G.R. No.

166046

March 23, 2006

MARGARITO C. SULIGUIN, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, and ECELSON C. SUMAGUE, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse the
Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPC No. 04-209 dated November
18, 2004 which denied petitioner Margarito Suliguins motion for reconsideration of the July 21, 2004
Resolution2 of the Comelecs First Division. The Comelec nullified his proclamation as the 8th
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Margarito Suliguin was one of the candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
Laguna during the May 10, 2004 elections. At around 6:00 p.m. on said date, respondent Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBOC) convened to canvass the votes for all the candidates. Petitioner
received 6,605 votes while respondent Ecelson Sumague received 6,647 votes. However, in the
Statement of Votes (SOV) covering Precincts 1A to 19A, Sumague appears to have received only
644 votes when, in fact, he received 844 votes. The MBOC failed to notice the discrepancy and
proclaimed the winning candidates at around 7:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004. Petitioner was proclaimed
as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, garnering a total of 6,605 votes. 3
Thereafter, Sumague requested for a recomputation of the votes received by him and Suliguin in a
Letter4 dated May 15, 2004, it appearing that there was a mistake in adding the figures in the
Certificate of Canvass of votes. He pointed out that he officially garnered 6,647 votes, as against
petitioners 6,605 votes.
The MBOC summoned petitioner and respondent Sumague to a conference. Upon review, the
MBOC discovered that it had, indeed, failed to credit respondent Sumague his 200 votes from
Precincts 1A to 19A, and that with his 6,647 votes, he should have been proclaimed as the 8th
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, instead of petitioner Suliguin.
On May 26, 2004, the MBOC filed before the Comelec a "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the
Statement of Votes" for Councilor. The error was attributed to extreme physical and mental fatigue
which the members of the board experienced during the election and the canvassing of votes.
In the meantime, on June 9, 2004, petitioner took his oath of office before Judge Renato B.
Bercades.5

On July 21, 2004, the Comelec (First Division) issued a Resolution6 granting the petition of the
MBOC. The Commission nullified the proclamation of petitioner Suliguin as the 8th Sangguniang
Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections "for
being based on an erroneous computation of votes." It then ordered the MBOC of Nagcarlan,
Laguna to reconvene and effect the necessary corrections in the SOV, and forthwith proclaim
Sumague as the 8th duly elected Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna. 7
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but the Comelec En Banc denied the
motion on November 18, 2004; hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that respondent Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling against him.
In support of his petition, he alleges that:
4.1 THE "PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR
COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS UNDISPUTEDLY FILED OUT OF TIME, and
4.2 "THE PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR
COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS FILED BY THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS IN DEFIANCE OF EXISTING COMELEC RULES AND REGULATIONS AND WAS
OBVIOUSLY BIAS IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANDICATE ECELSON C.
SUMAGUE.8
Petitioner argues that pursuant to Sections 35,9 36(c) and (f)10 of Comelec Resolution No. 6669
(General Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of Canvassers in Connection
with the May 10, 2004 Elections), the MBOC should not have entertained the letter-request of
respondent Sumague as it was filed only on May 17, 2004, or four (4) days after the canvassing of
votes was terminated and after he (petitioner) was proclaimed winner as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan
member of Nagcarlan, Laguna. Furthermore, respondent Sumague never entered any objection
during the proceedings of the canvassing of votes. The MBOC itself filed the "Petition to Correct
Entries Made in the Statement of Votes" before the Comelec only on May 26, 2004, 13 days after the
canvassing of votes was terminated. Petitioner maintains that the Comelec should have denied the
petition, since according to the Revised Comelec Rules, it should have been filed not later than five
(5) days following the date of the proclamation.
Petitioner likewise questions the personality of the MBOC itself to file the petition before the
Comelec. He further argues that upon the proclamation of the winning candidates in the election, the
MBOC adjourns sine die and becomes functus officio.
The issue is whether or not respondent Comelec erred in granting the petition of the MBOC to nullify
petitioners proclamation as the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan in Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all means within its command who the
real candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or
the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an
election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.11 In the case at bar, the simple

