Germany and the Origins of the First World War: New Perspectives Niall Ferguson The Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), 725-752. Stable URL: htp//links jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-246X%28199209%2035%43A3%3C72S%3AGATOOTE3E2,0,CO%3B2-0 The Historical Journal is currently published by Cambridge University Press. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup:/www.jstororg/about/terms.hml. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hup:/www jstor-org/journals/cup.huml Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, STOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals, For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org. hupslwww jstor.org/ Mon May 9 05:52:31 2005The Hisercal Jornal 5, (1998) PP. T2 Printed in Grst Britain 198 GERMANY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR: NEW PERSPECTIVES De lange Weg in die Katasvope, Die Vorgeshice des Eisen Wolves 185-1914. BY Immanuel Geiss. Munich/Zirich: Piper, 1990. Pp. g68. DM x93, Die Financpalith ds Deschen Reichs wahrend dr ReihsanclrscaftBelmann Haley und die Geld und Kaptalmarktserhatisce (1699-1913/14). By Rudolf Kroboth. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1986. Pp. 511. DM 33.00, Berit eam Kr. Kregsmentlitat im wilmintchen Deasland 180-191. Berge cur Aisorischen Fridenforchang. Edited by Jost Dalfer and Karl Holl. Gottingen Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1986. Pp. 330. DM 32.00 Another Germany: A Reconsidcration ofthe Imperial Era, Edited by Jack R. Dukes and Joachim Remak. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988. Pp. xi+-250. $45.00 "Rites of Spring. The Great War andthe Moder Age. By Modis Ekstens. London: Bantam, tg, Pp. vi +396. $12.95 Dar pple Mittaronas: de desc Heresy poli sche Statu-gu-Schrang und Aggresion 190-1913. By Siig Forster. Stutgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985. Pp. ait 322. DM 76.00. Hiswrche Foachang wed plitiche Kultur in Dewshland: ie Debate 1914-1918 ber den ‘Aucrach des Extn Woliogs. By Wollgang Jager. Gottingen: Vandenbocck and Ruprecht, 1984. Pp. $22. DM 76.00. Die Rechsbank ind de faniele Krigrorbercinng vom 197 bs 19rg. By Reinhold Zieh Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1987. Pp. 239, The Origins of he Fist Weld War By Gordon Martel, London: Longman, 1987. Pp vit 113. £3475 Escape into War? The Pavign Policy of Inperal Germany. Edited by Gregor Scbolign. Oxford, New York and Munich: Berg, 1990, Pp. xi+ 185, £24.05 July 1914. The Long Debate, 1918-199. By John W. Langdon. New York and Onford Berg, 1908. Pp. xi 198. £25.00 ‘Male, Scien and Prsian War Pani. By Arden Buchola. New York and Oxford Berg, 1991. PP. n+ 352. £35.00 The Origins of the First Weld War. By Ruth Henig. London: Routledge, 1080. Pp. 49 £3.99 “The German Army Leogu. Popular Nationalim in Wilhelmine Germany. By Marilyn Shevin Goetzee. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 1990. Pp. 176. £30.00. Von Kofrontatin cur Koester: Dit deacnglchnKolonialbeciangen in Aja ischen 1884 snd 1914. By Michal Frohlich, Bochuon: Universitatsverlag Dr N. Brockmeyer, 1990. Pp. 371- DM 5440 1 (On 21 June 1914, following a banquet in Hamburg, the German Emperor Wilhelm I {gave notorious analysis of Germany's ‘general situation’ w the banker Max Warburg He was worried about the Rusian armaments [programme and] about the planned railway ‘construetion; and detected [in these] the preparations fo awar agains usin 1916. He complained 75726 HISTORICAL JOURNAL out the inadequacy ofthe railwaylinks that we had a the Western Front aginst France; and hinted [at] whether ie would not be better to sre now, rather than wait Warburg ‘advised decidedly against” this: [1 sketched the domestic politcal situation in England for him (Home Role), the diiclies for France of maintaining the three-year service period, the nancial es in which France already ‘ound isl, and the probable unteliability ofthe Russian army. I strongly advised him] to walt patently, Keeping ov heads down fora few more years. "Weare growing stronger every yea; oi hemes ae geting weaker internally” Even if they have not exactly replicated the banker's assessment of the weakness of the three Entente powers, historians have often echoed his view of Germany's strength and ‘prospects in 1914. Germany ‘dominated continental Europe economically by 1914" Te was a society “literally bursting with every conceivable expression of strength"? Indeed, German scientists and engineers were at the foreftont of technological Advances which, quite apart from their economic advantages, would make a German Blizlveg in the west unstoppable within a matter of decades.* In one of two new contributions tothe debate on the origins inthe First World War, the Bremen historian Immanuel Geiss reiterates the point. Unification in 1870/1, he writes, gave Germany “latent hegemony [in Europe] literally overnight... It was inevitable thatthe union of all or most Germans in a single state would become the strongest power in Europe.” ‘The advocates of a German-dominated Europe were therefore correct, at least in theory: “There was nothing wrong with the conclusion...that Germany and continental Europe west of Russia would only be able to hold their own [alongsie...) ‘the coming giant economic and politcal power blocs... f Europe pulled together. And ‘united Europe would fll almost automaticaly under the leadership ofthe strongest power~Germany."* Yet such confident assumptions were far from the minds of Germany's political leaders before 1914 —as the Kaiser's remarks to Warburg make clear, In 1909, Admiral von Tigpit raised a spectre ofa lightning strike against hie fleet by the British navy; while the former chief of the general staff, Graf Alfred von Schlieffen, warned about hordes of invading Slavs.* Germany's military leaders felt weak, not strong. That seeming paradox provides the theme of this survey of recent writing on Germany and the origins of the war. From the moment the fighting began, of course, there were many who argued that the German sense of weakness was disingenuous: a bogus justification for a 1 Jabrbericht rot, pt, Mamburg,Binchrann, Wirt & CoM. M. Warburg (MAW), Mag Warburg Pape Jabresbercht 1914's ok MoM. Warburg, dst meinen dafchmngen ited privately), pag; E.Zechim “Bethmann Hellweg, Krcgeiko ond SED 1914" Det ‘Mona Sansa 1950), pat; A Hilger, Geman andthe uo Ward War (Cambridge, Mas, 198). 38s FPicher ar oft: Geman pts fom rt rgr4 (Landon, 1973) B47" * Ser eyplly Heng, Ong of te Ft Wold War, pg; Ekin Rie of Sing, p68 J Rema, "A summing up in Dukes and Renal, Aster Gary, p 209 3°] Seinberg, “The Copenhagen complex’ Jamal of Cowen Hite, m1 (1968) 40. 4 Sec A. Offer, The Fit Wort Waris erva nepraon (Oxo 8), 905 eb Beyerchen, ‘On the simulation of excellence in Wilhclmine sence’ in Dukes and Rema, Anat Geman, pp. £39-58 ©: P45 Teun “The German veo of tperalin: Weil’, n Scoligen e), Bape in war 6 * Seinber, “Copenhagen complex Immanuel Geis, July 19g. The tbat of the Be World War seed dames (Landon, 19) 360REVIEW ARTICLES 77 premeditated act of aggression. On go July, the Kaiser spoke as if his fears of the previous month had been realized: “England, Rusia and France have agreed among themselves..to take the Austro-Serbia conflict for an excuse for waging a war of extermination against us... The famous encirclement of Germany has finally become a complete fact... We squirm isolated in the net." But when thi analysis was sprvced up during the war and presented in the oficial German ‘White Book’ and elsewhere as an interpretation of the wars origins, it found litle eredence outside the borders of the Reich. As Langdon shows, even German writers (notably Karl Kautsky, Hermann Kantorowice and Max Monigelas) found when they set t0 work on the offical documents afer the war that the words and actions of those at the top in Berlin were almost impossible to construe as pacific. By the time Thimme, Lepsius and Mendelscohn-Bartholdy produced their monumental Grasse Politik der ewepdicchen Keabinae, the idea of portraying the war as an attack on an innocent Germany was increasingly giving way to more impersonal explanations — notably the geopolitical interpretation that Germany, the ‘land in the middle’, was peculiarly vulnerable to encirclement, and therefore condemned to choose between Bismarckian ‘stop-gaps" oF 1 Wilkelmine preventive war.” Similarly, historians outside Germany who questioned ‘the war guilt verdict did so with reference to systemic theories: for example, the Wilsonian idea that the war was the result of flaws in the international system (secret, contractlke alliances, and the lack of independent arbitration meckanisms);? the Leninist view thatthe war was the consequence ofmperalist economic rivalries wished ‘upon European workers by capitalist interests; the argument that the war plans ‘devised by General Staff in response to technological change made war ‘by timetable" ‘unstoppable after a certain point; or the related interpretation that the war was a product of ‘militarism’. As has often been remarked, interpretations of the war's origins have tended to be coloured by contemporary political preoccupations; and nowhere was this more ‘evident than in Fritz Fisher's attempt to reassert German responsibility forthe war," and the violent response it elicited. It is this politcal dimension which Jager ‘emphasizes, deseribing how Fischer's thesis about the continuity of German ambitions in Eastern Burope from 1914 t0 1943 touched raw nerves ata time of reorientation in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic, and attempts by a new generation of historians “come to terms" with the German past. Besides much vitriol, of course, the late tg608 and early r970" produced a wealth of new material on the period, from Fischer's revelations on German war aims to the private writings of Riezier and * Ibid. Doc. 195, p= 295 "See for example H. Oncken, Das Deasle Risk and die Vong des Webbrigs, 2 vol (Berlin, 1933) THLE: Barnes, Th ecto te World War (New Vor, 125): 8.B. Fay Th origins of he Weld Way, rev eda, 2 vos. (New York, 103) VL Lenin, Imprilisn th hight tage of exilim (19), 1 AJP Taylor, War by Gtable: hw the Fist World War began (London, +959). % G.Riter, Saad ad Krshandvek. Das Palen des" Mirna’ Desilan, 4 vols (Munich, 1965-8); tans. The Sword andthe Sep (Coral Gables, Florida, 1969) TE Fischer, ‘Kontinuitat der Tetum Zam Problem der deutschen Kriegziepoltik ian Eraten Welthieg”, Historische Zeit, exc (1960), 84-101; Mem, Grif mach der Weltmakt. Die Kregel ds bien Detschlnde 114-1918 (Dissldor, 195), tan. Geman ari the Fir World War (London, 1957). See albo idem, Welimact oer Nerang Frankf 16), ana Worl paaer of acne (New York, 1034)728 HISTORICAL JOURNAL Miller; leading to an increasingly sophisticated debate onthe calculations made by the ‘German leadership, in particular chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. Was there, as Fischer ‘came to believe, a plan for war, dating back to as early as December 1912, based on the belief that British neutrality could be secured in a war of conquest against Russia and France?