CASE DOCTRINES:

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Purisima v. Salanga 15 SCRA 704 (1965)
Election laws; Petition for recount; Candidate affected can file
petition alone.A candidate affected can file a petition for recount
alone, without the concurrence of the provincial board of
canvassers (Cawa vs. Del Rosario, L-16837-40 May 30, 1960). From
the fact, therefore, that the provincial board of canvassers has not
petitioned for a recount it cannot be inferred that they were not
convinced a discrepancy existed.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections' copies of election
returns authentic.The Commission on Elections' copies of election
returns are authentic copies within the meaning of Section 168 of
the Revised Election Code (Lawsin vs. Escalona, L-22540, July 31,
1964; Matanog vs. Alejandro, L22502-03, June 30, 1964).
Same; Same; Erasures and superimpositions in the election
returns; Duty of board of canvassers to suspend canvass; Case at
bar.Where, as in the case at bar, there were patent erasures and
superimpositions in words and figures on the face of the election
returns submitted to the board of canvassers, it was imperative for
said board to stop the canvass so as to allow time for verification of
authentic copies and recourse to the courts (Javier vs. Commission
on Elections, L22248, January 30, 1965). A canvass or proclamation
made notwithstanding such patent defects, without awaiting proper
remedies, is null and void (Ibid.).
Same; Same; Same; Failure to submit Commission on Elections'
copies to the board of canvassers.Where a candidate was
prevented from securing the Commission on Elections' copies of the
returns to establish a discrepancy between them and the Provincial
Treasurer's copies, the failure to submit the said copies to the board
should not prejudice his right to petition for recount before the
court
Same; Interpretation of election laws.Interpretation of election
laws should give effect to the expressed will of the electoratePatent erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the
votes stated in the election returns strike at the reliability of said
returns as basis for canvass and proclamation. A comparison with
the other copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only
way to remove grave doubts as to the correctness of said returns
as well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will of the people.

Cauton v. COMELEC 19 SCRA 911

Elections; Commission on Elections; Power over the conduct of
elections.The Commission has the power to decide all
administrative questions affecting elections, except the question
involving the right to vote.
Same; Commissions power regarding canvass of election returns.
The Commission on Elections has the power to investigate and
act on the propriety or legality of the canvass of election returns
made by the board of canvassers. The power of the Commission in
this respect is simply administrative and supervisory. It is intended
to secure the proclamation of the winning candidate based on the
true count of the votes cast.
Same; Object of the canvass.The object of the canvass is to
.determine the result of the elections based on the official election
returns. In order that the result of the canvass would ref lect the
true expression of the peoples will, it must be based on genuine
and untampered election returns, The Commission exercises its
jurisdiction, relative to the conduct of elections, in order to attain
that result.
Same; Tampered election returns; Duty of the Commission.Once
the Commission on Elections is convinced that the election returns
in the hands of the board of canvassers do not constitute the
proper basis in ascertaining the true result of the elections. it is
duty bound to take the necessary steps in order that the proper
basis for the canvass is made available. It would be absurd to say
the Commission has a legal duty to perform and at the same time it
is denied the necessary means to perform that duty.
Same; Power of Commission to order opening of ballot boxes.
Where the three copies of the election returns outside the ballot
box do not constitute a reliable basis for a canvass, then the
Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its power to administer
and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections, may order
the opening of the ballot boxes to ascertain whether the copy
inside each ballot box, corresponding to each precinct, is also
tampered like the three copies outside the ballot box. The
Commission may do this on its own initiative, or upon petition by
the proper party. That order does not affect the right to vote or the
validity of the votes cast.
Same; Purpose and effect of opening ballot boxes under the
circumstances.Once it is found that the copy of the election

return inside the ballot box is tampered, the Commission on

Elections would then have accomplished two things, namely: (1)
secured a basis for the prosecution for the violation of the laws
relative to elections and (2) afforded the party aggrieved by the
alteration of the election returns outside the ballot box a basis for a
judicial recount of the votes.
Same; Purpose of Election Law.The purpose of the Revised
Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections and to suppress
all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the-voters.
The purity of elections is one of the fundamental requisites of
popular government.
Same; Choice of means to insure clean elections is discretionary on
Commission.The Commission on Elections, by constitutional
mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and
honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the
performance of its duties, it must be given a considerable latitude
in adopting means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was createdto
promote free, orderly and honest elections. The choice of means
taken by the Commission, unless they are clearly illegal or
constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.
Technicalities, which may defeat the will of the sovereign people, as
expressed in their votes, should not be allowed to hamper the
Commission in the performance of its duties.
Same; When opening of the ballot box is allowable.The ballot
boxes may be opened in case there is an election contest. They
may also be opened, even if there is no election contest, when their
contents have to be used as evidence in the prosecution of election
frauds. Moreover, they may be opened when they are the subject of
any official investigation which may be ordered by a competent
court or other competent authority. The competent authority must
include the Commission on Elections which is charged with the
administration and enforcement of the laws relative to the conduct
of elections.
Roque v. COMELEC G.R. No. 188456 10 September 2009
Election Law; Automated Election System; Bids and Bidding; The
bidding ground rules, as spelled out primarily in the Request for
Proposal (RFP) and the clarificatory bid bulletins does not require,
for bidding purposes, that there be an incorporation of the bidding
joint ventures or consortiums.It may be, as petitioners observed,
that the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture remained an unincorporated

aggroupment during the bid-opening and evaluation stages. It

ought to be stressed, however, that the fact of non-incorporation
was without a vitiating effect on the validity of the tender offers.
For the bidding ground rules, as spelled out primarily in the RFP and
the clarificatory bid bulletins, does not require, for bidding
purposes, that there be an incorporation of the bidding joint
ventures or consortiums. In fact, Bid Bulletin Nos. 19 and 20
recognize the existence and the acceptability of proposals of
unincorporated joint ventures. In response to a poser, for example,
regarding the 60% Filipino ownership requirement in a joint venture
arrangement, the SBAC, in its Bid Bulletin No. 22, stated: In an
unincorporated joint venture, determination of the required Filipino
participation may be made by examining the terms and conditions
of the [JVA] and other supporting financial documents submitted by
the joint venture. (Emphasis ours.) Petitioners, to be sure, have
not shown that incorporation is part of the pass/fail criteria used in
determining eligibility.
Same; Same; Same; There is no requirement under either Republic
Act No. 8436, as amended, or the Request for Proposal (RFP), that
all the suppliers, manufacturers or distributors involved in the
transaction should be part of the joint ventureon the contrary,
the Instruction to Bidders allows the bidder to subcontract portions
of the goods or services under the automation project.Petitioners
beef against the TIM-Smartmatic JVA is untenable. First off, the
Comelec knows the very entities whom they are dealing with, which
it can hold solidary liable under the automation contract, should
there be contract violation. Secondly, there is no requirement under
either Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, or the RFP, that all the
suppliers, manufacturers or distributors involved in the transaction
should be part of the joint venture. On the contrary, the Instruction
to Biddersas petitioners themselves admitallows the bidder to
subcontract portions of the goods or services under the automation
project.
Same; Same; The bottom line is that the required 2007
automation, be it viewed in the concept of a pilot test or not, is not
a mandatory requirement for the choice of system in, or a
prerequisite for, the full automation of the May 2010 elections.
From the practical viewpoint, the pilot testing of the technology in
question in an actual, scheduled electoral exercise under harsh
conditions would have been the ideal norm in computerized system
implementation. The underscored proviso of Sec. 6 of Republic Act
No. 8436 is not, however, an authority for the proposition that the
pilot testing of the PCOS in the 2007 national elections in the areas
thus specified is an absolute must for the machines use in the

2010 national/local elections. The Court can concede that said

proviso, with respect to the May 2007 elections, commands the
Comelec to automate in at least 12 defined areas of the country.
But the bottom line is that the required 2007 automation, be it
viewed in the concept of a pilot test or not, is not a mandatory
requirement for the choice of system in, or a prerequisite for, the
full automation of the May 2010 elections.

be deduced from these definitions is that PCOS is merely one of

several automated voting, counting or canvassing technologies
coming within the term AES, implying in turn that the automated
election system or technology that the Comelec shall adopt in
future elections need not, as a matter of mandatory arrangement,
be piloted in the adverted two highly urbanized cities and
provinces.

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Sec. 6 of the amended

Republic Act No. 8436, as couched, unmistakably conveys the idea
of unconditional full automation in the 2010 electionsa construal
making pilot testing of the Automated Election System (AES) a
prerequisite or condition sine qua non to putting the system in
operation in the 2010 elections is tantamount to reading into said
section something beyond the clear intention of Congress, as
expressed in the provision itself.To argue that pilot testing is a
condition precedent to a full automation in 2010 would doubtless
undermine the purpose of Republic Act No. 9369. For, as aptly
observed during the oral arguments, if there was no political
exercise in May 2007, the country would theoretically be barred
forever from having full automation. Sec. 6 of the amended
Republic Act No. 8436, as couched, therefore, unmistakably
conveys the idea of unconditional full automation in the 2010
elections. A construal making pilot testing of the AES a prerequisite
or condition sine qua non to putting the system in operation in the
2010 elections is tantamount to reading into said section
something beyond the clear intention of Congress, as expressed in
the provision itself. We reproduce with approval the following
excerpts from the comment of the Senate itself: The plain wordings
of Republic Act No. 9369 (that amended RA 8436) commands that
the 2010 elections shall be fully automated, and such full
automation is not conditioned on pilot testing in the May 2007
elections. Congress merely gave COMELEC the flexibility to partially
use the AES in some parts of the country for the May 2007
elections.

Same; Same; Any lingering doubt on the issue of whether or not

full automation of the 2010 regular elections can validly proceed
without a pilot run of the Automated Election System (AES) should
be put to rest with the enactment in March 2009 of Republic Act
No. 9525, in which Congress appropriated PhP 11.301 billion to
automate the 2010 electionsthe Republic Act No. 9525 is a
compelling indication that it was never Congress intent to make
the pilot testing of a particular automated election system in the
2007 elections a condition precedent to its use or award of the
2010 Automation Project.Any lingering doubt on the issue of
whether or not full automation of the 2010 regular elections can
validly proceed without a pilot run of the AES should be put to rest
with the enactment in March 2009 of Republic Act No. 9525, in
which Congress appropriated PhP 11.301 billion to automate the
2010 elections, subject to compliance with the transparency and
accuracy requirements in selecting the relevant technology of the
machines, thus: Sec. 2. Use of Funds.xxx Provided, however,
That disbursement of the amounts herein appropriated or any part
thereof shall be authorized only in strict compliance with the
Constitution, the provisions of [RA] No. 9369 and other election
laws incorporated in said Act as to ensure the conduct of a free,
orderly, clean, honest and credible election and shall adopt such
measures that will guaranty transparency and accuracy in the
selection of the relevant technology of the machines to be used on
May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. (Emphasis
added.) It may safely be assumed that Congress approved the bill
that eventually became Republic Act No. 9525, fully aware that the
system using the PCOS machines were not piloted in the 2007
electoral exercise. The enactment of Republic Act No. 9525 is to us
a compelling indication that it was never Congress intent to make
the pilot testing of a particular automated election system in the
2007 elections a condition precedent to its use or award of the
2010 Automation Project. The comment-in-intervention of the
Senate says as much.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Automated Election System

