PROPERTY

COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

Faustino Ignacio vs Director of Lands GR No. L-12958 May 30, 1960

Facts:
Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of a mangrove land in Rizal. It was stated
in the application that he owned the parcelby right of accretion. The director of land opposed the
registration for the reason that the land to be registered is an area of public domain and that the
applicant nor his predecessor-in-interes possessed sufficient title for the land. The parcel of land
appliedwas acquired from the government by the virtue of a free patent title. However, the land
in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposists caused by the action of the Manila
bay. The petition was denied by the lower court and decided that the land to be registered are
part of the public domain. Faustino, however, contended that the court could have declared the
land not to be part of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts have the power to reclassify a land
Ruling:
No, the courts do not have the power to reclassify a land. The courts are primarily called
upon to determine whether a land is to be used for public purpose. However, it is only limited
there. A formal declaration of reclassification of land should come from the government,
specifically from the executive department or the legislature. These bodies should declare that a
land in question is no longer needed for public use, some public use or for the improvement of
national wealth.

Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

Facts:
2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter.
The wife died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the
wife's death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will where
he left his entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which he left
to his adopted daughter. Audreys will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken
on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife's
estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).
Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property
is situated
Ruling:
Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated.
However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by
her national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose
succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country

where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in the
Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the
national law of the testator.

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation
ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total
area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park,
contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the
properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the
public.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property
Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a
public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just
compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just
compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the
property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the
state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.

Spouses Custodio vs. CA, GR No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:
Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other
immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the
property. One of the tenants vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe
fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The fence was
constructed by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence and extended it to the entire
passageway, therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to the trial court
and ordered the custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to
the punlic street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way
Ruling:

Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use
and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done
by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss
is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and
ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this
case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said
use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life

German Management Services vs. CA, GR No. 76217 September 14, 1989

Facts:
Spouses Jose are the owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo. They executed a special power of
attorney authorizing German management Services to develop their property into a residential
subdivision. However, the property was being occupied by private respondents and twenty other
persons. They were asked to vacate but refused. PR filed an action for forcible entry and
alleged that they are mountainside farmers of the area and have occupied and tilled their
farmholdings prior to the promulgation of PD 27. They stated that they have been deprived of
their property without due process of law by means of force, violence and intimidation.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR ( I know this is RPC- but
involved and prop)
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR. In forcible entry, ownership is
not an issue. It may be a fact that the German Management was duly authorised by the owners
to develop the subject property, the actual possessors of the land, the Prs, can commence a
forcible entry case against the petitioner. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate.

6. Lopez vs. Orosa and Plaza Theatre, 103 SCRA 98

FACTS:
Orosa invited Lopez to invest with him in building a theatre. Lopez supplied lumber for
the construction of the said theatre. The materials totaled 62k but Orosa was only able
to pay 20k thus leaving a balance of almost 42k. Later on respondents acquired a bank
loan of 30k, with Luzon Surety Company as their surety and the land and building were
mortgaged as counter-security. Petitioner sued to collect the unpaid amount for the
materials and was able to get a judgment against the respondents making them jointly
liable to pay the remaining amount. Also, he was able to obtain a materialmans lien on
the building of the theatre. The stocks amounting to 42k shall be sold in public auction in
case the respondents default. Petitioner wasnt happy because he also wanted a lien on

the land, urging that the judgment lien should include it since the building and the land
are inseparable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the building and the land are inseparable?
HELD:
No. The contention that the lien embraces both the land and the building or structure
adhering thereto is without merit. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the
land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building,
separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real
properties (Article 415 of the new Civil Code) could mean only one thing that a
building is by itself an immovable property. Moreover, and in view of the absence of any
specific provision of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective
of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the
same owner.
7. Associated Insurance and Surety Company vs. Iya, et al, 103 SCRA 972
FACTS:
Spouses Valino were the owners of a house, payable on installments from Philippine Realty
Corporation. To be able to purchase on credit rice from NARIC, they filed a surety bond
subscribed by petitioner and therefor, they executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the house
in favor of the surety company. The spouses didnt own yet the land on which the
house was constructed on at the time of the undertaking. After being able to purchase
the land, to be able to secure payment for indebtedness, the spouses executed a real
estate
mortgage
in
favor
of
Iya.
The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC, petitioner was compelled to pay.
The spouses werent able to pay the surety company despite demands and thus, the company
foreclosed the chattel mortgage. It later learned of the real estate mortgage over the house and
lot secured by the spouses. This prompted the company to file an action against the spouses.
Also, Iya filed another civil action against the spouses, asserting that she has a better right over
the property. The trial court heard the two cases jointly and it held that the surety company had
a preferred right over the building as since when the chattel mortgage was secured, the
land wasnt owned yet by the spouses making the building then a chattel and not a real
property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the building can be considered personal property?
HELD:
No. A building is an immovable property irrespective of where or not said structure and the land
on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. A building certainly cannot be divested of its
character of realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another. To
hold it the other way, the possibility is not remote that it would result in confusion, for to

cloak the building with an uncertain status made dependent on ownership of the land,
would create a situation where a permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the
ownership of the land changes hands. In the case at bar, as personal properties may be the
only subjects of a chattel mortgage, the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building
is null and void.