%* Or —as Erdmann, Zechlin, Jarausch and others variously argued ~ was Bethmann taking some kind of ‘ealeulated risk’, gambling on a localized war to preserve the Reich’s freedom of action’ ~if not to preserve the Reich itself2"® Such {questions have come to hinge on the nuances of an enormous and still growing ‘foundation of German documents; and it is the sheer volume of primary and secondary material which provides the best justification for historiographical summaries like Langdon’s."* ‘A further valuable result of the Fischer controversy has been to generate a renewed interest in the roles played by other powers in the origins of the war, In the past two decades, a series of individual studies has been produced, covering the diplomatic and military policies of the principal combatants; and such studies have in turn helped ‘others to reappraive the war's origins from an international perspective." For a number of Fischer's critics, this has been a welcome shift away from the ‘thesis of sole responsibilty’. However, Geis ofall Fischer's pupils the one who has remained ‘most concerned with diplomatic history —now seeks to counter this trend by writing ‘a study which combines the international perspective with the esentials of the Fischer thesis. As long ago as 1965, Geiss set out to rebut the charge that Fischers thesis was 1. laches, King dr Msn, Die dace Plt om 1g bis 1914 (Duet, 1969), tal War of sins, German poles from 1911 19. (London and New York, 1975). See BF. Schulte, pase Krse nd Brier Weg Being ur Milage des Raises, 81-1914 (Frankfurt, 1983), p 207 See K. Erdmann, "Zur Beurceiung Bethmana Hollwegs", Gace in Wises wad Unrich, xv (igha), 525-40; B. Zeclin, ‘Deutichland wvitchen Kabinershrieg und Wirtchaftisieg: Politik tnd Kricgfuhrang in den enten Monaten dee Welikeieges 1914", Hisorsche Zeischift, exexe (1964), 347-458; K.H.Jarausch, "The illusion of limited war Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’ caculted rit, July 1914 Gaal Europe Hicory, (0969), YB. Sce abo E.Zechli, Krieg and Higa” Zar dich Pate im Eisen Welle {Dasseldoet, 1979): idem, ‘July 194: eply wa polemic, in H.W. Koch (ed), The origi of the First Word Wer (London, 1984); K.D. Erdmann, “War guilt 1914 reconsidered. A balance of new research’ in bi pp. $9470 See aio JA. Moss, The polis of illsoa: the Fiche contac i Geman hsriorapy (London, 975) ;J- Dr, Les cuss dea preme gre mnt: inal htrigraphe (Pai, 1979. ‘There are alo istoriographieal articles ton namerovs to it here TVR Berghahn, Grmany and he ppoot of warn 1924 (London, 1972.8. Stine, Britain andthe igi ofthe Fit World Wer (London, 1977); FV. Kier, Bane ad th rig of th Fit World War (London, of); R. Bosworth, aly and he arash ofthe Fit World Wer (London, £8) ;D. Lieven, Ras andl rig of te First Wald War (Landon, 183) ;S. R. Wllamson J, Ausra Hungry andthe cng ofthe Fost World Wer (London, 1990), LCF. Tamer, Ongins ofthe First World Wor (New York, 1970); J. Rema, *r9¢4~ the ‘third Balkan war. Origin econsidered Jounal of Madr History, wt (8974);D.E. Lee, Ears ral yrs, The ilomacbckgowd of World War 11908-1914 (Hanover, New Hampi, 974), R.T.B Langhorne, The ellape ofthe coca of Baropesintratinal pais 1Ago-19rg (London, 1981) ;6, Bareaclough, Pom Aged o Amagebdn; natnyoferts (London, 1982); James Jal, The origins of he First World Wor (London, Yaa); the stating point for al sich studies remains Albertini, Le Origin dia Guede 974, 3 vole. (Milan, 1942-3) KC Hildebrand, “Jule 19t4: Das earopsische Sicherheitdilemma. Berachtungen aber den Ausbruch des Esten Weldsege', Gece ie Wisc und Unerid, X30 (1985)REVIEW ARTICLES 729 excessively German-centred with his influential collection of documents on the July crisis, drawn ffom the archives of all the main combatants (though with German documents predominating). Geiss concluded that the war had its rots in German, Welpoltik, which inevitably posed a threat to Britain; though is immediate causes lay in the German government’s support for an Austrian punitive strike against Serbia ‘Germany was the aggresor...deliberately provoking Russia. [This] drove Russa, France and Britain to the wall and into a pesition when they could not but react ‘against massive German ambitions," In his most recent book, Geis sts out to prove ‘what is, in essentials, the same thesis by different means. Now, instead of those few crowded weeks of July 1914, his period isthe entire century between Waterloo and the ‘Marne; and instead of editing documents, he has written a compact international history comparable in scope with Bridge and Bullen’ successfal textbook. ** Geiss begins with the familiar model of the nineteenth-century European state system as a “pentarchy’, a delicate balance of power-centres and -vacua, maintained in equilibrium by an ‘antichegemonil principle’. Before 1815, it had been Britain and Rusia which had defeated the French revolutionary bid for mastery in Europe: and between 1815 and 1870, these two flanking powers preserved the fragile equipose, only clashing within Europe once (the Crimea) before transferring their attention and rivalry to Asia, However, from the #84os on, a new and unparalleled threat arose to the system: Germany. “The most significant erissspot’ in 1848; scene of ‘the most extreme version’ of European nationalism in the 1860s; ‘the strongest power of the Continent” once united in 1871, Germany's ‘automatic [threat to] the antichegemonial structure of the European system’ dominated the ensuing four decades: “Ultimately all significant diplomatic actions and calculations reveal themselves as reactions t0 the founding of the Reich and its consequences” (p. 128). Geiss hundred-year perspective therefore turns out, on closer inspection, to be a 43-Vear perspective: it was the period alter German unification, not Napoleon's defeat, which was the real ‘incubation period’ (p. 128). Geis proceeds to depiet the war asthe culmination of eight post1871 ‘crises’, symmetrically distributed between Bast and West: the 1875 Franco-German “War in Sight” crisis; the 1875/8 Eastern crisis; the 1885/7 Bulgarian ers; the 1886/9 Boulanger criss; the 1905/6 Moroccan criss; the 1908 Bosnian crisis; the 1gt+ Agadir ‘crisis; and the 1912/13 Balkan crisis, Reviving a debate which dates back tothe 1ga08 land before, Geiss stresses ‘the structural inability of the German Reich’ 0 choose between ‘a moderating, alliance-based compromise with England or Russia’, and portrays ‘the constellation of 1914” as ‘the result of Bismarck’s period in office” (p. 187), However, his maia contention remains that it was ‘German Weltpolitik which plunged Europe into the world war... In exporting themselves world-poitically .. it ‘was the Germans themselves who created the decisive conflict which escalated into the world war’ (p. 128). The implication is that the central mistake of German foreign policy was to spurn the possibility of an agreement with England, the price of which ‘would have been a naval agreement of the sort torpedoed by Tispitz and the Kaiser in 1912, “From a world-political point of view, the construction of the second-largest ficet by itself amounted to a declaration of war against England and the rest of the * Geis July 1914p. 365. For the subsequent development of Geis's work se idem, Das ease Reel and de Vorgechiche de Bites Walger (Munich, 1978); Wem, Des Dice Reh and der gre Waldieg (Munich, 1985). "°F R. Bridge and R, Bullen, The grt pes and he Buren sates stem. 815-1914 (London and New Vork, 1980),730 HISTORICAL JOURNAL ‘world’ (p. 214) The readers thus prevented with a central sequence of events leading fiom the Tipitz Plan, to Haldane’ failure, tothe ers of December 1g, to the filed ‘id for British neutrality on 29 July 1914, and fnally to the expiry of the Brith uldmatum at midnight on 4 August ‘This argument willbe familiar to readers of Berghal, who devoted more than half of hi book to illustrating Aebrentha's diagnos of 1911! “Antagonism between England and Germany [i] the dominant element of the international station [and will probably lead ta European war which is now unavoidable’; 8 well aso readers of Kennedy. It is alto a view wellsepresented in the collection of essays edited by Gregor Schollgen and based on seminars he organized while a visting Fellow at St Antony's, Oxford. Frite Facher himself, who provides a trenchant restatement of is thesis, begins by quoting Maller, who in 1896 saw Germany's aim as being to "break Britain's domination of the world"; and Bethmann, who in 1903 described the Kaiser's fist and base idea’ a8 being “to break Britain's leading poston in the wold in favour of Germany’ Willibald Gutsche alo quotes Bethmann, referring i r9%0 to England athe decisive rival of Germany when it comes tothe policy of economic expansion." Sehollgen himself, akes his stand only on the legitimacy and coherence of Germany's challenge to England. Yet itis precisely when one is presented with the "long view, as by Geis in his book, that one sees the weaknesea ofthis argument. Is hard to see ‘what, ifany, direct connection there was between Germanys ‘world policy” and the decision wo support the Austrian srke against Serbia in 19t4; and atemps to establish rich a connecton, such as David Kaiser's ruggestion that Bethmann sought to win a Colonial empire by defeating France on the batlefilds of Europe, are scarcely supported by what was said and done in the July eis ieelt In Aftca, at Michael Frohlich argues, Anglo-German “confrontation” bad given way to “coexistence” by 19143" and colonial matters scarcely figured in the deliberations ofthe German and ‘Austrian leaders, except when it became inescapably clear that Britain was going to center the war, at which point the Kaiser and Moltke began raving about German- fomented insueretions in India As for the naval implications of what was being altempted, these were given only the mos limited consideration.” ‘Afar more valuable approach has ben to set the criss in the content of the long running “Eastern Question’ and thi line of argument has now been produce in & condensed form by Gordon Martel, who argues thatthe Fit World War was.fought for the future of the Near Bas’ (p. 76). Ironically, much ofthe evidence for this view is presented rather more effectively in Geis, particularly in the lar section of his book, Berghahn, Germany ad the aproch of war, p. 145; P. M. Kennedy, There of the Ang German ntagnism 1850-1914 (London, 1980) SFE. Fischer, “The foreign policy of imperial Germany and the outbreak af the Fist World war in Schollgen (ed.), Bape ino war, p. 2. 