sp oatee ‘ Office of the President of the Philippines Mulacaiemg MEMORANDUM TO : ALL DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY HEADS SUBJECT : AMENDED CRISIS MANAGEMENT MANUAL DATIE : 15 November 2000 Pursuant to the recommendation of the Cabinet Cluster on Security and Political Development (Cluster E), this amended Crisis Management Manual is hereby promulgated and approved for implementation, guidance, and reference of all government departments and agencies effective this date. Se eetos | CONTENTS CHAPTER I. CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS Section One. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ! Aa The Situation 1 1.2. Purpose and Scope 1 1.3. Crisis and Emergency 1 141 Types of Crisis/Emergency 3 1.4.1 Man-Made Crises/Emergencies 3 1.4.2. Natural Crises/Emergencies 4 1.5 General Tasking 4 Section Two. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK = 5 1.6 The 4P Crisis Management Model 5 1.7 Phases of Crisis Management 5 1.7.1. The Pro-active Phase 5 ~ Prediction 5 Prevention: 5 ~ Preparation 6 1.7.2. The Reactive Phase-Performance 6 ~ Initial Action 6 Action Post Action CHAPTER 2, CRISIS MANAGEMENT POLICIES Section One, MATIONAL POLICY 9 v1 Terrorism as a Criminal Act 2.2. Peaceful means and other Options in the Resolution of a Crisis 9CHAPTER 3. , Section One. $ No-Compromise with Terrorists 24 Safely of Victims and Civilians "Prompt Handling of a Crisis a Crisis at the Lowest Level Possible ’ Coordinated Government Response to a Crisis 27 Public Information Management and Advocacy Subscription to Anti-Terrorism Covenants ?9 Respect for Human Rights 2.10. Crisis Situation Involving Foreign Nationals .11 Involvement of Filipino in Crisis Incidents Abroad 2.12 Evacuation curing Armed Conflicts 713° Handling Hostage Situations 14 Development of AFP/PNP Nationwide Capability to Cope with Terrorist-based Crises/Emergencies 2.15 Organization of AFP/PNP Special Action/Reaction Units at al Levels 2.16 Guidelines in Addressing Crisis Siluation Arising from Threats to National Security Pursuant to Executive Order No. 216, 5. 1995 General Principles 2 ~ Strategic Concept B ‘TERRORIST-BASED CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES PROACTIVE PHASE: PREDICT, PREVENT, PREPARE 1 Predict 4 3.1.1 Intelligence 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 ML wy uw 4 2 4 143.2 3a 3.1.2 ae 3.1.4 315 Prevent 3.2.1 3.2.2 3. 1 Strategic Intelligence 15 3.1.1.2 Tactical Intelligence 15 3.1.1.3 Operational Intelligence 16 Events 16 Threat Analysis 7 The Threat Groups 3.1.4.1 Broad Categories of Threat Groups 3.1.4.2 Terrorist Characteristics 3.1.4.3 Threat Characteristics Matrix 3.1.4.4 Terrorist Goals: Immediate, Long-Range 3.1.4.5. Terrorist Groups 3.1.4.6 Terrorist Operations 3.1.4.7 Terrorist Tactics 3.1.4.8 Terrorist Targets Vulnerabilities 25 3.1.5.1 Static Dimensions 3.1.5.2 Dynamic Dimensions Controllable to Some Degree 3.1.5.3 Dynamic Dimensions that are Hardly Controllable 3.1.5.4 Factors to Consider to Determine the Vulnerability of Some Installations 26 Operations Security 7 Personnel Security 27 3.2.2.1 Consideration on Personnel Threat Assessment 3.2.2.2 Stages of Preparation in the Personnel Security Progress Prepare: 29 3.31 Plan 2» 3.3.2. Organize 30 7 18 18 19 19 19 20 2 24 28 28eee eceeee 33.3 Train 30 3.3.1 Equip 13.5 blaintain aL Readiness Section Two, REACTIVE PHASE 32 hl Initial Action B 1.5 Action Stage et 1 Negotiation 4 2 Tactical Action/Intervention 35 3.6 Post Action 35 3.6.1 Processing and debriefing 3.6.2 Protection of the incident scene 3.6.3 Investigation of the incident 3.6.4 Documentation 3.6.5 Filing and prosecution of cases 3.6.6 Training and retraining of units/personnel 3.6.7 Damage compensation and rehabilitation CHAPIER 4. CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION Section One. HATIONAL LEVEL ORGANIZATION 38 4.1 General 38 41.2 Peace and Order Council (POC) 38 13° Crisis; Management Committee (CMC) 38 ‘4 AFP-PNP Organization at National Level 39 4.5 Lower Level Peace and Order Council 4 ‘.6 Lower Level Crisis Management Committee 4.6.1 Lower Level Crisis Management Organization 4.6.2 Composition of Lower Level CMCs 4.6.3 Functions of the Lower Level CMCs 36 36 36 36 36 36 7 41 41 42 42 38Section Two. Crisis 4.8 49 4.10 Ald a2 4.13 AFP-PNP organization at Lower Levels B 4.7.1 Philippine National Police (PNP) 44 4.7.2 Philippine Army (PA) 4 4.7.3. Philippine Air Force (PAF) 45 4.7.4 Philippine Navy (PN) 45 Management Organization 45 Organizational Level 46 4.8.1 National 46 4.8.2 Regional 46 4.8.3 Provincial v7 4.8.4 Municipal/City ” 4.8.5 On-Scene Command Posts (OSCPs) 48 4.8.6 Crisis Management Action Groups 48 National Level Crisis Management Organization 50 Regional Level Crisis Management Organization 50 Crisis Management Operations Center (CMOC) 51 On-Scene Command Past (OSCP) St Crisis Management Action Groups 53 4.13.1 Negotiation Group 4.13.2. Operations Group 4.13.2.1 Security Units/Elements 4,13.2.2. Tactical Action/Intervention Units/Elements 4,13.2.3 Utilities Liaison Team 4.13.3 Service Support Group 56 Legal/Investigation Teams Intelligence Team Communication-Electronics Team Logistics Team Medical Team Fire-Fighting Team Administrative Support Team 1.13.4 Public Affairs Group 4,13.4.1 Public Information/Media Liaison Control Teams 53 54 54 55 55 56 56 57 57 57 57 7 58 584.13.4.2 Community Relations Teams 4.14 Inter-Agency Relationship at the lower levels CHAPTER 5. IUSTAGE NEGOTIATION Section One, HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES 5.1 Hostage-Taking Situation 4.2 Categories of Hostages 5.3 Categories of Hostage-Takers 5.3.1 Criminals 5.3.2 Mentally-deranged individuals 5.3.3 Terrorists Personality Types of Hostage-Takers 5 Tactics Against Hostage-Takers Section Two, HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION CHECK-OFF LIST 4.6 WIIAT (Situation) 57 WHERE 5.8 WHO 5.9 WHEN 5100 WHY 5. HOW =m 60 66 60 6 6 62 66 07 68. 68 68 69 61 6 61 58 58 coLIST OF FIGURES 1 Difference between Crisis and Emergency Crisis Management Model: Conceptual Framework 3 Proactive Phase in Crisis Management: Predict, Prevent, Prepare Al Threat Characteristics: Organizational Characteristics 5. Threat Characteristics: Behavioral Characteristics 6 Threat Characteristics: Resource Characteristics 7 Threat Characteristics: Operational Characteristics 8 "Prevent" stages: Operational Security, Personnel Security, Physical Security, Prophylactic Actions 9. Schema of "Prepare" Activities 10. Initial Action, Action, and Post-Action Activities He pocicmc 12A AFP Organization at National Level 12B_ PNP Organization at National Level 13 Lower Level Crisis: Management Organization 41 Lower Level POCs/CMCs 15. AFP/PNP Organizationa at Lower Level 16 Crisis Management Ad Hoc Organizational Chart 7 Crisis Management Operations Center (CMOC) 18 On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) 19 Ctisis Management Action Groups 20) Negotiation Group 1 Operations Group 22° Service Support Group 15 Public Affans Group REFERENCES APPENDIX Memorandum Order No. 121 entitiled "Updating the Government's Hoey an Terrorism, Pasticularly on Hostage-Taking Situations.” Vater pe 138 14 7 30 2 39 40 40 4 43 49 51 52 53 53 54 56 58 71CHAPTER 1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS Section One. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 1.1 The Situation Being located along the circum-Pacific rim of volcanoes and typhoons, the Philippines plays host to a procession of natural disasters, Volcanic eruptions, varthquakes, typhoons and tsunamis regularly wreak havoc on lives and property. Aygravaling these natural disasters are man-made ones like civil disturbances, lerrorist activities, hijacking and hostage-taking incidents. Such disasters consequently cause public anxiety, loss of lives, and destruction af properties anil sometimes socio-political stability. These Crisis: situations, however, may be predicted and prevented, or their adverse effects minimized. 1. Purpose and Scope Thi document establishes the concepts, policies, and general procedures for hhanclhing crisis situations to guide and assist all concerned agencies in formulating their respective crisis management contingency plans and standard operating pfocedures, Lo adelress threats peculiar to them Specttically addressed are man-made crisis situations arising out of the actions of criminals, terrorist elements, or mentally-deranged individuals who use violence or threat of violence to pursue their ends. Kvdatedly, the ALP, the PHP and local government units (LGUs), by virtue of their respective mandates, capabilities and resources -become the primary “intervention agencies” which can neutralize the perpetrators. 1 Crisis and Emergency » Hom the Greck word Krises, means “to separate.” As clefined by Funk and Wagnalls, i a timing point in the progress of an affair or a series of eventsThough ciisis is often used interchangeably with emergency, and crisis develops {rom an emergency and vice versa, these terms have a certain degree of difference. Emergency comes from the Latin word emergentia meaning a dipping or plunging. Funk aut Wagnails define emergency as a sudden condition or state of affairs calling for immediate action. ‘he following schematic diagram illustrates the difference between crisis and emergent y CRISIS : Hrodtossive sequence of events Bink dup of instability Ll | Fuming point Decision | | Change L Continuity ‘Survival ’ EMERGENCY ‘Sudden and/or Event(s) or Untoreseen _______,. State of affairs Immediate response Correction Mitigation Remedy L Recovery ~ Restoration CRISIS = EMERGENCY Figure 1. Difference between Crisis and Emergency P-= 1.4 Types of Crisis/ Emergency Cries or emergencies are either man-made or natural, and categorized as follows: Ll Man-Made Crises/Emergencies + Civil disturbance + Violent labor strikes = Riots + Anarchy + Disorclerly Mass Demonstrations + Revolt + Mutiny + Insurrection + Coup d'etat + Revolution + Border incident + War + Conventional + Nuclear + Kidnapping + Hijacking + Air + Sea + Land + Hostage-taking + Terroristic activities (bombing, arson, _assassination/liquidation, extortion, intimidation) + Attacks/raids on government installations/ facilities ancl vital facilities1? Hatial atses/Linergencies . + Conflagrations + Harine/Air disasters + Structural collapse + Hazardous spills + Ililities failure (power, water, telephone) > Unclear accidents + Hood Scarcity/famine + buel shortage + Pestilence/epidemic + Floods + Volcanic eruption + Farthquake + Tsunami (tidal wave) + Typhoons + Drought neral Tasking When a crisis arises out of man-made emergencies as described above, the Peace anid Order Council at the appropriate level shall be the organizational body that shall primarily act on the crisis situation, However, when a crisis results from a hijack- ing of @ vessel or from terrorism committed against civil aviation, the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking and Terrorism (NACAHT) shall address the situation in ac- cordance with its mandate, When a crisis occurs as a result of natural disasters or calamities, the organization that shall primarily address the same will be the National DisasterCoordinating Council and its subordinate entities. The disaster management activities in this regard shall then be governed separately by Presidential Decree No. 1566 clated 11 June 1978 andl its implementing rules, regulations, and policies: ‘This Manual is particularly designed to cover crisis situations resulting from man-made emergencies. Section Two. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 1.6 The 4P Crisis Management Model Crisis incidents occur when they are least expected, What makes these incicents hecome crisis situations is when they go out of control and cause destruction to life and property, or endanger public safety. The 4P Crisis Management Moclel is envisioned 10 address crisis situations in two-phases, the Proactive phase and the Reactive Phase that progress through the four stages; Prediction, Prevention, Pieparation, and Performance, 1./ Phases of Crisis Management Cis management isa continuing activity with two distinct phases: The Pio active phase and the Re-active phase. 1.7.1 the Pro-active Phase. Designed to predict or prevent the probability of oecurrence of crises and the same time prepare to handle them when they occur, Tt encompasses the first 3P's of the 4P Crisis Management Model — prediction, prevention, and preparation. + Prediction, This stage involves foretelling the likelihood of crises occurring whether natural or man-made through the continuous assessment of all possible threats and threat groups, as well as the analysis of developing or reported events and incidents. Crisis inudents can be predicted through updated inputs from intelligence teports as well as continuous monitoring and analysis of the confluence of related events. This stage requires continuous study of the targets of existing threats, and of the threat groups, their probable targets, and the vulnerabilities of critical installations and facilities, All threats and threat groups should be considered, whether or not they are internal or external to any organization or facility.+ Prevention. With most man-made crises/emergencies, this stage involves the institution of passive and active security measures, as well as the remedy or resolution of destabilizing factors and/or security flaws leading to such crises/emergencies. On the other hand, most natural crises/emergencies at this stage require vigilance and alertness to signs and manifestations of developing crises/emergencies. Warning and alert systems have to be established to raise the level of preventing the occurrences of crises/ emergencies, Prophylactic actions may be applied to both natural and man-made crises/emergencies to prevent them from developing to uncontrollable proportions. Preparation for crises/emergencies entails planning, raining, and stockpiling of equipment and supplies needed for such crises/emergencies, Simulated drills at unspecified days and times test the effectiveness of preparations, bring out flaws and weaknesses, and enable corrections/remedies effected to heighten levels of readiness of systems, procedures, organization, equipment and logistics to better cope with actual crises/emergencies. 