Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Military Review November 1960
Military Review November 1960
Military Review November 1960
. ,_~.~t;J
W"'1
'1111_.&
..
I.
" Ill1liiiJ..
:Military Review
EDITOR IN\:1CHIEF
E. LAY, INF
COL KENNETH
ASSISTANT EDITOR
FEATURES EDITOR
SPANISH-Al\IERICAN EDITION
Editor
Assistunt Editors
MISSION.
The MILITARY REVIEW, official:
pUblication of the United States
Army and the United States
Army Command and General Staff
College, disseminates modem mili
tary thought and C)lrrent Army
doctrine concerning command and
staff procedures of the division and
higher echelons and provides a
forl}m for articles which" stimulate
military thinking. Authors, civilian
and military alike, are encouraged
to submit articles which will assist
in the fulfillment 6f this mission.
'I
BHAZILIAN EDITION
Editor
Assistant Editor
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
CWO
PRODUC1'ION OFFICER
POLICY.
Unless otherwise indicated, the
views expressed in the original ilr
ticles in this magazine are those
of the individual authors and not.
those of the Department of the
Army or the United States Army
Command and General Staff College.
STAFF ARTIST
Editor.
CHARLES A. MOORE
AI"
Fal~
MILITARY REVIEW,
VOLUME XL
NOVEMBER 1960
. NUMBER 8
CONTENTS
)
Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Case, Transportation Corps
Twilight War ___ . ________ ~---. __ . _______ . __________ . ____ 28
33
43
48
55
68
61
_______________ . 78
107
WARFARE
IN THE UKRAINE
Enrique Martfnez Codo'
1:
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
('
O,\KU"U
"\'-'1
-",.......1
OONETS
o(
DON~
- ~lYl~ "':'"
--'
.rf
..\~"'I.
ROMANIA
~~'t.
~
~
NORTHERN
REGION
E3
SOUTHERN
REGION
Imiil1illll
;;mmmm
INDEPENDENT
OPERATIONAL
""'""".
GROUPS
O
.
EASTERN
REGION
~~~]
WESTERN
~
,
REGION
_.
AcrUAl
BORDER
LIMITS
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
f '>,
I should
be noted that during this period
(1941-44) there was little activity of Red
guerrillas in the Ukl'aine, because the
German forces, as well as the UPA, had
chased them out of the region.
The most serious Red guerrilla attempt
to penetrate the Ukrainian region was
made under the leadership of the Soviet
General Kovpak. The force came from
ex
rOLESIE
YOLYN
BUKOVINA
KAMENETS
PODOLSKI
VINNITSA
GI
ZHITOMIR
KIEV (PROVINCE)
G2
G3
GALITZIA
CARPATHIAN UKRAINE
G4
DONETS
ONEPROPETROVSK
KHARKOV
KRIVOI ROG
ODESSA
KREMENCHUG
KIEV
UMAN
CRIMEA
G,
G6
Figure 2.
White Russia after crossing the Pripet
River and headed toward Galitzia with
the intention of reaching the Carpathian
Mountains. But the village militia and
the regular units of the UPA pursued
and harassed them to the p'oint of almost
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER, 196fr
iJ
THREE'PIECE
HEAVY
MACHINfGUN
PLATOON
PLATOON
THE RIFLE PLAtOON WAS 0RGANIZED FOLLOWING THE TRIANGULAR CONCEPT, THREE SQUADS OF 12 TO 15 MEN
Figure 3.
The UPA forces considered light auto
matic weapons best suited to guerrilla tac
tics, The most popular among these was
the submachinegun due to its easy han
dling and firepower which made it the
,most powerful shock element in ambush
and close combat, The standard hand gre
nade of the German' and Soviet Armies,
as well as those manufactured by the
guerrillas themselves, were also favorite
weapons. The efficient German panzer
fa1(Rt and the panzeybllsche 43 were usep,
as well as a 'variety of antitank mines.
The source of armament for these forces
was the German and Soviet arsenals
seized in raids and major engagements.
10
MILITARY REVIEW
'It
11
12
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 196U
UKRA:I~E
14
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 196,0
,.
- '.
...
"
hh'",
:~;'IJteaaat'C6Iohl Andrew,"
Fatui~, U~ S;'Army Command and ",., ~_,.1.".ft''''
hE
..
