Professional Documents
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Saward (2009) - Authorisation&Authenticity - Unelected Representation
Saward (2009) - Authorisation&Authenticity - Unelected Representation
122
MID the Make Poverty History campaign in 2004, the U2 singer and
political activist Bono said, I represent a lot of people [in Africa] who have
no voice at all . . . They havent asked me to represent them. Its cheeky but I
hope theyre glad I do.1 In all societies, not least in established democracies,
people who are not electedfrom interest group leaders and activists to spiritual
figuresoften claim to be political representatives. The decline of class-based
ideologies and policy positions, the lessening of the significance of national
borders to the shaping of issues and affected constituencies, widespread
disaffection from parties and electoral politics, and the rise of new claims to
represent (e.g.) non-human nature and future human generations, are among a
range of broad trends suggesting that the time is ripe for a reassessment of
non-elective representative claims.2 Can their claims, like Bonos, ever be
accepted as having democratic legitimacy? How can we know?
In this article, I discuss a set of cases of non-elective representative claims, and
generate a set of criteria against which such claims might be assessed. This work
is framed by an account of the characteristic strengths and limits of claims to
be representative based on free and fair election. The overall aim is to extend
and deepen our understanding of the nature and reach of political representation.
To a degree, this involves extending and deepening trends in existing work
on representationa concept and a practice that is receiving renewed critical
attention.3 For example, Mansbridges influential account of theoretical
*My thanks to two anonymous referees, and to John Dryzek, Bob Goodin and Grahame
Thompson, for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Initial work was carried out
while I was Visiting Fellow in Social and Political Theory at the Australian National University.
1
Brendan ONeill, What do pop stars know about the world?, BBC News Magazine, June 28,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4629851.stm (accessed 31 August 2007).
2
Civil servants, including members of non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) and
ambassadorial and consular staff are, of course, generally unelected and yet have public responsibility
and influence. Their more-or-less direct lines of accountability to elected officials means they are
excluded from my discussion. This is not to say that these bodies and roles do not raise important
issues of accountability, nor that the criteria of acceptability I discuss below may not apply.
3
The reasons for this renewed attention are varied, and arguable. The widespread though selective
acceptance of the analysis of Pitkin for more than 30 years after the publication of her book The
Concept of Representation is a key reason behind the lack of critical attention prior to the late 1990s
2008 The Author. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00309.x
MICHAEL SAWARD
legitimacy which in some ways echo but in important other ways are distinct
from electoral criteria.7
Central to this move is to view political representation through the lens of the
representative claimto view it as an economy of claim-making, rather than as
a fact resulting from (free and fair) election. The nature of and theoretical
grounds for this basic shift in focus I have outlined elsewhere.8 But in brief: none
of us is ever fully representedrepresentation of our interests or identities in
politics is always incomplete and partial. This implies that representation is about
a claim (redeemed, if at all, only partially), and not a fact or a possession. We
might elect a politician or a party into office, but the simple fact of their election,
important though that is, does not mean they can or will speak for the range of
interests and identities that make us up. Adopting this perspective opens up
the possibility of legitimate non-elective representative claims. Crucially, it does
not rule out this possibility by definitional fiata serious weakness of the
conventional representation-as-achieved-fact approach.
But what does the representative claim, which stresses representations
dynamic and contingent character,9 consist of? Normally, the idea of
representation holds that someone stands for, speaks for, or acts for another. In
other words, a Subject stands for an Objectan elected MP for a constituency,
for example. But we need to look more widely than this. Someone makes the
claima Maker. And the thing represented is an idea of it, not the thing itself; the
latter is better called a Referent (if a politician Makes himself the Subject who
stands for an Object, the Object is his idea of his constituencydecent,
hard-working folk for examplerather than the Referent, which is all the other
things the constituency is, or might be). All of this needs, and has, an Audience,
which receives the claims and accepts, rejects or ignores them.10 So there are
7
In part, this means effecting a greater distinction between representative government and
political representation than is evident in the current literature.
8
Michael Saward The representative claim, Contemporary Political Theory, 5 (2006), 297318.