1.7.2 The Reactive Phase-Performance. ‘This phase covers the last of the 4Ps, Performance, which is the actual execution or implementation of contingency plan when a crisis situation occurs despite the pro-active measures taken the objectives in this stage are: (a) to ensure a high probability of Success in neutralizing the perpetrators; (b) to minimize, or cushion the adverse effects of the crisis incident; and (c) to ensure a smooth and speedy rehabilitation or return to normalcy. The performance of crisis management action for terrorist-based cri- ses/management is done in three sub-stages; initial action, action, and Post action, + Initial Action." ‘All unit commanders are required to understand and acquaint themselves on crisis management ‘doctrine. As commanders, they will be held responsible for all their actions. Any military or police unit taking cognizance of a crisis incident shall immediately undertake appropriate actions to contain the crisismn aa EE RE Ee situation and report the matter to the cognizant agencies through channels, regardless whether such crisis situation is within or beyond its capability to handle, The initial action includes monitoring the progress of the incident, securing the scene, protecting the unit, establishing perimeter security, evacuating innocent civilians, if possible, and preventing the escape of the perpetrators, until the designated security and tactical elements/units augment the unit as they arrive. Other than the aforecited tasks, the initial action unit shall not engage in any tactical action against the perpetrators except in its own defense. Action. The action phase begins as soon as the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) is established and the Tactical/Intervention, Service Support units, Negotiation Teams and the Public Affairs personnel arrive and are deployed. The On-Scene Commander (OSC) gradually relieves the initial action unit commander and completes the staffing of the OSCP. The OSC discusses the incident with the commanders and staff of the units and agencies involved, plans what actions to take and establish positive contact with the Crisis Management Committee (CMC) to ensure that all his succeeding actions are cleared, The action phase consists of two distinct activities: negotiation and tactical action or intervention which may take place independently either simultaneously or in succession. In any case, both activities are under the complete control and supervision of the On-Scene-Commander. Post Action. This stage begins as soon as the perpetrators surrender, or when they are captured or neutralized and the crisis situation is leemed cleared. The On-Scene Commander ensures that necessary Post action activities are undertaken to restore normalcy and bring those responsible to court.a oo PROACTIVE PHASE ——_, ———— REACTIVE PHASE—___- = | rReDIcr | eee oe { PREPARE PERFORM | de ~ rome — | | OPN SCTY/ — | [Se] ee] pees TPUT THREAT SCTY CONTINGENCY | |__J ORGANIZE Sa mm wee 1 | (REE) Leary TARGETS: EQUIP, ACTION - WARNING/ [SIMULATED NEGO- See eee ADJUSTMENT ‘TIATION ___ POST ACTION FEEDBACK Figure 2. CRISIS MANAGEMENT MODEL: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKaan aaa Eo CHAPTER 2 CRISIS MANAGEMENT POLICIES Section One. NATIONAL POLICY 2.1 Terrorism as a Criminal Act The government considers all terrorist actions, regardless of motivation, as criminal acts and, therefore, shall be prosecuted and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. It shall undertake all lawful measures to prevent the conduct of such acts and bring to justice perpetrators of terrorism. 2.2. Peaceful Means and ot! Options in the Resolution of a Crisis The government shall exhaust all peaceful means in seeking a resolution to a crisis to minimize, if not prevent, the loss of life and destruction of property. If all peaceful means are exhausted, the government shall act promptly, decisively and effectively, choosing from the whole range of police and military actions appropriate to the circumstances. Armed action shall, however, be calibrated as required by the situation, to ensure safety of victims and innocent civilians, 2.3. No-Compromise with Terrorists The government shall not accede to blackmail or terrorist demands. Nor shall it grant ransom and concessions that will benefit the perpetrators and give terrorists an operational advantage over the government. Terrorists should be prevented or be denied! from benefiting from the fruits of their crime. 2.4 — Safety of Victims and Civilians The safety of victims and civilians shall be the government's primordial concern in the resolution of a crisis. In situations involving foreign nationals, the government shall act in accordance with its policies, and maintain close contact and coordination with the foreign government/s concerned. 2.5 Prompt Handling of a Crisis at the Lowest Level Possible All terrorist-based crises are generally police matters and shall be handled as such unless the situation escalates into that which requires a higher unit of authority to carry out the government's Anti-Terrorism Policy. The police, military and local government tnits’(LGUs) shall build the capability to effectively handle terrorist-related incidents anc arrest their escalation.10 is 2.0 Coordinated Government Response to a C Hw government shall handle a terrorist-based crisis through a crisis management committee (CMC) that is activated by the appropriate level of the Peace and! Order Council (POC) with jurisdiction over the incident. The CMC directs the mobilization of necessary government resources to assist in the resolution of a crisis. It shall also set the mode of interoperability between concerned agencies to ensure that operational demands during the crisis period are aptly met, and all government actions are coordinated and complementary, 2.7 Public Information Management and Advocacy ’ The government shall ensure the prudent handling of information to and from the media by conducting advocacy steps to effectively convey its position. The government shall ensure that the information it disseminates will not prejudice nor hamper ongoing operations or the crisis management process. It shall also ensure that government officials involved in the crisis speak with one voice. 2.8 Subscription to Anti-Terrorism Covenants the Republic of the Philippines subscribes to international conventions and initiatives against terrorism and will participate in all endeavors designed to strengthen international cooperation to prevent and neutralize terrorist acts. 2.9 — Respect for Human Rights. All government personnel responding to any crisis situation shall at all times respect lnuman rights of people, including those of suspects of terrorist activities. 210 C1 is Situation Involving Foreign Nationals In crisis situations involving foreign nationals or in crisis incidents inside an embassy or foreign occupied facility, the government will act in accordance with the existing bilateral understanding or agreement with the foreign government involved. In the absence of such understanding or agreement, the government will act in accordance with its policies and maintain close contact and coordination with the foreign government whose national or property is involved. 2.11 Involvement of Filipino Nationals in Crisis Incidents Abroad Similarly, if Filipino nationals are involved as perpetrators in similar incidents in foreign countries, the government will also maintain close and continuous contact with the host government and provide requested information relevant to the situation.=—— eee \ i If Filipino nationals are the victims, the government shall provide the necessary assistance for their immediate safety or repatriation in the country. 2.12 Evacuation during Armed Conflicts The evacuation of non-combatants shall be implemented by the AFP and PNP with the assistance of the local government executives and shall follow the guidelines instituted by the DSWD, DOH, OCD-NDCC and auxiliary NGOs such as Philippine National Red Cross. 2.13 Handling Hostage Situations 2.13.1 The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safety of civilian hostages as a paramount consideration that shall take precedence over all others. 2.13.2 Understand and minimize the mental anguish and agony of the victims’ family, relatives, and friends. 2.13.3 Achieve the early liberation of the hostages or victims. 2.13.4 Ensure the recovery and return of the loot or the fruits of the crime. 2.13.5 Ensure the successful case build-up and prosecution of cases against the perpetrators, 2.13.6 Attain effective integration of the efforts of the operating units for optimum results, to minimize duplication and unnecessary competition, ancl to promote efficiency. 2.14 Development of AFP/PNP Nationwide Capability to Cope with Terrorist-based Crises/Emergencies The AFP major services and the PNP shall organize, train, equip, and maintain special units based at GHQ, AFP and NHQ, PNP, with capability for nationwide deployment. ‘The AFP/PNP shall continuously develop doctrines, concepts, and proce- dures for containing terrorism taking into consideration our own culture, values, and justice system: 2.15 Organization of AFP/PNP Special Action/Reaction Units at all Levels Basically, pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 216 series of 1995 shall govern the organization of AFP and/or PNP units reacting to terrorist-based crises/ emergencies, itnn am ane aE eee 2.16 Guidelines in Addressing Crisis Situations Arising from Threats to National Security Pursuant to Executive Order No. 216, s. 1995. General Principles ’.tb.1 The AFP shall be employed to address internal security threats and such other threats posed by organized armed groups on the national security and territorial integrity requiring the employment of large tactical units and military weaponry. The PNP shall support the AFP in the accomplishments of this function, and shall, in certain instances, initially confront until such time that the AFP shall have deployed units/ elements for the purpose. As practicable, the PNP units/elements shall provide the AFP their holdings and assessments on the particular threat to ensure continuity and to preclude the occurrence of a security gap. 2.16.2 The PNP shall enforce laws and ordinances and perform other law enforcement functions, In the performance of these functions, it shall have unimpeded access to the operational area upon prior coordination, and it may call upon, and shall be assisted by the AFP. However, the AFP and its units and personnel shall not have law enforcement authority unless the exercise of such is in support of the PNP or other law enforcement agency or as a private citizen within the purview of section 6 of Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court. . 2.16.3 The PNP shall play a supportive role to the AFP during national emergencies, including disasters and calamities. 2.10.4 in the performance of their respective functions, the spirit of cooperation, coordination and accommodation shall prevail. Direct liaison, including regular inter-service intelligence exchanges and socials among those concermed is encouraged. 2.16.5 Service courtesies, particularly in regard to those accorded rank and seniority, shall be observed among personnel of both the PNP and AFP, especially during the conduct of official business. 2.16.6 Whenever units or elements of the AFP and the PNP are involved in an internal security operation, the unit or element of the agency with the primary role shall have operational direction and supervision over the units and elements of the agency playing the supportive role. The same procedure shall immediately be assumed in’ the case of conjunction of units or elements of the two agencies in the course of independent operations.eee ee ee ee ee 2.16.7 The units or elements of one agency placed in support of the unit or element of the other agency shall continue to perform its primary mission and statutory functions. Such support unit or element shall provide sufficient assistance in terms of personnel and resources without jeopardizing the accomplishment of its primary mission and statutory functions, Strategic Concept 2.16.8 2.16.9 2.16.10 2.16.11 2.16.12 Pursuant to Section 3, RA 8551, the AFP assumes the primary responsibility of preserving the internal security of the State. The DILG-PNP shall, through information gathering and performance of its ordinary police functions, support the AFP on matters involving suppression of insurgency, except in cases where the President shall call on the PNP to support the AFP in combat operations. In times of national: emergency, the PNP, the Bureau of Fire Protection, and the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology shall, upon the direction of the President, assist the AFP in meeting the national emergency. In line with Section 1 of Executive Order Nr. 110, s. 99, the PNP is directed to support the AFP in internal security operations (ISO) for the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security. The PNP is authorized to make appropriate adjustments in its organization subject to the approval of the NAPOLCOM. The turn-over of primary responsibility for internal security from the PNP to the AFP and vice versa in accordance with the procedures and parameters provided in these guidelines shall be in increments. of at least a whole province. General law enforcement functions nationwide shall be the primary concern of the DILG-PNP. 13CHAPTER 3 TERRORIST-BASED CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES Section One, PROACTIVE PHASE: PREDICT, PREVENT, PREPARE [ paepicr [Preven PREPARE + uppate~ om Scr | serve — ps oy] THREAT scTY PLAN anaLysis EASURES ORGAN mE | PERS SCTY/| PASSIVE /} scry TRAIN, | | ensures | PASICAL eu SCTY/ : | vrarnncy _ nee SIMULATED I SYSTEMS) BRILL AND — MEASURES pubIT PROPHYLACTIC ACTIONS ' ——— L - ADJUSTMENT I Figure 3. Proactive Phase in Crisis Management: Predict, Prevent, Prepare I — Predict The first and foremost concern of crisis management is to be able to predict the I likelihood of the occurrence of crises through the continuous gathering and updating of inputs, and the analysis of the threat. The inputs consist basically of intelligence and events. i 14 ih 7ee eee ee ee ee 3.1 Intelligence This involves collection, evaluation, processing, updating, and dissemination of information obtained from all possible sources. Intelligence for crisis management may be categorized as strategic, tactical, and operational. The requirements and sources of intelligence are indicated below. 