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Claire Covner
Marwa Maziad
JSIS 201, Section AH
6 March 2013

Vietnam: From Unified Nationalism to an Internal Ideological Divide

Vietnam has struggled with a tumultuous history of foreign invasions and occupation,
resulting in an intense nationalist sentiment countrywide and an aspiration to reclaim its land and
liberty and remain autonomous. Foreign domination and the generation of resentment of
imperial rule in Vietnam can be traced back to before the Common Era when Vietnam was a
province of the Chinese Empire, which lasted until the fifteenth century (SarDesai 1992, 2).
After a long period of Chinese dominance, the Vietnamese were finally able to gain
independence. However, in following centuries, Vietnam suffered many internal conflicts with
different groups vying for power. In one of these clashes, the leader of a southern-based faction
unified the country with the help of French mercenaries (Logevall 2001, 7). By 1850, France
became increasingly more involved in the country with its sending of Catholic missionaries to
protect Vietnamese Catholics (Logevall 2001, 7). Ultimately, Vietnam ended up the victim of
colonial occupation again, starting when France took complete control in 1884 (Logevall 2001,
xiv). Initially, the general Vietnamese population was unified with its nationalism and in its
desire, as a whole country, to eliminate foreign imperialist control. These sentiments first arose
in response to French occupation, then later against Japan in 1940, and eventually against France
again in 1945 with the conclusion of World War II.
However, this group effort fell apart leading into the 1954 Geneva Conference, a meeting
of several nations, including the United States, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the

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Peoples Republic of China, and the divided parts of Vietnam, whose goal was to end what
became known as the First Indochina War (Watt 1967, 8). The consequences of this conference
officially split Vietnam into two zones along the seventeenth parallel, a northern section to be
governed by the communist Vietminh, later to be called the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(DRV), and a southern section to be governed by the non-communist Republic of Vietnam
(Logevall 2001, 26). So, why did the conflict in Vietnam shift from a unified Vietnamese effort
against foreign occupiers into an internal battle between the north and south? Evidence shows
that this division occurred because of the 1954 Geneva Conferences facilitation of Vietnams
physical separation into two sections, superpower intervention on the parts of the Soviet Union
and, even more so, the United States, and most crucially, the communist factions ultimate
dominance of the Vietnamese nationalist movement.
Vietnams background and its consistent foreign occupation since Chinese control and
then Frances takeover in 1884 shaped Vietnamese anti-colonial feelings and led to the formation
of a strong nationalist movement. This nationalist movement was characterized by a variety of
different organizations, both communist and non-communist. Its common goal was to
reestablish Vietnam as strictly Vietnamese because French imperialism was detested by much of
the population (Logevall 2001, 10). The origins of communist groups in Vietnam came about
with the introduction of Marxism into the nationalist movement. They were able to identify with
Marxisms anti-imperialist emphasis, especially the notion of liberation for those suffering under
the power of European colonial nations. Although the objective to gain freedom from French
control was shared between communist and non-communist factions, along with anti-colonial
sentiment, the difference was non-communist nationalists proved to be weaker; they suffered
from factional splits and never established a mass following (Logevall 2001, 11).

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The most significant non-communist group during the 1920s was the Viet Nam Quoc Dan
Dang (VNQDD or Vietnamese Nationalist Party), which, at that point, had wider appeal than the
communists. But, in 1929, the French quickly put down the VNQDD following a failed attempt
at a nationwide uprising against the French due to a miscommunicated change in the
insurrections date (SarDesai 1992, 49). This meant the termination of any real opportunity for
the revitalization of non-communist leadership and paved the way for the communists to take
control of the nationalist movement. The most powerful group that emerged was the Indochinese
Communist Party (ICP), which was organized in 1930 by Ho Chi Minh (Jamieson 1993, 176).
After the ICP was banned with the commencement of World War II due to the start of Japanese
control, Minh later established the Vietminh, another communist group that derived from the
ICP. This new group ended up using its new title, Vietminh, as a screen behind which to hide
because although it had a different name, it still operated under the same leadership and had the
same goals. The creation of the Vietminh and Minhs establishment as its leader marked the
beginning of the official assumption of communist nationalist power throughout Vietnam.
The Vietminh was able to rally together a large base of followers. This took place largely
because it emphasized the broader goal of nationalism and the common fight for independence
and was able to get away with this general label rather than specifically be called a communist
group (SarDesai 1992, 54). The Vietnamese Communists were able to play down their
doctrinaire loyaltiesand make it appear to the nationalists that they placed the nationalist and
democratic interests above those of communism (SarDesai 1992, 54). In reality, however, Minh
was not very accepting of the non-communist members of the Vietnamese nationalist movement.
In addition, a lot of the Vietnamese people associated capitalism with French interests and saw
democracy as a type of government that was constantly stifled by repressive French colonial