9
Derrida offers a suggestive critique which stresses representations contingency and fluidity as
a practice. See Jacques Derrida, Sending: on representation, Social Research, 49 (1982), 30126.
Note also the close parallels with Rodney Barkers convincing account of legitimation: . . . what
characterizes government . . . is not the possession of a quality defined as legitimacy, but the claiming,
the activity of legitimation; Legitimating Identities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 2.
10
Rehfeld deploys the notion of an audience as the relevant group of people who must recognize
a claimant as a representative, and the relevance of the group will always depend on the particular
Function of a case of representation. See Rehfeld, Towards a general theory of political
representation, p. 5. For example, if the function of Libyas UN Ambassador is to represent Libya at
the UN, the UN assembly is the relevant audience. My conception of the audience is similar, but not
identical. In that conception, the audience for a given claim is that group which receives (listens to,
sees, or is aware of) the claim. The audience for a given representative claim might, in principle, be
coterminous with, overlap with, or even be wholly different from (including larger or smaller than)
the would-be constituency. In other words, objects are offered, as interpretations of would-be
constituencies (referents), to audiences whose members may or may not be part of the referent.
However, in many cases audience and constituency will overlap considerably. Further, there often will
be multiple and contested functions of representation. Function is not so much read off a given case,
but rather read in by participants and observers. This conception of audience reflects the fact that
my priority is to develop a theory that maximises empirical accuracy and interpretive purchase; both,
in my view, require the more fluid and constitutive sense of audience.
MICHAEL SAWARD
certain core ingredients to a representative claim: Maker-Subject-ObjectReferent-Audience. Representation is an ongoing process of making and
receiving claimsin, between, and outside electoral cycles. The democratic
plausibility of claims can in principle rest upon varied grounds, not least, of
course, election. One benefit of this framework is that it invites us to look closely
at the impact of a broad range of representative claimants, asking how, why
and whom they represent (if anyone), without our very definitions determining
whether and to what extent they constitute cases of representation.
Of course, the idea of non-elective representation is not new. Despite the fact
that Burkes notion of virtual representation rests upon a vision of a highly
unified national polity with a single and discernible set of interests, placing it
outside the more diverse forms of non-elective claim today, his argument that
common interest and common sentiment underlie genuinely representative ties
may still have currency (see below). And note that Hanna Pitkins preferred
definition of representationas a substantive acting for othersdoes not in
principle require election. This definition is distinct from other, less preferred ones
which do require formal authorisation in the form of voting (the authorisation
and accountability theories, in Pitkins words). Understandably, she does not
pursue the logic of this point. But arguably that logic says that a substantive
acting for others is prior to the means of achieving it, and in certain cases and
contexts electoral means may be inferior to others.
Choice and consent. Through voting we choose our elected politicians, and
through that we contribute to choosing the composition of the legislature
and the political colour of the government. But bear in mind that while
temporary governments are chosen, they are part of the permanent state,
which is not chosen (or at least cant be, now). From that angle, it is our
fate, and not our choice, to have government in the form that we do (as
b.
c.
11
Note Manins argument that election can be a mechanism for perpetuating distinction as well as
enacting political equality. See Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
12
This is the case despite the mutual engagement between elector and candidate or representative
implied by relational approaches to representation such as this one. A process of to and fro between
the two will always leave them out of synch in some respect, and to some extent.
13
See Andrew Rehfeld, The Concept of Constituency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005) for an extended discussion of territorial constituencies and democratic alternatives.
MICHAEL SAWARD
the other hand the institutional reality (where citizens and residents will feel
different degrees of attachment, for different reasons) is important, and goes
mostly unremarked. Such symbols may capture realities, but they may also
(must alsothe symbolism of oneness is necessarily fictional at some level)
gloss over realities such as necessary misrepresentation, shifting interests
that are not spoken for, the selectivity of portrayals of constituent interests,
and so on.
Note too that the representation of two moderate abstractionsof the
people by governmentis nested within the representation of two higher
level abstractionsrepresentation of the nation by the state. When
they are (deliberately or by structural necessity) not accurately or fully
representing peoples views, political leaders always have the option of
going up a level and claiming to speak for the larger nations interests.