3.1.1.1. Strategic Intelligence (International Threat Groups) + Requirements Identity of groups, leaders and members, known travel, recruitment Background, organization, training, financing, logistical support, weapons Usual areas of operation, international connections, state support Usual methods of operation Likely targets + Sources Police and military Diplomatic channels Friendly intelligence Press Clandestine reporting 3.1.1.2 Tactical Intelligence (Locally Operating Threat Groups) + Requirements (Same as Strategic Intelligence) + Sources Police and military Intelligence Service Captured/surrendered members of threat groups Concerned citizens Press 15=a eee 16 3.1.1.3 Operational Intelligence (Needed for Specific Incident) + Requirements Number, location, identities and background of threat groups Number, location, identities and background of hostages Weapons and explosives in the hands of threat. groups Detailed information on site of the incident and environs * Building design and construction, floor plans, utilities, locks, access points * Aircraft design and construction, communication equipment on board, access points * Ship design and construction, communication equipment on board + Vehicle design, construction + Terrain features of area, access routes + Airfield data + Weather data + Sources Observers at scene Witnesses at scene when incident began » Building plans ¢ Aircraft design plans and airport layout, designers Security and maintenance personne! ® Airport and airline personnel Released or escaped hostages Hostage negotiators Technical operators Ship design and layout, naval architecture 3.1.2 Events All significant information on events or incidents which could have a bearing on the types of crises herein addressed or data obtained during occurrence of'similar incidents or actual crisis, serve as inputs which can facilitate analyses necessary for the identification of probable threat groups and targets, or for formulating preventive measures, security procedures and probable courses of action when similar incidents occur. eeree Oe ee ee ee ee 3.1.3. Threat Analysis 3.1.4 AFP/PNP units must be able to identify the threat, its nature, characteristics, operational capabilities and probable targets and know their own vulnerabilities so that steps can be taken to keep a potential threat from becoming a reality. Threats may come in the form of kidnapping, assassination, ambuscade, arson, bombing, take-over of vital or high-value installations, or disruption of important national/international events. The Threat Groups 3.1.4.1 Broad Categories of Threat Groups + Political_Terrorists. These are _ideologically-inspired individuals or groups. They want prestige and power for a collective goal or higher cause. Many of its members have extensive criminal backgrounds. They often recruit new members from prisons, beginning their indoctrination and training while still confined thereat. These recruits see membership in the terrorist group as an opportunity to exercise violent behavior and they have pathological need for the support and identification provided by group membership. The CPP/NPA, MILF, the Abu Sayyaff and the so-called “lost command” are basically considered as belonging to the category of political terrorists. The ultra-rightist armed elements are likewise classified under this category. While these groups advocate different ideologies, their characteris- tics, organization, and modus operandi are similar in that they may follow violent patterns of terrorist actions such as hostage-taking, assassination, bombing of buildings, bridges and power lines, arson, assassination, ambuscade, ete. + Criminals. These are people who commit terrorist acts for ersonal rather than ideological gain. Some of their terroristic acts such as kidnapping or extortion, are planned. Others are not planned, but happen as a result of the confrontation and encounter with law enforcement agencies on an on-going crime. For instance, a number of bank robberies have evolved into hostage-taking situations when policemen arrive in response to an alarm while the robbery is stil in progress, 171s + Mentally-Deranged Individuals. These people commit terrorist acts during a period of psychiatric disturbance. This type maybe the most difficult terrorists to deal with. Many of them are impulsive and unpredictable. + Religious Extremists. Mainly belonging to certain religious fundamentalists. Intolerant of other faiths, they are apt to execute hostages belonging to other religions. + Economically-motivated_groups/individuals mainly belongir {0 labor groups. Depending on their ideological orientations, motivations and long-standing situation, recourse to violence may be resorted to for many reasons favorable to them. 3.1.4.2 Terrorist Characteristics + Common Characteristics — The following are characteristics common to terrorist groups: They promote fear. » Usually militarily weaker than the opposing security force. * Do not necessarily equate tactical with mission success. Publicity may be the main terrorist objective. © Highly mobile. ® Exploit the fact that terror is cheap. A few perpetrators with inexpensive small arms can create. disruptions affecting whole nations. Possess limited resources. Operate most often under cover. 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Cause government reaction, over-reaction, and repression leading to immediate public dissension. Harass, weaken or embarrass government, military police, and other security forces, Show government's inability to protect its citizenry. ® Obtain money or equipment. ® Disrupt or destroy means of mobility or communications. » Demonstrate power or threat credibility. Prevent or delay executive decisions or legislation. © Cause strikes or work slowdowns. ® Discourage impending foreign investments or foreign gov- ernment assistance programs or important events. © Influence elections, » Free prisoners. Satisfy vengeance. Long-Range Goals Cause dramatic changes in government from such outbreaks as revolution, civil war, or war between nations, Turn the tide favorably to their side during guerrilla warfare. Influence local, national, or international Policy decisions. Gain political recognition as the legal body representing an ethnic, national, religious or political, ideological group. 3.1.4.5 Terrorist Groups Cooperation Among Terrorist Groups Today, there is apparent worldwide conspiracy among terrorist groups. This include sharing of resources, expertise, and safe havens, engaging in joint operations. Certain foreign governments have encouraged cooperation among terrorist groups. These governments provide logistical Support, organize meetings between leaders from different 19groups, and assist in operations. These governments consicler the use of terrorism as a cheaper alternative to Conventional warfare. In essence, the terrorist groups also receive assistance from social, ethnic, and political groups in their area of operations. These front groups collect funds from people sympathetic to the terrorist group cause. They may also provide transportation, intelligence, guides and safe conduct/havens for group members. + Organization of Terrorist Groups : The way a terrorist group is organized is determined by the number of people in the group and their need for security, Generally, larger groups are penetrable and less secured while smaller groups can maintain a high degree of security, but usually have limited operational capabilities. Group size: Organizational growth creates administrative and support burdens. The larger groups can only succeed over the long term in a weak political environment. Group Security: Government forces attempt to destroy terrorist groups or keep them in defensive position to discourage them from mobilizing new terror. To reduce the effectiveness of the government agencies, terrorist groups must be extremely covert. 3.1.4.6 Terrorist Operations Terrorist operations are covert and well-executed. They are usually carried out by specially-trained, specially-equipped and specially-organized clandestine elements. + Weapons. Terrorists usually use basic arms and explosives during operations. However, they continue to seek access to advanced weaponry. + Training. Terrorists often undertake training activities away “from their homeland, usually in countries known to be sympathetic to terrorist activities. They usually ‘train in subversion, weaponry, infiltration and negotiation practices. Generally, specially-trained terrorists are of above-average intelligence. * 20 ae ee eeeo> oe = a oo ethods. Terrorists usually operate as small bands of trained Personnel carrying light automatic weapons, hand grenades, basic explosives, light rations, ammunition for several days, and light communication equipment. (This allow them to remain aware of public reaction to their acts). ‘They mask their activities by merging with the local populace. Teams include assault and security elements. Leaders serve as negotiators. During the hostage-taking or: barricading, Kidnapping, or hijacking, personnel of both assault and security elements take turns at providing security. They guard the victims and watch entrances and exits. They watch out for counter-terrorist forces, maintain their fields of fire and keep their weapons loaded and ready. Hostages are usually separated to prevent connivance or cooperation, escape planning, or intelligence gathering. Sequence Of Terrorist Actions: pre-incident, initiation, nego- tiation and climax, and post-incident Pre-Incident. __Pre-operational activities _include reconnaissance missions, lengthy periods of training, ‘and rehearsals. Plans are conceived by the command elements while target and area reconnaissance teams, and actual perpetrators do not meet. Information is passed down through intermediaries, liaisons, or by message drops. Most terrorist contingency plans include alternative targets, alternative negotiation demands, departure or escape routes and reassembly points. Initiation Phase. At this phase terrorists move to their target covertly, singly or in pairs along separate routes. They use fictitious names, fake identification papers and passports. Weapons and other items are sent separately to pre-arranged locations where they are to be given to perpetrators. Negotiation and Climax Phase. When the terrorists decide that a hostage or barricade or other similar undertaking is a worthwhile endeavor, they may use the negotiation phase to gain publicity. The negotiation may include certain specific demands that often require inter-government negotiations at the highest fevel. There may be trade-off, especially when the demands are more than the government is able to meet. meConversely, there may be no negotiation at all and the climax phase could immediately follow the initiation phase. Post-Incident Phase,’ During the post-incident phase, the terrorist. members regroup, critique and criticize the operation. They learn from and share their successes and failures. This learning is often shared with other terrorist groups. 3.1.4.7 Terrorist Tactics: bombing, arson, hijacking, assassihation, liquidation, ambush, kidnapping, hostage-taking, robbery and extortion, progressive taxation, raid or attacks. + Bombing Delivery to target is done through: + Vehicle bombs - booby trapped vehicles — with attached devices and car bombs + Laid charges - bombs placed by hand + Projected bombs - bombs thrown by hand, launched from rifles, or projected by a mortar device + Postal/mail bombs - bombs sent through letters, par- cels and other items sent by mail. Activation means + Command activation - by radio, electric leads, pull wire, or mechanical. strikers » Action by the subject or target - Trip wire, pressure device, light sensitive device, electric switch + Time delay - clock, burning, fuse, chemical delay, atmospheric pressure + Arson. This is used to destroy or disrupt targets such as Public utilities, political headquarters, economic and industrial facilities, + Hijacking. Hijacking and skyjacking are very popular means used by the terrorists, Terrorists hijack vehicles with supply, ammunition, or fuel cargoes. Hijacked “legitimate” vehicles provide the terrorist an easy means to approach or gain entry to a closed military installation. Skyjacking of 22 eee eocommercial aircraft, on the other hand, guarantees publicity for the terrorists. Assassination or Liquidation. This is the oldest but still the most widely used terrorist tactic, Targets are often predictable, and invariably, the terrorist will claim responsibility for the assassination. All three categories of terrorists operate against government officials, corporate executives, military, police and security officials. The CPP/ NPA’s sparrow operations are considered under this type of terrorist tactics. Ambush. This is a well-planned, generally well-thought- out, properly rehearsed and precisely executed operation. The terrorists have time on their side and will spend considerable time preparing for an operation. Terrorists have an advantage in that they can choose their time and place of operation. Kidnapping. Kidnapping for ransom is the most common form of this tactic. The victim is normally confined in a secret hideaway and the kidnapper makes material demands. Hostage-taking. The hostage-taker_ confronts the authorities and openly holds the victims for ransom. His demands are often more than just material in nature. Political concessions are frequently demanded in exchange for the hostages’ lives. The advantages of this new tactic are: First, because it is current, it attracts the media. Second, the fact that live hostages are involved increases the drama of the event, thus pressure can be applied by the terrorists to force concessions. Lastly, the hostage is a tangible-asset to the terrorist, something with which to bargain. Robbery or Extortion. Terrorist operations are expensive. To help finance their activities, terrorist rob banks and armored vehicles and persons carrying large sums of cash, Bank robberies are also used as graduation exercises for terrorist training programs and viewed as a tactical operation. They conduct reconnaissance, plan escape routes and operate with a high degree of efficiency. . 23_ Progressive Taxation. _ The progressive taxation scheme of the CPP/NPA is a form of extortion through coercion or use of force against the victim or his property. Raids and Attacks. Targets may not necessarily be vital, isolated or large ones, what is important is the raid or attack will-attract the public through media attention. 