Memo

To:
From:
Subject:
Date:

Dr. Ermila & Dr. Eustes

Jake DeGrace
Tubing Collapse Theory & Moving Forward
May 1, 2015

With CSM #1 producing very little on time, plans were created to sidetrack the
well so as to produce amid expectations. On 3/15/07, a mechanical integrity test
was performed on CSM #1 as per many states regulatory bylaws. The well had
passed the same test on 7/11/06, thereby providing no indication of a problematic
issue, however, during this MIT, standard procedures were not adhered to and
the well was left flowing. The MIT was failed due to pressure losses greater than
10% over the initial 15 minute timeframe. The crew bled outer annulus pressure
on three separate occasions before stabilization of pressure was reached, at
which point they rigged down, and called for help. On 3/18/07, the crew had
some surface equipment issues, however, after being resolved, attempted to
carry on with the sidetracking procedure. Equipment was unable to pass 8659
SLM due to tool sticking. At this point, an LIB was run in hole and also was
unable to pass at 8661; this process performed twice with the exact same
results. At this point, it had been discovered that the tubing had collapsed.
By examining the LIB impression pattern, it was quite evident that the circular
imprint could be attributed to tubing collapse. When pondering the probable
cause of the tubing collapse, pressure differential between the tubing and inner
annulus was investigated. The 7/11/06 MIT, when performed correctly, exhibited
a pressure differential of 620 psi at the surface, however on 3/15/07, correct MIT
procedure was not performed, as the crew left the well flowing, thus causing a
pressure differential of 2500 psi at the surface. At 8670, the depth of collapse,
the pressure differential was roughly 5014 psi. The L80 tubing presented a
collapse rating of 6390 psi, therefore would have been expected to withstand this
pressure differential. The caliper report presented a bit of extraordinary
evidence, such that the well was full of flowing sands, thus posing a source of
erosion or wear on the corrosive protective layer that L80 provides. The wellbore
schematic shows that the well was at least 5 years old by the time the new
sidetrack proposal was imposed. With wear and aging on the tubulars, and
without protection from these corrosive properties, the L80 tubing was no longer
able to serve as a solid anti-corrosive option. It is suspected that the tubing had
undergone corrosion severe enough to cause the pipe to lose at least 1400 psi of
its collapse rating. In a Stanford study, the effects of corrosion on collapse rating
were generalized to relate percentage corrosion with the percentage of collapse
rating lost. Based on the caliper logs, there is evidence of corrosion and
localized pitting at various points throughout the tubing string, thus presenting the
likelihood of corrosion in some of these areas. Included in the caliper logs, is the
average range of corrosion, with the maximum exceeding 30% corrosion.
According to the Stanford study, up to 42% of the collapse rating could be lost.

By applying numbers to the scenario at hand, it is easy to see that this could
certainly have been the cause of the tubing collapse. The collapse rating falls to
3706 psi, which is insufficient in handling the incorrectly performed MIT
differentials. Although manufacturing process of the tubulars was not mentioned,
it is also plausible to question whether the tubing was already lacking cross
sectional area. This would induce a natural weak point along the tubing wall thus
being another contribution to the collapse.
Soon thereafter, a rig workover unit swapped the tubing in preparation to
continue the sidetrack proposal. While running a whipstock in hole, the crew was
unable to get past the 5 by 4 crossover sub. At this point, an LIB was run
in hole in efforts to discover what was sticking. The impression left on the LIB
was characteristic of a much flatter, less ovular tubular. Based on this
impression, I suspect that a splinter of collapsed tubing from the MIT on 3/15/07
was unable to be fished out, and fell through the tubing, getting caught in the
crossover sub. The LIB pattern is consistent with this theory, however it is also
possible that the force of the collapse caused the crossover sub to separate from
the 4 , thus not allowing further passage at 8915. This theory would predict a
more circular impression on the LIB, however remains plausible.
In regards to moving forward, I believe it is most advantageous to attempt to fish
for the possible splintered tubing stuck in the crossover, as this does not require
you to pull tubing, while simultaneously allowing the ability to continue with the
original sidetracking proposal. Alternatively, you could attempt to mill through the
unknown stuck area, however this could potentially cause more damage than it is
worth to simply create an alternative sidetracking proposition. If fishing is
unsuccessful, and you are unable to retrieve whatever is causing a stuck point,
then an alternative route should be followed, as options to mill and replace will
likely be more costly than rerouting the sidetrack. For this scenario, Id
recommend pulling tubing from surface to packer at 8903, and running a cement
bond log to check for good cementing in the outer annulus within range of that
depth. With a good cement job, the possibility of sidetracking out from that point
will not readily allow fluid loss, and provides a viable option to simply avoid the
problems in the original well plan. Next, I would recommend setting a cast iron
plug on the packer, followed by about 45 feet of cement. This will allow you to
set your whipstock on top of the cement, and drill out of the casing to continue
with your sidetrack proposal. It is necessary to ensure the cement in the outer
annulus is in good condition, otherwise there could be an annular space that
prohibits drilling mud from successfully reaching the bit. In addition to that,
cuttings and other debris may have a means of escaping the desired annular
space. This sidetrack proposal allows new tubing to be run in hole, thereby
providing additional backup in the aging well.
Calculate the Oil, Gas, and Total Fluid Rate in ft3/day.
Report
Date

Oil Vol Met

(BOPD)

Oil Vol
(ft3/Day)

Gas Vol Met

(MCFD)

Gas Vol
(ft3/Day)

Total Vol
(ft3/day)

3/10/0
7
3/11/07
3/12/0
7
3/13/0
7
3/14/0
7
3/15/0
7

28461622.2
1
44609716.6
41337536.9
2
45670868.2
1

467

2622.205

28459

28459000

840

4716.6

44605

44605000

808

4536.92

41333

41333000

867

4868.205

45666

45666000

880

4941.2

45673

45673000

45677941.2

878

4929.97

45223

45223000

45227929.9
7

Would you classify this as a gas or oil well? Why?