With one level of representation nested inside another, the two are easily,
sometimes deliberately, confused. Charles de Gaulle expressed this point
graphically with his comment that In politics, it is necessary either to betray
ones country or the electorate. I prefer to betray the electorate.
Even on more straightforward grounds we can question the strength of
representative claims arising from the fact of election. They include: (a) the
effects of first-past-the-post electoral systems, like that of the UK, where
huge parliamentary majorities emerge from a minority of votes; (b) the fact
that rates of voting in noncompulsory systems are low, and (c) the
ambiguous status of nonenfranchised interests, such as those of children
and young people.
Control and accountability. Less abstractly, in most contemporary
democratic systems, parties choose candidates prior to voter choices. Key
choices are therefore made before citizens get to vote, which may enhance
intra-party accountability to the detriment of popular accountability.
Further, though the elected are accountable to the electorate, there are
serious limits to this accountability. As Mansbridge points out, the
electorates actual opportunity and capacity to hold elected officials to
account for their actions and policies is limited; promissory bases of
representation can be hollow, and we need to take seriously alternative
anticipatory and gyroscopic types where links of control and
accountability are so much weaker.14
d.
Taking these points together, in short, the state has a distinctive capacity to
represent us (voters, constituencies), but it also has a distinctive capacity (one
might rather say destiny) to misrepresent us. It, and its agents, also have a strong
incentive to emphasise the former and play down the latter. Elected politicians are
effectively forced to misrepresent us to some degree, precisely as a largely
14
unavoidable part of the workings of the very electoral processes through which
they are able to represent in the first place.
Political leaders are aware, to some degree, that claims based on election
are ambivalent. They bolster their positions by constructing favourable
representations (portrayals, depictions) of themselves, because they know their
representative claims will always be partial, unstable, and perhaps ripe for
exposureand that that can substantially dent their hopes of being elected,
which is likely to be their key concern. Political leaders regularly portray
themselves as standing for the nation, above and beyond narrow and partial
interests (think of the ubiquity of the Stars and Stripes in set-piece images of US
presidents and candidates). The architecture of their contexts also contributes to
this need, and habit. All of this is part of representation seen through the lens of
the representative claim.15
II. NON-ELECTIVE REPRESENTATION?
All of the aforementioned factorscentring on the partial and artificial nature
of any representation, including electiveopen up gaps which can, in principle,
be exploited by the unelected. I am not suggesting, along Burkean lines, that
non-elective representation is superior to elective.16 I am suggesting that despite
its undoubted strengths elective representation contains structural weaknesses
that some forms of non-elective representation may be able to exploit, by offering
15
To argue in this way is to stress, among other things, the performative side of political
representation. Performing representative claims involves careful projection of a leaders personality
and character. Many politicians have recognised the performance involved in what they do.
Long-serving post-war Australian prime minister Sir Robert Menzies believed that the core task of
political leadership was that of the political artist; John Uhr, The rhetoric of representation:
Menzies reshaping of parliament, Legislative Studies, 9 (1995), 92102 at p. 94. One of his
successors, Paul Keating, believed that political leadership involves a public performance, talking
about being out there on stage, doing the Placido Domingo; quoted in John Uhr, Political leadership
and rhetoric, Australia Reshaped, ed. G. Brennan and F. G. Castles (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), at p. 280. Keating used a movie director as his public speaking coach. Irish
prime minister Bertie Ahern has reportedly been taking lessons from the director of the Gaiety School
of Acting in Dublin to help him on the political stage (The Independent, November 19, 2004, p. 29).
As Erving Goffman wrote, All the world is not, of course, a stage, but the crucial ways in which it
isnt are not easy to specify; The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (London: Penguin 1990,
originally published 1959), p.76. And as Richard Fenno, the noted scholar of the US Congress, wrote:
Goffman does not talk about politicians, but politicians know what Goffman is talking about; Home
Style: House Members in their Districts (New York: Longman 2003), p. 55.
