CHAPTER 26 BULK CARRIER CASUALTIES Casualties in the 1980s and 1990s, factors contributing to bulk carrier casualties, the path to safer shipping, improvements introduced, prevention of casualties, casualty prevention by ships’ personnel and shipowners, detection of damage, casualties since 1993, conclusion Casualties in the 1980s and 1990s THE EARLY 19905 were a grim time in which to be serving aboard a bulk carrier. The realisation was gradually dawning on the shipping community that an uncomfortably large number of bulk carriers had foundered or been lost without trace (Appendix 26.1) in the previous fifteen years. That the lost ships had flown many flags and been registered with a number of different classification societies helped to conceal the wide extent of the problem despite the concern expressed during the 1980s by past and current seafarers such as Douglas Foy*#5* and Captains Boyle and Richardson’. The fact that some of the lost ships were relatively new increased the confusio In 1990 and 1991 one bulk carrier a month was lost on average, It was abundanily clear that something was wrong, but what was it? A few fortunate bulk carriers survived serious structural damage and photos appeared in the media of ships with side plating missing from both sides and a view of the scene beyond the ship, framed by the remaining bits of the ship’s structure. When mariners considered their own experience they identified two ways in which, it seemed to them, Ik carriers might be damaged. Big bulk carriers, anamax, Capesized or ULBCs, meet heavy weather ponderously and when the weather worsens and the bow starts slamming into the waves the impacts may Fig.26.1 On a big bulk carrier the distance from tanktop to ship's side framing and shell plating is immense Photo courtesy of Scanautics not be detected on the ship's bridge, 200 or more metres away. Mariners suspected that some Masters were carelessly driving their ships too hard in adverse ‘weather, thereby fatally damaging them. Mariners’ second concern was the manner in which massive tonnages of cargo, particularly iron ore, were poured into ships at high speed. It was felt intuitively that pouring 16,000 tonnes of iron ore an hour into a bulk carrier must stress her structure. When, finally, the principal causes of casualties were found neither of the mariners’ explanations was shown to be significant. Around about 1990 the classification societies finally recognised that unexplained bulk carrier losses, with the loss of more than 200 lives that year, had become a ous problem and resources were committed to amining the evidence and seeking explanations, individually and collectively within the International (IACS). Early 1992 Lloyd’s Register announced preliminary findings for bulk carriers of more than 20,000 dwt the most significant of which took nearly everybody by surprise. The holds of some bulk carriers were severely corroded but that had not been noticed! ‘The design of conventional bulk carriers, with their large sloping hopper side tanks (Fig. 26.1), makes it difficult to achieve a close-up inspection of the ship's side plating in the area of vertical framing between the lower and upper hopper tanks. In the 1980s Fig.26.2 There is often no way of getting close to the upper parts of the hold Photo courtesy of Scanautics BULK CARRIER PRACTICE 341BULK CARRIER CASUALTIES inspections by ships’ staff and frequently by surveyors too, often consisted of simply standing on the tanktop and looking at the ships frames and plating anything from 5 to 15 metres distant from them, Indented or buckled frames interrupted the symmetry of the construction and were easy to see but corrosion and wastage were not obvious and, it is now well known, were frequently overlooked. A later study conclude “The higher side shell and bulkhead structures are difficult t0 reach for close-up inspections. From a distance they may appear in deceptively good condition when actually highly corroded’ (Fig, 26.2), Factors contributing to bulk carrier casualties The classification societies had, by 1992, concluded*™ that the ships most likely to become casualties were older ships which had carried coal, then iron ore in alternate holds whilst exposed to heavy weather. It appeared that high sulphur coal had caused accelerated corrosion and alternate loading had, in heavy weather, exposed the ships to excessive stresses. Most surviving casualties had lost side shell plating, Unexpectedly high corrosion levels were frequently found aboye the lower hoppers and stools in the holds of casualties which survived. Neglected fatigue cracking was often found at bulkhead boundaries and the toes of frame brackets ‘The conclusions contained a number of possible causes of