"1 ..
16
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1!1'6~ .
17
18
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
HEADQUARTERS
DETACHMENT
COMBAT
FLIGHT
ONE OFFICER
FOUR ENLISTED MEN
to
Qualifications
The manning tables for target acqUIsI
tion detachments should specify that all
as,igned personnel will be fully qualified
airborne ranger ~pecialist" capable of in
dl'l1l'ndcnt action behind enemy lines un
der the most hazardous and trying con
ditions. It is appan'lJt that per~onncl
without these high qualifications would
tenrl to degrade the performance of the
dctaehmcnts in an operational environ
nwnt.
Target acquisition detachments (air
borne) Rhould be small cellular type units,
cnpable of sustained operations within and
behind enemy formations for a period of
three to five days. The desirahility of a
parent organization for command and ad
ministrative support, such as a target ac
quisition company (airborne), should be
considered.
The deta~hments should be operation
ally controlled at army, corps, and divi
;;ion levels where suitable nuclear deliv
ery means also exist. An estimated 10
detachments at division level and a pro
portionate number at higher headquarters
would be sufficient to provide full surveil
lance coverage within respective areas of
influence.
When conditions warrant, detachments
may be attached to existing military in
19
Moving Targets
Basic type missions should be directed
toward specific point reconnaissance and
surveillance, as opposed to either route
or area surveillance. This is in keeping
with our experience which has shown that
a moving enemy (ground) target has a
relatively low probability of being effec
tively engaged by nuclear weapons. True,
we have no wartime experience in this
matter, but complex channels of control,
un1"eliable commuiications, ponderous or
ganization, and difficulties attendant t'O
obtaining a decision to fire diminish our
chances for successful engagement of mov
ing targets today. Experience also tends
20
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
~l
THE
The tactical nuclear weapon can be" the key to victory in the flexible
formations and free ma~euver of the future battlefield. Successful
exploitation of nuclear fir~s will depend upon doing simple things quickly
NU~LEAR
WEAPONS
CHARGE:
CRATER:
~
..
i'
.,
\..
30
...
'- - -
,'
-"
GAP IN
CONFEDERATE
LINES:
APPROX. 350 YARDS
CASUAlTIES:
ESTIMATED CONFEDERATE
STRENGTH IN
VICINITY GROUND ZERO:
300
KILLED:
278
FEDERAL CASUALTIES BY
CONFEDERATE COUNTERATTACK: .4.400
RESULTS:
FAILURE
23
24
MILITAIW REVIEW
' I
NOtEMBER 1960' :
~.
!'
Time Element
Deciding upon and executing defensive
reactions to nuclear attack takes time.
During the period of defensive reaction
-the attacker's golden hour-the attacker
can execute his exploitation with relative
freedom and ease.
But the conditions favorable for exploit
ing maneuver do not endure. As the min
utcs pass after the nuclear detonation,
,hock effects on the enemy force also pass.
The defensive command structure is knit
up; support weapons are brought to bear;
mobile forces refill the gap made by the
'1lucIear strike; soldiers surviving in the
target zone find themselves alive and look
to their weaJ;lons, prOg'ressively regaining
vision, initiative, and energy. When the
~ttacker's golden hour is over, the enemy
is re,tored as a fighting organism, a little
felwr in numbers than before but ready
to seize the initiative by countermaneu
vel' Hg'ainst an opponent whORe intentions
arc now declared.
How long' is the favorable period for
exploitation? How long does it take the
defender to restore the functioning' of his
whole organism after nuclear attack on
one of its parts? Present service school
solutions frequently allow an hour and
'ometim<'s several hours after the nuclear
preparation before launching the exploit
ing attack. Burnside's loss at the Crater
sugge<ts that such delay is intolerable.
Experience on the nuclear battlefield.
