BIBLIOTHECA BUDDHI GAl.axXx MADHYANTA-VIBHANGA DISCOURSE on DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN MIDDLE AND EXTREMES ascribed to BODHISATTVA MAITREYA and commented by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSCRIT by Th, STCHERBATSKY MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED. DELHIFira Induan Edition, 1992 MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PVT. LTD. Ac Rights Reserved ISBN 31 -203-0976-9 Also avaiable at MOTILAL BANARSIDASS 41 LA, Bungaiow Road. Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110007 120 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Madras 600 004 it St Mark's Road, Bangalore 560 001 Asroh Rajpath, Patna 800004 Chowk. Varanasi 221 001 PRINTED IN INDIA ‘BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH LAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS, 4-45 NARAINA RMDUSTRIAL AREA, PHASE 1, NEW DELHI 110028 AND PUBLISHED BY MAREMDRA FRAKASM 3AM POR MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PNT. LID., BUNGALOW OAD, JAWAHAR NAGAR, DELHI 110 007PREFACE The Vijianavada school of Buddhism represents the latest ad final form of that religion, the form in which, after having transformed India’s national philosophy and leaving its native Indian soil, it spread over almost the whole of the Asiatic continent up to Japan inthe East and Asia Minor! West where it amalgamated with gnosticism. The Madhyantavibhanga-sastra (or sutra) of Maitreya Asanga with its commentaries, the bhasya of Vasubandhy and the tika of Sthiramati, belong to the most fundamental work$ of this V.,aa- navada (alias Yogacara, Vijiapti-matrata or Cittamatrata) schoo! of Northern Buddhism, The till now unique MS of its sanserit original has had the ¢ fate of having been discovered twice. The story of this double discus or of the double text-edition which followed has been very pointedly narraced by the illustrious first discoverer, the much regretted late Prof. Syian Lévi. In his preface to the second (which really was the first) edition he inter alia writes: ,i! est ficheux que l'édition concurrente. publiée en 1932 ne fasse pas mention (de l'autre édition) dans sa préface’.' It seems that | have not been the only victim of this strange reticence. It is only much later that owing to the kind attention of Prof. L. de La Vallée Poussin and Pref. E, Lamotte | became aware of the second edition, As soon as Prof. G, Tucci's edition® reached me | started on the work of translating this important text for the Bibliotheca Buddhica series whose publication was going to be resumed. Unfortunately | had no inkling of the existence of the other edition, My pupil, the late Dr E. Obermiller published areview of Prof, G, Tucci and V. Bhattacharya's edition? in which he suggested some corrections of those parts of the published text which represented the the 1) Sthiramati Madhyadntavibhagatika, édition par Susumu Yamaguebi (Nagoye, 1934), 2) Madhyantavibhigasitrabhasyatika of Sthiramati edited by Vidbushekbara Bhattacharya and Gioseppe Tucci (Calcutta, 1932, Cal-utta Onental series Ne 24), 3) Indian Historical Quarterly, vol. IX, Ne 4, p, 1019 ff.retransiations from the Tibetan to fill up the lacunae of the sanserit MS. He also did not suspect the existence of the other edition which made some of his emtical remarks superfluous. My English version, besides the karika's of Maitreya-Asanga, contains a translation of Vasubandhu's bhagya in full as well as of the tika of Sthira- mat, For Vasubandhu I have made nse of a very correct block-print execu- ted in the printing office of the Aga monastery in Transbaikalia, its folios are marked in my translation by figures preceded by the letter V. The other figures in margin refer to the pages and lines in Prof. Tucci and V. Bhatta- charya's edition. I am sorry I could consider Prof. S. Yamaguchi’s text, as far as the first part is concerned, only in the notes. The division in chapters and sections, as well as their titles, are added by me. It 1s a great pleasure for me to express my gratitude to my young friend Prof. A. Vostnkov, PhD with whom I discussed several hard passages of the text and to whom | am indebted for many valuable suggestions. An analysis of the philosophy of this treatise and an appreciation of its value will be contained in a following volume of the Bibliotheca Bnddhica senes. Antcipatively | subjoin the following remarks. This tranglation aims at an intelligible rendering of Bnddhist ideas; it therefore, with rare exceptions, avoids untranslated terminology, it tries to render Buddhist technical terms by more or less corresponding equiva- lents borrowed from European philosophy. This method seems to me not hopeless, because, in my opinion, Indian philosophy has reached a very high standart of development and the princinple lines of this development rn parallel with those which are familiar to the students of Enropean philosophy. India possesses parallels to onr rationalism and to ont empiricism, it has ‘a system of empirical idealism and a system of spiritual monism, it has, first of all, a logic and, what is remarkable, an epistemology. In this epistemology Buddhist authors play a leading part. From the Indian standpoint Bnddhism is a 34stra and what an Indian jastra is Indologists well know from the example of the great grammatical iastra’s of Panini and Patanjali. Now it is a remarkable fact, which varionsly can be explained, bnt which is undisputable, that the Pali-school of Buddhologists entirely over- looked that Sastra, the system of philosophy which however is present on every page of the Palikapoa. An Indian diséra first of all frames a special terminology for the concepts with which it operates and establishes clear-cut definitions of thene concepts. The Tibetans, being the pupils of Indian tradition, have carried this care of mimutely precise definitions to an extreme, almost artistic, perfection. ‘Therefore the stady of Tibetan sources has greatly contributed to our under- standing of Buddhicm. At the dawn of European Indology there has been a controweny between the great French scholar E. Burnouf and the great Ression sebolas W. Wassilieff om the question whether Buddhism could be better enderstond from ladian or also from Chinese and Tibetan sources.According to the first, only Indian sources provided evidence on genuine Buddhism, according to the second, Buddhism in the totality of its develop- ment conld he understood only from Chinese and Tibetan sources in addition to the Indian ones. Wissilieff's standpoint enahled him to determine the exact meaning of the crucial term Siinyata in which he discovered under a dialec- tical terminology an idea similar to the Absolute Idea of Hegel. The present translation hrings an eloqnent confirmation of Wassilieff's discovery made acentury since, whereas the Pali-school discovered in Mahayana nothing hut degencration and nihilism, Working in the traditions of the schoo! of Professors W. Wassilieff and I. Minayeff, my much regretted pupil Prof. O. Rosenberg in his ,Prohlems of Buddhist Philosophy" and myself in my ,Cen- tral Conception of Bnddhism* and ,Conception of Buddhist Nirvana estah- lished the exact meaning of the hasic technical terms of the system: 1) the term dharma meaning Element of existence; 2) the term samskara (= sam-bhiiya- karin) meaning cooperating Element of existence and 3) the term prafiya- samutpada (= samskrtatvam) meaning cooperation of the Elements of existence. The three terms refer to one and the same system of pluralistic empiricism which is the core of early Buddhism. Prof. O. Rosenherg has given to Buddhism the name of a dharma-theory and indeed Buddhism in the three main forms of its developmentis nothing hut a theory of dharmds, i. e. a system of a plurality of ultimate Elements of Reality to which a monistic foundation has heen added in the Mahayana, The recent capital work of Prof. de La Vallée Poussin ,Vijiaptimatrata-siddhi“ (here quoted LVP) which is a magnificent thesaurus of the most precious ioformation ou the ultimate phase of Buddhism contains among its 820 pages hardly a single one which would not be concerned with the elucidation and the profound implications of this or that dharma. The term 3anyafa is an innovation of the Mahayana, an innovation made uecessary hy the course of philosophic development. Its germs are found in the Htnayana, hut the Mahayana has given it a quite new interpretation, an interpretation in which the two main schools of the Mahayana radically diverged. The whole chapter V of the first part of the treatise is devoted to the elucidation of the Yogicara conception of this term as contrasted with the Madhyamika view cf it. It is there most clearly and emphatically stated that, for the Yogacaras, it means 1) grahya-grahaka-abhava and 2) tasya ca svabhava, i. e. 1) the (ultimate) non-reality of the relation of subject to object and 2) the (ultimate) reality of their (snhjacent, monistic) Ahsolute. In other words the denial of Pluralism and the vindication of Monism, with the impli- cation that this Monism has a superstructure of phenomenal Relativity or that the phenomenat Relativity has a subjacent foundation ol Absolute, non- relative, Reality. The Absolute is thus the Reality of Unreality“ or as Prof. W. Wassilieff has expressed it—to quote the German version of his celebrated translator Th. Benfey (p. 121-2) ,das mit dem Subject identischeObject. welches, so wie es in den Kreis nnseres Denkens tritt, nnmittelbar zu etwas subjectivem wird....... Alfirmation nnd Negation werden identisch* fep. below, p. 104) This Absolute represents the uniqne snbstance of the Universe fedam dravya7/. There is no other substance. It embraces the totality of everything relatively real. but is itself the non-relative Absolnte. ft has, 40 to Speak, a reflex on the opposite end of the scale, in the so called Thing-intself (sva/aksana} which is a point-instant of spiritnal Reality. There are thus two Absolutes, tne absolnte Particnlar and the absolnte Universal, the extreme concrete and particular and the extreme abstract and Universal, the limt, so to speak, from the bottom and the limit at the top. Bet- ween them we must locate the relative Reality of the phenomenal Universe. All phenomenal objects are interrelated and related to the two limits between whcch they mnst find their place. The one of them is the point-instant (ksana) of reality, the other represents its eternal (nitya/ Whole; the one is particular {svaslaxsana), the other Universal (sémanya-laksana); the one is a singfe Element /dharmaj, the other represents their totality (dharmatd); the one is athe" Real (vastu = sat), the other is the Reality (satya); the one is interdepen- dent (paratantraj, the other independent or Absolute (pasinipsanna); the one 1s paramdrtha-sai, the other —~ paramartha-satya. Applying Kantian terminology we could perhaps say that the one is transeendental (Suddha- Jaukika), the other transcendent (pariguddha, lokottra).? How are these two Absolutes related between themselves? They are, says the Yogacira, neither different nor identical (p. 39—40), jnst as every other Universal: although it camnot be separated from its respective particulars, it is not identical with them, Each of them represents the ,Reality of Unreafity“, the paratantra as abhida-parikalpa, the diinyata as abhivasya svabhava. As such the iiinyata can be characterized as being neither Affirmation nor Negation (cp. p. 78), or as Wassifieff puts it ,Affirmation and Negation become identical", Now the Madhyamikas deny the ultimate reality of both these concepts. They neither admit the reality of the parafantra nor of the parinispanna = daagate. For them these two Absolutes are as relative as all the rest. They admit no exception from their principle of Uuiversaf Relativity, no paramartha- 404, no Tning-in-ltself, They, of course, have 2 Paramartha-satya, or Highest Principle, of their own, but it consists just in the denial of the Thing-in- Heel, the denial of every ultimately real Element in existence. Tsofi-kha-pa, & good judge, mays in his Legs-biad siit-po that among afl systems of Bilewopky. Boddhist as well as noe-Baddhist, there is only a single one denies every kind of an ultimately Real; and this is the system of the Madbyamikas. According to the German expression, it represents ,cine 1 We then aan estab ica of equiva bynes =aapakytedharmacpartontrecsreiel Coyatbduragdde On ths the bend — dharmatd = binyatémta thatacatametytodkaroee partnipponan msdminys-lnkgape=paramartha-saty a ~Verabsolutieruug des Relativeu“. From this uuiversal Relativity there cau be uo exceptious. Neither the Buddha, uor the Bodhisattva, uor Salvatiou aud Nirvaya are excepted. They are dialectical Ideas, uot realities. As coucepts they are coustructious of our productive imagiuatiou, heuce ultimately unreal, bden-par med as the Tibetau emphatically states. Highly iustructive is from this poiut of view the divisiou of sinyata iuto 16 varieties. Of these 16, arieties there are 8 which refer to the mahayauistic Buddha aud Bodhisattva. For the Yogicdra they represeut Relativity also, iuasmuch as they are objects of couceptual thought which distiuguishes object aud subject, but this Relativity has a subjaceut Absolute Reality: for the Madhyamikas it has none, for them it is mere advaya without auy eka-dravya at the bottom. But this does uot at all meau that the Madhyamikas are uihilists. They were accused of uihilism by the polemical fervour of th: Yogacaras who imputed ou them the priuciple sarvam sarvena nasi (B. bhiimi, p. 44), as well as by the Europeau scholars of the Pali-school. They however emphatically protested agaiust that accusatiou. Relativism is uot Nihilism. In Japan, where the Yogaeara traditiou prevails, there is a teudeucy either to miuimize the discrepancy of the two schools (Suzuki aud others) or to accuse the Madhya- mikas of ajhilism (Masuda aud others). The Madhyamika philosophy however is the doctriue officially professed by the Tibetau church. It would souud excee- diugly strauge if we would iuterpret the solemu and exuberaut catholicism of that church as a disguised uihilism. This is the only poiut in which 1 would veuture to diverge from the views expressed by Prof. L. de La Vallée Poussin iu his capital work ou the Yogacara system. lu accordauce with some Japa- uese scholars, he is iucliued to uuderrate the difference betweeu the two maiu schools of Mahayana aud to ueglect the importauce of the war which they were wagiug, whereas the whole of the VijuaptimatrataSastra, as the title shows, is writteu with the aim of viudicatiug the Yogacara views agaiust the theories of the Madhyamikas. He says p. 757 ,,il y a Madhyamikas et Madhya- mikas, Yogacaras et Yogacaras“. This is quite right iu this seuse that we have intermediate schools aud subschools, but it is wroug wheu it teuds to obliterate the differeuce betweeu the maiu schools, It is also, iu my opi- uiou, uot quite exact to say that Nagarjuua ,admet uue réalité vide“. The dictum of the ,void vessel“, the vessel which is void but real, is a characte ristie Yogacdra dictum directed agaiust the Madhyamikas, as is clearly stated in the preseut treatise ou p. 12.20 (transl., p. 22). True is however that the Madhyamikas have a paramartha-satya, and that this paramartha-satya cousists iu the uegatiou of every paramartha-sat. The Discourse on Discriminatiou between Middle and Extremes is writteu with the same aim as the Vijiapti-matrata- siddhi, It repudiates the Uuiversal Relativism of the Madhyamikas. It re-pudiates aso the Pacalism «f Hinayana, By a stricter discrimination between Appearance and Realty 1! estab.ishes its own system of a spiritual Monism, There 18 3 transcendent Ans> ute Reality subjacent to the Appearance of the phen m+rai world, vt is the reality of the Pure Spirit (vijiiapti-matrata), Hege’'s Absolute Idea. The Mahayanistic Nirvana (the so called apra- ‘rgthita} 1s nothing but this Absolute Idea in which the totality of life is merged.PART I THE DOUBLE ESSENCE OF ULTIMATE REALITYCONTENTS OF THE FIRST PART Chapterl INTRODUCTION § 1. Vasubandhu's SalutationStanza.. 