damage to bulk carriers. They were: high levels of corrosion from cargoes, weakness in ship design detail, damage to the ship's shell structure by the methods of discharge and. inadvertent overloading of compartments. “Inadvertent over- loading’ is the term used to describe a situation in which a ship is properly loaded to her marks but by accident has an excessive tonnage in one hold and too little cargo in another hold. ‘Corrosion, damage and structural weakness might have been worsened in some cases by the liquefaction of the cargo because of high moisture content or flooding. Flooding through hatchway damage is also ‘mentioned as a possible first event ‘The above listed causes of casualties are summarised and also discussed more fully in Appendix 26.2. Appendix 26.3 contains descriptions of a number of other possible causes of bulk carrier damage and casualties. Most of them remain as valid today as they were when written in 1993, and deserve careful leration by anyone with a concem for bulk carrier safety. Discarded theories: It is worthy of note that there has, apparently, been little evidence to suggest that, losses have occurred as a result of exce: longitudinal stresses such as might be caused by faulty distribution of the cargo. Readers of The Nautical Institute's Seaways were authoritatively told in 1991: “There is overwhelming evidence that the vast majority. of structural failures affecting the seaworthiness of bulk carriers have little to. do with Iongitucinal stresses’. Most failures are fairly evenly distributed along the cargo hold length and originate close to the bending neutral axis. In other words, the damage is not found in the upper deck or double M2. THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE botiom, where longitudinal stress would be expected to show itself, A similar view was expressed ten years later when a shipping forum®"-2 was reminded that the most significant stresses to which bulk cartiers are subjected are transverse, not longitudinal. It is more likely that the side shell plating or the hatch covers, will fail than that the bulk carrier will snap in two. Bulk carriers may survive the failure of the ‘primary barrier’ (ie the side shell or hatch cover) but cannot bbe guaranteed to survive the subsequent failure of the ‘secondary barrier’ (transverse bulkhead). When a hold floods and a bulkhead leaks the ship is unlikely to survive the flooding of a second hold, Nor has there ever been significant support from naval architects for the mariners’ theory that ships are directly damaged by excessively high cargo loading rates though such rates will be an’ indirect cause of damage if the deballasting programme cannot keep pace with the loading rate. The path to safer shipping Ship Inspections: When in 1992 and 1993 the main ‘causes of bulk carrier casualties had been identified the shipping community set about publicising and correcting the faults in the system. The classification societies’ bulk carrier inspection regime was made more rigorous with the introduction, mandated by ‘The International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1993, of the Enhanced Survey Programme (ESP) for older bulk carriers in Resolution A.744*. This has perhaps been the single most effective improvement made to the safety of bulk carriers. The P&I Clubs and marine underwriters also introduced or increased condition surveys of the ships in which they had an interest. Shipowners inspected their ships more frequently and instructed their officers to do likewise. In 2004 IMO issued guidance for Port State Control Officers to assist them in inspecting the structure of bulk carriers* and part of this is reproduced in Appendix 26.5. Enhanced surveys" of the ‘cargo length’ of older bulk carriers, were phased in from 1 July 1993. They provide for more frequent and more thorough close- Up inspections of hold and ballast tank structures, measurement of steel thickness, and monitoring of the condition of coatings. Thoroughness of inspection increases as the ship becomes older, if substantial corrosion is found, and if hold and ballast tank coatings are not well maintained. A copy of the record of thickness measurements is retained aboard and is available along with the hull survey report, for inspection by all interested parties. These documents ‘were previously confidential between classification society and clients. Unified Requirements: The classification societies recognised that some of the problems of bulk carriers could have been caused by competition between them to accept designs that minimised shipbuilding costs. “Unified Requirements’, structural rules adopted as minimum. standards by all IACS members for different aspects of bulk carrier