3.1.4.8 Terrorist Targets Military and Police. To the terrorist, the military, paramilitary and police elements are sources of arms, explosives and other weaponry. Attacks against the military seen as the protective element of the political or national body the terrorist is attempting to subvert, are an integral part of any organized terrorist effort. Military/Police targets of terrorists include the following: Sensitive weapons Arms and ammunition depots Command and control facilities Logistics/storages facilities ° Explosives Engineering and energy system Hydroelectric plants 2 Offshore oil rigs © Nuclear facility sites © Gas pipelines © Dams and electric power lines Communication and supplies © Communication lines and facilities «Chemical storage sites © Dock facilities 2 Equipment warehouses © Computer facilities Transportation ® Rail lines and cars ® Bus depots— mo i a I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 i Pa RI ROR TOTES 3.15 Airports and aircrafts Trucking facllities Shipyards and ships Main land routes and bridges + Human Members of the Diplomatic Corps Government officials Corporate executives Police Military personnel Dependents, close relatives, and sympathizers of the above Vulnerabilities These are the weaknesses in installation security and the high risk targets within such installation. These vulnerabilities are normally identified in government and military/police installations and facilities through security surveys and inspections conducted periodically or on- the-spot by intelligence and security units/staffs. The analysis of the threats to certain installation are based on information with both static and dynamic dimensions. 3.5L 3.1.5.2 Static Dimensions + Terrain + Nationality of population + Major Industry in the Area + Location of installation + Installation mission Dynamic Dimensions Controllable to Some Degree + Assignment of personnel + Security measures Used + Access to facilities + Relations with civilian community + Activities within post location 25nae eee eee 3.1.5.3, Dynamic Dimensions that are Hardly Controllable + Weather + Activities of hostile groups + Economic conditions + Off-Post demonstrations 3.1.5.4 Factors to Consider to Determine the Vulneral Some Installations ity of The vulnerability of installations can be determined to some extent through the consideration of the following factors: + Installation characteristics and their attractiveness as a target for terrorist acts + Status of Training of personnel + Availability of communications + Time and distance from military/police installations able to lend assistance + Time and distance from urban areas + Geographic region + Proximity to foreign borders + Access to installation + Population density + Terrain 3.2 Prevent Based on the results of the Prediction activities, concemed agencies, business concerns and individuals establish passive and active security measures and systems {o lessen the chances of success of terrorist-based crises/emergencies. Additionally, systems and measures warning of the advent of crises/ emergencies may have to be established to prevent them from turing to full-blown proportions needing massive responses, Lastly, prophylactic actions may have to be undertaken to reverse or neutralize threats or threat groups. 262 2a — i oa ~rornarenraren esa era ere Nor Herma Reese PREVENT [ OPERATIONS PERSONNEL PHYSICAL PROPHYLACTIC SECURITY/ SECURITY/ SECURITY/ ACTIONS ACTIVE SCTY PASSIVE SCTY WARNING/ MEASURES. MEASURES ALERT SYSTEMS AND MEASURES Figure 8. “Prevent” stages: Operational Security, Personnel Security, Physical Security, Prophylactic Actions 3.2.1 Operations Security This pertains to the institution of proper security measures in the Performance of assigned unit missions and during military/police operations. Steps must be taken to prevent the potential threat groups from knowing the unit plans and operations. The techniques of information security, physical security, signal security and deception which are considered interrelated and simultaneous must be continuously applied. The key to an effective operations security system is protecting information. It provides awareness of the threats and denies the threat group an opportunity to obtain. sensitive information that can be used against the installation. Awareness and training likewise adds to the effectiveness of the program. 3.2.2. Personnel Security This pertains to the protection of personnel against subversion and blackmail. All personnel are generally susceptible to the threat of terrorist attack. They become terrorist targets not necessarily because of who they are but of where and when they happen to be. Good preventive or precautionary Measures can decrease the threat of these attacks. Terrorists also select Specific people as targets for kidnapping, extortion, hostage-taking and assassination. They gather extensive intelligence information on the Personalities targeted through extensive surveillance. 273.2.2.1 Consideration on Personnel Threat Assessment + Rank and risk. In general, higher ranking personnel have greater risk levels. In high threat areas, special measures must be taken to secure high-ranking officers, dignitaries, and their dependents. Some personnel may be selected as terrorist targets by expertise or special knowledge they possess, + Threat level. Personnel who are considered as potential targets may be categorized into primary, secondary, or random targets. Primary targets usually include ranking military/police officers, government officials, foreign dignitaries, other VIPs and individuals possessing sensitive information. hey are normally selected for their publicity value to the terrorists. Secondary targets are those selected as alternate terrorists targets. These are personnel of lower rank and risk than the primary targets but can be used by terrorist for publicity. Most action taken by the CPP/NPA terrorist elements are against secondary targets due to their inherent exposure and easier access. Secondary targets are normally attacked through ambuscades, raids, and sparrow operations. Randomly selected targets are those military/police or law enforcement personnel who are off-duty or engaged in private activities and become targets of opportunity, 3.2.2.2 Stages of Preparation in the Personnel Security Progress + Planning. This includes a threat analysis and an assessment of the available personnel security resources, Awareness and personnel security education procedures must be developed and integrated into the day-to-day unit operation and training. Special procedures must be developed for secondary and random targets. Special contingency plans must be developed for visiting dignitaries and VIPs, ' 28 =a ae ae ee eee eee= eee eee eee 3.3 Prepare Military/police, dignitaries, civilian employees and their dependents must be made aware of the terrorist threat in general as the perceived threat level at respective installations. This can be achieved through. periodic briefings, public information drive and the dissemination of printed materials. The need for personnel security awareness must be developed at this stage. Education. The specific personnel security procedures to be followed are presented during this stage. Because logistics constraints make it impossible to protect all possible terrorist targets, self-protection and effective crime prevention procedures, and deterrent measures must be undertaken. Personnel must be informed of the various terrorist techniques used in attacking personnel such as sparrow operations, letter bombs, ambuscades, and the like, Physical Security. This pertains to the observance of Physical means or measures to safeguard the installation against — sabotage. Physical security encompasses Protection of information, material and personnel against terrorist actions. Sufficient physical security measures have been devised to ensure the protection of military/ Police installation in general. Effort must be seriously exerted towards the proper and religious implementation of these measures. Physical security measures include outer and inner defense barrier protection, alarm, surveillance and guarding systems, and personnel control system. In addition to the preventive measures being undertaken, all government agencies, military/police units and installation must have Crisis Management Action Plans to enable them to react in cases when crisis incidents occur. In general, mmilitary/police commanders must organize, train and equip special reaction, security and negotiation elements and provide procedures for their immediate activation when the need arises, 3.3.1 Plan This stage calls for the preparation of appropriate plans to meet all foreseeable emergencies and crisis situations. 293.3.2 Organize Crisis Management Organizations composed of police, military and government leaders are established at the national, regional, provincial and ‘municipal levels to ensure an integrated and coordinated approach towards iianaging various types of crisis at all levels. 3.3.3 Train Commanders of units designated to compose the tactical and ‘support units and negotiation team should Periodically conduct training and exercises to ensure their operational readiness. This requires the regular and progressive conduct of necessary individual training to enhance the expertise of each participant, as well as scheduled and unscheduled unit training to develop team work and precision and responsiveness in the implementation of any crisis contingency plan whether during exercises or in actual crisis situations. PREPARE I Pu ‘ai foresize] © --frramw] Qu AINTAN READINESS [conrincency i [pocs] [-{inpiviovat lacquire ] [ORGANIZATIONAL ccs } [ oni} waa] L_[oneRaTTOwa ] [coc } osc f NEGOTIAT ]GROUP TAISON “AMS NEGOTIATION ELEMENTS I L ton] {OPERATIONS GROUP SERVICE PUBLIC AFFAIRS) [SUPPORT SECURITY ELEMENTS GROUP PUBLIC INFO TACTICAL ACTION/ MEDIA CONTROL LY INTERVENTION AGENCIES 30 — a a a eee ee ee ee oe MEDIA CONTROL |UTILITIES/LIAISON TEAM [CIVIL RELATIONS] [INVEST/LEGAL| MEDICAL inTeL FIRE-FIGHTING [comme] lLocisTics' ADMIN Figure 9. Schema of “Prepare” Activitiesoe ee oe | le! = tl” ea IFC 1 i 1 Lal le} L_2| 7 3.3.4 Equip AFP/PNP special action units shall acquire equipment peculiar to their functions, State of the art equipment which are specially designed for crisis situations shall be programmed through the Equipment Outlay Modernization of the AFP/PNP. 3.3.5 Maintain Readiness The ultimate manifestation of preparedness is the ability of the AFP/PNP to successfully contain any crisis incident as soon as possible with minimum resources expended and minimum losses. To ensure a high state of preparedness, it is necessary that the AFP/PNP maintain organizational as well as operational readiness. Organizational readiness refers to the preparedness of the individual units/ organizations composing the ad hoc crisis management organization. It means that a high state of morale, discipline, and proficiency exists in these units. Operational readiness refers to the preparedness of the entire ad hoc crisis management organization to respond with dispatch to any crisis incident. There must prevail utmost cooperation, coordination, and effective communication among these units. 31a a oo Section Two. REACTIVE PHASE When a crisis incident occurs despite proactive efforts, the concerned AFP/PNP units must be prepared to perform crisis management in accordance with their plans, This phase consists of the initial action, action, and post-action activities as shown below. PERFORM INITIAL ACTION NEGOTIATION TACTICAL ACTION TL INTERVENTION POST ACTION PROCESSING AND INVESTIGATION FILING AND PROSECUTION] * [DEBRIEFING PROTECTION OF DOCUMENTATION F— | TRAINING/RETRAINING. INCIDENT SCENE DAMAGE COMPENSATION/ REHABILITATION _ Figure 10. Initial Action, Action, and Post-Action Activitiesiq Initial Action 3.4.1 The initial action is normally taken by any police/military unit taking notice of the existence of a crisis incident. This unit is referred to as the initial action unit. 3.4.2. The unit commander of the initial action unit shall perform the following procedures: 34.21 3.4.2.2 3.4.2.3 3.4.2.4 3.4.2.5 3.4.2.6 3.4.27 Take immediate appropriate action to resolve problem. If the situation is beyond its capability to handle, the matter should be reported to the Crisis Management Committee (CMC). ‘The unit should take the necessary measures to initially contain the situation ‘The unit shall monitor and report the progress of the incident until the CMC takes cognizance of the situation. The unit shall likewise secure the scene, protect itself as much ‘as possible without gunfire, establish perimeter security and command, evacuate innocent civilians if possible, and prevent escape of the perpetrators, until the tactical action/intervention elements/units gradually take over as they arrive, Other than the aforecited tasks, the initial action unit shall not engage in any tactical action against the perpetrators except in its own defense. During this stage, the CMC shall establish the Crisis Management Operations Center (CMOC) at the appropriate AFP/PNP Headquarter Operations Center. The CMC shall officially declare the crisis situation and activate the military/police units, government agencies and non-government organizations included in the ad hoc crisis management organization at that level. The CMC designates the: On-Scene Commander (OSC) and directs him to proceed to the crisis incident scene. The OSC establishes the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) at a suitable area within the incident scene and informs the CMC through the CMOC accordingly. 33nn 34 3.5 Action Stage The action phase begins as soon as the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) is established and the Reaction/Intervention and Support units and the Negotiation Team arrive and are deployed. The On-Scene Commander (OSC) relieves the initial action unit commander and completes staffing of the OSCP. The OSC discusses the incident with his commanders and staff and decides on the plans and actions to take. The action phase consists of two distinct and independent activities: negotiation and tactical action/intervention which can take place simultaneously or in succession. 