, Essenz
und Existenz zu, aber er spricht jeder Wesenheit das Frhersein im Sinne eines Duns
Scotus und noch meher jegliche wirkliche physische Unterscheidung ab . . . Joannou
(1954a) 362.
36 See Trizio (2006) and Steel (2002) for the Eustratios Neoplatonism.
37 We should be clear that there is no non-participating plurality per se in Proklos. Nevertheless, as was generally accepted, he clearly understood matter to be the
constituent of particulars that did not share in form (A, Inst. Prop. 72, p. 68).
Damascius a generation later described matter precisely as non-participating ( N
" # @ )', In Prm. 281.1314).
38 Proklos cannot sustain the clarity of this logic throughout his deductive system
since he is forced to expand the single vertical relationship that I have represented
121
Unity
Participated unity
Unified
Participating plurality
between unity and the unified to a series of vertical relationships that accommodate
the descending continuity of the Neoplatonic hypostases, i.e., to the Henads, Being,
Mind, Soul and Matter, since each hypostasis possesses its own unparticipated unity.
Only when this series of hypostases is telescoped back into a single vertical relation are
the four elements related with logical consistency, a tendency which, I would argue,
is characteristic of the Byzantine appropriation of Proklos that begins with Psellos.
For Psellos, Unity is identified with Nous and the Unified with Soul; for Italos and
Eustratios, these associations become more logically conceived as genus/species and
immanent form respectively. See Jenkins (2006) 134142.
39 Inst. 65, 67 (pp. 6265).
40 Inst. 67.1114 (p. 64).
122
The One
Unparticipated unity
#
Whole before the part
david jenkins
Unity
Participated unity
@
Whole from the parts
Unified
Participating plurality
* "
These correlations are the basis of the conceptual realism of the Alexandrian Neoplatonists, with the important clarification that for them,
following Aristotle, the whole from the parts, understood now specifically as a logical abstraction, is subsequent to the substance of the
whole in the parts, whereas for Proklos the whole in the parts remains
clearly and logically subordinate to the whole from the parts (prop. 68:
Every whole-in-the-part is a part of a whole-of-parts).
As we have seen in his Aristotelian commentaries, Eustratios has
moved beyond the Alexandrians in removing substance entirely from
the abstracted whole from the parts and by clearly identifying this
whole as a kind of whole in the parts, while confining the whole from the
parts () ) to a collective whole of extensional objects, separate
from the genera of logic.41 Further, Eustratios understands perception
to be the simultaneous awareness of the common element shared by
particulars and the individual instance of that element in each particular. Perception falls on both indiscriminately ("), and it is
only later (=) that abstraction allows their separation.42 The
whole commonly seen in the parts is then in some sense both the whole
of abstraction and the whole of particular existence since, on the one
hand, it is subsequently comprehended as an abstraction and on the
other, it exists in each particular prior to perception (this simultaneEbbesen (1990b) 156.
In APo. 266.1728: ; * Z # N J
)7 M A
,
p Z N * L ;N 7 # N &
7 #" '
, '
. &
) /CL. + ? + ;CL> #
A.
' J
. * + +, # ' N I +, & I
V. R
Z J I + R I
V #
+
V. # *
, J
& & p
/N *
V, I
V
Z ; #
F> + & ) ;, ' "
7 ;. , M ' * " 0 A
' " * ,, I J
)+ . ' N V
/ # F.
41
42
123
Unity
Participated unity
@
Whole in the parts
(abstraction/perception)
Unified
Participating plurality
* "
We see then that Eustratios has confined the genera of logic, his three
states of the whole in the parts, to the relationship between unity
and the unified, or between the Neoplatonic existences
@
and * "
. The whole from the parts falls away since it is in
some sense pre-logical as a collection of extensional objects,44 and the
whole before the parts remains supra-logical as paradigm, an element
of Neoplatonic metaphysics with no apparent role within the operations
of Aristotelian logic.45
Nevertheless, the whole-before-the-parts is still very much alive in
the thought of Eustratios of Nicaea. Joannou is undoubtedly correct in
attributing his insistence on the identity of essence and existence to
43 Sten Ebbesen has lucidly explained the inevitable conflation of these apparent
states. He identifies the abstraction with the unranked universal (for the sake of his
example, /common dog/), the common element of each particular with the ranked
universal (/this particular dog/) and the particular instance with the particular itself
(/Snuy/) and goes on to say, If you cannot quite make up your mind on the question,
and I think Porphyry could not, /this particular dog/ has a strange intermediary status
between /Snuy/ and /common dog/. In a sense it is identical with the former, in
a sense with the latter and in a sense, maybe, it is a compound of the two. Ebbesen
(1990b) 153.
44 At the very beginning of the Isagoge he [Porphyry] examines the meaning of
genos. The first use of the word, he says, was to designate the origin of each mans birth,
and next it came to designate the set (plthos) or collection (athroisma) of people sharing
a common origin of birth. It is not in any of these sense, he continues, that we use the
word when we speak of the genos to which the species are subordinate, but probably
the logical use was established in imitation (kath homoiotta) of prior usage . . . Ebbesen
(1990b) 155.
45 See Lloyd (1990) 73.
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david jenkins
46
125
Tigranes (ca. 1114). In order to rationalize Christs two natures, Eustratios urges theologians to consider applying the distinction that Greek
philosophers make between a particular and a universal to the distinction between a person and a nature: a person is particular, a nature
universal. Since a particular can possess several substantial predicates,
so too can the Logos possess two natures. Although he again prefers to
identify the particular with primary existence and the universal with
subsequent abstraction, he sees no reason to fret over the fact that
sometimes the Greeks claim that the particular is subordinate to the
universal and its participant and at other times that the universal is
either subsequent to the particular or nothing at all: whenever these
claims are useful, they can be used; whenever they are not, they should
be ignored.47
It is therefore dicult to assess the implications of Eustratios understanding of universals given, on the one hand, that he denies the
abstracted whole of its existence, and on the other, that he arms the
whole before the parts and its operation within logical predication as
the paradigm of an image which apparently stretches from existence
to abstraction. What we can say is that in at least the Definition
of Being and his polemical works, where Eustratios hopes to rationalize the two natures of the Logos and three persons of the Trinity, these positions seem to converge almost exclusively on particular
being understood as the logical relationship between a particular and
its defining universals (between the participating unified and the participated unity of our scheme). In fact this convergence is so strong
that it defines what I consider the most significant feature of Eustratios thought: the identification of God Himself with particular being.
Though perhaps understandable in the context of a Porphyrian nominalism that extends formal logic to every name, this identification is still
striking and seemingly at odds with the long and orthodox tradition
of Ps.-Dionysios, who understood God to be beyond all being, particular or otherwise.48 Not that Eustratios denies this; in fact, even in the
Definition of Being he specifically acknowledges that God is beyond
47 Refutation 162166. His representation of this alleged Greek position is not entirely
Aristotelian since the Neoplatonic universal before the parts and existence #
are both specifically acknowledged as elements of that same argument.
48 As Gerhard Podskalsky has pointed out, Eustratios did not hesitate to use the
apophatic character of Pseudo-Dionysius thought when it suited his polemical intentions, but this appropriation seems disingenuous at best given seine im brigen fast
positivistischen Einstellung zur Theologie. Podskalsky (1977) 117.
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david jenkins
everything (=? ). However, his admission here is clearly concessive and occurs in a passage where Eustratios not only asserts that
God exists among men and angels but also that He creates me a god
composed from [the] elements and is created by me (' , )?
.,
) , , ? = )+). Joannous reading immediately clarifies this remarkably heretical statement to mean,
in language reminiscent of John Italos, that is to say, I am made a
god by adoption (Q
+ )l
").49 Not surprisingly, our four
manuscripts dier significantly here, and Alpers rejects Joannous reading, dropping altogether He is created by me (a phrase which in both
its instances was crossed out by later hands) in preference for: ' , ? )?
., ) , Q
+ )7,
' : ) ), , )7
". This reading better clarifies the distinction between divinized by adoption (
") and divine
by nature (), but Alpers makes no attempt to explain or fails to
recognize that the particle " would more than likely require its correlative ", which is of course supplied by , ? = ). Only
Vaticanus Graecus 711 preserves the passage as a " " construction:
' , ? )?
., ) , , ? = ),
Q A
)? N G, ' : ) ), ,
)7
" ( . . . that is to say, He became a man without sin
on account of me and what He is by nature I become by adoption).
Though this reading is perhaps theologically acceptable the language
remains provocative. Nevertheless, the notion is understandable if we
push for the particularity of God within the metaphysics of Neoplatonism. If God as the One descends the chain of being in His procession,
He is also met by us in the ascent of our return, a notion Michael
Psellos himself had suggested.50 In the Definition of Being Eustratios
makes it clear that God not only descends to and is found complete in
everything, but like all particular being He is also acted upon in return
and participated by something else, in His case, as Eustratios suggests,
by our sinfulness which required the incarnation of the Logos. However, the opposite movements of procession and return, both logically
necessary as binding the cause and eect of particular being, imply in
the case of God that the movement that begins in His transcendence is
conditioned by or related to the movement that returns from matter, or
as our alleged emendation suggests, that God is also created by us.
49
50
QQ 81.21.
Theol. I 64.
127
This is not the only time we see Eustratios experimenting with this
particular implication of Neoplatonic theology. In his commentary on
Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, he justifies the partition of the soul
by comparing it to the composition (
) of divinity, which,
although one in itself, is participated (* ) by others that
are dierent
=, so that the whole is made up of both
divinity and the divinized (
).51 Morever, like Italos before
him, Eustratios was specifically condemned in 1117 for applying the
idea of the return to the Logos, in his case, for claiming that the
humanity of Christ worships his divinity as a servant, , and
that his humanity was perfected only upon its return to the divine.
Jesus was, in theory, like any man, but he is the Logos because the
return of his humanity to the divine was perfectly accomplished.52 To
his accusers, the economy of this theosis was too logically conceived, and
Eustratios was finally charged with reducing the nature of Christ to
an Aristotelian syllogism.53 In spite of this, in his later commentary on
the Nicomachean Ethics, Eustratios would continue to claim that a beings
perfection depends on its appropriate return to the transcendent cause
of everything.54
So even if we claim that Eustratios tended to restrict the possibilities
of philosophy to the logic of predication, he was still operating from
within the thought world of Neoplatonism.55 It is well worth noting
in this context that forty years after his condemnation, Nicholas of
Methone wrote a refutation of Proklos Elements of Theology, which allows
us to compare his views on the specific chapters that interest us here,
namely, those that address the three-part division of existence and the
relationships of wholes to parts.56 In both instances, Nicholas makes
In EN 287.2837.