(AES) and Precinct-Count Optic Scan (PCOS), Defined.An AES is
not synonymous to and ought not to be confused with the PCOS.
Sec. 2(a) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, defines an AES as
a system using appropriate technology which has been
demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing
and transmission of election results, and other electoral processes.
On the other hand, PCOS refers to a technology wherein an optical
ballot scanner, into which optical scan paper ballots marked by
hand by the voter are inserted to be counted. What may reasonably

Same; Same; The first function of the Comelec under the

Constitutionand the Omnibus Election Code for that matter
relates to the enforcement and administration of all laws and

regulations relating to the conduct of elections to public office to

ensure a free, orderly and honest electoral exercise.The first
function of the Comelec under the Constitutionand the Omnibus
Election Code for that matterelates to the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relating to the conduct of
elections to public office to ensure a free, orderly and honest
electoral exercise. And how did petitioners come to their conclusion
about their abdication theory? By acceding to Art. 3.3 of the
automation contract, Comelec relinquished, so petitioners claim,
supervision and control of the system to be used for the automated
elections. To a more specific point, the loss of control, as may be
deduced from the ensuing exchanges, arose from the fact that
Comelec would not be holding possession of what in IT jargon are
the public and private keys pair.
Same; Same; With the view the Court takes of the automation
contract, the role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to
supply the goods necessary for the automation project, such as but
not limited to the Precint-Count Optic Scan (PCOS) machines, PCs,
electronic transmission devices and related equipment, both
hardware and software, and the technical services pertaining to
their operation.With the view we take of the automation
contract, the role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to
supply the goods necessary for the automation project, such as but
not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic transmission
devices and related equipment, both hardware and software, and
the technical services pertaining to their operation. As lessees of
the goods and the back-up equipment, the corporation and its
operators would provide assistance with respect to the machines to
be used by the Comelec which, at the end of the day, will be
conducting the election thru its personnel and whoever it
deputizes. And if only to emphasize a point, Comelecs contract is
with Smartmatic TIM Corporation of which Smartmatic is a 40%
minority owner, per the JVA of TIM and Smartmatic and the Articles
of Incorporation of Smartmatic TIM Corporation. Accordingly, any
decision on the part or on behalf of Smartmatic will not be binding
on Comelec. As a necessary corollary, the board room voting
arrangement that Smartmatic and TIM may have agreed upon as
joint venture partners, inclusive of the veto vote that one may have
power over the other, should really be the least concern of the
Comelec.
Same; Same; A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his
ballot, will always devise a way to do so; By the same token, one
with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his
vote known.The contention that the PCOS would infringe on the

secrecy and sanctity of the ballot because, as petitioners would put

it, the voter would be confronted with a three feet long ballot,
does not commend itself for concurrence. Surely, the Comelec can
put up such infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his
preference in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral
arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the
machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his ballot,
will always devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with
least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his vote
known.
Same; Same; Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. 108, as amended); The AntiDummy Law has been enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain
economic activities to Filipino citizens or corporations; The Court is
not aware of any constitutional or statutory provision classifying as
a nationalized activity the lease or provision of goods and technical
services for the automation of an election.The Anti-Dummy Law
has been enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain economic
activities to Filipino citizens or corporations. For liability for violation
of the law to attach, it must be established that there is a law
limiting or reserving the enjoyment or exercise of a right, franchise,
privilege, or business to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens. In the case at bench, the Court is
not aware of any constitutional or statutory provision classifying as
a nationalized activity the lease or provision of goods and technical
services for the automation of an election. In fact, Sec. 8 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, vests the Comelec with
specific authority to acquire AES from foreign sources, thus: SEC
12. Procurement of Equipment and Materials.To achieve the
purpose of this Act, the Commission is authorized to procure, xxx,
by purchase, lease, rent or other forms of acquisition, supplies,
equipment, materials, software, facilities, and other services, from
local or foreign sources xxx. (Emphasis added.) Petitioners cite
Executive Order No. (EO) 584, Series of 2006, purportedly limiting
contracts for the supply of materials, goods and commodities to
government-owned or controlled corporation, company, agency or
municipal corporation to corporations that are 60% Filipino. We do
not quite see the governing relevance of EO 584. For let alone the
fact that Republic Act No. 9369 is, in relation to EO 584, a
subsequent enactment and, therefore, enjoys primacy over the
executive issuance, the Comelec does fall under the category of a
government-owned and controlled corporation, an agency or a
municipal corporation contemplated in the executive order.
Same; Same; Even though the Automated Election System (AES)

has its flaws, Comelec and Smartmatic have seen to it that the
system is well-protected with sufficient security measures in order
to ensure honest elections.With the AES, the possibility of system
hacking is very slim. The PCOS machines are only online when they
transmit the results, which would only take around one to two
minutes. In order to hack the system during this tiny span of
vulnerability, a super computer would be required. Noteworthy also
is the fact that the memory card to be used during the elections is
encrypted and read-onlymeaning no illicit program can be
executed or introduced into the memory card. Therefore, even
though the AES has its flaws, Comelec and Smartmatic have seen
to it that the system is well-protected with sufficient security
measures in order to ensure honest elections.
Same; Same; Failure of all the machines would not necessarily
translate into failure of electionsmanual count tabulation and
transmission can be done, Precint-Count Optic Scan (PCOS) being a
paper-ballot technology.The disruption of the election process
due to machine breakdown or malfunction may be limited to a
precinct only or could affect an entire municipal/city. The worst case
scenario of course would be the wholesale breakdown of the 82,000
PCOS machines. Nonetheless, even in this most extreme case,
failure of all the machines would not necessarily translate into
failure of elections. Manual count tabulation and transmission, as
earlier stated, can be done, PCOS being a paper-ballot technology.
If the machine fails for whatever reason, the paper ballots would
still be there for the hand counting of the votes, manual tabulation
and transmission of the ERs. Failure of elections consequent to
voting machines failure would, in fine, be a very remote possibility.
Same; Same; The first step is always difficulthardly anything
works, let alone ends up perfectly the first time around.The first
step is always difficult. Hardly anything works, let alone ends up
perfectly the first time around. As has often been said, if one looks
hard enough, he will in all likelihood find a glitch in any new
system. It is no wonder some IT specialists and practitioners have
considered the PCOS as unsafe, not the most appropriate
technology for Philippine elections, and easily hackable, even.
And the worst fear expressed is that disaster is just waiting to
happen, that PCOS would not work on election day. Congress has
chosen the May 2010 elections to be the maiden run for full
automation. And judging from what the Court has heard and read in
the course of these proceedings, the choice of PCOS by Comelec
was not a spur-of-moment affair, but the product of honest-togoodness studies, consultations with CAC, and lessons learned from
the ARMM 2008 automated elections. With the backing of Congress

by way of budgetary support, the poll body has taken this historic,
if not ambitious, first step. It started with the preparation of the
RFP/TOR, with a list of voluminous annexes embodying in specific
detail the bidding rules and expectations from the bidders. And
after a hotly contested and, by most accounts, a highly transparent
public bidding exercise, the joint venture of a Filipino and foreign
corporation won and, after its machine hurdled the end-to-end
demonstration test, was eventually awarded the contract to
undertake the automation project. Not one of the losing or
disqualified bidders questioned, at least not before the courts, the
bona fides of the bidding procedures and the outcome of the
bidding itself.
Same; Same; The Comelec, in the discharge of its awesome
functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead
implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, should not
be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the
case of an organization of lesser responsibility.The Comelec is an
independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in
our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome
functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead
implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should
not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in
the case of an organization of lesser responsibility. It should be
afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising
means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great
objective for which it was createdto promote free, orderly, honest
and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often,
Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions to address
unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in
the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has
steered away from interfering with the Comelecs exercise of its
power which, by law and by the nature of its office properly pertain
to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
on Comelecs part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing
the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts
of that body.
PUNO (C.J.), Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Automated Election System; Separation of Powers; A
touchstone of our Constitution is that critical public policy
judgments belong to the legislative branch, and the Court must not
unduly intrude into this exclusive domain.A touchstone of our
Constitution is that critical public policy judgments belong to the
legislative branch, and the Court must not unduly intrude into this

exclusive domain. In enacting RA 8436 (Election Modernization Act)

on December 22, 1997, the legislature has clearly chosen the policy
that an AES shall be used by the COMELEC for the process of
voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of
the national and local elections. It decided to put an end to the
manual conduct of our elections that has frustrated the honest
casting of votes by our sovereign people. In the pursuit of its
objective, the legislature defined what it considered an AES and
provided the standards for its implementation. It further
determined the minimum functional capabilities of the system and
delegated to the COMELEC the development and adoption of a
system of evaluation to ascertain that the minimum system
capabilities would be met.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The interpretation of Section
5, Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is nothing less than a brain
twisterit appears like a Rorschach inkblot test, in which
petitioners and respondents assign meaning to certain words as
though they were deciphering images formed by inkblots.
Whether the conduct of the pilot exercise of the AES is a condition
precedent to its nationwide implementation involves the correct
interpretation of Section 5 of RA 8436. The interpretation of Section
5, RA 8436, as amended, is nothing less than a brain twister. It
appears like a Rorschach inkblot test, in which petitioners and
respondents assign meaning to certain words as though they were
deciphering images formed by inkblots. Using the same word of the
law, they arrive at different conclusions.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The conjunctions
provided, that and provided, further that and provided, finally that
signify that the clauses that follow the conjunction are a prerequisite or a condition to the fulfillment of the previous clause
the words provided, that mean the same as as long as, in order
that, and if only.The respondents reading of Section 5
disregards the tenor of the entire provision. A rational reading of
the entire provision will show that the different parts isolated and
then interpreted by the respondents are connected by the
conjunctions provided, that and provided, further that and
provided, finally that. These conjunctions signify that the clauses
that follow the conjunction are a pre-requisite or a condition to the
fulfillment of the previous clause. The words provided, that mean
the same as as long as, in order that, and if only.
Same; Same; Same; Laws of Congress have equal intrinsic dignity
and effect, and the implied repeal of a prior by a subsequent law of
that body must depend upon its intention and purpose in enacting

the subsequent law.In the case at bar therefore, there is

unmistakable evidence of the legislative intent to implement a full
nationwide automation of the May 2010 elections. It is impossible
to give effect to this intent and at the same time comply with the
condition precedent of conducting pilot exercises in selected areas.
The irreconcilability between Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended,
and Section 2 of RA 9525 is apparent for Congress could not have
maintained the requirement of a pilot exercise as a condition
precedent to full automation when it had made it absolutely clear
that it wanted to push through with a full nationwide AES this May
2010. Laws of Congress have equal intrinsic dignity and effect; and
the implied repeal of a prior by a subsequent law of that body must
depend upon its intention and purpose in enacting the subsequent
law. What is necessary is a manifest indication of a legislative
purpose to repeal. Repeal by implication proceeds from the premise
that where a statute of a later date clearly reveals an intention on
the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject,
that intention must be given effect.
Same; Same; Judicial Power; The Courts judicial function is merely
to check and not to supplant the judgment of the Commission on
Electionsto ascertain merely whether it has gone beyond the
limits prescribed by law, and not to exercise the power vested in it
or to determine the wisdom of its act.It should be underscored
that RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, does not mandate the use
of any specific voting equipment. Instead, the law gave COMELEC
the sole power to prescribe the adoption of the most suitable
technology of demonstrated capability as it may deem appropriate
and practical, taking into account the situation prevailing in the
area and the funds available for the purpose. Absent any capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the COMELEC, its
determination of the appropriate election technology, as well as the
procedure for its procurement, should be respected. Our judicial
function is merely to check and not to supplant the judgment of the
COMELEC; to ascertain merely whether it has gone beyond the
limits prescribed by law, and not to exercise the power vested in it
or to determine the wisdom of its act.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court is neither constitutionally
permitted nor institutionally outfitted to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of the system or of the nuances of the available
technologyit is ill-equipped to deal with the complex and difficult
problems of election administration; The Commission on Elections,
an independent Constitutional Commission armed with specialized
knowledge born of years of experience in the conduct of elections,
has the sole prerogative to choose which Automated Election