mathematical procedure of adding the total number of votes garnered by respondent Sumague as
appearing in the Statement of Votes submitted to the Comelec would readily reveal the result that he
has forty-two (42) votes more than petitioner. Such result would, in effect, dislodge petitioner from
said post, and entitle respondent Sumague to occupy the eighth and last seat of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. Petitioner himself never disputed the discrepancy in the total number
of votes garnered by respondent Sumague, and instead questioned the personality of the MBOC to
file the petition and insisted that such petition was not filed on time.
Sections 312 and 413 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that such rules
may be "liberally construed" in the interest of justice. Indeed, the Comelec has the discretion to
liberally construe its rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any portion thereof in the
interest of justice.14 Disputes in the outcome of elections involve public interest; as such,
technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to
the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Laws
governing such disputes must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. 15
What is involved in the present petition is the correction of a manifest error in reflecting the actual
total number of votes for a particular candidate. Section 32, subparagraph 5 of Comelec Resolution
No. 6669 includes mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate as a manifest error.16 As
correctly cited by the Comelec,17 a manifest clerical error is "one that is visible to the eye or obvious
to the understanding and is apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and
does not include an error which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been
committed."
The MBOC sought relief from the Comelec to reflect the true winner elected by the voting public, to
occupy the eighth position as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. In Carlos v.
Angeles,18 the Court had the occasion to declare:
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through
the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the
sovereign power of the people." "Specifically, the term election, in the context of the Constitution,
may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of votes." The winner is the candidate who has obtained a
majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. "Sound policy dictates that public elective
offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office.
For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and
no measure can de declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election."19
We quote, with approval, the ruling of the Comelec (First Division) granting the petition of the MBOC:
A careful perusal of the records show that there was, indeed, an honest error committed by petitioner
MBOC in the computation of votes for candidate Ecelson Sumague which resulted in the erroneous
proclamation of respondent as one of the winners for the said office.

"A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is
apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error
which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been committed."
The contention of respondent that the instant petition should be dismissed for being filed out of time
cannot be given merit because his proclamation was flawed. It must be stressed that "a proclamation
based on faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and a petition to correct errors in tabulation under
Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, even if filed out of time, may be
considered, so as not to thwart the proper determination and resolution of the case on substantial
grounds and to prevent a stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation based on an erroneous
tabulation of votes."
Furthermore, "where the proclamation is flawed because it was based on a clerical error or
mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not through the legitimate will of the electorate,
there can be no valid proclamation to speak of and the same can be challenged even after the
candidate has assumed office."
There is no showing that petitioner MBOC acted with manifest bias and committed a grave abuse of
discretion. "Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law." Petitioner MBOC is merely doing its function that is mandated by law to
canvass votes in the election returns submitted to it in due form, adding or compiling the votes cast
for each candidate as shown in the face of such returns and eventually proclaim the winning
candidates. Respondent miserably failed to prove that petitioner exhibited manifest bias thereby
thwarting his chances of winning the last slot for Sangguniang Bayan Member. "Absent a strong
showing to the contrary, the court must accept the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption."
Likewise, it cannot be said that petitioner MBOC violated the sanctity of the ballots. Unlike the Board
of Election Inspectors which counts the votes from the precinct levels, the MBOC computes the
votes as appeared in the election returns.
Finally, a subsequent annulment of the proclamation of the respondent does not constitute a clear
violation of his right. In the first place, there is no valid proclamation to speak of. He was not elected
by a majority or plurality of voters. His alleged right was based on an erroneous proclamation. By
any mathematical formulation, the respondent cannot be construed to have obtained such plurality of
votes; otherwise, it would be sheer absurdity to proclaim a repudiated candidate as the choice of the
voters. "Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidates assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make
such declaration a nullity." Respondent also cannot claim that he was denied of his right to due
process of law since he was given the opportunity to be heard. He was duly notified by petitioner
MBOC of the erroneous computation which resulted in his proclamation and was afforded the
opportunity to be heard by this Commission.