Niketas of Herakleia was among his accusers, specifically citing Eustratios speculation concerning the theosis of Christs humanity. See Apologia 304.1725.
53 As Kapriev points out, the charge of Aristoteliansim simply means the use of
syllogistic thinking, which was condemned since it implies a formal structure within
which the divine is comprehended. Kapriev (2005) 214.
54 In EN 288.1822: g H R " ? ; * N ) +
+ #
, ., ? . * N ), )N L
), &" )" &, * " ,
, % I
), ", @ ' ; " * N ;D G. . .
55 Recent commentators have qualified Joannous insistence on nominalism by reminding us of Eustratios Neoplatonism. See Kapriev (2005) 214; Podskalsky (1989)
col. 117.
56 Refutation 6971.
51
52
128
david jenkins
129
is subsequent, it is the same whole in the parts that exists and is simultaneously perceived.
So was Eustratios a nominalist? We agree with Ierodiakonou that
Joannous claim that Eustratios understood universals to be mere concepts (or pure names as Kazhdan claims) is an oversimplification
of his position as developed in the Aristotelian commentaries even
though his rejection of the existence of the abstracted universal is
clear (there is no explicit argument about universals in the Definition of Being).58 However, as regards Joannous second observation,
that Eustratios equated essence and existence, I think the case is
clear: Eustratios does tend to limit the discussion of being to the formal logic of predication, both in his engagement with Aristotle and in
the Definition of Being. Whether for reasons of philosophical anity
in the first instance or polemical clarity in the second, this reduction
tends to eclipse the paradoxical being of both God and matter in so
far as they name, as our simple scheme suggests, the unparticipated
correlates of predications universal and particular constituents. Eustratios philosophical predecessors, John Italos and Michael Psellos, were
less willing to ignore the problematic implications of this lack of participation. Italos still armed the existence of universals, granted at
least subsistence to abstraction, and openly pondered the significance
of being both above and below particulars, identifying these types of
non-being specifically with God and matter.59 Psellos maintained a
thoroughly Dionysian understanding of Gods being as an apophatic
regress of beyonds that transcend all comprehension:60
But further, if you want to be theologically precise, God is neither everything nor beyond everything, neither a definition nor a comprehensive
term, neither light, nor life, nor mind, nor being, nor the One, nor even
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david jenkins
beyond the One. These names are the products of our experience and
the pangs of our soul, but God is unspeakable and beyond unspeakable
and not only do we not know what He is, we have no idea how to determine our ignorance of Him since even His unknowablility is incomprehensible.
Charles Barber
Eustratios, Metropolitan of Nicaea was one of the more sophisticated
and engaged writers on the nature of art and painting in Byzantium.1 Yet, his work remains little used by art historians and theologians who seek to conceptualize the object that we call icon. Rather,
the literature on Byzantine aesthetics has tended to privilege the theologians of Late Antiquity, of the iconoclastic era, and the Palaeologan period.2 As such, Eustratios remains one of our more underappreciated thinkers on Byzantine art. Modern editions, translations,
and a richer secondary literature will no doubt help change this situation.3 Until these become available, this essay, like the other rare
accounts of Eustratioss writing on art, must be considered preliminary.
Given this condition, my essay will attempt to show how Eustratios
developed a consistent account of the image, one that led him to reject
the post-iconoclastic elevation of the icon to the status of theology or
philosophy. In order to do this, I will focus on three of Eustratioss writings. His discussion of art in his Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 6 and
his two closely linked essays on icons: the Dialogue and the Syllogistic
Demonstration.4 While the three works discussed here reveal the consistency of his thought, even though the Ethics might date to ca. 1120 and
the icon essays belong to the early 1090s, they also reveal one notable
1 Draeseke (1896) 319336; Joannou (1952) 2434; Joannou (1954a) 358368; Joannou (1954b) 369378; Joannou (1958) 130; Browning (1962) 112; Browning (1963) 173;
Giocarinis (1964) 159204; Gouillard (1967) 206210; Glavinas (1972) 195198; Mercken
(1973) 6*14*; Lloyd (1987) 341351; Mercken (1991) 5*7*; Trizio (2006) 3563. This
paper on Eustratioss thinking on art draws on materials published in Barber (2007)
99130.
2 There is no mention of Eustratios in such standard if aging works as: Mathew
(1963), Bychkov (1977), or Ouspensky (1992).
3 Mary Fox and Dave Jenkins have prepared the translations from Eustratioss
Syllogistic Demonstration. This forms part of a collaborative project that is working under
my direction to prepare editions, translations and commentaries on the materials
bequeathed us by Komnenian discussions of the icon.
4 In EN 299321; Dialogue 127151 and Syllogistic Demonstration 151160.
132
charles barber
addition in the later text.5 I will turn to this at the end of the paper,
where I will suggest that this addition, an identification of the best
wisdom with theology, presents an attempt by Eustratios to remove
the icon from the contentious theological position it had occupied in
eleventh-century Byzantium by lessening its status in regard to theology proper.
The passage from the Ethics commentary that introduces this addition is towards the end of the section that concerns Aristotles distinction of art from prudence and the respective values of doing and making and contains Eustratioss response to section 1141a9 of Aristotles
text, which reads:
The term wisdom is employed in the arts to denote those men who
are the most accurate masters of their art, for instance, it is applied to
Pheidias as a sculptor and to Polykleitos as a statuary. In this use then
wisdom signifies nothing other than artistic excellence.
N ? ) , " , & * " &,
X
' &., )+
? 6 ;? A N , R M &N " )>6
133
In EN 319.37320.19.
134
charles barber
I want to develop two strands from this passage. First, I would like
to show that his accidental account of art is consistent with Eustratios
discussion of art elsewhere. Second, I will, as mentioned earlier, return
to the implications of his separation of the work of art from the practice
of theology.
The points made in the passage above build from the preceding
discussion of art in the Ethics. So that by the time the reader reaches
this section he or she has seen that Eustratios has elaborated upon but
not really extended the scope of Aristotles text. Art is therefore already
understood to be a rational process of making that proceeds under its
own conditions.9 As it proceeds art moves that which is external to
the substance being worked.10 It brings something into existence and
the cause of this is the artist,11 who is obliged to be accurate as it is
this that puts the material of the image and the form of the subject
in contact with one another (' F I ) CL CL @C
' D D ="D + &+ )).12 Furthermore, art,
unlike natural things, is not necessary.13 It is therefore of little surprise
that when we come to the passage quoted above that the wisdom
accredited to art is of a second order. While the artist might be called
wise, with reference to his or her accurate rendering of the accidents
that adhere to or surround substance, this wisdom is of a dierent,
lesser, order when compared to the wisdom of one who attends to
being proper. This last, in its best form, is designated the work of the
theologian.
Eustratioss account of art in his Ethics commentary follows upon the
assumptions that underpin his earlier and extended engagement with
the question of art in the two essays on the icons that were written in
the early 1090s. In these, we find a rigorous and philosophical rendering
of the prevailing discourse on icons, veneration, and the visible, as
bequeathed in the writings of the ninth-century iconophile authors
Nikephoros of Constantinople and Theodore of Stoudios. Eustratioss
two essays were written in response to a theory of iconic depiction
proposed by Leo, Metropolitan of Chalcedon in a dispute that ran
from 1082 until 1094. This theory was developed in the course of
9
10
11
12
13
In EN
In EN
In EN
In EN
In EN
299300, 307308.
301302.
300301, 307308.
319.2628.
301.
135
Leos defense of his charge that the Emperor Alexios I Komnenos had
been guilty of iconoclasm when he had melted down church silver that
bore sacred images. The core of Leos definition was that the formal
relation between the image and its subject, their common likeness,
made the icon of Christ worthy of adoration. While Leo resisted the
argument made by Basil of Euchaita that the material of an image was
transformed by the impression of divine form into its surface, he did
argue that the form seen in the image not only gave the one looking at
the object immediate access to the divine hypostasis of Christ himself,
but also made the object as a whole sacred.14
In response Eustratios presented an array of arguments intended to
define more precisely an icons proper limits. These arguments were
grounded on two key themes. First, there was a need to draw a clearer
distinction between knowledge of the Logos and knowledge of the
incarnate Christ. Second, there was a need to define more clearly the
kind of knowledge that an icon could convey.
I would like to begin with a passage from the Syllogistic Demonstration
that Antony Lloyd and others have drawn to our attention.15 This
reads:
But they [Leo of Chalcedon] then say that we consider it [the icon] worthy of adoration not by isolating its material outlines, but by perceiving
the ground of the human per se, which is the divine hypostasis adored
in this portrait. But the essential ground of a particular man is nothing
other than humanity itself, which is seen equally in all men, and the one
who adores this would no more adore the assumed existing in God the
Logos than the humanity of any other particular man. And the one adoring this would seem rightly to be an anthropolater. Since God the Logos,
having assumed humanity, divinized nature, it follows that the perfection
of nature exists in the one in number [i.e. the particular]. Therefore the
essential ground of all enmattered and natural things is perceived per se,
not existing outside of particulars, but having its existence in them: not
as a whole from parts, but in the parts existing whole in each of them.16
And the one who adores the bare ground adores a concept more than a
thing.
' ? 6
, I ; L @ &+ L &+, &* + &
7 .
/ )+, I
D D L . 8 . ;7 + &
7 ;" ) V R &
. ;, ) &
7 )
14
15
16
136
charles barber
", ' C ; D ) D D .D = , R /D * " &
7. '
C . Z &
> )' ' . @ * + N )
", I L
) D /' &
=. i . ;7 )' ) ' ), ?
/., ; =
? '
V, ) F N @> I M ; )
, & ) " I ) /D = M ;> ' D .D
D, ) R .17
Eustratios makes several points here. First the ground (.) of man
is humanity rather than divinity. Second, it follows from this first point
that man cannot be adored. Third, the incarnation has divinized all of
nature. Fourth, it follows from this that the divine may be perceived
in the post-incarnational particular. Fifth, if one tries to adore the
groundin this instance divinitybeyond the particular, one will only
adore a concept rather than the thing that mediates and presents that
ground to us.
It is this last point that leads Eustratios to criticize the distinction
that Leo has tried to draw, namely that we can perceive Christ through
the icon but not in it. For Eustratios, Leo has overlooked the icon as
a medium whose very material particularity allows Christ to be knowable. Granted this, it is important then to recognize the constraints that
this medium imposes. Foremost among these is the understanding that
the description and definition of an icon, as an artifact, is not to be confused with the physical account of the implications of the incarnation
identified in this passage.
