Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cases in Persons
Cases in Persons
Cases in Persons
I apologize for not being able to see you for the past
couple of meetings as I have not been feeling well
and am presently undergoing medical treatment.
To get us back on track, Ive attached Part 3 of our
syllabus containing additional readings.
I would like you to focus on the following cases:
1. Silverio v. Republic
2. Republic v. Cagandahan
3. Tenchavez v. Escao (focus on the authority of the
solemnizing officer and on the parties good faith)
4. Navaro v. Domagtoy
5. Alcantara v. Alcantara
(*Just know the basic facts and rulings in these
cases; we will not dwell too long on them)
6. Madridejos v. De Leon (insofar as a Marriage
Certificate is not an essential requisite of a valid
marriage)
7. Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (but a Marriage Certificate
is the primary or best evidence of marriage)
8. Trinidad v. CA (nevertheless, the existence of
marriage may be proven in other ways)
9. Vda. De Chua v. CA (Transfer Certificates of Title,
Residence Certificates, passports and other similar
documents do not prove marriage)
10. Nial v. Badayog (G.R. No. 133778, March 14,
2000) this is not included in the syllabus but please
add the same
We will have classes tomorrow, Thursday, and wrap
up our discussion on Marriage and its requisites.
Please prepare for an exam on Tuesday next week.
The exam will cover Articles 1-43 of the Civil Code
and Articles 1-34 of the Family Code. Ill discuss with
you the topics you need to know for the exam.
Thank you and see you all tomorrow.
J. Mike Francisco
G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.*
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Change of Name; The State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification; A change of name is a privilege, not
a right.The State has an interest in the names
borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a
right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil
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I.
Rule103
CHANGE OF NAME
Rule 108
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT
ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court
erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition known as CAH, and her name from
Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally
defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court because while the local civil
registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3,
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Republic vs. Cagandahan
invokes Section 6,15 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
which states that courts shall construe the Rules
liberally to promote their objectives of securing to
the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of the matters brought before it. We agree that there
is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the
local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his
birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART.412.No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 37616 of the Civil Code, this
provision was amended by Republic Act No. 904817
in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters
can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of
such errors. Rule 108 now
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15 SEC.6.Construction.These Rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective
of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
RESOLUTION ON
MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER
Isabelo V. Binamira, Filemon B. Barria and Crispin
D. Baizas & Associates for appellants.
Vicente L. Faelnar, for appellee Mamerto Escao
and Mena F. Escao.
Jalandoni & Jamir for appellee Vicenta F. Escao.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for intervenor Russel Leo
Moran.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Not satisfied with the decision of this Court,
promulgated on 29 November 1965, in the aboveentitled case, plaintiff-appellant Pastor B. Tenchavez
and defendant-appellee Vicenta F. Escao,
respectively, move for its re
consideration; in addition, Russell Leo Moran, whom
said defendant married in the United States, has
filed, upon leave previously granted, a memorandum
in intervention.
Movant Tenchavez poses the novel theory that
Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of, an
award for damages because they are guilty of
contributory negligence in failing to take up proper
and timely measures to dissuade their daughter
Vicenta from leaving her husband (Tenchavez),
obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another
man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first,
because this was not raised in the court below;
second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it
contradicts plaintiffs previous theory of alienation of
affections in that contributory negligence involves an
omission to perform an act while alienation of
affection involves the performance of a positive act.
The prayer of appellant Tenchavez in his motion for
reconsideration to increase the damages against
Vicenta (P25,000 for damages and attorneys fees
were awarded to Tenchavez in the decision) should,
likewise, be denied, all factors and circumstances in
the case having been duly considered in the main
decision,
In seeking a reexamination of the decision,
defendantappellee Vicenta Escao, in turn, urges a
comparison between the two marriages, stating, in
plainer terms, that the Tenchavez-Escao marriage
was no more than a ceremony, and a faulty one at
that, while the Moran-Escao marriage fits the
concept of a marriage as a social institution because
publicly contracted, recognized by both civil and
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x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was
amenable and a willing participant to all that took
place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony
was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby
cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended
the civil wedding.36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitionerthat they
appeared before a fixer who arranged everything
for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a
certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapelwill not strengthen
his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman
shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will
be presumed in the absence of any showing to the
contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not
duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage
license has been duly and regularly issued by the
local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs
to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled
the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties
had fulfilled the requirements of law.38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The
presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It
is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,
Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer
the authority to solemnize a marriage. (Araes vs.
Occiano, 380 SCRA 402 [2002]) [Alcantara vs.
Alcantara, 531 SCRA 446(2007)]
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for (1) certiorari to annul and set aside
certain actuations of respondent Court of First
Instance of Cebu Branch III in its Civil Case No.
12328, an action for accounting of properties and
money totalling allegedly about P15 million pesos
filed with a common cause of action against six
defendants, in which after declaring four of the said
defendants herein petitioners, in default and while
the trial as against the two defendants not declared
in default was in progress, said court granted
plaintiff's motion to dismiss the case in so far as the
the date set for the hearing, otherwise the court may
not validly act on the motion." (Comments on the
Rules of Court by Moran, Vol. 1, 1970 ed. p. 474.)
Such is the correct construction of Section 4 of Rule
15. And in the instant case, there can be no question
that the notices to the non-defaulted defendants
were short of the requirement of said provision.
We can understand the over-anxiety of counsel for
plaintiff, but what is incomprehensible is the seeming
inattention of respondent judge to the explicit
mandate of the pertinent rule, not to speak of the
imperatives of fairness, considering he should have
realized the far-reaching implications, specially from
the point of view he subsequently adopted, albeit
erroneously, of his favorably acting on it. Actually, he
was aware of said consequences, for simultaneously
with his order of dismissal, he immediately set the
case for the ex-parte hearing of the evidence against
the defaulted defendants, which, incidentally, from
the tenor of his order which We have quoted above,
appears to have been done by him motu propio As a
matter of fact, plaintiff's motion also quoted above
did not pray for it.
Withal, respondent court's twin actions of October
21, 1974 further ignores or is inconsistent with a
number of known juridical principles concerning
defaults, which We will here take occasion to
reiterate and further elucidate on, if only to avoid a
repetition of the unfortunate errors committed in this
case. Perhaps some of these principles have not
been amply projected and elaborated before, and
such paucity of elucidation could be the reason why
respondent judge must have acted as he did. Still,
the Court cannot but express its vehement
condemnation of any judicial actuation that unduly
deprives any party of the right to be heard without
clear and specific warrant under the terms of existing
rules or binding jurisprudence. Extreme care must be
the instant reaction of every judge when confronted
with a situation involving risks that the proceedings
may not be fair and square to all the parties
concerned. Indeed, a keen sense of fairness, equity
and justice that constantly looks for consistency
between the letter of the adjective rules and these
basic principles must be possessed by every judge, If
substance is to prevail, as it must, over form in our
courts. Literal observance of the rules, when it is
conducive to unfair and undue advantage on the part
of any litigant before it, is unworthy of any court of
justice and equity. Withal, only those rules and
procedure informed, with and founded on public
policy deserve obedience in accord with their
unequivocal language or words..
TRANSLATION
This is to certify that 1, Miss Tan Ki Eng Alias Tan Put,
have lived with Mr. Lim Po Chuan alias TeeHoon since
1949 but it recently occurs that we are incompatible
with each other and are not in the position to keep
living together permanently. With the mutual
concurrence, we decided to terminate the existing
relationship of common law-marriage and promised
not to interfere each other's affairs from now on. The
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) has been given to
me by Mr. Lim Po Chuan for my subsistence.
Witnesses:
Mr. Lim Beng Guan Mr. Huang Sing Se
Signed on the 10 day of the 7th month of the 54th
year of the Republic of China (corresponding to the
year 1965).
(SGD) TAN KI ENG
Verified from the records. JORGE TABAR (Pp. 283-284,
Record.)
Indeed, not only does this document prove that
plaintiff's relation to the deceased was that of a
common-law wife but that they had settled their
property interests with the payment to her of
P40,000.
In the light of all these circumstances, We find no
alternative but to hold that plaintiff Tan Put's
allegation that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan has not been satisfactorily established and
that, on the contrary, the evidence on record
convincingly shows that her relation with said
deceased was that of a common-law wife and
furthermore, that all her claims against the company
and its surviving partners as well as those against
the estate of the deceased have already been settled
and paid. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
respective counsel who assisted the parties in the
quitclaim, Attys. H. Hermosisima and Natalio Castillo,
are members in good standing of the Philippine Bar,
with the particularity that the latter has been a
member of the Cabinet and of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines, hence, absent any
credible proof that they had allowed themselves to
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Q:
Will you please tell the Court for how long did you
stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad and his
children before 1940?
A:
For only three months.
Q:
How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A:
Every Sunday.
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Q:
You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A:
Q:
Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes
Trinidad was single. Do you know if he had cohabited
with anybody before his death?
A:
[T]hat I do not know.
Q:
You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A:
No, sir.
Q:
Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes
Trinidad if you have known of anybody with whom he
has lived as husband and wife?
A:
I could not recall because I was then in Manila
working.
Q:
After the war, do you remember having gone back to
the house of your aunt Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan?
A:
Yes, sir.
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors, died intestate on May 28, 1992 in
Davao City.
5. That the aforementioned deceased left
properties both real and personal worth
P5,000,000.00 consisting of the following:
50,000.00
P50,000.00
50,000.00
d) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT No. T-126584
with an area of 303 sq.
m. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50,000.00
e) Residential house in Cotabato City valued
at. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.........
300,000.00
f) Residential house in Davao City valued at. . . . . . . .
..........................................
...
545,000.00
i) Car, Colt Galant with Motor No. 4G5252D75248 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
............
110,000.00
j) Reo Isuzu Dump Truck with Motor No. DA6408
38635 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
350,000.00
k) Hino Dump Truck with Motor No. ED100T47148 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
..........
350,000.00
l) Stockholdings in various corporations with par
value estimated
at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3,335,000.00
TOTAL --------------------------- P 5,000,000.00
6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single
and without legitimate descendants or ascendants,
hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson
Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, his
children with herein petitioner shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. (Article 988 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines).
7. That the names, ages and residences of the
relatives of said minors are the following, to wit:
37
600,000.00
37
210,000.00
40
Names
Relationship
Ages
Residences
1.
Carlos Chua
Uncle
60
Aida Chua
Auntie
55
3.
Romulo Uy
Uncle
Petitioner.
Paragraph 4 of the original petition was also
amended to read as follows:
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the
abovementioned minors is a resident of Cotabato
City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao
City.
The petition contained exactly the same prayers as
the original petition.
Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition
alleging that at the hearing of said motion on 24 July
1992, private respondents counsel allegedly
admitted that the sole intention of the original
petition was to secure guardianship over the persons
and property of the minors.6
On 21 August 1992, the trial court issued an Order7
denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The
court ruled
that Antonietta Garcia had no personality to file the
motion to dismiss not having proven her status as
wife of the decedent. Further, the court found that
the actual residence of the deceased was Cotabato
City, and even assuming that there was concurrent
venue among the Regional Trial Courts where the
decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato had
already taken cognizance of the settlement of the
decedents estate to the exclusion of all others. The
pertinent portions of the order read:
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19,
1992, counsel for movant Antonietta G. Chua
presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation
that she was the lawful wife of the decedent and that
the latter resides in Davao City at the time of his
death. Exh. 1 was the xerox copy of the alleged
marriage contract between the movant and the
petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on
the ground of the timely objection of the counsels for
petitioner that the best evidence is the original copy
or authenticated copy which the movant cannot
produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in
opposition presented the following: a certification
from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such
marriage contract was ever registered with them; a
letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person
to have solemnized the alleged marriage that he has
not solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit 2
through 18 consist among others of Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L.
Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of
Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and
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