construction, were seen as a way of preventing damaging competition and have been gradually introduced over the years since 1993 for new tonnage and, to a lesser extent, to ships in service. This ensures that new ships beingbrought into service are safer than older tonnage, but additional measures were required to improve’ the safety of bulk carriers already in service. Guidance and regulation: The International Maritime Organization (IMO) put the issue of bulk carrier safety on the agenda of its Maritime Safety Committee in 1993 and started the development of guidelines, codes of practice and regulations to improve the safety of bulk carriers and those who serve in them. A new SOLAS chapter, Chapter XI, entitled ‘Additional Safety Measures for Bulk Carriers! and dealing principally with new buildings, was adopted in November 1997. Bulk carriers ‘were amongst the first categories of vessel to be required to implement the International Safety Management (ISM) Code when it was introduced in 1998. The Code of Practice for the Safe Loading and Unloading of Bulk Carriers (BLU Code), incorporating the Ship/Shore Safety Checklist and the Loading/ Unloading Plan was published in 1998, In 1998 the United Kingdom (UK) Administration propoxed to IMO that a full Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) of blk caries should be undertaken, The UK also offered to sponsor the study and to act as co- ordinators, This study reporting in 2002, identified 75 different ways of reducing the risks of bulk carrier operations and concluded that about 20 of them (Appendix 26.4) were cost effective. The FSA ran parallel to the Reopened Formal Investigation into the Loss of the ms. Derhyshine®, a 173,000 dwt ore laden British Oil/Bulk/Ore (OBO) carrier which had been lost without trace in a Pacific typhoon when nearing her destination port, Kawasaki in Japan, in September 1980. Her loss was remarkable because she ‘was a well-found ship and only four years old. It was only 14 years later that the ship's remains were identified on the seabed, 2.5 miles below the surface, when it was possible to methodically take about 136,000 photographs of the wreckage which led, eventually, to reliable conclusions as to the causes of the vessel’s loss. When the ship had met a long, high swell near the centre of the typhoon and taken green seas over her bows airpipes and ventilators: were broken and the forward spaces were flooded. As the forward draught increased, the increased load from the green seas sweeping over the No.l hatch covers caused them to buckle and collapse allowing the hold to fill with sea water almost immediately, soon to be followed by the other holds in succession. The time from collapse of the No.1 hatch covers until the final plunge to the seabed would have been no more than a few minutes, The Report contains a long list of recommendations for improving the safety of bulk carriers: most if not all the conclusions were applicable to all types of dry bulk carriers, not only to OBOs. At about the same time the IACS announced its “Eight Initiatives’ for existing bulk carriers™. They were: © Early implementation of SOLAS Chapter XII requirements, ‘© Revision of IACS’ Enhanced Survey Programme, © Installation of water ingress alarms in all cargo holds, ‘© Improved bulwarks or fiting of a breakwater, © Increased integrity of foredeck fittings, © Increased strength requirements for hatch covers, CHAPTER 26 {© Additional requirements for side shell frames in cargo holds, {© Water ingress alarms in forward spaces, Improvements introduced" ** This extensive research, investigation, regulation and litigation for bulk carriers has led in the years between 1993 and 2009 to numerous changes in the ways that bulk carriers, primarily single skinned bulk carriers of 150 m in length and upwards, are designed, built, operated and maintained. Structural: Since 1999 bulk carriers are built to comply with stricter flooding criteria. Their bulkheads are able to resist more severe sloshing and since 2004 they have hatches and coamings. with strength sufficient for the most severe weather and seas they can expect to meet? (International Association of Classification Societies’ Unified Requirement — IACS UR ~ S21), Hatch cover securing mechanisms have been upgraded where necessary to comply with raised standards (IACS URs S21 and $30). The strengthening of hold framing has been phased in for ships. in service and made mandatory for new buildings (IACS UR S81). Minimum standards for foredeck fittings (ventilators and airpipes) have been raised with many of the requirements applicable to tonnage in service as well as new buildings (IACS UR $27). Improved standards for the strength and securing of small hatches on