This leads Eustratios to argue that:
The portrait of the particular is nothing else, that is a portrayal that
both depicts and impresses the accidents specific to it, the accumulation
of which would never be found in any other thing of a similar nature;
therefore, depicting it from these [accidents], or sometimes describing it
with words, we are able to portray and distinguish it from others; nor
will the universal ever be depicted, so that someone could adore this in
images, but rather only the material outline of the particular and this
according to appearance.
N ? +
V ;? V, R ' O ' # . ;D, [ Z
;
Z ) Z =
"> ' ) ;
#, R .D ? =, Z ' -
17
137
138
charles barber
things, which are all accidents. One must also transfer the name on to
the essential form as it is named in accordance with the likenesses of the
shape. For these simulate and adorn and beautify the substance.
i * X #. Q . ' ., M )'
N / * ). ; * #
H ),
;? L ; ), . ?
/N '
#
, " &
+, , ' x +
V, B . ). ? c ' )' *
* ; J
. L L \
". 8
* ' + ' , ' =.20
20
21
22
23
24
25
Dialogue 142.
Dialogue 144.
Dialogue 144.
Dialogue 145.
Dialogue 147.
Dialogue 149.
139
This mediating function for the icon is founded upon its accidental
nature. It cannot oer direct access to the substance of its subject, as it
can only convey the external qualities of that subject. Hence:
Yet the icon takes the outline and the shape of the depicted, not the
essence. The outline and shape are simply a quality and the fourth kind
of quality. Every quality is simply an accident. No accident should be
adored. Equally no outline or shape should be adored. What we are
talking about when we talk about the icon is perfectly obvious: the
artistic and the mimetic. The pre-eternal Divine Logos has assumed
into himself at the end of days the additional from the holy virgin and
Theotokos, the first fruit of our mixture. The hypostasis of the Divine
Logos has required the adoption of our nature, so that the two natures
might be contemplated in the one hypostasis. So, just as the Son of
God has maintained his infallible hypostatic particularities, according
to which the hypostasis is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit.
So, too, did the Son of Man possess other particularities by which he
diers from the mother and other men. What are these secondary things,
substance or accident? By which I mean, colors, size, perhaps the curve
of a nose, or the hair for instance, or the outlines from which he has
emerged: the eyebrows, the eyes, and each part that is manifest on his
exterior, by means of which when we see them on icons we recognize
who each icon is representing.
i #l L ' N N + #" ; N
;> ? L ' N . G ' " " .> ? G . .> ;? ? .>
;? A L R N .. ? ; A '
" L #. ) . ,> ' * L L ' * > M . 7 z ) )
/ . ) L G
" ' .
=, N &N + " > ' =. ;
. L
, ), I ) = *
,
. g ? ; $ + + )
& * =* ;+ #7,
T +
' +
=.> I ? $ &
7 F ;
#7 V,
T " L ' &
7.
+ N * ) ; R .; $. ", ,
"
, . ., ,
26
Dialogue 148.
140
charles barber
, ", \
, ' / * N
F
), B ) , #. , )
N / #" #..27
The answer to his last question is, of course, accident. What Eustratios
sets forth in these texts is an account of painting that wishes to distinguish precisely the icon, a man-made object, from its natural subject.
This dierence is substantial. While Eustratios identifies the availability of the divine through a post-incarnational divinized nature, he is
unwilling to allow this presence to the work of art. It becomes necessary, then, for him to distinguish that which is in nature from that
which is visible in a painting. A painting remains the trace of the visible, a record of the accidents that describe the particular manifestation
of a given subject but that should not be confused with their substance.
These writings on the icons provide early insight into Eustratioss
thought. They show an engagement with the philosophical world of
eleventh-century Byzantine philosophy. This did not go unnoticed by a
late, fierce critic of Eustratioss thought. When, in the summer of 1117,
Niketas, Metropolitan of Herakleia, wrote a discourse that demanded
the removal of Eustratios from his episcopal see, he chose to link the
Syllogistic Demonstration text to Eustratioss discourse addressed to the
Armenians, which had been written in 1114.28 Read together, Niketas
argued that these texts betrayed an incautious application of philosophical technique to a theological problem. The relevant passage reads:
We find that the vow taken by the metropolitan of Nicaea, where he
states that: I have been suspected of professing a bad doctrine that I
have never borne in mind, as God knows, and that I do not now bear
in mind. was for the pleasure of those listening, for he has clearly had
these things in mind many times before. For in his discourse concerning
icons he considers that the assumed should not be adored. At the start
of this discourse he demonstrates that when one is a creature one cannot
be adored, and so he divides the one Christ into the adored and the
non-adored, the worshipped and the non-worshipped, while at the end
of the discourse he introduces a rational distinction for the assumed,
and considering on its own terms that which has never existed without
the Logos that has assumed it, he excludes this [the assumed] from
the adoration and worship which is rendered to the heavenly powers
themselves. Having also applied this rational distinction for the assumed
in the two discourses for which he is being criticized [the Armenian
texts], he has fallen into the abyss of a contrary doctrine. It follows
27
28
Dialogue 154155.
The Armenian discourse can be found at Refutation 160198.
141
therefore that one cannot say that he has repented these errors, rather
one is indeed suspicious regarding his approach.
M = N ). ] ), " M> 3 ). )' .C ; &
CL R ;" )., I X, ;? + , ) )C &. ">
* ' + * ;* ).. ' * ) D ' #. .D ;+ . X &, ) &CL ? + . #
+ & X &. X ., V
# ' &, ' &, A
, ) ? D " + . CL )P + , ' "
/ = ' + .
.
/
' L ' , ] '
= ; ; , , + &. C ? CL ) + " ' ) , ' .
O & , # L &. . )"
. 6 & ; A JC +, @ ?
' ' ;N N ".29
Niketas here criticizes Eustratios for applying logical distinctions to theological problems. In particular, he objects to Eustratioss construction
of his argument from the premise that one can separate the adopted
(Christs human nature) from the Logos that has adopted this nature in
the person of Christ. For Niketas, the distinctions drawn by this manner
of thinking were problematic because they appeared to betray Eustratioss continued adherence to the thought of John Italos, Eustratioss
teacher, who in 1082 was condemned for his own application of philosophical premises to theological matters. Consequently, we can see that
Eustratios is condemned in regard to the question of the icons for failing to live up to the vow he had taken to distance himself from his
teachers method.
Given that the primary complaint against Eustratios was defined
by his Armenian discourse, the additional reference to the Syllogistic
Demonstration might at first glance appear superfluous. I would, however,
like to suggest that this reference served a purpose that went beyond
simply establishing a heretical genealogy for the Armenian text. It
also introduced the question of the icon into Niketass description of
Eustratioss orthodoxy. This was a significant gesture in eleventh- and
twelfth-century Byzantium, as ones understanding of icons was an
important means of evaluating the orthodoxy of ones thinking. This
29 Darrouzs (1966) 302.23304.3. The reference to the discourse on icons appears
to cite discussions at Syllogistic Demonstration 152 and 159.
142
charles barber
function for the work of art was annually rehearsed in the Feast of
Orthodoxy, which at this period was beginning to expand around the
core question of the image, and is also attested in the trials of Symeon
the New Theologian and John Italos, as well as the professions of faith
by Michael Psellos and John Italos. In each instance the icon played a
significant role as a means of defining or testing the orthodoxy of the
figure on trial.30
This function for the icon was a legacy of the iconoclastic era,
whose theologiansprimarily Theodore of Stoudios and Nikephoros
of Constantinoplehad established the centrality of the icon for the
definition of orthodoxy, thus implicitly elevating the icon to the level
of theology. This status was confirmed by the seventh canon of the
Constantinopolitan council of 869870, which had declared:
Setting up holy and venerable icons and teaching the similar disciplines
of divine and human wisdom are very beneficial. It is not good if this is
done by those who are not worthy. For this reason no one is to paint the
holy churches who has been anathematized by what has been decreed,
nor to teach in a similar place, until they have turned back from their
deceit. Therefore, if anyone after our declaration were to allow these in
whatever manner to paint holy icons in the church or to teach, if he is
a cleric he will endanger his rank, if he is a layman he will be banished
and deprived of the divine mysteries.
* G ' * #. &+ ' 0
*
L
' &
, \.> ;
? + N * &
> #, ) , $, , 0 &
"
, N
) $D .D , " Z ) ) L # &.
J ! * + M N G #. )
)P R N ;0 + " , # ? . ), # J "
., # ? ., &"
,
'
.31
Here, painting, theology and philosophy are placed on the same plane
and are subject to the same policing. It is this legacy that Eustratios
sought to dismantle when he followed Aristotle in distinguishing wisdom in the arts from wisdom proper. For, while wisdom proper encompassed substances and the things in themselves, the wisdom of the
arts only addressed the accidental qualities of such a thing. This distinction leads Eustratios to distinguish theology, the highest manifestation
30
31
143
THE ANONYMOUS
COMMENTARY ON NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VII:
LANGUAGE, STYLE AND IMPLICATIONS
Elizabeth A. Fisher
The anonymous commentator on NE VII has gained a tripartite reputation for incompetence among the scholars of the past two centuries who have examined his work. Their verdict is unanimous: he
is incompetent in managing the morphology and vocabulary of Greek,
incompetent in mustering adequate Greek style to express himself, and
incompetent in understanding and explicating philosophical ideas. As a
philologist by training and inclination, I cannot discuss Anonymous as
a philosopher, but his capabilities as a writer of Greek and some peculiarities of his interests as a commentator seem to be worthy of further
examination. My observations on this topic at the Notre Dame workshop also elicited some very interesting observations from the other
workshop participants on the similarity of Anonymous commentary
to the work of other known Aristotelian commentators as well as on
the possible identity of our elusive subject. Accordingly, I shall treat not
only Anonymous language and style but also the implications of those
topics for contextualizing his commentary.