8. Bicerra vs. Tenezza, 6 SCRA 648

FACTS:

The Bicerras were the owners of a house built on a lot owned by them and
situated in the municipality of Lagangilang. Tenezza forcibly demolished the
house, asserting that they are the rightful owners of the land. Failure to restore the
house
and
to
deliver
the
materials
by
the
defendants,
plaintiffs were forced to file an action against them for damages as well as praying that
the court hold them as the proper owners of the house. The court dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES: Whether or not the house demolished is still considered an immovable property?
HELD:

No. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil
on which it is built. The classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house
may be situated on land belonging to another owner. But once the house is
demolished, it ceases to exist as such and the hence its character as immovable
likewise ceases.
9. Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. And Williamson, 37 SCRA 644
FACTS:
Compania Agricola Filipina bought rice-cleaning machinery from the machinery company and
this was secured by a chattel mortgage on the machinery and the building to which it was
installed. Upon failure to pay, the chattel mortgage was foreclosed, the building and
machinery sold in public auction and bought by the machinery company. Then Compania
Agricola Filipina executed a deed of sale over the land to which the building stood in favor of the
machinery company. This was done to cure any defects that may arise in the machinery
companys ownership of the building.
On or about the date to which the chattel mortgage was executed, Compania executed
a real estate mortgage over the building in favor of Leung Yee, distinct and separate
from the land. This is to secure payment for its indebtedness for the construction of the
building. Upon failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed. The machinery company then
filed a case, demanding that it be declared the rightful owner of the building. The trial
court held that it was the machinery company which was the rightful owner as it had its title
before the building was registered prior to the date of registry of Leung Yees certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the building in question is an immovable?

HELD:

The building made out of strong materials in which the machinery was installed is real
property. The mere fact that the parties dealt with it as separate and
apart from the land (or as personal property) does not change its character as real
property. In this case, it follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage
of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in the registry of
the sale of the mortgaged property had any legal effect.
10. Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 SCRA 630
FACTS:
De la Rosa was the lessee of a piece of land, on which a house she owns was built.
She executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the petitionerpurporting the leasehold interest
in the land and the ownership of house. After such, the petitioner moved for its registration
with the Register of Deeds, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record
of chattel mortgages. After said document had been duly acknowledge and delivered, the
petitioner caused the same to be presented to the respondent, Joaquin Jaramillo, as register of
deeds of the City of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record
of chattel mortgages. Upon examination of the instrument, the respondent was of the opinion
that it was not a chattel mortgage, for the reason that the interest therein mortgaged did not
appear to be personal property, within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and
registration was refused on this ground only.
ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

respondents

position

is

tenable?

HELD:
No. The respondents duties, as a register of deeds, in respect to the registration of chattel
mortgage are of a purely ministerial character; and no provision of law can be cited which
confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of
which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage. Generally, he should accept the
qualification of the property adopted by the person who presents the instrument for
registration and should place the instrument on record, upon payment of the proper fee,
leaving the effects of registration to be determined by the court if such question should arise for
legal determination. The Civil Code supplies no absolute criterion in discriminating between real
property and personal property for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage
Law. The articles state general doctrines, nonetheless, it must not be forgotten that under
given conditions, property may have character different from that imputed to it in the
said articles. It is undeniable that the parties in a contract may by agreement treat as
personal property that which by nature would be real property.

11. Punsalan vs. Lacsamana, 21 SCRA 331

FACTS:
Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to his
failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public auction to which
PNB was the highest bidder. On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of the
land, it secured a permit for the construction of a warehouse. A deed of sale was executed
between PNB and Punsalan. This contract was amended to include the warehouse and the
improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments, respondent Lacsamana secured title over
the property in her name.
Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among his allegations was that the
bank did not own the building and thus, it should not be included in the said deed.
Petitioners complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The trial court held that the action
being filed in actuality by petitioner is a real action involving his right over a real property.
ISSUE:
W/N the warehouse is an immovable and must be tried in the province where the property lies.
HELD:
Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property. Buildings are
always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it is
stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt
with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as
immovable property.

12. Prudential Bank vs. Panis 153 SCRA 390

FACTS:
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, they executed a
real estate mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also the right to occupy
the lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which
the building stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses secured another from the same
bank. To secure payment, another real estate mortgage was executed over the same
properties. The Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land
which was later on mortgaged to the bank. The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the
REM was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the
spouses. The respondent court held that the REM was null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid REM mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the
belonging to another.
HELD: A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging
to another. The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can

only mean that the building itself is an immovable property. While it is true that a mortgage of
land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings,
still a building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the land on which it is built. Such a
mortgage would still be considered as a REM for the building would still be considered as
immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. The original mortgage
on the building and right to occupancy of the land was executed before the issuance of the
sales patent and before the government was divested of title to the land. Under the foregoing, it
is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own
building was a valid mortgage. As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent
was issued and thus prohibits pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act.
13. Tumalad vs. Vicencio
FACTS: Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over
their house, which was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee
a loan, payable in one year with a 12% per annum interest. The mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a public auction and the plaintiffs
were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued. Thereafter, the plaintiffs
filed an action for ejectment against the defendants, praying that the latter vacate the house as
they were the proper owners.
ISSUE: W/N the chattel mortgage was null and void ab initio because only personal properties
can be subject of a chattel mortgage.
HELD: Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are
immovable property such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal
property those by their nature would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of
estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as
chattel, a conduct that may conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.
In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as
personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage
could only have meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least, intended to
treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand
by claiming otherwise.

14. Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation vs Wennever Texttile Mills

FACTS:
To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing, Wearever Textile discounted and
assigned several receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement with Makati Leasing. To

secure the collection of receivables, it executed a chattel mortgage over several raw materials
and a machinery Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range (Dryer). Wearever defaulted thus the
properties mortgaged were extrajudicially foreclosed. The sheriff, after the restraining order was
lifted, was able to enter the premises of Wearever and removed the drive motor of the Dryer.
The CA reversed the order of the CFI, ordering the return of the drive motor since it cannot be
the subject of a replevin suit being an immovable bolted to the ground. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether the dryer is an immovable property
HELD: NO. The SC relied on its ruling in Tumalad v. Vicencio, that if a house of strong materials
can be the subject of a Chattel Mortgage as long as the parties to the contract agree and no
innocent 3rd party will be prejudiced then moreso that a machinery may treated as a movable
since it is movable by nature and becomes immobilized only by destination. And treating it as a
chattel by way of a Chattel Mortgage, Wearever is estopped from claiming otherwise.
15. Sergs Products and Gaquiloy vs. PCI Leasing and Finance 338 SCRA 499
FACTS:
PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of money as well as a writ of replevin for the
seizure of machineries, subject of a chattel mortgage executed by petitioner in favor of PCI.
Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion for special protective
order. It asserts that the machineries were real property and could not be subject of a chattel
mortgage.
Issue: Whether or not the machineries become real property by virtue of immobilization.
HELD:
The machineries in question have become immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements in the industry, and thus have become immovable in nature.
Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may
validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreement, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.

