The Role of Antitrust Laws in the

Professional Sports Industry From a

Financial Perspective
By U.S. Sports Academy in Contemporary Sports
Issues, Sports Management, Sports Studies and
Sports Psychology
http://thesportjournal.org/article/the-roleof-antitrust-laws-in-the-professional-sportsindustry-from-a-financialperspective/Abstract
Submitted by: Howard Bartee, Jr.
Abstract
This research paper examines how antitrust laws
have played a role in shaping the financial
operations of the professional sports industry of
today. Different aspects of economical, historical,
governmental, cultural and financial perspectives
have been identified as vital sources in the
professional sports industry of the past, present
and future. This paper will also provide case
studies and other field research to reveal how the
influence of economical, historical, governmental,
cultural and financial perspectives stem from
antitrust laws that have shaped the world of
professional sports today in the NFL for football,
NBA for basketball, NHL for hockey, and MLB for
baseball.
U.S. Sports Academy
Submitted by: Howard Bartee, Jr.
Abstract
This research paper examines how antitrust laws
have played a role in shaping the financial
operations of the professional sports industry of
today. Different aspects of economical, historical,
governmental, cultural and financial perspectives
have been identified as vital sources in the
professional sports industry of the past, present
and future. This paper will also provide case
studies and other field research to reveal how the
influence of economical, historical, governmental,
cultural and financial perspectives stem from
antitrust laws that have shaped the world of
professional sports today in the NFL for football,
NBA for basketball, NHL for hockey, and MLB for
baseball.
Chapter I: Introduction
The professional sports industry has evolved into
an intriguing social phenomenon. As a means to
make a living and to relax the mind and body, the
sports industry is both a recreational and
economical entity that enjoys certain privileges
and immunities. Just as the Supreme Courts
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment have
nationalized rights and liberties, the professional
sports industry now appeals to and employs
individuals from very diverse background. As time

has progressed, there has been an increase in

women and minorities in both the player and
managerial ranks. As a result, the professional
sports industry finds refuge under public policies.
As an entity of private ownership in this
capitalistic American society, the professional
sports industry has become a thriving market.
Purpose of the Paper
The purpose of this research paper is to examine
how antitrust laws have played a role in shaping
the financial operations of the professional sports
industry of today.
Research Questions
In this paper, many issues arise about this
televised giant called the professional sports
industry (PSI). These issues manifest both simple
and complex questions. A set of questions
emerges from economical, historical,
governmental, cultural and financial perspectives
that are listed as follows: What actions and
reactions have most often occurred in the PSI and
our society in response to governmental
regulations? What is the projected role of
government in the PSI? Does the PSI operate
under the same governmental regulations, as do
other private industries? Which branch of
government has been most effective in regulating
the PSI? Are there applicable statutes or judicial
proceedings affecting the PSI? Has the principle
of judicial review been able to effectively control
the PSI? Do antitrust laws have a negative or
positive impact on the financial aspects of the
professional sports industry? What is the
economical impact of the professional sports
industry? With these questions in mind, it is
essential that definitions of various terms be
included to provide more background information
in this area of research.
Definition of Terms
Firstly, what is antitrust law? Simply stated,
according to Corley and Reed (1996), antitrust
law is used to describe all laws that intend to
promote and regulate competition and make our
competitive economic system work.
Secondly, what is the economic giant known as
the professional sports industry? According to
the Adams and Brock (1997), professional sports
are a textbook example of a bilateral cartel made
up of club owners and unionized players engaged
in intrastate and interstate commerce. The club
owners exercise monopoly power in the product
market and monopsony power in the input
market, whereas, the players try to countervail
that monopsony power. For example, according
toWikipedia, i n economics, a monopsony is a
market with only one buyer in the market, often
an input market (Wikipedia, 2004). At the same
time, this is analogous to the case of a monopoly

in which there is only one seller in a market.

