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Harvey D - Land Rent and The Transition To The Capitalist Mode of Production
Harvey D - Land Rent and The Transition To The Capitalist Mode of Production
Harvey D - Land Rent and The Transition To The Capitalist Mode of Production
David Harvey
Johns Hopkins University
Marx considered that money rent on land a n d its corollary, the formation of land markets, was a precondition
for the rise of capitalism. Like merchants capital and
usury, landed capital precedes the modern standard form
of capital. The latter ultimately subjugates these earlier
forms and converts them to its own requirements. The actual history of this process is strewn with complexities
generated out of the cross-currents of class struggle a n d
the diversity of initial conditions of land tenure and
ownership. Marxs general version of this history, based
on the West European experience, can be divided into
two phases. In the first, feudal labor rents (the source of
a surplus product) are transformed into rent in kind and
finally into a money payment, while land is increasingly
released from those constraints which prevcnt i t being
freely traded as a commodity. Furthermore, the conversion to money payments implies either a voluntary o r forcible integration of land users (particularly agricultural
producers) into some kind of general system of commodity production and exchange.
None of this ensures, however, that rent assumes its
modern, purely capitalistic form, thoroughly integrated
into the circulation of capital (and revenues). All kinds of
intermediate forms can arise and here Reys conception
of complex articulations of different modes of production, one upon the other, makes eminent sense. And
when what Marx viewed as a n inevitable, though lengthy,
transition is blocked for an extended period, as often a p pears t o be the case in third-world peasant societies, then
Reys interpretation is crucial to the degree that it sheds
light o n the material conditions and class configurations
a n d alliances that freeze the transition in a half-way state
between pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production. None of this implies, however, acceptance of Reys
conclusion that n o social basis exists within a purely
capitalist mode of production for the appropriation of
land rent. We will show how that conclusion can be
refuted in the next section. But for the moment we will
follow Reys perceptive line o f argument as it applies t o
the transitional phase.
Under transitional conditions landlords can play a
direct a n d active role in the exploitation of labor (as opposed to the backseat, passive role which Marx assigned
to them under capitalism). This is a s true for slave
economies (the American South prior to the Civil War) as
i t is for landlord-peasant systems of agricultural production in the present era. There is a direct incentive for the
landlord to extract the maximum of rent (whether in kind
or in money does not immediately concern us), not only
because this maximizes the landlords revenues, but also
because the peasant is forced to work harder and harder
and produce more a n d more commodities for the market
at ever lower prices (given the increase in supply). The
massive exploitation of a rural peasantry by a landlord
class is, from this standpoint, perfectly consistent with industrial capitalism all of the time it provides cheap food
for workers a n d cheap raw materials for industry. And
even if t h e peasants nominally own their own land (there
is n o overt landlord class), indebtedness at usurious interest rates and the obligation to pay taxes t o the state can
have the same effect. I t is not hard t o see how a powerful
alliance of classes - comprising landowners, industrial
bourgeoisie, money lenders, backed by the state - can
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form a n d block any full transition t o capitalist social relations on the land.
But such a form of exploitation, like absolute surplus
value (of which it is a bastard form) has negative social
consequences and inherent limits. Firstly, the extraction
of a fixed money payment from basically subsistence producers may diminish the supply of commodities when
prices rise because producers have to sell less to reach a
fixed money goal. Prices continue to rise as a consequence. When prices go down, on the other hand,
peasants have t o sell more a n d so increase the supply in
the face of falling prices. Price movements and commodity supplies d o not, under such conditions, integrate at all
well with the general dynamic of accumulation. That
dynamic, secondly, invariably requires a n expansion of
output which, with a fixed technology of peasant production, means increasing rates of exploitation. And as exploitation increases so d o the conditions for revolutionary movements ripen. Even in the absence of such
resistance, there is a n absolute limit to this kind of absolute exploitation. At some point the productive forces
on the land have to be revolutionized to accommodate
the expanding demands of capitalism. We then discover
that the transitional forms of organization inhibit the
development of the social productive forces of labour,
social forms of labour, social concentration of capital
. . . and the progressive application of science (Capilal,
Volume 3, p. 807). New productive forces have to be
deployed a n d that means opening u p the land lo the free
flow of capital.