System (AES) to utilize.This Court is neither constitutionally

permitted nor institutionally outfitted to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of the system or of the nuances of the available
technology. It is ill-equipped to deal with the complex and difficult
problems of election administration. This inordinately difficult
undertaking requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the
legislative and the executive branches of government. The
petitioners contend that the PCOS machines do not comply with the
minimum system capabilities set forth by Section 6 of RA 8436, as
amended. Then, in an entirely speculative exercise, they conjure a
perturbing series of doomsday scenarios that would allegedly result
from using this particular technology: unaddressed logistical
nightmares,
failure
of
elections,
and
massive
disenfranchisement. Let me preface my discussion of this issue by
accentuating once more the core of RA 8346, as amended: the
COMELEC, an independent Constitutional Commission armed with
specialized knowledge born of years of experience in the conduct of
elections, has the sole prerogative to choose which AES to utilize. In
carrying out this mandate, Section 6 of the same law directs the
COMELEC to develop and adopt, with the assistance of the
COMELEC Advisory Council, an evaluation system to ascertain that
the minimum system capabilities are met.
Same; Same; Hoary is the principle that the courts will not interfere
in matters that are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under their special technical knowledge and training;
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt
with realisticallynot from the standpoint of pure theory.I do not
find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
awarding the Automation Contract to the Smartmatic TIM
Corporation. It has approved the PCOS system, and we are bereft of
the right to supplant its judgment. Hoary is the principle that the
courts will not interfere in matters that are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under their special technical knowledge and
training. Our disquisition in the seminal case Sumulong v.
COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941), again finds cogent application: The
Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to
play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In
the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with
restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less
responsible organization. The Commission may err, so this court
may also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the

greater objective for which it was createdfree, orderly and honest

elections. We may not fully agree with its choice of means but
unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical
matter, and political questions must be dealt with realisticallynot
from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections,
because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derive from actual experience in
dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to decide complex political questions.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; The
system of divided and interlocking powers of the branches of
government are carefully blended so as to produce a complex
system of checks and balances that preserve the autonomy of each
branch, without which independence can become supremacy.As
the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, we have the
distinguished but delicate duty of determining and defining
constitutional meaning, divining constitutional intent, and deciding
constitutional disputes. Nonetheless, this power does not spell
judicial superiority (for the judiciary is co-equal with the other
branches) or judicial tyranny (for it is supposed to be the least
dangerous branch). Thus, whenever the Court exercises its function
of checking the excesses of any branch of government, it is also
duty-bound to check itself. The system of divided and interlocking
powers of the branches of government are carefully blended so as
to produce a complex system of checks and balances that preserve
the autonomy of each branch, without which independence can
become supremacy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The art of good government requires
cooperation and harmony among the branches.The COMELEC is a
constitutional body, mandated to play a distinct and important role
in the governmental scheme. In the performance of its
constitutional duties, it must be given a range of authority and
flexibility, for the art of good government requires cooperation and
harmony among the branches. We may not agree fully with the
choices and decisions that the COMELEC makes, but absent any
constitutional assault, statutory breach or grave abuse of
discretion, we should never substitute our judgment for its own.
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; The Commission on Election
has not abdicated its constitutional and legal mandate to control
and supervise the electionsSmartmatic and TIM are merely
service providers or lessors of goods and services to the
Commission.The COMELEC identified the type of technology,

specifications and capabilities of the system to be used in the 2010

elections; and the bidders were required to submit their bids in
accordance with the COMELECs stipulations. All the choices made
by the winning bidder were to be subject to approval by the
COMELEC, and the final design and functionality of the system
shall still be subject to [its] final customization requirements. It is
clear that the COMELEC has not abdicated its constitutional and
legal mandate to control and supervise the elections. Smartmatic
and TIM are merely service providers or lessors of goods and
services to the Commission. Indeed, Article 6.7 of the Automation
Contract, provides that the entire process of voting, counting,
transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes shall be
conducted by COMELECs personnel and officials.
Same; Same; Same; The power and duty of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to administer election laws and to have
control and supervision over the automated elections is not
incompatible with the decision to subcontract services that may be
better performed by those who are well-equipped to handle
complex technological matters with respect to the implementation
of the Automated Election System (AES).The power and duty of
the COMELEC to administer election laws and to have control and
supervision over the automated elections is not incompatible with
the decision to subcontract services that may be better performed
by those who are well-equipped to handle complex technological
matters with respect to the implementation of the AES. The
subcontractor cannot act independently of the COMELEC.
CARPIO,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Automated Election System; Contrary to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) view that Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, merely envisions an initial
limited use of an automated system in the 2007 elections, both the
text of the law and the intent behind its enactment show a
legislative design to use an automated system following a
staggered, dual-phased implementation scheme: the first phase
calls for the use of an automated system on a partial or limited
scale involving selected, voter-dense areas in each of our three
major island groupings while the second phase calls for the full use
of an automated system nationwide.Contrary to the COMELECs
view that Section 5, as amended, merely envisions an initial
limited use of an automated system in the 2007 elections, both the
text of the law and the intent behind its enactment show a
legislative design to use an automated system following a
staggered, dual-phased implementation scheme: the first phase

calls for the use of an automated system on a partial or limited

scale involving selected, voter-dense areas in each of our three
major island groupings while the second phase calls for the full use
of an automated system nationwide. Textually, this is made
mandatory by the uniform use of the word shall when Section 5
mandated that the AES shall be used in at least two highly
urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao, to be chosen by the Commission (phase one) and In
succeeding regular national or local elections, the AES shall be
implemented nationwide (phase 2). The word shall operates to
impose a duty.
Same; Same; One need not search far and wide to see the wisdom,
logic and practicality for this legislative insistence on transforming
our electoral processes from manual to automated gradually in
phases.The framework of using an automated election system in
a staggered, dual-phased manner in RA 9369 is not novel. The
same legislative scheme was adopted by Congress in RA 8436,
although the controlled variable in the first phase of RA 8436 was
not the scope of the electoral area but the positions included in the
automated tallying. Thus, instead of limiting the use of an
automation system in highly urbanized areas and provinces in the
first phase, RA 8436 mandated the use of an automated system in
the 11 May 1998 elections to canvass the votes cast only for the
positions of president, vice-president, senators, and parties,
organizations or coalitions participating under the party-list
system. One need not search far and wide to see the wisdom,
logic and practicality for this legislative insistence on transforming
our electoral processes from manual to automated gradually in
phases. As Senator Gordon puts it, the ultimate goal is to take the
kinks out of the system before deploying it full scale. Indeed, in
systems implementation, a pilot run or a parallel run before full
turn-over to the new system is a norm. Thus, even as Congress
gave the COMELEC discretion in choosing the appropriate
technology, Congress insisted on a phased implementation
involving local government units from each of our three major
island groupings cognizant as it was of the difficulties inherent in
automating elections in an archipelago as dispersed as ours, with
an average nationwide telecommunications coverage of not more
than 75%.
Same; Same; Compliance with the requirement in Republic Act No.
9369 for pre-election field test and mock election cannot serve the
same purpose as the initial staggered or partial implementation of
the automated system.Nor can it be said that compliance with
the requirement in RA 9369 for pre-election field test and mock

election, stipulated in the Contract, serves the same purpose as the

initial staggered or partial implementation of the automated
system. Congress treated both mechanisms differently by
separately providing for partial implementation in Section 5, as
amended, and for a field test and mock election report by the
Technical Evaluation Committee in Section 11. Indeed, field tests
and mock elections can never replicate actual conditions on
election day.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The office of statutory
interpretation has never been to privilege the letter of the law over
its spirit; Use of language, while a mark of civilization, remains
susceptible to error as the Court knows all too well after having
reviewed in the past imprecisely drafted legislation.The office of
statutory interpretation has never been to privilege the letter of the
law over its spirit. On the contrary, it has been and always will be
the other way aroundto breathe life to the legislative intent even
to the extent of ignoring the text. This is because use of language,
while a mark of civilization, remains susceptible to error as the
Court knows all too well after having reviewed in the past
imprecisely drafted legislation.
Same; Same; Same; Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, is no authority to support respondents proposition that
the phased automation mandated under Section 5, as amended,
may be dispensed with.The phrase [p]articipation in the 2007
pilot exercise appears in Section 12 of RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369, under the sub-heading Procurement of Equipment and
Materials. The phrase refers to the participation of a bidder in the
2007 elections, which participation is not conclusive that the
bidders system of equipment and materials is fit and suitable for
the 2010 nationwide electoral exercise. This phrase does not mean
that the pilot or partial automation in Section 5, as amended, can
be dispensed with prior to a nationwide automated electoral
exercise. The requirement of a pilot or partial automation in Section
5, as amended, is a totally different requirement from the
requirement of fitness of a bidders system in the procurement of
equipment and materials under Section 12, as amended.
Consequently, Section 12, as amended, is no authority to support
respondents proposition that the phased automation mandated
under Section 5, as amended, may be dispensed with. Indeed,
Section 12 has nothing to do with the issue. Section 5 and Section
12, as amended, are separate mechanisms of the law, governing
different aspects of the automation project, but commonly intended
to ensure the conduct of secure, accurate, and reliable automated
elections.

Same; Same; Same; Neither the text nor purpose of Republic Act
No. 9525 supports the submission that Republic Act No. 9525 has
repealed Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amendedan
implementing statute cannot repeal what it intends to enforce.
Neither the text nor purpose of RA 9525 supports respondents
submission that RA 9525 has repealed Section 5 of RA 8436, as
amended. On the contrary, the proviso in Section 2 of RA 9525
states that the disbursement of the amounts herein appropriated
or any part thereof shall be authorized only in strict compliance
with the Constitution [and] the provisions of Republic Act No. 9369
x x x. Thus, the COMELEC is authorized to spend the appropriated
amount only in strict compliance with RA 9369, which mandates a
partial automation. The statement in Section 2 that such measures
that will guaranty transparency and accuracy in the selection of the
relevant technology of the machines to be used in the May 10,
2010 automated national and local election shall be adopted
should be read with the rest of Section 2. At any rate, RA 9525
funds the implementation of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369. An
implementing statute cannot repeal what it intends to enforce.
Same; Same; Whoever controls the access keys controls the
electionscontrol of the access keys means the capacity to
instantaneously change the election results in any precinct in the
country.Items (1) and (3) are unmistakably repugnant to Section
26 of RA 8426. Whoever controls the access keys controls the
elections. Control of the access keys means the capacity to
instantaneously change the election results in any precinct in the
country. Giving to the Provider the access keysboth the private
and public access keysis like giving to the system administrator
of Yahoo or Hotmail ones private password to his or her email
account. The private key is supposed to be private to the Chair of
the Board of Election Inspectors, generated by him and unknown to
the Provider. Otherwise, the Provider will have the capacity to alter
the election results at the precinct level. Worse, even the private
keys at the canvassing level are generated by the Provider,
allowing the Provider to change the election results at the
canvassing level. Clearly, the COMELEC has abdicated control over
the elections to the Provider, putting the integrity and outcome of
the 10 May 2010 elections solely in the hands of the Provider.
Moreover, the polling places and canvassing centers, which are the
critical operational areas during the elections, must be under the
full control of the COMELEC.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 8436 does not bifurcate control and
supervision along technical and non-technical linesSection 26