16
In Burkes words: Virtual representation is that in which there is a communion of interests and
a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people
and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them. . . . Such
a representation I think to be in many cases even better than the actual. It possesses most of its
advantages, and is free from many of its inconveniences; it corrects the irregularities in the literal
representation, when the shifting current of human affairs or the acting of public interests in different
ways carry it obliquely from its first line of direction. The people may err in their choice; but common
interest and common sentiment are rarely mistaken. See Edmund Burke, A Letter to Sir Hercules
Langrishe, 1792; available at www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/burkee/extracts/chap18.
htm (accessed 4 September 2007).
MICHAEL SAWARD
different sorts of representative claims which may resonate well with specific
audiences.
In principle, non-elective representative claims can enact principles that also
figure heavily with regard to elections: choice in terms of more fine-grained,
multiple, issue-specific choices, including between elections; retroactive consent
on the reception and consideration of unconventional representative claims;
identification in terms of non-party and partial citizen identities; giving voice to
the affected by opening up new lines and styles of representation, which can be
more sensitive to intensity of preference and particular lived experiences, often
beyond territorially defined interests; and more varied and perhaps sometimes
more effective means of control and accountability via governance networks and
deliberative devices.
A variety of non-elected actors claim to be representatives, and sometimes
those claims have a resonance with their audiences because they can sometimes do
things that elective claimants cannot do (or cannot do so readily). Why do we
sometimes listen to their claims? Often, it is because key principles that we
understand as being core to elections canin varied waysbe realised by unelected
actors. This may not be true of all such principles (and their realisation even in
electoral contexts can be patchy) or indeed all such actors, but it can be true of
a range of them. For example, a range of unelected representative claimants:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
17
It could be argued that the present cult of celebrity, for example, provides a potent symbolic
architecture for unelected would-be representatives. Such things might provide some claimants with
access to potential audiences. But it does not provide any close equivalent to the formal constitutional
status of being elected to a legislative seat.
should be accountable to all. But if there are more, and more types, of
representatives beyond the elected ones, why not, for example, think of
other potential patterns that could operate alongside, or within, One for
All? Consider for example One to Many; One to Some; or Some to Some;
even Each to Each? In other words, we can think of different sorts of
representatives speaking for different parts of us, of our varied interests, in
a more fluid way than the (nonetheless crucial) One to All metaphor can
capture.
We choose specific elected representatives, on a particular level, but we
cannot choose not to be represented by elected representatives, on a more general
level. States are (in principle) compulsory entities. We do not choose non-elected
representatives in such a clear way, but neither are we fated to have them or
follow them. Choice works differently in the case of unelected representatives
it is a choice in the mode of representation rather than a choice of a specific
representative.
In short, non-elective representation can potentially give us some of what
elective representation cannot.
III. NON-ELECTIVE REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS
But who are these potential unelected representatives? I dont claim that the types
and examples I now go on to discuss are all (automatically) legitimate democratic
cases of representation. They are indications of representative claims that are,
and can be, made by non-elected figures. The claims may or may not be
acceptable, or accepted, by their audiences or by their would-be constituencies. I
come to the question of criteria for the evaluation of claims later.
In the first part of this section, I present a range of types and examples of
representative claims by the unelected. Each of these claims is a claim that
someone represents the interests of a specified group. I emphasise in what follows
the basis for justification of the claimthe X in I [he/she] represent[s] these
peoples interests because of X. The list is indicative rather than definitive, and
in this section of the article I present each type of claim without making explicit
evaluative comments. My goal is to take a step towards understanding the range
of representative claims, and the types of justification they invoke.
The claims listed vary in a number of ways. For example some are claims
about the selfI represent . . .. Others are claims about othersShe
represents . . . or It represents . . .. Some are explicit, others implicit. For the
moment I simply present the different types of claim-basis.18
18
One might protest that a number of these representative claims involve other
thingschampions, stewards, leaders, advocates, figureheads, or spokespersonsrather than
representatives. But each of these roles can readily be assimilated to, or sufficiently strongly equated
to, representation.