These cartels confront each other in a love/hate,
cooperation/conflict relationship with neither
being strong enough to exercise total dominance
over the other (Adams & Brock, 1997).
It is from these two definitions of antitrust law
and the professional sports industry that the
significance of this study, literary review and
summary/conclusions will arise.
Significance of the Study
Answers to these questions and terms should
provide relevant and significant information
pertaining to the professional sports industry as a
whole. By identifying governmental perspectives
of the PSI, the importance of the antitrust law will
be revealed through a financial perspective. This
paper also contains case studies of actions and
reactions in the PSI that will further support the
significant role of the antitrust law in regards to
the PSI from a financial perspective. This paper
further pinpoints how the professional sport of
baseball best exemplifies the implementation,
application, and interpretation of the antitrust
exemption issues.
Chapter II: Review of Literature
The professional sports industry is a very unique
entity. As an entity, it controls both activities and
attitudes, solicits actions and reactions, and
demands the immediate attention of fans,
arbitrators, mediators, lawyers, judges, players,
television networks, and management. However,
as an entity, it is regulated as a business activity
with and without exemptions from the federal
government. To limit the framework of both the
professional sports industry and antitrust
activities, the underlying meanings of past,
present and future perspectives will be discussed.
Past Perspective: The Historical Role of
Antitrust Laws
in the Professional Sports Industry
Historically, antitrust law has played a role in
developing regulations, controls, and protections
in the professional sports industry of today. Laws
that include such major statutes as the Sherman
Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1914, the NorrisLaGuardia Act of 1932, the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, and other antitrust and
labor relations acts (Corley & Reed, 1996). Court
decisions and/or interpretations include such
parties as: Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258, (1972); Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204
(1971);Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2116
(1996) and Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.
1987). Also, there is a history of concepts relating

to protections and guarantees to all parties

involved in the professional sports industry. Case
studies show that in baseball, the reserve
clause was the owners primary weapon for
eliminating free competition in the market for
players. Once a team obtained contractual rights
to a player, it enjoyed exclusive rights to his
services. Unless those rights were waived, traded,
sold, or otherwise assigned to another team, the
player was literally owned by the team with which
he signed the original contract (Adams & Brock,
1997). Also, certain sports in the professional
sports industry are classified as with antitrust
labor exemption, whenever the players can file
complaints with the government alleging unfair
labor practices or without antitrust labor
exemption, whenever the players cannot file
complaints with the government alleging unfair
labor practices (McGraw, 1998).
On the other hand, case studies show that in
football, basketball, and hockey, the emphasis
has been on the relief granted through the
application of antitrust laws (McCormick, 1989). A
final aspect focuses on what is the historical,
legal, economic, and future role of antitrust laws
in the professional sports industry of Major
League Baseball (MLB)? In evaluating this aspect,
each area seems to address in its own way the
evolution of the antitrust policy in their particular
industry. For example, according to U.S. News &
World Report, all four of the sports leagues enjoy
some measure of antitrust exemption, which
allows teams to pool their broadcasting-rights
fees, and in the case of baseball, prevents the
players from filing complaints with the
government alleging unfair labor practices
(McGraw, 1998).
Throughout the history of sports, several events
have occurred leading to how antitrust laws are
now applied along with their financial impact. The
following timeline from Major League Baseballs
Labor Turmoil: The Failure of the CounterRevolution by Jeffery S. Moorad (1997) is
explained in the Villanova Sports and
Entertainment Law Journal. It provides a running
account of actions that have been taken by
leagues and set the stage for legal court
challenges: It also provides a historical time line
leading up the formation of the American
Association and present day (MLB) baseball.

1882 The alternative league, American

Association, to the National League began
play. The American Association abolished the
reserve clause, sold tickets for half the price
of those sold by National League clubs and
allowed beer and whiskey in the stands on
Sundays.

1883 The American Association entered

into a pact with the National League in and

accepted the policies of the National League.

Two additional leagues, the Union Association
and Players League, soon followed, but both
failed within one season and the National
League absorbed all three leagues.

1892 The only alternative league to gain

foothold during this period was the American
League, which emerged as the Western
League.

1900 By the turn of the century, the

American League had wooed 100 players
from the National League, and was drawing
500,000 more fans per season. Once again,
club owners found competition not to their
liking.

1903 The two leagues came to an

agreement under which the National League
accepted the American League as an equal,
and together the two leagues formed the
bicameral system that characterizes Major
League Baseball today.

1913 The Federal League was established

the last alternative league of the pre-World
War II era. Next to the American League, the
Federal League was the most successful of
the alternative leagues, lasting for three
seasons, until a dissolution agreement
between the National League and Federal
League owners. As part of this agreement, the
National League absorbed some of the
Federal Leagues team, while others were
simply bought out.

1922 The first court challenge of antitrust

laws in the professional sports industry of
baseball occurred.