2. 6 ee ee § 2. Every word of the salutation stanza singly explained, ©. . § 1 epumahehaadnenabianmansanil § 4. The seven topics. . . § 5. The conseeation of the topics. Chapter Il THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENAL REALITY § 1. General Statement. § 2. The first meaning of the stanza, Repudistion of extreme scepticism... . « § 3. The second meaning of the stanza. Repudiation of extreme realism... . § 4. The third meaning of the stanza. The middle way between the two extremes of scepticism and realism 60 ee § 5. The fourth interpretation of the stanze. The contrast between Phenomens! and ‘Absotate Reality . leet 46 Thn to Abc: the serene cute sd ptr sd he ree abstract and universal. 0 ee § 7. The Middie Path, 6... eee ee ee eee 8 8 The etre of ea wih Grant of hese veri fests himself. 2. 0 ee ee eee eee § 9. Another division of ideas in three, reap. eight clasce. Mind-store ideas, Ego-ideas, six kinds of sensational ideas, «2.0... | feta e $10. The Postulate of Buddhism. 6. eee eee ee eee Chapter iil THE THREEFOLD ASPECT OF THE CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENA 8 § 2. The unreslity ofthe external world § 3. Repudiation of the Sautrintlas. ... . § 4, Repudiation of the Sarvistivadins.. . § 5. Cognition of the Monistic Absolute, . § 6. The hells, Se earth nde erent ae he penne er eet the Constructor of Appearance... 6. + se nee § 11 The other name of the Contractor of the phenomena! werlds. see nee 578 Gentorear eben Ho Perel es ee mental phenomena. 6 ee ee ee . ne 16 YW 18 19 42S &G8SS 8Chapter lV ‘THE DYNAMICS OF THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD-LLUSION & 1, The Subconscious Mind-Store or the Psyche . - L The dynam.c aspect of the Crestor of the World-lllusion. The 12 stages of the rotation of phonomenai life... 0 1 ee eee § 3 The rost cause of phenomenal life. Transcendental ‘lasion - see § A. The second member of Depeodent Origination. The prenatal Biotic Forces « § 5. The third stage. Intermediate existence +. - § 6. The fourth stage. The Embryo 2. so § § s 7. The fifth stage. The Sense faculties... & The sitth stage. Sensation... oe 9, The seventh stage. Feelng. . $10. The eighth atage. Sexual desire. $11. The ninth atage. ‘Attechment to cherished objects. Tok § 12, The tenth atage. The full realization of = new life. - . - § 13. The eleventh and twelfth atages. The anfferings of n new "birth on which new death follows... ee ee steno $14, The twelve members of Dependent Origination united in groups and regarded from different standpoints... . =. lesltottlectel ate bclecreed ob oe #15 Th din of he tlre member athe ad sto grep . $16. The division im seves groups... ee ee ee Ted gi Oise enigf the tev membered fru of Dependent Ovation $18, Summary of the theory of the Constructor of Appearance. . LE, Chapter V THE ABSOLUTE 3 od een Pence eee Abeohtte 0 ee eee : § 2 Another explanation of the five topics... § 3. The defimtion of the Absolute... .. . § 4 Other memes of the Absolute and their moenings. . 4 & The seventh and eighth mode, 6... GO. Thenithmede. ss. el. $10. The tenth modes... 8, § 11, The eleventh mode... lated $12 The twelfth made... sete Eee Seer eeL § 13. The thirmcath mode. . : last tne medes of Reletivity Reality. ame $16 Review of the Wmedes 0. $17. The proof sntahlishing the existence of the Absolute.” y BI 1 KIIKILSSI Se eiChapter I INTRODUCTION § 1. Vasnbandhn’s Salutation Stanza [V. 1. b. 1] J fervently salute (Maitreya), That san af the Accamplished Buddha Wha has revealed ta us this treatise. And (Saint Asatiga) I salute the teacher Wha has explained ta us its meaning. To analyse that meaning now 1 will (myself) attempt an effart. Stbiramati’s Camment [3.1] It is a rule’ among edneated men ta salnte their teaeber and (to worship) their tutelary deity befare beginning a work. Therefore this (aur author Vasn bandb u) wishing ta intimate that be bimself also fallaws this rule” begins bis commentary upon the ,Discaurse an Discriminatian between Middle and Extremes“ (viz. the Extremes af Sceptieism and af Realism*) by an expressian af devatian ta its divine authar* and to its (first) expositer? and then starts an the work of analysing’ its meaning, He says: [3. 5] J fervently salute’ (Maitreya), That son of the Accomplished® (Buddha) Who has revealed io us this treatise® And (Saint Asanga J salute, the teocher) Who has explained (to us) its meaning. To analyse that meoning now J will (myself) attempt an effort. [3.6] What merit it attained by this salntation (cf Vasubandhu)? The warship” af exalted” and benignant!* persons is a meritorious act When (ane is equipped) witb sueb aecretian af moral merit, the right effart™ will nat be frustrated by aeeidents and obstacles, it will be (crawned) by suceess withant great worry.!513, 8] It 1s also possible to assume that, by proposing to give a thorough- going explanation” of what has been revealed by the divine author and commented upon by his expositor, the salutation stanza pursues in its totality” the aim of inspiring a reverential feeling towards both these authors, the author of the Revelation and the author of the Exposition, as well as to their works, the sacred text and its commentary. [3. 12] A reverential feeling is first of all inspired towards the sacred text, because it shows what has been revealed by its divine author.” Saint Maitreya has revealed this work in the form of stanzas. He is (a divine Bodhisattva) separated (from final Nirvana only by his present) last rebirth (in Tusita heaven). He is a being who has gone through all the consecutive stages of a Bodhisattva’s career and has completely deliver- ed himself in each stage from the respective defects of (a limited will and a kmited knowledge)’ He is thus a being who has attained the highest perfection (of all the miraculous powers of a Bodhisattva), viz. his (six kinds of) supernatural knowledge, his unlimited memory,” his {four modes of) analytic insight," his (proficiency in entering various kinds of) trance, his (ten kinds of} supernatural powers,” his firm realization (of the Monistic idea),” and his (eight successive degrees of) complete hberation (from the illusion of materiality).”* [3. 17] Indirectly-* a reverential feeling is also inspired towards this (second) commentary, because it is assumed that it contains the authentic explanations of the (first) expositor. This (first expositor) is Saint Asanga. The revered teacher Vasubandhu™ has studied this sacred text under his guidance and, after that, has composed a commentary (of his own). [3. 19) These two (great men) were in the highest degree endowed with an analytical understanding.”' They were therefore capable of understanding (the sacred text) unmistakably, of retaining its meaning and of commu- nicating it to others. Thus in the conviction that they teach the correct meaning of the sacred text, a reverential feeling is also produced towards this commentary (of Vasubandhu). {4. 1] And thus it is that those who rely npon the personal authority (of great names)” will feel high respect to this sacred text and to its commentary. Those, on the other hand, who rely upon dogma™ know (q priori) that the meaning of the sacred text and of its commentary are good, but when (by analysis) a definite (logical) knowledge will be produced ™ in them, they will realize that it is also due to the learning of the divine author and of his commentator, not alone to the dogma and its (understanding by) dialecticians. Thus « feeling of respect will be produced (in them also) towards both the divine author (of the Revelation) and to his expositor. {4 7), Now, what is the nature™ of Revelation and why is it designated by (the sanscrit wor.) Jas? Revelation proceeds from pure intimationsappearing to us in the form of word-, phrase- and articulate-sound- complexes.” But (Buddhist) Revelation moreover™ procedes from inti- mations appearing as special verbal (declarations)** conducive to supra- mundane (Absolute) Knowledge * (and the attainment of Buddhahood). How can intimations (which are arising automatically out of the subconsciousness of the individual) be revealed and explained to him (by others)? This objection is futile, because the revealer and tbe explainer from which our intimations are supposed to arise are themselves nothing beyond our ideas of them.” (However that does not interfere with the fact that) a man training‘ on the Path towards Buddhahood attains special moral merits, special degrees of mental ecstasy and special direct intuition;+ he abstains from deeds — corporeal, vocal and mental — which would be unfavourable (for attainment of Nirvana) and attends to such actions which are favourable for it. [4. 14] Further (why is Revelation called) 3astra? It is so called because it conforms“ with what this word §astra (etymologically) means. It means. (,,that what rules—3as, and what saves— fra"), what by repeated instruction in religion rules out all vices together with all their germs and saves from a miserable rebirth (in hell), a rebirth which is frightful by long, uninterrupted, manifold and intense sufler- ing. Therefore by ruling out our enemies—the vices, and by saving from rebirth in hell it conforms with the definition of a work of Revelation.” These two features (extinction of vice and salvation from rebirth) are characteristic of all Mahayana and al! works devoted to its eluci- dation. They are to be found nowhere else. Therefore this work is a work of Revelation. Accordingly it has been stated: [4.20] That what controls oar foes, the passions, What from rebirth and misery delivers Is (our) Revelation, since it rules and saveth. All other creeds do not possess it, This doable benefit (of Mahayana). § 2. Every word of the salutation stanza singly explained [4. 24] The word ,this" (in the phrase ,who has composed «this» treatise“) is a direct” indication. (The author) has in his mind the stanzas of the work on Revelation called Madhyanta-vibhanga, i e. »Discrimination between Middle and Extremes“. (This work) deals systematically with seven topics (to be detailed later on) in order® to elucidate the three different Buddhist theories of Salvation ™ and is conducive te a cemplete extinction cf all the moral and intellectual defects ef (human nature).™[5.1] The words .who has revealed” (in the salutation stanza) mean ,,who has created". Although the root ni (from which pranita is derived) means «to lead”, this meaning is changed into ,to oreate“ by the addition of the preposition pra.‘ Indeed it is said: Forcibly changed is the meaning of @ root By the addition of a preposition, Just as the sweet water of the Ganges Mixed with (salt, water of the ocean. [5. 5] .Having fervently saluted“ means having direotly worshiped, having saluted or worshiped directly as though (the Bodhisattva were person- ally present) standing before or near him; having saluted by gesture, speach and in thought [S. 6] (Maitreya is called the son of the Acoomplished Buddha in the sense of being) produced out of the essenoe of perfeot Buddhahood. The Buddha is oalled the Accomplished, beoause starting from™ the limi- tations imposed (on all living beings) by desire and ignoranoe together with their seeds he well went (up to their oomplete annihilation and) the accomplishment of an Absolute Mahayanistio Nirvana. [5. 7] He indeed is the ,Acoomplished“, beoause he has completely liberated himself from the limitations of a human nature; because he has beoome identical with (Omniscienoe, i. e.) with the knowledge of all the Elements of existence, (their knowledge) in every respeot;® beoause he has become the possessor of a (miraoulous) body whose might is as inconceivably limitless as the might of the allyieldmg miraculous gem, {a body) through which he exercises all his wonder working powers; because he has the faculty to contrive that all the aims of all the sentient beings (of the Universe) shall be fulfilled at onoe, automati- cally, by themselves; because he is identical with that speoial direot non-discursive highest knowledge ® (whioh is Omniscienoe). [5. 11] The words ,his essence“ mean (the Absolute), the Ever-Self-Same ® the (Transcendent) Pure Reality. Since the direot” mystic intuition ® {of the Absolute} is produced by this (transcendent Reality), therefore (Maitreya, i.e. his Omniscience) is said to be born ,from“, or born nin* (that Absolute). In this sense he is the son of the Accomplished Buddha. [5.12] (The words .produed from the essence of the Accomplished Beddha*) also (carry the implication that Maitreya) is essentially iden- tical with the Buddha. We find indeed in a scriptural work a passage whioh declares ,he is born in the lineage of the Buddhas, (he is a Buddha by birth), because he possesses those miraculous powers which constitute the essence of Buddhahood". (Indeed the distance between him and 2 Buddha is insignificant). He is a Bodhisattva in the tenth (final) stage of his career and all things cognizable in every one of their aspects”are elear to him as though they were a myroholan grain seen cn palm ol his hand hy a man whose eyes are eovered by at 14 silk monsseline. With the Buddha this veil is as though witt from his eyes and this is all the dillerenee. [5.17] Here the words ,horn from the essenee ol the Accomplished Bnddha“ are an indication ol the laet that the divine author of this treatise has attained to the highest piteh (ol kiowledgel, the direet intuition ol the Ahsolute. And sinee he has eomposed the treatise regardless ol prolit and honours (exelusively lor the weal of mazkind), he at the same time has proved that he equally possesses the highest degree ol eommiseration (lor all living ereatures) as wei. as the nighest degree ol knowledge.” {5. 20] (The words ,,the teaeher) who has explained“ point to the author ol the (lirst) eommentary. They must he eonneeted with the words ,having lervently saluted“ and also, aeeording to other (authorities), with the words ,produeed lrom the essenee ol the Aeeomplished Buddha" (i. e. this teaoher possesses likewise the essenee ol a Buddha). This author ol the (lirst) eommentary is Saint Asai ga. Having reeeived the bless- ing ol Saint Maitreya and entering with his help (the tranee ealled) wintnition ol the stream ol the Elements ol Existenee“*+ he diseovered this treatise and explained it”? [5. 23] The word ,and“ (in the phrase ol the salutation stanza —,and Saint Asanga | salute“) either simply establishes the (grammatieal) eonneetion (ol Asaiga with Maitreya in this phrase) or (it may have no speoial meaning at all and is introduced lor metrical reasons only), to lill up the verse.”® It also may reler to an additional (number ol saluted persons). Other’ Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, whosoever they should be," are saluted, not alone that one who has revealed and that one who has explained this treatise. {5. 25] To whom has he explained it? (It is said in the salutation stanza) nto us ete.“, This means ,beginning with us to other people also“, to them, i. e. to us and to others (has he explained it). Being himself infallible (he possesses the authority) to give instruction (in the right comprehension ol the text).* {5. 