\\'h(>n it becomes available, will promptly
define the tolerable limits of delay. Until
practical experience is available, planning
mll,t be guided by analY5is of hypothet- .
leal future combat situations. For exam
ple:
A United States division encounters
an Aggressor division organized in bat
talion strong points. Each battalion
Ilosition.covers an area about four kilo
meters wide and two deep, and is com
posed of three company positions, two
up and one back. each eompany occu
pying an area about 750 meters wide
25
26
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
27
, sel'vation of the nuclear detonations by , clear fires on the total enemy organism,
commanders of maneuver elements. This if nuclear preparation and follow-up
should be accomplished to avoid the pos ground attack with its conventional fire
sibility of delays from communications in support are conducted as one sustained
ten'uptions, whether the result of normal blow, the nuclear' strike' which destroys
operational difficulties or of enemy, jam a battalion will lay open that battalion's
ming.
entire parent force to quick and complete
In order to permit contact to be gained defeat.
. while the enemy reaction capability is at
Conclusion
the minimum, prestrike positions of the
In the flexible formations and free ma
exploiting forces should be as close as neuver of the future battleground, suc
practicable to the enemy. If the exploiting cessful exploitation of nuclear fires wifl
fOlce is mounted in armor and the terrain depend upon doing simple things quickly.
is roasonably trafficable, 15 minutes' tin;e Casual staff work and command that lacks
distance should allow satisfaction of rea the edge of urgency will wait for the dust
sonable troop safety standards. If the to settle before mounting exploiting at
assault' force is not armored, greater tacks, and wars will go on to other springs
chances must be tallen. The time-distance -until, perhaps, we run out of springs.
to a~sault objectives should be controlling Soul'ld, thorough staff work and hard com
over ideal troop safety considerations. No mand control will drive exploiting forces
purpose is scrved by savi~ two percent onto objectives in time to win battles that
of a force from cxtremc-ranp."e effects of will win wars.
friendly weapons and thereby losing 15
On the future battlefield, the tactical
percent to enemy fire in the subsequent nuclear weapon cun be the I{ey to victory.
att[lck.
But the key will be usele~s if the door it
If exploitation is executed so that it
unlocks is not pushed open and passed
makes full use of the shock effects of nu
throug'h before the ('n!'my J'olocks it.
,TWILIGHT
Colonel Robert B. Rigg. Armor
TWILIGHT WAR
29
30
MILITARY REVIEW
..... 4-'
.""
Warfare of any type destroys and damages villages and crops, and produces complete
chaos. Consequently, the civil population always looks hopefully to whichever side can
restore normalcy.-US Army photos.
I,
c.
TWILIGHT WAR
Parallel Objectives
Hurd pressed, the French High Com
mand finally agreed to eXl'criment with
these proposals. General Bolladicre had
no overnight success with his ideas. He
was criticized for using troops as civilian
supervisors and medical practitioners. But
a portion of the French Army built and
taught schools, rebuilt bridges,' helped
with il'l'igation and farm projects, and
helped the people in sickness "and in
health-all in the process of its military
eampaigns. French Army influence ex
tended to the back areas and brought help.
They used not only ordinary soldiers, but
specialists as well. They especially used
the SAS 01' Specialized Administration
31
32
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
of Re~ Chino
LIE
MILITARY REVIEW
34
"
The Army
The s.trength of the standing army prob
ably is about four and one-half million,
consisting of about three million com
batant troops and the remainder in sup
port forces.
Of this large combatant element, about
90 percent at least is infantry, thus leav
ing only a comparatively small propor
tion of specialists, such as gunners, engi
neer!", armored crew, and signallers.
There are at least 10 armored divisions,
and either five or six artillery divisions in
existence. As more: equipmen~ becomes
available these numbers are increasing. It
is thought that the immediate aim is to
have up to 30 specialist divisions as soon
as possible, material being the'main re
tarding factor. In addition, there are at
least three airborne divisions, and about
15 others have'received some form of am
phibious training. These are basically in
fantry in character and cannot be counted
as "specialists." A few infantry divisions
and regiments are "motorized." There are
a few other types of specialist formations.
including engineer regiments for special
tasks such as railway construction.