16. MANARANG AND MANARANG V. OFILADA AND ESTEBAN 99 SCRA 108

FACTS:
Manarang secured a loan from Esteban guaranteed by a chattel mortgage over a house of
mixed materials. Due to failure to pay the chattel mortgage was foreclosed. Before the sale of the
property, Manarang tried to pay for the property but the sheriff refused to accept tender unless there is
payment for the publication of the notice of sale in the newspapers. This prompted Manarang to bring
this suit to compel the sheriff to accept payment. He averred that the publication was unnecessary as
the houses hold be considered as personal property per agreement in the chattel mortgage, and the
publication for notice of sale is unnecessary

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact that the parties entering into a contract regarding a house
gave said property the consideration of personal property in their contract.
HELD:
Yes. There is no question that a building of mixed materials may be a subject of chattel
mortgage, in which case it is considered as between the parties as personal property. The mere fact
that a house was the subject of chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property by
the parties doesnt make the said house personal property for purposes of the notice to
be given for its sale in public auction. It is real property within the purview of Rule 39, Section 16 of the
Rules of Court as it has become a permanent fixture on the land, which is real property.

17. NAVARRO VS. PINEDA

9 SCRA 631
FACTS:
Pineda and his mother executed real estate and chattel mortgages in favor of
Navarro, to secure a loan they got from the latter. The REM covered a parcel of land
owned by the mother while the chattel mortgage covered a residential house. Due to
the failure to pay the loan, they asked for extensions to pay for the loan. On the
second extension, Pineda executed a promise wherein in case of default in payment, he
wouldnt ask for any additional extension and there would be no need for any formal
demand. In spite of this, they still failed to pay. Navarro then filed for the foreclosure of
the mortgages. The court
decided in his favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage appended
to the complaint is valid notwithstanding the fact that the house was made subject of
chattel mortgage for the reason that it is erected on a land that belongs to a third
person.
HELD:

Yes. Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to another

person, it may be the subject matter of a chattel mortgage as personal property if so
stipulated in the document of mortgage, and in an action by the mortgagee for the
foreclosure, the validity
Of the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed by one of the parties to the contract of
mortgage. Furthermore, although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has
been considered as a chattel between the parties and that the validity of the contract
between them, has been recognized, it has been a constant criterion that with
respect to third
Persons, who are not parties to the contract, and especially in execution proceedings,
the house is considered as immovable property.
18. DAVAO SAWMILL V. CASTILLO
G.R.
No.
L-40411

August

7,

1935

FACTS:
Davao Sawmill Co., operated a sawmill. However, the land upon which the business
was conducted was leased from another person. On the land, Davao Sawmill erected a
building which housed the machinery it used. Some of the machines were mounted and
placed on foundations of cement.. The contract of lease stated that on the expiration of
the period agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by
Davao sawmill shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the lessor without any obligation
on its part to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings; which do not include
the machineries and accessories in the improvements.
In another action, a writ of execution was issued against the company and the
properties in question were levied upon. The company assailed the said writ contending
that the machineries and accessories were personal in nature, hence, not subject to writ
of
execution.
The
trial
judge
ruled
in
favour
of
the
company.
ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment

were

personal property

HELD
Yes,
the
subject
properties
are
personal
in
nature.
Art.415 (NCC) provides that real property consists of (5) Machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. Machinery is naturally movable.
However, machinery only becomes immovable when placed in a land by the owner of

the property or land but not when so placed by a tenant or any person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar,
the machinery is intended not by the owner of the land but by the saw mill company for
use in connection with its trade
19. TSAI V. CA
Gr. No. 120098, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained loan from Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom), secured by a Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where
its factory stands, and the chattels located therein as enumerated in a schedule
attached to the mortgage contract. PBCom again granted a second loan to EVERTEX
which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage over personal properties similar to those
listed in the first mortgage deed. During the execution of the second mortgage,
EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipment. Upon EVERTEX's failure to
meet its obligation. PBCom, commenced extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
PBCom leased the entire factory premises to Ruby Tsai and sold to the same the
factory, lock, stock and barrel including the contested machineries.
EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages against
PBCom, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject mortgage was not valid,
and that PBCom, without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the contested
properties which were not included in the Real and Chattel Mortgage of the first
mortgage contract nor in the second contract which is a Chattel Mortgage, and neither
were those properties included in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment were personal properties
HELD:
YES, the machineries and equipment are personal properties. The nature of the
disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real
property mortgaged does not make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and
(5) of the New Civil Code. While it is true that the properties appear to be immobile, a
perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein
reveal their intent, that is - to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. If the
machineries in question were contemplated to be included in the real estate mortgage,
there would have been no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage specifically with a listing
of the machineries covered thereby.
Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the
parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of
estoppel, where an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a
stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel
mortgage
is
executed
over
it.