requires no less than complete and exclusive control and

supervision by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) over the
automated system.What Section 26 confines to the COMELECs
exclusive control and supervision, the COMELEC in the Contract
relinquishes to Smartmatic. By designating Smartmatic as the
entity in charge of the crucial technical aspects of the
automated systems operationequipment security and installation
and results canvassing and transmissionthe COMELEC contented
itself with taking charge over the systems non-technical, that is,
manual aspects. However, RA 8436 does not bifurcate control and
supervision along technical and non-technical lines. On the
contrary, Section 26 treated the entire automated system
wholistically by mandating that [t]he System shall be under the
exclusive supervision and control of the Commission. Section 26
requires no less than complete and exclusive control and
supervision by the COMELEC over the automated system. The
regime of partial, non-exclusive COMELEC control over the
automated system under the Contract falls short of Section 26s
stringent standard.
Same; Same; No automated election system is perfect, but we also
cannot take chances with our fragile democracy.The COMELECs
lack of experience in nationwide automation, its non-familiarity with
its chosen technology, the gaps in security features of the system,
the scale of its operation, Smartmatics control over the automation
aspects of the system, and the not more than 75% network
coverage currently available in this archipelago of more than 7,000
islands all combine to create a gaping black hole of unknown risks
which can crash the untested system come 10 May 2010.
Undoubtedly, no automated election system is perfect. But we also
cannot take chances with our fragile democracy. After all, what
these machines count are not the days earnings of a general
merchandise store. They tabulate the rawest expression of the
sovereign will of every voter in this polity. This is why Congress saw
fit to use technologys benefits gingerly. Lost in the headlong rush
to switch this countrys electoral system from fully manual to fully
automated overnight is the sobering thought that if, for any reason
relating to the implementation of the Contract, there is a failure of
elections and no President and Vice-President are proclaimed, and
no Senate President and Speaker of the House are chosen, by noon
of 30 June 2010, a power vacuum is certain to emerge. This is the
surest way to defeat the purpose of the entire electoral exercise,
and put at unnecessary risk our hard-earned democracy.
CORONA,J., Separate Opinion:

Election Law; Automated Election System; Neither Section 5 nor

Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8436 removes or constrains the
mandate of the Comelec to implement an Automated Election
System (AES) nationwide beginning the 2010 elections.Citing the
proceedings of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 2231 (from which RA
9329 originated), petitioners posit that Sections 5 and 12 of RA
8436, as amended, impose the restriction that no AES can be
implemented in the 2010 elections unless the said AES shall have
been pilot-tested in at least two highly urbanized cities and two
provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao during the 2007
elections. Petitioners claim that the impugned notice of award and
contract contravene Sections 5 and 12 of RA 8436, as amended,
because they authorize the use of PCOS machines that have never
undergone pilot-testing. The view of petitioners is, however, at
odds with the plain language of the law and the proceedings of the
Senate. The aforecited provisions do not limit or restrict the
statutory mandate of the Comelec to implement a nationwide AES
beginning the 2010 elections. The provisos of Section 5 merely
prescribe the minimum scope of, as well as the conditions for, the
implementation of an AES by the Comelec in the 2007 elections. On
the other hand, Section 12 simply regulates the capability of the
supplies, equipment, materials, software, facilities and other
services which the Comelec can procure. Neither provision,
however, removes or constrains the mandate of the Comelec to
implement an AES nationwide beginning the 2010 elections.
Same; Same; The directive of the law itself is clear: the nationwide
implementation of the Automated Election System (AES)
commences in the 2010 elections.In the event that no AES was
implemented in the 2007 elections, Section 5 does not prohibit the
Comelec from implementing an AES nationwide starting in the 2010
elections. Rather, the last clause of Section 5 is categorical that in
succeeding regular national or local elections, an AES shall be
implemented nationwide. And the 2010 elections were the
elections that immediately followed the 2007 elections, the regular
elections held immediately after effectivity of [RA 9369]. In other
words, the directive of the law itself is clear: the nationwide
implementation of the AES commences in the 2010 elections.
Same; Same; Same; Considering that Republic Act No. 9369 took
effect only on February 10, 2007, it was almost impossible to utilize
an Automated Election System (AES) even in at least two highly
urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao during the May 14, 2007 elections; The law obliges no
one to perform an impossibilitylaws and rules must be
interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic,

common sense, reason and practicality.Considering that RA 9369

took effect only on February 10, 2007, it was almost impossible to
utilize an AES even in at least two highly urbanized cities and two
provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao during the May 14,
2007 elections. Considering that, from the effectivity date of RA
9369, there was only a little over three months left before the 2007
elections, the additional burden (on the preparations for the 2007
elections) of the procurement process for and implementation of
even a partial AES of the said elections would have been a
superhuman task. More significantly, the 2007 appropriations for
the Comelec did not include a budget for AES. The convergence of
time and funding constraints made the implementation of any AES
in the 2007 elections impossible for the Comelec to conduct. Nemo
tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they
are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and
practicality.
Same; Same; The basic contents of the ballot as required by
Congress dictate the size and form of the ballot that the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) shall prescribefor as long as
the requirements are met, the system of secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot adopted by Congress under Republict Act No. 9369 is
deemed observed by the Comelec.While delegating to the
Comelec the determination of the size and form of the ballot,
Congress prescribed the following minimum requirements of its
content: (1) that it shall contain the titles of the position to be filled
and/or the proposition to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum
or plebiscite; (2) that under each position to be filled, the names of
candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and
uniformly indicated using the same type size and (3) that the voter
must see all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his
or her vote and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot
choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot. In effect,
the basic contents of the ballot as required by Congress dictate the
size and form of the ballot that the Comelec shall prescribe. For as
long as the requirements are met, the system of secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot adopted by Congress under RA 9369 is
deemed observed by the Comelec.
Same; Same; There is no inherent flaw in the voting procedure
adopted by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) whereby each
voter must manually feed the ballot into the Precinct-Count Optical
Scan (PCOS) machine; The law can only do so much in protecting
the ballots sanctity.There is no inherent flaw in the voting
procedure adopted by the Comelec whereby each voter must

manually feed the ballot into the PCOS machine. There are
sufficient safeguards to the secrecy of the voting process in that
the voter alone will hold the ballot and feed it to the PCOS machine.
It is all up to the voter whether to discard caution and disclose the
contents of the ballot. The law can only do so much in protecting its
sanctity. Besides, assuming that the requirement under the
contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM as to the size of
the ballot poses concerns in connection with the secrecy of the
ballot, the Comelec is not without power to issue the necessary
rules and regulations that will effectively address them. Such rules
and regulations may include the specific manner on how assistance
on feeding the ballot to a PCOS machine may be rendered to a
voter to avoid compromising the secrecy of the ballot.
Same; Same; Same; No worst-case scenarios painted by
doomsayers, no speculative political catastrophe should be the
basis of invalidating the Comelecs official actsonly when the
exercise by the Comelec of its discretion is done with grave abuse
will this Court nullify the challenged discretionary act.Congress
has vested the Comelec with the authority to modernize the
Philippine electoral system through the adoption of an AES. In the
exercise of the said authority and considering the nature of the
office of the Comelec as an independent constitutional body
specifically tasked to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections, the Comelec enjoys wide latitude in carrying
out its mandate. No worst-case scenarios painted by doomsayers,
no speculative political catastrophe should be the basis of
invalidating the Comelecs official acts. Only when the exercise by
the Comelec of its discretion is done with grave abuse will this
Court nullify the challenged discretionary act. Otherwise, the
institutional independence of the Comelec will be unduly restricted
and eroded, and its constitutional and statutory prerogatives
encroached upon. This Court should not allow that in any situation.
This Court should not allow that in this case. Let us welcome the
significant change in our electoral system that is the automated
election system. The future is upon us. It beckons as it poses the
challenge of spurring technological innovation and safeguarding
values like accuracy and transparency in our electoral system. Let
us not turn our backs on it simply out of speculation and fear. Let us
give it a chance.
BRION,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Automated Election System; Judicial Review; The
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) reigns supreme in
determining how automation shall be phased in, how it shall affect

all aspects of our electoral exercise, and how it shall operate,

subject only to our intervention when our own constitutional duty
calls for enforcement.The automation question now before us,
like any other COMELEC administration and enforcement matter, is
a concern that COMELEC is entitled by law to handle on its own
without any interference from any outside agency, not even from
this Court, except pursuant to the allocation of powers that the
Constitution has mandated. In other words, the COMELEC reigns
supreme in determining how automation shall be phased in, how it
shall affect all aspects of our electoral exercise, and how it shall
operate, subject only to our intervention when our own
constitutional duty calls for enforcement. Specifically, we cannot
close our eyes when a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction has been committed, such as when the
COMELEC acts outside the contemplation of the Constitution and of
the law. Consistent with this view, I do not aim to question the
bidding the COMELEC undertook and its compliance with our
automation lawsRepublic Act (RA) Nos. 8436 and 9369in the
absence of any violation sufficiently gross to amount to the
proscribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. My focus, rather, is on the gut issues that really strike
at the heart of the right of suffrage and place the integrity of our
electoral process at risk.
Same; Same; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC), contrary to
the Constitution and the law, now shares automation
responsibilities with SMARTMATIC-TIM under their Automation
Contract.Despite the above conclusion, I still take exception to
the present implementation of election automation, as it involves
another more fundamental violation: the COMELEC, contrary to the
Constitution and the law, now shares automation responsibilities
with SMARTMATIC-TIM under their Automation Contract. In my view,
this is a violation that transgresses the Constitution, at the same
time that it is an action plainly outside the contemplation of the
law. Based on this characterization, this sharing of responsibility
over automation is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC that calls for the active intervention of this Court,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I take this view in light of Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution that commands the COMELEC to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election and thereby gives the COMELEC sole authority to
undertake enforcement and administrative actions in the conduct
of elections.
Same; Same; Under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 8436, the

mandate of the law is clearthe operative word used is

exclusive, which means that the automation responsibility given
to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot be shared with
any other entity.Under Section 26, the mandate of the law is clear
the operative word used is exclusive,which means that the
automation responsibility given to the COMELEC cannot be shared
with any other entity. Specifically, it means that the COMELEC,
through its ITD, shall have full and exclusive control over the entire
process of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and
canvassing of votes, including their performance and completion
and the final results. No special interpretative skill is necessary to
appreciate the meaning of exclusive. Supervision and control,
on the other hand, are terms that have practically attained
technical legal meaning from jurisprudence. Control as the
established cases signify means to exercise restraining or directing
influence over; to dominate, regulate; hence, to hold from action; to
curb; to subject; also to overpower. In any interpretation of Section
26, these are key terms and the standards that should predominate
in determining whether this Section has been complied with. The
ponencia, unfortunately does not appear to have considered this
Section at all.
Same; Same; What exists is not the exclusive supervision and
control of the automation process by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), but a shared responsibility between the contracting
parties to achieve this end.Based on all these considerations
drawn from the RFP and the Automation Contract, I cannot escape
the conclusion that what exists is not the exclusive supervision and
control of the automation process by the COMLEC, but a shared
responsibility between the contracting parties to achieve this end.
To point out the obvious, SMARTMATIC-TIM takes care of project
management, with the PMO relegated to the blurry role of
overseeing the Projects execution and implementation and with
no other clearly defined role in the automation project. ITD does not
even exist insofar as the project documents are concerned. Thus,
while the COMELEC retains its traditional role with respect to the
running of the election itself, a new election process is in place that
is substantially affected by automation. Stated otherwise, while the
COMELEC truly controls the BEI, the BOC, and the administrative
and adjudicative staff attending to the election process, the voters
themselves, and even the BEI and the BOC, must yield to the
process that automation calls for, which process is essentially
technical and is in the hands of SMARTMATIC-TIM, the provider who
wholly supplies the hardware and the software that controls the
voting, counting, canvassing, consolidation and transmission of
results, and who expressly has control and custody over the