The precise number of infantry divi
sions in existence is not accurately known,
but it, is of little real importance at the
moment since a gigantic reorganization
of that dement has just begun. Recently.
there were about 150 infantry divisions,
together with approximately 300 inde
pendent infantry regiments and battal
ions. The Communist Chinese infantry
division began as a small one, containing
less than 7,000 men. In the post-1949,re-
NOVEMBER' 1960
Structure Revised
In 1959 it was announced that the di
visional structure would be revamped
along lines similar to those of the United
States "pentomic' division." It was to can
sist basi<l'ally of five units, but for the
time bein'g there was to be no integral
armor and little mechanization: that was
to follow in due course, and artille,ry
would be added as and when it becawe
available. A start has been made, but it
is hard to say how far this reorganization
has progressed. Certainly, some of the for.
mations stationed in Fukien, opposite Tai
wan, have been reshaped. The object
seems to be to have the new "pentomic"
divisions replace all the old style ,infan.
try ones eventually.
Some authorities insist that the fight
ing element of the army is only two and
one,half million, but it is thought that
this figure is too low, and that three mil
lion is much more realistic. This means
that Communist China one day will have
between 240 and 250 small pentomic divi
sions.1 This transformation will take time,
Administration
Strategically, all army field formations
come under the control of one of the six
"Front Armies," which together covel' the
entire country, and' come directly under
General Headquarters at Peking, Under
35
Conscription
In case anyone is inclined to doubt such
prodigious figures, it can be mentioned
that conscription is in force and some 50,
million draftees a year could be produced,
if necessary. A selective system is in op
eration and only a small proportion of
those available actually are called up to
serve in the standing- army. Assuming
these figures are roughly correct, the
over-all figm'e of four and one-half mil
lion for the army is by no means an over
estimate.
Defense cuts, especially in manpower,
have been talked about since 1957, but
have never been put into effect. In fact,
the trend has been to make the armed
forces slightly lalger.
Conscripts serve for three years which
means that a large trained reserve is be
ing built up continually. Several sources
put this first line reserve, available for
immediate recall as being 17 million
strong, This ma~ true, but as most of
the men are d;afled automatically into
the militia, this figure is not significant
in itself.
The deduction is that the army is large,
is predominantly infantry, is in the proe
36
MiLITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
37
38
MILITARY REVIEW
Work
The Chinese Army boasts that it is both
a defender and a builder. Manual labor
plays a big part in the life of both the
officer and soldier. In the summer. whole
formations go out to help with the har
vest. an'iJ. it has been estimated that for
a few weeks a year about half the regu
lar' army is engaged in forms of nonmili
tary work.
Other work. especially of a construction
nature, is undertaken. Entire divisions.
for example. move out to work on flood
prevention projects. Also, the army is
called upon to help build dam~, canals.
and' roads. It seems to take an especial
NOVEMBER 196Q
ri:
V,
Pl
G
pi
pi
01
fl
Sl
01
Il
ci
t!
. 39
"
40
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER
me
41
42
MILITARY REVIEW
. .
:rhe Navy
By comparison with the army and the
air force the navy is tiny, consisting of
about 340 ships and approximately 50,000
men. There are two cruisers, 18 destroy
ers, and 32 frigates; the remainder are
small coastal craft. Two-thirds are Soviet
built. ]\1ore <kstroyers and frlgates are
under construction in the shipyards at
Shanghai and Canton. but the output wiiI
not be high for a few years.
In addition, the navy controls about 300
seagoing landing craft, and m01'e are be
ing constructed, prewmably witb the
Every member of the Army can take pride in its past achievements in
peace and war. Now we are in an era of revolutionary change in weapons and
m~ihods of warfare-but one fact remains constant-the weapons of war are
onty as good as the men "iho man them in battle. So long as our ranks arC'
filled with men and wome~ of dedication and sense of purpose we shall be
able to meet the challenge rf the future with the same effectiveness that has
characterized the Army's ~erformance throughout its long history of serv
ice to our country.
Battle
Is His Business'
Tactical concepts tlrat ignore tlte rifleman belong in the same category
as strategic, concepts tltat ignore tlte imp,riance of ground forces
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
45
MILITARY REVIEW
Dudley's Rifle
. While the enemy regiment immediately
facing' the 1st Battalion waited for an.
other nightfall, the situation un.derwent
a drastic change. Sergeant Arthur C.
Dudley, a recent replacement from a
service unit in Japan, commanding a
heavy machinegun squad, brought about
the change. Dudley left his squad's sup
port position and crawled up to a front
line firing point. Using his binoculars to
spot targets on the enemy-held ridge
more than 600 yarfls away, Sergeant
Dudley quietly went to work with his Mi.