"The COMELEC exercises immediate supervision and control over the members of the Boards of
Election Inspectors and Canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision and control includes the
power to revise, reverse or set aside the action of the boards, as well as to do what boards should
have done, even if questions relative thereto have not been elevated to it by an aggrieved party, for
such power includes the authority to initiate motu proprio or by itself steps or actions that may be
required pursuant to law."20
Petitioner posits that the Comelecs reliance in the ruling of this Court in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections21 is misplaced since, unlike the present petition, petitioner therein was an affected
candidate who filed his petition on time.
The argument of petitioner does not persuade. The Court, in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,22 declared that:
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not
thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds. Adherence
to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable
result of frustrating the peoples will cannot be countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, we
categorically declared that:
x x x Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently
observed by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in
Duremdes v. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination
of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also settled is the rule that
laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo,
26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27,
1962; Macasunding v. Macalaang, G.R. No. L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967). In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to
ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate.
(Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). x x x (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra,
pp. 818-819). (Italics ours)
In the later case of Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was
reiterated and the Court went on to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it frowns
upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results. This
bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).
The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election
laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.

Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction of
what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by both
candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination
and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private respondent and respondent MBCs of
Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly, this
only calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by
the MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the proper and
diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan. 23
The Court made a similar pronouncement in Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections, 24 to wit:
The argument is devoid of merit. For one thing, records indicate that respondents assumption of
office was effected by a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not
through the legitimate will of the electorate. Thus, respondents proclamation was flawed right from
the very beginning. Having been based on a faulty tabulation, there can be no valid proclamation to
speak of insofar as respondent Castillo is concerned. As this Court once said:
"x x x Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that Comelec is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate
proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power. It, of course,
may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private respondents petition
before the Comelec is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we
perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to
Comelec.
xxx
"We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a proclamation may be challenged even
after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office.
xxx
"It is, indeed, true that, after proclamation, the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an election is
to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there has been a valid
proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office
cannot in any way affect the basic issues." (Aguam v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 883
[1968]; cited in Agbayani v. Commission on Elections, 186 SCRA 484 [1990]). 25
Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of petitioner for being based on an
erroneous computation of votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v. Commission on
Elections,26 where the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidates assumption of office
cannot deprive the Commission the power to declare such proclamation a nullity. We emphasized
that a defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.27
In fine, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of
petitioner. In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part of petitioner to prove not

merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion means a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough, it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.28
To the credit of the MBOC, when it realized that it made a mistake in computing the total number of
votes for respondent Sumague, it took swift action and called the attention of the Comelec by filing
the Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes for Councilor.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in SPC No.
04-209 dated July 21, 2004 and November 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Order issued
by the Court dated January 11, 2005 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
CONSTANCIO D. PACANAN,
G.R. No. 186224
JR.,
Petitioner, Present:

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and FRANCISCO M. LANGI,
SR.,
Respondents.

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,**
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.
Promulgated:

August 25, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari which seeks to set aside 1) the
Order dated March 17, 2008 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) First
Division and 2) the Resolution[2] dated January 21, 2009 of the Comelec En Banc
dismissing petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr.s appeal from the Decision [3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar, in Election Case No.
07-1, which declared private respondent Francisco M. Langi, Sr. as the winning
Mayor of Motiong, Samar.
[1]

In the Order of March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division dismissed the appeal
for failure to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed by the Comelec Rules of
Procedure within the five-day reglementary period.
In the assailed Resolution dated January 21, 2009, the Comelec En Banc
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, declaring that the Comelec did not
acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment of the appeal fee
on time, and that the Comelec First Division was correct in dismissing the said
appeal.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr. and private respondent Francisco M.
Langi, Sr. were candidates for mayor in the municipality of Motiong, Samar during
the May 14, 2007 elections. After the canvassing of votes, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) of Motiong, Samar proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected
mayor, having garnered a total of 3,069 votes against private respondents 3,066
votes.
Thereafter, private respondent filed with the RTC a Protest [4] dated May 25,
2007 which was docketed as Election Case No. 07-1, contesting the results of the
elections in ten (10) of the forty-nine (49) precincts in Motiong, Samar, and
alleging acts of violence and intimidation and other election irregularities in the
appreciation of the votes by the MBC. Thereafter, petitioner filed his Verified
Answer with Counter-Protest[5] dated June 4, 2007, asserting that private
respondents allegations of threat and intimidation, fraud and other irregularities in
the conduct of elections were mere allegations unsupported by any documentary
evidence. Petitioner also disputed the election results with respect to seven (7)
precincts.
On January 7, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision [6] in Election Case 07-1,
which declared private respondent as the winner in the May 14, 2007 mayoralty
race for Motiong, Samar with a plurality of six (6) votes, viz:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing Protestant Francisco M. Langi, Sr.
having obtained the over all total votes of 3,074 and the Protestees 3,068 total and
final votes is declared the winner in the Mayoralty contest in Motiong, Samar
with a plurality of (6) votes. Therefore the proclamation on May 17, 2007 is
hereby annulled and declared Francisco Langi, Sr. y Maceren as the duly elected