Whatever his own limitations, Anonymous travels in the company of
respectable commentators whose treatments of individual books of the
Nicomachean Ethics were assembled by Eustratios and Michael of Ephesus at the instigation of Anna Komnene.1 These early twelfth-century
scholars selected existing commentaries on some books and supplied
their own commentaries to Books I and VI (Eustratios) and to Books V,
IX and X (Michael).2 Did Michael and Eustratios invite Anonymous
and his commentary on Book VII into their select circle, or did his
work intrude into the collection without their endorsement later in its
textual history? The question is open, since the first evidence of this
collection as it now survives dates from the mid-13th century, when
Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, translated into Latin these com1
2
146
elizabeth a. fisher
147
148
elizabeth a. fisher
149
150
elizabeth a. fisher
151
On page 408 eight instances of Q occur within ten lines of text (12
21), and on page 410 eleven instances occur within eighteen lines (17
36). To gauge the eect of this prominent aspect of Anonymous style
as a commentator, let us examine Aristotles text at the opening of NE
VII (1145a1520) with Anonymous commentary following it:
* ? + ", A " &, M ' * Q
)' J, &
.. * ) , ?
' L> ? * &N ) +> ? N
. Z G. " N =? &,
'
152
elizabeth a. fisher
153
Anonymous sounds like a grammatikos all too familiar with the frustrations of teaching students who grasp only superficially the texts their
teacher knows intimately and values profoundly.
Perhaps it is too generous to attribute details of the commentary to
deep-seated humanistic convictions on the part of Anonymous, since
he is persistently eager to supply literary context for mundane aspects
of Aristotles text. To illustrate the aection of an unrestrained person (&, cf. 434.19) for debilitating luxuries mentioned by Aristotle
as inducing softness ( .) at 1150a914, Anonymous specifies
Pramnian wine (, ., O # )
, X
, 434.30 and 32),30 apparently anticipating Aristotles characterization two pages later of the unrestrained person ( &) as one who
gets drunk quickly and easily ( & ) , 0
"
' = \ J ' ) R I $ 1151a56). Although
Anonymous may be an incompetent philosopher, at least he has read
30
Perhaps an allusion to Homer; cf. Iliad 11 line 639 and Odyssey 10 line 235.
154
elizabeth a. fisher
Cf. Greek Elegiac Poetry from the Seventh to the Fifth Centuries bc, 404407.
Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriptis Bibliotecae Regiae Parisiensis, v. I, 423.
155
33
34
35
36
156
elizabeth a. fisher
157
158
elizabeth a. fisher
159
only a little from to be, and not to be something from not to be.
In like manner when something is predicated in a certain respect and
absolutely . . . (i. e., anyplace and without qualification)48 (
? * L " ' " X + X,
' N X + N X. ? ' * CN '
G> 167a57). Leo Magentinos expands vividly upon this passage:
Thus, if it seems good among the Triballoi to sacrifice their elders,
by this very fact and without qualification and in every place is this
considered good. Once there was this example of such; all the people
in the Golden Age were good according to Hesiod,49 but according to
him no person in the Iron Age was good (" # ) ,
, &
0 "
, Q ' G ' #
. &
+ . + ? ? +>
$ ) D D " A
* g &
' <> ;' ?
A
) D D " ; &
<. Scholion 71, lines 7
12, Ebbesen (1981) v. 2, p. 287). According to the TLG, Leo shares this
particular combination of arresting examples only with an anonymous
scholion, where the similarity is striking: Both all people are just and
no person (is), but not at the same time nor always, but the one sort in
the Golden Age, the other in the Iron (Age). And in some places (it is
considered) good to sacrifice fathers. For (it is so) among the Triballoi,
but without qualification, (it is) not (good) (' A
' ;, ; B ? ; &, & $ ? )' + + ", $ ?
)' + +. 0 ,
.> ) , ,
G ;. Anonymi in Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos paraphrasis, Scholion
24, lines 1315). Did the anonymous scholiast rely upon Leo for this
combination of examplesor vice versa? Alternatively, did the two
commentators rely upon the same hitherto unidentified source?
Michael of Ephesus (= ps.-Alexander-2)50 also mentions the Golden
and Iron Ages from Hesiods myth in his scholion to this passage of
the SE, but without citing Hesiod by name: But also (there is) the
one who says that every person in the Golden Age was good and no
person in the Iron (Age was) good, then concludes that every man and
no man was good (&* ' " A
)' + +
" &
X ' ;" A
)' + + &
.,
Forster transl. (1955) 27; explication mine.
Cf. Op. 106201.
50 Ebbesen identifies ps.-Alexander-2 as the first edition of Michaels commentary
on the SE; cf. Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 268.
48
49
160
elizabeth a. fisher
161
George Arabatzis
I
Michael of Ephesus, when commenting on the last book of Aristotles
Nicomachean Ethics, gives lengthy consideration to the empirical man
and to a lesser extent the degree how this figure relates to the world
of education/culture. In my paper, I will not discuss the Aristotelian
text, but will concentrate on the structure and the possible coherence
of Michaels ideas. To facilitate this reading, I will present a series
of translations I have made of passages from Michaels commentary.
These will not give the total of Michaels thinking on this book, but
should oer the reader a good understanding of Michaels analysis. The
references in my text are to the CAG edition of Michaels commentaries,
although the punctuation of the translated passages is often mine.
In his commentary, Michael underlines the traditional Aristotelian
position regarding the importance of experience for the sciences and
the arts, noting that they combine logos and action:
. . .experience contributes greatly to the medical and other arts, whose
objective is not pure knowledge, but whose work consists of logos and
action. . .
(617.1214)
164
george arabatzis
he who knows the general will care for the particular; but the one who
does not know the general, there is nothing preventing him from caring
through experience about a particular thing and about what is good and
what is bad for him. Among those who are good for people are the
doctors who know from experience what can save them [their health]
and consequently, the father who knows by experience what sports are
good for his son so that he may train him better than a coach.
(614.1824)
The whole question is finally linked to the condition of the empirical man as knower: the empirical man is distinguished from the layman, who can possibly judge what is good and bad, but who lacks
the knowledge proper to the empirical man, meaning a dexterity
in accomplishing the practicalities of every particular thing in general:
empirical men [are prudent men and knowers] not only in music but in
everything in general; I call empirical men those scientists and artists
who occupy themselves in everything. In everything the empirical man
judges works appropriately, namely by which means and how we accomplish them. The doctor knows what is health and by which means and
how it is accomplished. The doctor knows what is health and by which
drugs and which diet it comes along and how to use them; but not the
layman. In the same manner, the painter knows which icon is the best
and where somebody makes an error and in which part [of the image]
and it is impossible for inexperienced and unskillful men to conceive and
realize such a work; but it is dear to them [the laymen] to know if the
work has been well done or not. Accordingly, those who are not politicians cannot legislate but possibly they can judge if the laws are good.
(618.212)
165
that laws are indeed products of prudence and intelligence and that
they also produce prudence and intelligence:
It is habitual for Aristotle to name intelligence that which is superior by
art or prudence or experience or prediction or discovery of the good
and the useful. We need intelligence to become good. But the fatherly
intelligence, meaning someones father, possibly will choose the good,
unless he is vulgar and of the populace, and will convince healthy men
directed toward the good to act for the good; but for vulgar characters,
he [the father] is feeble and set aside and does not have what it is needed,
meaning the violence of law; because the natural [fatherly] filter blocks
the violence toward the son. So, what can one say about the father? One
man cannot wholly command all the sons of a state unless he is a king or
a tyrant. These latter can accomplish this task because they have plenty
of power. But, for the reason that not all states are under the command
of one king or tyrant, we need laws. Every law has the power to compel
because it is a discourse that derives from prudence and intelligence
and posits prudence and intelligence. And prudence and intelligence
concerning actions come after long experience. And he [Aristotle] said
when he spoke about prudence that we should accept the sayings of the
experienced and the eldest as Principles. Because they possess an eye
gained from experience; he called the prudence through which they can
see that which will be useful eye. So, people obey laws believing that the
legislators made the laws because they were able to perceive in advance
through their eye the good and the useful.
(608.27609.10)
The two passages above go beyond the stated contradiction in the law:
that is, that the law as a mixture of logos and action is simultaneously
complete and incomplete. As logos it can account for great experience
and can also produce good actions. At the same time, it is incomplete
because it cannot account for the totality of reality. Yet, the law can
overcome a gap in reality: the father who is sucient for the supervision
of one son is insucient for the supervision of all sons, while a king or a
tyrant cannot stand as fathers for the whole of society. Later, Michael
does not forget to raise the question as to whether laws can eectively
make many people good. The problem is there related to the legislator,
who is conceived as an educator. Like the teachers of arts and sciences,
the legislator who can make one man good can also do the same for
many:
The distinction between laws that are fair and evil is the work of the
legislator, just as it is the work of the doctor to distinguish what is good
from what is bad for the health . . . it is to be considered, they say,
whether the law that can make somebody good can make many like him
and whether that which is useful for many is also useful for one. This is
one and the same question. He who is right and without error does the
166
george arabatzis
same regarding the other arts and sciences and the artists and scientists.
As it happens there, where the one capable of teaching and making him
a doctor or a musician can make many like him and, respectively, he who
can make many can make one, the same happens with the law: who can
make one great can make many likewise and vice versa.
(611.2431)
Aidos is a dicult word to translate and even more dicult to understand in the context of the Byzantine society of the eleventh-twelfth
centuries. It is, however, very probable that it had an anity with the
concept of timiteron in science that we are going to examine below.
II
In order to understand the relation between the empirical man and the
educated man we must turn now to other texts by Michael of Ephesus.
Thus, in his scholia and glossae In Politica, he states that:
we call the craftsman an empirical man and the architectural man a
logical man. We call craftsmen those who are actually identified as
the subordinate assistants, architectural men those who are now named
doctors and chief doctors. The proemium of the first book of the de
Partibus Animalium correctly identifies the educated man in every art
and science, and I myself also discuss this in my commentary on the
book.1
(306.2834)
1 This is for the present time the only non CAG edition of a Michael of Ephesus
text; see In Pol.
167
in terms of geometry, the educated man is not the man who is accustomed to geometrical theorems (such a man is called the chief [kyrios]
scientist), but is he who possesses the geometrical principles and knows
some theorems and is able, on the basis of these, to judge whether his
interlocutor is a geometer according to geometrical principles and if he
converses as a geometer ought. The man who has [the knowledge] of
geometrical, mathematical, astronomical, physical principles and simply
[hapls] of every art and science ( . . .) such a man should be identified as
being completely educated, as one who is educated about everything and
possesses the principles of everything, and who is thought to be capable
of judging everything, and is one in number; such a man is not many but
one ( . . .). It is obvious from the above that the scientist is an educated
man but that not every educated man is a scientist; even if he ever theorizes (theorei) about it [the truth of a scientific assertion], the educated
man does not determine (skopei) in advance the truth or not of the object
(that is the work of the scientist), but his work is to theorize whether the
object is geometrical and is shown according to geometrical principles.