Because he was careful to scatter his
kills, the occasional report of his rifle
must have seemed harmless as a fire
cracker to the enemy at first. Hours must
have passed before they realized what
was happening. Dudley continued to spot
unwary targets long after his score
passed the 30 mark.
According to sworn affidavits later sub
mitted by eyewitnesses, long-range rifle
fire in that section accounted for more
than 100 known enemy casualties. That
night, for the first time since the big push
began, the enemy spearhead did not at
tack. Prisoners said that deadly sniping
fire had nearly panicked the Chinese reg
iment. Dudley's battalion commander
credited him with saving the battalion's
key position.
In nuclear battle the need for Dodds
and Dudleys will not be confined to the
infantry. The enemy assaults against
command posts,' artillery positions, and
supply facilities that red-lettered the fluid
phases of the Korea and Indochina con
flicts merely hint at the scope of the fu
ture threat to rear area installations. Like
Archimedes, who was cut down by a Ro
man Legionnaire behind the walls of
Syracuse, our specialists .and technicians
will rieed more than scientific knowledge
and long-range missiles to cope with en
emy infiltrators in close combat. Hence
forth, there will be more truth than irony
NOVEMBER 1960
47
In any type of military operations, one thing which has lIot changed is
the importance of the soldier's mastery of his individual weapon-fundamen
tally. the rifle.
In fact. this importance has increased. I have pointed out that dispersion
of units ,vill permit infiltration. Consequently, not only infantrymen but can
noucers. cooks. and clerks must be ready and able to defend themselves
against sudden enemy raids. Indeed, even in the Korean War there were nu
merous instances when troops in so-called 'rear echelons' were called on to
seize their personal weapons and beat off enemy attacks. We can expect such
occurrences to be much more common in any future war.
As for the infal1tryman himself, the rifle is still his basic weap~n. We
must not forget that the military purpose of war is to achieve control over
land a'nd the people who live on it. The ultimate measure iof the control which
has heen attained is the area dominated by the infantryman with the fire of
his individual weapon. In the final analysis. the success with which that
domination is established. maintained, and extended depends in large part on
the soldier's mastery of his rifle.
All{ed and United States research and development are becoming more
effective through the coordination and technical assistance provided by
the participating nations of the Mutual Weapons Development Program
49
50
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 196,) :
51
88-11
52
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
G-91 Fiat
r:
53
54
MILITARY REVIEW
'NOVEMBER 196.
.1
We can, here at horne, arm to the teeth and yet go down in total defeat if
we let the rest of the world be swallowed up by an atheistic imperialism. By
abandonment of struggling millions to lives of hopeless desperation, rich
America might, for a time, live more extravagantly. But not for long. For a
just p~ace, .dependable security, and real progress were never bought by de
structive weapons and hardhearted selfishness but rather by education, by
training, by constructive works-by cooperation.
e
j
e.
iJ~( V~f.W
f(QM l00lt l~iJiJ~~
Elihu Rose
IN
. .
56
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
-!
57
I .was in the ranks myself once, and in mandy Invasion was undoubtedly due in
those days I was always, being shoved ( large measure to the continual troop in
around by people I ne1Jer sdw and abollt spections carried out by all the senior
whose sanity I had the gl'avest doubts. commanders. These dearly indicated to
Well, I want YOlt to know what I look the troops the interest and concern of
like, not because I think I'm' any oil p(lint their leaders and proved well worth the
il/g, but beca1lse I think you ought to
enormous expenditure of time.
know the bloke issuing the olders. Then
A recently published history of Ma~or
you'll know who to blame fO}' them.
General Frank D. Merrill's Maraudcl's
Today, such a thought hardly seems un
relates a minor incident which, neverthe
usual, but it l'epresents a remarkable step less, emphasizes this aspect of troop psy-
Culver
Pil'fUT'S
NOVEMBER 1960
MILITARY REVIEW
58
Distinguishing Trade-l\1arks
Many commanders have found that dis
tinguishing trade-marks have aided in
establishing both recognition and rapport.
Cuircr p'ctures
~'
. il.'~\
. l\);~~
'"
59
I\,'
.~.
