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Pubcorp Case 6
Pubcorp Case 6
Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac.
Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of
the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the
municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the
neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse
as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent
municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of
1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid
loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance
No. 13 is unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil
Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional
and void.
Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of
Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council
of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal
ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5)
must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of
the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial
obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.
PUBCORP CASES
Lina v. Pao
G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001
Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal for the operation of
lotto, applied for a mayors permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground that an
ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Laguna prohibited gambling in the province,including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his application,
private respondent
fileda n a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f w i t h p r a y e r f o r p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n a n d t e m p o r a r y restrain
ing order. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent enjoiningpetitioners from implementing or
enforcing the subject resolution.
Issue:
whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lagunaand the denial of a mayors permit
based thereon are valid
Held:
No. The questioned ordinance merely states the objection of the council to the saidgame. It is but a mere policy
statement on the part of the local council, which is not self- executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to
prohibit the operation of the lotto
systemi n t h e p r o v i n c e o f L a g u n a . A s a p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t e x p r e s s i n g t h e l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s o b j
e c t i o n t o t h e l o t t o , s u c h r e s o l u t i o n i s v a l i d . T h i s i s p a r t o f t h e l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s autonomy to
air its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments.However, this freedom to
exercise contrary views does not mean that local governmentsmay actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given thispremise, the assailed resolution in this case could
not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.Moreover,
ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments
arem e r e l y a g e n t s o f t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t . T h e l o c a l c o u n c i l s e x e r c i s e o n l y d e l e g a t e d legisl
ative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. The delegate cannot besuperior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. This being thecase, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powershigher than those of the latter. The question of whether gambling should be
permitted is forCongress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress hasallowed
the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits legislative grant of authority,
the province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify theexercise of said authority by preventing something
already allowed by Congress.
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL v. THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and
THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA. G.R. No. 154599. January 21, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National is the national organization of all the barangays in the
Philippines, which pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code of 1991, constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial
chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters. Section
493 of the LGC provides that the ligas directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5)
members of the board of directors. All other matters not provided for in the law affecting the internal
organization shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws. The Liga then adopted and
ratified its own Constitution and by-laws to govern its internal organization. One the provisions was:
"There shall be nationwide synchronized elections for the provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC
chapters to be held on the third Monday of the month immediately after the month when the
synchronized elections". The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in
the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002, setting on 21 October 2002 the synchronized
elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila, together with
independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters. Respondent then enacted enacted
Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among other things, for the election of representatives
of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty
days after the barangay elections. The ordinance was transmitted to then Mayor Lito Atienza, which he
signed even if the Liga requested him to veto the ordinance as it encroached upon, or even assumed,
the functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the
powers of the City Council.
ISSUE: Whether respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he signed and passed Ordinance No. 8039.
RULING:
No. First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto
themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to
issue, the following requisites must concur:
(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions
and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term
which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as
a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Before a tribunal, board,
or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise
to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made,
and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with
power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending
parties. The Court agreed that respondent's act was in the exercise of legislative and executive
functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will
not lie. Second, the Court concludes that petitioners seek the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of
the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction. The Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. Third, the Court stated that
petitioner clearly disregarded the hierarchy of courts. There is no reason or circumstance given by
petition on why direct recourse to the Court be allowed.The Court has decided that disregard to the
hierarchy of courts can be allowed by two reasons:
(1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and
(2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a
trier of facts. (Santiago v. Vasquez)