(1.32.10)
The original Aristotelian text that Michael comments upon states that:
Every study and investigation, the humblest and the noblest (timiteran)
alike, seems to admit of two kinds of proficiency; one of which may be
properly called educated knowledge of the subject, while the other is a
kind of acquaintance with it. For an educated man should be able to
form a fair judgment as to the goodness or badness of an exposition. To
be educated is in fact to be able to do this; and the man of general education we take to be such. It will, however, of course, be understood that
we only ascribe universal education to one who in his own individual
person is thus able to judge nearly all branches of knowledge, and not to
one who has a like ability merely in some special subject. For it is possible
for a man to have this competence in some one branch of knowledge.
(639a112, transl. W. Ogle, p. 994)
We see that Michaels commentary points firstly to the fact that the
educated man is one in number, a this, and more precisely one not
many. Another interesting statement concerns the scientist being an
educated man but not every educated man being a scientist. Michaels
definitions ought to be of interest to modern scholars, in that his commentaries refer to notions like numerical identity and numerical dierence concerning the educated man and the scientist, to the asymmetrical relation between them, or rather, to the referential opacity that
covers the two terms as well as to their ontological status.2 It seems that,
168
george arabatzis
3
4
5
6
7
169
need of this dialectics of general culture is that the foundations of science itself escape scientific reasoning. Aubenque, therefore, in declaring
that Aristotle, although a scientist himself, refused to consider science as
an absolute value, interprets the Aristotelian text in light of some very
modern anxieties about the role of science in society.8
III
Before we continue with Michaels analysis of the relations between
the empirical man, the scientist and the educated man we have to
acknowledge and answer two questions: What is modern scholarships
opinion regarding both Michaels commentaries In EN and his wider
activity as a commentator? And, are the dierent positions proposed in
the dierent commentaries logically consequent? I will deal briefly with
these questions.
The latest theory about the scholiastic activity of Michael of Ephesus is that he, together with Eustratios of Nicaea (c. 10501120), wrote
commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics for the sake of the Byzantine
princess Anna Komnene;9 Michael produced scholia on the books V,
IX, X and Eustratios on books I and VI. Ancient scholia were used
for most of the rest of the books. Friedrich Schleiermacher held these
scholia in very high esteem, especially the ones by Eustratios.10 According to Mercken, it is probably the Christian Platonism of Eustratios
that attracted Schleiermachers interest, while Michael is said to be the
more Aristotelian of the two commentators.11 Anna Komnene, in her
famous historical book the Alexiad has only good things to say about
Eustratios but does not mention Michael at all.12 The modern editor
of the Nicomachean Ethics R.A. Gauthier has a remarkably lower opinion
of these commentaries than Schleiermacher.13 More recently, Michaels
activities as a commentator have attracted the attention of scholars
like Nussbaum, Preus and Konstan (see Bibliography). The fact that
Michael was the first to have commented on the biological works of
8
9
10
11
12
13
170
george arabatzis
Aristotle and on his Politics after many centuries is most intriguing for
the modern historian of philosophy.
The question is whether and to what extent we can claim that
Michael of Ephesus views on the relations between education and
science in the commentary In PA are coherent with those expressed in
his commentary In EN. According to Browning, this latter commentary
is dated after 1118, the year of Anna Komnenes forced retirement to
the Monastery of Kecharitomeni.14 At one point in Michaels commentary
In Parva Naturalia (149.816), the author refers to his commentary In
PA in a list of his other commentaries that includes In Parva and In de
Motu Animalium. He also announces a commentary In Metaphysics V
XIIIa much debated question in modern scholarship as we will see
belowand says that what remains for him to do is a commentary In
de Coloribus. We find no mention here of his work In EN.
Michaels life is also very dicult to date. At the beginning of the
twentieth century Praechter, on the evidence of some anonymous scholia written before 1040 that contained passages by Michael, defended
the position that Michael was not, as it had been believed until then,
a pupil of Michael Psellos, but his contemporary. Ebbesen showed that
both the anonymous scholia and the passages attributed to Michael
were based on more ancient commentaries, so there was no need for
a co-dependency of the two. This point supports Brownings thesis that
Michael belonged to the circle of Anna Komnenes scholiasts. In his
commentary In Politica, Michael gives some information about himself,
as Ernest Barker has already noted.15 Here, Michael manifests a critical
attitude towards the government of his times. If we were to follow the
earlier date for his life and work, Michael would have been referring to
the reign of Alexios I Komnenos, but if we accept the newer hypothesis, then it can be suggested that he was thinking of Emperor John II
Komnenos, Annas brother and, arguably, the usurper of her throne.
Another passage that is critical of the Byzantine Emperor also indicates
that John Komnenos and not Alexios Komnenos was the subject of
the comment. Within the same scholia and glossae, Michael remarks
that the Turks desired the maintenance of a status quo with the Byzan-
14 Anna Komnene, first-born child of the Emperor Alexios I Komnenos, had the
ambition to rule the state together with her husband Nikephoros Bryennios after her
fathers death. It was her younger brother John who took over the command probably
with the collaboration of the dying Emperor and later forced Anna to monastic life.
15 Barker (1957) 140.
171
IV
It is now time to examine Michaels approach to the problem of the
relations between the empirical man, the scientist and the educated
man. At first, we may summarize his definition of the empirical man
following his commentary In EN in the following terms
(1) The empirical man is the man of particular experiences in general
Furthermore, any scientist/artist 1,2,3 . . . n is an empirical man, in that
he is interested in every particular thing, so that
(2) scientist / artist 1 is an empirical man
scientist / artist 2 is an empirical man
scientist / artist 3 is an empirical man
...
...
scientist / artist n is an empirical man
16
172
george arabatzis
17 We should keep in mind that for Aristotle this dierence is not always valid; see
NE 2,5,1106b515; Met. 981a12b9; however, see the subsequent passage Met. 981b25
982a3 where he returns to the distinction between the sciences and arts stated in NE
6,3,1139b1436.
173
174
george arabatzis
V
It is important to investigate the way in which Michael faces the world
of empirical facts or in other terms the material world. In his commentary In PA I, writing about the famous passage that constitutes (for
Jaeger) Aristotles praise of empirical research,18 Michael states:
if someone thinks the theory of the parts of which animals consist to
be ignoble (atimon), for not producing pleasure to our senses, he must
think the same of himself; for, what pleasure can the menses of women
or the foetal membranes that cover the baby when it comes out of
his mothers belly, or the flesh, the nerves and such-like of which man
consists produce? It is significant that we cannot see without much
discomfort that of which the human species consists; we call discomfort
the sorrow that is produced in the senses or, as we might say, disgust.
(23.39)
The question of material bodies and their painful or pleasurable perception must be related, I think, to the following passage from the
commentary In EN, where Michael uses the term somatoeidis = bodily material, corporeal.
sight, for this species, is a perception without materiality, as Aristotle has
shown in the second book of De anima . . ., being without the material
from which they derive. Hearing and smell are more corporeal (somatoeideis) and they perceive the sensed objects more passively together with
their material.
(569.814)
18
175
but substances which have body in them, like thick soups and silver,
since, owing to their weight, they contain much corporeal matter (somatoeides) and other resistance, because they are subjected to violent force
as the heat tries to make its way out, form bubbles wherever the heat
prevails.
(transl. E.S. Forster)
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george arabatzis
Michaels intellectualism seems to draw not only from Plato but also
from Proclus as it is shown in the next passage, where the Proclian
influences were noted by Carlos Steel20 and are indicated here in italics:
. . .escaping from the appetites of every kind and the consecutive sensations that
deceive the intellect and introducing fantasies as introducing forming and dividing
principles and something like an unsolvable multiplicity, rejecting the opinions as
multiple and in themselves and for the other things, and mixed to the senses and the
imagination (because every opinion acts together with irrational sensation
and imagination), returning to science and intellect, and after that to the life of
intellect and the simple intuition, and on the process receiving the illumination
from the divine and filling inside with the immaculate light. What is the
good by which the divine rewards those who engage themselves in the
intellect that is relative to it?
(In EN 910 603.1630)
We can see in the above that alongside the Proclian references are
expressions that remind us of a Christian orthodox vocabulary, such
as that of the Greek fathers of the Church, for example: filling inside
with the immaculate light. Michaels attitude is that of a Christian
or of a man that has been raised in a Christian cultural environment
or in a culture with a monotheistic ground. This is also evident in
another passage from his In de Motu Animalium, where Michael relates
the timiteron to the prior. We read:
Saying [Aristotle] that the first mover always moves, he adds, for the
eternally noble and the primarily and truly good, and not just occasion20
177
ally good, like our goods (for these are not always goods), is too divine
and precious to have anything prior to it, i.e., that it is so divine that
nothing is prior in worth to it; for such a thing is more precious [timiteron] than anything.
(114.1115, transl. Preus)
Nussbaum (1978) 317318. For a dierent view, see Preus (1981) 75.
Balme (1972) 76 . and Dring (1980) 213221 for an opposite view.
178
george arabatzis
VI
In view of the above, the problem of the relations between the educated
man and the empirical man becomes less crucial than the question
concerning the relations between scientists and empirical men. How
can (2) and (7) be true at the same time? Neither the distinction between
the sciences and the arts nor the criterion of practicality can be decisive
here. I think that what we need is to see the scientist in a more complex
way and the qua device can be of great utility. For Michael the scientist
of the particular sciences, the chief scientist (kyris), as he calls him, is
(14) a scientist qua doctor. . . qua geometer. . . qua naturalist, etc.
(14) is equivalent to the series: scientist1, scientist2, scientist3 . . . scientistn.
It is only this scientist of (14) that can be appropriately called an
educated man. Only a scientist of the particular sciences is an educated
man; in virtue of the fact that both the scientist and the educated
man may be called thises. We should note the conceptual aliation
between the hapls of the simply educated and the kyris of the
chief scientist from the commentary In PA, a similarity to which
Bonitz has already pointed in the Aristotelian corpus. So (7) must be
formulated in the following manner
(15) every scientist qua doctor. . . qua geometer. . . qua naturalist, etc. is
an educated man
There is also a scientist as a generic name that does not need a definition in terms of particular sciences; we can put this second scientist
between quotation marks and call him a scientist. It is this second scientist that must be called an empirical man since both the scientist
and the empirical man are rather generic names than thises. Thus (2) is
false and must be replaced by the following
(16) a scientist is an empirical man
179
VII
It is clear by now that Michaels analysis of Aristotles introduction in
the Parts of Animals I is dierent from most of the analyses of modern scholars. Michael conceives of neither a humane critique of science, as Aubenque does; nor of a retreat in the face of dialectics, as
does Le Blond; significantly, he does not focus on the educated man, as
Irwin does; his approach is also distinguished from the question of Aristotelianism as speculative philosophy, that Dring emphasizes. I think
that while most of the above scholars perceive the relation between the
educated man and the scientist only in terms of Michaels first articulation concerning principles/theorems, this Byzantine thinker goes
beyond this (which for a medieval commentator such as him probably follows upon the dierence of proprieties found in Porphyrys commentary In Categories) and advances the articulation of Skopein/Theorein.