These events helped to establish present day

antitrust law exemption and how we view Major
League Baseball (MLB).
Present Perspective: Legal Case Analysis of
Antitrust Law and the Professional Sports
Industry with the Antitrust Exemption from
a Present Day Angle
Legally, in our present day and time, antitrust
legislation and court decisions with labor
exemption show variations in features of
provisions, applications, and interpretations of
significance. From the inception of the
professional sport industry to the present, actions
involving antitrust have helped shape this sport.
For example, cases in the past have focused on
issues of antitrust and labor exemptions to
professional players. According to the Antitrust
Bulletin, the issue of whether sports leagues are
protected from antitrust attack by the labor
exemption has arisen primarily in cases
challenging league rules or devices designed to
restrict the unfettered movement of veteran free

agent players from one team to another when

their contracts with the former team expired
(Roberts, 1997).
Example of Antitrust Laws and the Professional
Sports Industry with Antitrust Exemption: Major
League Baseball (MLB)
Professional baseball is the most representative
of professional sports with labor exemptions in
many ways.
Firstly, there is the role of the reserve clause.
According to Leshanki (2003), the reserve clause
essentially stated that the teams had the right to
renew a players contract following each season.
In this way all rights to a players contract
belonged to the team and a player could never
escape from that club or seek competing bids
from other teams. Players were not even able to
invalidate a contract by sitting out for a year and
then returning to the game. In essence, the club
could buy, sell or trade a player via his contract
as if the player were livestock. Even though
surveys suggested that the players initial
reaction to the reserve lists was positive, it soon
became clear that reservation was not in the
players best interest.
Secondly, according to Villanova Sports and
Entertainment Law Journal, reservation brought
an end to the free market for their services, along
with an end to their salary increases because of
two reasons: (a) reactions to the reserve clause
and (b) the control it provided to owners. Moorad
(1997) discussed how players and other
individuals established alternative leagues, which
forced the development of competition for
players services and how players associations
were formed (Moorad, 1997) such as the Major
League Baseball Players Association to represent
the players in union negotiations with owners.
Additional court challenges show many features
of the economical, recreational, and
governmental institutions. They are explicit in
issues, parties involved, decisions, and the
extensiveness of governmental regulations,
controls, and protections. In the Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)
case, the Federal Baseball Club made two
arguments against the defendants. These
arguments were as follows: (1) that several
defendants, including the American and the
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
monopolized the market for baseball players in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act and (2)
that the defendants were monopolizing the
market because once a team was placed in the
American League or the National League, the
reserve clause precluded players from jumping
to the upstart rival Federal Baseball League.

The Supreme Courts unanimous opinion, written

by Justice Holmes, held that although baseball
players and their equipment were physically
moved across state lines, putting on baseball
exhibitions was purely a state affair that only
had an incidental effect on interstate commerce
and thus fell outside of the Sherman Acts
jurisdiction. Although the Court recognized that
baseball was in fact a business, it also held that
personal effort, not related to production, is not
the subject of commerce (Ross & Dimitroff, 1997).
Another case in 1953 revisited the exemption via
the reserve clause in Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). The plaintiffs
alleged antitrust violations between organized
baseball and the Mexican League because they
had entered into various agreements binding
each to respect the others reserve clause,
thereby eliminating each leagues rights to
contract with certain baseball players. In a per
curiam opinion, the Court reaffirmed baseballs
exemption on the ground that it should only be
removed or limited by legislation and since
Congress had repeatedly declined to do so, it
shouldnt be changed. As a result of this
happening, this meant that antitrust and antitrust
exemption fell into the hands of Congressional
legislation. In a nutshell, the majoritys opinion
effectively held that organized baseball in the
United States could enter into a worldwide
conspiracy in restraint of trade with baseball
leagues in other countries and yet the conspiracy
would be exempt from U.S. antitrust laws.
Therefore, the Courts decision had more severe
potential repercussions than simply
affirming Federal Baseball (1922). Also, it
effectively expanded baseballs antitrust
exemption to reach global conspiracies (Ross &
Dimitroff, 1997) through its impact on the overall
sports world. Furthermore, according to Justices
Burton and Reed in Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), the defendants
(Yankees) were now engaged in interstate trade
or commerce as those terms are used in the
Constitution of the United States and the
Sherman Act (Ross & Dimitroff, 1997).
In 1972, the court again considered the
exemption issue in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
(1972). In this case, the St. Louis Cardinals traded
outfielder Curt Flood to the Philadelphia Phillies at
the conclusion of the 1969 season. Unhappy
about the trade, Flood sent a letter to
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn stating his displeasure
and asked the commissioner to declare him a free
agent for the upcoming season so he could
consider offers from teams other than the Phillies.
Kuhn refused, and informed Flood that his only
choices were to play for Philadelphia or not to
play at all. Flood decided to sit out the 1970
season and filed suit against the commissioner,