26] In answer to the question what shall you do alter having saluted the author and the expositor, it is said ,1 will strive“, i.e. 1 will employ my efforts, ,to explain its meaning“, ,,To explain its meaning* means to disclose its intention or it also means to analyse its contents in separate (topics). The form of the locative case” indicates (here in the sanscrit original) the aim, it means ,with the aim of disclosing the intention (of the work will | employ my efforts)“. As to the topics which here constitute the so called ,body" of the work, they are seven; they are discussed in this treatise,§ 3. The aim of the treatise and the topics discussed in it {h. 5] Whatfore 1s ths treatise reveaied? It has been revealed in order to (teacht the product 1 of that direct highest intuition (of Absolute Rea sty} which 1s {ine exe.usive property) of tne Buddhas, our Lords.* By teachg that a. single! Elements of ewistence do not contain any abso- ute rea sty «= themse ves,” (that singly ali are relative), a non-discursive direct tation (of their absolute totaity) is produced. By an intense concentratan cf the mind upen this (intuition) a complete annihilation of the phenomenal mirage, uf al. its emotional and all intellectual obscuratons with all their germs {lying hidden in subconsciousness)** is attained, {and the Gnosis is produced). [hn 8] Thos this work 1s undertaker with the aim of establishing the (really) rght theory of Absolute Reality, ie. the theory of the relativity of every E.ement singly and the collective Reality of their sum-total. Ths is dove by repudiat ng a double error, viz. 1) the error that the Reiati.ty of every Element singly mplies the unreality of all the Elements coiectivery (Nuhilism) and 2) the error that the denial of a substantive Soul as an internal contruiler (of the personality) implies the denial of an Absmute (in the cullect.ve totality of the Elements of the Universe). {6 11] However others maintain that the aim of the work is to repudiate .gnrance and misconception by promoting the right comprehension on the part of those who are ignorant or are mistaken in regard of the {double) essence of Reality, of its illusive Appearance and all other (top cs here discussed). [6. 12] There also is another aim. The Bodhisattvas may think it very dif- fieult to arrive (at Ommuscience), because infinite are the partieular objects contained in the five departments of knowledge, viz. the knowledge of the worlds, of the classes of living beings, of the elements of existence, of the rules of behaviour, and of the path towards perfee~ tion." They can loose their energy and in order to combat this their mind-depression (Vasubandhu) quotes (the first stanza of the treatise, containing its table of contents, viz.) Reality, its Essence and Appear- ance, the Absolute“ etc. § 4. The seven topics [V. 1. B. 2] (Vasubandhu introducing the first stanza says)— here, just at the beginning of the body of the work it is stated) Ce St {Stanaa 1.1.] The essence of Reality and its Appearance; The Absolute and its Unveiling By Trance ond Meditation; Their Degrees and their Results; Preeminence of Mahiyiina.[V. lb. 3] The following seven topies sre diseussed h trestise, viz. 1) the (double) Essenee of Reslsty, 2) its ig. els ye anee, 3) the Absolute Reslity, 4) its Purifiestion (} x sf, ead” meditstion), 5) Degrees of Purifiestion, 6) its fins] Resuh,” 7) preemi- renee of Mshgyins, Sthirsmsti's eomment {6 16] (Vssubsndhu ssys)—~ here, i. e. just st the beginning of the work, its body {i. e. its eontents) will be estsblished“. Here* mesns either in this snslysis of the topies, or in this work. ,,Just at the beginning“ mesns st first. Whst s Revelstions! work (astra) is, hss been s'reads explsined.” Its body" (is mentioned) either in the sense of s summary, or of its sbbrevistion, or of its foundstion. Just ss the esreas (contating the esterior snd interior Elements“ of sn individusl) is esied his body, just so the bady of s work eonsists of the topies w diseussed in it, whieh sre its foundstion. They sre sever, Essenee (of Resiity, its Appesrsnee ete.). Vssubandhu says ey sre estsblished*. This is {the predieste whieh) must be referred {to the seven topies), it mesns they sre discussed. (6. 23] It esn be ssked whatfore is this tsble of eontents mentioned at the beginning of the work? Will it not be suffieientily known when the work itself will be gone through? Nol the tsble of euntents (stated st the beginning) is not useless! It is mentioned for the benefit of the student. fndeed s student who knows {in sdvsnee) whst topies will be discussed will more essily follow the detsiled exposition (of the subject), just sss horse running swiftly on s well known rsee ground.* Not otherwisel™ (7. 1.] ,These seven topies are discussed in this work" (ssys Vssubsndhu), this mesns thst they represent the eomplete work.’ The word ,these“ refers to the topies indiested by the words Essence of Reslity, (Appear- anee} ete. Seven is their number. This is mentioned in order to point out their inelusive number. ,Topies* sre the points thst are simed st, thst sre espfsined. ,,In this work“ mesns in the work ealled ,,Discrim- instion between Middle snd Extremes“. They are ,discussed“, i. ¢. tsught or definitely settled. »Thus* is s particfe indiesting thst such is the mesning. {7. 6.] (Vssubandhu) says Essence“ (of Reafity). That by what something is essentistty ehsrseterized is ealted its essence. Now the essence of Reality is double, impure snd pure.” Of them the impure (or pheno- mens]} Resfity is ninefold (it spears in nine different aspects), begin- ning with thst (trsnscendentsl, but still phenomenal aspeet which isthe Constructor of phenomena, as stated in stanza 1. 1), the Universal Construetor of phenomens exists“, and ending (with stsnzs 1. 11 where it is ststed) thst ysevenfold are the phenomena proceeding from this Universaf Constructor of phenomena".” The remaining part of the21} is devoted to an nates, ooo te fest part, vir stanras amtacs (Part Rea own. e of the Ansy IM} ies vestind "ys essence” that tare at something is essen- egy cmarattormn g different from both berseaer ad that is not so; because tore tate gz rse..- E. g. density (or mass) Stress ara eliracterste of a soud bods,’ but the solid element Wats ehog exstrg apart from density (or mass). essental character:stic™ can alsu be conceived (not as an nstrument athrough* which something is being characterized, but) asian tp ot wareh itself is being characterized. * Thus indeed (Reality) impare and ‘ure is essentially characterized (as such), i. e. as having tne essence of Reshty impure and pure {or Reality phenomenal and absolutes. {7 35] (The divistos of Reality into impure and pure carries) still another {mplcatonk in accordance with being either phenomenal or absolute® it also is ether the Particular or the Universal (in the sense of the extreme cunerete and particular, the Thing-in-ltself, and of the extreme abstract and universal. which is the Absolute Totality of all exist- ence)” {7. 16] (The second topic) is the Veil (of illusive Appearance covering Reality). It conceals the Elements propitious (to Salvation), by prevent ing them to appear. These Elements are concealed through it. In this sense Appearance is a veil. It consists of 53 varieties (of moral and rntellectual defects which are obstacles on the Path towards the percep- tion of Ultimate Reality). [7. 18] (The third topic is) Absolute Reality. (When we think) ,,this is merely this", (i.e, the bare fact of the reality of something), the condition (of being merely this, .Thisness“ or ,Suchness“) represents the Abso- lute; it can be nothing else (than merely this, nothing empirically defi- nite). It can be considered from 10 different (viewpoints). (7. 19] (The fourth topic) is the Antidote (against phenomenal impurity. It is so called because it represents) that part which annihilates the coun- terpart, (it is the enemy of impurity). It is the Path (of Purity, or Path to Salvation). lt consists of Meditation (in rapturous trances). (The Path is Meditation, because its different stages) are created ® by pro- found meditation. {7. 21} (The fifth topic) is the Degree, i, e. the special degree of that very Path which is (gradually) developing in (uninterrupted) continuity. It has nineteen stages, ¢. g. the stage of the Lineage“, (j. e. that degree of trance when the certainty of belonging to the Spiritual family of Boddhas is reached), and other stages." (7. 22} (The sixth topic is called) Reaching the Result, i e. attaining the fruit. it bas fifteen varieties, vir. the result of moral retribution etc. [tiptoe weraCH, INTRODUCTION a [7. 23] (The seventh tnpic) is the nnsnrpassable preeminence of Mah famong all dnetrines nf Salvation). Yana means a vehicie hy nne mnves, (hy which one is carried. It is a prngress and ils exceiency is nnsnrpassahle in three respects, ‘ the excellency of equipment, {o* the start and nf the resnitl. [7. 25] It is stated (in the stanza that the tnpics) are seven. The tnpics are jnst so many. This is said fnr the sake nf limiting their namher and fnr the sake of pninting tn their ennsecntinn. They are specified as heing jast sn many, not mnre (than seven). Their consecution is estahlished in ennfnrmity (with the aim nf the systems which 1s the attamment of (the Gnnsis), the transcendent highest Intuition n} the Ahsointe. § 5. The ennsecutinn nf the tnpics First explanation [8 3] The futnre Bnddha at the heginning nf his career (while sti in the preliminary stage, the sn called) stage of Faith, ' chiefly attending tn his dnties of a shigher) mnrality, shnuld nevertheless hegin cleverly to distinguish betwecn impure (nr phennmenal) and pure (nr ahsolute) Reality, since every Element af virtue prnpitinus tn Salvatinn is checked hy some correspnnding phenomenal impurity which must he knnwn. If it is nnt cleared away, Salvatinn is impns ihle, hut if it is ant knnwn, it cannat he extinguished, hecause its influence remains unnnticed. He then will realize that the nhject upon which he must enncentrate in arder tn free his mind frnm impurity is the pure nr ahsnlute) Reality. “ With this nhject’ he will then apply the method which extinguishes the enver (nf phennmenal impurity), He will realize that (transic) medi- tatinn is the remedy (against the cnver of phennmenal Appearance). [8. 9] After that cnmes a process nf enncentration upon the Elements which cnunteract (the gloom nf phenomenal Appearance), which annihilate the cnrrespnnding nhscuratinns, which increase the fnrce nf the antidntes against them. (The future Buddha) must know the (respect ve) stage which he has reached in this process of meditation, e. g. »The stage of Certainty" regarding his belonging to the Spiritual Lineage of the Buddhas.-'* (8. 11] After that (the future Buddha) attains the result (of his eareer). The Elements of Transcendent (Transphenomenal) Reality clearly appear to him. (This first vision of Nirvana is the so called) result of Entering the Stream" (attained at the 16th moment of the Path of Enlight- ment). (8. 12] All these (six consecutive degrees in the moral and intellzctual development of the future Buddha) are the common features of (the Path) of Bodhisattvas, Srivakas, (Pratyekas) and their novices, i. e. of Mahayana and Hinayana and of all the three different Paths towards“ MADHTANIA-VIBIANUA Salvation). This agrees with Scripture (where we find the following injnnetion) — ,this recinse is training for progress along the method. of the Srivakas; he is also training for progress along the method of the Pratyekas; he also is training for progress along the method of the Bodhisattvas*. (This proves that all the three methods applied ‘on the Path towards Salvation have common features). But the match- less preeminence of Mahayana, which constitntes the seventh topic, deals with the special properties of a Bodhisattva which nothing can surpass. Second explanation [8 17] But others maintain that the (donble) Essence of Reality (the first topic) is mentioned at the beginning in order to produce a more clever (not naive) conception™” of the (donble) essence of Oppression and Deliverance, for Oppression here means the veil (of phenomenal Appearance) and Deliverance means Absolute Reality. Through the knowledge of Absolute Reality the mirage (of phenomenal Appearance) is dispersed. Therefore (both) Appearance and Reality (are pointed out at the beginning). [8 20] After that (the next topic is the Path). In order to teach the expe- dient serving to annihilate the (mirage of phenomenality) its antidote, the Path (of Purity) with all attaining details, is mentioned. [8 21] The Path has beginning, middle and end. In each stage can it be lightly or middleway or intensely practised. This produces different varieties. In order to point to them the next topic are the (compara- tive) stages (of the Bodhisativa’s progress). [8 22] Every stage brings a corresponding result. The next topic is there- fore the Result (reached at each stage). All these six topics (are con- cerned with facts) which are the common feature of a Bodhisattva * with the Seiivakas and other (Saints). But the last topic is the preemi- 16. 25) Others again maintain that the (double) Essence of Reality has been place because we cognize Reality either in its real ©, sitimets) emence or in its unreal (i. ¢. phenomenal) essence. this casontial (differeace), the mirage of Appear- ri F ftCH, l. INTROOUCTION 1S After that comes the special stage which is but the comparative degree, high or low, which weditatiou has reached. The Result cousists in the auuihilation (of the mirage of pheuomeual Appearauce) through this iuteuse meditatiou. After that the supreme vehicle of Salvatiou (Maha~ yaua) is reached. The cousecutiou of the seveu topics has the aim of illustratiug this process. Fourth explanation {9. 5] Agaiu others thiuk' that, siuce we are liable to be mistakeu iu regard of what Elemeuts are real aud what are unreal, the Esseuce (of Reality) must have beeu iudicated (at first) iu order to put au eud to both au (exaggerated) deuial aud au (exaggerated) imputatiou (of Reality). (The doctriue of the origiu of the pheuomeual) mirage (should be theu expouuded) in order to promote its clever distiuctiou ou the part of those who strive to get rid of that illusiou. But ultimate Reality is hiddeu uuder the veil (of pheuomeual Appearauce), therefore iu order to promote a scholarly couceptiou of Reality, the uext topic is the (ultimate or absolute) Reality. The pheuomeual mirage cau be dispelled by a peuetratiug aualysis of what is (esseutially) real. Therefore after haviug giveu (the defiuitiou) of Reality, the couuteractiug (auti-phe- uomeualistic) profouud Meditation (must be explaiued). The couditiou (reached iu the progress of this Meditatiou must be uext described iu order to construct} a scholarly theory of its differeut stages. Every stage produces its (correspoudiug) result,” therefore uext to the theory of the stages their result must be (also) cousidered iu order to produce a scholarly couceptiou of what the Result is. (Finally), since all these topics (are here represeuted iu that their aspect on which the Mahayana religiou is fouuded), since they serve as au iutroduction to Mahayana,’ therefore, as 2 coucludiug topic, the preemiueuce of the Mahayana (among all other religions) is discussed.Chapter II THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENAL REALITY § 1. General Statement With reference to the (double) essence of Reality we have the following statement: [Stanza 1. 