election equipment to be used in the voting, with no reserve power

whatsoever on the part of the COMELEC in this regard. Not to be
forgotten is that SMARTMATIC-TIM also provides the necessary
services that run across voting, counting, canvassing, consolidation
and transmission activities. These arrangements, viewed from all
sides, does not indicate an exclusive supervision and control
situation over the automation process. To be exact, they involve
shared responsibilities that, however practical they may be from
the business and technical perspectives, are arrangements that
Philippine law does not allow.
Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); By placing
solely in the hands of SMARTMATIC-TIM the discretion to assign the
digital signatures, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has
effectively surrendered control of the May 10, 2010 elections and
violated its constitutional mandate to administer the conduct of
elections in the country.The digital signatures are crucial since
Section 22 of the RA No. 8436 as amended provides that the
election returns transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall
be considered as official election results and shall be used as the
basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a
candidate. Thus, by placing solely in the hands of SMARTMATIC-TIM
the discretion to assign the digital signatures, the COMELEC has
effectively surrendered control of the May 10, 2010 elections and
violated its constitutional mandate to administer the conduct of
elections in the country. Significantly, even the counsel for
SMARTMATIC-TIM admitted during the oral arguments that the
COMELEC should not have given to SMARTMATIC-TIM the
possession and control of the public and private keys.
Same; Same; To be wary of giving control of the critical elements of
our election process to an entity other than the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) cannot and should not be regarded as an
unhealthy skepticism that we should shy away fromwariness
should be our mindset, particularly on legal matters bearing on
elections and their automation, given the constitutional and legal
guidelines that foist on us the standard of a fair, clean, honest and
credible election.Section 26 clearly provides that the ITD shall
have exclusive supervision and control of the AES and shall carry
out the full administration and implementation of the system. To
fully implement this statutory requirement, the COMELEC should
have stipulated in the automation contract that it is the ITD, and
not SMARTMATIC-TIM, that should be made in charge of the
technical aspects of the automated May 10, 2010 elections,
consistent with its constitutional mandate as well as Section 26 of
RA No. 8436. Under the present contract, the exclusive supervision

and control over the AES that the law in its wisdom has put in
place, has simply been negated. To be wary of giving control of the
critical elements of our election process to an entity other than the
COMELEC cannot and should not be regarded as an unhealthy
skepticism that we should shy away from. On the contrary,
wariness should be our mindset, particularly on legal matters
bearing on elections and their automation, given the constitutional
and legal guidelines that foist on us the standard of a fair, clean,
honest and credible election. We must be wary, too, because we
are not wanting in warnings from those who have waded ahead of
us into the waters of automation.
10 February 2010
Arroyo v. DOJ and COMELEC G.R. No. 199082 18 September
2012
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Preliminary
Investigations; Under Section 2, Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants are
given continuing authority as deputies to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses under
election laws and to prosecute the same.The constitutional grant
of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code, to wit: Section 265. Prosecution.The Commission
shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms
of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the
Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from
his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of
the fiscal [public prosecutor], or with the Ministry [Department] of
Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. Under
the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter,
however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to
avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants
are given continuing authority as deputies to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses under
election laws and to prosecute the same. The complaints may be
filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them by the
petitioner or its duly authorized representatives.

Election Law; Preliminary Investigations; Preliminary investigation

is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or
investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasijudicial officer.It is settled that the conduct of preliminary
investigation is, like court proceedings, subject to the requirements
of both substantive and procedural due process. Preliminary
investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the
prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions,
acts as a quasi-judicial officer. The authority of a prosecutor or
investigating officer duly empowered to preside over or to conduct
a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge
or even an RTC Judge.
Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); The Constitution
envisions a truly independent Comelec committed to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections and to serve as
the guardian of the peoples sacred right of suffragethe
citizenrys vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of
government and in achieving and promoting political stability.
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes
all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of
the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. The Constitution envisions a truly independent Comelec
committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections and to serve as the guardian of the peoples sacred right
of suffragethe citizenrys vital weapon in effecting a peaceful
change of government and in achieving and promoting political
stability.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigations; The Department of Justice
(DOJ) now conducts preliminary investigation of election offenses
concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies.
The grant of exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of
election offenses to the Comelec was not by virtue of the
Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Code which was
eventually amended by Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now
conducts preliminary investigation of election offenses concurrently
with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies. If the
prosecutors had been allowed to conduct preliminary investigation
and file the necessary information by virtue only of a delegated
authority, they now have better grounds to perform such function
by virtue of the statutory grant of authority. If deputation was
justified because of lack of funds and legal officers to ensure
prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses,

the same justification should be cited to justify the grant to the

other prosecuting arms of the government of such concurrent
jurisdiction.
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Preliminary
Investigations; It is well-settled that the absence [or irregularity] of
preliminary investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction
over the case; Neither is it a ground to quash the information or
nullify the order of arrest issued against the accused or justify the
release of the accused from detention.It is well-settled that the
absence [or irregularity] of preliminary investigation does not affect
the courts jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity
of the criminal information or render it defective. Dismissal is not
the remedy. Neither is it a ground to quash the information or
nullify the order of arrest issued against the accused or justify the
release of the accused from detention. The proper course of action
that should be taken is to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon
such information and to remand the case for the conduct of
preliminary investigation.
CARPIO,J., Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
BRION,J., Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); View that
at present, the 1987 Constitution (as has been the case since the
amendment of the 1935 Constitution) now provides that the
COMELEC, like all other Constitutional Commissions, shall be
independent.At present, the 1987 Constitution (as has been the
case since the amendment of the 1935 Constitution) now provides
that the COMELEC, like all other Constitutional Commissions, shall
be independent. It provides that: Section 1. The Constitutional
Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit. [emphasis ours]
Same; Same; Congress; View that Congress, a co-equal branch of
government, had no power to review the rules promulgated by the
COMELEC for the implementation of Republic Act (RA) No. 9189 or
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.The Court ruled that
Congress, a co-equal branch of government, had no power to
review the rules promulgated by the COMELEC for the
implementation of Republic Act (RA) No. 9189 or The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, since it trample[s] upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Thus,
the Court invalidated Section 25(2) of RA No. 9189.

the government.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigations; 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure; View that under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or
their respective assistants were given continuing authority, as
deputies of the COMELEC, to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under election laws that
may be filed directly with them, or that may be indorsed to them
by the COMELEC or its duly authorized representatives and to
prosecute the same.As outlined in that case, Section 265 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881) of the Omnibus Election Code granted
the COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigations and prosecute election offenses. Looking then at the
practical limitations arising from such broad grant of power,
Congress also empowered the COMELEC to avail of the assistance
of the prosecuting arms of the government. Under the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Chief State Prosecutor, all
Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants were
given continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC, to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses
under election laws that may be filed directly with them, or that
may be indorsed to them by the COMELEC or its duly authorized
representatives and to prosecute the same.
Same; Same; Same; View that the COMELEC must be given
considerable latitude in the fulfillment of its duty of ensuring the
prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses.I agree
with the majority that the COMELEC must be given considerable
latitude in the fulfillment of its duty of ensuring the prompt
investigation and prosecution of election offenses. I duly
acknowledge that the COMELEC exercises considerable latitude and
the widest discretion in adopting its chosen means and methods of
discharging its tasks, particularly its broad power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
Same; Same; Same; View that to discharge its duty effectively, the
Constitution endowed the COMELEC with special features which
elevate it above other investigative and prosecutorial agencies of
the government.Section 2, Article IX (C) of the Constitution
specifically vests in the COMELEC the plenary power to investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses and malpractices. To discharge its duty effectively, the
Constitution endowed the COMELEC with special features which
elevate it above other investigative and prosecutorial agencies of

Same; Same; Same; View that under the present legal framework,
the COMELEC and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and its
prosecuting arms, have equal jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute election offenses.With respect to the
power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute
election offenses, Congress has mandated under Section 42 of RA
No. 9369 that the COMELEC shall have the power concurrent with
the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute these offenses.
Concurrent jurisdiction has been defined as equal jurisdiction to
deal with the same subject matter. Thus, under the present legal
framework, the COMELEC and the DOJ, and its prosecuting arms,
have equal jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute election offenses. Effectively, this means that the DOJ
and its prosecuting arms can already conduct preliminary
investigations and prosecute election offenses not merely as
deputies, but independently of the COMELEC.
Same; Same; Same; View that while the COMELEC and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) have equal jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute election offenses (subject to the rule that the body
or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others), the COMELEC
whenever it directly acts in the fact-finding and preliminary
investigation of elections offencescan still work with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and seek its assistance without
violating its constitutionally guaranteed independence, but it can
only do so as the principal in a principal-delegate relationship with
the DOJ where the latter acts as the delegate.The only
arrangement constitutionally possible, given the independence of
the COMELEC and despite Section 42 of RA 9369, is for the DOJ to
be a mere deputy or delegate of the COMELEC and not a co-equal
partner in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses
WHENEVER THE COMELEC ITSELF DIRECTLY ACTS. While the
COMELEC and the DOJ have equal jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute election offenses (subject to the rule that the body or
agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others), the COMELEC
whenever it directly acts in the fact-finding and preliminary
investigation of elections offencescan still work with the DOJ and
seek its assistance without violating its constitutionally guaranteed
independence, but it can only do so as the principal in a principaldelegate relationship with the DOJ where the latter acts as the

delegate.
MENDOZA,J., Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Preliminary Investigations; Commission on Elections
(COMELEC); View that the arraignment of petitioner Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (GMA), on her very own motion, is tantamount to
her submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.I am in
agreement with the ponencia that the arraignment of petitioner
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA), on her very own motion, is
tantamount to her submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The entry of her plea of not guilty to the crime of electoral
sabotage can only be deemed as a waiver of her right to question
the alleged irregularities committed during the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary
Investigation Committee, headed by the Prosecutor General (Joint
Committee) and/or Comelec. Consequently, her own actions
rendered the issues on probable cause and on the validity of the
preliminary investigation as moot and academic.
Same; Same; View that the right to a preliminary investigation is
not a mere formal or technical right but a substantive one, forming
part of due process in criminal justice.Although a preliminary
investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function
of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The right to a preliminary
investigation is not a mere formal or technical right but a
substantive one, forming part of due process in criminal justice. The
prosecutor conducting the same investigates or inquires into the
facts concerning the commission of a crime to determine whether
or not an Information should be filed against a respondent. A
preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic appraisal of the
merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must
be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not
be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. A preliminary
investigation has been called a judicial inquiry; it is a judicial
proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding when there is an
opportunity to be heard and for the production of, and weighing of,
evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.
Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; View that true, under
Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision is
generally proscribed. In election offenses cases, however, such
motions are allowed.Due process demands that the Comelec
should have given the petitioner the opportunity to submit her
counter-affidavit. And if its resolution would be adverse, as was the