' _
~ t'
.. :'L \ , '
ty
f1'i~l/lll d)'r8,~cd,
Wide World
as
Fresh as /n'idcgroom . , ,
for he made lilt' mad
To sre hi", shillt' "0 In'isk and smell
80 sweet,
alld talk, , ,
of guns alld dl'IOIlS,
and wOllnds,-God savc the mark!
60
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
Ii
I i i iJ11fllPlfI
3
THE
Index of Adequacy
Simply stated, the problem is that dur
ing periods of so-called peace, people fail
to understand the value received for the
dollar spent. Maintenance of an adequate
Military Establishment often is regarded
as a questionable drain on the Nation's
pocketbook. As a result, the 1 !my's ade-
62
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
'0
"
63
,
~ILITARY
64
REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
"
IF YOU DON'T LIKE THE MESS . . .
High .Employment
What' aoout the money that goes for
operation and maintenance (O&M)? The
Jist of items covered by. the Army's an
nual O&M expenditures is vast and it
65
66
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
67
UNITED STATES
US Army
69 .
US Armll
70
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER> 1960
US
Arm1!
U~
Armu
71
and a remova
undercarriage for trans
porting the
unchers. Radars and con
trol vans curl' ntly in use are on mobile
mounts.
Tests at the White Sands Missile
Range, New Mexico, have clearly demon
strated the improved effectiveness of new
long-range radar and ground control
equipment which has been developed for
the Hercules. In these tests Hercules have
successfullY .intercepted and destroyed
other Hercules missiles as high as 19 miles
above the test lange. The target missile
, was launched from the northel'n end of
US AT"'"
72
M1L1TARY REV1EW
NOVEMBER lS!1
US An Forrr
Mechanical Mechanic
The Army is employing the first "com
puterized checkout system for automotive
vehicles" at its Frankfort Arsenal in Phil
adelphia. The system uses an electronic
computer to check the vehicle, diag-nose
its mechanical deficiencies, and pl'escribe
repairs. Currently in use only as a depot
installation, a portable version of the com
puter checkout system is to be developed
for field lise.-News item.
73
to
Clutle
Willow Freeze
Pal1ama
Dnming Spring
Tll1Il1de)' Bolt
Dava Plains
Mohawk An'ow
Location
Camp Drum,
New York
Alaska
Canal Zone
and
Fort Sherman
Camp Irwin,
California
Fort Hood,
Texas
Yakima,
Washington
Camp Drum,
New York
Date
Troops
Participating
J anuaryFebruary
18,000
January-February
Early in 1961
(6 days)
3,500
2,000
March (7 days)
4,000
8,000
17,000
Unannounced
(15 days)
5,000
74
MILITARY REVIEW
'H-37B' Helicopter
A recently negotiated contract calls for
the modernization of 30 of the United
States Army's H-37A Mojave helicopters
to an improved H-37B configuration.
Changes to be accomplished under the
terms of the 3.4 million dollar contract
include the installation of an automatic
stabilization system, crash resistant fuel'
cells, and ,standardization of electronic and
radio equipment. Landing gear cycling
NOVEMBER 1960
GREECE
Greetings
What may be the world's first draft
notice has been discovered near the site
of the ancient Greek town of Troezen,
about 30 miles north of Athens. The no
tice is inscribed on a small stone tablet
about 15 inches high and two feet wide
and apparently was concerned with the
mobilization of forces for the Battles of
Thermopylae and Salamis during the sum
mer of 480 B. C. The tOO-word tablet was
a decree of Themist cles, famed Greek
general who foresaw the pending invasion
of Greece by the Persians.-News item.
GREAT' BRITAIN
'Wombat' Troop Trials
~,
./--- ..
,,/
US Army
NATO
Naval Exercises
A series of naval tactical exercises have
been conducted in the North Atlantic in
recent weeks. Part of regular NATO train
ing, the exercises have involved fleet, anti
submarine, and submarine operations with
close air coordination. Ships and "men
froml Belgium, Norway, the United States,
Portugal, France," Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the Netherlands partici
pated.-News item.