10
MICHAEL SAWARD
See M. E. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
11
20
12
MICHAEL SAWARD
13
14
MICHAEL SAWARD
31
The foundations of such claims, and innovative institutions through which they might be
crystallized, are discussed by: Andrew Dobson, Representative democracy and the environment,
Democracy and the Environment, ed. W. M. Lafferty and J. Meadowcroft (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1996);
and Robyn E. Eckersley, Deliberative democracy, representation and risk: towards a democracy of
the affected, Democratic Innovation, ed. M. Saward (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 11732.
32
See Robert E. Goodin, Enfranchising the earth, and its alternatives, Political Studies, 44 (1996),
83549.
33
The works of David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), and
John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) offer
influential and contrasting approaches to cosmopolitan or transnational democratisation.
34
In some respects officials sanctioned by the UN are civil servants, but their operating beyond the
mandates of elected national governments makes them examples of potential nonelective claimants.
15
being heard or represented and attempt to make good the perceived shortfall.
The notion of individualised collective action is evocative here.35
IV. EVALUATING NON-ELECTIVE REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS:
SOME POSSIBLE CRITERIA
Those are some common enough examples of non-elective representative claims.
So much for making claims. What might make some such claims convincing, in
democratic terms? What tests might we want to apply? I do not suggest that there
are hard-and-fast criteria, or that many cases would not fall into a grey zone
between the plainly bogus and the strongly convincing; close attention to the
impact of claims over time and in their context is crucial. I will sketch very briefly
possible evaluative criteria, leaving to readers to consider, in empirical terms, how
they might connect with the types of non-elective claims discussed above.
The first response might simply be: if representative claims on any of these
bases are made, let the claimants stand for election and see if their claims get them
into office. This is, of course, a powerful democratic response. But it is not the
only potential or (I hope to show) reasonable democratic response. As we have
seen when discussing the limits of electoral representation in general terms, there
is scope, in principle, for potentially legitimate non-elective representative claims.
In this respect, I maintain that we should not adopt any prior assumption or
stipulation of illegitimacy for non-elective claims.
The criteria I discuss define ways in which, in a reasonably open democratic
society, citizens are most likely to be able to recognise and weigh up
representative claims.36
The nature of the criteria varies. Some refer to the verifiability of a claim with
respect to an invoked constituency. Others refer to the position of the claimant
within larger sets of institutions or processes. Yet others tap into a sense of
genuineness of chosen attachments and positions. Principled currents run
through the criteria, such as (again) choice, accountability and affectedness.
There are also deeper, underlying principled currents too, which centre upon
fundamental tensions and contrasts between authorisation and authenticity. I
turn to these currents in the concluding section.
The criteria come under three headings:
A.
35
See Michele Micheletti, Political Virtue and Shopping (New York: Palgrave, 2003).
I focus on claims within electoral democracies in part because these tend to be the harder cases
to evaluate. There is much more scope for actors opposing fundamentally undemocratic governments
or political orders to claim democratic legitimacy.
36
16
B.
C.
MICHAEL SAWARD
17
40
18
MICHAEL SAWARD
B. CONFIRMING CRITERIA
The confirming criteria are embedded within two questions.
i. Can the Representative Claim Be Tested in Principle?
Does it suggest the existence of a specifiable constituency to which the claim
refers, and which might therefore be able to attest in some way to the claims
veracity or reasonableness? Alternatively, does it trigger into existence a new
constituency by successfully articulating interests in a new way? If neither of these
is the case, we might suspect there are no secure grounds for the claim. A
constituency of interest must be articulated by the claimant.
ii. Is the Claim Accepted, or Provisionally Acceptable?