case, she should have been given time to file a motion for
reconsideration before the Comelec. True, under Rule 13 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of an en
banc ruling, resolution, order or decision is generally proscribed. In
election offenses cases, however, such motions are allowed.
23 July 2013
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Under the
present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the
government, such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), now exercise
concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses.This is not the first time that the Court is
confronted with the issue of whether the Comelec has the exclusive
power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws. In Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections, 595
SCRA 477 (2009), the constitutionality of Section 43 of RA 9369 had
already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the
Court. While recognizing the Comelecs exclusive power to
investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881
or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This
exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be
amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present
law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government,
such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
Same; The Comelec Law Department and the Office of the Chief
State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) were tasked to
jointly supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the
Comelec-DOJ Task Force.It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution
No. 3467 was issued when Section 265 of the Omnibus Election
Code was still effective, while Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as
Comelec Resolution Nos. 8733 and 9057 mentioned in the assailed
decision but missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued during
the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and
other prosecuting arms of the government the concurrent
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses. This
amendment paved the way for the discrepancy. In Comelec
Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the continuing
deputation of prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was
tasked to supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of
the task force pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus Election
Code. However, with the amendment, the Comelec likewise

changed the tenor of the later resolutions to reflect the new

mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the
government now exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the
Comelec Law Department and the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the
investigatory and prosecutory functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task
Force. Considering, therefore, that the later resolutions, including
Joint Order No. 001-2011, were issued pursuant to Section 43 of RA
9369 amending Section 265 of BP 881 which was declared
constitutional in Banat, there is no reason for us to declare
otherwise. To maintain the previous role of other prosecuting arms
of the government as mere deputies despite the amendment would
mean challenging Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which has already
been settled in Banat. To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee
is not repugnant to the concept of concurrent jurisdiction
authorized by the amendatory law.
Same; Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the
Comelec and the Department of Justice (DOJ) nevertheless included
a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of
the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses
shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.Notwithstanding the grant of
concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless
included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the
resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in
accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. With more
reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint
Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs independence
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; View that what exists under Joint Order No. 001-2011
is not a scheme whereby the COMELEC exercises its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses
independently of other branches of government; what it provides is
a shared responsibility between the COMELEC and the Executive
Branch through the Department of Justice (DOJ).I reiterate, if only
for emphasis, that what exists under Joint Order No. 001-2011 is
not a scheme whereby the COMELEC exercises its power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses
independently of other branches of government; what it provides is
a shared responsibility between the COMELEC and the Executive
Branch through the DOJ. The result cannot but be an arrangement

that the Constitution and the law cannot allow, however practical
from the standpoint of efficiency it might be. To stress the obvious,
the joint or shared arrangement directly goes against the rationale
that justifies the grant of independence to the COMELEC to
insulate it, particularly its role in the countrys electoral exercise,
from political pressures and partisan politics.
Same; View that this concurrent jurisdiction between the COMELEC
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses is circumscribed by the
Constitutional
provisions
guaranteeing
the
COMELECs
independence as a Constitutional Commission.I take exception to
the ponencias conclusion that the creation of the Joint DOJCOMELEC Committee is not repugnant to the concurrent jurisdiction
conferred to the COMELEC and other prosecutorial agencies of
government (such as the DOJ) under Section 42 of Republic Act No.
9369. I reiterate the view that this concurrent jurisdiction between
the COMELEC and the DOJ in the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses is circumscribed by the Constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the COMELECs independence as a Constitutional
Commission. To my mind, the only arrangement that can pass
constitutional muster is the practice of delegation of authority by
the COMELEC, otherwise known as deputation, which has long been
upheld by the Court.
Same; View that in order for the COMELECs action in the present
case to be constitutionally valid, it must still be shown that the
COMELECs determination of probable cause was free from any
attendant participation by the Executive.I also cannot accept the
ponencias strained reasoning that the creation of the Joint
Committee does not undermine the independence of the COMELEC
because the determination of probable cause ultimately pertains to
the COMELEC under Section 2 of Joint Order No. 001-2011. In my
view, the constitutionally objectionable arrangement of a shared
responsibility between the COMELEC and the DOJ is not saved by
the existence of Section 2 of Joint Order No. 001-2011. In order for
the COMELECs action in the present case to be constitutionally
valid, it must still be shown that the COMELECs determination of
probable cause was free from any attendant participation by the
Executive.
Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); View that the
COMELEC, not the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Committee, has the primary,
if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of
election cases, and the creation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC
Committee constitutes an unconstitutional abdication by the

COMELEC of its constitutionally-granted independence.The

COMELEC, not the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Committee, has the primary,
if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of
election cases, and the creation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC
Committee constitutes an unconstitutional abdication by the
COMELEC of its constitutionally-granted independence. In arriving
at this Dissent, I take into account, together with my above
conclusion, the extent of injury that can be caused to our electoral
system by opening the COMELEC to Executive intrusion, as well as
the haste the petitioners pointed out.

Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC G.R. No. 207264 25 June 2013

Election Law; House of Representative; House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Jurisdiction; As held in Marcos v.
COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who
is not a member of the House of Representatives.As held in
Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the HRET does not have
jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of
Representatives, to wit: As to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunals supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRETs jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
Same; Same; To be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites:(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office.It is then clear that to be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2)
a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Indeed, in some cases,
this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation
has been made, COMELECs jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its
jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal
pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate
who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also

assumed office.
Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Jurisdiction;
The petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed
office; The term of office of a Member of the House of
Representatives begins only at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election. Thus, until such time, the
Commission on Elections retains jurisdiction.Here, the petitioner
cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives
because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what
has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House
of Representatives begins only at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election. Thus, until such time, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction. In her attempt to comply with the second
requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken
before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is
not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of
Representatives. Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the
House of Representatives provides: Section 6. Oath or Affirmation
of Members.Members shall take their oath or affirmation either
collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it
must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made
the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was
made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains
unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied
with. More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this
controversy that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the
issue of petitioners lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its
Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was,
before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioners
qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept
the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of
jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after
the COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which
proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render
nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a
decision of the COMELEC First Division.
Same; COMELEC Rules of Procedure; Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in order
to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and

disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the

Commission.It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not
bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
Commission. In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition
to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was
properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times
more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings.In administrative proceedings, procedural due process
only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to be
heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC, 688 SCRA 552
(2013): The petitioners should be reminded that due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more
creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.
In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.
BRION,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
Jurisdiction; View that the proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before
it at the time of the proclamation and the party questioning the
qualifications of the winning candidate should now present his or
her case in a proper proceeding (i.e. quo warranto) before the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal who, by constitutional
mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving the election, returns and qualification of members of the
House of Representatives.I submit on this point that the
proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that
triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating
to the winning candidates election, return and qualifications. In
other words, the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the

COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the

time of the proclamation and the party questioning the
qualifications of the winning candidate should now present his or
her case in a proper proceeding (i.e. quo warranto) before the HRET
who, by constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases involving the election, returns and qualification of
members of the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; View that as far as the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is concerned, the
proclamation of the winner in the congressional elections serves as
the reckoning point as well as the trigger that brings any contests
relating to his or her election, return and qualifications within its
sole and exclusive jurisdiction.It appears clear that as far as the
HRET is concerned, the proclamation of the winner in the
congressional elections serves as the reckoning point as well as the
trigger that brings any contests relating to his or her election,
return and qualifications within its sole and exclusive jurisdiction. In
the context of the present case, by holding that the COMELEC
retained jurisdiction (because Reyes, although a proclaimed winner,
has not yet assumed office), the majority effectively emasculates
the HRET of its jurisdiction as it allows the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto only after the assumption to
office by the candidate (i.e., on June 30 in the usual case). To
illustrate using the dates of the present case, any election protest
or a petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or more than
fifteen (15) days from Reyes proclamation on May 18, 2013, shall
certainly be dismissed outright by the HRET for having been filed
out of time under the HRET rules.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that as a
general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELECs
appreciation and evaluation of evidence.As a general rule, the
Court does not ordinarily review the COMELECs appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions to this rule have been
established and consistently recognized, among others, when the
COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so grossly
unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these
instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty
to intervene and correct the COMELECs error.
Election Law; Administrative Cases; Evidence; Substantial
Evidence; View that in administrative cases, the quantum of proof
required is substantial evidence.It is also basic in the law of
evidence that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is

substantial evidence. In the present case, the majority obviously

believed, together with the COMELEC, that Tan did overcome this
burden and that his documentary evidence he submitted
established that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen. A major clash
between the parties exists, of course, on this point as Reyes, as
expressed in her petition, is of the completely opposite view. Even a
quick look at Tans evidence, however, indicates that Reyes view is
not without its merits and should not simply be dismissively set
aside.
22 October 2013
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); In Special
Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the
Commission En Banc shall become final and executory after five (5)
days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme
Court.The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the
impediment to proclamation may be removed. Rule 18, Section 13
(b) provides: (b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or
resolution of the Commission En Banc shall become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court. Within that five (5) days,
petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a
restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En
Banc cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5)
days the Supreme Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow,
the proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen. Petitioner did
not move to have it happen. It is error to argue that the five days
should pass before the petitioner is barred from being proclaimed.
Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as respondent. Her certificate of
candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be
proclaimed because there was a final finding against her by the
COMELEC. She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court
to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision
adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court
intervention became even more imperative. She would have to
base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy
and that a restraining order, which would allow her proclamation,
will have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated
possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there
was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to
her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to take
the law into her hands and secure a proclamation in complete
disregard of the COMELEC En Banc decision that was final on 14

May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.

Same; Electoral Tribunals; House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET); That the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives is a written constitutional provision.Petitioner is
in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has
exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the
House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional
provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is
NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never
ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for
such membership. Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioners
certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable
determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly
lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the
COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14
May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide
the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC
regarding petitioners ineligibility as a candidate for Representative
of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioners
proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order was
obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days
from 14 May 2013.
Same; Certificates of Candidacy; Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy; The special action before the COMELEC which was a
Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was a summary
proceeding or one heard summarily.The special action before
the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard
summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the
COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which
states that the Commission may designate any of its officials who
are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive
evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when
the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral
testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be required to
submit their position paper together with affidavits, counteraffidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x and that [t]his
provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and
reception of evidence are delegated by the Commission or the
Division to any of its officials x x x.

Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; Commission on Elections

(COMELEC); The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioners
certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation,
which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be
legally proclaimed.It may need pointing out that there is no
conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the
petitioners being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned.
The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioners certificate of
candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the
pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed.
The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation
of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on
an original action before the Court grounded on more than mere
error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of
discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is no
longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction over
the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is
original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered
by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been
terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary,
proceeding.The HRETs constitutional authority opens, over the
qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and
legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards
such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of
the Member of the House of Representatives is original and
exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the
proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been
terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary,
proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the
House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness,
that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the
House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the
HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is
the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of
cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner
is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux
of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in
representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision
on the qualifications of the Member.
Sereno, CJ., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Election Law; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; View that the 1987

Constitution transferred the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives
to be the sole judge[s] of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, but the
constitutional language has not changed.The 1987 Constitution
transferred the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to the electoral
tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives to be the
sole judge[s] of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members, but the constitutional
language has not changed. The jurisdiction granted was similar to
that of the COMELEC under the 1973 Constitution, which the Court
interpreted to mean full authority to hear and decide these cases
from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including
those arising before the proclamation of the winners. When the
same language was adopted in the 1987 Constitution, it must be
interpreted in the same way. Thus, petitions to deny due course or
to cancel the certificate of candidacy of those aspiring to be
members of the Senate or the House of Representatives under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code should be under the
jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals and not of the COMELEC.
Same; Due Process; View that the right of petitioner to due process
was never violated, as she was given every opportunity to present
her side during the reception of evidence at the Division level.The
right of petitioner to due process was never violated, as she was
given every opportunity to present her side during the reception of
evidence at the Division level. She was furnished a copy of the
Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and
Amended List of Exhibits. She had all the right to interpose her
objections to the documentary evidence offered against her, but
she failed to exercise that right. The COMELEC First Division,
therefore, did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it
admitted in evidence the documents offered, even if the printed
Internet article showing that petitioner had used a U.S. passport
might have been hearsay, and even if the copy of the Bureau of
Immigration Certification was merely a photocopy and not even a
certified true copy of the original.
Same; View that Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of
Court. The third paragraph of Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence provides that an offer of evidence in writing
shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.Section 1, Rule
41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the suppletory

application of the Rules of Court. The third paragraph of Section 36,

Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an offer of
evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after
notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
Petitioner failed to raise any objection to the offer of evidence on
time. It is now too late for her to question its admissibility. The rule
is that evidence not objected to may be deemed admitted and
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. As a
corollary point, the COMELEC En Banc committed no grave abuse of
discretion when it did not set petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration for hearing. Setting a case for hearing is
discretionary on its part. In fact, in summary proceedings like the
special action of filing a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy, oral testimony is dispensed with and,
instead, parties are required to submit their position paper together
with affidavits, counter affidavits and other pieces of documentary
evidence.
Same; The COMELEC was correct in ruling that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy and that
without complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, she was not
qualified to run for public office.This submission of the Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship and the Identification Certificate
issued by the Bureau of Immigration confirms the acquisition of
foreign citizenship by petitioner and the applicability of R.A. 9225 to
her. Thus, the COMELEC was correct in ruling that she was no
longer a Filipino citizen when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy
and that without complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, she
was not qualified to run for public office. Since these two
documents were not submitted to the COMELEC, there can be no
grave abuse of discretion either on the part of the COMELEC First
Division when it cancelled her Certificate of Candidacy, or on the
part of the COMELEC En Banc when it affirmed the cancellation.
Same; View that the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), a
subordinate body under the direct control and supervision of the
COMELEC, cannot simply disregard a COMELEC En Banc
Resolutionbrought before its attention and hastily proceed with the
proclamation by reasoning that it has not officially received the
resolution or order.On 16 May 2013, petitioner had already
received the judgment cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy. As
mentioned, two days thereafter, the PBOC still proclaimed her as
the winner. Obviously, the proclamation took place notwithstanding
that petitioner herself already knew of the COMELEC En Banc
Resolution. It must also be pointed out that even the PBOC already
knew of the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of

petitioner when it proclaimed her. The COMELEC En Banc

Resolution dated 9 July 2013 and submitted to this Court through
the Manifestation of private respondent, quoted the averments in
the Verified Petition of petitioner therein as follows: xxx While the
proceedings of the PBOC is suspended or in recess, the process
server of this Honorable Commission, who identified himself as
PEDRO P. STA. ROSA II (Sta. Rosa, for brevity), arrived at the
session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque where
the provincial canvassing is being held. xxx The process server,
Sta. Rosa, was in possession of certified true copies of the
Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections En Banc
on 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) entitled Joseph Socorro B.
Tan vs. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes and an Order dated 15 May
2013 to deliver the same to the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Marinduque. The said Order was signed by no less than the
Chairman of the Commission on Elections, the Honorable Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. xxx Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II immediately
approached Atty. Edwin Villa, the Provincial Election Supervisor
(PES) of Marinduque, upon his arrival to serve a copy of the
aforementioned Resolution dated 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-05 3
(DC). Despite his proper identification that he is a process server
from the COMELEC Main Office, the PES totally ignored Process
Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II. xxx Interestingly, the PES likewise refused
to receive the copy of the Commission on Elections En Banc
Resolution dated 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) despite
several attempts to do so. xxx Instead, the PES immediately
declared the resumption of the proceedings of the PBOC and
instructed the Board Secretary to immediately read its Order
proclaiming Regina Ongsiako Reyes as winner for the position of
Congressman for the Lone District of Marinduque. This narration of
the events shows that the proclamation was in contravention of a
COMELEC En Banc Resolution cancelling the candidates Certificate
of Candidacy. The PBOC, a subordinate body under the direct
control and supervision of the COMELEC, cannot simply disregard a
COMELEC En Banc Resolution brought before its attention and
hastily proceed with the proclamation by reasoning that it has not
officially received the resolution or order.
Same; View that the law provides for the suspension of a
proclamation whenever there are pending disqualification cases or
petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy,
and the evidence of guilt is strong.The law provides for the
suspension of a proclamation whenever there are pending
disqualification cases or petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, and the evidence of guilt is strong. This
provision points to the legislative intent to be cautious in

proceeding with the proclamation of candidates against whom

pending disqualification cases or petitions for cancellation of
certificate of candidacy are filed. When the petition for cancellation
of the certificate of candidacy is no longer pending as when the
COMELEC En Banc had, in fact, affirmed the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy, the need for the suspension of the
proclamation becomes more apparent.
Carpio, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
Jurisdiction; View that the Supreme Court has consistently ruled
that proclamation alone of a winning congressional candidate
following the elections divests COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative in favor of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).We have consistently ruled that
proclamation alone of a winning congressional candidate following
the elections divests COMELEC of its jurisdiction over disputes
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. Proclamation alone
of a winning congressional candidate is sufficient, and is the only
essential act to vest jurisdiction upon the HRET. Taking of the oath
and assumption of office are merely descriptive of what necessarily
comes after proclamation. In Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 674 SCRA 530
(2012), the most recent decision on the matter, the ponente Justice
Roberto A. Abad wrote: The Court has already settled the question
of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the
HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed Representatives in favor of the HRET.
Same; Same; Same; View that upon proclamation, jurisdiction over
any election contest against the proclaimed candidate is vested in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) by
operation of the Constitution.Upon proclamation, jurisdiction over
any election contest against the proclaimed candidate is vested in
the HRET by operation of the Constitution. Any challenge to the
validity of the proclamation falls under the HRETs jurisdiction as
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of House Members. To hold that the HRET does not
have jurisdiction over a challenge to the validity of a proclamation
is to hold that while jurisdiction vests in the HRET upon
proclamation, the HRET loses such jurisdiction if a challenge is filed
assailing the validity of the proclamation. If so, a party then

exercises the power to terminate HRETs jurisdiction that is vested

by the Constitution. This is an absurdity. It may also happen that
one losing candidate may assail the validity of the proclamation
before the Supreme Court while another losing candidate will file an
election protest before the HRET within 15 days from the
proclamation. In such a situation, there will be a direct clash of
jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the HRET. The case in
the Supreme Court can remain pending even after the House
Members have assumed their office, making the anomaly even
more absurd.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Courts ruling today is
a double flip-flop: (1) it reverses the well-settled doctrine that upon
proclamation of a winning congressional candidate, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) acquires sole jurisdiction
over any contest relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of House Members; and (2) it also reverses the wellsettled doctrine that any question on the validity of such
proclamation falls under the sole jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).The Courts ruling
today is a double flip-flop: (1) it reverses the well-settled doctrine
that upon proclamation of a winning congressional candidate, the
HRET acquires sole jurisdiction over any contest relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of House Members; and (2) it
also reverses the well-settled doctrine that any question on the
validity of such proclamation falls under the sole jurisdiction of the
HRET.
Brion, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Evidence; Blog Article; Due Process; View that even
without the use of technical rules of evidence, common sense and
the minimum sense of fairness, to my mind, dictate that a blog
article published online or unidentified documents cannot simply
be taken to be evidence of the truth of what they say, nor can
photocopies of documents not shown to be genuine can be taken
as proof of the truth on their faces.Even without the use of
technical rules of evidence, common sense and the minimum sense
of fairness, to my mind, dictate that a blog article published online
or unidentified documents cannot simply be taken to be evidence
of the truth of what they say, nor can photocopies of documents
not shown to be genuine can be taken as proof of the truth on
their faces. By accepting these materials as statements of the
truth, the COMELEC clearly violated Reyes right to both
procedural and substantive due process.

Same; Disqualification of Candidates; Renunciation of Citizenship;

View that as applied to Reyes, her possession and use of a U.S.
passport, by themselves, did not signify that she is no longer a
natural born Filipino citizen or that she had renounced her
Philippine citizenship.An admission of dual citizenship, without
more, is not a sufficient basis for a CoC cancellation, as this Court
has already held in its settled rulings. While Reyes might have
admitted in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
that she had been married to an American citizen, the admission
did not mean that she had already lost her Philippine citizenship in
the absence of any showing that, by her act or omission, she is
deemed under the law to have renounced it. Section 4, Article 4 of
the Constitution is very clear on this point Citizens of the
Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by
their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced it. As applied to Reyes, her possession and use of a
U.S. passport, by themselves, did not signify that she is no longer a
natural born Filipino citizen or that she had renounced her
Philippine citizenship.
Same; Due Process; View that where the denial of the fundamental
right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
of that right should be declared void for lack of jurisdiction.I
submit that the violation of Reyes right to due process raises a
serious jurisdictional issue that cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will, and cannot be saved by the claim that she had
been accorded her hearing rights. The latter relates purely to the
actual hearing process and is rendered meaningless where there is
failure at the more substantive deliberation stage. Where the denial
of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right should be declared void for lack
of jurisdiction. The rule is equally true for quasi-judicial bodies
(such as the COMELEC), for the constitutional guarantee that no
man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial
or administrative) where the violation occurs. Consequently, the
assailed March 27, 2013 and May 14, 2013 COMELEC resolutions
cancelling Reyes CoC should be declared void for having been
rendered in violation of her right to due process.
Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Jurisdiction; PreProclamation Controversies; View that by law, it is the COMELEC
that has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over preproclamation
controversies,
including
the
annulment
of
proclamations for positions other than the President, the Vice
President, and the Members of the two Houses of Congress which

all have their specific constitutional rules on the resolution of their

elections, returns and qualifications.I submit that the Court
cannot rule on the issue of the validity or invalidity of Reyes
proclamation as this is NOT an issue raised in the present petition
before this Court, nor an issue in the COMELEC proceedings that is
now under review. Proclamation is a separate COMELEC action that
came after and separately from the CoC cancellation ruling. As a
cautionary note, any ruling by the Court on the validity or invalidity
of Reyes proclamation is beyond the Courts jurisdiction at the
present time since the Court does not have original jurisdiction over
annulment of proclamations and no petition is before this Court
seeking to impugn or sustain Reyes proclamation. By law, it is the
COMELEC that has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over preproclamation
controversies,
including
the
annulment
of
proclamations for positions other than the President, the Vice
President, and the Members of the two Houses of Congress which
all have their specific constitutional rules on the resolution of their
elections, returns and qualifications.
Same; Same; Same; Same; House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunals (HRET); View that prevailing jurisprudence dictates that
upon proclamation of the winning candidate and despite the
allegation of the invalidity of the proclamation, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) acquires jurisdiction to
hear the election contest involving the election, returns and
qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives.With
the fact of Reyes proclamation established or undisputed, the
HRET alone to the exclusion of any other tribunal has
jurisdiction over Reyes qualifications, including the matter of the
validity or invalidity of her proclamation. Prevailing jurisprudence
dictates that upon proclamation of the winning candidate and
despite the allegation of the invalidity of the proclamation, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction to hear the election contest involving the
election, returns and qualifications of a member of the House of
Representatives.
Same; Due Process; View that elementary fairness demands that if
bad faith would be imputed, the ponencia should have viewed the
Marinduque election dispute in its entirety, starting from the fact
that Reyes handily won over her opponent and that the only claim
to negate this victory is the cancellation of her Certificate of
Candidacy through extremely questionable proceedings before the
COMELEC.Elementary fairness demands that if bad faith would be
imputed, the ponencia should have viewed the Marinduque election
dispute in its entirety, starting from the fact that Reyes handily won
over her opponent and that the only claim to negate this victory is