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policies (SarDesai 1992, 54). They therefore favored a nationalist movement led by
anticapitalist Communists who could harass the French, something the Vietminh offered, and as
a result the Vietminh gained national recognition as viable representatives of nationalism
(SarDesai 1992, 54, 56). The Vietminh further solidified itself and achieved the populations
trust when it took charge of relief efforts after a devastating 1945 famine killed 2 million people
in northern Vietnam. This boosted the Vietminhs reputation and helped win approval among the
masses.
The Vietminhs triumph lasted and soon the Vietnamese nationalist movement had
suffered a schism between communist and anti-communist factions in 1945. The Vietminh
established a provisional government, the DRV, after the Japanese, who had originally taken
control in Vietnam following Frances submission to Germany, surrendered to the Allies at the
end of World War II. In an attempt to be diplomatic and look as nationalist as possible to other
nationalist leaders, as well as to try and merge the two Vietnamese administrations into one,
Minh invited such prominent figures as Ngo Dinh Diem, a devout Catholic and staunch anticommunist, to be a part of his communist government in 1946 (Crozier 1955, 50). Diem and
other nationalists, however, refused the invitation because they disliked Minhs communist aims.
Diem especially resolutely opposed communism and therefore did not wish to collaborate with
Minh (Logevall 2001, 29). This marked the ideological and political split between the
communists and anti-communists of the nationalist movement and led to irreconcilable
differences.
Before the end of 1946, the Vietminh and the French were engaged in a hostile dispute
and so the French looked to establish an official alternative group to the Vietminh in the southern
part of Vietnam (Watt 1967, 10). In direct contrast to the cohesive northern Vietnamese

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government headed by the Vietminh, the southern Vietnamese experienced a lot of problems,
including political chaos and a lack of unification (Jamieson 1993, 197). Politically, the southern
Vietnamese government faced the difficult task of dealing with anti-communist refugees, often
Catholics and Buddhists, attempting to escape the communist Vietminh in northern Vietnam
(Crozier 1955, 50). It also struggled to win over sections of the populations that had been
propagandized by the Vietminh as well as balance the conflicting sides it was confronting
(Crozier 1955, 49). The combined weight of all these problems led to extreme weakness and
ultimately permanently crippled the southern Vietnamese anti-communist part of the nationalist
movement.
The Geneva Conference of 1954 played a huge role in the shift of the conflict into pitting
the northern and southern parts of Vietnam against one another. The goal of this conference was
to settle the fighting in Vietnam and create a plan for the future of Indochina. Going into the
conference, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh were in a good position militarily they had just
defeated the French at Bien Dien Phu, a mortifying and weakening blow to France as well as
politically with the rise of their popularity (Logevall 2001, 26). However, the final agreement
that was signed at the end of the conference did not accurately represent this Vietminh
dominance. Despite the fact that the Vietminh had the trust and the support of the majority of the
population throughout Vietnam, Minh was only able to acquire half of the country with the
Geneva Accords. This had to do with Soviet and U.S. intervention because of their roles as the
major communist and anti-communist superpowers and the ongoing occurrence of the Cold War
throughout this time. Both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. wished to have its ideology dominate over
the other and so they were each particularly ready to back the part of Vietnam that represented
communism and anti-communism respectively.

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The Soviet Union advised the Vietminh to accept the agreement, even though it was not
the best deal, because at the time the Soviet Union was espousing a global policy of peaceful
coexistence with capitalist powers during the period of dtente, or the time of relaxing tensions
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the Cold War (SarDesai 1992, 62). The U.S.S.R. therefore
did not want to antagonize the U.S. and strain their relationship. Additionally, the U.S.S.R. only
really felt like it had a stake in the DRV once the communists took over in China, which at this
time had not yet occurred. In contrast, the U.S. supported the non-communist government of
South Vietnam headed by Ngo Dinh Diem. One aspect of the U.S.s intervention was in its
advising of South Vietnam to not agree to the final Geneva settlement. Ultimately both the U.S.
and South Vietnam did not sign (Holmes 1967, 459). This caused an impediment to the
agreement from the very beginning because countries that had power, such as the U.S., were not
doing what was needed to make the measures of the settlement work. Although the U.S. and
South Vietnam agreed that they would abide by the general provisions and not disturb the
armistice, they were not legally bound to anything (Holmes 1967, 459). As a result, the power
of the settlement was weakened due to this lack of commitment on the parts of the U.S. and
South Vietnam. The U.S. was careful not to let the communist Vietminh obtain too much power
because of the U.S.s intense commitment to the containment policy, its strategy to contain the
spread of communism, and its concern with Southeast Asia falling to communism. This fear was
based on the domino theory, the notion that if one country in the area fell to communism then the
rest might do so as well. The U.S. was afraid that if Vietnam surrendered to communism, other
countries in the region would soon too become communist. For this reason the U.S. was tough in
its negotiations and wanted to stop the potential for a communist takeover because it knew that
the southern Republic of Vietnam was no match for the northern DRV, which had attained