The first articulation, although implied in Aristotles Posterior Analytics, is
more clearly stated in Proclus Commentary in Euclids First Book of Elements. We may here perceive another filiation between Neoplatonic philosophy and the Michaels work as a commentator. The second articulation, like the first, is not a clear-cut distinction, and so diers from
Proclus, who would like to attribute dierent functions to dierent levels
of the intellect. For Michael, the two terms characterize both the educated man and the scientist, as the whole question is, I think, part of a
theory or proto-theory of scientific intentionality suggested by the terms
skopein and theorein. The first is the more immediate and proto-reflexive
intentionality, the one that probably causes the pain and the pleasure in
180
george arabatzis
perception. The second intentionality produces the theorems, or otherwise the objects of theoretical activitythese objects are linguistically
formulated as terms / horoi but that does not mean that the objects
of the first intentionality are pre-linguistic; the activity of theorein can be
called theorization of the objects. In that way, the distinction between
skopein and theorein can be described as a distinction between intentionality of the content and intentionality of the object, a classical distinction
in the theories of intentionality after Brentano.23 The existence of such
a theory or proto-theory of intentionality is to be found in Michaels
commentaries. To the relevant passages quoted above, we must add the
following that Stan Ebbesen has drawn our attention to as the sole original contribution by Michael in his commentary in Sophistici Elenchi:24
The phrase the science is not in the species is equivalent to the science
is not said by the species although it is in the species. Such as the
medicine is a species of science (what is meant by the suppose it to be
the medical science, as it is in general) is clear that it [the science] is in
the medicine; yet, although it is in the medicine, it is not said by it; for, he
who says medicine does not say science; the reason for that is induced by
him [Aristotle] by saying the science is of the knowable, meaning that
science is said potentially of the knowable but the medicine is not said of
an object; neither grammary is said grammary of an object nor any of
the other particular sciences, as we have learnt from the Categories; so,
if somebody saying science means science of an object but he who says
medicine does not mean of an object, it is clear that the species is not
said together with the genre. Better, the assertion the science is not in
the species is equivalent to the science is not appearing in the species.
It is habitual for him [Aristotle] to use such interpretations as one who
says science does not say medicine although this last is under the science;
likewise, one who says double does not say half.
(183.824)
Simons (2001).
Ebbesen (1981) 270.
181
any meaning at all, any more than half; and even if it has a meaning,
yet it has not the same meaning as in the combination. Nor is knowledge
the same thing in a specific branch of it (suppose it, e.g., to be medical
science) as it is in general; for in general it is science of the knowable
(transl. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge; translation modified: science instead of
knowledge for the Greek word: episteme).
In the parallel text from the commentary In PA, after a similar argument, Michael concludes:
25
Ibid.
182
george arabatzis
. . . If then the last dierentia is the main [kyria] one in distinguishing the
species, then the rest are said in vain; the last dierentia is implying the
previous dierentiae. If someone says that this is not the main dierentia
but the rest also and that we have to utter them as well then he arrives to
repeat many times the same thing; thats what he said in the book Z of
the Metaphysics.
(10.1030)
26 See In PN 149.1415; in fact, Michael speaks of the books Z to N. See Luna (2001)
and Taran (2005); see also Arabatzis (2006) 162170.
183
184
george arabatzis
sight is superior to touch in purity, and hearing and smell to taste; the
pleasures, therefore, are similarily superior, and those of thought superior
to these, and within each of the two kinds some are superior to others.
(1176a13, transl. W.D. Ross revised by J.O. Urmson)
32 The question left open is that of empirical data. We have seen in his commentary
In EN and In PA that Michael refuses to enlist in speculative philosophy and also
permits the infiltration of purified empirical objects into his theory of science. Yet,
the full presuppositions and implications of his positions remain to be clarified.
Katerina Ierodiakonou
A study of the Byzantine twelfth-century composite commentary on the
Nicomachean Ethics cannot pass over Michael of Ephesus contribution
to it. For it is not only that Michael is undoubtedly the writer of the
comments on books V, IX and X,1 it has also been plausibly suggested
that it was he who compiled this commentary, bringing together the
comments of Aspasius, Eustratios and two anonymous commentators.2
He thus produced an invaluable tool for a better understanding of
Aristotles ethical theories, a tool which proved to be of great help
not only to the Byzantines, but also to the students of Aristotle in
the medieval West, who extensively used its Latin translation made by
Robert Grosseteste in the thirteenth century.
Nevertheless, we know next to nothing about Michaels life, and little
attention has been given so far to the content of his comments on the
Nicomachean Ethics. At least we now can say with confidence, thanks to
Brownings and Ebbesens research, that he lived not in the eleventh
century, as Praechter had argued, but in the twelfth century, and moreover that he most probably, together with Eustratios, belonged to Anna
Komnenas circle of intellectuals.3 It still remains unsettled, however,
whether Michael wrote his commentaries only while he was working
under Anna, or whether he worked on Aristotle also before and after
this period.4 On the other hand, we seem to be well informed about
the remarkable breadth of his writings as an Aristotelian commentator. He not only wrote commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, but also
on Metaphysics VVIII and on the Sophistical Refutations, both wrongly
attributed to Alexander, on the Generation of Animals, wrongly attributed
to Philoponos, on the Parva naturalia, on the Parts of Animals, on the MoveIn EN 5, In EN 910.
Ebbesen (1990) 451, n. 23; Mercken (1990) 437.
3 Praechter (1931); Browning (1990) 399400; Ebbesen (1981) 268285; Mercken
(1990) 430432.
4 Preus (1981a) 10, n. 22; Mercken (1990) 437.
1
2
186
katerina ierodiakonou
ment of Animals, on the Progression of Animals, all edited in the CAG series;5
furthermore, he wrote comments on the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De
coloribus, which are still unedited,6 on the Politics, which have only partly
survived,7 and finally, on the Prior and Posterior Analytics, on the Topics, on
the Physics, on the De caelo and on the Rhetoric, which are unfortunately
lost.8
But Michaels surviving commentaries have not been studied in great
detail. It is only due to Ebbesens work that we know something about
Michaels logical comments on Aristotles Sophistical Refutations, and we
owe it to Preus and Arabatzis eorts that we know something about
Michaels comments on Aristotles zoological writings.9 Now, concerning the comments on the Nicomachean Ethics, there is no systematic study
of them. Mercken has discussed them in general terms, and he has
raised the general issue of whether Michael should be regarded as a
Platonist or as an Aristotelian. On his view, Michaels task as a commentator was to clarify Aristotles doctrines without taking sides; that is
to say, without being a militant Aristotelian, but also without trying to
force Aristotle into a Platonic, or for that matter, a Christian mould.10
Since there is no detailed study of any of Michaels comments on
the Nicomachean Ethics, I want to focus here on these comments, and in
particular on the comments on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. To be
more precise, I want to discuss three issues which arise from Michaels
comments:
1. The use of medical examples
2. The distinction between two kinds of eudaimonia
3. The issue whether non-rational animals can achieve eudaimonia
I choose these three issues because I think that they themselves are
philosophically interesting, though I am not sure that what Michael has
to say about them is original. The fact that we have no other ancient
187
188
katerina ierodiakonou
actions (594.2934).14 And there are many other similar cases in which
medicine is used as an example which Michael seems to consider as
simpler and easier to understand.15 But there are also at least two contexts in which Michaels use of medical examples is particularly interesting and enlightening.
The first case I want to focus on concerns Michaels comments on
Aristotles sentence right at the beginning of book X of the Nicomachean
Ethics. Aristotle verbatim says After these matters we ought perhaps next
to discuss pleasure (1172a19),16 and Michael undertakes to explain why
Aristotle here uses the adverb perhaps (isos). In doing so, he tries to
make sense of the reason why Aristotle includes in his ethical treatise
an account of pleasure, and thus raises the issue of the relation between
pleasure and eudaimonia.
According to Michaels comment (530.212),17 if Aristotle had
thought that pleasure actually is a part of eudaimonia, he would have
said that it is necessary in this context to talk about pleasure. For just
like in the case of a horse it is necessary to talk about the non-rational,
since it is part of a horse to be non-rational, similarly in the case of
pleasure, if pleasure is a part of eudaimonia, it would be necessary to talk
about pleasure in an ethical treatise on eudaimonia. If, however, pleasure is not a part of eudaimonia, but only its symptom, as it were, and
shadow, it would not be obligatory to talk about pleasure in this context, though of course we would still have the option to do so. Now,
from the two examples used here, that of the symptom and that of the
shadow, Michael in the rest of the passage chooses to further elaborate
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18
190
katerina ierodiakonou
191
Ierodiakonou (2005a).
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192
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not follow the general rule; for example, although in general those who
have fever should not eat, doctors realise that sometimes not eating
is not beneficial to certain patients (cf. 612.2233). And again this is
something doctors learn from experience. Hence, medicine does not
only involve knowledge of the universal but presupposes a great deal
of experience, which means that medicine as a discipline should be
closely connected with its practical exercise.25 Michael explicitly says
that doctors do not only have knowledge of the universal, but most
importantly they cure patients; this after all is the reason why it is
crucial not only to know what the medical textbooks say, but also how
to combine this with practical experience in treating patients (618.25
619.4).26
Michaels insistence on the importance of combining reason and
experience in medicine is not novel; on the contrary, it is very much
in the spirit of Aristotle as well as of Galen. For Galen, too, suggests
in many places of his voluminous writings that we should, on the one
hand, learn as much as possible from experience and develop a body of
empirical knowledge that is quite uncontaminated by any theory, and,
on the other hand, develop a general theory, and then check the results
of this theory against our body of empirical knowledge. He thus tries to
find a position from which one can see that there is an important place
in medicine for the approach of the Empiricist doctors, just as there
is a need for the general theories which the Rationalist doctors adhere
to, that the two do not exclude but rather complement each other, and
that they depend on each other in an accomplished doctor. Indeed,
it may be Galens influence which accounts in good part for the fact
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193
that, after his time, doctors as well as those who discuss the theory and
practise of medicine, like Michael does, seem to have lost their interest
in the ancient dispute between the ancient medical schools, namely the
Empiricists, the Rationalists and the Methodists.27
But Michael does not agree with Galen only in his understanding
of medicine as a science which depends both on theory and on practical experience. He also gives an explanation similar to that of Galens
as to why in the case of medicine it is not enough to have knowledge of the universal (540.338).28 For Michael points out that there is
something indefinite in the practice of medicine, namely that medicine
when it comes to restoring the health of particular patients accepts of
degrees. This does not mean, according to Michael, that health itself
accepts of degrees, or in other words that medical knowledge is anything but universal. However, as soon as we consider, not health in
27
Frede (1985).