the cancellation of her CoC through extremely questionable

proceedings before the COMELEC. Notably, in these proceedings,
no less than COMELEC Chairman Brillantes spoke out to comment
on the grave abuse of discretion that transpired. If only the
ponencia had been mindful of this reality and the further reality
that the democratic choice of a whole province should be
respected, then perhaps it would not have carelessly imputed bad
faith on Reyes.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
Proclamation of Candidates; View that the proclamation of the
winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the jurisdiction
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) over
election contests relating to the winning candidates election,
returns, and qualifications.I reiterate my previous Dissenting
Opinion position that the proclamation of the winning candidate is
the operative fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over
election contests relating to the winning candidates election,
returns, and qualifications. In other words, the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation; the party
questioning the election, returns and the qualifications of the
winning candidate should now present his or her case in a proper
proceeding (i.e., an election protest or a quo warranto petition)
before the HRET that, by constitutional mandate, has the sole
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Same; 2011 House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
Rules; View that Rule 19 of the 2011 HRET Rules provides that the
period for the filing of the appropriate petition, as prescribed in
Rule 16 and Rule 17, is jurisdictional and cannot be extended.In
this regard, I take exception to Justice Abads view that the period
for the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto is
merely a deadline. The HRET Rules clearly state that filing periods
are jurisdictional. Rule 19 of the 2011 HRET Rules provides that the
period for the filing of the appropriate petition, as prescribed in
Rule 16 and Rule 17, is jurisdictional and cannot be extended.
Significantly, the filing of an election protest or petition for quo
warranto beyond the periods provided in Rule 16 and Rule 17 of the
HRET Rules is a ground for summary dismissal of the petition.
Abad, J., Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; View that when Congress
enacted the Omnibus Election Code, among its concerns were
persons who, although not qualified, seek public office and mar the

orderly conduct of the elections.When Congress enacted the

Omnibus Election Code, among its concerns were persons who,
although not qualified, seek public office and mar the orderly
conduct of the elections. To address this problem and for the public
good, Congress empowered the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to hear and decide petitions for the cancellation of their
certificates of candidacies on the ground of false material
representations that such certificates contain. Section 78 of the
Code reads: Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy.A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); View
that for the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to
have jurisdiction, the case must involve a member of the House.
The fact alone that one won the elections and has been proclaimed
does not, to be sure, make him a member of the House. To
become a member, the candidate to the position must win the
election, take an oath, and assume office when his term
begins.The HRETs jurisdiction covers only contests relating,
among other things, to the qualifications of their respective
Members. This power is inherent in all organizations as a means of
preserving their integrity. For the HRET to have jurisdiction, the
case must involve a member of the House. The fact alone that
one won the elections and has been proclaimed does not, to be
sure, make him a member of the House. To become a member,
the candidate to the position must win the election, take an oath,
and assume office when his term begins. The term of a member
of the House begins on the 30th of June next following his election.
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution, provides: Sec. 7. The
Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election. Clearly, a proclaimed winner will be a member of the
House only at noon of June 30 following his election and not earlier
when he was merely proclaimed as a winning candidate. The
reason is simple. There is no vacancy in that office before noon of
June 30. It is implicit that the term of the member whom he would
succeed would continue until noon of that day when the term of the
new member begins. Consequently, the proclaimed winner in the

elections remains an outsider before June 30. Only on June 30 will

his term begin. And only then will the COMELEC be divested of its
jurisdiction over any unresolved petition for the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; View that the supposed clash of
jurisdiction between the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Supreme Court is illusory and cannot
happen; The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the jurisdictional
boundaries of all constitutional bodies. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has never claimed this
role.Justice Carpio also claims that it could happen that a losing
candidate would assail the validity of the proclamation before the
Supreme Court while another losing candidate could file an election
protest before the HRET within 15 days of the proclamation. When
this happens, he says, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
the HRET would be in direct clash. But such supposed clash of
jurisdiction between the HRET and the Court is illusory and cannot
happen. Any clash of jurisdiction would essentially be between the
COMELEC, asserting its power to hear and decide petitions for
cancellation of certificates of candidacies of those who seek to be
elected to the House, and the HRET, asserting its power to decide
all contests relating to the qualifications of its members. The
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the jurisdictional boundaries of
all constitutional bodies. The HRET has never claimed this role.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); View
that in Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. De Venecia, 393 SCRA 639 (2002), the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) cannot assume
jurisdiction over a cancellation case involving members of the
House that had already been decided by the COMELEC and is under
review by the Supreme Court.The HRET cannot oust the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction under the Constitution. As the Court held in
Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. De Venecia, 393 SCRA 639 (2002), the HRET
cannot assume jurisdiction over a cancellation case involving
members of the House that had already been decided by the
COMELEC and is under review by the Supreme Court. It can be said
that it is for the above reasons that the Court heard and decided a
number of petitions filed by losing party-list organizations that
sought membership in the House. The Court did not inhibit itself
from deciding their cases even if the winners had already been
proclaimed since it was merely exercising its sole power to review
the decisions of the COMELEC in their cases. The Court took
cognizance of and decided their petitions in Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior
Citizens Party-List) vs. Commission on Elections, 701 SCRA 786

(2013).
Leonen, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals;
Jurisdiction; Proclamation of Candidates; View that the Supreme
Court should maintain its consistent doctrine that proclamation is
the operative act that removes jurisdiction from the Supreme Court
or the Commission on Elections and vests it on the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).In case of doubt, there
are fundamental reasons for this Court to be cautious in exercising
its jurisdiction to determine who the members are of the House of
Representatives. We should maintain our consistent doctrine that
proclamation is the operative act that removes jurisdiction from this
Court or the Commission on Elections and vests it on the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
Same; Electoral Tribunals; Proclamation of Candidates; View that
the earliest moment when there can be members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate is upon their proclamation as
winners of an election.The earliest moment when there can be
members of the House of Representatives or the Senate is upon
their proclamation as winners of an election. Necessarily, this
proclamation happens even before they can actually assume their
office as the elections happen in May, and their terms start at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
Contests of elected representatives or senators can happen as soon
as they are proclaimed. We should remain faithful to the intention
of the Constitution. It is at the time of their proclamation that we
should declare ourselves as without jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court has been asked
to resolve the issue when jurisdiction over election contests vests
on electoral tribunals.Time and again, this Court has been asked
to resolve the issue when jurisdiction over election contests vests
on electoral tribunals. In all these cases, this Court has consistently
held that it is the proclamation of a candidate in the congressional
elections that vests jurisdiction on the electoral tribunals of any
election contest, even though the candidate has not yet assumed
his or her office or the protest was filed before June 30. Once the
winning candidate vying for a position in Congress is proclaimed,
election contests must be lodged with the electoral tribunals and
not with the Commission on Elections. To repeat, certification by
the proper x x x board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a
member-elect to a seat in [Congress] and to render him eligible to
any office in the said body.

Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);

Jurisdiction; View that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the
House of Representatives, [the] COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)s
own jurisdiction begins.It is my opinion that this Court did not, in
any of the cases cited in the main ponencia, change the timehonored rule that where a candidate has already been proclaimed
winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner
is to file an electoral protest [or a petition for quo warranto] with
the [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal]. The main
ponencia cites several cases to support its ratio decidendi that
three requisites must concur before a winning candidate is consida member of the House of Representatives to vest jurisdiction on
the electoral tribunal. These cases appear to have originated from
Guerrero v. Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA 458 (2000). In
Guerrero, this Court held that x x x once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member
of the House of Representatives, [the] COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The case cited
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 400 (1995) and
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300
(1995) to support the statement.
Same; Electoral Tribunals; Proclamation of Candidates; View that
there is only one rule that the Supreme Court has consistently
applied: It is the proclamation of the winning candidate vying for a
seat in Congress that divests the Commission on Elections of
jurisdiction over any electoral protest.To reiterate, there is only
one rule that this Court has consistently applied: It is the
proclamation of the winning candidate vying for a seat in Congress
that divests the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction over any
electoral protest. This rule is consistent with the Constitution, the
2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the
Omnibus Election Code, and jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Same; View that an electoral protest that also assails
the validity of the proclamation will not cause the Commission on
Elections to regain jurisdiction over the protest.An electoral
protest that also assails the validity of the proclamation will not
cause the Commission on Elections to regain jurisdiction over the
protest. Issues regarding the validity or invalidity of the
proclamation may be threshed out before the electoral tribunals. As

held in Caruncho III v. Commission on Elections, 315 SCRA 693

(1999), the electoral tribunal has jurisdiction over a proclamation
controversy involving a member of the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; View that matters relating to factual findings on
election, returns, and qualifications must first be vetted in the
appropriate electoral tribunal before these are raised in the
Supreme Court.The second fundamental reason for us to exercise
caution in determining the composition of the House of
Representatives is that this is required for a better administration of
justice. Matters relating to factual findings on election, returns, and
qualifications must first be vetted in the appropriate electoral
tribunal before these are raised in the Supreme Court.
VOTERS
People v. Corral 62 Phil. 945 (1936)
ELECTION LAW; SUFFRAGE; DISQUALIFICATION.Under the law a
person is disqualified to vote who, since the 13th day of August,
1898, has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than
eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon. (Administrative Code, sec., 482.)
ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF.Whoever at any election votes knowing
that he is not entitled so to do incurs in criminal responsibility. (Sec.
2642 of the Administrative Code.)
ID.; ID.; STATUTORY NOT NATURAL RIGHT.The modern conception
of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. It is a
right created by law, not a natural right.
ID.; ID.; A PRIVILEGE.Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State
to such person or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the
public good. For reasons of public policy, certain classes of persons
are excluded from the franchise. Among the generally excluded
classes are minors, idiots, paupers, and convicts.
ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF STATE.The right of the State to deprive persons
of the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of
crime, is beyond question. The manifest purpose of such restriction
is to preserve the purity of elections. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)
ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM CONVICTIONThe
presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony
is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold a public

office. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)

ID.; ID.; DlSQUALIFICATION IS FOR PROTECTION, NOT PUNISHMENT.
The exclusion from the exercise of suffrage must be adjudged a
mere disqualification imposed for protection and not for
punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a
personal right. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)
ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION; DURATION.From the very nature of
the suffrage disqualificationwhich is imposed "for protection and

not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the

denial of a personal right"the deprivation of suffrage does not
lapse at the expiration of the sentence of the convict.
(Administrative Code, sec. 432.)
ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION.The disqualification for crime imposed
by law, having once attached and not having been subsequently
removed by a plenary pardon, is not wiped out only because the
ex-convict had once been allowed to vote.