'W. Gutche, The foreign policy of imperial Germany and the outbreak ofthe war inthe hisoviography of the GDB in ibid. 50. ™G.Schilgen, “Introduction: the heme reflected in recent German reeare, in ibid. pp. 1-17; idem, "Germany's foreign policy inthe age of imperialism: a vicious rele’, pp. 121-33 8''D.E. Kaier, “Germany and the origins ofthe First World War", Joral of Soden History, ty (1083), 442-74. POE Steiner, Brita ed the origins, pp 105-9 Geiss, Jy 1914 P:294. doc. 179, ® Fora recent dlacanon ofthe naval dimension in 1914s I. N, Lambi, The may and German er pols, 162-1914 (Boston, 1984), pp. 416-27 See esp. Fischer, War of isons, passim; BLP. Schulte, Vor dow Keqsausbrach 1014 Deaton, die Taret and der Baton’ (Diseldor, 1980); G. Schiligen, Inprialinas nd Gltgavic, Deehland, Expand and die orietliche Frage, 1871-1914 (Musich, 1984.REVIEW ARTICLES 731 which, with its excellent account of the Serbian-Austrian conflict, sits uneasily alongside his eatier insistence on the centrality ofthe Anglo-German confrontation. As Geis’s account reminds us, Germany only became involved at a late stage in the protracted struggle, involving both great power rivalry and south European nationalism, (0 supplant the Ottoman empire in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean - a struggle in which Russia was traditionally the most aggressive power. It was only in 1go8, when the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought to an end a period of Austro-Russian harmony in the Balkans, that Germany ceased to be a diplomatic on-looker, strongly supporting Vienna and raising the possibilty of war with Russia; and it could be argued thatthe immediate effect ofthis intervention was to reduce rather than increase the risk of war. This was certainly the case when there was renewed friction between Austria and Russia in late 1912, following the first Balkan war: faced with warnings of war from London, Berlin acted to restrain her ally. The aftermath of Sarajevo could therefore conceivably have been an encore of 1912/13. The difference was that, on this occasion, Germany decided to support an Austrian military strike against Serbia. The initial puzzle forthe historian is to explain why they persisted with thie venture in the face of ample evidence that it would lead to a European war. is true that during July the German decision-makers sometimes expressed the hope that the conflict would be localized: in other words that Austria would be able to vanquish Serbia without Russian intervention.®! However, its hard to reconcile such aspirations with the frequent allusions elsewhere to the likelihood of a more general conflagration arising Its striking that when the Kaiser mentioned a preventive war to Warburg, the latter clearly assumed he meant a war against Russia, France and England —despite his own involvement in attempts to seek a rapprochement with England on colonial isues. The Germans had good reason to think that an Austrian move against Serbia would, if supported by Germany, lead to a full-scale European war. Sazonov made it clear from the moment the Austrian ultimatum was published ‘hat Russia would react; while on 25 and 29 July 1914, Grey had restated the British position of December 1932: should “the position of France as a power’ be threatened, England would not stand aside.” Given these indications that the war would not be localized, there were ample opportunities for Berlin to back down.* Yet the initial British initiatives were given only the most insincere support by Germany.” ‘The Germans pressed on, urging the Austrians to make haste; and after 26 July, openly rejecting diplomatic alternatives.** Only at the eleventh hour did they begin to lose their nerve: the Kaiser fist, on 28 July; and then Bethmann who, after hearing of Among many example, se Biedermana’s report to Dresen on 17 July, pp, 120, doe. 28 'i'Tn February 193, Bethmann had rejected the ides of « preventive war against Serbia ‘because "Rusan intervention. would yall na wartike conf ofthe Triple Alliance against the Triple Entente, and Germany would have wo beat the fll bruat of the French and Brish attack’ ibid, p 44. Cr the very pesimicasesments described by Schoen on +8 July ror4 ib 390, doe. 33. Gustav Schmid, “Contradictory postures and conflicting objectives; the July cis’, in Sehallgen (ed), Exp no War, p. 139; Ges, Jay t9r4 PP 258-41, doce 97, 98, 993 P27, og. 122; pp. 288, doe. 190. Ibid pp. 2438, doc. 100; pp. 2516, doc. 108; p. 28, doc. 128; p. 287, doc. 129; pp. 288, oc. 190; pp. 2931, dc. 135; P.329,doc. 163; p. 345, do. 1733 pP- 343h, doe. 174 & Ibid p22, doc. 95 % Ibid. pp. 297, dor 9: pp. gst, doc. 1015 pp. agg, doe. 110; p. 332, doc. 16. © Ibid. pp. 2306, doe. 112; pp. ag, doc. 131; Schmidt, “Contradictory postures’ p. 149. Geiss, Jay 1904732 HISTORICAL JOURNAL Grey's warning to Lichnowsky of 29 July, frantically sought to persuade the Austrians to apply the brakes.* Berchtold tried to respond; but was the German military which ultimately secured, by a combination of persuasion and defiance, the mobilization forders, the ultimata and declarations of war which unleashed the conflict. * By 27 July, it's clear that the Germans’ principal concern was, as Miller put it, ‘to put Russia in the wrong and then not to shy away from war’—in other words, to portray the fact of Russian mobilization as evidence of an attack on Germany.” Why did the Germans act as they did? The best answer which can be offered by a diplomatic historian relates to the structure of European alliances, which had clearly tilted against Berlin since the turn ofthe century. Russia, France and England had all bbeen able to find issues on which they could agree (mostly extra-European): but Germany had repeatedly failed or chose not to secure ententes: not with England in 1887-90; not with Russia in 1890; not with England in 1goa; not with Rusia in 1904-5; and not with England in 1912. Even such allies as they did have, the Germans hhad doubts about: declining Austria, unrcliable Italy. It can therefore be argued that the Germans saw a confrontation over the Balkans as a means of preserving their own fragile alliance, possibly also creating an anti-Russian Balkan alliance and perhaps even splitting the Entente.* Such calculations were by no means unrealistic. As events proved, there was good reason to doubt the Triple Alliance's dependability; and the ‘Triple Entente was indced fragile, atleast where England was concerned. As late as 5 August Grey could only secure a commitment to lend naval support to France; and the final declaration of war did not come until the end of the next day.*® Moreover, French support for Rusia, although expressed enthusiastically by Paléologue and Joffre, seemed to waver on go July and 1 August. Itis therefore possible that, despite boeing well aware ofthe implications of war with respect to Belgium,** Bethmann and. Jagow discerned just enough evidence of distension within the Triple Alliance for the ‘Germans to continue to hope for British neutrality. Yet none of this satisfactorily explains why the German generals were so determined to go to war and continue fighting even if he Triple Entete held; and ths is the critical % cia, Jay 914 pp 288, do. 130: pp 201, doc. 133: pp 92h do. 194 pp. gst, doe 3 tid. pp sate, doc. 125 p 270; ck Rites, Te Sword and be Seis, 247-75; I ha, of coun ben argued thatthe Runian decion to mobic, party or fly played its part in Unleashing the coe: see L- C.F Turner, *The Russian mobiation in 19% i P.M Kennedy (cl), Tie ar pls ofthe ga powers 880-914 (Leon, 1979), pe. 250-98: Hower, the Romian argument hat her mobzaon was nou the same as Genta and id ot mens wat ves privately acepted by Moltke and Bethmann: Ge J sor, PP af, de 68; 344 oc, 171 pp. 286,270 364; Berghatn, Geman ete sock of ar 207 i Th pp 2050 elm, Da lege Weg de Kalsopt, p30; H.Pogge von Strandmano, “Germany and the coming af war’ idem and R. J. W. Evans (eh), Tecoma of te Fist Wald Wor (Oxor, 1988), p10, Schmit, \Coneeictory posture’, p. 149: Bergan, Gomer and epoahof ar, Ph, !38 tH, 200; Ges Ja) Joe pp. 123, doe 30. 8 Gri, Ju tor, Bp 97% doe. 183; P34, oe. 1703 347 0.175. & Geis, Jb 1914p 396, do. 185; p. 30, do. 185. Tid pp sats doc 48; pp. 4p do. 178 * On a8 April 915, Jagow his hadrefored to provide the Recheag budget committee with «guarantee of Belgien netality, since wouldve the French a potters to were fo ‘xpect stone of thon revealing denial which were his peculiar forte: Reoboy Fiaeplit pare.REVIEW ARTICLES 733 point, since, as Schmidt admits, it was they who pressed for mobilization after the diplomatic gamble had failed. At this point, the military historian offer an explanation, based on the German general stafl's pessimistic calculations about the relative present and fature strengths ofthe European armies, on which was based their argument for ‘a preemptive or preventive war. This was a case which had repeatedly been rejected in the past. However, at the Kaiser's comments to Warburg indicated, by June 1014, it was once again on the Tagesorduung. ‘The reason for this was a sustained lobbying ‘campaign by the general staf, designed to convince the Kaiser, the civilian authorities, and the Austrians that, asa result of new armaments programmes in France and, above all, Russia, Germany would be at their mercy within a few years. Moltke put the case to Conrad at Carlsbad in May 1914: “To wait any longer meant a diminishing of our chances; as far as manpower is concerned we cannot enter into a competition with Russia"; and repeated it to Jagow a few weeks later: “Russia will have completed her armaments in two or three years. The military superiority of our enemies would be so ‘great that he did not know how we might cope with them. In his view there was no alternative to waging a preventive war in order to defeat the enemy as long as we could still more or les pass the test." “Prospects could never come better for us’, argued Waldersce on 3 july, referring to Russia's unpreparcdness; a view repeated by the Keiser three days later: “Rusia is at the present moment militarily and financially totally unprepared for war.'"” On 6-7 July, Riezler recorded that military intelligence gave ‘a shattering picture’, reinforcing Bethmann’s ‘fear of Russia's quickly growing military might’ "The future belongs to Rusia," he went on, ‘which is growing and ‘growing and is becoming an ever increasing nightmare to us... After the compl ‘of their strategic railroads in Poland our position will be untenable... The Entente knows that we are completely paralysed." Jagow relayed the news to Lichnowsky on 1B July: “Russia is not yet ready to strike at present. but] according to all competent ‘observation, she will be prepared to fight in a few years. Then she will crush us by the ‘number of soldiers; chen she will have built her Baltic Sea Fleet and her strategic railroads." On 25 July, Theodor Wolff was told by Jagow that although ‘neither Russia nor France wanted war... The Russians... were not ready with their armaments, they would not strike; in two years’ time, if we let matters slide, the danger would be ‘much greater than at present. When Moltke returned to Berlin the next day, therefore, the ground had already been well prepared for his argument: ‘We shall never again strike as well as we do now, with France's and Russia's expansion of their ‘armies incomplete." Itean be debated whether the outcome deserves the apologetic name of “preventive ‘war’ As Bucholz and Forster show, however, there is no question that, measured crudely in terms of manpower, Germany was falling behind; indeed was already so far ‘behind that launching the Schlieffen plan in August 1914 was a considerable gamble, & Geis, Jub 1g, pp. 48; Benghahn, Germany nd te approach fue, pp. 164-7. The exchange wag om ether 20 May or 8 June. See alto Geis, Jay 19r4, pp. 65-8 docs. 5 ‘"Berghaln, Germany axd the approach of war, p18 bid. p. 203; Schmit, "Contradictory postures”, p. 344. © Geis July 1974p. 128, doe. By 16 July, even Grey was awate that the German government was “genuinely alarmed atthe military preparations in Rusia; though he mistakenly asumed {hig would put the Germans in "peaceful mood’: Schmid, p. 144 ST, Wall, The Bue of 974 (London, 1995), 448 8 Benghahn, Germany ead he aprach of we, . 209 "9 Fischer, War of ills, pp. 451-5; Pogge, “Germany and the coming of war’, pp. #18734 HISTORICAL JOURNAL ‘even on the assumption that England could be kept out. This was an inferiority with deep roots. Between 1877 and 1889, the German army's peacetime strength had stagnated at around 468,400. In the subsequent seven years, it increased t0 557.490, despite two attempts to introduce universal military service (which would have added 150,200 in 18g0). Thereafter there were only the most minimal increases, so that its peacetime strength was just over 607,000 in x9r0, Tt was only in 1912 and 1935 that «wo bills were passed increasing the army to 761,000, which meane that, at its fll wars time strength, the German army totalled around 2°2 million men, compared with as many a8 9-4 million once the Russian army was fully mobilized Similarly, the Russian and French armies had a total peace-time strength in 1913/14 of 2,551,000, compared ‘with a combined German and Austrian strength of 1,341,000. In 1912, that gap had been only 794,665; while in 1904, the combined German-Ausrian strength had actually exceeded the Franco-Russian by 371,180. The growing disadvantage was ‘equally clear in terms of total numbers called up in 1915/14: 585,000 to 383,000." According to the German general staff, 84% of thote eligible for military service in France performed it, compared with 53% in Germany.** The comparable figure for ‘Austria- Hungary was 29%. Teis true that, when other factors (particulary the ratios ‘of officers, NCOs and armaments to men) are taken into account, the diserepaney was Jess pronounced, and that the idea of future Franco-Russian invasion of Germany lacked credibility; but the spectre of inexorably diminishing diplomatic bargaining power clearly impressed Bethmann and Jagow. There is no need to post, as Fischer stil oes, pre-existing German war-plans to create spheres of influence in central Europe and Africa, to destroy France as a power and to carve up Russia's Western Empire.** ‘The evidence points far more persuasively to a military “frst strike’, designed to presempt a deterioration in Germany's military position; though this is by no means incompatible with the idea that the outcome of such a strike if succesful, would be German hegemony in Europe. " TThese diplomatic and military perspectives are invaluable. Yet none ofthis evidence fally explains the outbreak ofthe Fist World War; rather it begs a more fundamental question, Why, if the Germans were right to think that their military potion was deteriorating, did they not seck to rectify the deterioration by increasing their defence capability? Ione begins by considering the extent of Germany’s economic rewources, the reason for this is far from obvious © igures from: Reichsarchiv (ed) Der Welbitg 24-sgr8. Erser Reihe, Die milk Operatonn zu Land (Berlin, 1925), p.gBC; orser, De dipale Milam, pp. 8,37, 9, 129, 10, 248: Buchole, Molt Sein and Pasion ear plansing, pp. 62, 67,159; Berghahn, Gomany th approach of warp. i Jll, Origins ofthe Fst World War, p72 W'Fonter, Dr dil Miler, p. 205, 5 ‘See also G. E, Rothenberg, The sr of Francis Josh (West Lafayete, 1976); itis tre that only 20% ofthe annul cohort n Rusia was called ips bu given te enormous abeoite numbers involved, this wat scant conscation fr Bevin: P. M. Kenedy, Th ie ond al of te get pase. Econ change and miliary confi fom 300 2000 (London, 1988), p. 307. CN. Stone, Th Eaton ‘rat 1gr4-1917 (London, 1975); W. Rutherford, The Rusin arm in World War I (Londen, 1975). We F Picher, “The foreige policy of imperial Germany aod the outbreak ofthe Fist World War, in Schollgen (ed), Brae ino War’, p. 37REVIEW ARTICLES 735 ‘OF course, the role of economic factors in the origins of the First World War is a subject which has lost much ofits fascination for historians in recent years. Scholars in the Marxist-Leninist tradition like Gutsche and Zilch may continue to argue that, by 1914, in addition to ‘mining and steet monopolist, influential representatives of large banks, electrical engineering and shipping corporations (...were) now inclined to pursue a non-peaceful option’; bue the evidence for such views, and for their influence ‘on diplomatic and military decision-making, is scarce. For example, among the handful ‘of businessmen kept (party) informed of developments during the July exss, either ‘Albert Ballin nor Max Warburg favoured war. The only evidence which Gutsche himself provides for his assertion is a quotation from the wholly unrepresentative Hugenburg. Indeed, Zilch reminds us of the lack of enthusiasm with which Reich “officials responded to proposals for an ‘economie general staff” from businessmen like Rathenau, Reser, Posschl and the Saxon industrialist Leonhard; while the meeting he describes between Reichsbank president Havenstein and eight directors of the great banks? on 18 June was principally concerned with increasing the reserve-ratio of the later, It is @ misreading of Havenstein’s comment that ‘we will only be able to maintain peace if we are financially as well as militarily strong" to suggest thac the Reichsbank president had ‘unambiguously aggressive objectives’ (p. 79) ‘The Marxist interpretation ofthe war's origins seems likely to decline stl further in credibility with the collapse of the regimes which most avidly fortered it. However, an alternative model of the role of economics in 1914 shows signs of stepping into the breach, The work of Paul Kennedy, in particular has done much to propagate the idea ‘of economics as one of the ‘realities behind diplomacy’ ~a determinant of power, capable of being expressed in terms of population, industrial ousput, iron and steel production and energy consumption. In this view, politicians have more “fre will” to attempt imperialist expansion without necesary reference to capitalist interests; but their country’s economic resources place the ultimate constraint on that expansion, ‘which, beyond a certain point, becomes unsustainable.” A similar line of argument is taken by Geiss, who argues that the acquisition of ‘the strongest modern industrial economy” made Germany the ‘super great-power ofthe continent’ In ite enormous and sill expanding power Germany was ike a fastibreeder reactor without & protective shell. The economic sense of power magnified the sel-conidence acquired since 1871 Into that seleover-eaimation which drove the German Reich via Wall into the Fist World Wart Yet this model ofthe relationship between the German economy and German power ‘overlooks a number of important aspects of the Reich’s place in the world economy. It is true that, if one compares Germany and Britain between 1895/6 and 1913, there were more Germans (in Germany) than Britons (in Britain); and that the German cconomy was expanding faster than the British in terms of output growth, domestic investment and productivity." But ina period characterized by unprecedented and as yet unrepeated freedom of movement of people, goods and capital, there are other ways. ‘of comparing national economics, For Britain, this period saw a continued high level of emigration and a worsening of the balance of trade, counterbalanced by @ Y Kennedy, Rise and alo he great por ep. pp. 249-954. Geiss, Drange Win de Ratasophe, pp. 54, 16, 129; c- Kennedy, Rise nd al, pp 269-77, © See the survey in V. Henachel, “Produktion, Wachstum snd Produbtiitst in England, Frankreich und Deutchland von der Mitte ds 19, Jahrhunderts bis 2um Ersten Welkieg Virtahrchit fr Sociale and Wirth, 130 (1981),736 HISTORICAL JOURNAL ‘remarkable increase in an already high level of capital export Germany, however, ceased to export Germans; had a far smaller trade deficit and an increasing export ‘marketshare; and exported a diminishing proportion of new capital formed.* ‘Whether these differences caused or were caused by the differences inthe two countries’ domestic economic performance is unclear; but the implications in terms of relative international power deserve more emphasis. As Offer has recently suggested, Britain's high level of emigration created bonds of kinship which ensured the loyalty of the Dominions tothe mother country.® By contrast, the declining German birthrate and increase in immigration heightened German awareness of Eastern Europe's superior manpower. True, Germany's increasing success as an exporter appeared to pose a ‘threat to British interests; but Germans feared that export growth (and the corollary, continued reliance on imported raw materials) could be jeopardized by the protectionist policies of more successful colonial powers Finally, British and, to a lesser extent, French capital exports undoubtedly increased those countries i ternational politcal leverage. As Bulow lamented: ‘The enormous influence of Prance...is to great extent the product of her wealth of capital and liquidity."* Yet it was precisely the banks’ preference far domestic business which some economic historians have identified asa reason for her industrial and trading success. Germany's “power” in the international economy was therefore circumscribed: the dramatic level of industrial growth experienced since 1895 in fact tended to weaken its international bargaining postion. ‘There was, however, one way in which the state could compensate for these disadvantages; and that was by increasing its military power. That such a course of ‘action was regarded as legitimate in Wilhelmine Germany goes almott without saying, so much has been written in the past about German militarism. Yet the nature of German militarism remains problematic, as a number of recent works on the subject demonstrate. For Marxist writers, thee is a convenient shorthand: one speaks of ‘the “aggressive character of the bourgeoisie allied with the Junkers" and ther reactionary ‘and dangerous strivings'." But in western hstoriogeaphy, the idea of such an ‘alliance’ land the question of its “reactionary” character have become the subjects of intense debate." In a tradition given its frst specifically historical formulation by Kehr and See 8, Pollard, Brain's prime and Brit's deli. The Brith econmy 1870-1914 (London, 49); R.C. Flow Britain 1860-194: survey’, in em and D. McCloskey ed), Th ecommic ison of Brain since 1700 (Cambridge, 1981), 1, 1-26 RR. Mitchell, Fura Kita statis, 1770-1970 (New York, 1098), pe 14s; A. ‘Sommariva and G,’Tullio, Groman marco hsty 1880-1979, A sty of he efit of comic ‘paige, carey derceton nd grat (Lomdon,*985), pp. 4¢-30: V. Hentchel, Wire ‘nd Wirtschaft im waist Detuhlnd. Oranirar Kaplaliomas and Inventions? (Staugare, 1978), p. 3 © Offer, Agron interpretation, pp. 121-35 Geis, Der lange Weg in de Ketastropte, pp. 188 Kaiser, "Germany and the origins of the Fint World Wat’, p. 4553 ef Kroboth, inept, p. 573 Zeb, Rehan, . Bo. fe addition to Rite, Saastant and Kieighenbuert, see: A. Vagtsy A hsty of militarism, Gisiian ond military (New York, 1959); ©. A. Craig, The pits ofthe Pasion amy, 591945 (Osford, 1955); W. Wheeler-Beanett, The nema roe (London, 1954); F. L. Carsten he ‘Reichauc and pits, 110-1995 (Onford, 1986); M. Meserchmidt, Miler and Politik in dr ‘Bomar snd im wilbinisten Deascland (Darmatadt, 1995); V-R. Berghah, Milas (Cologne, 1975)! Kem, Milani. The hstry ofan itratinal debate 1861"1979 (Leamington, 198) Zilch, Rian, p. 40. "CLG. Bley, Army state and civil sciety revisiting the problem of German militaria’ ‘dem, From amfation to Nazim. Reintpeing the Geman pst (Boston, 1986), pp. 85-109,REVIEW ARTICLES 737 subsequently adopted by Fischer, there existed an ‘alliance of elites’, in which (in contrast to the East German model) the Prussian aristocracy dominant in government and army~had the upper hand over their junior partners among industrialists and other reactionary bourgeois groups. For this conservative axis, militarism served not only an economic purpose (arms contracts for industry), but also ‘a number of political purposes. The army could be used as a weapon of last resort in the struggle against social democracy; of, in conjunction with the navy, asa rallying- point for popular chauvinism, turning attention away ffom the Reich's ‘anti- democratic™ political system.!” Certainly, there were a number of important figures ‘who did express the view that an aggressive foreign policy could weaken the domestic politcal challenge posed from the let. On the other hand, Fischers idea ofan alliance of elites clearly exaggerated the extent to which politicians, generals, agrarians and industrialists agreed. Bethmann for one was sceptical of such arguments.”" “More recent reearch has pointed towards an alternative interpretation of militarism, in which the pressure for increased armaments came as much fom below as from above. The work of Geoff Eley, Roger Chickering and others on the character of the radical nationalist organizations which favoured increased armaments and military activism before 1914 has challenged the ‘Kehrite” orthodoxy that all who favoured such policies were mere ciphers of conservative elites. Even when (as inthe ease of the [Navy League) they were established to generate public support for government policy in a way which could legitimately be described as ‘manipulative’, such organizations attracted supporters whose militarism so outstripped oficial intentions that they gradually came to constitute a kind of ‘national opposition’. According to Eley, this reflected the mobilization of hitherto politically apathetic groups mainly drawn from the petty bourgeoisie ~a populist element challenging the dominance of notables” in ‘bourgeois associational if." ‘This was part of that ‘reshaping’ of the Right which, in his view prefigured the definitive merger of traditional conservative elites, radical nationalists, mitelstandisch economic interest groups and anti-emites into a single political movement: National Socialism.” In place of the idea of the war as a conservative “fight forwards” to pre-empt democratic pressures from the left, then, historians have suggested populist pressures from the right ~ and not only in Germany asa postive cause of belligerence." Influenced by such reinterpretation, some recent ‘writers have sought to arrive ata compromise pestion. In an attempt to synthesize the various interpretations of *militarism’, Stig Forster argues that there was a ‘double militarism’, or rather two militarisms: a reactionary ‘traditional, Prussian, con- servative’ militarism “from above’, which dominated between 18g0 and 1905, and a © incher War efillasonn, pp 13-25 lem, Bins dor Ble, Zar Kontittdr Mechorataren 4x Deatblnd, 18711045 (Diseidrt, 1979), wana. Pom Kalverach 9 Thd Rech: ements of the ‘amin in Geman istary 1871-1045 (London, 1986). ""H.-U. Wehler, The German amie, rr-1gr8 (Leamington, 108s), pp. t55-623 Berghah, Gnmary and ie affoac of wr, PP. 4.48213 Ibid: pp 2,92 8 See his famous comments to Lerchenfeld in 1914, quoted in Ges, Ju 1914, p47. % G.Eley, Reaping the German right Radial nationalism ond oliical change afer Bismarck (New Haven, 1979); idem, "The Wilhelmine right: how ie changed’, in R. J Evans (ed), Sui ond ols in Withaiine Germany (New York, 1978), pp. 112-85. See alo: R. Chickering, We mex teh fel mast Geman: ela stay of be Pan-German Leap, 86-7914 (London, +984). 7G. Bley, “Comervatives and radical nationale in Germany: the production of fascist potentials, 1912-28, in M.Blinkora (ed), Facss auf cosas (London, 1990), PP: 50-70 ‘Se in general A.J. Nicholls and P.M. Kennedy eds), Nets and ras motomel it Britain and Germany before gig (London and Oxford, 1981),738 HISTORICAL JOURNAL “bourgeois militarism’ “from below, which “tended to the radical right” and tciumphed chereaier™ Valuable though ‘this reappraisal of radical nationalism is it sulfers ffom two weaknesses. Firs, in focusing on politcal lobbying organizations and positing an increasingly homogencous entity called “The Right’, Eley in particular has perhaps tended to understate the complexity, even ambiguity, of radical nationalism as an ideology. Secondly, in atempting to identify the radical Right with a special social froup— the petty bourgeose —Eley has understated the significance of the elite Bildangcbirgetum not only in radical nationalist organizations but also in the evoltion of radical nationalist ideology. These point are suggested by the elleton ofesays edited by Dafer and Holl a8 well asthe new study by Coctze on the German Army League. ‘The social point is mest easily dealt with. At thei respective peaks, the Principal radical nationalist associations claimed 540,000 members, the majority (331,900) in the Navy League." However, as Coetzee argucr, tht Sgure greatly ‘exaggerates the level of participation: some people were enthusiastic members of more than one League or asiociation,"” while many others existed only on paper, having simply been induced to part with the insignificant membership fee (it cost one mark to join the Army League), Coetee gives a convincing pictare of dhe enthusiasts of the ‘Army League, reading their newspaper Die Web, enjoying regular slide shows and excursions, and gathering together annvally for 8 Uhree-day jamboree, ‘The social ‘composition i unmistakable. Of the af! men who were on the Executive Committe of the original Settgat branch, eight were army officers, eight were senior bureanerats land seven were businesmen; and as it spread to towns in Brandenburg, Saxony, the Hanseatic ports and beyond, it aracted similar ‘notable types: bureaucrats in Pose academics in Tubingen; businesamen in Oberhausen.” The picture snot dissimilar in the ease ofthe Pan-German League, iworthird of whose members were academically celucated.™ By contrast, the one truly petty bourgeois nationalt asociation, the ‘Veterans’ Assocation, was anything but radical in its nationalism. As Dading shows, the biggest of ll the nationalist astociations ~ with 28 million members in ig it even coutaumbered the SPD ~ was profoundly conservative in orientation: ‘An inestimable ‘means..ofkeeping the loyal atte... lively in the lower middle clases’ inthe words 7% SFonter, “Alter und never Miliarismus im Kaisereich, Heeresrastungspoik und Dispostionen ‘sam Krieg zwischen Satur quo Sicherung und impeialiacher Expansion, 8go-194 in Daler and Holl, Bare cam Rig, pp. 22-45; Forster, De dopple Mitarisms, pp. 1-10, 297-300, For a more traditional view, see the enay by D. Bald, “Zum Kriegsbld der riltariachen Falrung im Kalerrich’, i bid exp. p- 158 W Coewee, Army lee pt The Army League in South west Germany had links withthe Volunteer Youth Army; the German. League against the Abuse of Inexiating Drinks; the German League for the (Combating of Women's Emancipation; the League agaist Soil Democracy andthe General German Language Asocaton as well as, improbably but revealing, the Wartemberg Associaton for Breding Pedigree Hunting Dog: ibid. pp. 55-8, 65, Ibid. pp. 75-tog, Coetzee’ attempe to derive a more exact sociological profil ofthe League Som the rol kept of members hiled in the war gives a similar piture! ay4%, were career soldiers; 6-2% chil servants; 114% academics or teachers; 77% businessmen; 89% other profaions; and only 65% were clerical employees (pp. got), Unfotucatly, there are ‘methodological dticaltes with these gues, since they naturally overrepresent the You; ‘whereas another sample of 95 pre-war members reveals that go% wer ver 40. One point which (Goctae could pechape have made more of the League's origin and popularity in non-Pranan rmany. Was this aslF-conscious effort 0 “germanicle" the vadivonaly Prussian army? W'Ghickering, Pa German League, pp. 102-31REVIEW ARTICLES 739 ‘of the Prussian Minister of the Interior in 1875." This will hardly come as revelation to anyone who has read Heinrich Mann's Der Untertan (1918), with ite caricature Diederich Hessling. Nevertheless, Duding’s documentation ofthe veterans’ oaths to the crown and banner-waving Sedan Day parades is one of the most important recent contributions to the social history of the Kaiserreich, providing a valuable corrective rot only to Eley, but also to Mann. ‘An important point sometimes overlooked is the importance of radical forms of pprotestantism in the ideology of radical nationalism. This is a point stressed by ‘Greschat in his survey of protestant theologians’ views on war, which shows the way “God's will’ (Gatter Fugung) gradually evolved into ‘God's leadership” (Goter Fuhr) in war sermons between 1870 and 1914, As Greschat steses, miliaris sentiment was by no means monopolized by orthodox pastors like Reinhold Seeberg: liberal theologians like Otto Baumgarten were especially prone to invoke‘ Jesu-Patriotismus; land it was Martin Rade's Chrictliche Welt which published a grotesque pastiche of the Lord’s Prayer shortly after the war had begun (‘Give us each day the enemy dead..." ** Faced with such competition, as Leugers shows, catholics felt obliged to ‘demonstrate that, in the words of one catholic leader: “No one can out-do us when it ‘comes to love for Prince and Fatherland.” Such sentiments from the godly were influential. In a useful essay on the Pan-German League, Chickering emphasizes the ‘xchatological quality of much ADV rhetoric, quoting Class: “War is holy tous, since i will awaken all that is great and selfxacrificing and selfs in our people and cleanse ‘our souls ofthe dross of selfish pettines."* Coetzee’s Army League was overwhelmingly ‘protestant league, set up in the protestant enclaves of largely catholic Warttemberg by a man who had been expelled from the Navy League for attacking the Centre party Nor was it merely radical nationalists who reflected the tone of contemporary religion. As Buchole notes, Moltke had become involved through his wife and daughter with the theosophise Rudolf Steiner, whore theories derived largely from the Book of Revelations ~ a stark contrast with the austere Hutterian-Pietist Schleffen.** Nor sit without significance that Schlieffen liked to sign himself Dr Graf Schlieffen” in correspondence with academics: many clements of pre-war militarism and radical nationalism clearly had their roots in the universities as well as the churches. This should not be overstated, of course, As vom Bruch argues, German academics were far {rom being a homogeneous ‘bodyguard of the House of Hohenzoller’ and Wilhelmine “media dons’ ike the Pan-German Dietrich Schafer were in many ways exceptional in striking radical nationalist postures even in their inaugural lectures." On the other D, Dadlng, ‘Die Kriegsverene im wilhelminischen Reich und ir Beitrag aur Milnariserang der deuschen Geselichaft yn Daler and Holl, Bert cum Kreg, p. 108. less effective attempt to reappraise the social role of the army itself D. Showalter, “Army, sate and society in Germany 1871-1914: an interpretation, ia Dukes and Remab, Astle Gomary, pp. 1-18 NM. Greschag, ‘Keeg und Krigsbereuchaft im deutuchen Protesancemts’ in ibid. pp. $5305, Leugers“Eintellungen 20 Krieg und Frieden im deutchen Katholismus vor 1914" in ibid, p. Ga, Tei signiicane that crowds tn Betinon t and 2 August 1914 sang not only the protestant Bn’ fst Burg ist unser Gott, but alo the catholic ‘Gresser Got wir lben Dich’ Eksteins, Rite of spring "Rt Chickering, "Die Alldcuachen erwarten den Krig’ in ibid. p. 25, Bachole, Mol, Scion and Pion or planning, pp. t09-14, 217-20, 273 Rovom | Bruch, “Krieg und Frieden. Zar Frage der” Miitarscrang deaucher Hochschulleber und Universiaten im spaten Kalsertech’ n Dall and Holl, Bit 2am Kr, pp. 74-98.740 HISTORICAL JOURNAL hhand, there were many faculties which made significant contsibutions to the evolution of radical nationalist ideology; not least history. Geopolitics a derivative of geography and history, was immensely influential, particularly in giving currency to the idea of ‘encirclement’, a fixation with men as diverse as Hasse and Bethmann. A student of philosophy lke Riezler could see the inevitable “confit between nations for power" in terms derived from Schopenhauer. § For others, racial theories provided a justification for war. Mller spoke of “upholding the German race in opposition to Slavs and Romans’, as did Moltke; while it was university Germanists who held a 1913 conference on the subject of ‘the extermination of the Un-German...and the Propagation of the Superiority of the German “Essence”. The Army League's members included archaeologists and ophthalmologists In short, when the Pan- German Schmidt-Gibichenfels— writing in the *Political-Anthropological Review ~ described war as ‘an indispensable factor of culture’, he perfectly summed up its significance for the German Bildungsbirgertum ‘Perhaps the most important point to emerge from these books, however, isthe degree of continuity from National Liberalism to radical nationalism, ‘This is something which historians ike Hildebrand and Hillgruber have long emphasized.” Now even Geis i more ready to indicate the continuities in German nationalism from 1848 to the 18gos."* Weber's Freiburg inaugural lecture remains the most famous cll fora new era of National Liberalism under the standard of Well; but there are many other ‘such echoes. For example, an important contribution here was made by the historical profession, which created a mythology of unification of enormous importance to National Liberals: Wilhelmine proponents of Miteleropa as a German-dominated ‘customs union clearly harked back to the Prussian lloeri’s role in German tunification.** Above all, Kroboth shows how close the connections were between the National Liberal Party and the Army League in the debates over the 1912 and 1913, Army Bill. Keim himself might claim that ‘military sues had nothing to do with party polities’, and seck to recruit Reichstag deputies in the conservative parties as well, 8 the National Liberals; but this rhetoric of “unpolticism® was the stock-in-trade of (German nationalet, and he was soon cooperating closely with Bassermann, in whose mind memories of old battles with the Prussian conservatives over the financing and. social composition of the army clearly loomed large. Bassermann's slogan: ‘Bismarck lives on in the people, but not in the government” gives a flavour of the National Liberal core of ‘radical nationalism"; Meinecke used similar anguage.** Of course, not all National Liberals wished to be reminded of their roots: two Agrarian League- backed Reichstag deputies, Paasche and Dewitz, were forced by the Bal. to resign from, the Army League. Equally, there were those whose revolutionary impulses took them 8 Benghahn, Germany end the oproach of war, pp. 20g Geiss, Fly 104, pp 22,43 1 Vom Bruch, “Krieg und Frieden’, pp 856 % Coetace, Army laue, pp B36 1 nid. p 50; Fischer, War of sins, p. 194 Sc fr example their essays in the Scholgen volume: K. Hildebrand, “Opportunities and limite of German foreign policy inthe Bismarckian ers, 1871~1890:"A system of topape? m Schallgn (ed), Escape it War, po}; A. Hillruber, "The historical siguifcance of the Fist ‘World War: a seminal catastrophe’, in ibid. p 163, % Geis, Der lange Wego de Ksarphe, pp. 8, 207. W. Mommien, Max Web and Geman palitis, 1890-120 (Chicago, 1984) pp. 35-40 % See Fischer, War of lls, pp. 4-7, sf 259-271, 395-625 H.C, Meyer, Mitalarpa in Gren thoght end ation, 15-1045 (The Hag, 1955) % Rorster, Der dpe milena, p, Bo; EXatins, Rie of rig, pREVIEW ARTICLES 740 significantly beyond the political pale of liberalism. Class argued that even a lost war ‘would be welcome, since it would increase ‘the present domestic fragmentation to {the point of] chaos’ allowing ‘a dictator's mighty will to intercede." But even this had a radical pedigree: when day-dreaming about dictatorial power, it was Napolcon who provided the Kaiser with his model” Such historical perspectives are as important at those we gain with hindsight from knowing that one or two Army League members ended up in the NSDAP.* Viewed in this light, Eksteins’s boldly impressionistic argument that the First World War represented a cultural confrontation between @ revolutionary, modernist Germany and a conservative England is (whatever other reservations one may have about it) to be preferred to the old view that the war was caused by a conservative Germany's determination to uphold ‘the dynastic... ideal of the state’ against ‘the modern revolutionary and national democratic principle of self government’. ‘There are, however, two further points of importance, Even if pacifism had shallow roots and social democracy was susceptible to ‘negative integration’, not everyone in Germany was a militaist (or a modernist), eager for an apocalyptic war. In 1906, Biilow had postponed the idea of a preventive war until “a cause arose which would inspire the German people’. One point to emerge from the so-called ‘War Council’ ‘of December 1912 is that all concerned doubted whether the people were prepared for war; and studies of popular (as opposed to educated middle-class) opinion in 1914 suggest that the subsequent attempts to alert ‘the man in the street’ to Germany's interest in the Balkan question achieved lile.*™ Was the German ‘war mentality” as different from the British as Eksteins claims? Or should we be looking for‘ Another Germany’, as Dukes and Remak urge—a Germany whose excellence-pursuing universities, boosting city councils and independent newspaper editors seem to invite ‘comparisons with the war's last combatant, the United States? This comparative dimension will be eturned to below. The second point is that German militarsts were rot much concerned with economics, True, economic expansion was frequently cited 235 justification for armaments, particularly where the navy was concerned. Yet the war-time comment of the Army League member von Strane reflected the tendency of ‘many radical nationalists to despise economic factors: ‘For us it does not matter whether we win or lose a few colonies, or iTour trade balance will be 20 billion ..or 25 % Coetzee, pp- 45-30% Chickering, “Alldeutchen’y p30 © Geis, Jay sot, pp 216; Berghahn, Germany and the apprach of war, p. 4s oetce, omy agus, pp. 1396 °° hates, Ries of ring, p ivi Geiss, Jb 14, p48. 1 See R. Chickering, Inpril Gemay ond rd isdn wer (Princeto Negative Iteration and veslatonter Attias 109-1914 (Frankf, 1973) "Sp, Winten, “Der Krieg in Bilows Kalk: Katattophe der Diplomatie oder Chance der Machtexpsnsion?”, in Daler and Holl, Beat zu Krieg, . 18. "Gel, Der lange Weg in de Retactps, p. 250, "© Compare the evidence in Elateins, pp. 55-05, 195-7, with that in V. Ulich, Hvggllag Hanbrg i rien Welreg (Cologne, 1982), pp. 30-24. "St "Dulkes and Remak, dah Germamy, erp J- Rema, Another Germany’ summing up", pp 207-19, In attempting to portray the Reich as ‘ein Land wi andere auch’, Remak goes uch farther than other recent crits ofthe idea of « German ‘Sindy cf D. Blackboatn and G. ley, The puslarier of Geran soy. Bruges sity ond elit in mincetentay Germany (Oxford, 1988) 1" Berghahn, Gemany and te aproach of war, p. 675 Fischer, "The foreign policy of imperial Germany’, p. 26 1975); D. Grok,742 HISTORICAL JOURNAL billion [ie] What really is a issue i something spiritual and the enemy is England." In contrast to such high-flown appeals, acknowledgements that German military ‘capability was in fact dependent on economie factors were remarkably rare. In one of its frst publications, the General (later Pan-) German League made the point: [We ate} a people of ity million, who dedicate our best strength to military service [and] who ‘pend over half billion every year on defence... Our sseifce of blood and money woul indeed teexceaive i ur lary power enabled us. tosecue ou jut rights only where we receive the sracious asent of the Engl.” ‘Similac, as Bethmann explained to Baroness Spitzemberg:‘In order to build [a feet} a lot of money [is required] which only a rich country can afford, so Germany should become rich’. As has already been noted, Germany did become rich; and many Germans were enthusiastic about their navy and their army. Yet by 1914, her military leaders were so pesimistic about her military capability that they resolved to gamble ‘on a pre-emptive strike by an under-strength army. The Baden National Liberal Edmund Rebmann could dedaim, as he did in February 1913: *We have the weapons, land we are willing to use them"; but there simply were not sufficient weapons or men to be sure of achieving, as he anticipated, “the same thing as in the year 1870". As Schlieffen himself had put it in 1903: ‘We keep on puffing about our high population... ut these masses are not trained and armed to the full extent of those suitable (for military service).""* Why, when the Germans had ‘the people and the ‘money’=and, apparently, militarism too~did they nevertheless ‘lack the deter- ‘mination to place both atthe service ofthe Fatherland." That isthe question which remains to be answered, Mr ‘The ‘new” history is often that of the generation before last; so pethaps itis not surprising that Gregor Schligen is 0 dismissive of the ideas — ‘the primacy of domestic politic’, “social imperialism’, “Bight forward” — favoured by older scholars like Geiss, Berghahin and Webler." Certainly, as has been suggested above, there are numerous qualifications which must now be made to interpretations inspired by Kehr. However, ‘that is not to deny’ that there is sil a kernel of truth in the idea, Why did Germany's land forces appear to be slipping inexorably below the strength which the German general staff regarded as adequate for the task of winning a war against her eastern neighbour? The proportion of national product spent on defence in peacetime is not engraved on stone tablets, in the manner of the ‘externally fixed opportunities and. limitations" of geopolitics (Schollgen’s phrase): itis determined politically. Today, at atime of relative international stability, Britain spends about 49% of GDP on defence; Germany, with her minimal intemational commitments and substantial pacifist lobby, 129%. By contrast, the Soviet Union in recent years may have spent as much as 20% 1 Coctzce, Amy league, p. 116; ef Thomas Mann's Berachanger cies Unplitices (2918), Which portrayed the war as 4 confit between German Kuler and English materials, 1 Forster, Der dpple Miltroma,p. 6 J" Fgeher, “The feign pli of imperial Germany”, p. 2 8 Forster, Der dppele Mittarioms,p. 279 Bid. p. 06. 8 August Keim, quoted in Coetzee, Army lage, p 28. 1G. Schellgen, “Tntedction: the theme reflected in recent German research, idem (ed), Bree its We? pp. 17.REVIEW ARTICLES 743 of gross national product on defence.!!® Only domestic politics can explain why, in 1915/14, ata time of great international tension and domesti-politial bellicosity, the comparable figure for the German Reich was 55% less than the proportions spent by both France and Rusia."* Tn part, the explanation lies in the fundamental ambivalence of the Prussian ‘conservative tradition, The familiar image of Prusia is ofa state with a large military ‘establishment and an efficient fical system to service it. However, when the question ‘arose of whether to expand the German military establishment and the German fiscal system, the Prussian response tended to be hostile. This is the central point which ‘emerges from both Forster's and Kroboth’s work. Historians have, ofcourse, long been familiar with the arguments within the military establishment against expanding the army, characterized as “conservative militarism from above" by Forster. The essential desderatum was, as the former chief ofthe general staff Graf Waldersee put it in 1897, “to keep the army intact’. Put simply, that meant keeping the percentage of officers from aristocratic families at around 60%; and the percentage of NCOs and recruits fiom rural areas at the same level, so as to exclude those “democratic and other ‘lements, unsuitable for the [military] estate’ which von Einem later warned ‘against In this, they could make common cause with Tirpitz and the other advocates of building a Go-ship German batte-fleet. Successive war ministers von GGopsler and von Einem made no bones about accepting the army's subordination to the navy in the defence budget and agreeing to derisory increases in the army's size. However, by December 1912 ~ nearly 20 years since the failure of Caprivi and Verdy’s attempt to introduce universal military service in 1899-3 much had changed within the army, despite the best efforts of the conservatives, To be sure, the proportion of generals who were aristocrats had fallen only slightly, and the senior ranks continued tobe filled with scores of von Balows and von Arnims."¥ But the proportion of all army oficers who were aristocratic had fallen from 65 t0 30%. The change was especially ‘marked in the great general staff (GGS), which by 1913 was 70% non-aristocratic, ‘with some sections, notably the important Railway Section, almost entirely middle class. Here the spirit was technocratic rather than conservative; and the principal concern was with external rather than internal enemies above all, with the threat posed by the French and Russian armies, The most dynamic figure ofthe new military ‘meritocracy’ (Bucholz) was Erich Ludendorff, who in November 1912 stated the case for enforcing universal service in language which harked back to the era of the Wars 18 Figures from The Finzi Times, 8 August 199 14 Estimates of German defence spending in 1919/14 vary ftom Roeder’s 1.164 m. M. to ‘Wite's 2,406 m. M depending onthe method ofeomputation. The figures worthy of consideration sre: S, Andie and J. Veverks, “The growth of government expenditure in Germany since the ‘niiation’, Finxcacin, xm (1964), 189, 203, 263; PxC. Wit, Die Finaneolth dr Detchn Reicks 1g95"13 (Labeck, 1970), pp. 3806; D.E, Schremmer, “Taxation and public Snance: Britain, France and Germany” iP. Mathiss and S. Pollard (ed, The Cambri nomi soy f Ena, vol VID. Th ntl eae: the dnlpmen of eno nd scl fli (Carbide, 980) p. 474i Henticel, Wiruchaft and Wirtchafipai,p. 149} K. Roclr, Die Piancplt der Detzhon Recher i Erin Welly (Beri, 1967), p. 195- So also Statik Jaebuch fer (as Dette Rich (0084), PP: 348-55 ‘3 Forster, Der dopa Milas, 18 Tid. pp. 266, 986, 193, 147 8° Buchoa, Molle, Scien and Pasion wa loming,p. 133 18 See Craig, Plies of the Prin army, pp. 292-8; K. Demeter, Das deiche Ofiiraps in esta and Saat sy0-1095 (Frankfurt, 165); M. Kitchen, The Geman oe srs 199-1914 (Oxford, 1968); U. Trumpener, ‘Junkers and others: the rise of eommoners in the Prussian army, Bpt-ugi4’, Canaan Jornal of History, ¥ (1978), 29-47744 HISTORICAL JOURNAL ‘of Liberation: “We must become the people in arms once again." Ludendorf?'s ‘great ‘memorandum’ of December 1912 called for putting an additional 30% of those eligible through military service (increasing the call-up rate from $2 to 82%, i. tothe French, level), a total increase of 300,000 recruits over two years" To the military conservatives in the war ministry, the radical connotations of Ludendorf's plan were clear. General Wandel retorted bluntly: ‘Ifyou carry on like this with your demands, ‘you wil bring the German people to [the point of] revolution." The war minister himself, Heeringen, explicitly blamed the ‘doubss...about our war strength" which hhad arisen in ‘sections ofthe army” on the ‘agitation of the Army League and the Pan- Germans’. Denouncing Ludendorf's plan as ‘democratization’ of the army, he secured his demotion to a regimental command in Dasseldorf, and drew up an alternative army bill for an increase of just 117,000 troops.” It is important to note that the debate between conservatives and radicals within the army was not just about numbers; it was also about military technology. At issue were questions about the continued utility of the cavalry; the need for improved field arillery; and the need to equip the army with machine guns. Above all, as Bucholz shows, it was their preoceupation with the role of railways which marked out the radicals within the general staff. In 1870 it had taken 27 days to mobilize the Prussian army against France; as late as 1891, German mobilization within the borders ofthe Reich stil took place across five different time-2ones. Bucholz describes with an enthusias’s attention to detail how the general staff devoted itself in the ensuing decades to improving this. Although its work included war gaming, making maps, teaching military history and going on rural ‘rides'"* it was the general staff's responsiblity to devise and perfect the military wansport plan which, he suggests, was crucial. Schlieffen had sketched how Germany might win a ewosront ‘war of Annihilation on the model of Cannae; but it was the technocrats like Groener who had to work out how to get over 2 million men, 600,000 horses and the necessary supplies to the decisive field at the optimal moment. Here it was a knowledge of railway timetables rather than the classics which was required." By the eve of the war, the military transport plan ~ the fifth stage of German mobilization — had been reduced to 1 gizshour exercise, involving 11,000 trains." Yet even with this remarkable achievement of logistics the Germans could not feel satisfied. In addition to Russian ‘numbers and Russian artillery, Russian rallways were an acute source of anxiety in Berlin in 1914.2” Such fears were given wide currency by Groener’s testimony belore 8 Forster, Der dpe Militrioms,p. 251 1 Ritter, The Sood andthe Spine, 209; Flcher, War of liso, pp. Bo Thi. pp. 268 2 Kroboth, Fiaanepolit, pat ** For a discusion of the 1913 Army Bill which concentrates largely on is strategie jostfication, se J. Dukes, “Militari and arms policy, in Dukes and Rema, Another Garman, PP, 9-30 ‘81s fascinating to farm that Hindenburg gained an intimate knowledge of the future ‘teed of Tannenberg on thet ide; and that Walderce insisted on being accompanied on them by his two dackehunda in-a basket? Buchole, Mole, Sisfn and Paion wer flown, PP. 106, 128, 2 40 1s Tha ps a6. In 18go, Walderse advised senior ofcers to fllow the elder Moltke’ example in using the German rallay guide in preference to lrgescale miltary maps, On the Seiten Plan, se G. Ritter, Th Slifn Plan. Cri ofa myth (London, 1958); L. C.F. Turner, "The rifcance ofthe Schlefen Plan’, in Kennedy, War plan, pp. 199-221 Buco, Mold, Sclfenend Prasanna planing, p. $6 See Jagow’s comments in July 1914, quoted in Geis, Jub 1914, p. 123, doe. go; Reale’ ‘quoted in Schmid, "Contradictory portare' p14REVIEW ARTICLES 745 the Reichstag finance committee in April 1919, in which he claimed that Germany had lagged behind both Russia and France in railway construction since 1870." ‘The fact that Groener took his troubles to the Reichstag finance committee i not ‘without significance ‘Double militarism’ there may have been; but the obstacles to an expansion of the army along the lines envisaged by Ludendorif were not confined to the conservatives inthe Prussian war ministry. Because oftheir financial implications, and the complex consticutional questions which these in tuen raised, the general sta's plans touched nerves in the most diverse members of the German body politic. Only by putting together Forster's primarily military study with Kroboth's primarily financial one is it posible to appreciate the full complexity ofthe problem. As has often been noted," the hinge on which everything turned was money. Contemporaries frequently acknowledged this” ‘What use is an army ready for action, a navy prepared for war, ifwe are let down by our finances?” asked the leading authority on the Reich's financial system, Wilhelm Gerloff™ Yet shortage of funds by itself is no explanation, As has been suggested above, the German economy was generating ample income and wealth. In theory, the Reich could have responded to the Rusian challenge by increasing taxation; by inereasing borrowing; or by reducing civil expenditures. Why did i fail to do so? ‘The obstacles toa bigger defence budget existed at four levels. Firstly, there were those stemming from the Reich's peculiar federal structure. As has long been recognized, Bismarck’s attempt, in devising the Reich constitution, to stick more tothe league of states (Statenbund) [model] while in practice giving it the character of a federal state (Bundestat)"™? left the Reich significantly smaller than the sum of its parts, particularly in financial terms. The states retained control in many spheres of ‘government activity ~ education, police, public health, tax collection; while at the same time establishing an effective monopoly on direct taxation; and attempts by Bismarck to shift the balance in favour of the Reich were constantly frustrated." Indeed, in some years there were net transfers from the Reich tothe states ~ averaging 4350 million M per annum in the 1890s. ‘Thus, while the states (and the local ‘communes) were able to modernize ther fiscal systems by introducing income taxes* "3 Buchole, Motz, Shligfen ond Pasian war lang, pp. 306t 19 See eg. V.Berghahs, Germany andthe oprochof ar. 7 "As Alber Ballin puri in 1g: "We jut cannot alford a race in dreadnought again the ‘much wealthier British ibid. p. 78 By 1909, the Kaiser oo acepted that under the inexorable constraints ofthe tights of fads. justified demands ofthe Front” had tobe ft unfuliled Ibid. p. 83. Even Moltke saw the problem, commenting in December 1gia: "Our enemies are farming more vigorously than we, beeause we are strapped fr cash": Forwer, Der dipale ‘Miliarioms, p53; 2 Riter, The Surd andthe Sepa, n, 220. oncally, Moltke tied to justify war asa deliverance from the great armaments [and] fom the financial burden they entailed "2H Kroboth, Fanpali, p88 1" L Gall, Bimare, The while rolutionary (London, 1986), 1 307 298 Soe J von Kruedener, “The Franckenstein paradox in the intergovernmentlfical relations ofimperial Germany, in PC. Wit, Wel and Usain in OmialEarpe. he bis and ily of public fone (Leamington Spa, 1987), pp. 111-235 Wit, Fiancolit, pas, F.Terhalle "Geschichte des deutichen Finanawirschaft vom Beginn des 19. Jabrhundert bis zum Schlus des aeiten Welkrieges', i W. Geral and F- Newmark (el), Hondach der Fnanasirmschat (Tabingen, 1952)", pp. 274-80. B'By 913, the sates depended on income tax for berween 40 and 75% of their revenue: Sehremmer, “Taxation and public mance. Britain, France and Germany pp 489. The communes, which accounted for around 40% of woul public expenditure by 193 alto relied746 HISTORICAL JOURNAL ‘the Reich in the 1890s remained almost entirely dependent (for 9o% ofits revenue) on the old taxes on consumption and imports. As Bilow put it, echoing Bismarck, it remained ‘a poor traveller, stubbornly knocking on the doors ofthe individual states, 1 wholly unwelcome guest in search of subsistence’. An additional point, often neglected, is that the states ~and, indeed, the communes ~ were in competition with the Reich on the capital market, When the Reich sought to cover increased expenditure by issuing bonds, it was entering an already crowded market for public debt. In 1890, the total Reich debt stood at 1,318 million M, only slightly more than that of the communes (1,057 million M). The combined’ debt of the states was 19,230 m. M — around two-thirds of it Prussian. The second problem was the growth ‘of spending by other departments. In part, this reflected a generalised tendency in the industrialised states rom the late nineteenth century onwards as the cost of defence, ‘administration and social welfare rose: ‘the law of growing state expenditure’, as Wagner called it. But in the Reich's ease, persistent deficits and rising expenditure ‘owed much to its peculiar administrative structure. As Witt's seminal study showed, the Reich Treasury Office was ill-equipped to control German finances: it had just 55, officials (in 1880) t was responsible for only go % of total public spending; and it had limited authority over the defence departments. The third ~ and fo historians most controversial - problem of Reich finance was the role of parliamentary institutions, particularly the Reichstag." Its true, as Witt has argued that the Reichstag’s control lover the budget was limited, But that is not to say that the Reichstag could not (or dared not) significantly amend government finance bills: it did, and the most that the ‘executive ever did in reply was to call a general election (asin December 1906).!° In practice, ifthe government wished to spend more on defence - or on its civil functions he Reichstag’s approval was needed for both the expenditure and, i it exceeded existing revenues, the means of financing it Increasingly on income tax: by 1910, 52% of Prussian local government revenue came from rurcharger on the state income tax: V.Hentichel, "German economic and socal policy, 1815-1990 in Mathias and Polar, The Cambridge cosmic Rit of Ere, i, 1636 18 Kroboth, Finonepolii, p29, 1% Figures tom Keoboth, Finacial, pp. 48gf. C6 H, Stuebel, Des Vrs ihe Saat and Bonen anf dem Geb det reich Aas eon 181 is 1913 (Bet, 1995. "WA, Wagner, Gnndlgung dr olicke Oetoromie (Leipeg, +893), p. 895; H. Timm, “Das GGesets der wacheenden Stattzauigaben’ in Fiancee, new seis, Xxt (296), 20¢-47% Andie and Veveria, "The grow of government expenditure’ passim. A maximum estimate for the ‘ublic sector's share of NNP ~ including revenue from publicsector enterprises, public borrowing {and the socal insurance sytem = shows it rising fom 138% in 18go to BB% in 1913: Henschel, Winch p48 cf. PC. Wit, “Finanspolitik und sozlaler Wandel. Wachstm und Funktonwandel der Staatsaugaben in Deutschland 187-1935", in H.-U. Wehler (ed), Sevalgeshiche Hee. Fest far Hos Rosenberg (Gottingen, 1974), BP. 85°74 "Wi, Finaneplist pp. 17-38; idem, "Reiehsinanzen und Rastungspoltik in H. Schotelie land W, Deist ed), Marine und Merial im Iaiuoichn Deieond 171-1914 (Diseldor, 198), pp. 48-77 19 "There remains a profound division berween those, lke Wehler and Wit, who see the [Reihstag’s power over nance as extremely limited ~ part ofthe Reich's ‘sham conaitutonaism™ ‘and these, notably Raub, who argue fr a gradual process of paliamentarzation before 19¢4 Webler, Geman pie, pp. §2-55, 72-84; P-C. With “Innenpoiik und Imperialism in der Vorgeschichte der Enten ‘Weltkiege', in K.Holl and G.List (eds), Libraimas end inperatsichr ‘Stet (Govingen, 1995); M. Rau, Realimas and Parlanetrismas in leech Rach (Deseldor, 1972): idem, Di\Parlamentarsieung sks Darke Reicher (Daseldor 1977). ©... Croers, Goman dion of 1go7 (New Vork, 1941)REVIEW ARTICLES 147 ‘The fourth and final obstacle o increased defence spending lay in the composition, ofthe Reichstag, the most democratic of imperial Germany's representative assemblies Designed to weaken liberalism, the franchise also benefited the parties of politcal catholicism and socialism; and these increasingly made their political capital by criticising Reich finance policy, whether by demanding special teatment for south German peasants and small businessmen, or criticizing the regressive taxation of ‘working-class consumers." Bismarck and his successors were ingenious in devising strategies to weaken these ‘anti-Reich’ parties and strengthen the more ‘state- supporting’ conservative and National Liberal parties. But the common factor linking the construction of the navy and the acquisition of colonies ~ supposed “national acts’ Which would awaken patriotic feelings and reduce economic discontent with more direct electoral bribes like tariffs, wax rebates and social insurance, was that they transformed the Reich’s latent financial weakness into a fully-blown erisis. What the architects of Sanmlnrpolitik had failed to foresee was that debates on increased expenditure simply underlined the Centre Party’s pivotal position in the Reichstag and lent credibility to Social Democratic attacks on dear bread and militarism; while the financial options ~inereased Reich borrowing, the introduction of Reich direct taxation, oF simple cuts in spending ~tended to divide rather than unite the “government” parties. These are all points which emerge clearly from Kroboth's account of the last stages of the financial crisis’ under Bethmann Hollweg; though it should be said that, in a ‘numberof important respects, Kroboth's work represents only alimited advance on the ‘work of Witt!" Although he acknowledges the influence of the important post-Kehrite ‘writers like Hentschel and Raub, he nevertheless remains firmly rooted in the Kehrite ‘world, in which party-political postions are primarily to be understood as functions of economic interest." In reality, as is clear from his own descriptions of the contemporary parliamentary and press debates, the battlestines were far les clearly- drawn, Economic interests cut across party lines, and coalitions based on them tended to vary from isue to issue —so that, for example, many of those business groups (e.g the Bdl) which favoured a direct tax in 1912 denounced the finished product a5 excessively progressive in 1913, More importantly, this was also a debate about constitutional ideas between particularists and advocates of a more centralized Reich; and between defenders of royal prerogatives and proponents of increased parliamentary power. In this debate, economic interests were often exaggerated to 11 Os the Centre's increasingly millindic polities tone, see D. Blackbourn, Gls, lige nd lac pats in Wibelnine Germany. The Cnr party in Wartenberg bf 1914 (New Haven snd ‘London, 1980). Henschel estimates thatthe indirect ax burden fl from 5% on incomes of ess ‘han Joo M to just 1 Yon those over 10,000 ME. Tarif alone cot the average family 1-1°5% of annual income! Wuehf! and Wirral, pp 202 For the debate on the effectiveness of Sommagfaliit (Which cleanly existed a6 a government strategy), see esp. D Stegmann, Die Biden Bismark, Parien and Verbinde in de ‘Spulpave des wiblmnichen Deaihlandr Semmiagrtitit, 18971978 (Cologne, 1970): and the tetique by G. Ely, "Samluniplist, soil imperialism and the German navy lw of 188", ‘Milaegeschichche Minaangen, 6 (1974), 29-63. 10 Unlike Wit, he was unable to mae us ofthe important archives in what was, a the time be undertook his rerearch, sll the GDR. ‘O'Thus he sees the parliamentary confices over financial reform as being between industrial-tiberal” interests and “agraian-conservatives': Kroboth, Piamzflit, pp. 99, 195. ayo, These are then implicitly equated with tbe conflicting "protagonists of a eaesitutonal ‘modernisation appropriate wo the [extent ofsocal] change’ and ‘the exponents ofthe pola! and social status quo" ibid. p. 284