1] The Universal Constructor! of phenomena exists! (But he himself) does not contain any division® Jn two parts, (the apprehended and the apprehending). The Absolute* however is contained in him, And in the Absolute again he is included. Vasubandhu's comment [V. 2 a 1] Among them (i e. among the seven topics) this stanza deal (with the first, viz.) the Essence fof Reality). eer {V. 2. a. 2] Under ,the Universal Constructor of phenomena“ we here (must understand) our Productive Imagination* which constructs (the pheno- menal work by spitting concrete reality in two parts) the one graspi : Sa Tae fat fhe melee al he raped subject grasping it, (He, struct himself) is quit fee of ts (hvac) a ial . ver is contained in him (says the stanza). Z ? ‘ f (bere the Non-Relativity), it is this same (but uni- ey Conti of pene is co ree Ce Gane aT itp is (Abc) he i indaded ( phenomena. (Thus the lute the relativity of subject aad object, but this relativity Indeed the correct defini- f iCH, 1, THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTCR CF PHENCMENAL REALITY uv Sthiramati’s cumment {9. 12] With refereuce tu the (duuhle) essence uf reality, (phenumeval aud ahsulute), it is stated: The Universul Censtructcr cf phencmenu exists! (But he himself) dees nct ccntuin uny divisicn dn twe purts (the upprehended und the upprehending). The Absciute hcwever is ccntuined in him, And in the Absclute uguin he is included. {9. 16] (Vasuhaudhu says) ,amcug them“, this meaus amuvg the just meuticued seveu tcpics, viz. the Esseuce cf Reality, Appearauce etc. etc. With refereuce tc (the first cf them, viz.) tc the Esseuce cf Reality, this stanza has heeu ccmpcsed: , The Uuiversal Ccustructcr cf phevo- meua“ etc. (The crder) cf explavaticu fcllcws (the crder) cf euuuciaticu. Therefcre the (dcvhle) esseuce cf Reality heiug the tcpic meuticued iu the first place, (it is vatural) that its explavaticu is giveu before {all the cthers). § 2. The first meaning cf the stanza, Repudiaticn cf extreme scepticism [9.20] There are some (philcsophers, viz. the Madhyamika school, whe maiutaiu) that all the Elemeuts cf existeuce® are iu uc way realities. (lu the early schools all existeuce was analyzed iutc Elemeuts assumed tc represeut ultimate realities. But acccrdiug tc the Madhya~ mikas) they are as uureal as a pair cf herns cu the head cf a hare, (they de uct exist at all).’ Therefcre, iu crder tc repudiate this whcle- sale uegaticu, it is stated — ,The Uviversal Ccustructcr cf pheucmeva exists!“ This prcpositicu must be supplemeuted by the werds ,iu itself“. (It exists iu itself, i. e. ahsclutely), it is the Thivg-iu-ltself.® [9. 22] Hewever is this uct coutradicted by Scripture? (Mahayavist) Scripture iudeed declares ,all the Elemeuts are devcid (cf this absclute reality iu itself)“. Nel there is uc ccutradicticu, bccaysc it is (further) stated that nhe coutaius uc duality, (i. e. this ccustructcr ccutaius uc divisicu iu twe parts, the cue graspiug the cther). {9. 24) The Constructcr cf pheucmeva is devcid cf the distiucticu iute au appreheuded chject aud au appreheudiug subject, in this sense (culy) is he ,,devcid*, but uct iu the seuse cf beiug deprived cf all reality iu itself. Therefcre there is uo ccutradicticu with (MahZyaua)-scripture. (The Constructcr is devcid cf empirical but uct of trauscendental vealitw)8 MATHYANTA-VIBHANGA [9. 26] but if that be so, then .duality*, (i. e. every subject-object couple) will it not be totally non-existent, just as the hare’s horns (which do not exist at all)? The Constructor of phenomena will then (alone) represent absolute existence (existence in itself). This would imply a denial (of the other, the ultimate) Absolute. [10. I[ That is not so! because this (other) Absolute is contained in him. (What indeed is this other Absofute?) Just this universaf non-exist- ence of the division into object and subject in (every) Constructor of phenomenal appearance is the Absolute. Therefore it cannot be (deduced that the ultimate) Absolute does not exist.” [10. 3] (Now) if this Absolute contains no duality (and if it is inherent in every Constructor of a phenomenon), why is it that we are not omni- scient.”” If it is present (before us) why is it not perceived? fn order to solve this doubt it is stated (in the stanza) ,and in this Absolute he is included*. [10. 6[ (Because this Absolute is not pure), because the Constructor of phenomenal (illusion) is also found in it, therefore you are not saved (and omniscient). Just for this reason, just because the pure Absolute is covered by (phenomenal) impurity, it is impossible to perceive it, just as it is impossible to perceive the (genuine) purity of the water- element, when it is soiled by filth. § 3. The second meaning of the stanza. Repudiation of extreme realism [10. 9] (The stanza) also sims at repudiating (the other extreme), the opinion those who maintain that not only the Mind and mental phenomena exist as realities (or things by themselves), but that the (external) material objects likewise exist (2s things by themselves). (To their address) it is said that the Constructor (or the foundation) of pbeno- mena (alone) exists"? He alone exists as a Thing in itself. There is no Matter outside him, i.e. Matter does not exist as a reality (or as a thing in itself, it exists merely as an idea). [10. 12] Why is it that there is nothing (besides ideas)? (The answer is) whe contains no duality“. (This means) that neither does this (Element which is) the Constructor of phenomena apprehend something, nor is he apprehended by some one. He represents (Monism, i. e.) pureCH. Il THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENAL REALITY yo musi know thal consciousness conlaining ideas of objecis arises withoul any exlerna! objects al all; just as il arises in dreams and (hallucina- lions) i1 also arises (in waking) and other condilions, il arises exclu- sively from a (subconscious) germ (which lays dormant in lhe Store- house of subliminal consciousness and arises in due lime lo produce an idea) when il becomes ripe for thal. [10. 18] If there are no apprehended external objects, there (evidently) is no one who apprehends them. !1 is (absolutely) impossible thal there should be an apprehending part where there is no (corresponding) apprehended parL'S Therefore there are beyond the illusive consiruclions of our imagination"® no (external) material objects" (and no consciousness apprehending them). [10. 20] However, if there is absolutely nothing to be apprehended, Salvation [10. (and omniscience) become impossible, because (this would mean thal) there neither is any Pure Objectivity (Iranscending the limits of the phenomenal world)."* Thal is 101 so, because (says the slanza) ,The Absolule however is conlained in him“. The word ,,however“ here replaces Ihe word ,because“. This Absolule indeed conslilules the Pure (Transcendenl) Object.” ! conslilules thal (Absolute) Univer- sal Reality in which (empirical) subject and object disappear.” fi is conlained (hidden) in the Constructor of (ihe illusive) phenomena (of phenomena! worlds). Therefore Salvation (and Omniscience) are nol impossible. 24] Bul if i1 really is contained in the Construclor of the pheno- menal world, we should perceive it, since il is presen! (before us}. Why then do we not perceive il? (We do nol perceive il), because il is concealed by the Constructor of phenomena, nol because il does nol exisl, jusl as the elher is nol perceived because il is transparenl, nol because il does nol exis. § 4. The third meaning of the stanza. The middle way hetween the two extremes of scepticism and realicm [11. 3] (The stanza) can also (be inlerpreled so thal its first phrase is directed agains1 radical scepticism and its second phrase agains! realism). Indeed (Ihe phrase) ,,the Universal Construclor of pheno- mena existsl“ has the aim ol repudialing the total negation of every (ultimate reality by exlreme sceplicism). I1 is nol true thal all (the Elements) are neither unreal, nor are they real“ (as maintained by the Madhyamikas). (All Elements) are real, (bul real only) inas- much as they represen! modifications (of the Element of pure) con- sciousness. [11. 6] (The second phrase of the slanza) ,he contains no duality" aims al repudiating a wrong impulation of reality." It is directed (against dualism), agains! those who maintain that the external world exists18 MACHYANTA-VIBHANGA [9. 26] But if that be so, then ,dnality“, (j. e. every snbjent-nbjent nnnple) will it nnt be tntally nnn-existent, just as the hare’s hnrns (whinh dn nnt exist at afl)? The Constructnr nf phennmena will then (alnne) represent absolnte existenne (existenne in itself). This wnnld imply a denial (nf the other, the nitimate) Absolnte. [10. 1] That is not sol benanse this (nther) Absninte is nnntained in him. (What indeed is this nther Absolnte?) Jnst this nniversaf nnn-exist- ence of the division intn nbject and snbject in (every) Cnnstructnr of phenomenal appearance is the Absnlute. Therefnre it nannnt be (deduced that the ultimate) Absofute does nnt exist.? [10. 3] (Now) if this Absolute cnntains nn duality (and if it is inherent in every Constractnr of a phennmennn), why is it that we are nnt nmni- scient.” ff it is present (befnre us) why is it nnt perceived? fn nrder in solve this doubt it is stated (in the stanza) ,,and in this Absnlute he is included*. [10. 6] (Becaus: this Absolute is not pure), because the Cnnstructnr nf phennmenal (illusinn) is also fnund in it, therefnre ynu are nnt saved {and omniscient). Just for this reason, just because the pure Absninte is covered by (phenomenal) impurity, it is impossible tn perceive it, just as it is impossible tn perceive the (gennine) purity nf the water- element, when it is soiled by filth. § 3 The second meaning of the stanza. Repudiatinn nf extreme realism [10. 9] (The stanza) also aims at repudiating (the nther extreme), the npininn of those who maintain that not noly the Mind and mental phennmena exist as realities (or things by themselves), but that the (external) waterial objects likewise exist (as things by themselves).” (Tn their it is said that the Constructor (or the foundatinn) nf pheno- mena {alonc) exists." He alone exists as a Thing in itself. There is no Matter outside him, i. c. Matter does not exist as a reality (or as a thing in itself, it exists merely as an idea). [10. 12] Why is it that there is nothing (besides ideas)? (The answer is) whe contains no duality". (This means) that neither does this (Element which is) of phenomena apprehend something, nor |CH, Il, THE UNIVERSAL CCNSTRUCTOR CF PHENOMENAL REALITY 9 must knew that ccnscicusness centaining ideas cf cbjects arises withcut any external cbjects at all; just as it arises in dreams and (hallucina- ticns) it also arises (in waking) and cther ccnditicns, it arises exclu- sively frcm a (subccnscicus) germ (which lays dormant in the Stcre- heuse cf subliminal ccnscicusness and arises in due time te produce an idea) when it beccmes ripe fer that. [10. 18] If there are nc apprehended external cbjects, there (evidently) is nc cne whe apprehends them. It is (absolutely) impossible that there shculd be an apprehending part where there is nc (ccrresponding) apprehended part.'5 Therefcre there are beycnd the illusive ccnstructions cf cur imaginaticn © ne (external) material objects!’ (and nc ccnscicusness apprehending them). [10. 20] However, if there is absolutely ncthing tc be apprehended, Salvaticn (and cmniscience) beccme impossible, because (this wculd mean that) there neither is any Pure Objectivity (transcending the limits of the phencmenal werld)." That is nct sc, because (says the stanza) ,,The Absclute hewever is ccntained in him*. The word ,,hcwever* here replaces the werd ,because“. This Absolute indeed ccnstitutes the Pure (Transcendent) Object.’ It ccnstitutes that (Absolute) Univer- sal Reality in which (empirical) subject and cbject disappear. It is ccntained (hidden) in the Constructcr of (the illusive) phencmena (cf phencmenal werlds). Therefcre Salvaticn (and Omniscience) are nct impossible. {10. 24] But if it really is ccntained in the Constructcr cf the pheno- menal werld, we shculd perceive it, since it is present (befcre us). Why then de we net perceive it? (We dc not perceive it), because it is ecneealed by the Constructcr cf phenomena, nct because it does not exist, just as the ether is nct perceived because it is transparent, not because it dces nct exist. § 4. The third meaning of the stamza. The middle way between the two extremes of scepticism and realism [11. 3] (The stanza) can also (be interpreted so that its first phrase is directed against radical scepticism and its second phrase against realism). Indeed (the phrase) ,the Universal Constructor of pheno- mena exists!“ has the aim cf repudiating the tctal negation of every (ultimate reality by extreme scepticism). It is not true that all (the Elements) are neither unreal, nor are they real“ (as maintained by the Madhyamikas). (All Elements) are real, (but real only) inas- much as they represent modifications (cf the Element of pure) con- scicusness. [11. 6] (The second phrase of the stanza) ,he contains no duality“ aims at repudiating a wrong imputation of reality.” It is directed (against dualism), against those who maintain thet the external world exists rn MADHYANTA-VIBHANGA, just as it appears, uamely as somethiug real iu itself, (both subject and object being ultimately real), iudepeudeutly from (that oousciousuess) whioh is the Coustruotor of pheuomeua.” The aim (of the text is to emphasize) that the Coustruotor of pheuomeua aloue exists, (hut uot the llusive pheuomeua whioh are ooustruoted hy him). {11. 9] However there are also some philosophers who thiuk that the ahseuce of both (a subject aud au object) means au ahsolute hlank,? suoh as the sou of a harreu womeu. Ou the other haud, there are others who thiuk that the negatiou of all suhstauoe * (aud its replacemeut by mere qualities— dharmas) refers ouly to the uegatiou of a suhstan- tial Soul regulating life from withiu (without affeotiug the full reality of all other Elemeuts). Therefore, iu order, ou the oue haud, to repu- diate the negatiou of the Uuiversal Absolute, aud iu order, ou the other hand, to deuy the reality of a substance iu every siugle thiug” it is stated that the Absolute however is ooutaiued iu him*. [11.12] If the Absolute is coutaiued iu this Uuiversal Coustruotor of phenomenal (i. e. iu every real thiug), theu all liviug heiugs will per- ceive it and will easily attain (omuiscieuoe and) Salvatiou. However this does not happen, because (the stanza says) »And iu the Absolute again he is included™. (It exists under the cover of pheuomeua). As Jong as the Absolute is not disclosed Salvatiou is uot possible. It is concealed®” and a great effort is needed for purifyiug it Therefore there is no easy Deliverance, § 5. The fourth interpretation of the stanza. The contrast between Phenomenal and Absolute Reality {41.17] There is a further (interpretation, but as a matter of faot) it is not diferent from what.has been stated above™ regarding the essence of Reality. (Reality is dowble), impure and pure (or phenomenal and absolute). According to this interpretation the stanza ,The Universal (Coustractor af phenomenal (illusion) exists, etc. etc.“ pursues the aim af calling attention™ (to this aspect of the problem, viz.) the corrup- tion (of pure Reslity through the phenomenalizing forces) and its purification (on the Path towards Nirvana). Phenomenal Reality (or the 32 stages of ever revolving life) is identical with the Consiruetor ot iffesion, because the essence of this construction is nothing het the (phenomenal) illsion™ (of.a mentally consiructed quasi real ts this to be understood? How can the essence of the Conntventor of phonceneeal reality represent an illusion? (Was it not ed son tt che exists abeobstely", being 2 reality-in-itself). | | |CH. 1, THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENAL REALITY a1 it docs not cxist (ultimatcly) in itself. {In itsclf ultimate rcality is moni- stic). It is thercfore cvident that (from this point of view) the esscncc of the Constructor of phcnomena is nothing hut a (transcendental) Musion.