3.5.1 Negotial 3.5.1.1 3.5.1.3 3.5.1.5 3.5.1.6 3.5.1.7 jn , The Chief negotiator undertakes the negotiation as soon as he has been properly briefed and has received appropriate instruction from the OSC. He shall keep the OSCP informed of the progress of negotiations and shall take instructions only from the OSC. He arranges or settles by conferring or discussing with the terrorists and not mediating. His primary role is to persuade the perpetrators to make the best of a bad bargain, ‘The chief negotiator does not command and neither does the " ‘on-scene or tactical commander negotiate. The Negotiation Team may allow intermediaries, such as national or local political leaders, members of the clergy, immediate family members of the perpetrators or hostages, or other respected/credible leaders in the community, to help in the negotiation. However, they should be supported and backed up by trained members of the negotiation Team. Likewise, the recommendation/advice of such intermediaries may or may not be accepted by the OSC, whose decision shall be final unless countermanded by the Chairman, CMC or higher competent authority. The Negotiation Team shall be composed of personnel trained and.experienced in the art of negotiation. Negotiators may employ psychologists and interpreters to facilitate dealings with the perpetrators as the situation warrants.3.5.1.8 All negotiations shall be terminated as soon as the perpetrators take hostile actions or begin killing hostages. 3.5.1.9 No further negotiations shall be undertaken once the Reaction Intervention Unit Commander initiates tactical operations to neutralize the perpetrators. 3.5.2 Tactical Action/Intervention 3.5.2.1 The Reaction/Intervention Commander makes a complete estimate of the crisis incident situation and plans his courses of action upon arrival at the scene while the negotiation is in progress. 3.5.2.2 He shall maintain close and continuous contact with the OSCP and keep same informed of the developments in the inner perimeter and of all tactical actions being taken. 3.5.2.3, He shall take instructions only from the OSC but continuously monitors the negotiation. 3.5.2.4 He shall coordinate all his support requirements with the OSCP. 3.5.2.5 He shall exercise authority over all CMC action groups through- out the conduct of the tactical action phase. 3.5.2.6 When the negotiations fail or when the perpetrators begin killing hostages or undertaking further hostile actions, the reaction/ intervention commander shall, upon clearance with the OSC, assault or undertake appropriate tactical action against the perpetrators until they are neutralized. Hot pursuit operations may be conducted in case the perpetrators escape. 3.6. Post Action This phase begins as soon as the perpetrators surrender, or when they are Captured or neutralized. The On-Scene Commander shall ensure that the following are. accomplished: eee eee 3536 = 3.6.1 3.6.2 3.6.3 3.6.4 3.6.5 3.6.6 Processing and debriefing + Hostages/victims + Perpetrators + Witnesses + Key participants of the incident Protection of the incident scene The incident scene must be cordoned and protected to prevent looters and preserve evidences as necessary. Investigation of the incident The investigation of the incident must proceed and shall be completed as soon as possible as part of the necessary documentation for purposes of filing the case in court. Documentation + Sworn statements of the following: - Witnesses - Hostages Perpetrators - Key participants in the incident + Recovery and preservation of evidences + Preservation of pictorials, video coverage and all written records. + Post-incident reports Filing and prosecution of cases After all the necessary documentation is completed, the case shall be filed in court and the perpetrators prosecuted. Training and retraining of units/personnel Special units and negotiators shall continue with their training in order to improve their proficiency and enhance their readiness.3.6.7 Damage compensation and rehabilitation 3.6.7.1 Initiate recommendation for the compensation, and provide appropriate assistance to civilians killed or injured during the tactical operations. 3.6.7.2 Initiate recommendation for the rehabilitation/construction of damaged/destroyed properties and essential infrastructures. = se hon abs ate 3738 =o | CHAPTER 4 CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION ‘Section One. NATIONAL LEVEL ORGANIZATION 4.1 General As a matter of policy, natural calamities and disasters will be the responsibility Of the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC). — Terrorist-based crises/ ore gencies, on the other hand, will be the responsibility of the National Peace ard Order Council (NPOC). Lower level organizations of the NDCC and NPOC shall like-wise be organized and take cognizance of responsibilities tasked to their national organs. 4.2 Peace and Order Council (POC) (Figure 11) The National Peace and Order Council (NPOC) addresses various aspects of level ve waiton and suppression. A peace and order organization at the barangay level was recommended at the 4th National Summit of Peace and Order (11-12 April poco). Senate Resolution No. 145, 5. of 1992 also urged the establishment of Barangay Crime Watch Centers nationwide. Executive Order Nr. 366, s. 1996 organizes the Barangay Peace and Order Committees as the implementing arm of the city/municipal Peace and Order Council at the barangay level, 4.3 Crisis Management Committee (CMC) (Figure 11) 43.1. In accordance with Executive Order 320, the NPOC has constituted Crisis Management Committees (CMCs) at all levels specifically to take decisive action in emergency situations. 4.3.2, The national level CMC is composed of the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government as Chairman, Secretary of National Defense, Secretary of Social Welfare and Development, Secretary of Justice, Chief, PNP, Chief of Staff, AFP, and other concerned cabinet members,™ ! I i 1 t I i J on =a POC’ Mc SEC, DILG' CHAIRMAN | | | SEC, DND SEC, DSwo | | sec,D03 | [c, pnp] [csarp] [OTHER MEMBER MEMBER MEMBER CONCERNED CABINET MEMBERS Figure 11. POC/CMC 43.3, The CMC is primarily concerned with the formulation of crisis management procedures, integration and orchestration of government, and miltary/police and public efforts towards the prevention and control Of crisis incidents. All actions and decisions taken by the CMC shall be within the policies laid down by the corresponding POCs. 4.4 AFP-PNP organization at National Level (Figures 12A and 128) At the national level, the Chief, Philippine National Police represents the PNP while the Chief of Staff represents the AFP. The Directors of the Aviation Security Command, Special Action Force, and the Maritime Command of the PNP, and the Commancing General of the Philippine Army shall organize, train, equip, and maintain the following special action units with capability for nationwide deployment in handling Crisis situations: + Special Operations Group (PASCOM) + Special Operation Battalion (PNP SAF) + Sea-borne Operation Group (MARICOM) + PA Special Action Group from the PA Special Forces + PAF Special Operations Wing (SOW) 39CS AFP | [ (CG, ba 7 CG, PAF r—L—Forc, pn] —¥_] | [Par p—L—swe__] |___[Tacticat unrrs : a including Sow MARINES | COAST GUARD OTHER PN TACTICAL UNITS Figure 12-A. AFP Organization at National Level Other PAF SWG Tactical Units, Coast Guard, and other PN Tactical Units [cenp_ | f [eascom] [maricom | Gmc] SAF [ REcoMs [Pcs & CPCs CIC ch DISTs STNS/ PRECINTS Figure 12-B. PNP Organization at National Level 40 aeICMCs [ NEGOTIATION OPERATIONS SERVICE SUPPORT |__| PUBLIC AFFAIRS Group _| GROUP _| GROUP : |_| POLITICAL [miurrary GOVERNMENT MEDIA ELEMENTS | ELEMENTS AGENCIES MILITARY/ POLICE MILITARY/ GOVERNMENT [| POLICE | ELEMENTS |--4 POLICE AGENCIES L ELEMENTS — aa POLICE ELEMENTS OTHERS a Figure 13. Lower Level Crisis Management Organizations 4.5 Lower Level Peace and Order Council (Figure 14) ‘The Peace and Order Councils at the low. er levels shall function in the same man- ner as and in accordance with the guidance of t he NPOC at the following levels: + Regional Peace and Order Councils (RPOCs) + Provincial Peace and Order Councils (PPOCS) Municipality/City Peace and Order Councils (M/CPOCs) 4.6 Lower Level Crisis Management Committee (CMC) (Figure 14) 46.1 Lower Level Crisis Committee Management Organization In accordance with Executive Or der No. 320 s. of 1995, as amended, Crisis Manag ement Committees are organized at all levels 41nea ee eee ee 15 follows: + Kegional Crisis Management Committees (RCMCS) i + Provincial Crisis Management Committees (PCMCS) : + Municipal Crisis Management Committees (MCMCs) 4.0.2 Composition of the Lower Level CMCs . These lower level CMCs are composed of the political leadership, j military and police organizations, and the Non-government organizations (NGOs) in the locality. Each CMC shall have four action groups which? F shall be placed under the operational corirol of the GreSoene . Commander. These groups are as follows: + Negotiation Group Negotiation team Uaison team + Operational Group Security/elements/units Police/military action/intervention elements + Service Support Group Military/police support elements/units Government agencies Non-government organizations (NGOs) Public Affairs Group Media control and liaison team _& Public information team Civil Relations teams 4.0.3 Functions of the Lower Level CMCs (FIG 14) The CMCs ‘shall exercise prior planning, decision-making, and Coordination at their respective levels in accordance with the guidelines of the higher level POCs and CMCs,sf E a [Pocs cms POLITICAL, MILITARY/ NGOs |. OTHERS LEADERSHIP POLICE LEADERSHIP Figure 14. Lower Level POCs/CMCs 4.7 AFP/PNP Organization at the Lower Levels All AFP/PNP unit commanders at the regional, provincial, and municipal or city levels shall organize in an ad hoc basis their respective crisis management action forces/units. Such forces shall be composed of regular or special AFP/PNP units organic to or under their operational control and situated in their respective areas of operations (AORs) . f REGIONAL LEVEL z I i PA Divs PNP RECOMs: PAF CASFS PN DISTRICTS PROVINCIAL LEVEL i PA BDES PROVINCIAL COMMANDS ‘CASF ELEMENTS PN ELEMENTS CTTY/MUNICIPAL LEVEL 1 =A BINS PNP PAF ELEMENTS PN DISTRICTS PNP COYS/ DETACHMENT PNP STNS/ PRECINTS Fiqure 5. AFP/PNP ORGANIZATION AT LOWER LEVEL 4B47.2 oe eee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee, ee 47.1 Phil A711 A712 47.13 4714 Philippi 47.241 4.7.2.2 4.7.2.3 ppine National Police Regional - The PNP Regional Command shall be the PNP Crisis Management Force for that region. The Regicnal Director shall be the police member in the Regional CMC, He shall designate his Deputy Regional Director for Operations as PNP tactical Commander during crisis management operations at regional level. Provincial - The PNP Local Command assigned to a province shall be the PNP Crisis Management Force for that province. The Provincial Director shall be the PNP tactical commander during crisis management operations in that province. City Municipal - The PNP Chief of Police assigned to a city or ‘municipality shall be the PNP Crisis Management Force for that city or municipality. Its commander shall be the PNP tactical commander during crisis management operations in that city/ Municipality. In cities where there are PNP Mobile Force companies, they shall be the PNP Crisis Management Forces and their commanders shall be the Tactical Commanders during crisis management operations in these cities. PNP NSUs - PNP NSUs assigned in any of the foregoing levels oF nearest thereto may be designated as PNP tactical action/ intervention units in the ad hoc Crisis Management organization at the lower levels. ine Army Regional - The PA Division assigned to a region shall be the PA Crisis Management Force for the region. The Division Com- mander shall be the PA tactical commander during crisis man- agement operations. Provincial - The PA Brigade assigned to a province or nearest to that province shall be the PA Crisis Management Force for that province. The Brigade Commander shall be the PA tactical commander during crisis management operations. City Municipal - The PA Battalion, Company, platoon or detachment assigned to a city/municipal or nearest to that city/ Municipality shall be the PA Crisis Management Force for that City/municipality. The PA unit Commander shall be the tactical= ee : =) 4.7.3.3 47.41 4.7.4.2 47.43 commander during crisis management operations. 4 PA Special Units - PA special units assigned in any of the foregoing levels or nearest thereto may be designated as PA tactical action/intervention units in the ad hoc Crisis Management organization at the lower levels, 4.7.3 Philippine Air Force 47.3.1 Regional - The PAF Composite Air Support Force (CASF) assigned to a region shall be the PAF Crisis Management Force for that region. The CASF Commander shall be the Tactical Commander during crisis management operations, 4.7.3.2 Provincial, City/Municipal - The CASF Commander may assign specific PAF Components or elements to a province or city/municipality to provide air support to PA or PC/INP units engaged in crisis management operations in these areas, PAF Special Units - PAF Special Units assigned in any of the foregoing levels or nearest thereto may be designated as PAF tactical action/intervention units in the ad hoc . Crisis Management Organization at the lower levels, 4.7.4. Philippine Navy Regional - The PN District Command having the region as its area of operations (AOR) shall be the PN Crisis Management Force for that region. The Naval District Commander shall be the PN tactical Commander during crisis management operations in that region. Provincial, City/Municipality - The Naval District Commander Concerned may assign specific PN Components or elements to a Province or city/municipality to provide naval support to PA or PC/INP units engaged in crisis management operations in these areas, PN Special Units - PN Special Units such as Philippine Coast Guard or Philippine Marines assigned in any of the foregoing levels or nearest thereto may be designated as PN tactical action/intervention units in the ad hoc Crisis Management organization at the lower levels, 45“Ee Section Two, CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION C 4.8 Organizational Level 4.8.1 National + National Peace and Order Council (NPOC) + NPOC crisis Management Committee (CMC) Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary, Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development (Dswp) Secretary, Department of Justice (D0J) Chairman, Cabinet Crisis Committee + NHQ, PNP + GHQ, AFP 4.8.2. Regional + Regional Peace and Order Council (RPOC) Regional Crisis Management Committee (RCMC) - same composition at national level, the DOJ being represented by the Regional State Prosecutor at the regional level, + Regional Crisis Management Operations Centers (RCMOC) - to be designated by the RCMC. ‘AFP Units in the Region PA Divisions PAF Composite Air support Forces (CASFs) PN Districts * Philippine Coast Guard * Philippine Marine Brigades 46 nme aE ae eee eee4.8.3 * Regional Non-Government Organizations : + PNP Units in the Region Provincial + Provincial Peace and Order Councils (PPOCs) + Provincial Crisis Management committees (PCMC) + Provincial Crisis Management operation Centers (PCMOC) + Provincial Government Agencies + AFP units in the Provinces PA Brigades/Battalions PAF Elements PN Elements PNP Units in the Province Provincial Non-Government Agencies (PNGOs) 4.8.4 Municipal/City Municipal/City POCs Municipal/City CMCs — same composition as that of the Provincial level, with the DOJ being represented by the Municipal Attorney or Prosecutor at the city/municipal level. Municipal City CMOCs -to be designated by the CMC Municipal/City AFP units PA Battalions Companies PAF Elements PN Elements 47ne eee ca + Municipal/City PNP units + Municipal/City NGOs 4.8.5. On-Scene Command Posts (OSCPs) See item 4.12 below. 