the teams, and the owners, thereby taking on the

reserve clauses 50-year exemption from the
antitrust laws. This attempt by Curt Flood thus
left the antitrust exemption in the hands of the
Supreme Court for another challenge to see if
legislation by Congress was the determining
factor.
As a result, the Supreme Court recognized that
baseballs long-standing exemption was an
aberration since no other professional sport had
been similarly favored, at least not without
special legislation from Congress. Further, the
Court reversed the underpinning of Federal
Baseball (1922) by holding that professional
baseball is engaged in interstate commerce.
But, in a close decision, the majority again
explained that Congress had considered the issue
and tacitly approved the exemption by refusing to
overturn it. In addition, the Court held that
baseball and its reserve system are also exempt
from state antitrust laws. The exemption was
therefore not only left intact, it was again
extended (Ross & Dimitroff, 1997).
Despite the seeming lack of rhyme or reason to
its holding in Federal Baseball (1922), the Court
has continued to staunchly clutch to its ruling in
subsequent decisions (Ross & Dimitroff, 1997).
This is true because baseballs antitrust
exemption has proven to be remarkably resistant
to challenge despite the suspect reasoning
behind its creation (Moorad, 1997). On the other
hand, a district court opinion in 1993, took at
least a chink out of the exemptions protective
armor. The federal district court in Pennsylvania
held that the exemption applies only to the
reserve clause inPiazza v. Major League
Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1993),
(Ross & Dimitroff, 1997).
In this case, several investors (including Vincent
Piazza, father of New York Mets all-star catcher
Mike Piazza) sued Major League Baseball when it
refused to approve the sale and relocation of the
Giants from San Francisco to Tampa Bay. Major
League Baseball filed a motion to dismiss, citing
the antitrust exemption. The federal district court
denied the motion on the ground that the
exemption is restricted to the reserve clause,
even though Piazza analyzed the exemption in
terms of stare decisis. The court also pointed out
that the Supreme Court itself had acknowledged
that the trilogy between the cases of Federal
Baseball, Toolson, and Ford was limited to the
reserve system because professional baseballs
reserve system is within the reach of the antitrust
laws (Ross & Dimitroff, 1997) and did not apply
to teams attempts to move from city to city
(Moorad, 1997). Basically, the holding
in Piazza signaled that the current restrictions on
the sale or transfer of major league baseball

teams were not included because this action may

not be insulated from the Sherman Act by
baseballs antitrust exemption (Ross & Dimitroff,
1997).

(Rishe & Mondello, 2004). This demand, whether

increased or stagnant, led to the following
economic values in 2001 as described by Howard
and Crompton (2004) for the four major leagues:

Other issues that have been recent challenges

are between owners and players. According to
Moorad (1997), when the owners tried to gain
back some of the ground they had lost in the
most recent set of bargaining talks a decade ago,
the players refused to budge. The standoff
ultimately led to a season long strike in 19941995. Although the World Series had survived two
world wars and even natural disasters, it could
not survive this labor dispute and was not played
for the first time in 90 years. Moorad (1997)
estimates that the hard out of pocket losses to
both sides as a result of the 1994-95 strike were
one billion dollars. The aftershocks of the
unseemly and distressing strike were still being
felt in 1997; with attendance and TV ratings
significantly lower than pre-strike figures. Fans
begin to realize that they could live without
baseball and found other ways of spending their
time. More importantly, fan sympathy, which had
traditionally been with the players, turned into
fan annoyance at both the owners and the
players (Palm, 1997). One additional argument
that could have shed light during this period is
the belief held by Isidore: (a) even if the teams
payroll increases significantly, market forces limit
the amount owners can charge fans (Isidore
2002, April 5) and the proliferation of variable
pricing is further evidence that player salaries do
not drive ticket prices (Isidore 2002, December
27). With this additional note, it can be seen why
some stability has returned to baseball.

Economic Value of the Major Leagues

In the last few years, this stability has returned

because the owners and players have reached a
new collective bargaining agreement. Thanks to
the strength of the union, the agreement allows
the players to retain the mobility that they had.
Secondly, it creates the notion that the owners
and players are in a joint venture, as opposed to
the players being mere employees. Thirdly, from
an economical standpoint, the agreement also
begins to address the great disparity of financial
benefits and burdens between the major market
franchises and the smaller market franchises with
modified profit sharing among clubs and a luxury
tax imposed on clubs whose salaries exceed
certain levels. Furthermore, the agreement
contains important exceptions to a full profit
sharing approach. However, there is a long way
to go before the gap between the big and smaller
markets are closed (Palm, 1997) even though the
professional baseball industry is enjoying a period
of relative tranquility (McCormick, 1997). For
example, the demand for baseball and football
increased between 1996 and 2002 as compared
to the overall demand for hockey and basketball