the foredeck have been introduced (IACS UR $26). In a welcome return to ship building traditions bulk carriers are again being built with raised forecastles which contribute to the vessel's buoyancy and give protection to the coamings and covers of the forward holds (IACS UR $28). The structural strength requirements for single sideskin construction in SOLAS have, since July 2006, been applicable to all bulk carriers. The sea water ballast tanks of ships built since 1998 and the double side skin spaces of bulk carriers built since 2006 must be provided with an efficient corrosion prevention system, Standards for protective coatings for holds have also been established (IACS UR Z9). Operational: Older bulk carriers, unless built with exceptional strength, or specially modified to satisfy the higher standards now required, are forbidden to carry denser cargoes®*, Unless, in addition, they can satisfy the most demanding flooding criteria in any one hold they are forbidden to carry a full high density cargo in alternate holds". The International Safety Management (ISM) Code has introduced safer and more methodical and thorough methods of working to fleets where these were not previously found, but operating standards continue to vary from fleet to fleet and, to a lesser extent, from ship to ship, depending upon the culture of the owner or manager, and upon the calibre of individual managements, Masters and their crews. Since 2006 Masters on voyages longer than 48 hours are required to report their positions daily", Masters have been provided with important and necessary guidance on preparations to abandon ship rapidly if flooding is suspected (See Chapter 21). Equipment: Every vessel of 3,000 gt and upwards is required 10 have a voyage data recorder”. All bulk carriers must be fitted with water ingress detectors BULK CARRIER PRACTICE 343BULK CARRIER CASUALTIES (WIDs) in their holds and forward spaces with visual and audible alarms on the bridge! and with remotely activated pumping systems serving tanks and. spaces in the forward part of the vessel%. Chain lockers must be watertight with access via bolted doors” (IACS UR L4). Windlasses much be strongly fixed in place (ACS UR $27). The industry has been provided with requirements for loading computers*”. All bulk carrier crew members must be provided with immersion suits. New built bulk carriers must be provided with free-fall lifeboats! Double side skin structure: One of the recommendations of the Formal Safety Assessment of bulk carriers was that double side skin structure was the most effective way of preventing side-shell failure, the single most recorded cause of losses of larger bulk carriers. However this was subsequently rejected by IMO ‘as other options were deemed more cost effective per life saved, although with a lower potential risk reduction, ‘there would be less lives saved’, Despite this decision double side skinned bulk carriers are being built in increasing numbers (see Chapter 18) and their performance over the Jonger term will continue to be of considerable interest to the industry, ‘An intersting compromise was reached and a new ‘regulation, SOLAS XI 6.5 introduced to ensure that single side skin ships would have the same benefits as given by double side shin construction, ie cargo friendliness, easy of discharge of cargo, structural continuity and redundancy". In fact, itis difficult to visualise how the rules can be satisfied, except with double side skin construction. Prevention of casualties Since 1991 a great many measures have been put into place to prevent bulk carrier casualties. If all involved in the operation, repair and inspection of bulk carriers do their jobs properly casualties should become exceedingly rare, but risk continues to lie in the fact that individuals do not always do their jobs properly. Seafarers can do no better than remember the simple rule that has prevented so many mistakes ~ always double check. This means that plans, procedures, programmes and inspections, if done by fone person should be checked by another person or another method. OF greatest interest to the ships’ officers are the measures that they themselves and shipowners can take to reduce the risk of their ships becoming casualties. These measures come in two categories those designed to prevent damage; and those intended to discover damage so that it can be repaired. Casualty prevention by ships’ personnel and shipowners ‘The prevention of damage to the ship's structure is of considerable importance to the shipowner and of even greater importance to the seafarer who may lose his life if his ship becomes a casualty. Structural damage is not inevitable, as is illustrated by the faet that sister ships are sometimes found