Mayor of Motiong, Samar. The winner is awarded the amount of P 32,510 as

actual damages and no evidence aliunde for damages for the court to award. xxx

On January 10, 2008, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and paid P3,000.00
appeal fee per Official Receipt No. 6822663 before the RTC, Branch 27,
Catbalogan, Samar.He also appealed the RTC decision dated January 7, 2008 to the
Comelec which docketed the case as EAC No. A-13-2008. Out of the P3,000.00
appeal fee required by Section 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,
petitioner only paid the amount of P1,000.00 (plus P200.00 to cover the legal
research/bailiff fees) to the Cash Division of the Comelec, per Official Receipt No.
0510287. The said payment was made on February 14, 2008.[7]
On March 17, 2008, the
Order dismissing the appeal, viz.:

Comelec

First

Division

issued

an

[8]

Pursuant to Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure which provide for the payment of appeal fee in the amount of
P3,000.00 within the period to file the notice of appeal, and Section 9 (a), Rule 22
of the same Rules which provides that failure to pay the correct appeal fee is a
ground for the dismissal of the appeal, the Commission (First
Division)RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant case for
Protestee-Appellants failure to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed by the
Comelec Rules of Procedure within the five-(5)-day reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.

On March 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[9] which the
Comelec En Banc denied in the Resolution[10] dated January 21, 2009, declaring
that the appeal was not perfected on time for non-payment of the complete amount
of appeal fee and for late payment as well. The Comelec En Banc held that the
Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment
of the appeal fee on time. Thus, the Comelec First Division correctly dismissed the
appeal.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari raising the following grounds:
The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the correct
appeal fee was not paid on time.
The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in failing to consider that

assuming that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, the alleged
non-payment of the correct appeal fee is not in anyway attributable to
herein petitioner.
The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in failing to consider that
assuming that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, there are
highly justifiable and compelling reasons to resolve the subject case on
the merits in the interest of justice and public interest.

Petitioner further claims that he paid a total of P4,215.00 for his appeal, as follows:
a. To RTC on January 10, 2008 ------ P3,000.00
10.00
5.00
TOTAL P3,015.00
b. To Comelec on February 14, 2008 -- P1,000.00
50.00
150.00
TOTAL P1,200.00

Petitioner submits that it is incumbent upon the RTC to transmit to the

Comelec the entire P3,000.00 appeal fee that he paid on January 10,
2008. Petitioner also advances another interpretation of the Comelec Rules that the
RTC is under obligation to remit to the Comelec the P2,000.00 representing the
excess amount of the P1,000.00 appeal fee.Thus, petitioner claims that he must be
deemed to have complied, in full or at least substantially, with the Comelec Rules
on the payment of appeal fees.
Petitioner maintains that the alleged non-payment of the correct appeal fee is
not due to his own fault or negligence. He claims that the laws on appeals in
election protest cases are not yet well-established, thus, he must not be made to
suffer for an oversight made in good faith. The Resolution No. 8486 of July 15,
2008 adopted by the Comelec to clarify the rules on compliance with the required
appeal fees in election cases should not be applied retroactively to the subject
election protest.
Lastly, petitioner invokes liberality in the application of the election law. He
asserts that the popular will of the people expressed in the election of public
officers should not be defeated by reason of sheer technicalities. Petitioner argues
that the true will of the people of Motiong in the May 14, 2007 elections should be

determined by ordering the Comelec to give due course to his appeal and to resolve
the same on the merits.
In his Comment, respondent Langi, Sr. states that the petition was just a
mere rehash of the Motion for Reconsideration that petitioner filed with the
Comelec En Banc.Respondent maintains that for the Comelec to exercise its
authority to administer proceedings, grant leniency, issue orders, and pass
judgment on issues presented, it must first be shown that it has acquired the
requisite jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to the initiatory acts and
procedural compliance set as conditions precedent.
Respondent also argues that the negligence and mistakes of petitioners
counsel bind petitioner. He then reiterates the cases where this Court held that the
non-payment or insufficiency of payment of filing fees is a valid ground for the
dismissal of the appeal and that the subsequent full payment thereof does not cure
the jurisdictional defect.
We grant the petition.
Section 3, Rule 22 (Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest Cases) of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates that the notice of appeal must be filed
within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision, thus:
SEC. 3. Notice of Appeal. Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision
of the court, the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice of appeal, and
serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party.