20. MINDANAO BUS CO. V. CITY ASSESSOR DIGEST

G.R. No. L-17870 29 September 1962
FACTS:
Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargo
by motor vehicles. Petitioner likewise owned a land where it maintains a garage, a
repair shop and blacksmith or carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon in
wooden and cement platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400
realty tax on said machineries and repair equipment. Petitioner appealed on the ground
that the same are not real properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment are considered immobilized and
thus subject to a realty tax
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court held that said machineries and equipment are not subject to
the assessment of real estate tax. Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as
immovable property xxx (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended
by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works;
Said equipment are not considered immobilized as they are merely incidental, not
essential and principal to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business
could be carried on without repair or service shops of its rolling equipment as they can
be
repaired
or
services
in
another
shop
belonging
to
another
Aside from the element of essentiality the Art.415 (5) also requires that the industry or
works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. As such, the equipment in
question are not deemed real property and not subject to realty tax, because the
transportation business is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land,
as demanded by law.
21. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS V. MERALCO
G.R. No. L-15334. January 31, 1964
FACTS:
Meralcos electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan
Falls, Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission
wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said City. These electric transmission
wires which carry high voltage current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel
towers. Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land
belonging to it.
The QC City Assessor declared the MERALCO's steel towers subject to real property
tax. After the denial of MERALCO's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was

taken to the QC Board of Assessment Appeals, which required respondent to pay real
property tax on the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956.
MERALCO paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) which rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of the said tax
declarations and the refunding to MERALCO by the QC City Treasurer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the steel towers of an electric company constitute real property
for the purposes of real property tax.
HELD:
NO. The steel towers of an electric company do not constitute real property for the
purposes of real property tax. Steel towers are not immovable property under
paragraph 1, 3 and 5 of Article 415 (NCC) because they do not constitute buildings or
constructions adhered to the soil. As per description, given by the lower court, they are
removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when
unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.
They cannot be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an immovable
in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. These steel towers or supports
do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries or receptacles,
instruments or implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or
works on the land.
Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel supports
or towers are constructed.

22. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS

114 SCRA 273
FACTS:

Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel plates wielded and
assembled on the spot. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisted of
compacted earth, sand pad as immediate layer, and asphalt stratum as top layer. The
tanks are within the Caltex refinery compound. They are used for storing fuel oil for
Meralco's
power
plants.
The municipal treasurer of Batangas made an assessment for realty tax on the two
tanks, based on the report of the Board of Assessors. Meralco contends that the said oil
storage tanks do not fall within any of the kinds of real property enumerated in article
415 of the Civil Code the tanks are not attached to the land and that they were placed
on
leased
land,
not
on
the
land
owned
by
Meralco.

ISSUE : Whether or not the oil storage tanks constitute real property for the purposes of
real property tax
HELD:

YES. While the two storage tanks are not embodied in the land, they may
nevertheless be considered as improvements in the land, enhancing its utility and
rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been
installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable
quantities
of
oil
needed
by
Meralco
for
its
operations.
For purposes of taxation, the term real property may include things, which should
generally be considered as personal property. It is a familiar phenomenon to
see things classified as real property for purposes of taxation which on general
principle
may
be
considered
as
personal
property.

23. PIANSAY VS. DAVID, 12 SCRA 227

FACTS:
David obtained a loan of P3,000 with 12% interest from Uy Kim. To secure the payment
of the same, he executed a chattel mortgage on a house in Tondo. Upon Davids failure
to pay, it was foreclosed and Uy Kim bought the house at the public auction and
thereafter sold the same to Salvador Piansay. Later on, Marcos Mangubat filed a
complaint against David before the CFI Manila for the collection of the loan of P2,000.
The complaint was later amended to implead Uy Kim and Piansay praying that the
auction sale and deed of absolute sale executed by Uy Kim in favor of Piansay be
annulled. CFI Manila ordered David to pay and annulled the chattel mortgage. CA
affirmed. David was ordered to pay and the house was levied upon. To prevent the sale
at the public auction, Piansay and Uy Kim filed a petition before the CA but it was
denied. Subsequently, the latter instituted an action against David and Mangubat
praying that judgment be rendered declaring Piansay as the true owner and restrain the
levy and sale to public auction. David demanded from Piansay the payment of the
rentals for the use and occupation of the house; the latter claims it is his property.
Mangubat, on one hand, moved to dismiss the complaint which was granted. CA
affirmed it by explaining that Uy Kim had no right to foreclose the chattel mortgage
because it was in reality a mere contract of an unsecured loan. Piansay assailed
Mangubats right to levy execution upon the house alleging that the same belongs to
him, he having bought it from Uy Kim who acquired it at the auction sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the chattel mortgage and sale are valid
HELD:

No. Upon the theory that the chattel mortgage and sale in favor of Uy Kim had been
annulled in the original decision, as affirmed by the CA, the fact is that said order
became final and executory upon the denial of the petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Hence, Uy Kim and Piansay are now barred from asserting that the chattel mortgage
and sale are valid. At any rate, regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a
chattel mortgage on a house, as between the parties to said contract, the same cannot
and does not bind third persons, who are not parties to the contract of their privies. As a
consequence, the sale of the house in question in the proceedings for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar as defendant Mangubat is
concerned, and did not confer upon Uy Kim, as buyer in said sale, any dominical right in
and to said house, so that she could not have transmitted to her assignee Piansay any
such right as against Mangubat. In short, they do not have a cause of action against
Mangubat and David
24. SIBAL VS. VALDEZ, 50 PHIL 512
FACTS: As a first cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano
Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued
by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant
Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven
parcels of land. Within one year from the date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff
offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount
sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments
or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest
corresponding thereto. But Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar
cane to the plaintiff.
As a second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez
was attempting to harvest the palay planted in four of the seven parcels and that he had
harvested and taken possession of the palay in one of said seven parcels and in
another parcel, amounting to 300 cavans; and that all of said palay belonged to the
plaintiff.
After hearing and on 28 April 1926, the judge (Lukban) rendered judgment in favor of
the defendant holding that the sugar cane in question was personal property and, as
such, was not subject to redemption; among others. Hence, the appeal
ISSUE:
Whether the sugar cane in question is personal or real property
HELD:
Manresa, the eminent commentator of the Spanish Civil Code, in discussing section 334
of the Civil Code, in view of the recent decisions of the supreme Court of Spain, admits
that growing crops are sometimes considered and treated as personal property.
Moreover, from an examination of the reports and codes of the State of California and
other states we find that the settle doctrine followed in said states in connection with the
attachment of property and execution of judgment is, that growing crops raised by
yearly labor and cultivation are considered personal property.
On the other hand, Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognized that growing crops
are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides: "All personal property shall be subject to
mortgage, agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance

thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides: "If growing crops be
mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself
properly to tend, care for and protect the crop while growing.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. 1508 was enacted on the assumption that
"growing crops" are personal property. This consideration tends to support the conclusion
hereinbefore stated, that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by
section 450 of Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as
mentioned in said article of the Civil Code have the nature of personal property. In other words,
the phrase "personal property" should be understood to include "ungathered products."