1 ,
75
JAPAN
SPAIN
TURKEY
Retirements Stepped Up
I'
l'
DENMARK
'Nike' Sites Completed
'The air defense of Denmark has been
streng-thenI'd recently by the completion
'of 36 launching sites for ,Vi/a Aja,' and
Nih Hel'clllcs missilos. The 'vilec units
al'E\~ manned by personnel trained in tHe
Unrted States and are reported to be fully
operational. Exercises carried qut under
"
US Army
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
"
SWITZERLAND
'Flex-Trac' Truck
A Swiss firm has designed a rough ter
lain truck capable of climbing a thr(>e
foot-high wall. The six-wheeled vehicle
77
USSR
Soviet Missile Cruisers
AUSTRALIA
Weapons Research Agreement
US Army
IGESTS
Source
of
Military'
Power
80
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
MILITARY DIGESTS
!
I~~,;
,
.,
(f:
~
81
...---
{'.. .
~':':'"'Tf"J
....
'
II:
,fl" '
\
US Arm1l
82
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 196'
MILITARY DIGESTS
83
84
NOVEMBl':R 1966
MILITARY REVIEW
MILITARY DIGESTS
85
Digested from s. coPYrighted article by Brigadier Sir John Smyth in THE ARMY
86
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
MILITARY DIGESTS
87
88
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 196fr
nither t,aining, equipment, nor trans place was Givenchy in Northern France,
port, and opposed as they were by highl~ which, in the previous 10 days, had been
trained Japanese divisions, their own in captured and recaptured several times,.
feriority soon became apparent to them At that moment the Germans were firmly
selves just as it did to the Japanese. And in possession of Givenchy and the high
when, in addition, they were faced with ground, and we had been bundled down
a superior air force, then you had a set into the valley where we were preparing
of circumstances which would have l'ap to spend a miserable Christmas in wet
idly reduced the confidence and morale of and muddy trenches.
any troops in the world. But again-the
I had been detailed to guide a French
law was in the circumstances, not in the battalion in a night assault on the posi.
1
').r~
~.
"
US Army
89
MILITARY DIGESTS
-'I
.
positio~ and there was not nearly enough
artillery support available to give the at
tack more than an outside chance of suc
cess. I wQndered what the Guards would
make of such a situation and I watched
their calm, precise, and thorough prepa
rations with interest.
When zero hour struck and the attack
US Arm11
90
MILITARY REVmW
NOVEMBER 1960
fl
MIl.ITARY DIGKSTS
91
92
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
Social Perception
It is seldom realized, even by those who
have proved 'remarkably successful in
business administration or personnel man.
agement, that the pattern of interpersonal
relationship depends to no small extent on
what one sees in others and what others
see in oneself. Healthy interpersonal reo
lationships depend almost entirely on the
extent to which social perception ill com
prehensive and realistic.
Two points have to be emphasized in
this connection. What psychologists tech
nically call "constancy phenomena" occur
not only in the perception of material
things but also of people. For example,
an aircraft may appear as a tiny silhou
ette when it is far off, but as a huge ob
ject when seen at close quarters. Yet the
apparent difference in size would make
no difference to the realization that it i,
an aircraft. This i"s so because, notwith
standing the difference in size, there is
a general form quality-a pattern, a ~ody
outline-which remains constant in the
two conditions. In much the same wa\',
there is, underlying the apparent dIffe;"
('nces resulting from situational influ;:nces
over the same person, a constancy wHicb
is capable of becoming unmistakably evi
dent to the perceiver. Between radically
different pictures of "Philip drunk" and
"Philip sober," there is inevitably a com
mon denominator which issues from PhilIp
himself. This is what should be identified
in social perception.
Distortions in Social Perception
When something is seen from an awk.
ward angle, it appears qUiRi'fferent from
what it is ordinarily. Look
yourself in
a mirror with a convex SUI face, and you
will wonder what you are
eing. Much
the same holds true about the way ~ome
people see others.
A common distorting factor in social
perception is the "ego complex." Under
lying this perverse mental disposition is
an organization of false notions regard
93
,MILlTARY DIGESTS
Practicallnlplications
What has been said regarding social
perception carries several grave implica
tions regarding the administrative re
gponsibility of a military commander. Let
us consider one important area, namely
the Annual Confidential Report (Efficiency
Report). This is, highly important because
of its far-reaching effects on the career
prospects of the young officer.