to have quite different levels of damage. This is a matter over which conscientious seamen supported by their owners can exercise considerable influence. Prevention of S44 THE NAUTICAL TTUTE damage by the use of safe procedures and good planning and by firm dealings with shippers, stevedores, trimmers and receivers is work which is worth doing well The recommendations which follow were compiled by The Nautical Institute's Bulk Carrier Working Group in 1992 and most of them remain as relevant in 2009 as they were when first listed. A number of them are now mandatory. They summarise ways in which the International Association of Classification Societies’ original brief recommendations for reducing structural failures ean be put into effect. Occasional remarks from a 2009 perspective have been added inside square brackets [like this] Detailed operational and maintenance procedures are described in the body of this book Where the adoption of any of these recommendations would require a departure from established company policy, The Nautical Institute would expect a Shipmaster to consult his employers before adopting the recommendation. corrosion within holds by maintaining paint coatings. The areas most liable to suffer from corrosion are the frames and adjoining areas against the ship's sides, and the transverse bulkheads. These areas are less exposed to scouring by cargo or cargo- handling equipment than are tank tops and lower hopper sides, so paint coatings, if properly applied, can last reasonably well. Paint coatings should be maintained. Holds which have been routinely washed with sea water should where possible be given a final rinse with fresh water. Ships which are continuously employed carrying the same corrosive cargo, where holds are not cleaned between cargoes, have a higher risk of corrosion. A procedure of pumping bilges regularly during the voyage will reduce corrosion at tanktop level and within the bilge system, Dut will not stop corrosion which occurs as a result of sweat. Extra precautions should be taken when the cargoes are corrosive Minimise corrosion within ballast tanks by maintaining coatings. The touching up of mechanical damage and local corrosion is suitable work for a ship's crew, but a complete descaling and recoating probably requires shore labour and equipment. Prevent stevedores’ damage by close supervision of | the stevedores to prevent bad practices, and by holding them responsible for any damage done. Prevent hull contact damage by proceeding carefully when berthing, unberthing, manocuvring and passing through ice [and check for damages by pushing tugs or cargo lighters lying alongside]. Report damage, and have it surveyed and properly repaired: Ensure that damage, when found, is reported to owners. All except minor damage should be reported to Class and surveyed by a Class surveyor. It should be properly repaired by a competent and suitably quallfied person. Avoid local overloading: Ensure that maximum permissible hold tonnages are known, and are not exceeded. Do not exceed maximum tanktop loadings. Avoid block loading except when approved by Class. Monitor loading and prevent delivery of excess tonnage to hold. Distribute closeweight cargo evenly over the length of the hold,Provide accurate, accessible stability information: Ensure that the’ ship’s stability and loading information is readily available, accurate and easy for the officers to use. Prepare a full loading /deballasting or discharging/ ballasting plan: Use IMO’s form (Appendix 9.3) or a similar one and make sure that every stage is within. permitted longitudinal bending stress and shear force limits. Keep strictly to _loading/deballasting or discharging/ballasting plan: Accept changes to the plan only when an amended plan has been fully calculated and found to be safe. Reduce loading rates when starting an empty hold:* While the cargo is being poured directly on to the tanktop the loading rate should be reduced, Cargoes which can cause damage require special care. The first grabloads of scrap should be lowered close to the tanktop before being released. When pig iron is being loaded the tanktop should be shielded from the first pour by temporary sheathing such as pallets. Ensure that discharging and ballast changes are planned and executed with the same care as loading: High values of longitudinal bending stresses and shear forces can be reached by unplanned or careless operations. They should be avoided. Reject cargo with excessively high moisture content: Insist on being provided with a certificate of transportable moisture limit, and follow the ‘guidelines laid down in the [MSBC Code Ensure that ship is not twisted whilst loading or changing ballast: Twisting can occur if