We may, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been
modified by section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the
sense that, for the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the
Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal property.
25. RUBISO VS. RIVERA, 37 PHIL 72
FACTS: Bonifacio Gelito sold his share in the pilot boat Valentina, consisting of 2/3
interest therein, to the Chinaman Sy Qui, the co-owner of the other 1/3 interest in said
vessel; wherefore this vendor is no longer entitled to exercise any action whatever in
respect to the boat in question. After the sale of the boat to the defendant Rivera, suit
having been brought in the justice of the peace court against the Chinaman Sy Qui to
enforce payment of a certain sum of money, the latters creditor Fausto Rubiso. Rubiso
later acquired said vessel at a public auction sale and for the sum of P55.45. The
certificate of sale and adjudication of the boat in question was issued by the sheriff on
behalf of Fausto Rubiso, in the office of the Collector of Customs, on 27 January 1915
and was also entered in the commercial registry on 14 March 1915.
On 10 April 1915, the plaintiffs brought suit in the CFI and alleged in the complaint that
his clients were the owners of the pilot boat named Valentina, which had been in bad
condition since 1914 and was stranded in Tingloy, Bauan, Batangas; and that Florentino
E. Rivera took charge or possession of said vessel without the knowledge or consent of
the plaintiffs and refused to deliver it to them, under claim that he was the owner
thereof. After the hearing of the case and the introduction of documentary evidence, the
judgment of 6 September 1915, was rendered, , in which the defendant and appellant
was ordered to place at the disposal of the Fausto Rubiso the pilot boat in litigation. No
special finding was made for costs. The defendant appealed and moved for a new trial.
This motion was denied and appellant excepted.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, with the costs against the appellant.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the requisite of registration in the registry, of the purchase of the
vessel, is necessary and indispensable in order that the purchasers rights may
be maintained against a third person
2. Whether or not the boat is a real property
HELD:
1. The legal rule set down in the Mercantile Code subsists, inasmuch as the amendment solely
refers to the official who shall make the entry; but, with respect to the rights of the two

purchasers, whichever of them first registered his acquisition of the vessel is the one entitled to
enjoy the protection of the law, which considers him the absolute owner of the purchased boat,
and this latter to be free of all encumbrance and all claims by strangers for, pursuant to article
582 of the said code, after the bill of the judicial sale at auction has been executed and recorded
in the commercial registry, all the other liabilities of the vessel in favor of the creditors shall be
considered canceled. 1awphil.net
The purchaser at public auction, Fausto Rubiso, who was careful to record his acquisition,
opportunely and on a prior date, has, according to the law, a better right than the defendant
Rivera who subsequently recorded his purchase. The latter is a third person, who was directly
affected by the registration which the plaintiff made of his acquisition.
2. Ships or vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail, partake, to a certain extent, of the
nature and conditions of real property, on account of their value and importance in the world
commerce; and for this reason the provisions of article 573 of the Code of Commerce are nearly
identical with those of article 1473 of the Civil Code.

26. PHIL. REFINING CO. VS. JARQUE, 61 PHIL 229

FACTS:
On varying dates the Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three
mortgages, denominated as chattel mortgage on the motor vessels Pandan and
Zaragoza. The first two mortgages do not have an appended affidavit of good faith,
while the third contains such. The third mortgage was subscribed by Jarque and MN
Brink (in what capacity the latter signed is not disclosed) and was not registered in the
customs house until 17 May 1932, or within the period of 30 prior to the commencement
of insolvency proceedings against Jarque. A fourth mortgage was executed by Jarque
and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage
registry of the register of deeds on 12 May 1932, or again within the 30-day period
before the institution of insolvency proceedings.
A petition was filed with the CFI Cebu on 2 June 1932 in which it was prayed that
Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor, with the result that an assignment of
all the properties of the insolvent debtor, was executed in favor of Jose Corominas. The
petition on the matter of Jarques insolvency was granted. However, the judge declined
to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special
defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, with costs against appellant
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the vessel is a personal property
2. Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce a chattel mortgage on a
vessel
HELD:
1. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. (Code of Commerce,
article 585.) Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property. Under the
common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a

peculiar kind of personal property. Since the term personal property includes vessels,
they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
(Act 1508, section 2.) Indeed, it has heretofore been accepted without discussion that a
mortgage on a vessel is in nature a chattel mortgage. The only difference between a
chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personality is that it is not
now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the
register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a
vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry.
Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its
requisites and validity.
2. Section 5 of the Chattel Mortgage Law deemed it a requirement to have an affidavit
of good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The absence of the
affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. As a
consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith required
by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.
27. US vs. CARLOS 21 PHIL 553
FACTS:
Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco.
The court issued a warrant of arrest. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He
claimed that what he did failed to constitute an offense. His counsel further asserted
that the crime of larceny applied only to tangibles, chattels and objects that can be
taken into possession and spirited away, hence a movable property. Deliberation quickly
followed at the court which subsequently sentenced him to over a year in jail. Mr. Carlos
contested saying that electrical energy cannot be stolen (how can one steal an
incorporeal thing?). He filed an appeal on such grounds and the court of first instance
affirmed the decision. The case reached the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in declaring that electrical energy can be stolen?
RULING:
Yes. Analogically, electricity can be considered as gas which can be stolen.