4.8.6 Crisis Management Action Groups + Negotiation Group Negotiation Liaison + Operations Group Security Tactical/action/intervention Utilities liaison team + Service Support Group Investigation/legal Intelligence Communication-electronics Medical Transportation Logistics Administrative support + Public Affairs Group Media Control/Liaison 48» Public Information > Civil Relations CRISIS MANAGEMENT AD HOC ORGANIZATIONAL CHART TIPS —| LOWER-LEVEL POCS: crc cmocs I (oscr NEGOTIATION OPERATIONS SERVICE SUPPORT| PUBLIC AFFAIRS GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP NEGOTIATION SECURITY TNVESTIGATIONT PUBLIC INFO TEAM ELEMENTS LEGAL TEAMS TEAM LIAISON INTEL TEAR] [MEDIA CONTROT] TEAM |_|} actiony —— TEAM INTERVENT = TON ELEMNTS |__[MEDICACTEART] CIVIC RELATIONS] TEAM [COMET TEAR] TAISON TEAM DMIN TERT Figure 16. Crisis Management Ad Hoc Organizational Chart 4949 4.10 National Level Crisis Management Organization 4.9.1 All crisis incidents at the national level shall be handled by the NPOC Crisis Management Committee, headed by the Secretary of the Depart- ment of the Interior and Local Government. 4.9.2. The NPOC CMC shall give the necessary orders to those concerned for the activation of the Ad Hoc National Crisis Management Organization. 1.9.3. The National Crisis Management Operations Center (NCMOC) hall be established at IRC, NHQ Building, Camp Crame and the On-Séene Command Post shall be established at the most appropriate location in the vicinity of the crisis incident scene. 4.9.4 The participation of all AFP units in CMC-directed operations involving PNP units shall be as directed by the Chief of Staff, AFP in coordination with C,PNP. 4.9.5, The NPOC CMC shall monitor crisis incident situations at the lower levels and be prepared to make decisions on matters referred by these lower level CMC, Regional Level Crisis Management Organization 4.10.1 Al crisis incidents at regional level shall be handled by the Regional Crisis Management Committee. 4.10.2 The Regional CMC shall give the necessary orders to those concerned for the activation of the Ad Hoc Regional Crisis Management Organization. Upon activation thereof, the Chairman of the Regional CMC shall immediately inform the Chairman, NPOC-CMC, 4.10.3 The Regional Crisis Management Operation Center (RCMOC) shall be established at the PNP Regional Command Operations Center and the On-Scene Command Post shall be established at the most appropriate location in the vicinity of the crisis incident scene. 4.10.4 The participation of attached AFP units shall be as directed by the PNP Regional Director in coordination with the Commanders of the AFP Major Service Components in the region. He shall likewise direct | the Participation of all PNP units in the crisis management operations,4.10.5 The Regional CMC shall monitor crisis incident situations at' the lower levels and be prepared to make decisions on matters referred by these lower level CMC. 4.11 Crisis Management Operations Center (CMOC) A Crisis Management Operations Center (CMOC) shall be established at the appropriate PNP Headquarters Operations Center where a crisis incident occurs. The CMOC shall be the focal point of all communications coming from the -On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) and all instructions from the CMC. The CMC members shall be at the CMOC while the crisis incident is in progress, NPOC SAC LOWER LEVEL POCs [sac OCS] [osc] | NEGOTIATION | ‘OPERATIONS [SERVICE SUPPORT] PUBLIC AFFAIRS GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP Figure 17. Crisis Management Operations Center (CMOC) 4.12 On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) 4.12.1 The On-Scene Command Post shall be established at the vicinity of the crisis incident site where it can best. monitor and control the crisis management operations. All instructions from the CMC shall be relayed to the OSCP through the CMOC. . 4.12.2 An On-Scene Commander (OSC) shall be designated by the Chairman, CMC from among the senior officers of the PNP Headquarters. He maybe the Deputy Regional Director, RECOM operations Officer, Provincial Director, Company Commander of station Commander, or any officer in the locality chosen depending upon the nature, gravity and possible implications of the incident. He shall be responsible for everything happening at the crisis incident scene. He shall exercise direct command and control over all negotiation, operations, support and public affairs groups assigned to him by the CMC, regardless of the presence of any officer more senior than him, unless relieved by higher competent authority. All orders at the scene of the crisis incident shall emanate from the On-Scene-Commander only. He shall communicate and clear all his actions, if necessary, with the CMC, ; —— cmc moc NEGOTIATION] _ [OPERATIONS ‘SERVICE SUPPORT PUBLIC AFFAIRS] GROUP GROUP GROUP LIAISON SECURITY ] _ [INVEST/LEGAL MEDICAL PUBLIC INFO TEAMS ELEMENTS [INTEC FIRE- [ MEDIA-CONTROL] necoviarion] | [Tactical | __—_] FIGHTING AGENCIES I ACTION/ INTER- [cont LOGISTICS MEDIA CONTROL] | VENTION 4 CIVIL RELATIONS] “ADMIN uTiumies LIAISON TEAM Figure 18. On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) 52t i £ 4.13 Crisis Management Action Groups CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTION GROUP NEGOTIATION} OPERATING SERVICE SUPPORT PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP Figure 19. Crisis Management Action Groups 4.13.1 Negotiation Group — This group shall be composed of selected civilian officials/personalities and military/police personnel for the purpose of negotiating with the terrorist elements and performing liaison functions between them and the On-Scene Command Post. This group shall be under the direct control and supervision of the On-Scene Commander. 4131.1 4.13.1.2 NEGOTIATION GROUP { LIAISON TEAM NEGOTIATION TEAM Negotiation Team -The Negotiating Team shall be headed by a chief negotiator properly selected by the Chairman, CMC from among trained negotiators. It may include a psychologist or an interpreter as required by the situation. The primary concern of the Negotiation Team is to save lives, prevent destruction of property, and pave the way for a. peaceful resolution of the crisis situation. Liaison Team -This team shall work in coordination with the Negotiation Team and the OSC and the Tactical Action Commander to ensure smooth coordination. It shall coordinate for all the support required of the Negotiation Team. Figure 20. Negotiation Group 53eRe! : 4.13.2 Operations Group (Figure 21) -This group shall be cqmposed of regular and special military and police units/elements deployed in the crisis incident site to perform security functions and ‘conduct tactical operations/intervention necessary and appropriate to neutralize the terrorist elements/perpetrators at the: earliest possible time and at minimum risk and cost to life and property. OPERATIONS GROUP | eR, (aR sence | ‘ ‘SECURITY ELEMENTS TACTICAL UTILITIES INTERVENTION LIAISON TEAMS: AER SECURITY | [PRET SECO ‘AFP | [ PNP ] INNER OUTER ] OVERT CROWD CONTROL COVERT] TRAFFIC CONTROL, CHECK POINTS | Figure 21. Operations Group 4.13.2.1 Security Units/Elements These are military or police personnel who shall compose the area and perimeter security, Depending on the magnitude of the crisis, area security outside the — immediate vicinity of the incident shall be established to prevent other forces friendly to the perpetrators from interfering or sending reinforcements of men or materials, + Area Security Units/Elements AFP/Police units/elements tasked to provide general areaeel = = security to contain enemy and criminal elements who may take advantage of the crisis incident and neutralize ter- rorist reinforcement elements. Perimeter Security AFP/Police_units/eléments tasked to provide outer and inner perimeter security in the immediate vicinity of the incident. = Outer Perimeter Security effort shall be directed out- ward and they must be distant enough from the scene to be out of the range of fire, prevent unauthorized TV coverage of the inner perimeter actions, prevent terror- ist supporters from observing action, and perform crowd control functions to ensure that no one (terrorist reinforcements, press, curious spectators and other Persons) who is not supposed to be at the scene of the incident. > Inner Perimeter Security shall be directed inward. They must be positioned as close to the incident site as prac- licable, but out of the sight of the perpetrators, Their two main functions are containment and intelligence collection. 4.3.2.2 Tactical Action/ Intervention Units/Elements These are AFP/police units or elements specially organized, trained and equipped to perform highly specialized anti-terrorist Operations such as sniper operations, bomb detection and disposal, and the like. 4.13.2.3 Utilities Liaison Team On orders of the OSC, the team coordinates with power, telephone, and water utility and tries to regulate supply to the area where hostage taking occurred for the purpose of enhancing the government negotiation position. 55wee SERVICE SUPPORT INIVESTIGATION/LEGAL TEAMS MEDICAL TEAM eee INTELLIGENCE TEAM FIRE FIGHTING TEAM COMMEL TEAM LOGISTICS TEAM ‘ADMIN TEAM Figure 22. Service Support Group This group shall be composed of civilian agencies/organizations and tnilitary/police units tasked to provide the necessary administrative, operational and logistics support to the On-Scene Command Post. These support activities include food distribution, medical evacuation, communication- electronics, ransportation and other services. The Service Support shall have the following elements: 4.13.3.1 Legal/Investigation Teams ‘These teams provides the necessary investigative support to the On-Scene Commander. They conduct the investigation, collation and preservation of evidence, documentation, and provide legal advice to the On-Scene Commander. 4.13.3.2 Intelligence Team This team is responsible for the collection and processing of all operational intelligence needed by the On-Scene Commander and his,staff. The team must receive all intelligence gathered, and must be able to task other government elements for needed information. It maintains maps and diagrams showing current situation. 564.13.3.3 Communications-Electronics Team This team is responsible for insuring effective Communications between the OSC and CMC, between the Reaction/Intervention unit and the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP), between the Support Group Teams and the OSCP, and between the negotiators and the terrorist elements. It may also ensure that control is established over all other communications into and out of the crisis incident site. 4.13.3.4 Logistics Team This team is composed of support personnel who provide food and drinks, ammunition, clothing, Supplies, equipment, transportation, lighting/electricity if needed and other logistic services. They also maintain facilities where off-duty personnel can eat and rest, and where briefings can be held, This team must be able to request needed items from appropriate agencies, 4.13.3.5 Medical Team The medical team provides medical supplies and services. It shall maintain contact with hospitals to ensure that they are Prepared to handle any eventuality. It shall plan for the reception, treatment, and evacuation of hostages and other Casualties during and after conclusion of the crisis incident. 4.13.3.6 Fighting Team Tt shall provide fire-fighting units to extinguish fires intentionally set by the perpetrators, or fires resulting from the Operations of the reaction/intervention units. 4.13.3.7 Administrative Support Team This is composed of personnel assigned to the OSCP to Keep written record of events, incoming and outgoing communications and ensure. continuity between shifts, and submit accurate Post- Incident Reports. S74.13.4 Public Aft 's Group (FIG 23 ) This group shall be composed of civilian and military/police personnel tasked to coordinate and contro! public information/media ‘coverage, and community relations functions. ee [| PUBLIC AFFAIRS GROUP PUBLIC INFO TEAM i ! MEDIA CONTROL TEAM CIVIL RELATIONS TEAM ; : Figure 23. Public Affairs Group 4.13.4.1 Public Information/Media liaison and control Teams | ; q 3 The team is stationed at the OSCP. The press relations or t public affairs officer may release approved information to members of the print and broadcast media. The team may i provide cleared briefings, and answer questions. The team may provide video coverage for documentation and training purposes | when cleared by the CMC through the On-Scene Commander. 4.13.4.2 Community Relations Teams This team conducts civic action, provides public assistance, coordinates and supervises relocation of civilians displaced as a result of the terrorist action or of the military/police action taken against the terrorist elements, and undertakes other activities necessary to ensure maximum public cooperation. 4.14 Inter-Agency Relationship at the lower levels The lower level Crisis Management Committees shall be under the direct umbrella of the corresponding lower level Peace and Order Councils. These committees shall be guided by the policies set forth by such POCs.om All civilian government agencies, non-government agencies, military ‘and police forces shall be pl faced under the control and supervision of the corresponding lower level CMC for the duration of the crisis incident, i In cases of crisis incidents where immediate military/police action is needed, the Chairman of the CMC at any of the lower levels may coordinate directly with the designated military/police commander responsible in his locality for the deployment of the necessary crisis action force/units. For purposes of implementing this interim doctrine, all AFP/PNP units designated as crisis management operations forces/units shall’ be placed under the pberational control of the Chairman of the particular CMC having incident, by the C, PNP, Chief of Staff, AFP, or the Area Commander concerned, on orders of the Chairman, Crisis Management Committee, In both of the foregoing instances, the AFP/PNP units designated to compose the crisis management force shall take orders directly from the designated military/ police tactical commander during the conduct of operations. These ueite shall revert to the control of their assigned Command upon termination of the crisis incident.CHAPTER 5 HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION Section I. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES 5.1 Hostage-Taking Situation 5.1.1 The frequency with which the CPP/NPA, the MILF, the Abu Sayyaf, othér criminal elements, and even mentally-deranged individuals resort to hostage-taking to achieve certain objectives, necessitates that military/ police units as well as other civilian government agencies and non- government organizations organize and train hostage negotiation teams. 5.1.2 The procedures, tactics and techniques in hostage negotiation to be discussed shall apply to a hostage-barricade incident, wherein the location of the hostage taker and the hostages are known and the incident site is surrounded and cordoned. 5.1.3. In the pursuit of the basic policy of “no concession to hostage- takers," the over-riding goals for any negotiation are the preservation of life and the safe release or hostages . 5.1.4 There are two basic concepts in a hostage-barricade situation, namely: 5.14.1 The hostage-takers have placed themselves willingly or unwillingly in direct confrontation with the authorities and therefore they must be prepared to deal with them. Since there is a confrontation, it is safe to conclude that the hostage-takers are willing to discuss the situation. 5.14.2 It is not in the interest of the hostage-takers to get violent. They do not take hostages with the expressed purpose of taking their hostages’ lives. They do it in order to coerce the authorities to behave in certain ways and eventually to exchange the hostages for something they want. 5.2 Categories of Hostages the hostages could be simple civilians, government officials, or military/ bersonel of various position, or rank or stages in life. oo 1 1 1 1See eee ee ee Categories of Hostage-Takers 53.1 Criminals are generally more interested in money, escape, or personal safety. They may have taken hostages in response to unforeseen Circumstances and have not really thought out the consequences of what they have done. — Criminals may be operating alone and therefore unaffected by the opinions of others. “If they are with a group, they may begin to question the ability of their leader to make the right decisions as events begin to turn unfavorable to them. 53.2 Mentally-deranged individuals take hostages because of something that may have provoked them. They probably have not engaged in planning whatsoever. 5.3.3 Terrorists, whether political or religious tend to be dedicated to their cause and are willing to risk their lives to ensure its success. They are generally part of an organization which has objectives and expectations Which they feel obligated to meet. Since they operate in groups, they bolster each others’ confidence and can relieve each other during long and extended negotiations. They are known to be using drugs to enhance their effectiveness and alertness for longer periods. Terrorists generally create political complications and are more calculated and rational, Personality Types of Hostage-Takers 5.4.1 The most common disorders involved in hostage-taking are the Psychotics and personality disorders. + Types of Psychotics Paranoid Schizophrenics They are characterized by persistent false mental Perceptions or beliefs such as delusions of persecution. Their thinking is often loose and makes no sense. They can appear Normal at some moments and psychotic at other times. Psychotic Depressives They experience extreme sadness, hopelessness, feelings of inadequacy, worthlessness, slow thinking and speech, and indecisiveness. They have less concentration and are prone to suicide, 61+ Personality Disorders Antisocial Personalities They are repeatedly in conflict with society, thus, are incapable of loyalty and are grossly selfish, gallous "and irresponsible. They feel no guilt and have a low frustration tolerance. They tend to blame others no matter what the circumstances are. They are probably the’ most difficult personality type to deal with, Inadequate Personalities They are unable to respond effectively to emotional, social, intellectual and physical demands, They show ineptness, poor judgment, and social instability, and they lack physical and emo. tional stamina. 5.4.2 Quick Recognition Points + I a person's behavior is weird, he is probably a paranoid schizophrenic + IT his response is something like "Go away and leave me alone," he is probably a psychotic depressive. + If bis demands are fairly realistic, he may be an antisocial personality. + Ifhe'is totally unrealistic, he is most likely an inadequate Personality, 5.5 Tactics Against Hostage-Takers 5.5.1 Establish and maintain communication ‘The first order of business is to establish contact with the hostage- takers. This may be initiated by the hostage-takers or by the authorities, Once contact is established, endeavor to maintain communication with the hostage-takers and establish the followin + A problem-solvin 9 climate by showing a desire to understand and willingness to help. 62= + Ali ate of compromise by adopting a give-and-take attitude and Ly showing a willingness to bargain and yield when necessary. 5.5.2. Stall for ti ‘21 The passage of time increases all basic human needs, both Rolaaical ancl psychological. These needs tend to multiply snd become more complex as time passes. Some of these are tle treed for food, medicine, light, rest or release from tension. lve negotiators are probably in a position to satisfy some of these heads anid may even be able to create other needs that will alte heed salistying, Bede Author factor Uat is always present and related to time: ts flies. Peuple tend to become more rational as they become less emotional. Therefore, to get your message across, first sls Something to reduce the hostage-takers’ emotional level. ‘The body reacts to stress through its adaptive mechanism. However, individuals cannot maintain a high level of resistance to stress Eventually, they will each the exhaustion stage. The negotiators lust be able to recognize this exhaustion stage and must take care lo Feach this stage themselves by making arrangements for relief at appropriate times, 2823 Except on certain: exceptional cases, time is on the side of the Hegollators. “Unless required by the situation, always stall for fine to achieve the following: + Reduce the stress environment + Allow for negotiations extemal to the conflict zone. ~ Perit the implementation of active hostage rescue efforts, 55.) Obtain information 73-4 The hegotiator cari use open-ended or close-ended questions “epeniding on the initial reactions of the hostage takers Open-ended questions allow ling answers while close-enlet! questions call for “yes or no” or brief responses. Usually mectalors ius start with close-ended questions until rapport ic mained and the hostage-taker talks more. spontaneously Anather technique is active listening which is practiced by restatement of content and reflection of feeling.2.5.3.2 In restating content, the negotiator repeats in his own words what he thinks he has heard. This will show the hostage-taker that the negotiator has paid attention and that he understood what has been said at the same time giving the other persons opportunity to correct any error that the negotiator might have made. °.5.3.3, In reflecting feeling, the negotiator must pay attention to what is said and how it was said. He must listen specifically for the strength, tone, and pace of the hostage-takers’ voice to bring Out hidden messages. He must observe the feelings that the other person is experiencing. Again these show the negotiator’s interest and understanding and encourages the hostage-taker to talk, 5.53.4 The negotiator can obtain as much information as he can, and record and pass them on to those who might need such informa- tion. These information will assist in developing the negotiator’s bargaining position and his response to the hostage-taker. These information might even be useful to the tactical unit, if an assault becomes necessary. °5-1 Calm the hostage-takers by doing the following : * Modeling. ‘The negotiator must talk and respond in a calm and fonltolled manner using a very conversational tone. After a while, the hostage-takers will tend to follow his manner of talking and begin to feel more calm. + Ventilation. Give the hostage-takers time to talk without interrupting them. * Distraction. Use this to draw the attention of the hostage-takers away from whatever is bothering them. Estab i Rapport -This can be done through the following : * Show that you take the hostage-takers seriously and that you are sincere in working towards a satisfactory agreement. * [xbress empathy by showing that you understand their feelings and their point of view. Concentrate on what they say and do to find out their true motivation. Empathize convincingly. 64mms 5.6 + Recognize the importance of helping the hostage-takers save face. Allow them to retreat gracefully, control the pace of concession. giving, and provide the hostage-takers with relevant, fact-saving rationalization should they concede in certain areas. Note that when they are made to look weak and foolish before a significant audience, they are more likely to be adamant and may retaliate in some ways it their concession has led to loss of face. + Do not express criticism, threats, or impatience since time is on your side and works in your favor. + Be consistent and responsive in your behavior in order to enhance co- operation. * Try to empathize your similarity with the hostage- takers. They are more inclined to cooperate with those who have similar social back- ground and experiences in life. Use persuasion -Persuading consists essentially of the following: * Agreement in part with their views. This lowers their resistance to later arguments. + Deal with the small issues first thus creating an atmosphere of success. Put off the major problems until the hostage-takers have invested time and have shown greater interest in reaching an agreement. + Break the big problem into smaller ones which are easier to handle, + If no progress is being made, initiate issues to be negotiated and ‘hen give in on these in exchange for some concessions. + In trying to convince, use episodic or historical information rather than statistical facts. * Constantly suggest surrender. They might see this as a more viable alternative as things become more complicated. + Maintain non-threatening communications, both verbal and non- verbal, * Agree with obvious reluctance to any demands that might be to your tactical advantave in exchange for concessions on the part of the 65hhostage-takers. If the demands are to the advantage of the hostage-takers or fall in the area of non-negotiable items, stall for time and express willingness to seek altemative solutions, 5.5.7 Be alert to the development of the Stockholm Syndrome, where reciprocal feelings may be developed by the hostages and the hostage- : takers after having been together for sometime, as noted in a hostage- taking in a bank in Stockholm that lasted for 131 hours. + The three aspects of this syndrome are: positive feeling of the hostages towards the hostage-takers, Negative feeling of the victims towards the authorities, positive feeling of the hostage-takers towards the victims, + While the negotiator has to live with the first two aspects, he must work toward encouraging the last aspect by: Emphasizing the hostages’ human qualities. Asking to check on the health and condition of the hostages. Give the hostages and the hostage-takers things to do as a group. For example, if they demand food, send in bulk items as unsliced meat, cheese or food which require cooperation, group activities and sharing. Section Two. HOSTAGE-NEGOTIATION CHECK-OFF LIST 5.6 WHAT (SITUATION) 5.6.1 What has occurred? 5.6.2 Who initiated the call? From where? Who received it? 5.6.3 What was the time.of occurrence? 5.6.4 What injuries were reported on: + Perpetrator/Suspect + Hostage 66f 1 1 i 3 1 r I 1 I = = + Other persons 5.6.5 Has contact been made with the perpetrator/suspect? + What kind? + When? By whom? How? 5.6.6. Is the situation locked in? 5.6.7 What are the negotiating positions? + What are the negotiables? + What are the non-negotiables? WHERE 5.7.1 Where are the perpetrators/suspects located? 5.7.2. Where are the hostages located? : 5.7.3 Where are the non-hostages located? 7.4 What is the floor plan? As built? + Where are the ingresses and egresses? + Where are the telephones located? + Where are the observation points? By the suspects of the negotiators? By the negotiators of the suspects? 5.7.5 Where and what are the suspect's weapons? + Firearms + Explosives + Chemicals : + Others 5.7.6 Where and what are the life support-basic human needs? : + Needs f + Desires 6768 5.8 5.10 wo + Hustage-takers’ Identity Description-physical and clothing Photo LD. check Psychological and medical profile Other factors Input from the family Group affiliation + Hustage’s Identity Description Photo LD. check Psychological and medical profile Other factors Input from the family, relatives and friends Non-hostages’ Identity Description Other factors Have other relevant personnel been interviewed? (Suspects captured, hostages released, witnesses) WHEN + Deadlines for various requirements? + Timed mechanisms? (Vaults, alarms, lights, sound systems, locks?) WHy + Reasons + Demands + UltimatumsSL SMA Sa Contain and stabilize Control hostage-taking scene Calm agitated perpetrators Build rapport. , No precipitous acts Establish problem-solving climate Establish climate of compromise Avoid “imposing” climate Avoid use of "soft bargainer” climate 1.10 Calming the perpetrator/suspect + Show understanding + Do modeling + Encourage ventilation + Distract + Watch out for non-verbal cues to aggression + Avoid provoking perpetrator/suspect Building rapport + Stalling for time + Self-disclosure + Empathy Warmth + Helping save face + Don't belittle perpetrator + Avoid criticisms, threats, and impatience Gathering information + Open-ended questions + Closed-ended questions + listening + Restatement of content (paraphrasing) + Reflection of feeling + Discrepancy confrontation + Nature of demands Persuading the perpetrator Agree, in part, with the perpetrator’s views. + Deal with smaller issues first. 