A representative claim might immediately be acclaimed by public action on the
part of large numbers of the would-be constituency of the claim-maker. Or, it
may not be opposed when repeatedly, publicly expressed, in which case one
might charitably apply a notion of provisional acceptability43the claim
can be respected by observers as long as it receives validation by the relevant
proto-constituency at some reasonable future date, and rejected if it does
not.44
In short, with regard to confirming criteria, we need to see if there is some
constituency that could respond to a claim. Does Bonos claim, or the Dalai
Lamas, or did Martin Luther Kings, evoke a clear and reasonably bounded
sense of constituency? Could we, in other words, reasonably identify the
referent in the claim, normally via thinking through the would-be constituency
that specific claims address while evoking or hailing? Subsequently, we should
look for some evidence of such response amongst potential constituents and
possibly wider audiences. How did audiences of their various claims receive
them? What reliable evidence is there that such claims were accepted, rejected,
or ignored, and to what degree in each case? And we need to allow time for
these thingsagain, denying an immediate assumption of illegitimacy of nonelective claims. So here, the focus is on the extent to which claims are or can
be confirmed over time through specifiable, invoked constituencies. In this
respect, confirming criteria clearly invoke deliberative principles; with respect
to a given, non-elective representative claim, has there been scope and time for
public consideration and deliberation, and what range of views have those
deliberations produced?
43
On the idea of provisionality in such contexts, see Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,
Democratic disagreement, Deliberative Politics, ed. S. Macedo (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), pp. 243279.
44
See the discussion of the non-objection criterion in David Runciman, The paradox of political
representation, Journal of Political Philosophy, 15 (2007), 93114.
19
C. UNTAINTEDEDNESS CRITERIA
It is fair to say that untaintedness criteria form an equal and opposite category
to connectedness criteria. On one level, this shows the plurality of ways we need
to consider regarding the potential legitimacy of non-elective representative
claims. Of course, all manner of individuals and groups might be untainted
by participation in government or state institutions and procedures. It is not
untaintedness in itself we are interested in here, but rather representative claims
which may invoke interests which, along the lines of my earlier discussion, are
marginalised or excluded under the present structure or operation of electoral
politics in a certain context.
i. Is the Claim Acceptable Precisely Because It Is Untainted by
Formal Election Processes?
If Carl Schmitt was right that parliamentary democracy involved the embodiment
of a certain principled unprincipledness,45 elected members must be prepared to
negotiate and compromise, and to that extent be unprincipled; and if this very
preparedness must be held as a principle, then perhaps there is always a space
for such untaintedness claims? Does disinterestedness, in the older sense of the
word (where it does not mean uninterested but rather unbiased detachment)
sometimes require independence of electoral pressures? Electoral pressures,
it is sometimes argued, press those subject to them to look to short-term
and parochial interests. Disinterestedness may require distance from these
pressures. From another angle, being an elected representative forces one to
addressrhetorically at leasta wide array of concerns more or less all at the
same time. The resulting bundling of issues may do disservice to individual
concerns, and give rise to grounds to argue that non-elected representatives can
stand for or speak for or champion such concerns effectively. We could add
claims to represent intensities and singularities of preference that get diluted in
the structures of formal representation.
ii. Is the Claim Acceptable Precisely Because It Is Untainted by Virtue of
Disconnection from a State Apparatus?
From a still wider perspective, we could say that electoral processes are linked to
the state, and that the state is tied into structural imperatives that prevent it from
acting systematically in the interests of its citizens. Dryzek argues that . . . we
can step back and ask whether democracy does indeed require counting heads.
I would argue that a logically complete alternative exists based on a
conceptualisation of intersubjective communication in the public sphere as a
45
F. R. Ankersmit, Political Representation (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002),
pp. 989.
20
MICHAEL SAWARD
46
John S. Dryzek, Discursive democracy vs. liberal constitutionalism, Democratic Innovation, ed.
Saward (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 7889 at p. 84.
47
John Street, Celebrity politicians: popular culture and political representation, British Journal
of Politics and International Relations, 6 (2004), 435452 at p. 448.
48
Henrik P. Bang and Torben Bech Dyrberg, Governance, self-representation and democratic
imagination, Democratic Innovation, ed. Saward (London and New York: Routledge, 2000),
146157.
49
Micheletti, Political Virtue and Shopping.
50
For reflections that are highly suggestive on this topic, see Hans von Rautenfeld, Thinking for
thousands: Emersons theory of political representation in the public sphere, American Journal of
Political Science, 49 (2005), 18497.
51
See Iris Marion Young, Activist challenges to deliberative democracy, Political Theory, 29
(2001), 67090.
21
22
MICHAEL SAWARD