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prominence after its victory over French forces (Logevall 2001, 28). Additionally, part of the
Geneva Accords stated, general elections to reunify the country were to be held in July 1956
(Logevall 2001, 26). The U.S. feared that because of the Vietminhs esteemed reputation, the
communists would easily take over the country following the elections. In the end, the Geneva
Conference symbolized the end of French colonialism, yet the beginning of a growing conflict
between North and South Vietnam.
Following the Geneva Conference, the U.S. reacted strongly against the agreement that
had been devised and actively encouraged the South Vietnam government, led by Diem, to make
the southern zone into an area independent of the north (SarDesai 1992, 65). The U.S. strongly
supported South Vietnam and Diems government largely on the basis that it was anticommunist, even though Diem eventually proved to be a cruel and authoritarian leader,
suppressing everyone he believed to be communist as well as those that were not Catholic, such
as the Buddhist population. He conducted a campaign to condemn and remove communists from
South Vietnam and antagonized the Buddhists by favoring the Christian minority (SarDesai
1992, 78). This suppression resulted in Diems alienation of the majority of the South
Vietnamese population and led to extreme discontent under his rule (SarDesai 1992, 72). The
U.S. played a significant role in Diems taking control of South Vietnam and then allowed Diem
to stay in power despite the brutality and suffering he imposed upon his own people. U.S.
intervention was therefore a major cause in the increasing disparity between North Vietnam and
South Vietnam, as the U.S.s anti-communist policies and its involvement in the Cold War led the
U.S. to support a leader who steered South Vietnam down a road of devastation and further
prevented South Vietnam from being able to get along with the communist north. The U.S.S.R
and U.S.s use of Vietnam as a proxy site for the Cold War also only increased the disagreement

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between North and South Vietnam on the basis of communism versus anti-communism. Both
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. played dominant roles in Vietnam, but the U.S. exploited this
opportunity to spread its anti-communist beliefs more so than the U.S.S.R. did, especially in its
support of Diem, a clearly anti-communist leader who also proved to be a terrible choice for the
people he represented.
The fact that the conflict known today as the Vietnam War between the northern
Vietnamese communist Vietminh and the southern Vietnamese U.S.-supported government
originated as a unified Vietnamese struggle against its foreign occupiers is truly puzzling. It
seems as though the conflict shifted from a nationalist struggle against, for the most part, France,
to one between the north and the south due to the differences in their ideologies and the
irreconcilability of communist and non-communist visions. This split in ideology occurred
because of differences in each sides approach to attaining independence and the organization
and unity of their governments and supporters. This began with the division of the Vietnamese
nationalist movement into separate communist and non-communist factions, with the communist
group led by Ho Chi Minh eventually able to take more control and eventually dominate the
movement. Then, with the settlement of the Geneva Conference, it was decided that Vietnam
would be officially split at the seventeenth parallel and the division into northern and southern
zones eventually led to the split of the population based on communist versus anti-communist
ideologies.

Works Cited
Crozier, Brian. "The Diem Regime in Southern Vietnam." Far Eastern Survey 24.4 (1955): 49-

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56. JSTOR. Web. 26 Feb. 2013.
Jamieson, Neil L. Understanding Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Print.
Holmes, John W. "Geneva: 1954." International Journal 22.3 (1967): 457-83. JSTOR. Web. 26
Feb. 2013.
Logevall, Fredrik. The Origins of the Vietnam War. Harlow, England: Longman, 2001. Print.
SarDesai, D. R. Vietnam: The Struggle for National Identity. Boulder: Westview, 1992. Print.
Watt, Alan. "The Geneva Agreements 1954 in Relation to Vietnam." The Australian Quarterly
39.2 (1967): 7-23. JSTOR. Web. 26 Feb. 2013.