two loaders do not operate exactly in tandem, or if a single loader distributes cargo unevenly between port and starboard sides. This damage can also be caused by uneven changing of ballast. Close dump valves immediately deballasting is completed: Ensure dump valves are well maintained and do not leak and have a routine to ensure that they are closed when deballasting is completed. ‘Trim cargo reasonably level to the boundaries of the cargo space: Cargo should be trimmed in accordance with the IMSBC Code’ Ensure that cargoes such as steel are well secured: Cargo which breaks adrift can damage the ship’s structure. Securing should be in accordance with th IMO Gargo Securing Gode™. All hatch covers should be well maintained and carefully secured: The hatch covers must be in sound condition, with a cleating system which is well maintained and correctly operated. ‘All deck openings should be in sound condition and properly closed and secured: This applies upon sailing, at night, during adverse weather and any time when there is no need for them to be open. Speed should be substantially reduced in adverse weather: When adverse weather causes a speed reduction of 25 per cent (for example from 12 knots, to 9 knots) with constant engine speed, the rpm should be substantially reduced to avoid damage from forcing the ship into the weather. Avoid continuous heavy rolling: Heavy rolling results in the repetitive heavy loading (panting) of the side shell plating as the pressure of sea water is applied and removed. Ships are built to withstand this CHAPTER 26 treatment, but can be harmed when rolling is excessive and prolonged. [Continuous heavy rolling is not likely to damage a ship within her normal lifetime] Sloshing of ballast water in partfilled tanks should not be allowed to occur: As far as possible ballast tanks should be filled or emptied before bad weather is met, this precaution being particularly important in. the case of ballast holds and topside ballast tanks, both of which have large open areas which allow sloshing, Prevent springing by adjustment of course, speed or ballast: Springing, otherwise known as whipping, flexing or wave-excited hull vibration, can be prevented by adjustment of course, speed or ballast. It will disappear with change of loading, Aboard OBOs follow strict procedures to avoid the possibility of gas explosions: When carrying dry bulk cargoes all compartments, including void spaces, empty ballast tanks and duct keels, must be scrupulously gas freed. Thereafter they must be regularly rechecked for gas to detect any unsuspected gradual build-up. ‘Additional measures: The following additional measures have been adopted by some shipowners and maritime authorities, and The Nautical Institute lists them for consideration by those who want to provide a greater margin of safety than that which the Classification societies require Stay within the atsea stress limits whilst in port: To reduce the longitudinal bending stress and shear force during loading, plan the loading to stay within the atsea stress limits in port. Increase the number of loading passes: To reduce the longitudinal bending stress and shear force during loading, increase the number of passes used for loading (eg, make three pours into each hold instead of two) Insist that a maximum loading rate (eg, 5,000 tonnes/hr per loader) is not exceeded. ‘Avoid jump (alternate hold) loading of closeweight ‘cargoes, and load all holds even when, on newer ships, the regulations permit jump loading. Detection of damage Inspections: When damage cannot be prevented it must be detected, reported, examined and repaired. The enhanced programmes of surveys aciopted by the Classification societies should ensure that they find damage earlier than was previously the case, but as there are intervals between the surveys this still cannot detect all damage. Unexpectedly high rates of corrosion have been reported"? and it seems that a ship’s steelwork can deteriorate rapidly when exposed to corrosive cargoes, excessive loads or mechanical damage. It is therefore highly desirable that ships’ personnel should also take an informed interest in the condition of their ships, inspecting carefully for clamage and excessive corrosion, Itis unrealistic to imagine that ships’ personnel can make a close-up inspection of every hold every voyage, but it should be possible to examine every hold thoroughly about once a year, provided that suitable ‘equipment is available to allow the inspector to make a close-up examination of the full height of the frames. A geared bulker can carry a cherrypicker and BULK CARRIER PRACTICE. 