* {11. 22] Now (the next words of the stanza, viz.) «The Ahsolnte however is contained here (i. e. in him)“ (according to this interpretation) refer to a consideration (of ahsolute reality) as a purifying (force counteracting the defiling forces of transcendental illusion). {11. 23] The essence of purification consists in (the realization) of the Absolute, since (pure or ahsolute Reality) means non-duality (or Monism). We must moreover consider that (it is not Nirvana alone which is here taken as the Absolute, hut) Nirvana as well as the Path towards it, because both Nirvana and the Path (or, in other words, the Buddha and the Saint) are brought in full relief hy (the idea of) the Ahsolute. The pure Reality (of the Absolute or of Nirvana) mnst be converted into the Path towards Nirvana (by the Saint) taking his stand in phenomenal reality. (Nirvana) is not something existentially separate (from phenomenal reality). In order to point out (this relation between absolute and phenomenal reality), the stanza says here“ (ij. ¢. in him“), in the phenomenal reality, (sc. the Absolute is immanent in the Pheno~ menal).'5 {12. 2] Now, if this division (of reality into object and subject) does not really exist, why is it that simple people are mistaken and think that (both the object and the subject) really exist? In answer to this qnestion (the stanza states) — ,andin the Absolute again he is ineInded*; whe“, i, e. the Constructor of the division ™ (of reality) into an objective, grasped part and into a subjective, grasping part, (he is contained merged in the monistic Absolute). It is jnst as the images of elephants and other (animals) which appear in a magically evoked phantom in which no real elephants® are contained. (The snbject-object image of the world is a phantom concealing the absolute monistic world- reality). [12.5] The term ,,Creator of phenomena“ means that one in whom this division does not exist or that one by whom it is constructed. {12. 6] The word phenomena“ (or unreality, not-genuine reality) suggests that the form in which reality here appears to us, the form divided into an object grasped and a subject grasping it, does not (ultimately so exist). [12. 7] The word ,,Constructor“ suggests that the objects do not exist in that form into which they are converted (by creative imagination). ‘We have thus emphatically stated that the essence of reality is some- a quite free from the division into two parts, the one grasping the other.2 MADHYANTA-VIBHANGA, § 6. The two Absolntes: the extreme concrete aud partieular aud the extreme abstract and universal {12. 10] This Creator of the phenomenal world who is he finally? (He is onr conscionsness!). The Mind and Mental phenomena in all the three spheres of existence (the sphere of men and gods of gross sensnal desire, the sphere of ethereal beings with purified desires and the sphere of gods with no sensuous desires}; the past, the present and the fntnre, so far as they, being interconnected as causes and effects, agree as constituting phenomenal life, beginningless in time and lasting until the moment of Nirvana—are each of them, without any differenee, creators of phenomenal illusion. (They are the causally interrelated but mental Elements of the phenomenal world—samskrta- dharma). A difference between them (is introduced with) the separa- tion’ into an apprehended and an apprehender parts. The apprehended, objective part is constituted by the ideas representing (the external world), inanimate things and living bodies. The apprehending, sub- jective part is constituted by ideas representing the Ego and its sensa- tions. Their duality consists of the apprehended and the apprehending parts, the apprehended is e. g. a coloured (surface), the apprehending part is the (corresponding) visual sensation. [12. 15] The fact of the unreality of the relation between a grasped and a gras- ping part, the universal fact of its unreality® (or relativity), this fact repre- sents (the part) of the Absolute which is inherent in the Creator of the world-illu-sion.» But that does not mean that the Creator of this unreal relation, fof this relativity), is himself unreal.” (He is himself quite real, but he creates illusion). Just as when we mistake a rope for a serpent the rope is devoid of the reality of a serpent, devoid of it at any time, but it is not devoid of the essence of the rope; just so in the case under consideration (the moment which creates phenomenal appearance is itself devoid of this appearance, but it is not devoid of the nature of being its creator). [12. 18] (The stanza says) And in the Absolute again he is included’, i. e. the Constructor of appearance is included. Thus (by these words) it is suggested that the (easy) cognition of the Absolute (i. e. easy Omniseience) is impossible, since it (i. . the Absolute) lays (hidden and) oppressed” by accid=nial obscurations. {12. 20] Accordingly it is said (in Scripture}: yhe (the Bodhisattva) rightly perceives that if something is absent (from a receptacle, this receptacle) is then considered as .devoid" of that thing“. And here, (in the case wader consideration), what is absent? and in what (receptacle) is it abocat? ‘The division (of concrete reality) into two parts (is absent and it ie absent) in the Creator of phenomenal illusion. Therefore (the Bo- ‘@hisattve) intuits that (the Element which is) the Creator of the phenomenaiCH, I THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENAL REALTY 23 world is devoid“ of the division into two parts. But that residue which remains after all duality has been rescinded is (ultimately) real. And what is it that here remains? (Two items remain, viz. the Element) which is the Creator of phenomenal reality and the Absolute, * (i. e. the eatreme Particular and the extreme Universal). Both these items are (ultimately) real (the ultimate Particular and the ultimate Universal). This (the Bodhisattva) intuits (directly), without any wrong imputation of reality and without denying it where it exists. This he intuits accord- ing to reality as it really is. {12, 25] Indeed by intuiting that (the Element which is) the Creator of the world-illusion contains in himself no duadty (of one part grasping the other), the imputation of a wrong reality is obviated. And by intuiting that (the particular moment) creating illusion, as well as the Absolute (or the totality of these moments both) really exist, an evtreme scep~ ticism is set aside. [13. 1] We thus have ehcited the correct definition (of that prineipie whieh conentionaly is known by the name of) .Voidness", because (we have estab.ished) tnat the thing which is devoid of something, exists, but the tning of which it is devoid does not exist [13. 2] (This oar defin.tion of the principle of Voidness“ is the only right ore. According to it one part of the Elements of existence are not ultimate realities, but the other, the part which ,remains" after the deduction of the first, is absolutely real. Both the definitions of the Madhyamikas and Sarvastivadins, on the other hand, are) wrong defini- tions. (The first maintain that) not a single Element is real, (the second) that ,,every thing (i. e. every Element) really exists“. The consequence of both these definitions would be to make impossible the principle of nVoidness* itself.“ (Indeed if we with the Madhyamikas declare that not a single Element is real, that) there is no such particular thing which we could characterize as the real thing which is ,devoid" (of the object- subject relation,) then there can also be no general principle of ,Void- ness“ (in that sense), because indeed a general principle is dependent on the reality of particular things, as e. g. the principle of instantaneous being“ (is dependent on the reality of particular instantaneous single things).5 [13. 5] (On the other hand if we with the Sarvastivadins maintain that ,every thing exists,“ i. e. that whatsoever is an Element is eo ipso real), then both (object and subject) will be ultimately real and there evidently will be no ,Voidness“ (in the sense of the ultimate unreality of this relation). {13. 6] (The Sarvastivadin objects). If the relation of object to subject is something absolutely unreal, unreal as the horns on the head of a hare, what does it then mean that the Constructor of phenomena is ,,devoid“ of this division? (Does it mean that he is ,devoid* of nothing?).MADHY ANTA-VIBHANGA, Experierce shows that only a real thing can be deprived of another real thing, ase. g. a cloister can be deprived of monks (not otherwise!) [13.8] (The Yogacara answers). That is not so! (It is just as in the case of ‘lusions and hallucinations). Supposing a rope (lying on the road in the dark) is mistaken for a serpent, or (supposing we have) a magically excked vision (of a man supposing then somebody, in order to clear off the misrepresentation,!’ declares there is here no serpent or athere 1< here ao (real) man"; just so, in order to induce naive men to quit their (realistic) habits of thought (and in order to brirg home to them the notion of the Absolute), it is declared to them ,,the Constructor of this phenomenal world is rid of the double form of subject and object, this form is Appearance, it does not exist in itself (it is not an ultimate reality at all". § 7. The Middle Path [Stanza 1. 2] Neither is it asserted That all (the Elements) are unreai, Nor are they all realities; Beoause there is ex:stenoe, And also non-existence, And (again) existence: This is the Middle Path! Vasubandhu's Comment [V. 2. b, 1-5] ,Neither unreal are (all the Elements of existence), because there are (two items that are real, viz. the eternal, all-embracing) Absolute and the (instantaneous) Corstructor of phencmena. Nor are they not-unreal (i. . not all are real). Inasmuch as there is separation into two parts (the one grasping the other) there is no (genuine) reality. wAll (the Elements)" means (the two main groups into which the 75 Elements of existence established in the Hinayana are divided, viz.) the ,caused* ones which are (also) the constructors of phenomena and the uncaused* ones which is the Absolute. ,,It is asserted“ means it is established. Because there is existence“ — this refers to the real exist- ence of the Constructor of phenomena; ,and (also) non-existence’, this refers to the division (into an object and a subjeot) ,and (again) existence®, this refers to the presence of the Absolute in the Construotor and of the Constructor in the Absolute. ,, This is the Middle Path“, these Sor intimate that neither are all Elements exclusively ungesl nor are bey exclusively real. ‘an interpretation of the Middle Path agrees St (many) pescages from the ,Discource on Transcendent Intuition“‘CH. I. THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENAL REALITY 25 Sthiramati's comment {13. [15] With what aim has this stanza been composed? Its aim is to declare that all (the Elements of reality), the caused (or instantaneous) ones and the uncaused (or eternal) ones are (in their ultimate essence) not affected by the division into one part grasping the other. This indeed also appears as the real meaning of the passages from the ,Discourse on Transcendent Intuition“ which declare that,,all this is ncither unreal nor is it real“. It repudiates the radical (theories of extreme scepticism which declarcs that not a single Element is real, and of extreme rcalism which maintains that whatsoever is an Element is eo ipso real). Other- wise the first half of this text (,not unreal‘) would stand in contradiction to the other half (,not real“). [13. 19] (The stanza) moreover has the aim of establishing (the doctrine of) the Middle Path—otherwise either the unreality or the reality (of all Elements) would be onesidedly asserted — and also of making a concin- sive statement regarding the repudiation of an exaggerated denial of reality, as well as of an exaggerated assertion of it. (Asserted is as real first of a!l) the cansally interdependent Element," which is the Con- structor (or the basis) of phenomena, because it obtains its own realiza- tion in strict dependence on causes and conditions. (Asserted is as real) also the Absolute, the uncaused Element, since it does not depend on (causes and possesses an independent, absolnte reality of its own). »This is asserted sc. in the ,Discourse on Transcendent Intnition* and similar works. {13. 23] (The words of the stanza) ,because there is existence“ refer to (that Element of existence which is) the Constructor of phenomena, {they mean that all Elements cannot be nnreal, because admitted mnst be the reality of the Constructor of the phenomenal worlds), That essence of every causally interrelated Element of existence which is the Constructor of the (corresponding) phenomenon, (it alone) is not nnreal, (it is absolntely real as a Thing-in-Itself). Bnt that other essence of this Element which converts it into either an apprehended object or an apprehending snbject is (a construction of onr prodnctive imagination), it is not nltimately real. (This is expressed in the further words of Vasnbandhu) ,because there is non-existence“, non-existence namely of this dnality.# {14. 1] (The repetition in the stanza of the words) ,and again because of existence“ * refers to the presense of the Absolnte in the Constructor as being its universal property and (vice versa) of the Constructor in the Absolnte as being the possessor ™ of that property. Thus it is that the ,nncaused“ (i. e. the eternal Element or the Absolute) is not unreal, (not relative), inasmuch as it represents the ,Elementness" (or absolute totality of all the genuinely reat Elements of existence)”%6 ‘MADHYANTA-VIBHANGA {14. 3] When (the Scripture) maintains that it is not real (in saying that it is qneither not devoid nor devoid“), this shonld he interpreted so that in itself it is essentially devoid, (hnt devoid only) of the division in twe parts, (the one grasping the other). (14. 4] (It is said in the stanza)—,And this is the Middle Path“. Indeed in the Ratnakata™ and other (scriptural works) we find the following deliverance: ,O, Kadyapal It exists“ is one extreme, ,it does not exist* is another extreme. The intermediate attitude hetween these two extre- mes, O, Kiayapa is called the Middle Path. It represents the (deepest) intuition of that reality (which is hidden at the hottom) of every Ele. ment of Existence. This is the Middle Path. In this manner the Middle Path is made to agree (with our System).* [14. 7] The word yall* (used in the sacred texts in snch phrases as yall is real*— sarvam asti, and yall is unreal“— sarvam Sinyam) refers te (both categories of the Elements of existence as estahlished in the early schools, viz.) the causally dependent (or instantaneons ones— samskria) and the cansally independent (or eternal ones — asamskrta), The Elements are not all exclnsively (relative and) nnreal, hecanse there are among them two Elements that are (absolntely) real; they are the (instantaneous) Constructor lying at the bottom of every phenomenon and the (eternal Flement) of the (allemhracing) Ahsolnte.” [14. 9] Nor is it exclusively real*,*! since (their appearance, viz. their divi- sion) into two parts (the one grasping the other) does not (in nitimate reality) exist at all. [14. 