Moreover, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the Comelec rules require the

payment of appeal fees in appealed election protest cases, the amended amount of
which was set atP3,200.00 in Comelec Minute Resolution No. 02-0130,[11] to wit:
SEC. 3. Appeal Fees. The appellant in election cases shall pay an appeal
fee as follows:
(a) For election cases appealed from Regional Trial Courts.P3,000.00
(per appellant)
(b) For election cases appealed from courts of limited
jurisdiction..P3,000.00 (per appellant)
SEC. 4. Where and When to Pay. The fees prescribed in Sections 1, 2 and
3 hereof shall be paid to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the
Commission within a period to file the notice of appeal.

Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC[12] also provide the

procedure for instituting an appeal and the required appeal fees to be paid for the
appeal to be given due course, to wit:
SEC. 8. Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
Commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice
of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the
adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the
court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.

A reading of the foregoing provisions reveals that two different tribunals (the
trial court that rendered the decision and the Comelec) require the payment of two
different appeal fees for the perfection of appeals of election cases. This
requirement in the payment of appeal fees had caused much confusion, which the
Comelec addressed through the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8486. [13] Thus,
to provide clarity and to erase any ambiguity in the implementation of the
procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees for the perfection of appeals of
election cases, the resolution provides:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections is vested with appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, and those involving
elective barangay officials, decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 07-4-15
(Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving
Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials) promulgated on May 15,
2007 provides in Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 thereof the procedure in
instituting the appeal and the required appeal fees to be paid for the
appeal to be given due course, to wit:
Section 8. Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to
the Commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation,
by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the
decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not
represented by counsel.
Section 9. Appeal Fee. The appellant in an election contest shall
pay to the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the
notice of appeal.

WHEREAS, payment of appeal fees in appealed election protest

cases is also required in Section 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure the amended amount of which was set at P3,200.00 in
COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 02-0130 made effective on
September 18, 2002.
WHEREAS, the requirement of these two appeal fees by two
different jurisdictions had caused confusion in the implementation by the
Commission on Elections of its procedural rules on payment of appeal
fees for the perfection of appeals of cases brought before it from the
Courts of General and Limited Jurisdictions.
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the rules on compliance with
the required appeal fees for the proper and judicious exercise of the
Commissions appellate jurisdiction over election protest cases.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission
hereby RESOLVES to DIRECT as follows:
1.

That if the appellant had already paid the amount of P1,000.00

before the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court or lower courts within the five-day period,
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in
Election Cases Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal
and Barangay Officials (Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 07-4-15) and his Appeal was given due course by the Court,
said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal fee
of P3,200.00 at the Commissions Cash Division through the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by postal
money order payable to the Commission on Elections through
ECAD, within a period of fifteen days (15) from the time of the
filing of the Notice of Appeal with the lower court. If no payment
is made within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be dismissed
pursuant to Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. The appeal may
be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance
of the Commission on any of the following grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee;
xxx

2.

That if the appellant failed to pay the P1,000.00 appeal fee

with the lower court within the five (5) day period as prescribed
by the Supreme Court New Rules of Procedure but the case was
nonetheless elevated to the Commission, the appeal shall be

dismissed outright by the Commission, in accordance with the

aforestated Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.
The Education and Information Department is directed to cause the
publication of this resolution in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
This resolution shall take effect on the seventh day following its
publication.
SO ORDERED.