MLB *Gross Revenue: $2.79 Billion *Net Worth:

$6.55 Billion
NHL *Gross Revenue $1.82 Billion *Net Worth:
$3.75 Billion
NFL *Gross Revenue: $3.51 Billion *Net Worth:
$12.80 Billion
NBA *Gross Revenue: $2.1 Billion *Net Worth:
$6.01 Billion
Future Perspective: An Outlook of Antitrust
Law in the
Professional Sports Industry Beyond 2004
What does the future hold for the role of
government in business regulations, controls,
protections, and exemptions in the professional
sports industry and their reactions? Based on this
research paper, and according to Palm (1997),
the future for professional sports is uncertain.
Although the intersection between labor in the
professional sports industry, antitrust laws and
finance is clearer than it was, recent decisions in
each of the sports leagues may result in a
decertify todayrecertify tomorrow mentality
which may make professional sports even more
unstable. For example, if players unionize and
engage in collective bargaining, then they receive
the benefits arising from the labor laws and
collective bargaining, but lose virtually all of the
protection that the antitrust laws would afford. In
such cases, the labor laws primarily govern the
relationship between the players and the owners,
and the antitrust laws will be largely applicable
due to the nonstatutory labor exemption. This
action of decertification is primarily focused on
players keeping or breaking up their unions. On
the other hand, if the players choose to decertify
their unions, then they obtain the full protection
of the antitrust laws, but will enjoy the benefits of
the labor laws and collective bargaining
(McCormick, 1997). Ultimately, the parties have
to come to grips with the issue of whether the
financial pie will be distributed more equitably
among the players and owners. The real dispute
may become whether it should be more of a
partnership model or remain an employment
model (Palm, 1997). Regardless of what model
the two parties choose, the value of professional
sports franchises has been appreciating at
double-digit rates annually for the past 30 years
(Howard & Crompton, 2004) and should continue
to grow in the future.
Another projection, according to U.S. News &
World Report, is that some officials consider the

practices of the leagues and the teams to be

monopolistic. Some economists propose breaking
sports leagues into separate businesses, much
like AT&T was broken into Baby Bells. Others
propose government regulation, such as a federal
sports commission that regulates ticket prices,
team relocation, salaries and the like because it
has gotten to the point where huge amounts of
tax money are aiding and abetting the behavior
of an industry that is gouging its consumers
(McGraw, 1998).
Even others, such as Howard and Crompton
(2004), predict that part of future expansion in
sports is likely to take the form of increased
globalization. Womens sports are rapidly
emerging as a component of the professional
sports mosaic in North America, and there has
been growth in niche sports, which have a
relatively small but avid following. These authors
found that this growth has been aided by the
multitude of cable television channels that are in
constant need of new programming to fill their
24-hour schedules.
Chapter III: Summary and Conclusions
Conclusively stated, the writer found that the
emergence of the professional sports industry has
become an entity with which public policies have
significantly affected the sports arena.
Specifically, it was found that there are several
features and trends that are observable about the
role of antitrust laws in the professional sports
industry from a financial perspective.
Secondly, the writer found that governmental
controls, regulations, and protections make up an
array of historical, legal and economic factors
involving owners, players, and fans.
Thirdly, according to the Economist, the historical
role of antitrust laws in the professional sports
industry shows that this law has affected the
industry through antitrust exemption granted in
baseball, and not granted in football, basketball,
and hockey (Andrews, 1998) and the writer
agrees with this finding.

Fourthly, findings from the Antitrust Bulletin show

that if the structural reorganization of
professional sports is the goal of the public or
government, antitrust offers the requisite
weapons for achieving it. For example, in
professional sports, where a cartel of club owners
exercises a monopoly power in the product
market, and where powerful trade unions
dominate the relevant labor markets, there is an
almost irresistible tendency toward tacit vertical
collusion (Adams & Brock, 1997). It is the writers
view that this exercise of power will continue as
each major league sport continues to become
more commercialized through the websites
of: www.nfl.com;www.nba.com; www.mlb.com;
and www.nhl.com.
Finally, the writer believes that antitrust laws will
continue to play a very important role because as
history shows us, the professional sports industry
has had many landmark cases that have helped
to shape the industry of today from a financial
and legal standpoint. Therefore, antitrust laws will
affect the professional sports industry of
tomorrow because of the principle of judicial
review and profit-sharing. Furthermore, the
author believes that the world of reality sports,
including fantasy league sports participation, by
billions of fans, will contribute to the growth of
this intriguing social phenomenon and now
worldwide social phenomenon known as the
professional sports industry.
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