10] Whether we assnme that all the Elements (into which reality has been analyzed in Buddhism) are real or that all are nnreal, in both these cases, we shall have extremes, bnt not the Middle Path. $§ &. The categories of ideas im which the Creator nf the phenomenal worlds manifests himself Vasubandho's Comment {V. 2b. be Ate Bev thas ob thus pei ie (our Prodnetive jmagination) se from the positive side (as existent) and from thes wien etait postive side fee existe) Mind and Matter} onl the different categories Mind ae Mat, pial, be now indicated: {Stamm 1.3] The Mind itself appears to ns As a projection of things (inanimate), As well as living bodies, (As the ideus) of a Self and his sensations. Their objects do not exist however, And without! them unreal are also These (‘deas).CH, IL THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENAL REALITY 27 [V. 2. b. 6] (There are four eategories of ideas, ideas of iuauimate tbiugs, of liviug bodies, of a Self aud of bis differeut seusatious). Amoug them the ideas of thiugs (iuauimate reduce) to seuse-data, sueb as eoloured (surfaees aud differeut sbanes) ete.;tbey are projeetious appeariug to us as real (external) objeets. The ideas of auimate tbiugs (or liviug bodies reduee) to the five orgaus of seuse wbieb appear as projeetions eou- ueeted with oue's owu or with auotber mau’s eoutinuity of life (iu some bodily frame). Tbe idea of tbe Self is the Miud (itself, but not tbe pure Miud of the Absolute), it is the pbeuomeual Miud iutimately eonueoted witb egotism. The ideas of seusatiou are tbe six kiuds of seuse-pereeption (iueludiug the pereeptious, or appereeptious, of tbe iuterual seuse). [V. 3. a. 1] The stanza says ,tbeir objects do uot exist", beeause the thiugs iuauimate aud the liviug bodies are projectious of notbiug, they do not exist at all;? aud the ideas of a (pbenomeual) Ego and of sense-pereep- ton are (pereeptive ideas, but) wroug ideas, (iuasmueb as tbe external objeots correspouding to them do uot exist). Aud siuoe these (external' objects do uot exist the pereeptious apprebeudiug them do uot (really exist likewise. Stbiramati's Commeut [14. 12] (Vasubaudhu says) ,after baviug thus characterized tbe Creator of pbeuomeual reality from tbe positive aud from the uegative sides“ — (these words bave the followiug meauiug). A positive obaraoteristio" meaus bere a obaraoteristio tbrougb reality, to wit .Tbe Coustruotor of pbeuomeua exists“. Tbe (ultimate) reality of the Creator of the world-illusiou is thus iudioated, suob is the meauing. [14. 15] lu the same way is be obaraoterized by uou-existenoe. Tbe uou- existeuoe of sometbiug is a uegative obaraoteristio. (This uon-existeuoe bere refers) to the uou-ezistence iu the (double) form of an apprebeuded objeot and of tbe suhjeot appreheuding it. Beoause this double form does uot really exist iu the Creator of pbeuomeual reality, therefore this Creator bimself also does uot exist, (i. e. be does uot exist) so far this his double form is ooucerned. This is asserted. {14. 18] (Vasuhaudhu says) ,uow tbe particular essence will be indioated*. What iudeed is (here) the difference betweeu ,real essence“ aud wpartioular esseuce“? (Is not the partioular esseuce of a thing its real esseuoe?) The real esseuoe is here the general, the particular essence is the speoial. ff tbe partioular oases (in which the Constructor mani- fests himself) will uot be indicated, what will happeu? The ,,body“ (or the compass) of the Construotor of phenomenal reality will not be iudicated. Therefore, iu order to iudioate that compass, the following stanza has beeu composed: The Mind (itself) appears to us As a projection of things (inanimate) As well as living bodies, As the ideas of an EgoB MADHYANTA-VIBHANGA And of his sensations. Their objects do not exist, however, And without them Unreal are also these ideas. The first meaning of this stanza [14. 24] (This stanza has) also™ (the followiug meaulug). It has heew here established that the Miud, uudiffereutiated iuto suhjeot aud ohjeot, is the unique (Reality), it is the Coustruotor of the pheuomeual worlds. (However formerly the Elemeuts of Reality have heew distrihuted iu 18 differeut groups, viz. six seuse-organs iuoludiug the iuternal seuse, six kinds of correspoudiug sense-ohjeots, iuoludiug the internal ohjeots of the internal sense, and six kiuds of seusatious iuoludiug the iuternal apperceptions or reflections of the Mind upou himself). It remaius unknown how are these groups to he rightly redistrihuted (iu order to tally with the new conceptiou). [15. 1] Iu order to declare that (the items of the old division) oau he syste- matized uuder the head of the Miud-Coustrustor as speciat categories ‘of ideas iz which he manifests himself, the particular items of the Construtiow of the pheuomeual world are iudicated. (The Category of the ideas of things corresponds to the six categories of seuse-ohjects; the category of the ideas of liviug beiugs correspouds to the six cate- gories of sense-organs; the category of the ideas of sensatious corres- ponds to the six kinds of sensations iu the old divisiou, and the category of the ideas of Ego is an additioual item ahseut iu the old classificatiou)- A second interpretation of the stanza {15. 3] There also is (another iuterpretation of this stanza). (The iuitial stanza, in the words) The Universal Constructor of pheuomeua exists“ werely asserts his existence, but says nothing about his essence. Nor is the reason indicated why notwithstanding the unreality of the division into object and subject, there is an inveterate belief in its reality. Neither has the reason been indicated why (instead of believiug iu the reality of the external world) we should believe in the unreality of the division of existence into an objective part and a subject grasping it” Therefore im order to indicate all this, the stanza says: The Mind itself appears i us As a projection of things and Foing bodies And as ideas of an Ego and Sensations. [15. 8] The easeace of the Creator of the world illasion is the Mind (himself, ‘his crontive imagination) The Mind is here understood together with ‘the menial phenomena inherent in him, but predominantly ™ the Mind Wvineeli (the pure Mind) is here referred to.CH, IL THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENAL REALITY 2 [15. 9] The cause of our inveterate belief in the real existence of a snbject and his objects (consists in the character) of our ideas of inanimate and living things (which always appear as projections into the external world). [15. 11] The reason why we should believe in the unreality of the division into object and subjeet is stated (in the words of the stanza): Their objects do not exist however And without them unreal are also these ideas."* § 9. Another division of ideas in three, resp. cight, classes. Mind-store ideas, Ego-ideas, six kinds of sensational ideas’ [15.12) Among these fonr classes, the two first classes, viz. ideas of things inanimats and of animate bodies constitute the Mind-store together with its satellites of mental phenomena.” It consists (exclusively) of the process of maturation in the Subconsciousness (of the influence of former good or bad deeds) and has therefore no outspoken moral character of ist own. [15. 13] (The second class is constituted by) the idea of 2 Self (or Ego), it represents the phenomenal Mind with the inherent satellites (of egotistic feelings). Since it always possesses the vices (of Egotism), it is morally not quite indifferent, it is an element (always) slightly vicious."* [15. 14] (The third class is constitnted) by sensation ideas. They are the six classes of sense-perceptions (inclusive of the apperceptions by the inner sense), perceptions visual and others with their satellites (of feelings and volitions). (From the moral point of view) they are either good (i. e. propitious to Nirvana) or bad (unfavourable for Nirvana) or indif- ferent, (accordingly as they are associated with a good, bad or indif- ferent volition), [15. 16] Thus we have (in our system together) eight categories of ideas, viz. 1) ideas of things inanimate and animate, (or of the external world), 2) ideas of a Self (or Ego) and 3—8) six kinds of perceptive ideas (inclusively of the apperceptions of the innar sense). They are accompa- nied by their satellites (of feelings, ideas and volitions). They all arise out of the subliminal Mind Store (the Psyche) under the influence of cooperating forces (which bring their germs to maturity). They mani- fest themselves in the five modes of phenomenal existence (as infernal beings, as ghosts, brutes, men and gods) in accordance with the possi- bilities (of each individual being). (The subconscious Mind-Store-theory thus represents) the second (of the four) great principles (intuited by the Saint directly at the moment when he attains omniscience, viz. the so called) Truth of the Origin of Phenomenal Life.™ [15. 18] (The difference in the fate of all the classes of living beings is con- ditioned) by a difference” which is produced in the subliminal Mind~Py MADHYENTA-VIBHANGA Store in accordance with the influence of former moral, immoral or neutral deeds, owing to which idcas arisc of mutually disorcpant cha- ractcr, (these idcas constitute the whole of all the manifold, phcnomenal individnal cxistences in all the spheres of life).7* [15. 21] How is it that our idcas take the form of external ohjccts if therc are none in existence? (We sometimes mistake at a distanoc # post for a man), hat if there were altogether no men in existence, never wonld a post appear to ns in the form of a man. This ohjcction is futile] (Whe- ther known or nnknown the ohjcct always appcars as somcthing cxtcrnal to consciousness). Indecd when an idca of a thing ariscs there isin the mind of simple people” an invetcrate hahit of thonght to belicve in the real cxistence of the ohjcct ontside our consciousness; c. g. pcople suffering from cyc-discasc have a constant vision of flying locks of hair, (thcy naturally perceive them as cxtcrnal to thcir conscionsncss). In ordcr that they shonld quit this their belicf (in the reality of things existing outside thcir conscionsness), it is said to them ,it is a mere idea, it only has the form of an external thing or of a living hody,” just as with ophthalmic people thc vision of flying hair (has thc appcar- ance of an cxternal thing) without the rcality*. 15. 26] Thus it is that the interdependent Elemcnts™ of the phenomenal world are (nothing hut idcas), mental realitics of cight different kinds.” It is here asserted that thcy represent the Constructors of phcnomcnal reality (j. e. they represent our Mind or its crcative imagination). Vasuhandhws Comment analyzed hy Sthiramati [16. 1] (Vesubandhu says that ,thc idcas of things inanimate reduce to scnse- dats}, such as coloured (surfaccs and shapes appcaring as cxternal) things“, i. e. they (thc inanimate things) iu their cssence represent coloured (surfaces), sounds, smells, tastes, contacts ® and ohjccts of the inner sense." They are ,projections because they arc produced as images having such forms. {16. 2] ,Ideas of animatc things are ideas of one’s own or another onc’s continuity of life superimposed on the five sense-organs“ says (Vasu- bandha), (i e. superimposed) on the five sense-organs which are the indication of animal life, because they represent the places to which (the beings) are extraordinarily attached. Sticking to them or attached to them is the living orgenism. On the basis of the production of sack images (of organired bodies) we have ideas which are their projection (into the external world). {16. 6] (Vasubesdim says) the idea of the Self is the Mind (itself, but not the pure Mind of the Absolute), it is the phenomenal Mind since it is intimately connected with egotinn*. Because the phenomenal Mind is intheately connected" with egotism, with a belief in the reality ‘ofl a Self, with the lowe of the Self and a pride in it and because theseCH. I IRE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENAL REALITY 31 feelings are directed towards the Self, it is quite all right (to consider) the phenomenal mind as the idea of the Self. {16. 9) The six sense-perceptions (five according to the number of outer senses and one apperception hy the inner sense) are ideas (founded) on sensations (says Vasuhandhu). They are sensation-ideas because they appear in the form of apprehender-ideas. On the hasis of their production in this active form of an apprehending (consciousness) they are (called) sensation (or intimation) ideas. {16. 11] , Their ohjects do not exist however (says the stanza), i. e. there are no external objects corresponding to these four classes of ideas. {16. 12] (Vasuhandhu says) ,because there are no (separately)-formed ideas of things inanimate and living bodies (beyond the ideas which appear as apprehending them); and hecause (the ideas apprehending them as external ohjects, viz.) the ideas of the Ego and his sensations, are wrong perceptions, (since they represent to us as existing in the external world things that do not exist there at all)*,* (therefore there are no external ohjects at all). [16.13] This means that the ideas (of external things), of inanimate things and living bodies, since they represent the ohfective (passive) part (of cognition), cannot he said to represent wrong perceptions, (They are no perceptions at all). Just their deficiency in having a separate form of their own,® (their coalescence with the ideas apprehending them), proves that there are no external objects (separate from the ideas grasping them). {16. 15] But other philosophers maintain that the external ohject is not alto- gether formless, since it has that form which the perceiver imposes on it. However the unreality of the external world is sufficiently established by the illusive character of these ideas.” {16. 16] (Bnt what indeed is the form of an object?) It is either the manner™ in which it is conceived, e. g. as being something instantaneous. This (perceptive character) the external object does not possess, since it represents an apprehended, (but not an apprehending) part. This means that if something is not an apprehender, (i. e. is not a perceptive idea), it can have no form (and therefore does not exist at all). Or the .form* of an object, may mean (its projection, i.e.) the distinct feeling of the presence of the object in the ken.” This the two categories of external things, inanimate and animate, do not possess, (because they appear as the objective part lying outside consciousness). Hence the formlessness Qwhich we are obliged to ascribe to the external object) establishes its non-existence.® [16. 19] (Now, we have established that inanimate things reduce to sense-data and the animate ones to the presence of sense-organs). If both these categories are formless, how is it that they are different, (their difference is it not a difference of form?) Indeed on the one side we have colours2 MADHYANTA-VIBHANGA. and other sensible qualities, on the otber the organ of vision and otber sense-organs. Under these conditions it must be asked what is the advantage of idealism (over the old realistic conceptions) equally admitted in life and m science. These establisb the separate existence of sensible qualities, on the one band, and of sense-organs on tbe otber. Why sbould we reject them and replace them by (the reality of the Mind alone), the Mind which is supposed to be not different from them in bis essence, {under the pretext that) there are altogetber no objects outside the Mind? {16. 