Our ruling in the very recent case of Aguilar v. Comelec,[14] quoted

hereunder, squarely applies to the instant case:
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provide for the
following procedure in the appeal to the COMELEC of trial court decisions in
election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials:
SEC. 8. Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
Commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a
notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served
on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The appellant in an election contest shall pay to
the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.
Section 8 was derived from Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution
and Rule 40, Section 3, par. 1 and Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of
Court. Section 9 was taken from Rule 141, Sections 7(1) and 8(f) of the Rules of
Court.
It should be noted from the afore-quoted sections of the Rule that the
appeal fee of P1,000.00 is paid not to the COMELEC but to the trial court that
rendered the decision. Thus, the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment
of the P1,000.00 appeal fee perfect the appeal, consonant with Sections 10
and 11 of the same Rule. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the records have to
be transmitted to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department of the
COMELEC within 15 days. The trial court may only exercise its residual
jurisdiction to resolve pending incidents if the records have not yet been
transmitted and before the expiration of the period to appeal.
With the promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the previous rule that
the appeal is perfected only upon the full payment of the appeal fee, now
pegged at P3,200.00, to the COMELEC Cash Division within the period to

appeal, as stated in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, no

longer applies.
It thus became necessary for the COMELEC to clarify the procedural rules
on the payment of appeal fees. For this purpose, the COMELEC issued on July
15, 2008, Resolution No. 8486, which the Court takes judicial notice of. The
resolution pertinently reads:
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing resolution is consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended. The appeal to the COMELEC of the
trial
courts
decision
in
election
contests
involving
municipal
and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the
payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within
the five-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment
of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in
accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in
outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. Following, Rule 22, Section 9
(a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And pursuant to
Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees are not paid, the
COMELEC may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid
and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. In such a situation, the
COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.
Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division, may
dismiss petitioners appeal, as it in fact did, for petitioners failure to pay
the P3,200.00 appeal fee.
Be that as it may, the Court finds that the COMELEC First Division
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order dismissing petitioners
appeal. The Court notes that the notice of appeal and the P1,000.00 appeal fee
were, respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on
April 21, 2008. On that date, the petitioners appeal was deemed
perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the rule on the
payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or almost three months after the
appeal was perfected. Yet, on July 31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the
issuance of Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed
petitioners appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash Division of the
additional P3,200.00 appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the
clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, petitioners appeal should not be
unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486. Fairness and
prudence dictate that the COMELEC First Division should have first
directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee in accordance with the
clarificatory resolution, and if the latter should refuse to comply, then, and

only then, dismiss the appeal. Instead, the COMELEC First Division hastily
dismissed the appeal on the strength of the recently promulgated
clarificatory resolution which had taken effect only a few days earlier. This
unseemly haste is an invitation to outrage.
The COMELEC First Division should have been more cautious in
dismissing petitioners appeal on the mere technicality of non-payment of the
additional P3,200.00 appeal fee given the public interest involved in election
cases. This is especially true in this case where only one vote separates the
contending parties. The Court stresses once more that election law and rules are to
be interpreted and applied in a liberal manner so as to give effect, not to frustrate,
the will of the electorate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari
is GRANTED. The July 31, September 4 and October 6, 2008 Orders and the
October 16 2008 Entry of Judgment issued by the COMELEC First Division in
EAC (BRGY) No. 211-2008 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the COMELEC First Division for disposition in accordance
with this Decision.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the appeal from the trial court
decision to the Comelec is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the
payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the trial court that rendered the
decision. With the promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the perfection of the
appeal no longer depends solely on the full payment of the appeal fee to the
Comelec.
In the instant case, when petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal and paid the appeal
fee of P3,015.00 to the RTC on January 10, 2008, his appeal was deemed
perfected. However, Comelec Resolution No. 8486 also provides that if the
appellant had already paid the amount of P1,000.00 before the trial court that
rendered the decision, and his appeal was given due course by the court, said
appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the Comelecs
Cash Division through the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or
by postal money order payable to the Comelec, within a period of fifteen (15) days
from the time of the filing of the Notice of Appeal with the lower court. However,
if no payment is made within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be dismissed
pursuant to Section 9 (a), Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, which
provides:

SEC. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. The appeal may be dismissed

upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission on any of the
following grounds:
(a)
Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx

Thus, when petitioners appeal was perfected on January 10, 2008, within
five (5) days from promulgation, his non-payment or insufficient payment of the
appeal fee to the Comelec Cash Division should not have resulted in the outright
dismissal of his appeal. The Comelec Rules provide in Section 9 (a), Rule 22, that
for failure to pay the correct appeal fee, the appeal may be dismissed upon motion
of either party or at the instance of the Comelec. Likewise, Section 18, Rule
40[15] thereof also prescribes that if the fees are not paid, the Comelec may refuse
to take action on the appeal until the said fees are paid and may dismiss the
action or the proceeding.
Here, petitioner paid P1,200.00 to the Comelec on February 14,
2008. Unfortunately, the Comelec First Division dismissed the appeal on March
17, 2008 due to petitioners failure to pay the correct appeal fee within the five-day
reglementary period. In denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the
Comelec En Banc, in the Resolution datedJanuary 21, 2009, declared that the
Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment
of the appeal fee on time.
However, during the pendency of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
dated March 27, 2008, the Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 8486 to clarify
the implementation of the Comelec Rules regarding the payment of filing
fees. Thus, applying the mandated liberal construction of election laws, [16] the
Comelec should have initially directed the petitioner to pay the correct appeal fee
with the Comelec Cash Division, and should not have dismissed outright
petitioners appeal. This would have been more in consonance with the intent of the
said resolution which sought to clarify the rules on compliance with the required
appeal fees.
In Barroso v. Ampig, Jr.,[17] we ruled, thus:
xxx An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a
public interest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the
people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the
basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest therefore
involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival

candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public concern involved and
the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And
the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its command
who is the real candidate elected by the people.
Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal
construction. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Comelec. Thus we have declared:
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule
recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. An election contest,
unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves not
only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but also the
paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of
the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office
within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an
uncertain period one whose right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that
his claim be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for
the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Order dated March 17, 2008 of
the Comelec First Division and the Resolution dated January 21, 2009 of the
Comelec En Banc in EAC No. A-13-2008 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, let the case be REMANDED to the Comelec First Division
for further proceedings, in accordance with the rules and with this disposition. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 of Catbalogan, Samar is DIRECTED to refund to
petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr., the amount of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) as the excess of the appeal fee per Official Receipt No. 6822663 paid
on January 10, 2008.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 184801

July 30, 2009

JONAS TAGUIAM, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANTHONY C. TUDDAO, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction1 assails the December 20, 2007 Resolution2 of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPC No. 07-171 which granted private respondent
Anthony C. Tuddaos Petition for Correction of Manifest Error and Annulment of Proclamation of
petitioner Jonas Taguiam as the 12th winning candidate for theSangguniang Panglungsod of
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Also assailed is the October 9, 2008 Resolution3 of the COMELEC En
Banc denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.4
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Tuguegarao City in Cagayan during the 2007 National and Local Elections. On May 19, 2007,
petitioner was proclaimed by the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) as the 12th ranking and winning
candidate for the said position with 10,981 votes.5 Private respondent obtained 10,971 votes6 and
was ranked no. 13.
On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition for correction of manifest
errors in the Election Returns and Statement of Votes for 27 clustered precincts 7 and for the
annulment of the proclamation of the affected winning candidate in Tuguegarao City. He alleged that
he was credited with less votes in several Statements of Votes by Precincts (SOVP) as compared
with the tally of his votes in the election returns ERs), whereas petitioner was credited with more
votes. Private respondent offered evidence in the following nine precincts: 0035A/0036A,
0061A/0063A, 69A/69B, 87A/87B, 192A/192B, 264A/265A, 324A/325B, 326A, and 328B.
Petitioner denied the allegations of private respondent and argued that the petition should be
dismissed for having been filed late or six days after the proclamation of the winning
candidates.8 Meanwhile, the members of the CBOC of Tuguegarao City denied private respondents
allegations of manifest errors in the SOVP; maintained that petitioner garnered more votes than
those obtained by private respondent; and that they have properly performed their duties and
functions.9
On December 20, 2007, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, to
wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition filed by Anthony Tuddao for Correction of
Manifest Error and Annulment of Proclamation of Jonas Taguiam is hereby GRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, the City Board of Canvassers of Tuguegarao, Cagayan is hereby DIRECTED to (i)
RECONVENE after giving due notice to the concerned parties, (ii) CORRECT the errors in the
Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOVP), and thereafter proclaim the 12th winning candidate for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
1avvphi1

Let the City Board of Canvassers of Tuguegarao, Cagayan implement this Resolution with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.10
The COMELEC held that the belated filing of private respondents petition cannot deter its authority
to ascertain the true will of the electorate and thereafter affirm such will. Thus, after due proceedings,
the COMELEC found private respondents allegations duly substantiated with material evidence and
confirmed the following:
A. With regard to the votes of private respondent:
Precinct No.