The problem of the commander who ini
tiates the Annual Confidential Report is,
without doubt, a difficult problem indeed.
On the one hand. he has to feel satisfied
that due regard has been given to the in
terests of the service in making hi'S as
sessments. At the same time, he is obliged
to assess the officer or the subordinate
under his command in such a way that
no injustice is done. as a result of false
impressions, which would naturally arise
if the pel'son has not been seen in the
correct perspective.
In siZing up the capabilities and limi
tations of the person assessed, many sub
jective influences will, without doubt, play
a large part, ITo guard against these in
fluences, espe~ially influences which might
lead to wrong conclusions, and to main
tain a strictly objective standard of as
sessment would be a.sheer impossibility in
94
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBeR 106&
MlLITARY DIGESTS
95
96
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1966
MILITARY DIGESTS
97
98
, MILITARY REVItW
NOVEMBER 1960
MILITARY DIGESTS
99
US ATntll
100 .
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER ]960
;0
MILITARY DIGESTS
101
MOVING?
If YOU are moving, please notify the MILlTARY REVIEW, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
of your chlJ,nge of address. Be sure to include your name, old address, and new address.
102
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
MILITARY DIGESTS
103
104
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER 1960
,A
MILI;rARY DIGESTS
105
Massing of Fires
Artillel'Y ranges will rarely permit a
concentration of more than the artillery
Demands of Modern Warfare
of two brigades on the same target.
;llodern combat will be characterized by
Thus, a massed concentration of the bri
fluid conditions rather than rigid front
gade artillery battalions is no longer
lines. Large gaps may exist .between bri feasible.
U
gades: These can best be dominated by ar
Temporal'Y overlappiJg may occur in
tIllery fire. Exposed flanks and great depth cases of smaller combat front-age. But this
may be the rule. Losses to atomic fires
will not be the rule. FrclIuent threats to
may force us to regroup and employ those
the flanl,,, require the battery emplace
units that are still combat worthy. Thus, ments to be well to the real' of the front- .
tlw norm would be independently operat line so that flank protection can be pro
inp; brigaoes or possibly reinforced battal vided without a change in position.
ions.
The concentration of fire of several
Although efforts will be made to retain brigades becomes even less likely when
the integrity of divisions, losses and an several brigades are staggered in depth in
amalgamation of brigades mai soon lead
mobile combat. The following conclusions
to a kaleidoscopic unit consisting of bri are obvious:
gades of various nationalities. Each bri
In most instances the brigade artillery
p;ade must ensure its own logistical sup- cannot be commanded as part of the divi
port. Brigade fronts of 10 kilometers may ~ional artillery regiment.
bccome usual. But since a brigade cannot
Temporary subordination to the artil
,defend itself successfully on such a front,
lery regimental commander under mobile
"delaying actions and \ counterattacks will combat conditions is not expedient. since
alternate. Rapid charge from one form of this could deprive the parent brigade of
combat to the other twill become habitual.
its artillery at a crucial time.
What conclusions must be drawn from
Mutual support by the artillery elements
tbese changes in combat operations for the of neighbor units is rarely possible.
artillery? Can the divisional artillery reg
Ammunition supply responsibility can
iment cover a 30-kilometer battlefront no longer be assured by the artillery regi
represented by three brigades side by ment since logistics are now the respon
side? Can it, in constantly changing situa sibility of the brigade.
tions, still employ centralized command as
Do these combat developments negate
in the past? Can it supervise all of the
the principle of mass fire which has been
action and react promptly to changes 'in applied to artillery in the past? No, but
the situation?
artillerymen must adapenew methods and
Limitations on communications afone discard timeworn conceptions. The artil
indicate that this is impossible. A precise llll" regiment in its old form is obsolete
evaluation of the battIe situation necessi because it is too inflexible. It is relegated
tates direct eommunications between the ~ to the past. The brigade is a small divi
MILITARY REVIEW
106
NOVEMBER InnO
j"
I
108
MILITARY REVIEW
NOVEMBER W60
109
110
MILITARY REVIEW
A.
FINKt.E/
!4,ty
NOVEMBER 1960
111
112
MILITARY REVIEW