194
katerina ierodiakonou
general, but the health of a particular person, we should consider different degrees of health. And this is what Galen claims, when he distinguishes between the general nature of a disease and the treatment of a
particular patient; the former should be diagnosed through a scientific
and certain method, whereas the latter can only follow a conjectural or
stochastic procedure. According to Galen, this distinction results from
the unpredictable and unique features of the individuals temperament,
whereas the theorems of medicine are universal and certain.29
2. The Distinction between Two Kinds of Eudaimonia
Let me now turn to the second issue, namely Michaels distinction
between two kinds of eudaimonia. There are indeed many passages in
his commentary on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics in which Michael
distinguishes between what he calls theoretical eudaimonia and political
or practical eudaimonia (529.911 et passim), a distinction which we find
nowhere in Aristotles text, at least not in these terms. But is it a distinction which Aristotle himself implicitly adheres to, or does Michael
interpret Aristotles text in a way which clearly is not Aristotelian?
But we should begin with another relevant distinction also drawn by
Michael, namely the distinction between two kinds of virtues, the ethical or political or practical virtues and the theoretical virtues (571.31
572.12).30 At first one could think that this distinction corresponds exactly to Aristotles distinction of ethical (ethikai) and intellectual (dianoetikai)
virtues at the end of book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. But the terminology used here, i.e. the characterisation of virtues as political and
29
Ierodiakonou (1995).
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33 On the dierent kinds of virtues, cf. Dillon (1990); Wildberg (2002); OMeara
(2003) 4049.
34 For the Neoplatonic background of the notion of political eudaimonia, cf. OMeara
(2003), 90. For further discussion of the notion of political eudaimonia in Michael of
Ephesos and in Eustratios of Nicaea, cf. OMeara (2004) 113 and (2008) 4849.
196
katerina ierodiakonou
totle does not suggest that, if one acquires external goods and exercises the ethical virtues, then one can be said to have reached eudaimonia. There is, of course, in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship a
disputed question about whether eudaimonia can be reached only by
contemplation or whether ethical virtues and external goods are also
required; this is the famous issue of the so-called inclusive or the dominant conception of the end in Aristotle, and hence of his notion of
eudaimonia. But Michaels distinction between political and theoretical
eudaimonia seems to try to circumvent this issue. For Michael does not
talk of one kind of eudaimonia, but of two kinds; one can achieve political eudaimonia just by acquiring external goods and exercising ethical or
political virtues, while someone who exercises both political and theoretical virtues achieves theoretical eudaimonia. And theoretical eudaimonia
is obviously considered as the highest form of eudaimonia (kyrios, kratiste,
teleia eudaimonia),35 since it presupposes practical eudaimonia; for it is not
possible, according to Michael, to devote ones life to contemplation, if
one does not first manage to master the bodily passions and to live an
ethically virtuous life.
Does the dierence between Aristotles theory and Michaels interpretation merely lie in the fact that Michael attributes to the person of
ethical or political virtues a kind of eudaimonia, even if this is not the
perfect kind? There is a further distinction drawn by Michael in this
context which is very illuminating, especially in revealing the motivation behind the distinction between political and theoretical eudaimonia
(580.318).36 On Michaels view a human being should be thought of in
two ways: firstly, the human being as the composite of body and soul,
and secondly, the human being as reason or intellect (nous); indeed, this
35
197
latter notion of the human being is, according to him, the true human
being (alethes, alethinos, ontos, malista, protos anthropos).37 Moreover, political or ethical virtues characterise the human being as the composite of
body and soul, whereas theoretical virtues characterise the true human
being. But this is not a distinction we find in Aristotles Nicomachean
Ethics. Of course, in book X Aristotle does talk about the composite
nature of human beings to which the ethical virtues belong, whereas
the exercise of the virtue of reason is contemplation and we should try
so far as we can to achieve this. But this does not mean that Aristotle would accept Michaels distinction between the human being as the
composite of body and soul and the true human being. Rather, the terminology used here of the true human being is again Platonising, and
the distinction itself between the composite human being and the true
human being can be found, for instance, in Plotinus Enneads.38
In addition, the similarity to Platonic views extends further to the
way Michael describes the condition of theoretical eudaimonia. For he
defines theoretical eudaimonia not only as the knowledge of the divine,39
something we would expect from a reading of Aristotles Ethics or
Metaphysics, but as the knowledge of and connection with (epafe) the
divine.40 In this context, moreover, Michael talks of the attempt to
separate oneself from the animal which resides in us and unite ourselves
(enosis) with the divine,41 by being drawn to it (anatasis)42 and accepting
its illumination (ellampsis).43 We are clearly reminded here not only
of Plotinus terminology, but also of Platonic doctrines.44 It could be
argued, however, that Aristotle also claims that we as rational beings
must try, so far as we can, to, in contemplation, share in the life of
the divine. But in this case, too, Aristotle thinks of the human being
who, being the composite of body and soul, tries to exercise theoretical
wisdom as far as humanly possible, rather than of the true human being
198
katerina ierodiakonou
199
beliefs with Aristotles doctrines, though this might have been facilitated
by an already Platonising interpretation of Aristotle.
3. The Issue as to Whether Non-Rational
Animals Can Achieve Eudaimonia
It is time now to turn to the last issue I want to discuss briefly, namely
Michaels comment about Aristotles claim that non-rational animals
cannot achieve eudaimonia (598.18599.38). Michael says that, since the
perfect kind of eudaimonia is theoretical eudaimonia, and one can achieve
theoretical eudaimonia only by exercising both political and theoretical
virtues, and theoretical virtues crucially involve the excellence of reason, non-rational animals cannot achieve theoretical eudaimonia. This is,
according to Michael, Aristotles view, but he crucially adds that it is
also his own view, Platos view and the view of all those who identify
eudaimonia with intellectual life (598.1825).49
Mercken mentions this text as an example of a passage in which
Michael summons Plato in support of Aristotles views. He claims
that such passages serve to clarify Aristotles text, without necessarily
proving Michaels interest in defending or attacking Platos doctrines.50
Indeed there is no doubt that Michael here summons Plato in support
of Aristotles view, since Plato, too, would agree that non-rational animals cannot attain eudaimonia. I think, though, that the way Michael
refers to Plato is not as neutral as Mercken presents it. For it seems
that Michael summons Plato in support of Aristotles views, because
Michael considers him as an important authority, whose views have
particular weight for him.
And a final short remark about the content of Michaels comment.
Although it seems that Plato and Aristotle are in agreement that nonrational animals cannot achieve eudaimonia, according to Michael the
Epicureans and the later Stoics claim that this is possible. For in the
case of the Epicureans, Michael says, eudaimonia is identified with eupa49 )" N
", Q N * N ' &
'
. " ? I " * " ' [ F
, M * ? * A . 8 ' @
' ; = ; . ' , &. D7,
)? ? ' ' 0 A M N ; ) P CL $,
& * ;, * A D7, )" + ' L L.
50
200
katerina ierodiakonou
theia; but non-rational animals can achieve eupatheia, therefore nonrational animals can achieve eudaimonia. In the case of the later Stoics,
eudaimonia is identified with well-being, well-being is identified with living in accordance with nature, non-rational animals live in accordance
with nature, and therefore non-rational animals can achieve eudaimonia
(598.2534).51
It is, I think, very interesting that Michael here refers at all to
the Epicureans and the later Stoics, though there is a question as to
what exactly he has in mind when he talks about the later Stoics.
And it is striking that he tries to present their theories in a syllogistic
form, though there is no evidence that the Stoics, or for that matter
the Epicureans, argued about this topic and in this particular way.
Moreover, Michaels presentation of the Stoic position is really unfair.
The Stoics would never claim that non-rational animals can achieve
eudaimonia, for what is important in their understanding of what it
means for human beings to live in accordance with nature is that
human beings can live in accordance with their rational nature, and
thus can have a grasp of what they should or should not do in order
to achieve eudaimonia. But Michaels criticism of the Epicurean and the
Stoic position is not at all original; for he clearly follows Plotinus, whose
views on this subject he reworks or even almost quotes.52
In conclusion, I discussed three dierent issues which arise from Michael of Ephesus comments on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. It has
become clear by now that in the relevant passages Michael seems to
have been influenced by the views of Plato, Galen, Plotinus and the
Neoplatonists; he even refers to the Hellenistic philosophers, though
only to argue against them. That is to say, Michaels comments seem to
do much more than simply present and elucidate Aristotles views.
Zervos has pointed out the Platonic influences on Michael, Praechter
has contrasted Michael of Ephesus, the Aristotelian, with Michael PselM ? * 0 8 ' 0 0 " ; ' * A D, * A > # ;
, 6 L )
8, ? 6 L ;. ) 8 ' 0 0 D ;,,
;
, A ;, )> = ? , &. D7 ;
,, E
' ;,. , # * * 0 0 6 L ),
? 6 L ' ;0 ' 8 ;, ), * A
;, )> &* N = , &. D7 * &
" " L &L> ;, F A * A D.
51
52 Enneads 1.4.12. I would like to thank Dominic OMeara for pointing out to me
the source of Michaels comments here.