345BULK CARRIER CASUALTIES Fig.26.3 The great height, the protruding hopper ‘sides and the ship's movement all make close-up inspections of places high in the hold difficult Photo courtesy of Scanautics place it in the hold when required, but for gearless vessels lightweight aluminium ladders are likely to be the only option except for ships built since 2006 which must be provided with a means of having overall close-up access 10 every part of the cargo spaces. It is necessary that ships’ personnel have an efficient means of reaching areas high in the hold, but, often they do not (Fig. 26.3). On occasion it is possible to inspect the higher parts of the hold from the surface of the cargo, and ballast holds when part filled can. sometimes be inspected from a raft. However, these possibilities are the exception and cannot be relied upon. The hold must be washed clean for an effective inspection and the hatchcovers must be open to admit daylight. Conditions are likely to be most favourable on a sheltered river or fjord wansit or at an anchorage. It has been argued that such an inspection may only find 40 fractures when there are actually 120 to be found, but that misses the point. Forty fractures are quite enough to alert the Master, the owners and the classification society to the fact that the ship's condition has deteriorated and needs urgent expert examination. Ships’ officers cannot replace the Classification society surveyor, but they can help to make sure that he overlooks nothing which is important. Appendix 26.5 contains clear advice for port State control officers on inspecting bulk carriers andl this information can be just as useful to ships’ officers Paragraphs 12-17 and the three supporting diagrams are particularly helpful, Practical advice on the conduct of surveys of damaged holds has been offered by a surveyor experienced in this work whose advice® can be summarised as follows. The owner will expect the Master to advise him of any stevedore damage, and any visible cracking in the ship's structure, Wastage clue to corrosion is sometimes difficult to detect. In fone actual case high-tensile steel had wasted very evenly, without obvious critical spots, so there was. little to show that heavy corrosion had occurred. Masters should be alert 10 this possibility, 346 ‘THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE The second area of concern reported by the same surveyor is the problem sometimes found in ships’ frames, which suffer a high level of ‘grooving’ or ‘necking’ right next to the weld where the frame is attached to the ship's side. When the structure is stressed, the frames are cracked or detached from the ship’s side at the point of weakness. To inspect this area the Master must first chip away any rust or cargo. residues from the vicinity to ensure that he is inspecting sound steel. The areas where damage is most likely to be found in and around the hold of a bulk carrier are clearly shown in diagrams included in Appendix 26.5 and listed in Appendix 24.1 Bilge soundings: Unexpectedly high bilge soundings can provide the first warning that damage has occurred, and flooding is taking’ place. Bilge soundings should be taken daily. In bad weather, if remote readings are not available the sounding should be taken when the ship is hove-to for inspection of the decks. Water ingress detectors provide a valuable back-up but cannot give the early ‘warning that high bilge soundings provide. The holds should be checked for flooding if the bilge cannot be pumped dry. Flood water sloshing: The survivors of several casualties have reported on the odd and unusual motion of the ship when holds were flooded. It seems likely that this odd motion was due to the flood water sloshing in the holds. The motion was described as ‘not pitching, not rolling, not corkscrewing, not vibration, but immediately noticeable’ (to an experienced seaman). In one case this was the first ‘warning that ship’s personnel had that their ship had been damaged. Casualties since 1993 From the appalling total losses of bulk carriers and their crews in 199] and 1992 the number of losses due to structural failure diminished until in 1997 there ‘were no bulk carrier losses from this cause (Fig. 26.4). ‘The casualties caused by grounding, machinery fire/explosion and collision occupy the bulk of the records (Fig. 26.5) and are, of course, cause for concern, but are beyond the scope of this book. Since 1997 the number of casualties resulting from structural failure has never been more than three and in several years has been none. It is fair to say that if structural problems have not been entirely eliminated they are under far better control than was the case in 1993 when the First Edition of Bulk Carrier Practice was published. Trends recorded by Intercargo show a cor decline in casualties (Fig, 26.6) and