SOVP No.

ER No.

Votes in SOVP

Votes in ER

Votes Affected

69A/69B

15327

9602679

27

27

87A/87B

10543

9602699

13

13

192A/192B

10531

9602801

20

19

-1

326A

10532

9602921

43

53

+10

TOTAL

+9

B. With regard to the votes of petitioner:

Precinct No.

SOVP No.

ER No.

Votes in SOVP

Votes in ER

Votes Affected

35A/36A

10543

9602647

40

33

-7

61A/63A

10539

9602672

55

50

-5

264A/265A

10528

9602871

39

29

-10

324A/325A

10533

9602920

62

61

-1

328B

10527

9602924

33

32

-1

TOTAL

-24

The COMELEC concluded that nine votes should be added to the total number of votes garnered by
private respondent; while 24 votes should be deducted from the total number of votes obtained by
petitioner. Thus, the total number of votes obtained by private respondent was 10,980, while the total
number of votes received by petitioner was 10,957. As such, private respondent was rightfully the
12th winning candidate for the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC En Banc on
October 9, 2008.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari11 raising the issue of whether or not the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of
private respondents petition for correction of manifest errors in the Election Returns and Statement
of Votes despite its late filing.

Petitioner avers that private respondents petition for correction of manifest errors should have been
dismissed outright for failure to show any justification for its late filing; that, if the petition had been
properly dismissed, private respondent had other remedies available, such as an election protest.
Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly states that:
Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly with the Commission
(a) The following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:
xxxx
2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results
during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was
tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct, or two or
more copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there has been a mistake in the
copying of the figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called
returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have
been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the
winning candidates had already been made.
xxxx
If the petition is for correction, it must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of
proclamation and must implead all candidates who may be adversely affected thereby.
While the petition was indeed filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period, the COMELEC however
has the discretion to suspend its rules of procedure or any portion thereof. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule
1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure state, to wit:
Sec. 3. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the effective and
efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition
of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended
by the Commission.
Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the spirit of Section 6, Article IX-A of the
Constitution which bestows upon the COMELEC the power to "promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices" to attain justice and the noble purpose of
determining the true will of the electorate.12
In Jaramilla v. Commission on Elections13 and Dela Llana v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court
affirmed the COMELECs suspension of its rules of procedure regarding the late filing of a petition for
correction of manifest error and annulment of proclamation in view of its paramount duty to
determine the real will of the electorate. We have consistently employed liberal construction of
procedural rules in election cases to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical objections.15

In the instant case, records show that petitioner was declared the 12th winning candidate based on
SOVPs containing mathematical and clerical errors. The total number of votes in the SOVPs of the
identified precincts are markedly different from the votes tabulated in their respective ERs, i.e.,
petitioner was given additional votes, while private respondents votes were reduced, which altered
the outcome of the election. Petitioner was declared the last winning candidate for the position
of Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, instead of private respondent.
In Torres v. Commission on Elections,16 the Court reiterated that while the remedy of the losing party
is an election protest after his opponent has already been proclaimed as winning candidate, such
recourse is on the assumption, however, that there has been a valid proclamation. Where a
proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity
and annul the proclamation.17
It is significant to note that petitioner did not assail the factual findings of the COMELEC of manifest
error in the tabulation of votes but only raised issues on the foregoing technicalities. Hence, the
COMELECs unrebutted findings of fact are therefore sustained.
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by,
or to act at all in contemplation of law. In a certiorariproceeding, as in the instant case, it is
imperative for petitioner to show caprice and arbitrariness on the part of the court or agency whose
exercise of discretion is being assailed.18
For acting pursuant to its Constitutional mandate of determining the true will of the electorate with
substantiated evidence, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
annulling the proclamation of petitioner. Said proclamation is flawed from the beginning because it
did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the electorate. Having been based on a faulty tabulation,
there can be no valid proclamation to speak of.19
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The December 20, 2007
Resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the October 9,
2008 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice