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Is Virtue Ethics Inherently Egoistic?

By Douglas Grecian
Virtue Ethics is one of the oldest and most well known moral theories, its most
famous advocate being Aristotle. While it has many supporters, there is an accusation
that as a theory, it is inherently egoistic. Is this a valid point?
In this essay I will try to show that while there is some ground for this criticism, it is
one that perhaps misses some aspects of Virtue Ethics, and is not necessarily an
accurate assessment. This will be done by clarifying what we mean by egoism and
examining the main characteristics of Virtue Ethics, as well as some of the main
reasons behind the charge. Since Aristotles writings are the most well-known in this
area, this essay will focus mainly on his views.
One of the first things that should be made clear is that being egoistic is not the same
as being egotistical, which commonly refers self-glorification. Egoism, as we know it,
is the idea that true good comes from the development and happiness of oneself. In
other words, a form of morality that is based on methodical self-interest. Working on
this basis, it is easy to see how Aristotles Virtue Ethics are viewed as being egoistic,
especially when compared to other moral theories.
Eudemonia is a concept, put forward by Aristotle, which is sometimes inferred as
happiness but is more accurately described as having a life that is fulfilling. Most
importantly, focus is on the life of the agent himself, rather than those around him.
This notion of a good life, and how we achieve it trough the development of the
virtues will be the focus of whether this theory is egoistic. At first glance, however,
the focus on living a life that is fulfilling for the agent in question would seem to
indicate that egoism is an inherent trait, though at this point we cannot make any
assumptions. It seems that at this stage that the notion of egoism is built on the fact
that a person aims at her own flourishing rather than that of others. David Cooper
suggests that this is simply because she is living her own life (Cooper, 2005: 522).
However, it is possible to argue that living ones life is in itself inherently egoistic,
which we will examine more closely later on.
While the notion of focusing on achieving fulfilment for yourself could be seen as
evidence of egotism, we cannot ignore how you achieve it, which is perhaps the most
important part of Virtue Ethics. The core of this is developing the virtues and acting in
accordance with them. An important part of this for Aristotle is his concept of
practical wisdom. By this, he means that a practically wise man will be able to
perceive the right thing to do in any given situation, based on the experience he has
built up through his life. It determines virtue as being an appropriate expression of
certain characteristics, such as courage. Crucially, acting virtuously is dependent on
the particular circumstance, rather than any moral code. This could lead to the
accusation that it is too subjective as a theory, since an agent could simply assess the
situation and act according to what is best for him. Some of Aristotles writing would
seem to support this, saying that Virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant
(Cooper, 1998: 40).

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If we look at some of the passages from his work, Nicomachean Ethics, it appears at
first glance that Aristotle himself had egoistic views. At one point he writes pleasure
is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant
(Cooper, 1998: 39). One interpretation of this extract is that pleasure is something
that is good for the soul. He also states earlier on The good turns out to be activity of
the soul in accordance with virtue (Cooper, 1998: 29). While these statements could
be used to support the accusation of Virtue Ethics being self-centred, they are only a
small extract from the work and represent a limited view of this theory. Other sections
indicate an appreciation of others. When Aristotle talks about the final good being
self-sufficient, rather than just for the solitary man it is also for parents, children,
wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for
citizenship (Cooper, 1998: 37). To me, this illustrates the fact that it was always his
intention that any ethical decisions would take into account how it affects others,
though it could be argued that people could still act virtuously out of selfishness.
Indeed, the example of behaving courageously in a battle might be construed as
someone seeking glory through acting virtuously.
While this does seem to be a reasonable criticism, it fails to take into account some of
the things Aristotle says about practising the virtues and flourishing. Crucially, he says
it must be valuable in of itself and cannot be wanted for anything else. In essence a
person that acts virtuously who generally does not think about the consequences of his
actions and will only if he lived a good life when its at its end. If we define egoism
as methodical self-interest, then it seems that one would have to consider the
consequences of ones actions, which is not the case here.
At this point, it might be appropriate to discuss a criticism made by one of Aristotles
contemporaries, Plato. He claims that human nature is, biologically, so intrinsically
egoistic that a conventional moral upbringing which promotes the virtues as second
nature distorts and perverts it (Hurthouse, 1999: 252). As a result defective human
beings are produced rather than good ones. With this being the case, it would be
inevitable that Virtue Ethics is egoistic as well, since any virtuous act would be
affected by humanitys inherent egoism. However, the problem here is that this
argument is based on how we define human nature, which is still contested.
Hurthouse contends points that the view of self-centred egoism being natural misses
out on the social co-operation that is needed for what proponents fantasize about
being free to enjoy (Hurthouse, 1999: 252-53). One might ask what egoists fantasize
about, since it could be said social co-operation simply makes things easier.
For followers of Aristotelian ethics, their view of human nature could be similar to
Hughes, who writes: By nature we need relationships with others, of various kinds
and depths (Hughes, 2001: 179). He says it is no accident that two books of the
ethics are taken up with the discussion of the relationships between human beings.
In my view, this gives a clear indication that as a theory, Virtue Ethics is perhaps
about more than the pursuit of a flourishing life for yourself. On the other hand, you
could say that it fails to clearly state the basis of human nature, when Aristotle and
Plato both looked at it from a biologists point of view.

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While we have been mainly examining aspects that appear to indicate an inherent
egoism within Virtue Ethics, it might be useful to examine a couple of the arguments
that have been made against this criticism. Cooper argues that accusations of egoism
are dependent on an assumption that flourishing must be specified independently of
practise of virtues, making them means to an end, and that ethical disputes about lives
are disputes about alternate means to agreed upon ends (Cooper, 2005: 523).
Essentially, it would seem he is arguing that many are accusing Virtue Ethics based on
the assumption that moral theories should have sets of rules that can be applied to real
world situations. It is not unreasonable that many would think that a theory that places
importance on personal development is an exercise in egoism. This does not mean
that their views should be discounted out of hand.
Lastly, the other counter that could be made is that we are viewing Aristotle through
our modern day perceptions. The argument here is that he cannot at least be described
as an egoist in the modern sense without qualification (Hughes, 2001: 172). Since
Nicomachean Ethics was written in ancient Athens, it is unlikely that it would sit
comfortably with our liberal sensibilities with aspects like the neglect of women. Due
to this, it is difficult to call it inherently egoistic without some clear evidence.
In Conclusion, I think that claiming Virtue Ethics are inherently egoistic arises from
misunderstanding and not appreciating all of the literature, at least in terms of that by
Aristotle. There are other types of Virtue Ethics I have not discussed which might be
egoistic, but that is beyond the scope of this discussion. As a final thought, even if this
theory is inherently egoistic, is that necessarily a crucial flaw?

Bibliography

Cooper, D., Ethics: The Classical Readings, (Blackwell, 1998)

Cooper, D., Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, (OUP, 2005)
Hughes, G., Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics,
(Routledge, 2001)
Hurthouse, On Virtue Ethics, (OUP, 1999)