in (Fig. 26.7) though the lives lost in. 2006 (37) and 2007 (39) are a distressing reminder that when a bulk carrier founders she often sinks very rapidly. That older bulk carriers are at greater risk of becoming casualties from all causes is_evident from. their prominence in the statistics (Fig. 26.8) where bulk carriers aged more than 15 years account for 85% of losses and those over 20 years occupy 70% of the table. For most of the last twenty years concern for bulk carrier safety has been focused on the larger vessels, swith deadweight greater than 20,000 and/or length more that 150 metres and it is, perhaps, a measure ofCHAPTER Year Losses Bulkers Lives ost ues of eae Structural Total 1998-2007 Failure Structural 12 1984 3 14 106 Fire and explosion 10 1995 2 5 57 Machinery failure 6 1996 2 14 50 Flooding 13 1997 0 1 30 Collision 15 998 3 19 87 Groundings at 71999 2 aa aa Contact object 1 Cargo loading/cargo shift 5 a = 14 28 Other {unknown 3 2001 1 4 64 —s 2002 oO 5 4 86 2003 oO 4 0 2004 1 3 Fa Fig 26.5 Data courtesy of Intercargo 2005 1 GL, 2006 1 7 37 2007 oO 8 39 Fig.26.4 6 wo in ie ia i, = Lin i O00. TOOT 1088 TORR. Tabe- Tams 1906- YT TaBE 899 2000 2001 2002 2003 200 2005 2006 2007 Teo Yee Prod ‘ego 2000 2001 2008 2002 2001 2008 2000 2007 Ton Yoar Period Fig 26.6 Annual average number of bulk carriers over 10,000 dwt lost Data courtesy of intercargo Fig 26.7 Annual average number of lives lost in bulk carrier casualties Data courtesy of Intercargo ‘Number of vessels lost in 10 year period 1998-2007 by age BD 0-4 years BB s-0 years TB totayears 4 [HE tstoyears 14 HB 20-24 years 29 HB 25+years 30 ‘Number of vessels lost in 10 year period 1998-2007 by size Bi tandysize 52 BE ttandymax 13 HB ranamax 12 DB cape-sized 9 Fig 26.8 Data courtesy of intercargo Fig 26.9 Data courtesy of intercargo BULK CARRIER PRACTICE 347BULK CARRIER CASUALTIES the success of those efforts that it is smaller bulk carriers (handy-sized_ and handymax) that now dominate the casualty lists and give cause for concern, Fig. 26.9) Conclusions A spokesman for the UK Maritime and Coastguard, Agency speaking in 2005! observed that some of the new requirements, particularly the structural, improvements to prevent water ingress, are applicable to new ships only. The overall risk reduction achieved, will therefore, he continued, not be evident for some years, when new ships of today reach ages where structural failure becomes more commonplace. The case for seamanlike precautions, for care, method, thoroughness, prudence and double checking in the inspection, operation and maintenance of bulk carriers remains as strong as ever. Sources 4, 5, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 57, 58, 65, 66, 68, 80, 82, 83, 84, 88, 94, 129, 138, 167, 182, 222, 256, 957, 258, 259, 262, 271, 272, 973, 974, 975, 976, 97, 278, 279, (See List of Sources, Page 497) Li i; | | Minimise corrosion within holds by maintaining the condition of paint coatings, rinsing with fresh water and taking extra precautions with corrosive cargoes. ‘Minimise corrosion within ballast tanks ty maintaining the condition of paint coatings. Prevent stevedores’ damage. Prevent hull contact damage. ‘Report, damage and have it surveyed and properly repaired, Avoid local overloading. Provide and use accurate, accessible stability information. Always prepare a full loading/deballasting or discharging/ballasting plan. Keep strictly to loading/debaliasting or discharging/ballasting plan. Reduce loading rates when starting an empty hold. Ensure that discharging and ballast, changes are planned and executed with the same care as loading, Reject cargo with excessively high moisture content, Ensure that ship is not twisted whilst loading or whilst changing ballast. Close dump valves immediately deballasting is completed. ‘Trim cargo reasonably level to the boundaries of the cargo space. Ensure that cargoes such as steel are well secured. ‘All hatchcovers should be well maintained and carefully secured. ‘All deck openings should be in sound condition and properly secured. Speed should be substantially reduced in adverse weather. Sloshing of ballast water in part-filled tanks should not be allowed to occur, Prevent springing by adjustment of course, speed or ballast. Aboard OBOs follow strict procedures to avoid the possibility of gas explosions. Dooo00000000000000000e0 a Possible additional measures when a greater margin of safety is required Gi Stay within the at-sea stress limits whilst in port, Gl merease the number of loading passes. Cl Insist that @ maximum loading rate (such as 8,000 tonnes/hour per loader) is not exoseded. Ci Avoid jump (alternate hold) loading, and load all holds. 348 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE