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CHARLES R.

WEBER COMPANY TANKER

REPORT
2005

Freight Rates and the Price of


Oil Part Company

MAY 2005

may05
ESSENTIAL READING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL OIL TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY

IN THIS REPORT

01:1-2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WILL TANKER SHIPPING TAKE OFF IN 2005?

02:3-6
WORLD OIL MARKET
CRUDE OIL DEMAND - FORCAST FOR 2005 STRENGTHENS
AGAIN + OPECS MICRO MANAGEMENT DOES NOTHING
FOR MARKET CONFIDENCE + INSUFFICIENT CRUDE OIL
PRODUCTION CAPACITY + LONG TERM UNDERINVESTMENT IN THE REFINERY INDUSTRY

03:7-9
TANKER MARKET
THE LINK BETWEEN CRUDE OIL PRICES AND TANKER
FREIGHT RATES BREAKS IN 1Q05 + FREIGHT RATE
WEAKNESS + INVESTOR REACTION TO TANKER MARKET
PERFORMANCE

04:10-13
PROSPECTS FOR TANKER FREIGHT RATES 2005
TANKER STOCKS HOLDING UP + CRUDE OIL DEMAND
GROWTH + CONTINUED LONG HAUL TRADE GROWTH

05:14-16
VESSEL SECTORS
TANKER MARKET REVIEW + THE RANKINGS +

06:17-20
VLCC FLEET
THE ACTUAL TRADING VLCC FLEET BASIS MAY 2005

Issue 02
Weber TANKER Report
Charles R. Weber Company Inc. Tanker Report is
published four times a year. It reviews important topics within the tanker shipping industry and tanker sectors that are of particular interest. It focuses on
changes in tanker trading patterns and changes in
fleet supply and demand.
SOURCES:
Charles R. Weber Research, International Energy
Agency, Energy Information Agency, Lloyds Maritime
Information Unit, Baltic Exchange, Global Trade
Information Services.

EDITORIAL BOARD
Basil G. Mavroleon - Managing Director
Dan ODonnell - Director
CONTACT DETAILS
Johnny M. Kulukundis
Charles R. Weber Company Inc.
Greenwich Office Park One
Greenwich, Conneccticut, 06831, USA
voice:+1 203 629 2300
fax:+1 203 629 9103
e-mail:jmk@crweber.com
web: www.crweber.com

DISCLAIMER
Whilst every care has been taken in the production of this study, no liability can be accepted for
any loss incurred in any way whatsoever by any
person who may seek to rely on the information
contained herin. The information in this report
may not be reproduced without he express written permission of the Charles R. Weber Comapny,
Inc.
COPYRIGHT
2005 Charles R. Weber Company, Inc.

>>THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THERE HAS BEEN GROWING CONCERN THAT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY WILL

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:01

Will Tanker Shipping Take Off in 2005?


The disappointing feature for tanker owners during 1Q05
was that while crude oil prices remained close to levels
seen at the end of 2004, tanker spot earnings fell by around
75% from peak levels in mid November 2004. However, it
should be pointed out that leading publicly quoted tanker
owners still posted encouraging results for 1Q05 with net
income up an average of 48% compared to 1Q04 for OSG,
OMI, Genmar and Teekay (see section 3 for more details of
tanker company results). All be it a carry over from the a
very firm fourth quarter of 2004 as discussed in our last
quarterly report.
The VLCC market illustrates this demise with average spot
earnings for a modern vessel at around $50,000pd at the
end of April compared to a peak of $221,455pd in the week
ending 12th November 2004.
The Link Between Tanker Earnings and Crude Oil
Prices Breaks in 1Q05

Firstly, the pace of tanker fleet expansion (up +6.2% in


2004) was unabated at the start of the year with a net
increase of 7.4MnDwt (+2.2%) for first quarter 2005. Tanker
deliveries were particularly strong with 9MnDwt added,
while tanker scrapping remains low, but is starting to creep
up.
Secondly, high oil prices were finally translated in higher
bunker prices at the start of the year, which significantly
increased tanker voyage costs and helped drag tanker
earnings lower. It is estimated that bunker prices have risen
by 50% since the start of the year.

However, the continuing strength of tanker demand


suggests that the freight market has overshot.
60

250,000

Tanker demand as measured by crude oil production was


up 1.5Mnbd YOY in 1Q05 - despite falling slightly to
83.8Mnbd from peak levels of 84.2Mnbd in 4Q04.

55

VLCC Average Spot


Earnings

50

West Texas
Intermediate

Therefore, the sluggish start to the year does not necessarily give rise to concerns for tanker freight rate prospects for
the remainder of the year.

45

$day

150,000

40
100,000

$Bbl

200,000

The weakness of tanker freight rates during 1Q05 can


be explained by two major factors.

35

Crude oil demand forecasts for 2005 strengthen again


30
50,000

Figure 2 shows the world crude oil supply/demand balance


(source International Energy Agency, IEA) for 2003 and
2004, as well as the IEA's demand forecast for 2005.

25

0
04/01/2002

20
10/01/2003

16/01/2004

21/01/2005

figure 2

IEA World Oil Supply/Demand Balance 2003-05

figure1

87
85
Mnbd

Figure 1 shows that there has been a reasonable correlation between crude oil prices and
tanker earnings for the three year period up to
the start of this year, but that this link was well
and truly broken during 1Q05.

83
81
79
77

1Q03 2Q03 3Q03 4Q03 1Q04 2Q04 3Q04 4Q04 1Q05 2Q05 3Q05 4Q05
79.2

78.4

79.4

81.7

82.3

82.4 83.2

84.2 83.8

Demand 80.4

77.3

79.4

82.1

82.5

81.1 81.9

84.5 84.6

Supply

82.7

83.7

86.1

BE UNABLE TO KEEP PACE WITH DEMAND. ONE OF THE PRIMARY WORRIES HAS BEEN THE LACK OF
1

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:01

While demand is not expected to reach growth levels of


2004 the demand forecasts for 2005 have been revised up.
This latest forecasts from the IEA are up from their
December 2004 numbers and are now more in-line with
other forecasting organizations that are also estimating
increased growth.
Tanker freight rate prospects for the remainder of 2005

The strength of the shipping market at the end of last year


occurred despite a 6.2% increase in the supply of tanker
tonnage. In 2004, supply negatives were overpowered
by a combination of surging world oil demand and a
shift to an increased dependence on longer haul trades.
At the start of 2005, crude oil demand has continued to
strengthen (+2.6% yoy). However, the improvement in
crude oil supply during 1Q05 has been less impressive
(+1.7% yoy), while tanker supply growth has continued to
forge ahead (+2.2%).

growth predicted by the IMF), and if Chinese crude oil


imports (and to a lesser extent imports to India and the
United States) continue to expand strongly, then
supply/demand tightness in the market will persist and there
will be every chance of significant tanker freight rate spikes
later in the year.

These spikes may be triggered by downstream bottlenecks,


geopolitical tension; nervousness in the market caused by
the actions of OPEC or increased concern about spare
crude oil production capacity. The supply/demand balance
is so tight that even small events may have major consequences. However, the expected tanker freight rate spikes
are unlikely to be as spectacular as in 2004 - unless
Chinese crude oil imports increase at a faster rate than currently forecast. Even if this happens, a lack of storage and
refinining capacity availability in the short term will serve to
somewhat cap these spikes.

Fleet growth and high voyage costs will continue to act


as a drag on tanker earnings in 2005, but freight rate
spikes are probable during 2H05

High crude oil prices represent the biggest risk for a recovery in tanker rates in 2005 for two reasons. Firstly, if crude
oil prices remain high, then bunker prices (a major component of tanker voyage costs) will also remain high and
tanker earnings will be depressed.
Secondly, the damaging impact of high crude oil prices on
tanker profitability is being repeated across many other
industries. Consequently, worldwide economic prosperity is
being put at risk - as stressed in April by the IMF in its twice
yearly assessment of global economic prospects. A prolonged period of high oil prices cannot be sustained, and will
eventually cause crude oil demand to falter.

Rapid tanker supply growth, which is set to continue in


2005, is nothing new. However, the fleet is expanding much
faster (est. +6.0% 2005) than crude oil demand (est. +2.1%
2005). Therefore, unless tanker long haul trades expand
faster than short haul trade - boosting tanker tonmile
demand - then the upside potential for tanker freight rates
will be restricted. China - with its reliance on long haul crude
oil imports - remains crucial to the fortunes of the tanker
market.

However, if crude oil prices can be maintained at "reasonable" levels (and the world economy achieves the "solid"

SPARE PRODUCTION CAPACITY, GLOBAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY CLAIMS ARE NO LONGER BEING
2

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT WORLD OIL MARKET:02

(1) Prospects for the World Oil Market in 2005

China Crude Oil Imports


13000

Crude Oil Demand - Forecast for 2005 strengthens


again

12000

Although not expected to match the bumper crude oil


demand growth seen in 2004 (+2.72 Mnbd, +3.4%),
demand forecasts for 2005 have been revised up to 1.77
Mnbd (+2.1%) (source International Energy Agency, IEA).

10000

11000

'000bd

9000
8000
7000

This latest forecast for 2005 represents a 0.39Mnbd


increase compared to the IEA's forecast in December 2004,
and brings the organisation into line with other forecasting
organizations that are also estimating growth of around
2Mnbd. The US Government's Energy Information Agency
(EIA) is predicting average crude oil demand growth of
2.2Mnbd for 2005 and 2006.

6000
5000

2004/5
2003/4

4000

2002/3
3000
10

11

12

Months

The positive outlook for crude oil demand growth is underpinned by positive world economic indicators. Chinese
strength is central to this positive outlook, and its economic
performance remains robust. Figure 3 shows that the value
of Chinese imports and exports is continuing to run along at
record levels at the start of 2005.

70,000

70,000

60,000

60,000

50,000

50,000

40,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

05

30,000

20,000

05

04
03

10,000

04
10,000

03

02

11

11

Months

It is important to remember that despite all the attention,


China remains an unknown quantity. At the start of 2004,
most commentators were not expecting crude oil imports to
break 100MnTons.

02
0

0
1

Despite the slow start to the year, some forecasters continue to expect significant Chinese crude oil import growth in
2005 and 2006, albeit at a slower rate than in 2004 (source:
EIA). They point to the government initiative to build a
strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) as an important factor
underpinning crude oil demand in 2005 and beyond.
Though progress with this (SPR) projects is reportedly not
moving as fast had been previously hoped for.

China Exports

$ Million

$ Million

China Imports

figure 4

Year

Crude Oil Imports


(MnTons)

2002
2003
2004
2005e
2006e

69.4
91.1
122.8
139.1
155.4

Months

figure 3
Nevertheless, some commentators argue that there is considerable economic risk in the Chinese economy despite
seemingly strong growth. The slow down in Chinese crude
oil imports at the start of the year (see figure 4) perhaps
points to some fragility with imports for 1Q05 (29.6MnTons)
still lower than the corresponding period in 2004
(30.1MnTons).

% Chg Yoy

31.2%
34.8%
13.3%
11.7%

China may seem to be bathed in the light of a bright


new dawn, but it is struggling to fashion its peculiar
brand of capitalism inside a communist straight jacket.

TAKEN AT FACE VALUE, AS THEY HAD BEEN IN THE PAST. AT THE END OF 2004, SAUDI ARABIA
3

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT WORLD OIL MARKET:02

Crude Oil Supply - OPEC's micro management does nothing for market confidence at
the start of 2005
OPEC's successive production cuts in September 2003 (0.9Mnbd) and February 2004 (-1Mnbd) contributed to the
surge in oil prices during 2004 because OPEC was cutting
crude oil supply just as world crude oil demand was starting
to take off.

Three subsequent production increases in 2004 (7/04


+2Mnbd, 8/04 +0.5Mnbd, 9/04 +1Mnbd) were a belated
attempt to force crude oil supply to catch up with demand,
and were insufficient to prevent crude oil prices reaching
record levels (West Texas Intermediate $55.23 bbl on
25.10.04).

By the end of the year, crude oil prices were finally starting
to respond to increased crude oil production (by both OPEC
and non-OPEC producers). However, OPEC likes to be
proactive and - anticipating a 2Q05 seasonal lull in demand
- elected to introduce an "unofficial"* quota reduction in
early December 2004 (-1Mnbd). This cut was an important
catalyst in a renewed surge in crude oil prices, which had
fallen to around $41bbl (WTI) just before the quota cut was
announced.
* "unofficial" quota because it didn't apply to all OPEC members
By mid March, crude oil prices had reached new record levels (West Texas Intermediate $56.47 bbl on 16.03.05). At
this point, OPEC - although still concerned about a 2Q05
seasonal lull in demand - was forced to introduce a counter
seasonal increase in quota levels (+0.5Mnbd, 27.5Mnbd**)
in order to try to control the upward spiral of oil prices.
** a further 0.5Mnbd is available if oil prices fail to respond
to higher production levels.

figure 5

OPEC Quota Changes 2004-5

27

60
West Texas
Intermediate (right
axis)

26
Mnbd

55

OPEC 132
15.9.04 Quota
27Mnbd
(+1.0Mnbd)

50

25
OPEC 133
10.12.04
"Unofficial"
Quota 26Mnbd ( 1.0Mnbd)

24
23

OPEC 129
10.2.04 Quota
23.5Mnbd ( 1.0Mnbd)

22
1/04

4/04

45

OPEC 135
16.3.05 Quota
27.5Mnbd
(+1.5Mnbd)

40

OPEC 131
3.6.04 Quota
25.5Mnbd
(+2.0Mnbd)
rising to 26Mnbd
in August

35

West Texas Intermediate $Bbl

28

30
7/04

OPEC Production Quota ex Iraq

10/04

1/05

4/05

Actual OPEC Production ex NGLs & Iraq

INCREASED PRODUCTION TO 9.3 MNBD. WHEN OPEC PRODUCTION PEAKED IN OCTOBER 2004, THE
4

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT WORLD OIL MARKET:02

Its proactive policy of production cuts to head off crude


oil price falls ahead of an anticipated seasonal lull in
demand had failed, and was replaced just three months
later (and before the start of the seasonal lull) by a reactive policy of production increases to try to reign in run
away crude oil prices.

Total OECD Industry Product Stocks


1500
2004/5
1450

2003/4
2002/3

1400
MnTons

It seems that OPEC's attempt to micro-manage the crude oil


price by its frequent quota adjustment has not helped to create a stable, transparent crude oil market. Indeed OPEC despite its protestations that health of the world economy is
its primary consideration - injected further confusion into an
already uncertain environment when it failed to provide a
replacement system for its "target $22-28 price band" which
it formally abandoned at its January 2005 "extraordinary"
meeting.

1350

1300

1250

1200
10

Of course, OPEC is only partly responsible for creating


the environment that has proved so conducive to high
prices. As OPEC points out there are a number of factors
at work that help explain the current era of high prices.

OPEC argues that far from crude oil supply failing to keep
up with demand, the market is in fact well supplied with
crude oil, and points to improved OECD crude oil and product stock levels (see following charts) as evidence for this.

(i)
(ii)

940

(vi)
920

MnTons

900

880

It contends that the oil prices have become inflated by a


combination of psychological, short term and "outside" factors rather than structural weaknesses in the market. These
factors include:

(iv)
(v)

960

12

Months

(iii)

Total OECD Industry Crude Oil Stocks

11

Late winter northern hemisphere cold snap


Expectation/concern of higher than expected crude
oil demand paralleling events in 2004
Concern that there is insufficient spare produc
tion capacity to deal with a crude demand surge
or local production hiatus
Geopolitical tensions (Iran, Iraq, and Nigeria etc.)
Speculators - defined as non-commercials such as
hedge funds and more recently pension and index
funds that are active in the futures market
Long term underinvestment in the refinery
industry that has created a fragile infrastructure
prone to frequent downstream bottlenecks and
unable to deal with the increase in world crude
oil demand

All of the above are important factors underpinning high


crude oil prices. The following section will investigate some
of these factors in more detail.

860

840
2004/5
2003/4
820

2002/3

Insufficient Crude Oil Production Capacity

800
10

11

12

Months

There is no doubt that there has been growing concern that


crude oil supply will be unable to keep pace with demand.
One of the primary worries has been the lack of spare production capacity. Rather like the recent imperative to revaluate worldwide crude oil reserves following misreporting of
its reserves by Shell, production capacity claims are no
longer being taken at face value.

IEA CALCULATED THAT THE INDUSTRY WAS CLOSE TO ITS PHYSICAL MAXIMUM
5

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT TANKER MARKET:03

At the end 2004, Saudi Arabia increased its production to


9.3Mnbd from 8.25Mnbd at the start of the year. When
OPEC production peaked in October 2004, the IEA calculated that the industry was close to its physical maximum
with OPEC having as little as 1Mnbd of spare production
capacity.
Since then OPEC has taken positive steps to salve market
concerns. It announced in early March 2005 that it had
increased spare production capacity to 2Mnbd, and that this
figure would exceed 3Mnbd by the end of 2005. Not all commentators believe that this is a realistic forecast.
International oil companies have also increased their investment activities. This is illustrated by the figure below, which
shows that rig employment levels remain high (source:
Baker Hughes). However, there are concerns as to whether
the quality of the additional production capacity will be high
enough to meet market requirements.
figure 7
The downward revision in forecast non-OPEC crude oil supply growth in 2005 has compounded the concerns surrounding the lack of spare production capacity. The IEA
World Rig Count

2700

vestment over many years has created an industry that is in


part ageing and unreliable - prone to outages and often
lacking the flexibility to process heavy/sour crudes. With the
industry so stretched even minor outages/bottlenecks can
have a magnified impact.
New refinery plant is coming on stream (see table below).
The United States and China will add a combined 1.1Mnbd
of new capacity in 2005. However, concern about the lack of
refinery capacity persists with the expectation of dislocations between the crude oil and crude oil product market.
New and Expansion Refining Capacity Scheduled to
Come on Stream in 2005 (source: Oil & Gas Journal)
Country

New Capacity
'000 Bbls/day

United States
China
Indonesia
Angola
Greece
India
Colombia
Abu Dhabi
Bangladesh
Croatia
Canada
Other

665*
478
247
200
199
176
162
77
74
62
53
363

Total

2756

Number of Rigs

2500

2300

2100

1900
2004/5
2003/4

1700

2002/3
1500
10

11

12

Months

downgraded its 1Q05 estimate for Non-OPEC crude oil supply from 51.3Mnbd (December 2004) to 50.3Mnbd (April
2005). Although some of the lost output has been transferred to the end of the year, the downward revision on NonOPEC supply will mean that more is expected of OPEC in
its role of swing producer.
Long term Underinvestment in the Refinery Industry
There has been widespread concern voiced about the
shortage of new refinery capacity coming on stream (especially conversion capacity). Low profitability and underin-

* There is some debate that the estimate for additional


United States refinery capacity is too high. The W.S.J. quoted PIRA on May 24th as saying that global refinery capacity grew by only 700,000 b/d in 2003 & 2004. Barnes & Click
state that since 1993, despite the number of U.S. operating
refineries falling by 30 to 145, the industry added 1.62 million b/d of operable capacity, an aggregate expansion of
10.7% or the equivalent of 8 new world-scale refineries,
despite zero new refinery construction. They site two explanations: A constant trickle of major capital projects which
collectively add capacity such as the following in ,000 b/d:
Valero (Premcor) Port Arthur TX
Valero (Orion)
Good Hope LA
Murphy
Meraux LA
MarathonAshland Detroit MI
Holly
Artesia NM
Valero
Texas City
Totals

Before
255
155
100
74
58
165
807

After
325
230
125
100
75
243
1,098

Their other theory is capacity creep, where refiners increase


capacity not with capital but through better utilisation of
existing iron and use of technology. They site EIA figures
for 2003 as reporting an increase of capacity of 275,000 b/d.
One would expect that the high gross margins presently
being experienced by refiners will induce them to continue
to squeeze more from less....

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6

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT TANKER MARKET:03

Why tanker freight rates shadowed crude oil price


movements in 2004

(2) Tanker Market Performance in 1Q05


The Link between crude oil prices and tanker freight
rates broken 1Q05
Figure 8 shows that there was a reasonable positive linear
correlation between crude oil prices and tanker earnings for
the three year period up to the start of this year, but that this
link was well and truly broken during 1Q05.
VLCC average spot earnings fell to around $50,000pd at
the end of April 2005 compared to a peak of $221,455pd in
the week ending 12th November 2004, while crude oil
prices have held on to the record levels achieved during
4Q04
By contrast, figure 9 reveals that the equivalent positive linear correlation between Capesize dry bulk freight rates and
world steel prices remains intact - although there are signs
that by the end of April/early May that dry bulk rates are also
starting to slide.
The Link Between Tanker Earnings and Crude Oil
Prices Breaks in 1Q05
250,000

55

VLCC Average Spot


Earnings

The divergence between tanker rates and crude oil prices


looks dramatic and unusual. However, by focusing on the
annual cycle of tanker freight rates (see figure 10), the path
of tanker freight rates during 1Q05 looks to be following a
familiar path - closely paralleling earnings at the start of
each of the last two years.

50

West Texas
Intermediate

$day

40
100,000

$Bbl

45

150,000

The link between crude oil prices and tanker freight rates
can be broken as a result of structural changes to the supply/demand balance e.g. significant tanker fleet additions,
as well as short term factors such as local disruption to
crude oil supply (although this may also have the effect of
boosting rates as the tanker fleet is required to reposition),
or even psychological factors.
Explaining the divergence between crude oil prices and
tanker freight rates in 1Q05

60

200,000

The relationship between commodity prices and freight


rates is indirect. In 2004, crude oil prices surged partly
because of wild card events like the hurricanes in the
USGulf, but mainly because unexpectedly strong crude oil
demand (underpinned by Chinese economic expansion) ran
ahead of crude oil supply. Crude oil producers pulled out the
stops to try and increase the supply of crude oil and this
intensified the tanker fleet workload with the result that
there was a (lagged) improvement in tanker freight rates
starting in May 2004.

Tanker Earnings Following the Same Routine?

35

250,000
30
50,000

2005

25

200,000
0
04/01/2002

2004
2003

20
10/01/2003

16/01/2004

21/01/2005

$day

150,000

Still Connected - World Steel Price


and Capesize Spot Rates

100,000

720
670
Hot Rolled Coil Transaction Price (Av.
EU, Asia, USA) Source: MEPS

50,000

34

420

19

370
14
320
9

270
220
Jan-98

4
Jan-99

Jan-00

Jan-01

Jan-02

Jan-03

Jan-04

Jan-05

12

11

10

1
24

$Tonne

$Tonne

470

29

520

Tubarao-Beilun/Baoshan 150KDwct

570

39

620

Months

figure 10
In light of the above chart, could it be that crude oil prices
are artificially inflated, while tanker freight rates are
responding to normal supply/demand factors? Alternatively,
in the context of steadily increasing worldwide crude oil
demand (+3.4% in 2004, +2.1%e in 2005), could it be that
tanker rates are artificially low?

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7

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT TANKER MARKET:03

This section of the report will try to find where the balance
lies.

The weakness of tanker freight rates during 1Q05 is due


to a number of factors.

As discussed earlier in section 1, there are a number of


factors - structural, short term and psychological - that
collectively explain the current era of very high crude
oil prices. Section 1 highlights nervousness in the crude oil
market that has skewed the normal supply/demand balance
and helped underpin high oil prices. This nervousness has
been generated by concerns - both real and perceived relating to potential crude oil supply shortages, the viability
of spare crude oil production capacity, the potential for a
crude oil demand surge like that in 2004, the role of speculators and underinvestment in the refinery industry.

(1) Continued Strong Fleet Expansion - +2.2% in 1Q05

10500

50

10000

45

9500

40

9000

35

8500

30

340

335

330

325

-1

320

MnDwt

345

-2

11000

55

315
4

Deliveries

10 11 12
Deletions

Fleet

figure 12

Index

$Bbl

60

Dow Jones & Oil Price


Consolidate 2004 Gains During 1Q05

Tanker Fleet Expands by 2.2% in 1Q05

MnDwt

However, section 1 also points out that although factors are


at work to artificially boost price, the fundamental cause of
high oil prices is supply/demand tightness. Crude oil
demand in 2004 (+3.4%) increased faster than in 2002
(+0.7%) and 2003 (+2.4%) and as a result crude oil production has been pushed to its limits. The tightness in the market has been exacerbated by OPEC's clumsy attempts to
micro manage oil prices, and downstream bottlenecks.

Figure 12 shows that the pace of tanker fleet expansion (up


+6.2% in 2004) was unabated at the start of the year with a
net increase of 7.4MnDwt (+2.2%). Tanker deliveries were
particularly strong with 9MnDwt added, while tanker scrapping remains low, but is starting to creep up.

8000
West Texas
Intermediate

25

20
04/01/2002

Dow Jones

7500

7000
10/01/2003

16/01/2004

21/01/2005

figure 11
For another perspective, it is worth comparing the performance of oil prices with the Dow Jones (see figure 11). This
reveals that crude oil prices gains (prices have roughly doubled over the last two years) are well in excess of those
made by a resurgent stock market, which has increased in
value by around one third over the same period.

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8

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT TANKER MARKET:03

(2) High Bunker Prices

How Investors have reacted to the performance of the


tanker market in 1Q05

High crude oil prices have taken some time to translate into
higher bunker prices. However, figure 13 demonstrates that
from the beginning of the year to the end of April, bunkers
have risen by close to 50% e.g. Singapore 380 cst has
climbed from $159Ton to $284.5Ton over this period.
Without wishing to overstate the importance of bunker
prices, this sharp escalation of a key tanker voyage costs
has acted to depress tanker spot earnings during 1Q05.
Bunkers Dent Tanker Earnings at the Start of 2005
300
280
200,000

VLCC Average Spot


Earnings

260

Bunkers Singapore
380 cst

240

200

$Ton

220

$day

150,000

180

100,000

Tanker secondhand sales were very buoyant up until


November 2004 when sales activity peaked at 6.3MnDwt.
However, with 5 year vessels becoming more expensive
than newbuilds by the end of the 2004, investor secondhand activity has tailed off considerably - averaging
1.8MnDwt for the period December 2004 to March 2005.
figure 15
Investor Interest Slows as Prices
Continue to Spiral

160
50,000

140

10/01/2003

16/01/2004

100

21/01/2005

figure 13
Bunkers Catch up Oil Price Gains
60

300
280
260
240

West Texas
Intermediate

90
80
70
4

40

180

Orders

160
30
140
25

100

6
Sales

10 11 12

VLCC NB Price

VLCC 5Yr Price

At the end of May, it is estimated that a VLCC newbuilding


will cost $126 mill, while a 5 year old VLCC is $120 mill. A
Suezmax newbuilding $78 mill vs $75 for 5 year old and a
newbuilding Aframax $65 mill vs $64 for 5 year old.

35

120

$Bbl

$Ton

100

50

200

If vessel values are sustained at such high levels, then


tanker investor activity levels in 2005 may be much lower
than in 2004. Combined tanker orders and sales totaled
10.5MnDwt for 1Q05, compared to 77MnDwt for full year
2004.

20
16/01/2004

45

10/01/2003

110

220

04/01/2002

120

55
Bunkers Singapore
380 cst

130

7
MnDwt

0
04/01/2002

10

120

$Million

250,000

Tanker orders were consistently above 2MnDwt per month


between August 2004 and January 2005 despite steadily
increasing newbuilding prices. However, a significant rise in
prices from February 2005 coupled with freight rate weakness has significantly curtailed contracting with a total of just
1.4MnDwt ordered in February and March. It may be the
case that investors are also being put off by the long delivery times for newbuildings. For example the earliest delivery
date for a VLCC is 3Q08.

21/01/2005

figure 14
(3) Lower Crude Oil Production
Crude oil production slipped back slightly during 1Q05 from
84.2Mnbd to 83.8Mnbd, but this reduction is relatively small
and would not appear to justify such a dramatic fall in earnings.
Therefore, despite the negative impact of higher bunker
prices and fleet expansion, it would appear that tanker
freight rates have over corrected.

At the moment, tanker investors are in "wait and see" mode.


If there are significant freight market spikes in 2H05, then
investors may be tempted to come back in even at such
high prices (and such late delivery dates). However, if
freight rates remain at disappointing levels, then vessel values may correct sharply downward.
The next section looks at the prospects for tanker freight
rates for the remainder of 2005.

www.crweber.com
9

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT FREIGHT RATES:04

(3) Prospects for Tanker Freight Rates in 2005


Tanker stocks holding up
Although tanker spot earnings were disappointing during
1Q05, and though influenced by 4th quarter 2004, shipping
stocks provide a more positive indication regarding the
strength of the market for the remainder of the year. Figure
16 - which plots Baltic Dirty Tanker Index against Overseas
Shipholding Group - reveals that tanker stocks have not
been affected by lower freight rates. In fact tanker stocks follow very closely the path of crude oil prices, which seems to
be interpreted as the fundamental driver for this shipping
sector. Figure 17 reveals that share price resilience was
underpinned by strong results in 1Q05 for leading quoted
Tanker Stocks Starting to React to Falling Earnings
3500
BDTI

Long haul trade growth will continue as an accelerator


for tanker demand in 2005

2500

55

2000

45

1500

35

1000

25

$Share

Index

Looking ahead for the remainder of the year, it seems that


crude oil demand growth will again be an important factor
underpinning the market over the next few months.
However, forecast crude oil demand growth in 2005 (+2.1%)
is lower than growth in 2004 (+3.4%) and would not be
expected to exert as positive an influence.

65

Overseas Shipholding
Group

500
09/05/2003

Crude oil demand growth with help underpin tanker


freight rates in 2005

It should be pointed out though that China may yet again


surprise the market with the strength of its crude oil import
requirement.

75

3000

strong earnings during 4Q04 were primarily the consequence of strong crude oil demand growth coupled with
strong growth in tanker long haul trades which acted as an
accelerator for tanker demand. These factors will continue
to act as key positives throughout 2005.

15
16/04/2004

11/03/2005

tanker companies.
Listed Tanker Company Net Income Quarterly Results

It has been an accepted fact in tanker shipping for more


than thirty years that the Middle East with its relatively large
crude oil reserves will eventually dominate world tanker
seaborne trade. Middle East seaborne trade routes are generally longer than for other export regions.
Tonmile demand is a truer reflection of tanker demand than
simply using crude oil demand. It takes into account the distance traveled to deliver each tonne of crude oil. Obviously,
long haul trades will generate a higher tonmile demand than
short trades for the same amount of cargo delivered.
Therefore, long haul trades require more vessels than short
haul trades for the same amount of cargo delivered.

300

The importance of long haul crude oil trades has also been
boosted by the preference for sweet/light crudes such as
those from West Africa and the North Sea. (Heavy/sour
crudes include certain grades from Saudi Arabia, Venezuela
and Mexico).

250

$Million

200
150
100
50
0

1Q04

2Q04

3Q04

4Q04

Teekay

189

98.5

245.3

224.6

1Q05
279

OMI

56.4

30.3

50.5

108.5

75.8

OSG

76.2

45.4

68.5

211.1

164.9

General

78.3

41.6

54.6

140.5

68.5

figure 16
figure 17
In the first quarterly publication of the year, we stressed that

In 2004, China and the United States were responsible for


around 50% of the total increase in world crude oil demand
(see figure 18). The Middle East was the major source of
this extra demand, benefiting from problems with Nigerian
and Venezuelan production coupled with declining North
Sea production.
The dependence on the Middle East for incremental crude
oil demand acted as an accelerator for tanker demand in
2004. In 2005, crude oil demand growth is expected to slow,
but once again the distribution of the extra demand will
boost tanker tonmile demand with China and the United
States again forecast to be the most important growth
import markets.

www.crweber.com
10

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT FREIGHT RATES:04


United States Crude Oil Imports 1995-2004

Estimated Annual World Oil Demand Growth 2000-2005


Source: IEA (April 2005)
Figures Million barrels per day

Regions

00-99

01-00

02-01

03-02

04-03

North America
Latin America
FSU
Europe
OECD Pacific
China
Other Asia
Subtotal Asia
Middle East
Africa

0.26
0.00
0.08
-0.12
-0.04
0.26
0.09
0.31
0.12
0.00

-0.06
0.00
0.00
0.21
-0.07
0.12
0.18
0.23
0.17
0.13

0.10
-0.04
-0.20
0.00
-0.04
0.30
0.27
0.53
0.17
0.08

0.47
-0.10
0.12
0.20
0.14
0.55
0.22
0.91
0.20
0.04

0.61
0.17
0.13
0.24
-0.15
0.86
0.47
1.18
0.32
0.07

05-04
Forecast
0.36
0.12
0.05
0.11
0.00
0.50
0.24
0.75
0.29
0.09

World

0.66

0.67

0.63

1.84

2.72

1.77

figure 18
The tables below (figures 19 and 20) break down the distribution of Chinese and United States crude oil imports by
exporting country.
China Crude Oil Imports 1995-2004
Source: Global Trade Information Services
Figures in Million Tonnes
Exporter
Voyage
Units
Duration
Saudi Arabia
MnTons
Long Haul
% Chg
Oman
MnTons
Long Haul
% Chg
Angola
MnTons
Long Haul
% Chg
Iran
MnTons
Long Haul
% Chg
Russia
Short Haul/
MnTons
Overland
% Chg
Sudan
MnTons
Long Haul
% Chg
Vietnam
Medium Haul MnTons
% Chg
Yemen
MnTons
Long Haul
% Chg
Congo
MnTons
Long Haul
% Chg
MnTons
Equatorial GuineaLong Haul
% Chg
Indonesia
Medium Haul MnTons
% Chg
Norway
MnTons
Long Haul
% Chg
Other
MnTons
% Chg
Total
MnTons
% Chg

Source: Global Trade Information Services


Figures in Million Barrels
Exporter
Voyage
Units
Duration
Canada
Venezuela
Mexico
Saudi Arabia

Short Haul/
Overland
Long Haul

Nigeria

Medium Haul

Iraq

Long Haul

Algeria

Medium Haul

Angola

Medium Haul

United Kingdom

Medium Haul

Norway

Medium Haul

Kuwait

Long Haul

Ecuador
Other

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Total
0.34
3.65
1.00
0.93
0.04
0.00
0.76
2.47
0.03

5.28

2.59

0.23 0.50 1.81 2.50 5.73 8.78 11.39


-32% 117% 262% 38% 129% 53% 30%
5.65 9.03 5.67 5.02 15.60 8.14 8.05
55% 60% -37% -11% 211% -48% -1%
1.66 3.84 1.10 2.88 8.64 3.80 5.71
66% 131% -71% 160% 200% -56% 50%
2.31 2.76 3.62 3.95 7.00 10.85 10.63
148% 19% 31%
9% 77% 55% -2%
0.32 0.48 0.14 0.57 1.48 1.77 3.03
773% 49% -70% 296% 158% 20% 72%
0.00
0.27 3.31 4.97 6.43
50% 29%
1.01 1.50 0.87 1.51 3.16 3.36 3.54
32% 49% -42% 75% 109%
6%
5%
3.77 4.06 3.75 4.13 3.61 2.29 2.26
52%
8% -8% 10% -13% -37% -1%
0.13 0.98 0.38 0.38 1.45 0.64 1.05
390% 681% -61%
1% 278% -56% 63%
0.20 0.24 0.81 0.92 2.15 1.78
19% 234% 13% 134% -17%
6.30 6.59 3.42 3.95 4.58 2.65 3.24
19%
5% -48% 16% 16% -42% 22%
0.99 0.49 2.01 1.48 0.92 2.11
-50% 310% -26% -38% 130%
1.25 4.56 5.31 8.63 13.19 9.95 10.20
-52% 266% 17% 62% 53% -25%
2%

15.18
33%
9.28
15%
10.10
77%
12.39
17%
5.25
73%
6.26
-3%
3.51
-1%
7.00
209%
3.39
224%
1.46
-18%
3.33
3%
0.93
-56%
13.05
28%

17.24
14%
16.35
76%
16.21
60%
13.24
7%
10.78
105%
5.77
-8%
5.35
53%
4.91
-30%
4.77
41%
3.48
139%
3.43
3%
2.01
116%
19.27
48%

17.09 22.62 35.47 26.80 36.61 70.13 60.26 69.41 91.13 122.82
32% 57% -24% 37% 92% -14% 15% 31%
35%

Short Haul/
Overland
Short Haul

Short Haul

MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg
MnBbls
% Chg

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999


379

396

461

424

501

4%

7%

8%

-8%

18%

425

454

513

522

461

500

7%
346
474
264

425

2000

2% -12%

8%

337

484

469

448

473

-3%

44%

13%

-3%

-5%

6%

407

482

507

490

507

-14%

18%

5%

-4%

287

231

343

-6% -20%

49%

269

304

2%

13%

12

17
9

108

263

232
-12%

-33% 106% -45%


130
141
91

45

129

142
10%

93

72

70

100

107

-34% -23%

-3%

43%

8%

105

99

121
-15%

84

111
33%

5%

84

101

4% -26%

20%

109

8%

25%

37

141

21% -18%

-6% -15%

87

113

521

551
6%

5%

na

511

506

577

-1%

14%

na

537

568

567

na

544

na

221

na

174

na

54

8% -100%

-1%

15%
81

172

na

4%

532% 143%
7

2001 2002 2003 2004

117

na

127

na

151

na

146

na

82

581

6%

0%

633

552

16%

-13%

317

393

44%

24%

165

247

-5%

50%

98

123

80%

26%

143

117

12%

-18%

150

99

-1%

-34%

89

92

-39%

3%

77

87

-7%

13%

37

33

31

40

na

41

51

85

-18%

0%

-9%

-8%

29%

24%

66%

319

345
8%

382
11%

424
11%

434
2%

358
-17%

na

399

414
4%

409
-1%

2704

2665
-1%

3077
15%

3258
6%

3224
-1%

3399
5%

na

3508

3761
7%

3929
4%

figure 20
In contrast to China, US crude oil imports are not so
dependent on long haul trades. Near neighbors - Canada,
Venezuela and Mexico - were the top three exporters to the
US last year.
Saudi Arabia was the largest exporter to the US in 2003, but
was only 4th largest in 2004. Its exports fell by 13% in 2004
(based on full year data).
However, other long haul trades from Iraq and Kuwait were
up 50% and 13% respectively.

figure 19
China crude oil imports are dominated by long haul trades
from the Middle East (and also West Africa). Exports from
Oman and Angola, the second and third largest exporters to
China, increased by 76% and 60% respectively in 2004
(based on full year data).
It should be noted that the fastest growing exporter of crude
oil to China is Russia. Most crude oil from Russia enters
China by train, while in the future pipeline transportation is
likely to dominate.
An important landmark was achieved on 30th March 2005
when the 441,000Dwt TI Europe (operated by Tankers
International) received Government approval to dock at
Ningbo. Prior to the TI Europe, the largest vessels to call at
Ningbo was less that 320,000Dwt. Four other terminals in
China will be able to handle upto 500,000 dwt vessels in the
near future. The visit illustrates the growing importance of
China to the VLCC sector.
www.crweber.com
11

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT FREIGHT RATES:04

Short term Tanker Freight Rate Forecast


Fleet growth and high voyage costs will continue to act as a
drag on tanker earnings in 2005, but freight rate spikes are
probable during 2H05

Long term Tanker Supply/Demand Balance Forecast


2005-2010
Figure 21 compares world crude oil demand and tanker
supply (fleet >=10,000Dwt) for the period 2000-2004 and
then projects forward for the period 2005-2010.

High crude oil prices represent the biggest risk for a recovery in tanker rates in 2005 for two reasons. Firstly, if crude
oil prices remain high, then bunker prices (a major component of tanker voyage costs) will also remain high and
tanker earnings will be depressed.

There are two crude oil demand forecasts: The "low" case
is based on annual average growth of 1.3%, which corresponds to the average historical growth rate 1998-2003.
The "high" case is based on the IEA forecast (April 2004) of
2.1% for 2005, and an annual average growth rate of 2.3%
for 2006-10, which is 0.5% higher than the average growth
rate for the last 10 years. (The growth rate has fallen below
1.3% on three occasions in the last 10 years - in 1998
(0.5%), 2001 (0.9%), and 2002 (0.8%)).

Secondly, the damaging impact of high crude oil prices on


tanker profitability is being repeated across many other
industries. Consequently, worldwide economic prosperity is
being put at risk - as stressed in April by the IMF in its twice
yearly assessment of global economic prospects. A prolonged period of high oil prices cannot be sustained, and will
eventually cause crude oil demand to falter.

There are also two tanker supply forecasts: The "high"


case reflects deletions based on IMO's phase-out schedule,
and orders based on scheduled orderbook deliveries for
2005-7 and for 2008-10 deliveries based on estimated
annual average deliveries for the period 2002-7 (a boom
period for tanker deliveries). The "average" case reflects a
20% increase on IMO's phase-out schedule, and deliveries
based on scheduled orderbook deliveries for 2005-7 (as for
"high" case) and for 2008-10 deliveries based on 2001
orders (the low point for deliveries in the period 2000-7).

These spikes may be triggered by


downstream bottlenecks, geopolitical tension; nervousness in the
market caused by the actions of
OPEC or increased concern about
spare crude oil production capacity.
The supply/demand balance is so
tight that even small events may
have
major
consequences.
However, the expected tanker
freight rate spikes are unlikely to be
as spectacular as in 2004 - unless
Chinese crude oil imports increase
at a faster rate than currently forecast.

Million Deadweight

However, if crude oil prices can be maintained at "reasonable" levels (and the world economy achieves the "solid"
growth predicted by the IMF), and if
Chinese crude oil imports (and to a
World Crude Oil Demand v Tanker Supply
lesser extent imports to India and
History 2000-4 & Forecast 2005-10
the United States) continue to
expand
strongly,
then
440
supply/demand tightness in the
market will persist and there will be
420
every chance of significant tanker
freight rate spikes later in the year.

95
93
91

400

89

380

87
85

360
Tanker Supply - High Case

83

Tanker Supply - Average Case

81

World Oil Demand (Forecast


Growth av 2.3% p.a.)

79

World Oil Demand (Forecast


Growth av 1.3% p.a.)

77

Mnbd

Rapid tanker supply growth, which is set to continue in


2005, is nothing new. However, the fleet is expanding much
faster (est. +6.0% 2005) than crude oil demand (est. +2.1%
2005). Therefore, unless tanker long haul trades expand
faster than short haul trade - boosting tanker tonmile
demand - then the upside potential for tanker freight rates
will be restricted. China - with its reliance on long haul crude
oil imports - remains crucial to the fortunes of the tanker
market.

340
320
300
280

75
00

01

02

03

04

e05

e06

e07

e08

e09

e10

figure 21
www.crweber.com
12

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT FREIGHT RATES:04

It should be noted that the forecast methodology is a relatively simplistic approach to supply/demand balancing. For
example in the case of measuring tanker supply, there is no
allowance for changing trade patterns which impacts on the
average transportation distance of a barrel of crude oil
(measured in seaborne tonne-miles). This is an important
consideration when calculating how far tonnage supply will
stretch i.e. effective supply.
Nevertheless, (within the confines of this rough measure) it
is apparent that under both the "high" and "average" supply
cases there will be enough tonnage overall to match/exceed
the "low"/"high" demand scenarios until 2009. However, in
2010 the sharp acceleration in removals under IMO phaseout schedules will create a potential shortfall of tanker tonnage (1).
It is clear that the tanker fleet is in a potentially perilous position. Today the tanker orderbook is equivalent to 24% of
the tanker trading fleet. Under the "high" and "average"
supply cases, the fleet is set to expand at between 4.2%
and 5.8% p.a. over the next 5 years (2005-9), which is
revised up from 3.9% and 5.5% respectively in January
2005. This compares to demand growth of 2.3% under the
"high" demand case. Notwithstanding, the growing
importance of long haul trades (2), the tanker market
will be extremely vulnerable to demand fluctuations
during this period. For example, a major concern is that
China will not sustain its phenomenal growth rates of the
last few years.

and opportunities for larger tankers to find alternative


employment as storage or FPSO vessels. It is not yet clear
how many tanker owners have so far embarked on putting
their vessels through CAS, although it is probably only a
handful.
(2) As discussed the impact of a shift towards long haul
trades was crucial to the strength of the tanker market in
2004. World crude oil demand of 3.4% was effectively
boosted by the growth of long haul trades, so that demand
more than offset the burden of 6.2% tanker fleet growth.
The growing importance of long haul trades will continue in
the short and long term. For example, the rapid economic
rise of China will continue to foster long haul trades from
regions like West Africa, the Black Sea and even the North
Sea, while the decline of North Sea production (down to
6.1Mnbd in 2004 compared to 6.8Mnbd in 2000) will
increase the reliance on Middle East production. The preference for sweet/light crudes also has a positive impact on
tanker tonmile demand.

Therefore, strong crude oil demand growth of 2%+ p.a.


and a further significant shift towards long haul trades
are the key factors in ensuring consistently strong
tanker rates for 2005-10.
If "effective" demand (taking into account tanker tonmiles)
falters, it is unlikely that the supply curve will follow either
that shown in the "high" or "average" supply cases. It is perhaps more likely that supply will follow a third way or "low"
case. With little scope to halt fleet growth through a slow
down in orders (the orderbooks are virtually full up to the
end of 2007), it is the majority of single hull tankers (as well
as double side and double bottom) tonnage that will come
under pressure to scrap even more rapidly than in the "average" supply case (20% higher than the IMO scrapping rules
demand) in order to slow down the rate of tanker supply
expansion.
(1) The majority of tanker single hull tonnage will not be
finally phased out until 2010, and even then the Continuous
Assessment Scheme (CAS) affords a further extension to
the trading life of these vessels. However, as discussed, if
tanker rates come under significant downward pressure,
this majority may exit the market earlier than the 2010 cut
off - especially with the extremely high level of scrap values
www.crweber.com
13

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT VESSEL SECTORS:05

(4) A Review of the Tanker Market in 1Q05 by The following sections recap developments in 2004 and
1Q05, and provide updated fleet forecasts 2005-2010 for
Vessel Segment
each of the vessel sectors.

In order to help highlight the key developments in each vessel segment, a system of rankings has been put together
(figure 22) to reflect the development of key performance
indicators in 2005. Amongst other things, these rankings
show which segment has attracted the most investment so
far in 2005, and which has grown fastest.
The Rankings 1Q05

VLCC
Suezmax
Aframax
Panamax
Handy
Total

(all figures as % of relevant sector trading fleet)

Deliveries %
2.3
2.3
2.7
4.4
2.4
2.5

Scrap %
0.0
0.6
0.9
1.9
0.3
0.5

Orders %
1.1
0.0
1.7
3.0
1.5
1.2

Sales %
2.8
2.4
2.7
3.5
2.1
2.6

Obook%
17.6
23.5
26.1
54.8
26.5
24.3

Growth %
2.3
1.7
1.9
2.5
2.1
2.2

Sales %
12.9
6.8
8.3
5.1
4.9
9.1

Obook%
19.3
25.1
27.0
55.4
26.9
25.5

Growth %
6.3
5.5
4.9
9.0
8.7
6.5

figure 22
The above table shows that the Panamax sector remains
the most popular sector with investors. The equivalent of
3% of the Panamax fleet was contracted during 1Q05,
which has maintained the orderbook at a level equivalent to
more than 50% of the trading fleet.
By contrast the Suezmax sector has received no interest
from investors at the start of the year.
The Panamax sector has the highest delivery percentage
for 1Q05 (4.4%) and - despite also recording the highest
percentage of deletions (1.9%) - is also the fastest growing
sector (+2.5%). The VLCC sector (+2.3%) is the only other
segment where fleet growth exceeded overall fleet expansion (+2.2%) in 1Q05.
The ranking table for 2004 is included here for to allow comparisons to be made with 2005.
The Rankings 2004 (all figures as % of relevant sector trading fleet)

VLCC
Suezmax
Aframax
Panamax
Handy
Total

Deliveries %
7.1
8.2
8.7
13.9
10.8
8.7

Scrap %
1.2
5.5
4.0
5.6
2.8
2.6

Orders %
8.9
8.2
12.6
26.5
14.3
11.7

figure 23
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14

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT VESSEL SECTORS:05

As we look forward, the additional capacity coming to the market at more than two
vessels a month for the year has not been
absorbed as growth in ton miles slowed
and there was minimal scrapping, making
any improvement in rates doubtful for the
near term. One has to look out to the end
of the 3rd qtr before any meaningful
improvement may be expected as seasonal stock building takes place. With
high bunker cost eating into returns, its
understandable that some owners are
taking advantage of high asset values
and selling tonnage at very firm numbers.

2005 First Quarter Average Earnings


100,000
90,000
80,000
70,000

$/Day

60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2005-01

2005-02

2005-03

2005-04

Suezmax Sector:

Month
VLCC

Suezmax

Aframax

Panamax

VLCC Sector:
The Hot Button Sector

The Suezmax sector enjoyed strong /


steady earnings in the first quarter of
2005 with average TCEs of about

Reported Delivery Schedule Basis End May 2005

There is an on-going debate about exactly how scheduled IMO scapping in this
sector will affect the market. We have
included the present trading fleet at the
back of this report to try and get to the
bottom of this question.

100

90

80

70

No. of Vessels

As discussed earlier in this quarterly, the


increase in long-haul trades and global
oil consumption has placed a greater
reliance on this sector of the market,
there is in essence some room to
increase the orderbook through the 2010
cut off. Also a number of vessels will
have the flexibility to trade in certain markets after the 2010 cut off.

Products

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Remainder of 2005 through 2008
VLCC

The start of the year proved disappointing for VLCC owners as rates rapidly
retreated from the historic highs of the fourth quarter. As we
entered the new year rates fell from the ws 300 level for
AG/East to ws 85 in three weeks. A slight spike to the mid
ws100's in February brought some relief. One could say that
the writing was on the wall as the number of VLCC fixtures
ex AG shrank from the 120's in the 4th to the very low 100's
of the first quarter. This reduced off-take caused an erosion
of rates to the WS 80/90 level which closed out the quarter.
The Atlantic VLCC market experienced less volatility with
rates falling from the WS 200 level to WS 100 as the year
started. The Atlantic hasn't seen the wide swings in freight
as it moves in a much narrower band, with the raw numbers
trading between WS 85 and WS 130.

Suezmax

Aframax

Panamax

Products

$50,000 p/d. With the weather not playing the same part it
did in the Black Sea trade this year the 2004 rate spike from
the Black Sea didnt materialize, limiting delays to around
10 days versus the 25-30 days of 2004. This spilled over
into West Africa and acted as a stabilizing influence, removing much of the previous quarters volatility and West Africa
rates shuttled between WS 160 and 190. With more sweet
crude destined for China, an alternate trade for VLCCs, cargos for the U.S. were primarily left to Suexmax tonnage.
The prospects for the year remain guarded as 2nd quarter
refinery turnarounds will slow the pace of activity and rates
will reflect this softness. The addition of 9 units so far this
year and further 17 scheduled to be delivered in 2005 (this

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15

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT VESSEL SECTORS:05

includes 1 shuttle tanker) with what would look to be a very


soft sector scrapping figure, only two units scrapped so far
this year. This may serve to hold down any 3rd and 4th
quarter rate run up.

150 WS points for double hulls and WS 90 for others. March


saw the market jump back up to an average of WS 268 and
WS 223 respectively. April, May and June have followed the
same see-saw pattern.

The start up of the BTC pipeline for an additional 400,000


b/d of Med export in the 4th quarter as well as increased
Baltic exports will help to absorb the new ice class tonnage.
The mid east trades continue to operate in parallel to the
VLCC sector with volatility always present.

Despite these fluctuations the market as a whole has


remained resilient, be it CBS/USAC, CONT/STATES,
WAFR/STATES or Brazil up. Just when one thinks the bottom is about to fall out, one of the four load areas has come
to the rescue. While the Aframax market has had some
affect dampening or pushing depending on the market
cycle, for all intents and purposes the Panamax market has
been making its own way on its own merits.

It is interesting to note a return to period interest with charterers willing to take tonnage for long periods reflecting their
belief in this sector.
2005 Reported Suezmax Period Charters Over 12 Months:
Vessel

Built

Period

Monte Granada
Four Sun
Flawless
Timeless
Faultless
Sacramento
Sabine
Spetses
Sea Star

2004
2003
1991
1991
1992
1998
1998
1996
1996

12 months
33 months
3 years
3 years
5 years
7 years
7 years
7 years
7 years

With PDVSA banning all single hull and probably double


sided and double vessels to follow, we could be in for an
interesting next few months.

CPP Sector:
The Atlantic basin clean market has clearly softened over
the course of the year, to some degree as the domestic
crude and product inventory levels have increased. While
rates during the first quarter of 2005 upcoast averaged
about 38 x WS 290, and Cont/States averaged about 37 x
WS 314.25, we have seen consistent softening during May
and June in both markets.

Aframax Sector:
Since the start of 2005 Aframaxs have experienced dramatic swings in WS rate levels in the Caribbean. Since
January the inter-month low to high has been approximately 90 points, but, nonetheless, the average remains inexcess of WS 200 which equates to more than $35,000 per
day time charter equivalent. Thus owners are not finding
this markets volatility too painful.
The inter-UKC market, after coming off the winter highs has
been trading in a narrow band between WS 140 and WS
175 with little sign of change.
The cross-Med market has witnessed by far the most violent swings, super highs approaching WS 300 and staggering lows nearing WS 100.
We believe that there will not be much of a change as we
head into the second half of the year.

Freight rates during the first quarter of 2005 certainly saw


some benefit from the changing inventory paradigm, moving
from the low inventories of the first 2 or 3 quarters of 2004,
to the high inventories we have domestically today, coupled
with the usual seasonal strength seen during the winter
months and the buildup for the summer driving season.
Gasoline inventories today are in the upper half of the average range and distillate inventories in the lower half of the
average range. Certainly such levels have some impact on
transportation demand.
Going forward, as we move farther into what is traditionally
a softer summer season for freight rates, we should expect
the markets to soften.
However, taking into account the expected demand increases for refined product over 2005, and in particular potential
refining bottlenecks as we move into the fourth quarter or
heating oil season, there is good reason to expect that clean
markets will see their usual fourth quarter rebound.

Panamax Sector:
The Caribbean Panamax market has been anything but predictable. January was strong with an average WS rate of
380 for double hulled vessels trading CBS/USAC-G and WS
267 for non-double hulls. February saw rates drop almost
www.crweber.c
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16

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT VLCC FLEET:06

VLCC Actual Trading Fleet as of May 2005


45

40

35
14
30

25

4
20
3

41

13

38

15

37

30

30
27

24
10

19

17

15
5

8
1

23

21

14

13

12

10

12

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Single

Double Bottom

Double Sides

S/R Mediterranean
Shoju Maru
Titan Libra
Titan Venus
Vl Chios

The Actual VLCC Trading Fleet


Ship_name

Dwt

Blt

Hull

Sbt

F'cast Scrap

323100

1979

SH

2005

1979
Folk Sun

1980
Petrobras 50
Belokamenka

279688
360700

1980
1980

SH
SH

2005
2007

257882
224738
360700

1981
1981
1981

SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y

2007
2007
2007

290085

1982

SH

2008

322912
294739
322446

1983
1983
1983

SH
SH
SH

N
Y
Y

2005
2009
2009

1982
Kazimah

1983
Folk Sea
Al Funtas
Settebello

1984
Eleuthera

255987

1984

SH

2010

259995

1985

SH

2010

239351
264148
248965

1986
1986
1986

SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y

2010
2010
2010

1985
Apollo Sun

1986
B Elephant
Bright Jewel
Hebei Explorer

214861
258034
265551
250267
239783

1986
1986
1986
1986
1986

SH
SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

264758
254601
250079
214862
264631
261068

1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987

SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

276052
255087
255271
255346
248049
240401
260039
245653
265322
265243

1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988

SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

248034
255087
238500
247471
304622
277020
258049
265316
275984
277020
276210
276736

1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989

DB
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2014
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

1987
A Elephant
Aegiali
C Elephant
S/R Long Beach
Takamatsu Maru
Titan Gemini

Y
Y
Y

1988

1981
Apollo
Chang Yun
Folk Moon

Double hull

C. Concord
Europe
Island Accord
Island Bauhinia
Kolossi
Shinyo Jubilee
Tinos
Titan Leo
Titan Neptune
World Prelude

1989
Clovely
Albatross
Astro Lupus
Brilliant Jewel
Dorado
Eastern Fortune
Eastern Jewel
Episkopi
F Elephant
Halden
Lysaker
Navarin

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17

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT VLCC FLEET:06


Protaras
Star II
Verona TBRN
Vl Malibu

255028
304622
258076
248976

1989
1989
1989
1989

SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y
Y

2010
2010
2010
2010

255226
244651
285715
243272
275269
285768
285690
285640
248050
274990
275993
261167

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990

SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

281751
284533
264892
284317
284487
284497
285873
281794
261155
249037
285739
275628
248034
271208
259530
264164
261212
280000
259490

1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991

SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

302149
302440
264301
284889
285117
284532
269065
264484
285767
285771
261284
284480
258094
281598
291640
249107
286006
285933
281018
258080
258096
269101
243870
269581
254351
255396

1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992

DS
DS
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2015
2015
2005
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

291381
301824
290927
284493
299999
299700
298900
298033
303184
306430
293239

1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

1990
Azuma Enterprise
Dynamic City
Front Sabang
Geilo
Grand Atlantic
Grand Explorer
Grand King
Hebei Ambition
Lania
Orpheus Asia
Taos
Vasant J Sheth

1991
Agios Nikolaos III
Al Awdah
Falkonera
Front Highness
Front Lady
Front Lord
Front Vanadis
Grand Lady
Kaimon
Nichiryu
Nile
Orient Jewel
Shinyo Alliance
Shinyo Mariner
Sunrise Iv
Sunrise V
Tohdoh
Welsh Venture
Yahiko Maru

1992
Radiant Jewel
Sunrise Jewel
A H Bhiwandiwalla
Al Samidoon
Al Shuhadaa
Al Tahreer
Antiparos
Asian Jewel
Astro Leon
Astro Libra
Bright Artemis
Front Duke
Kanayama
New Valor
New Venture
Nichiwa
Noto
Nuri
Oriental Venture
Orpheus Orchid
Pacific Beauty
Pacific Courage
Shinyo Clipper
Suzuka
Titan Uranus
Tohzan

1993
Arosa
Chios
Crude Guardian
Eagle
Folk Star
La Esperanza
La Prudencia
New Wisdom
Olympic Loyalty
Savoie
Sebu

Shinyo Landes
Soro
Universal Hope
Edinburgh
New Vitality
Starlight Jewel
Yiomaral
Able Dolphin
Front Ace
Front Duchess
Front Tobago
Grand Mountain
Hebei Spirit
Libra Star
New Victory
Okinoshima Maru
Pacific Ruby
Phoenix Star
Prem Putli
Sala
Satsuma
Shinyo Guardian
Sunlight Jewel
Sunrise III
Suva
Sylt
Takayama
Tataki

306474
299718
299700
302493
290691
306902
302432
264512
275546
284480
259992
260995
269605
291435
291613
262945
260988
291435
280654
279989
258019
259993
300364
264165
293371
293297
259991
244275

1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993

DH
DH
DH
DS
DS
DS
DS
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2015
2015
2015
2015
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

306951
299700
279864
291435
305668
262618
265995
263097
301550
259999
305846
301227
301542
305783
264158
269605
301569
285365
301591
301862

1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994

DH
DH
DH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

299900
281559
310000
281226
298306
298432
264340
298816
298306
299700
298405
265353
299700
301858
264340
284410
277798
278157
258096
301862
275616
301665
281199
261031
269141
301389

1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH
SH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

1994
Berge Stadt
La Madrina
New Vision
Al Bali Star
Carina Star
Dar Yun
Falcon
Grand Pacific
Hamal Star
Han-Ei
Hydra Star
Markab Star
Mirfak Star
Orion Star
Pacific Crystal
Pacific Superior
Polaris Star
Provence
Shaula Star
Suhail Star

1995
Astro Centaurus
Atlantic Liberty
Atlantic Prosperity
C. Trust
Camden
Chelsea
Diamond Hope
Jupiter Glory
Kensington
La Paz
Mayfair
Super Zearth
Universal Peace
Alphard Star
Astro Luna
Astro Lyra
C Navigator
C Planner
El Junior
Gemini Star
Golden Stream
Hebei Mountain
Hyundai Star
Katori
Navix Azalea
Pherkad Star

1996
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18

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT VLCC FLEET:06


Bourgogne
Crown Unity
Ghawar
Hampstead
Hawtah
Iran Nabi
Iran Najm
Iran Nesa
Iran Noah
Iran Noor
Majestic Unity
Navix Astral
Ohminesan
Olympic Legacy
Os Arcadia
Os Concord
Ramlah
Raven
Sovereign Unity
T. M. Harmony
Tajima
Watban
Hyundai Banner

296230
300482
300361
298306
300361
298731
298731
298731
298731
298732
300549
275644
267812
302789
298960
301345
300361
301653
309892
264992
265539
300361
281074

1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
SH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

309636
300955
300349
300349
309966
300361
300955
299997
299985

1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

310453
310513
309995
311189
311286
300058
300149
301178
301171
299127
259997
272700
280889
298324

1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

298969
301620
299198
301438
299167
306397
309344
281050
307190
308571
311224
300133
311168
311168
310138
300155
279999
299150
281705
300144
306009
302193
284893
305839
310137
281050
281050
259993

1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

1997
C Bright
Courtenay Bay
Equatorial Lion
Meridian Lion
Regal Unity
Safaniyah
Tantramar
Universal Brave
Universal Prime

1998
Al Salheia
Al Shegaya
Antares Voyager
Front Century
Front Champion
Front Vanguard
Front Vista
Hyundai Sun
Millennium
Neptune Glory
Orion Trader
Saturn Glory
Takachiho II
Ti Creation

1999
Algarve
Alrehab
Ascona
Ashna
Astro Callisto
British Pioneer
Christina
Diamond Jasmine
Elisabeth Maersk
Emilie Maersk
Front Chief
Front Comanche
Front Commander
Front Crown
Gemini Voyager
Golden Victory
Kou-Ei
Luxembourg
Nichihiko
Ocana
Omala
Opalia
Osprey
Pacific Lagoon
Phoenix Voyager
Ryuho Maru
Takasago Maru
Takase

Tenryu
Tokachi

281050
280973

1999
1999

DH
DH

Y
Y

306085
314026
281037
305994
306397
306307
298570
307190
259999
308491
308491
298620
298824
306324
299999
299986
306278
298677
300000
299364
299089
298552
301429
299543
302561
309498
298543
308700
310138
281050
298920
279989
281050
281050
308491
279999
299325
279999
299089
281050
281050

2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

309371
298530
309459
298330
305965
306344
305704
306344
298412
281395
281395
281434
303115
305870
299988
298990
299999
309327
308700
298911
296000
298628
281395
312638
312679
299498
299450

2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

302986
309287
299222
304732

2002
2002
2002
2002

DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y

2000

2010

A. I. Angelicoussis
Asian Progress II
Bandaisan
British Pride
British Progress
British Purpose
C. Dream
Effie Maersk
Eli Maersk
Ellen Maersk
Else Maersk
Front Commodore
Front Tina
Hawk
Ibukisan
Ikomasan
Kestrel
Lucky Trader
M. A. Angelicoussis
Maritime Jewel
Mars Glory
Namur
Nordmillennium
Nysa
Oscilla
Overseas Donna
Patris
Raphael
Regulus Voyager
Ryuohsan
Sanko Unity
Takasuzu
Tenyo
Tenzan
Titan Glory
Ubud
Ulan
Ural
Venus Glory
Washusan
Yohteisan

2001
Antonis
Ariake
Arion
Artois
Astipalaia
Astro Castor
Astro Chorus
Astro Cygnus
Famenne
Formosapetro Ace
Formosa. Challenger
Formosa. Discovery
Harad
Kos
Kumanogawa
Mercury Glory
Mogamigawa
Overseas Ann
Overseas Chris
Pluto Glory
Sakura I
Sarah Glory
Shinyo Kannika
Stena Victory
Stena Vision
Utah
Utik

2002
Abqaiq
Amantea
Astro Challenge
Britanis
www.crweber.c
com
19

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT VLCC FLEET:06


Charles Eddie
Cosgreat Lake
Crude Crest
Crude Progress
Crude Topaz
Eagle Vermont
Eagle Virginia
Front Eagle
Front Falcon
Front Page
Front Serenade
Front Stratus
Iran Delvar
Iran Hormoz
Iran Huwayzeh
Kaimon II
Koho I
Leo Star
Marjan
Neptune
Nichinori
Nippon
Otina
Overseas Mulan
Pisces Star
Safwa
Sky Wing
Taizan
Tanabe
Tateyama
Ti Africa
Ti Asia
Ti Europe
Tsurusaki

305460
298833
300000
300000
319430
306999
306999
309064
308875
299164
299152
299157
299500
299261
299242
314014
301045
316501
302977
319360
298414
298399
298465
319029
316808
303138
299997
300405
298561
300373
441893
441893
441893
300838

2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

308200
316476
306314
305870
299095
298100
317614
316507
299079
299145
309233
318692
301013
299500
299500
279400
299229
299214
300667
303896
319174
319012
308500
304992
317972
299992
300257
304996
305000
299097
299991
441585
300838
299985
298287
298717
298555

2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

318000
306352
317650
317614
306999

2004
2004
2004
2004
2004

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2003
Apollonia
Aries Star
Astro Carina
Astro Corona
Australis
Bunga Kasturi
C. Champion
Capricorn Star
Cosbright Lake
Cosglory Lake
Crude Sun
Crudestar
Eneos Breeze
Iran Damavand
Iran Daylam
Iran Hamoon
Iran Harsin
Iran Hengam
Iwatesan
Kaminesan
Nordenergy
Nordpower
Olympic Legend
Olympic Liberty
Overseas Rosalyn
Perseus Trader
Rokkosan
Samco America
Samco Asia
Sea Fortune
Selene Trader
Ti Oceania
Tsurumi
Vega Trader
Venture Spirit
World Luck
World Luna

E. I. Angelicoussi
Eneos Tokyo
Erha Fpso
Flandre
Formosapetro Empire
Fujikawa
Iran Darab
Iran Dena
Irene Sl
Isuzugawa
Kai-Ei
New Century
Nichioh
Nissho Maru
Oriental Jade
Sea Energy
Sea Force
Starlight Venture
Taga
Takamine
Toba
World Lake
World Lion
Xin Jin Yang
Younara Glory

306229
300976
368000
305704
299170
299984
299500
299500
319247
299984
299997
299031
303994
300544
306352
305318
305442
317970
303430
306206
299980
298564
298563
297376
320050

2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

298000
300500
300542
306206
306999
310309
316217
318000
318658
318669
319000
320472

2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005

DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2005
Xin Ning Yang
Aquarius Wing
Bunga Kasturi Dua
Tokio
Eagle Valencia
Toyo
Desh Ujaala
Chrysanthemum
Athina
Seaking
Spyros
Andromeda Voyager

2004
Ardenne Venture
Asian Progress III
C. Emperor
C. Vision
Eagle Vienna

www.crweber.c
com
20

CHARLES R. WEBER TANKER REPORT CONTACT RESEARCH:07

Charles R. Weber Company, Inc. is one of the oldest and


largest ship brokerage firms in the United States.
Established in 1940, the company is an independent fullservice shipbroker and marine consultant.
Based in Greenwich, Connecticut, Charles R. Weber offers
a broad range of maritime brokerage and consulting services to international marine, trading and financial clients
worldwide.
From tanker voyage charter, bare boat, and time charter to
sale and purchase of all vessel types and marine projects in
the tanker, off shore and specialist sectors of the market.
Charles R. Weber with their broad and diverse global partnerships are able to develop marine projects, whatever their
size or complexity, from concept to completion, providing
their clients with over fifty years of maritime experience and
expertise in all sectors of the marine industry.
After reading our quarterly If you would like further information or
bespoke market analysis we would be happy to discuss your
needs. Please feel free to contact us:
E-mail: chartering@crweber.com
Voice: (1) 203-629-2300
Facsimile: (1) 203-629-9101
Telex: 179100 WEBTANK CT
Or contact us by mail:
Marine Projects
Charles R. Weber Company Inc.
Greenwich Office Park One
Greenwich, Connecticut 06831
United States of America
www.crweber.c
com
21

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