23] This must be explained on the following (analogy). Altbougb our consciousness does not contain in itself a real plurality of different objects, it bas the capacity of producing a manifold of ideas. Each is produced from its own germ (wbieb lays dormant in subconsciousness) and is strictly peculiar to the respective continuity (of conscious mo- ments constituting a given personality). {16. 25] Thus e. g. the pretas (gbosts) imagine tbat they perceive rivers filled witb putrid stuffs, excrements and urine garded on botb sides by men armed with sticks. However otber men perceive these same rivers as filled by transparent fresb water which bas notbing repulsive, (the difference is not produced by external reality which is the same, but from the germ of ideas strictly peculiar to every being). [17. 2] The yogins again, wben plunged in transic meditation, being engaged in the concentrated contemplation of the borrible, perceive whole areas * completely covered, witbout a free place, by skeletons. Tbe same bap- pens in the so called krtsnayatana exercises when the yogin con- centrating bis attention on a piece of earth perceives the whole of the horizon filled up by it. [17. 4] Now, it is quite impossible that, if the appearance of ideas were strictly conditioned by the presence of corresponding external objects, tbey could arise independently from the latter; nor is it possible tbat these ideas should represent something quite different from the external objects which are supposed to have produced them. [17. 6] Therefore it cannot be doubted that all perceptions, wbicb represent external inanimate and animate things are produced witbont any pre- sence in the ken of such objects, And therefore (the two other cate- gories of ideas), those which represent the Self and those which repre- ‘sent its sensations, are wrong ideas, since they represent an apprebend- ing part where there is altogether no corresponding apprebended part Another interpretation of stanza 1.3 117. 9] Or (tee meaning can also be the following one). (The words ,their object does not exist" mean)— the object docs not exist in that form which is constrected by the Mind, (by its creative imagination). (The object ja wrong and) a wrowg idea is produced by a wrong object, as[17.4 CH, IL THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENAL REALITY 38 e.g: (the wrong idea) of a tiger is produeed (when a noise is mistaken) for his roar. (The objeet aeeordingly will not be altogether non-exist- ent, but it will be immanent to eonsciousness). 1] However it is our prineiple that (an idea eannot be divided in two parts, the one grasping the other, because if we reduee eognition to a moment of simple awareness, this) awareness (is pure), it is devoid of another part (ij, e. an objeetive immanent part) construeted by a seeond aet of awarenes.” Therefore just as there are no external inanimate and animate things eorresponding to their ideas, there also is no objective Ego and no objeetive part immanent in the ideas of pereeption.” [17. 13] And sinee there are no o>jeets (says the stanza) their ideas are likewise unreal“, An idea is something that apprehends.” If there is no apprehended part there ean be no (eorresponding) apprehender part. ™ Therefore, sinee there are altogether no objects, the ideas in their rdle of apprehenders ~ of reality do not exist (they are not ultimate realities), but they are not unreal in so far as they are mere imagination of things, of living bodies, of Ego's and of pereeptions (they have the reality of mental faets). [17. 16] lf we would deny also the reality (of these mental faets) we would run into the (Madhyamika) theory of universal negativity, because with the only exeeption of the reality (of ideas qua ideas), we do not assume any other reality (in them). [17. 17] On the other hand if we assume (in the idea itself an objeetive part) whieh is different from it, how is its apprehension to be accounted for? How is this splitting (of one idea into two parts) possible? ** [17.18] Consequently finally established is the prineiple which we have asserted at the beginning, i. e. the apprehended part and the apprehend- ing part do not separably exist, but that conseiousness whieh wrongly represents them asexistingin the shape of separate realities, actually exists, Therefore (as it is stated in the stanza): The Universal Constructor of phenomena exists! But he himself does not contain any division In tevo parts (an apprehended part And an apprehending one). § 10. The Postulate of Buddhism [17. 21] (The next stanza) begins by emphasizing that this (principle, the principle namely that a real consciousness constructs an unreal pheno- menal world must be regarded as firmly established). [Stanza 1. 4] Established have we therefore this That our (consciousness) creates illasion. HosenM4 MADHYANTA-VIBHANGA (Reality) is not such (as it appears), Nor is it a total blank Because extinguished can be that Illusion, And this extinction means Salvation. Such is our Postulate. Vasubaudhu's commeut {V. 3. a. 2] Therefore, iu the shape iu which (the world) appears to us, iu that shape does it uot really exist. But this does uot (meau that iu the jheuomenal world) there is ahsolutely uothing real, hecause this Uuiversal lusiow (has a real cause) which produces it. Why is it that we do uot admit (the world) to be au absolute blauk? Because we maiutaiu that Extinct Ilasion means Salvation. Otherwise (without admitting the reality of consciousness itself) there neither could be a real Bondage nor a real Salvation and we would bring upon ourseives the blame (of being Materialists) who do not recog nige the diference between phenomenal impurity and the purty of the Sthiramati’s comment [17. 23] Established is therefore the illusive character of these four catego- ties of ideas. ,Therefore“ means in accordance with the reasons give above in the stanza: And without them Unreal are the ideas. 117. 24] In order once more to emphasize the reality (of the Mind although he) creates mere illusion and to prove the illusory character of the divi- sion (of concrete reality) into an apprehended objective part and an apprehending subjective one; (the stanza) says: Jt is not such (as it appears), (Nor is it) a total blank. (18. 2] We can also explain the word therefore“ (in the first line of the stanza) as referring to the reason which will be indicated later (i, e. iu the second half of the stanza), In pointing to it (the stanza) says: Kis not sach (as i appears), {Nor is it) « total blank. [18 4] Reality) is not such as it appears (in the phenomenal is it an sheohae new Ema lndood 8 appears az divided ata © copvioed pat and a cognizer part. But of them, first of all, the cognizer part is evi- dently unreal, because from the four categories of ideas (which representCH. fl, THE UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOWENAL REALITY 35 the totality of our miud) two are uot cognizers at all, and two are wroug cognizers. (The categories of thiugs iuanimate which reduce to seusihle qualities aud the category of liviug bodies which reduce to seuse-orgaus are exclusively objective, they are uot cognizers; the categories of the Ego aud of our seusatious are wroug cognizers, siuce they project iuto the external world thiugs which do uot exist there at all). But the (immaueut) cognized part of our cousciousuess also does uot really exist, because (there can be uo immaueut object). (Pure cousciousuess) is absolutely devoid of every (secoud) esseuce imposed upou it hy another special meutal act. (Thus the immaneut object is au illusiou, pure consciousuess is ueither a coguized uor a cogniziug part). But it neither is a total hlank. [18. 8] (Vasubaudhu says ,that does uct meau that hehiud the pheuomeual illusiou) there is ahsolutely uothiug real, because although heing a mere illusion (jt has a real cause) hy which it 1s produced*. This meaus that although a reality hy itself, the shape iu which it appears is au illu siou, * (hut this illusion is a real fact) just as a magical visiou (is a real fact although it represents au illusion). The word ,mere* (ju the phrase pwere geueral illusiou“) has the aim of excludiug auythiug else, (the whole pheuomeual world itself is uothiug but illusion). [18. 10] The meauiug is here the followiug: siuce the illusive ideas really exist, it is impossible to assert that uothiug exists. However the uou- existeuce of the object aud of the subject of cognitiou are asserted, why is it theu that the uou-existeuce of the illusive ideas cannot be likewise asserted? (Wheu such a question is asked) the implied meaning is that such a topic as the absolute reality (behiud the illusive ideas) trauscends all possible cognitiou, uobody cau realize it, (siuce that Pure Awareuess which produces mere illusiou is iu itself uucognizable). [18. 14] (The auswer theu is stated iu the stauza)— [18. This is our Postulate, Extinct illusion means Salvation. That is the reasou why simple non-existence cannot be admitted. Ou the contrary. Its reality is inferred indirectly (through the dialectical oppositiou) of the parts of phenomenal impurity and of the purity of the Atsolute. 17] Otherwise, (says Vasubandhu)—i. ¢. if we admit the absolute uureality (of illusiou) —there will be neither Bondage, nor Final Deli- verance“. If this trascendental illusiou (this wholesale error) did not really exist, there would be no obscuration of reality and consequently also no Bondage, (no phenomenal life). And since Salvation means salva- tion out of a preceding bondage, there equally would be no Salvation. ”% MADHYANTAVIBHANGA, [18 20] But theu iudeed, ou the oue side, you do uot admit the reality of that shape of the world iu whieh it appears to us aud, ou the other side, you do uot admit its total unreality, (what do you admit theu?) Iu order to auswer sueh a thought of the oppoueut (the stauza says): This is our Postulate, Extinct illasion is Salvation. It follows hy implieatiou that as loug as this (transeeudeutal illusiou) is uot extiuet Boudage (will prevail) {18. 22) ,Otherwise, (says Vasuhaudhu) there will he ueither auy Boudage vor auy Fiual Deliverauce*, We would he rightly accused of deuyiug both the impurity (or pheuomenalizatiou) aud purity (or sauctificatiou of Reality). (18. 23] But if itis so, (f the hifureatiou of reality iuto oue part graspiug the other is uot ultimately real), how are we to explaiu that all liviug beiugs begivuiug from hrutes (up to the higher classes of gods) perceive the world iu appareut (divisiou)? However ifthis divisiou would represeut ahsolute reality, iu this case the impurity (and oppressiou of phevomeval life) weuld last eternally, There cousequeutly uever would he any Nir Vinal {19. 1] And likewise (ou the other hand) if we admit uo transceudeutal iflusiow at all, there could be uo (phenomenal) wretcheduess; absolute pority (and bliss) should be existeut in all eternity, Iu both these cases the struggle for Final Deliverance would be senseless. Consequently it must be necessarily admitted (what was stated at the beginning): The Universal Creator of the world illusion exists, But he himself does not contain eny division (Of one part of reality grasping the other).Chapter III THE THREEFOLD ASPECT OF THE CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENA § 1. General statement Vasubandhw's comment [V. 3. a. 4] After having thus indicated the ,particular essence” of the Constructor of Phenomena (i. e. after having mentioned the four categories of particular ideas in which he manifests himself} his ninclusive essence“ will be explained (i. e. it will be indicated) how in him alone, in him exclusively‘ (i, e. in every particular Ens) athreefold aspect is included. [Stanza 1. 5] As an objective (part) tis totally imagined, As the Constructor of that thing imagined Jt is (reality) interdependent, And as the merger of the subject with the object Tis called (the Absolute) The non plus ultra of Reality? Among these (three aspects) the one which represents (reality) as an ,object* (in ee to the A ject) is entirely presents (ee »} our imagination, The Constructor of this (corstru phenomenon (is a moment of pure consciousness) ,dependent” on other (preceding moments). The merger of this (constructed) object with the subject is called the Ultimate, the Absolute Reality.* Sthiramati’s comment [19. 5] (Vasubandhu says), ,the inclusive essence will be indicated”. This either mcans that just® the inclusion (of the three aspects) constitutes the essence (of the Constructor), or it means that (this Constructor) possesses an essence which is characterized through the inclusion of these three aspects.® [19. 6] Now why is this (inclusive character) indicated? (The reason is the following one). It has been stated above that the Constructor of pheno- mena (i. e. the Creator of the illusion of phenomenal reality) alone exists. He is free (of the relation) between an apprehended object and a subject apprehending it. However other scriptural works declare8 MADHYANTA-VIBHANGA that there are (in him) three different essences (viz. an imagined one, areal one and an absolnte one). Therefore in order to show that there is no contradiction with these works the inclnsion (of the three essences in the one) is here indicated. The Expositor (Vasnbandhu) therefore (emphatically) states ,alone in the Constructor of phenomenal Appear. ance, in him exclusively“? (are the three aspects included). (This is expressed in stanza 1. 5): As an objectioe part tis totally imagined, As the Constructor of the thing imagined EE is reality interdependent, And as the merger of the object with the subject T’is called (the Absolute), The non plus ultra of Reality. {19. 13] The object and the subject of cognition (are correlative). They are devoid of proper reality (each in itself, separately from the other). Although not (ultimately) real, they are imagined as being real. There- fore this their aspect is called ,totally imagined“. It does not exist in ultimate reality? but in every day life (jt is supposed) to be real and is spoken ol (as il both parts were) realities by themselves. [19. 15] (The second aspect is the aspect of causal) dependence, Since the origination ol every real thing is strictly dependent on (a complex) of causes and conditions (the real thing, the Thing-in-Itself) is called the Dependent.’ {19. 16] With reference to it the following stanza has been composed: (Bg creative imagination) not constructed, From cooperating causes originating, (Connotatively) unutterable at all, The thing’s own essence is Dependent; Tis the domain of Pure Reality, But it is get phenomenal.” [19. 20] The (nom-phenomenal}, the ultimate aspect of Reality consists in its apr fl (i. ©. in Monism, in the Universal character of the absence of a divisioa into object and subject as inherent in every single Constractor of = * It is not dependent on causes, (eter- nally) immatuble and therefore Perfection (of Reality). With regard to it the following staura has been composed: Jn the faa of reality imagined. Of nen-discarsive ™ (direct ‘the Sais OF ew rect Enlightment of the Saint)(CH, UL, THE THREEFOLD ASPECT OF THE CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENA 39 [19. 24] (The stanza says) ,on behalf of object“, i.e. (it is totally imagined) as an objeotive part. In the same manner (the words of the stanza) was the Creator of the thing imagined“ and ,as the merger of the objeot with the snbjeot“ mnst be interpreted (namely as definitions of the seoond and the third aspeot of the Construotor). [19. 25] (Vasnbandhn says) ,objeot here means the totally imagined form of it*. Objeots are here’ of fonr kinds, 1) the sense-data, 2) sense- organs, 3) the Ego’* and 4) its sensations. These fonr kinds of objeots are (mere ideas), they are not to be fonnd in the Constrnotor of pheno- mena (i. e. in reality) in that form in whioh they are imagined. Thns it is therefore that the first aspeot which is entirely oonstruoted by imagina- tion has no reality (at all). [19. 