6970 State conclusions. Promote active listening by the perpetrator. Present both sides of the argument. Consider perpetrator's motives. Argue against yourself, Point out similarities, Request delayed compliance. Minimize counter arguments. Try to persuade gradually. Initiate issues to negotiate on. Reward perpetrator yielding to facilitate resolution of situation. Use factual evidence. Avoid audiences. Avoid challenging, Reduce perpetrator “irrationality”, Discuss demands which benefit perpetrator. Offer suggestions. Keep perpetrator’s hopes alive,eee REFERENCES AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (DCS) FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING, J8. January 1990. DND-AFP interim doctrine on crisis management. (Restricted). ALBRECHT, STEVE. 1996. Crisis management for corporate self-defense: How to protect your organization in a crisis. . . How to stop a crisis before it starts. New York: AMACON. American Management Association, FINK, STEVEN, 1986. Crisis management. New York: AMACOM. American Man- agement Association. HELLER, ROBERT, and TIM HINDLE. 1998. Essential manager's manual: organizing, motivating, analyzing, interviewing, delegating tasks, notes skills, scheduling, communication, meetings, strategies, roles, crisis negotiating. London: Dorling Kindersley, MANTELL, MICHAEL, and STEVE ALBRECHT. 1994. Ticking bombs, Burr Ridge, Ill. Irwin Professional Publishing. MINER, J. 1985. People problems. New York: Random House, NEWMAN, FREDERICK H. and LLOYD W. SINGER. 1982. Security management. “Simulation - a key to crisis management training.” OFFICE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 1981. Pat- terns of international terrorism. REGESTER, MICHAEL. 1987. Crisis management: How to turn a crisis into an op- portunity. London: Hutchinson Business, 71eee MALACANANG Manila MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 121 UPDATING THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY ON HOSTAGE-TAKING SITUATIONS WHEREAS, the incidents of hostage-taki the year; Country was confronted with two successive ing by terrorist elements during the first half of WHEREAS, the government's existing } to test in the hostage-crisis situation in Sul | learned therefrom, to wit: 1. That the government’s no-concession or no-ransom policy i remains an effective policy, which - should always be implemented strictly; %. That negotiation should be treated as part of the whole crisis Trapagement process. It should not be treated as the sole option that precludes all other options; and That if the government is to negotiate during a crisis, it must Negotiate from a position of strength; WHEREAS, there is a 1 ed for the government to modily and improve policies that address cris is situations arising from terrorism; WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is mandated by Republic Act 8551 as the lead agency in addressing internal security threats, with the Philippine National Police in support; NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, hereby Prescribe the following policy guidelines for the guidance art compliance of all government agerTION 1. POLICY GUIDELINES A. Definition. ‘the government shall adhere to the following definition of terrorism: The premeditated use or threatened use of violence or means of destruction perpetrated against innocent civilians or norrcombatanis, or against civilian and government properties, usually intended to influence an audience. Its Purpose is to create a state of fear that will aid in extorting, coercing, inttinidating, or causing individuals and groups to alter their behavior. Its methods, among others, are hostage- faking, piracy or sabotage, assassination, threats, hoaxes, and indiscriminate bombings or shootings, Purpose and Scope. This Memorandum Order provides and defines measures and guidelines on how to effectively address terrorism particularly hostage-taking situations However, all aviation-related incidents shall be covered by existing laws and procedures under the National Action Gouumiltce on Ant-Hijacking and Terrorism (NACAHT), and this Memorandum shall be supplementary thereto C. Principles |. Terrorism as a Criminal Act. The government considers all terrorist actious, regardless of motivation, as eriminal acts and, therefore, shall be prosecuted and penalized tinder the Revised Penal Code and appropriate special laws, It shall undertake all lawful measures to prevent the fonduct of such acts and bring to justice perpetrators of terrorism 2. Peaceful Means and other Options in the Resolution of '@ Crisis. The government shall exhaust all peaceful means in seeking a resolution to a crisis to minimize, if ay. brewent, the loss of life and destruction of property. If F—r—T—————Sss—— act Promptly, decisively and effectively, choosing from the — _ SE CEE the ‘circumstances. Armed action shall, however, be calibrated as required by the situation, to ensure theDa safety of victims and innocent civilians, 3. No-Compromise with Terrorists. The government shall not accede to blackmail or terrorist demands. Nor shall it Brant ransom and concessions that will benefit the Perpetrators and give terrorists’ an operational advantage ver the government. Terrorists should be prevented ot te denied from benefiting from the fruits of their crime, 4 Safety of Victims and Civilians. The safety of victims and ‘civilians shall be the government's primordicl invest in the resolution of a crisis. In situations involving foreign nationals, the government shall act a, accordance with its policies, and maintain close contace and coordination ‘with the foreign government/s concerned °. Prompt Handling of a Crisis at the Lowest Level Possible. All terrorist-based crises are generally police matters ‘and shall be handled as such unlese the (LGUs) shall build the capability to effectively handle terrorist-related incidents and arrest their escalation, ©. Coordinated Government Response to a Crisis. The i risis management committee (CMC) that is activacca by the appropriate level of the Peace and Order Council (POC) with jurisdiction over the incident. The CMC directs {he mobilization of necessary government resources to 7. Public Information Management and Advocacy. The Informant shall ensure’ the prudent handing of information to and from the media by conducting advocacy steps to effectively convey its position’ ‘Thegovernment shall cusure that the information it disseminates will not prejudice nor hamper ongoing operations or the crisis management process. It shall also cnsure that government officials involved in the crisis speak with one voice. 8. Subscription to Anti-Terrorism Covenants. ‘The Republic of the Philippines subscribes to international conventions and initiatives against terrorism and will Participate in endeavors designed to strengthen international cooperation to prevent and neutralize terrorist acts, %. Respect for Human Rights. All government personnel responding to any crisis situation shall at all times Tespect human rights of people, including those of suspects of terrorist activities. : D. TASKING As a general rule, management of terrorist-related crises shall be part of the mandated tasks of concerned national agencies and local government units (LGUs), as indicated below. Agencies and LGUs must, therefore, be capable of taking proactive action upon cognizance of terrorist activities in ther respective areas of jurisdiction. If experiencing deficiencies, agencies and LGUs must endeavor to remedy such deficiencies and build the capabilities of their personnel and logistics to a level where they can effectively and promptly orchestrate orista management efforts with minimal supervision from the national government. 1. Role of the Philippine National Police (PNP) @ In line with the policy that terrorist activities are basically Within police concerns, the local commander of the PNP should, at the first instance, immediately take all necessary steps to resolve the crisis and/or prevent it from escalating. The police commander ensures that @ crisis is resolved by peaceful means but at the same time, seis up a contingency plan for the appropriate police and/or supporting military action. ‘The police commander, in close coordination with the LGUconcerned, also ensures that all necessary law enforcement steps such as arrest and prosecution of perpetrators, are taken b. If the crisis is beyond the operational capability of the local PNP unit, a higher PNP unit such as the provincial or regional command should immediately take full control and responsibility of the situation, when its judgment calls for such an action. ¢. All urban, provincial and regional units of the PNP must have within their ranks trained negotiators for hostage- taking situations. Negotiators are preferably non- commissioned officers whose training in negotiation and mediation should constantly be upgraded as part of PNP policy. d. The PNP and DILG shall make it a policy to continue the development and improvement of the skills of the existing Pool of trained negotiators within the police force to keep the PNP constantly prepared to effectively handle hostage- crisis situations. 2. Role of Local Government Units (LGUs) and Peace and Order Councils (POCs) : a. Ifa crisis is not resolved at the local police level, the POC of the municipality or province affected by the crisis immediately convenes and forthwith organizes/ activates @ CMC headed by the concerned local chief executive (the mayor or governor as the case may be) with guidance from the national government, in accordance with the Crisis Management Manual. b. The CMC orchestrates all efforts to resolve a crisis through careful coordination of all agencies concerned. The CMC is not the negotiating team. Thus, local executives or CMC members shall refrain from acting as negotiators or mediators so as not to raise the stakes in a hostage-crisis situation. The CMC, instead, designates an official negotiator preferably from the pool of trained negotiators from the PNP or AFP.c. At the same time, the CMC tasks the police and/or the muilitary to craft and prepare a contingency plan for the usc of reasonable force if peaceful measures are exhausted d. The local CMC ensures the continuity of all government actions and efforts on the ground until its responsibility has been assumed by,a higher CMC or agency of the national government. 5. Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) a. When a crisis has evolved into a military situation where the perpetrators have preponderant military capability, the AFP unit having jurisdiction over the affected municipality or province shall take a proactive role to assist the PNP and LGU concerned in resolving the crisis. b. In accordance with RA 8551, the AFP takes the lead in the preparation of a contingency plan over a crisis that arises from insurgency or secessionism, or internal security threats, and therefore, one that warrants the ] deployment of military force, subject to the approval of the CMC and the guidance of the national government. ©. As the lead agency in internal security operations, the AFP shall also make it a policy to develop its own pool of \rained negotiators for hostage-taking situations arising from insurgency or secessionism. It shall also develop and train a special contingency force that can be deployed for anti-terrorism operations where military capability is needed. It shall endeavor to make | hostage-taking negotiation a part of military training so as to complement the capabilities of the PNP. 4. CMC at the National Level a. The Cabinet Cluster “E” (Cabinet Cluster on Security and Political Development) is designated as the national CMC if a situation arises from internal security threats, and evolves into a national security concern. Incidents arising from public law and order problems are normally handled by the National Peace and Order Council (NPOC) as /mandated by Executive Order 320 (series of 1988) and Executive Order 309 as amended (series of 1988). b. As the national level CMC, the Cabinet Cluster “E” takes the ultimate and overall guidance from the President in the implementation of its mandate. c. The Cluster “E” may take over the responsibilities of the local CMC, or give strategic and policy guidance in support of the efforts of the local CMC, I d. The Cluster “E” may designate a lead Cabinet member who is the head of the lead agency or the office of primary responsibility (OPR) that is addressing the situation on the ground, to oversee the implementation of the Policy or strategic guidance of the Cluster “E.” The OPR and its | head shall have the flexibility to configure the task a units/entities and utilize the resources and agencies of the departments concerned to effectively ensure unity of : command. The PNP, in coordination with the AFP and the \ Provincial/City Prosecutors, shall undertake the necessary and complementary investigation and other legal actions to bring the perpetrators to justice. 5. Other government agencies a. Other government agencies, when requested, shall render assistance to the local or national CMC according to their mandates and expertise at all stages of a crisis. b. Concerned public information agencies, upon request and coordination with the CMC or agency handling a crisis, shall undertake advocacy measures to help generate support for government efforts to resolve a crisis and mitigate its effects. SECTION 2. CRISIS MANAGEMENT MANUAL. The provisions of this Memorandum shall be incorporated in the Crisis Management Manual as amended. The Manual shall be circulated to all government agencies for their guidance, compliance and reference. Special training or orientation on crisis management shall be conducted by the DND/AFP for its agencies and units, and likewise by the DILG/PNP for its bureaus and LGUs.SECTION 3. RESCISSION CLAUSE. All other Memorandum Orders and issuances inconsistent with this Order or any parts thereof are hereby rescinded or modificd accordingly. SECTION 4. EFFECTIVITY. This Memorandum shall take effect immediately, DONE in the City of Manila, this 31st of October, in the Year of Our Lord, Two Thousand. xB el JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA By the President: Pre Hl RONALDO B, ZAMORA 4 Executive Secretary “ah