However, the true test of what constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether
the subject is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by
another other than the owner. It is a valuable article of merchandise, a force of nature
brought under the control of science. Mr. Carlos secretly and with intent to deprive the
company of its rightful property, used jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own
use. This constitutes larceny.
28. US vs. TAMBUNTING 41 PHIL 364
FACTS:

The Manila Gas Company installed equipment for the transmission of gas in a house at
Evangelista. After the original subscriber left, the apparatus was sealed and the services
discontinued. Later Mr. Tambunting moved in. He was a cheapskate and spliced the tubing to
leech free gas for household use. Alas, the crime was discovered by the gas company. The
prosecutor filed charges and hailed Mr. Tambunting to court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not gas can be the subject of larceny.

RULING:

Yes. Gas is a substance which lends itself to felonious appropriation. It is a valuable

merchandise that can be bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being
siphoned from a larger mass and transported from place to place.

29. INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER vs. RAMIREZ

44 PHIL 933

FACTS:

The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity &
Surety Co. on March 10, 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while
another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also
in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity &
Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by
Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.

ISSUE:

Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property.

RULING:

Yes. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of
the property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a
personal property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of
movable properties in Article 414 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage.
30. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
384 SCRA 152

FACTS:

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the
DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the transfer is valid.

RULING:

No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
31. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS
281 SCRA 639
FACTS:
Morato filed for a patent on a parcel of land located in Calauag, Quezon,
which was approved, provided that the land shall not be encumbered or alienated within
a period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent. Later on, the land was
established to be a portion of Calauag Bay, which was five to six feet deep during high
tides and three feet deep on low tides. The water level rose because of the ebb and flow
of tides from the bay and the storms that frequently passed through the area.
Furthermore, it was observed by the Director of Lands from his investigation, that the
land of Morato was leased to Advincula and it was also mortgaged to Co. The
government sought for the revocation of the patent issued. The trial court and appellate
court decided in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land granted under patent which was later on leased and
mortgaged should be revert back to the ownership of the State it being a foreshore land.

HELD:
Yes, foreshore lands have been defined to be that part of the land which is
between the high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. This is
the strip of land that lies between the high and low watermarks and that is alternatively
wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. Foreshore lands may not anymore be the
subject of issuance of free patents. Under property of public ownership or dominion are
foreshore lands, as provided for in the Civil Code.
It is to be noted that when the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the
invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of public domain. In
accordance with this land reclassification, the land can no longer be subject to a
pending patent application and must be returned to the State.

32. LANZAR V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

78 SCRA 130
FACTS:
Lanzar filed for application for registration of title over a parcel of land, to which
the Director of Lands objected to as the land in question, according to him, was part of
the foreshore lands. The trial court adjudicated the land to Lanzar as the said land
wasnt necessary for public utility or establishment of special industries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.
HELD:
Yes, lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the sea, form part of the public domain; it cannot be appropriated nor can it be
acquired by prescription. When they are no longer washed by the water of the sea and
are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for coastguard services, then the Government shall declare them to be
property of the owners of the estate adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
33. IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
108 PHIL 335
FACTS:
Ignacio filed for the registration of title over a mangrove to which he later said
that he acquired right to the mangrove through accretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ignacio has the right to declare that such land can be subject to
registration and does not anymore form part of the public dominion.
HELD:
No, only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the

authority and power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea is not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries or
for Coast Guard Service otherwise, the property continues to be property of public
dominion ,further, it cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription notwithstanding the fact
that it is not actually devoted for such use or service. If no such declaration has been
made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. Under
Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of Aug. 3, 1866. lands added to the shores by
accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public
domain. Since alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain, it is
not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons.
34. VILLARICA V. COURT OF APPEALS
309 SCRA 193
FACTS:
Spouses Teofilo and Maxima Villarica, filed an application for confirmation of the
title over a parcel of land which they allege they bought from Teofilos father. Said
application was opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the said land forms
part of the public domain as it is within the unclassified area in Meycauayan and is not
available for private appropriation. The trial court dismissed the case since the property
forms part of the public domain therefore the certificate of title is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land still forms part of the public domain
HELD:
Yes, there has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the
land in question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed disclosed that
applicants have not introduced any evidence which would have led the court a quo to
rule otherwise. Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof,
no matter how long doesnt ripen to a registrable title. The adverse possession which
may be the basis of a grant or title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. Thus, if the land in question still
forms part of the public forest, then possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it
into private property as it is beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to
register under the Torrens System.

35
36
37
38

39. Chiao Liong Tan vs CA Nov.19,1993 GR no.106251

Facts:
Petitioner claims that he is the owner of a motor vehicle, relying on the fact that such
was registered in his name.Petitioner's brother private respondent averred that the
vehicle was for their family business use for the delivery of machinery to its
customers.Prior to such dispute private respondent asked Petitioner to look for a vehicle
and give the latter P5,000 as down payment,after a month private respondent himself
paid the whole price out of a loan of P140,000 although receipts for down payment as
well as the payment of balance of the purchase price was issued in the name of
Petitioner.Allegations of private respondent has been corroborated by witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner is the lawful owner of the vehicle?
Whether or not Petitioner action for Replevin proper?
Ruling:
The NCC recognizes cases of Implied trust other than those enumerated therein.Thus
although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties,it is undeniable that
an implied trust was created when the Certificate of Registration of the motor vehicle
was placed in the name of petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but
by private respondent.The principle that a trustee who puts a Certificate of Registration
in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration is one of the well
known limitations upon a title. A trust which derives its strength from the confidence one
reposes on another especially between brothers,does not lose that character simply
because of what appears in a legal document.
It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of
possession.Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determines
nothing more than the right of possession.However when the title to the property is
distinctly put in issue by the defendant's plea and by reason of this policy to settle in one
action all the conflicting claims on the property in controversy,the question of ownership
may be resolved in the same proceeding.
40. Felipe Calub vs CA April 27,2000 GR no.115634
Facts:
The Petitioner from DENR apprehended two motor vehicles which was carrying illegally
sourced lumber in violation of the Revised Forestry Code,and thereafter confiscated
them.The owners of the subject vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover such
vehicles.They succeed in the trial court averring on the ground that the Petitioner did not
act in accordance with the law.Petitioner appeals on the ground that the replevin in this
case is a suit against the State and therefore invalid.
Issue:
Whether or not Replevin may be instituted for the reconveyance of the vehicles under
custodia legis? and whether such replevin in the case is a suit against the State?
Ruling:
No.Writ of Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of
legal process and considered in the custody of law. This suit is not valid because the
State may not be sued without its consent or when the public official acted in bad faith in