201
los, the Platonist, Preus has claimed that Michael tries to stay as close as
possible to the spirit of Aristotle, Mercken has suggested that Michaels
Aristotelianism is never a militant one.53 It seems that modern scholars
have moved from regarding Michael as a Platonist to regarding him
as an Aristotelian, even if not a militant one. To stress once again the
Platonic roots of Michaels comments, as I have done, does not mean
that I want to return to the view that he is a Platonist. On the contrary,
what I have tried to show by working my way through these passages
of his commentary is that perhaps it is rather dicult to put a specific
label to Michael. For Michael is a commentator of Aristotle, and this
means that he thinks that Aristotles work is significant, and thus in
explaining it wants to stay close to his spirit. But this does not mean
that he agrees with Aristotle in everything. At the same time, Michael
often follows Plato, Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, or other ancient
thinkers, like for instance Galen. Besides, it may have been important
for him, as a Christian commentator of ancient philosophical texts not
to adhere uncritically to an Aristotelian, Platonic or other ancient viewpoint. Hence, it is, I think, essential in the future not only to closely
read all of Michaels commentaries, before we attempt to assess his
overall contribution in Byzantine thought, but to carefully reflect on the
role of a commentator in twelfth-century Byzantium, as he no doubt is.
53
Zervos (1920) 222223; Praechter (1931); Preus (1981b) 22; Mercken (1990) 434.
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INDEX
Abelard, Peter, 116
Abraham, 41
Agamemnon, 24
Ailios Aristeides, 17
Ailios Dionysios, 11
Albertus Magnus, 66
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 65, 7475,
9798, 107, 185
Alexios I Komnenos, 2425, 27, 40,
4546, 49, 51, 53, 5760, 135, 170
Alpers, K., 111, 113, 117, 126
Ammonius, 75
Andronikos, son of the emperor
John II, 23
Andronikos Kallistos, 67
Andronikos Rhodios, 67
Antioch, 51
Apollo, 153
Apollodoros, 157
Arabatzis, G., 186
Arethas of Caesarea, 10
Aristophanes, 6, 11, 1920, 29, 31
Aristotle, 1, 14, 17, 2021, 2930,
3638, 4041, 4550, 5259, 61,
6469, 7274, 76, 8182, 8890,
93, 97, 103105, 109, 113, 116
118, 122, 124, 129, 132, 134, 142,
147154, 156158, 160, 163, 165,
168170, 172, 174175, 177, 179,
181, 183, 185190, 192, 194199,
201
Artemis, 153
Aspasius, 68, 185
Athena, 40
Athens, 14, 16, 22, 168
Aubenque, P., 168169, 172
Augustine, 182
Bacon, Francis, 18
Balme, D.M., 168
Bardanes, George, 14
Barker, E., 170171
Basil of Caesarea, 8, 39
Basil of Euchaita, 135
Baynes, N., 43
Bellerophontes, 10, 30
Benakis, L., 65, 108, 111, 117119
Berroia, 2627
Bertha-Eirene, 23, 27, 29
Blachernai, 51
Blachernites, Theodore, 61
Bogomils, 61
Brentano, F., 180
Brown, P., 43
Browning, R., 149, 170, 185
Bryennios, Nikephoros, 57
Buckler, G., 149
Budelmann, F., 30
Bury, J.B., 43
Bywater edition, 73
Caston, V., 183
Constantine IX Monomachos, 28
Constantine Paleokappas, 67
Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos,
6, 37, 149
Constantinople, 35, 38, 46, 51, 156
157
Coulon, V., 6
Crete, 67
Crusaders, 3, 8, 51, 60, 171, 183
Cyclopes, 38
Damaskios, 71
Dareios, 15
Demodocus, 154
Demosthenes, 1718
Digenes Akrites, 22
Diktys of Crete, 24, 26
Diogenes Laertius, 154
Dionysios Periegetes, 30, 32, 34
Dionysios Thrax, 1415
Doxopatres, John, 151
Dring, I., 168, 179
224
index
index
Lamia, 147, 152
Lattimore, R., 28
Le Blond, J.M., 168, 179
Leo Magentinos, 157161
Leo of Chalcedon, 40, 50, 52, 54,
134136
Leo the Philosopher, 10
Leros, 154
Leto, 153
Libanios, 18
Linear B, 10, 24
Lloyd, A.C., 6566, 108, 111, 113,
116118, 124, 135
Loeb Classical Library, 4
Lykophron, 20, 2931
Magdalino, P., 54
Magnanimous Man, 58
Manasses, Constantine, 23, 61
Manuel I Komnenos, 23, 27, 46, 53,
57
Marcus Aurelius, 69
Maria Skleraina, 28
Mauropous, John, 60
Meleager, 157
Melitene, 171
Mercken, H.P.F., 6566, 146148,
150151, 155, 157, 169, 186, 198
199, 201
Metochites, Theodore, 68
Michael Choniates, 14, 22, 33
Michael of Ephesus, 20, 30, 37
39, 4750, 6465, 71, 145148,
151, 155, 157, 159160, 163
201
Michael, later Patriarch of Constantinople, 54
Momigliano, A., 43
Mommsen,T., 43
Moses, 41, 102
Muses, 7
Neilos of Calabria, 52, 54
Nero, 24
Nicholas of Methone, 25, 127
Nikander, 29
Nikephoros Blemmydes, 68
225
226
Prodromos, Theodore, 14, 21, 24,
4648, 53, 61, 157
Proklos, 2526, 31, 7172, 7680,
8283, 8588, 90100, 103105,
108109, 113, 120122, 127128,
176, 179
Ps. Dionysios the Areopagite, 125
Psellos, Michael, 13, 1718, 2021,
2526, 28, 58, 65, 68, 71, 81, 89,
113, 117, 126, 128129, 142, 170,
200
PseudoAristotle, 6869, 186
PseudoOlympiodoros, 67
Ptolemy, 4748, 58
Quintus of Smyrna, 26
Ross, W.D., 183184
Satyros, 153
Saul, 15
Schissel, O., 156
Schleiermacher, F., 146148, 150
151, 169
Shepard, J., 60
Simplikios, 6
Smyth, H.W., 148
Socrates, 33, 191
Solon, 41
Sorabji, R., 65, 155
Spivey, N., 8
Steel, C., 71, 176
Stephanos Skylitzes, 30, 155158,
160
Stephanos, Metropolitan of Trebizond, 48
Stephen of Byzantion, 13
Symeon the New Theologian, 142
Synesios of Cyrene, 15
Syrianus, 77
index
Teubner, 4
Themistios, 5
Theodore of Smyrna, 54
Theodore of Stoudios, 102, 134,
142
Thucydides, 7, 148
Tigranes, 125
Titans, 33
Todd, R., 152
Tornikios, George, 25, 37, 4748, 50,
5658, 62
Trebizond, 157
Triballoi, 159160
Triklinios, Demetrios, 19
Trizio, M., 65
Trojan War, 7, 24, 26
Troy, 24
Tryphon, 15
Tzetzes, John, 1011, 14, 16, 20, 23
24, 2632, 38, 53
Tzetziros, 117
Urmson,J.O., 183184
Venice, 65
Virgin Mary, 115116, 124, 139
Walz, C., 13, 16
Wilson, N.G., 2
Wolska-Conus, W., 157, 160
Xenophon, 148
Xerxes, 154
Xiphilinos, John, 60
Zervos, C., 71, 200
Zeus, 7, 15, 27, 33, 39
Zonaras, John, 11, 47
81. Gelber, H.G. It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and Necessity in Dominican
Theology at Oxford, 1300-1350. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13907 9
82. Bos, E.P. Logica modernorum in Prague about 1400. The Sophistria disputation Quoniam
quatuor (MS Cracow, Jagiellonian Library 686, ff. 1ra-79rb), With a Partial Reconstruction of Thomas of Cleves Logica. Edition with an Introduction and Appendices. 2004.
ISBN 90 04 14009 3
83. Gottschall, D. Konrad von Megenbergs Buch von den natrlichen Dingen. Ein Dokument
deutschsprachiger Albertus Magnus-Rezeption im 14. Jahrhundert. 2004.
ISBN 90 04 14015 8
84. Perler, D. and Rudolph, U. (Eds.). Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im
lateinischen Mittelalter. 2005. ISBN 90 04 11118 2
85. Bezner, F. Vela Veritatis. Hermeneutik, Wissen und Sprache in der Intellectual History des
12. Jahrhunderts. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14424 2
86. De Rijk, L.M. Giraldus Odonis O.F.M.: Opera Philosophica. Vol. II: De Intentionibus. Critical edition with a study on the medieval intentionality debate up to ca. 1350. 2005.
ISBN 90 04 11117 4
87. Nissing, H.-G. Sprache als Akt bei Thomas von Aquin. 2006. ISBN 90 04 14645 8
88. Guerizoli, R. Die Verinnerlichung des Gttlichen. Eine Studie ber den Gottesgeburtszyklus
und die Armutspredigt Meister Eckharts. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15000-3,
ISBN-10: 90-04-15000-5
89. Germann, N. De temporum ratione. Quadrivium und Gotteserkenntnis am Beispiel Abbos
von Fleury und Hermanns von Reichenau. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15395-0,
ISBN-10: 90-04-15395-0
90. Boschung, P. From a Topical Point of View. Dialectic in Anselm of Canterburys De Grammatico. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15431-5, ISBN-10: 90-04-15431-0
91. Pickav, M. Heinrich von Gent ber Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft. Studien zu einem
Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. 2006.
ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15574-9, ISBN-10: 90-04-15574-0
92. Thom, P. Logic and Ontology in the Syllogistic of Robert Kilwardby. 2007.
ISBN 978 90 04 15795 8.
93. Goris, W. Absolute Beginners. Der mittelalterliche Beitrag zu einem Ausgang vom Unbedingten. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 16215 0
94. Khler, T.W. Homo animal nobilissimum. Konturen des spezifisch Menschlichen in der
naturphilosophischen Aristoteleskommentierung des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts. Teilband 1. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 16289 1
95. Bonner, A. Art and Logic of Ramon Llull. A Users Guide. 2007.
ISBN 978 90 04 16325 6
96. Folger-Fonfara, S. Das Super-Transzendentale und die Spaltung der Metaphysik. Der Entwurf
des Franziskus von Marchia. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16384 3
97. Roling, B. Locutio angelica. Die Diskussion der Engelsprache als Antizipation einer
Sprechakttheorie in Mittelalter und Frher Neuzeit. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16553 3
98. Kirchhoff, R. Die Syncategoremata des Wilhelm von Sherwood. Kommentierung und historische Einordnung. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16633 2
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vor dem Hintergrund seiner Kritik am Formalittenrealismus. 2008.
ISBN 978 90 04 16972 2
101. Barber, C. and D. Jenkins (Eds.). Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics.
2009. ISBN 978 90 04 17393 4
102. Brown, S.F., T. Dewender and T. Kobusch (Eds.). Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early
Fourteenth Century. 2009. ISBN 978 90 04 17566 2