I would classify this as an oil well because the GOR is less than 100 Mcf/bbl.

The well was left flowing during the pressure test. Why are you
concerned?

The standard MIT procedure is that a packer or bridge plug should be set 100 ft
or less above the highest perforations, thus allowing the pressure to build in the
tubing, and providing a higher collapse backup rating. When you realize this
procedure has not been adhered to, the likelihood of a higher pressure
differential makes you fear that the tubing may have collapsed.

Is this your fault? Should you have seen this coming?

No, this is not your fault. If standard MIT procedure was followed and the well
was shut in, this likely would not have happened (depending on the severity of
the corrosion effects on the collapse rating). As an engineer, it is not your
responsibility to ensure that the crew properly followed procedures by being on
site!

Use the 3/15/07 pump report to determine the pressures on the tubing and
inner annulus before and during the pressure test.

Before Test Flowing: Tubing P (Gauge) = 1000 psi

IA Pressure (Gauge) = 500 psi
During Test Flowing: Tubing P (Gauge) = 1000 psi
IA Pressure (Gauge) = 3500 psi

Calculate the hydrostatic pressure in the annulus. The pump truck used
crude to pressure up on the IA, so you can assume you have a full column
of crude on the backside of the well. Use calculations above (Flowrates)
to determine fluid column density in the tubing.

Crude 0.35 psi/ft

Gas
- 0.06 psi/ft
IA Hydrostatic at 8760 ft: (0.35 psi/ft)(8670 ft) = 3034.5 psi
Tubing Fluids: 4930/45227950 = 0.000109 (Oil)
45223000/45227950 = 0.999891 (Gas)
Tubing Hydrostatic at 8760 ft: (0.000109)(0.35 psi/ft)(8760 ft) + (0.999891)(0.06
psi/ft)(8670 ft) = 520.47 psi
Total Tubing Pressure:
Before 1000psi + 521 psi = 1521 psi
During 1000 psi + 521 psi = 1521 psi
Total IA Pressure:
Before 500 psi + 3035 psi = 3535 psi
During 3500 psi + 3035 psi = 6535 psi

What is the collapse rating of the tubing?

Collapse rating of 5 17 ppf L80 = 6390 psi

Based on your calculations, should the tubing have failed? Why or why
not?

The collapse rating does not account for corrosion/localized pitting, which would
affect the rating, however the calculations do not predict a collapse.

If it shouldnt have (yet it did), what are the possible reasons?

One probable reason is that corrosion was taking place and wearing the pipes
integrity, thus decreasing the collapse rating.
A secondary reason is that the well was left flowing during the MIT, and should
not have been, thus causing a large pressure differential. The MIT, if performed
correctly, would have had a much higher collapse backup rating.

What could have been done differently during the MIT to prevent this?

(Refer to the sample calc sheets for diagrams) If the well was shut in (at least 8
hours), the tubing would have had seen a higher tubing pressure, thus more
backup for the collapse. The well should have been shut in!

Unable to get past the crossover sub What do you think happened?

There are two scenarios which could be the cause of the stuck point. The first is
possible, but not very likely. If the tubing collapse generated a high enough force
to cause the tubing to become dismantled from the crossover sub, then the LIB
could have hit the edge of the crossover (likely leaning on the casing).
Another, more probable scenario, is that a fragment of the collapsed tubing fell
through the tubing and got stuck in the crossover sub. This is consistent with the
impression left on the LIB.

What does the LIB tell you?

The LIB tells you that you have likely hit something that fell and got caught in the
crossover sub. Another theory could be that the crossover sub parted from the
tubing and leaned on the casing wall, thus allowing the lead impression block to
have the shape it does. The theory that tubing collapsed and a portion fell into
the crossover sub is in compliance with the ovalic pattern seen on the LIB, and
resembles a pattern quite similar to the LIBs dropped before the collapsed tubing
was retrieved.

Now what? List at least one option to put yourself back in a position to
sidetrack CSM #1.

Option 1 Because you do not know what the impression block is hitting near
the crossover sub, there is a variability with this method being successful, but if
not, case 2 below will offer a very viable plan. You could run a fishing tool in the
hopes that the LIB is hitting a collapsed casing fragment and simply fish it out
and continue with the proposed plan.
Option 2 If all else fails, you could pull tubing, run a CBL to ensure outer
annulus cement was in good standing. Then you could set a cast iron plug,
cement about 45 ft above it, set your whipstock, and begin sidetracking your well.
A similar sidetrack plan could be followed, but slight provisions would likely need
to be made.

3/15/07 MIT Pressure Differentials

7/11/06 MIT Pressure Differentials

It is necessary to recognize that the effects of corrosion are

often
localized and create pitting effects in certain cathode-anode
areas, thus causing specified areas of the tubing to lose more steel, further
decreasing collapse rating.