the discharge of his duties.It has been established that the DENR acted within its
authority as provided by the applicable law.Hence,its action is the action of the State.
41 . Sarmiento vs CA Nov.16,1995 GR no.116192
Facts:
The Private respondent owns a parcel of land adjacent to this lot is one wherein
petitioner had a house built on.Trying to cause relocation of her lot,Private respondent
found out that petitioner was encroaching on her property.When the latter talked to
petitioner about constructing a new fence, which will cover her true property,petitioner
refused and threatened private respondent with legal action.For fear of being sued,she
sought judicial relief.Trial court decided in her favor.Petitioner assailed that the issue
was on ownership of the portion of land thus,the action should have been an Accion
Reivindicatoria and not forcible entry.
Issue:
Whether or not Accion Reivindicatoria the proper remedy?
Ruling:
Yes.The facts reveal that the action is neither of forcible entry nor of unlawful
detainer,but essentially involves a boundary dispute which must be resolved in an
Accion Reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the portion of the land. Forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases are distinct actions.Private respondent cannot
belatedly claim that Petitioner's possession of the controverted portion was by mere
tolerance.Complaint did not characterize Petitioner's alleged entry on the land whether
legal or illegal.Complainant admitted also the fact that the fence had already pre-existed
on the lot when she acquired the same.
42. Bongato vs Malvar 387 SCRA 327
Facts:
Private respondent spouses filed a complaint for forcible entry against Petitioner for
alledging unlawful entry in a parcel of land and constructed a house of light materials
thereon. Trial court ordered Petitioner to vacate the lot and issued an order as to
determine the location of the houses involved in the civil cases the same with the one in
criminal case for anti-squatting.Judge made a warning that there will be no extension to
be granted for the submission of the survey and failure to do so would prompt the
issuance of the writ of execution. Upon failure of petitioner to submit a survey report,the
judge ordered the return of the records of the case to the court of origin for disposal.
Issue: Whether or not Forcible entry the proper action?
Ruling:
In Forcible entry ,one employs FISTS (fraud,intimidation,strategy,threat,stealth) to
deprive another physical possession of land or building thus,plaintiff must allege and
prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the
defendant. Sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession of
the property.Neither a claim of juridical possession nor an averment of ownership by the
defendant can outrightly prevent the court from taking cognizance of the case.Ejectment
cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely
to prove prior possession on de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
In the present case,the lower court lacked jurisdiction .First,the house of petitioner was

actually situated in the lot subject of the anti-squatting case and not on the lot of the
spouses.Second,house has been in existence prior to the alleged forcible
entry.Third,respondent's had knowledge of the existence of the house long before the
alleged date of entry.
43. Cagayan De Oro Landless Residents vs CA 254 SCRA 220
Facts:
A lot in dispute was formerly classified as timber land until the time it was reclassified by
the government as public land. Petitioner were authorized to survey the land for
subdivision into residential lots. Meanwhile, NHA initiated expropriation proceeding into
the lot. Petitioner intervened and said that instead of being paid through money it
preferred acquisition of any housing area of NHA.Upon learning of the annulment of the
title over the same land NHA sought the suspension of expropriation
proceeding.Thereafter,SC finally resolved by annulling the title and declaring the subject
lot to be public land.The Bureau was furnished with the decision and according to the
investigation,members of the Petitioner was found settling in the land. A presidential
proclamation was then issued reserving entire subject land for a slum improvement
project of the NHA,leading to the rejection of the survey submitted by the Petitioner and
the demolition of settlement constructed by the members of Petitioner,and prompted the
latter to file a case for forcible entry on which trial court decided on its favor.During the
pendency of the civil case, a special patent was issued for the entire subject land.The
petitioner sought the execution of the decision which was countered by a case for
quieting of title by NHA.
Issue: Whether or not writ of injunction is proper in this case?
Ruling:
NHA was entitled to the Writ of Injunction because of the pendency of an appeal for
forcible entry; the special patent issued to it by the president over the parcel of land.As
an extraordinary remedy,injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo
of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits
of the case can be heard.As such injunction is accepted as a strong arm of equity or a
transcendent remedy to be used cautiously,as it effects the respective rights of the
parties and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity.
44. De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 230
FACTS:
Petitioner contracted a loan from Villanuevas parents, mortgaging the subject parcel of
land as security. Years after, the parcel of land became the subject for an application for
registration by the Ramos brothers. They insisted that they had a better claim over the land
than petitioner. After trial, the case was dismissed as the land has not been reclassified for
other purposes and remained a part of the forest reserve. Consequently, the brothers
were able to secure reclassification of the land and the same was registered in their name as
owners, and they later sold the land to Villanueva. Thereafter, petitioner came to know
of the registration and filed a complaint, which was dismissed.
HELD:

Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it had been declared by the
government as part of the forest reserve. In fact, the land remained as part of the forest
reserve until such time it was reclassified into alienable or disposable land at the behest of
the Ramoses. A positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified
as forest, and to convert it into alienable and disposable land for other purposes. Until
such lands have been properly declared to be available for other purposes, there is no
disposable land to speak of. Absent the fact of reclassification prior to the possession
and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained
classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by prescription

45. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Fernandez, 358 SCRA 489
FACTS:
The subject parcel of land was subject of an expropriation proceeding entered into by
EPZA and the newly registered owners of the land. Private respondents sought the nullity of
the documents executed as he alleged
that he was excluded from the extrajudicial partition of the estate, originally owned by
their predecessors. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint as it was allegedly barred
by prescription. This was denied by the trial court and the CA.
HELD:
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes 4 years from the discovery of
the fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of
title over the property. Registration of real property is considered constructive notice to all
persons, and thus, a four-year period shall be counted therefrom. The action for reconveyance
based on fraud has already prescribed.
Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied constructive trust would have
already prescribed. The imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied
trust applies only when the plaintiff is in
possession of the property. However, private respondents are not in possession of the
disputed property. In fact, they dont even claim to be in possession of it, even if to so
would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action.
Furthermore, reconveyance is a remedy to those whose property has been wrongfully
registered in the name of another. Such recourse however cannot be availed of once
the property has passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not
have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
46. IDOLOR V CA (351 SCRA 402)
FACTS:
Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage.
Upon the failure of the petitioner to settle her mortgage, respondents went to the Barangay

which resulted into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos which noted that the petitioner shall pay within
90 days and her failure would warrant the foreclosure of the property with the right to
repurchase within one year without interest.

Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed
an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The property was sold in a public
auction to respondent Gumersindo and the Certificate of Sale was registered.
After more than a year, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220,
a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.Trial court subsequently
issued the TRO and the writ.
CA anulled the writ
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner has proprietary rights to the writ of preliminary injunction
2. Whether or not the Kasunduan was a form of novation
HELD:
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before
an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:
1. there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;
2. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.
Petitioner had one year redemption period from the registration of the sheriffs sale to redeem
the property but she failed to exercise this right. Hence, the right no longer exists.
There was no novation that was brought by the Kasunduan, since it is essentially the same
agreement as the first, only that the conditions were changed a little. Novation requires the
extinguishment of the obligation, here the original obligation was not extinguished.
47. Lucero vs. Luot
GR L-16995
October 28, 1968
Facts:

The movant-appellant (Lucero) and oppositors-appellants (Luot, et al) are parties in a land
registration proceedings. The land registration court awarded the subject property to Lucero and
was granted a writ of possession. The oppositors claim that there were defects in the
reconstitution of records and that the motion was not under oath. However, the court claimed
this was untenable. It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession to whom
the subject property was to be awarded, in accordance with Land Registration Act 496, as
amended.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of posessesion should be awarded to Lucero
HELD: Yes, it should be awarded. It was in accordance with the law."the issuance of a writ of
possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the
registered owner." It is equally true, as likewise mentioned therein, that there is "no period of
prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, ..."
There would be an avoidance of the inconvenience and the further delay to which a successful
litigant would be subjected if he were compelled "to commence other actions in other courts for
the purpose of securing the fruits of his victory."
We have heretofore held that a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person
who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the
land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings ... The issuance of the
decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the
said proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any
time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a
writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by
the successful claimant.

48. VENCILAO V. VANO

182 SCRA 492
FACTS:
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same parties and parcels of
land in question.
On the first case, it was tackled that the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for
registration of the subject parcel of land.
A reconveyance case was filed against
them by petitioners on the ground that they are true owners of thereof.
The second case involved the death of the administratix of the estate of the owner of the subject
land. After her death, a TCT was issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in

the name of several persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court against the
petitioners.
Issue: WON a writ of possession may be issued against unlawful and adverse occupants in the
land
HELD:Yes.
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the
said land registration case, as their names dont appear in the amended application for
registration. They have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than 30 years which
began long before the application for registration; and that even after registration, they
continued to possess the land.
In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its
registration in his name necessarily carried with it the right of ownership. The issuance of
the writ of possession is therefore sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by
the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests. A writ of
possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or
any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final
decree.

49. GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES V. COURT OF APPEALS

177 SCRA 495
FACTS:
Spouses Jose issued a power of attorney in favor of petitioner for the development of
their parcel of land into a subdivision. Private respondents were occupying the land and
petitioner advised them to vacate but they refused.
Thereafter, petitioner continued
their development and construction. Respondents then filed a case for forcible entry.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and this was reversed by the CA.
Issue: WON the possessors of a land may file a case of forcible entry even against the owner
himself
Held:
Notwithstanding petitioners claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop
the subject property, private respondents as actual possessors, can commence a forcible
entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a

quieting process, and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniment of title
it presented, such evidence doesnt responsively address the issue of prior actual possession
raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of title to
the property, the party in a peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatver may be the character of his prior possession, if he
has in favor priority in time, he
has security that entitles him to remain on the property until he has been lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

50.
CAISIP V PEOPLE
36 scra 17
FACTS:
Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevarra are people who cultivated a parcel of land
known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu,
Batangas. The overseer of the hacienda is petitioner Felix Casipi and the owner of the same is
Roxas y Cia. The latter acquired a court ruling against the spouses Gloria and Marcelino for
forcible entry which orders them to vacate the premises within 20 days. The order was carried
out June 6, 1959 (so they had until June 26 to vacate it.) On June 17, Gloria was seen by Felix
Caisip harvesting their crops in Lot 105-A. The Latter bade her to stop what she was doing and
to leave the premises. When Gloria refused, Caisip called for Sgt. Rjales and Cpl. Villadelrey to
help him shoo her away. Gloria stuck to her attitude and still refused to stop and leave so the
two police officers, by means of force, stopped her and dragged her away (they also tried to
threaten her by drawing their guns :). As a result, the clothes of Gloria got torn. One of Glorias
neighbours caught sight of the event and asked the officers to release her. Gloria was later
turned over to the police on duty for interrogation.
A case filed against the petitioners, Caisip and the officers, for Grave Coercion (Petitioners also
filed grave coercion and unjust vexation against Gloria after 8 days maybe just to get back at
her- just in case sir asks.) One of their defenses was ART. 429 (including the doctrine of self
help.) The petitioners were found guilty by the lower court thus this appeal.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Art. 429 can be used as a defense?

RULING:
Article 429 is inapplicable to the case at bar. The complainant didnt usurp or invade said lot.
She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have
become its co-possessor. Appellants didnt repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of the property. They expelled the complainant from a
property on which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible
entry was filed against them.

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