27} There is also (another stanza) on this (snbjeot): Imagination (is the Mind), Tis not itself oreated by imagination.” But by another mental act. Tis split in two, (an object and a subject). No ultimate reality obtains In this dichotomized form.* (20. 3] (Vasnbandhn says) ,,The oreator of this thing imagined (is a moment of consciousness) dependent oa other (preceding moments). It is oalled »dependent-on-other (things)", becanse it is not self-existent (not causa sai), since it depends on, or is prodnced by, canses and conditions. [20. 4} (Vasubandhn says) ,the merger of the objeot with the subject is the ultimate, (the Absolute Reality)“. It is called ,the ultimate“ because (of a double kind of perfection), 1) the perfection of immntability (as the absolute whole of existenoe), and 2) the perfection of Truth (as oognized by the mystio omniscience of the Saint only). {20. 6] (It shonld be noticed) that when we here assert that the Construotor of phenomena oontains no dnality (i. e. no ohjeot-to-subject relativity) this refers to the division (of reality) into an objeotive and a subjective parts, but not to the absenoe of every relativity. It is just in this Construotor of phenom:ua that Cansality (i. e. cansal relativity) prevails. For this reason it is oalled the Dependent. This same (Dependent Ele- ment), but having a (superinduoed) object-subject form constitutes the (first), the totally imagined aspeot (of the Coustructor). Again this same (Dependent Element), but layed bare of the object-to-subject (and effect~ to-cause) relativities is the Absolute. Thus it is that the Constructor of phenomena (i. e. the Thing-in-Itself) includes in himself all three aspects. {20. 12] And thus it is that (the idea) of the Constructor of the pheno- menal (worlds) points to that Pure Reality which at first mast be thoroughly investigated, (theu) must be layed bare (of all saperinduced” MADHYANTA-VIBHANGA illusiua) aud (fiually) iutuited directly by the Saiut iu a mumeut uf mystic eulightmeut wbeu all illusiua bas beeu cleared away (aud Omui- scieuce attained)” § 2. The unreality uf the external wurld Vasubaudbu's cumment {V. 3. a. 6] We will uuw demuustrate the esseuce uf tbat expedieut thruugb which the uegative characteristic” uf the Creatur uf Illusiun (j. e. the ultimate uureality uf the divisiun futu ubject aud subject) cau be realized. [Stanza 1. 6] When (the Pure Spirit) is considered All other objects disappear When disappeared have all the objects Their apprehender also disappears. This means that wbeu Pure Awareuess” is iutuited (as the unique ultimate reality by the transic euligbtment uf the Saiut) the perceptiuu uf the ubjective wurld disappears and, wheu tbe perceptiuu uf the (pluralistic) objective wurld bas disappeared, tbeu, takiug uue’s staud un ths non-perceptiua uf all ubjects, the perceptiuu uf Pure Awareness itwelf (in tbe rile of a perceiving subject) likewise disappears. Such is the method of (gradually) realizing the (ultimate) reality wbicb re- preseuts the merger of the appreheuded object and the apprebendiug Sthiramati’s cummeut (20. 14] As long as this (ultimate reality wbicb is) the Constructur uf the world is not thoroughly iuvestigated, as loug as attributes (are to him ascribed) which are not (ultimately) real, be preseuts hisaself as a (pluralistic) world of Appearance with its illusion, (moral and immoral) deeds and rebirths! Therefore iu order thoroughly to know that the world of Appearance is an illusive attribute (of Absolute Reality) and im order to show the expedient through which this can be known (the following stanza) has been composed: When the (Pure Spirit) is considered (All ether objects) disappear; When disappeared heeve (all the objects) (Their appeehender) also diseppears. 120, 17) (This means thet) sech is the essential feature of the Constructor of Ap- Peramon, or that this ahacuce of the object-to-subject relation is itself the iegative eanence (of the absoluic reality of the Constructor). (Vasubandha says} eam be catered", i.e. cognized. (The words) ,its expedientCH, lil, THE THREEFOLD ASPECT OF THE CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENA 4 refer (10 thal mystic inluition of Monism) after allaining which the Sain1 realizes thal this (division of reality inlo an apprehended ohjeci and a suhjecl grasping il) isan illusion.** I1 refers 1o the douhle proficiency (of the Bodhisallva lo gel rid of the helief in the exislence of an exlernal world, and 1o gel rid of the helief thal there is a consciousness really apprehending il). [1 hegins 1o he reached on the Path of Training (preparatory lo the Path of Vision) when all ohjecis wheresoever they might exis! will appear as fully absorhed in Ihe (unique, undifferentialed) Ahsolule.“* [20. 20] The aim of the slanza is indireclly to point lo this (Mahayamstic Path of Illuminalion of the Bodhisattva). (Vasuhandhu explains) ,when Pure Awareness is inluiled (as the unique ullimale Reality), the percep- lion of a (real) objective world disappears“. Pure Awareness means non-exislence of exlernal ohjects. A represenlalion which exhibils Ihe form of a patch of colour or any other (exlernal thing) arises oul of a germ which having aliained malurily appears (from one's Suhliminal Mind-Store), hut the paich of colour as an exlernal object does nol exist. (The Bodhisallva thus hegins) by realizing the non-exislence of the apprehended object in founding himself al he same lime (provision- ally) on the exislence of lhe apprehending suhjecl. 20. 24—21. 1] Indeed (in order io arrive al Ihe conviclion thal the exlernal world does nol exist) he should argue thus. A represenlalion can depend on an exlernal ohjecl either al the moment when il arises or (al a suhsequenl momen), when il has already arisen. Bul al the momen! when il arises (being in statu nascendi) i1 does nol yel exis! and cannol therefore apprehend the object. Neither can il do this {al a suhsequen! moment) when il already has arisen, because when arisen it already contains the (ready) image of the ohjecl. A repre- seolatico iodeed has no olher funclioo 10 fulfil as 10 appear io projecl- ing Ihe ohjecl inlo the exlernal world. A represenlation has nol lo lake aclion in order thal we may say gil perceives the objeci*.” [21. 5] But supposing ao object is employed aboul simultaneously existing represeolations, nol aboul nasceol ones; however under these condi- tioos * the production of the represeniation will nol be owing lo the exlernal objecl. The whole hypothesis of such an origin becomes senseless, because the perceplion of a simultaneously existing object is excluded (by our fundamental theory) of the instantaneous characler of every reality (the object, if il represents a cause, must precede the representation, bul being instantaneous il will exis! no more at the momeul when its cognition will be produced, thus the simultaneous momentary exislence of the objeclive cause and of the representation produced by il are impossible). [21. 8] According 10 the same ™ (principle of instantaneous reality) an object cannol be apprehended by a represenlation as long as it has not under-42 (21. (21. (21. (a. MADHYANTA-VIBHANGA. gone some change of its own condition. (There are some philosophers who therefore) surmise that the object nndergoes a change of condition Inst at the moment when it is grasped. (A new qusfity, viz. ,cognized- ness“, is produced in it). Bnt then we nevertheless will be obfiged to face the consequence that a changed condition of the object will (really) be grasped, and therefore an object wifl he perceived which (as a matter of fact) has hecome a different object? § 3. Repndiation of the Sautrantikas 11] There is another (phifosopher) who professes the folfowing theory. (All existence being instantaneons), it is jnst the disappearing thing that is the chject and the canse ef onr cognition which arises (in its track in the next moment). It is its (special) canse which is distingnished from alf its other canses and conditions hy creating the image of the object and projecting it(into the externaf world).* This same philosopher assnmes that either the atoms of colonr or of some other stnff, themselves or their assemblages, are thus the (real) ohjective canse (of the image). 15] (We answer.) In either case there is an impossihifity, (neither the single atoms nor their assembfages) can he objects. indeed every per- ception arises as representing either a jar or a cfoth or such sort ,of thing, it never represents an atom. It is however impossible that onr cognition should contain the image of one thing while its object wonld be a thing quite different. 17] (We must moreover consider that if we establish the principfe that the canse producing a cognition is its object, the canses are many, all will be objects.) The organ of sight and aff other sense organs (are also causes producing sense-perception). We will arrive at the absurd con- sequence that they will be (not organs), but objects. 18] When another philosopher™ maintains that only aggregates of atoms become objects of perception, not single atoms separately, this his objection is futile, Although the atoms be assembled™ they can be admit ted as objects of perception only singly, not as aggregates, but such & perception of atoms, one by one, never arises. They always appear as aggregates. Just for this reasoa the atoms cannot be the real objects of perception.” [21.23] Moreover an aggregate of atoms cannot represent a (real) object (as the real cause of itz perception for the following reason). (An aggregate is always 2 nominal Eas) and 2 nominal Ens can never be the cause {of whstsorver), Indeed when (we speak) of a cause producing cognition (a real, officiont camse is moant}, just, as the immediately preceding moment im the stream of consciousness is a real efficient cause (of the following moment). The object-canse should also be assumed {as a real couse, bat being & nessinal entity it cannot be 2 cause).CO TME THREES STD AQP TOF THE CONSTR TLR COTS WENA, + Thus it is that {the theory of the Sautranthas mamtaini~g that a> wistantaneous object produces? just at the moment when i disappears. a cogmitian lansing in the for uw -g moments cavmot be admitted. § 4. Repudiation of the Sarvasti:adins [21. 25] (Remains the theory of the Sarvastadsns who assume) that a1 ettinct tning can (nevertheless) be an object of cogation. Bat if ths were so, then a past thing and a future thing c-u.d be the object uf a (present perception). (However ths aypoties.s is quite unnecessary, since it is an undisputabie fact that a dreams and iin aallucinatrons) we have percept.ons without any (correspond ng externa’: cbject at all. [22. 1] There are some (realistic philosophers) wno mainta.r that even im dreams and hallucinations our representations are not altogether without any external object, since the'r object is a mark® {left by the object). Such a mark 1s a reflection (coming from iti, it has the nature of an energy (being neither a physical nor a mental object, but a force). [22. 3] However it is quite impossible to assume the existence during dreams of such marks (or reflections) when the objects themselves are absent, just as it is well known that ¢. g. the reflection of a face (in a mirror) never appears if there is no face actually present. [22. 4] (But even if we admit the existence of such an external force, we must face the former dilemma, viz.) the representation will be cither nascent or ready produced; neither the one nor the other, as has been stated above, could apprehend an object (the nascent because it does not yet exist, the ready produced, because being produced, it has nothing more to do and disappears at once).* Consciousness itself, since it contains the image of the object, represents its reflection, there is therefore no need to assume the existence of a specific energy (for the sake of explaining the presence of ideas in dreams). [22. 7] That consciousness itself contains representations, this must be neces- sarily assumed." If it did contain in itself no images (if it were image- less pure consciousness) it would be quite impossible to establish a definite correspondence between the object apprehended and the cognition apprehending it (sinee the apprehending pure consciousness would he always the same). [22. 9] There is another (philosopher) who thinks that in dreams as well as in the yogi's meditation, (viz. when the yogi concentrates all his thoughts on the mental contemplation of the disgusting and horrible condition of a putrified dead body}, there necessarily is some kind of penetrable (transparent, subtle) matter representing the external object. However such an object (if it were real) would possess real colour, figure and other (physical qualities) and this contradicts the permeablewm MADHYAHTA-VIBHANGA, character of this (supposed) external object cogoized (oot by the seoses, but by the Miod ooly). Aod iodeed with the ooly exception of the ,lateot matter" (of the Vai bhi sikas) oo other kiod of permeable’? matter has beeo assumed io scieoce ‘ Therefore this is a mere (futile) hypothesis. {22. 12] There are other philosophers ‘* who maiotaio that ooly such objects cao be perceived io dreams of which we have had a former experieocs, because a bliod-born mao caooot io bis dreams perceive e.g. the colour blue. {22. 14] But (we reply), it is oot true that a bliod-bore mao does oot perceive colours io his dreams." He ooly does oot koow them by oame, be- cause their oames have oot beeo taught to him, aod he therefore cacoot talk of them to others. (Eveo if we assume that we cao see io dreams only such thiogs which we have had some previous experieoce of), why should we deoy that a bliod-born cao perceive colour io dreams? He certaioly has seeo colours in some of his former existeoces. Dreams are not restricted to objects experieoced io the preseot life. There is 00 difference betweeo a wakiog aod dreamiog mao in regard of whether their ideas refer to the past, the future or the preseot. It is therefore pure faocy to maiotaio that dreams cao refer ooly to some actual experience (of the preseot life). (22. 20] (But eveo admittiog that only past experieoce cao be the object of + dream), since the past experieoce (is a experieoce which) exists 00 more, we sbould be certaio that the images we see io dreams are purely mental without any corresponding external objects. Thus it is that by obseriog {io these cases) that Miod alooe exists, we become engrossed io the idea of the unreality of the external world. (22. 23} (Vasubandhu says) ,basing oneself oo the ooo-perceptico of aoy objects the non-perception of Pure Awareness (in the réle of a perceiv- ing subject) is ikewise produced". Just as the object, which our Productive imagination constructs as apprehended outside our conscious- ness, does not exist and (the Bodhisattva) thus enters in an objectless domain (of thought) in basing himself on the principle of Miod only; just 10 (vice versa) in basing oneself on the strength (of the prin- ciple) of the unreality of the apprehended object, the unreality of the subject apprehending it, (the subject) of that pare intimation which apprebeads, is likewise realized. Indeed {these notions are corre- \ntive}, the apprehending part exists oaly as depeadent on the apprehead- ed cee, Uf the apprehended part does wot exist, neither does the Ome exint,CH iL THE THREEFO.) ASPFL7 0) THE CONSTRUCTOR OF PHENOMENA, 4s [23. 3] Now (since object and