This brings us to the second phase of Marxs version of
the transition t o capitalist forms of rental appropriation.
Capital and labor must confront each other on the land
free from any direct interference of the landlord class.
The landlord must be reduced to a purely passive figure.
The class alliance between an industrial bourgeoisie and a
landlord class breaks down and antagonistic relations
arise between them, until such time as the latter class entirely disappears as a coherent force in society. And all of
this must happen because this is the only way, under
capitalism, for productive forces to be revolutionized on
the land itself.
W e can understand this transition from the standpoint
of the landlord in the following way. The landlord can
dominate a peasantry tied to the land and has everything
to gain from maximizing the extraction of rent. But the
landlord cannot similarly compel the capitalist to invest
and therefore has much t o lose from maximizing the extraction of rent from the capitalist. The power of landed
property then acts as a barrier to the free flow of capital
onto the land and inhibits the development of the productive forces. The possibility exists, however, for a terrain
of compromise between landowner and capitalist. The
use value of land to the capitalist is as a n element, means
or condition of production which, when worked on by
labor, produces surplus value. The capitalist is concerned
with rent in relation t o surplus value produced. The
landlord, o n the other hand, is concerned with the rent
per acre. Under conditions of strong capital flow onto the
land, the rent per acre can rise while the rent as a portion
of surplus value produced declines (cf. Capital, Volume
3, p. 683). Under these conditions, the landlord has
everything to gain by lowering the barrier which land-
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2o
Marxs views on differential rent, particularly those partially worked out in Capital, are quite distinct from those
of Ricardo and provide the clue to the true interpretation
to be put upon land rent in relation to the circulation of
capital.
Marx follows Ricardo in distinguishing between two
kinds of differential rent, but innovates by analyzing how
the two forms of rent relate and serve simultaneously as
limits for one another (Capital, Volume 3, p. 737).
Marxs insights are hard to recuperate from chapters full
of convoluted argument and elaborate arithmetic calculations. I shall simply summarize the most important
features.
Differential rent of the first type (DR-I) arises because
producers on superior soils or in superior locations
receive excess profits relative to production costs on the
worst land in the worst locations. Superior soil and location, like superior technology, are indeed a source of
relative surplus value to individual producers (which explains why all of them can appear as productive of
value). But unlike superior technology, superior locations and soils can form relatively permanent sources of
excess profits. If the latter are taxed away as rent, the
profit rate is equalized across different soils and locations. Capitalists can then compete with each other only
through adoption of superior techniques. Which pushes
the capitalist system back onto its central track of looking
to revolutions in the productive forces as the means to its
salvation. The extraction of DR-I has a vital social function in relation to the dynamics of capital accumulation.
Without it, some producers could sit complacently on the
excess profits conferred by natural or locational
advantages and fail i n their mission to revolutionize the
productive forces on the land.
This conception of DR-I, essentially no different from
that of Ricardo, has to be modified in three important
respects. First, trade-offs can exist between fertility and
location so that the worst land has to be understood as
a combination of characteristics. Secondly, both fertility
and location are social appraisals and subject to
modification either directly (through soil exhaustion or
improvement, changing transport facilities, etc.) or indirectly (through changing techniques of production
which have different land or locational requirements).
The excess profits from superior soils or locations are
permanent only in relation to changing appraisals. Thirdly, DR-1 depends upon a normal flow of capital into
production on the land. And when we switch to consider
what constitutes that normal flow of capital onto the
land we immediately encounter the problem of the second kind of differential rent (DR-2). The immediate
implication is that DR-I depends crucially on capital
flows which automatically generate DR-2.
Imagine a situation in whcih no advantages due to
location or fertility existed. Differentials in productivity
on the land would then be due solely to the different
quantities of capital invested (assuming some pattern of
returns to scale). Excess profits in this case are entirely
due to the investment of capital. Conversion of these excess profits into DR-2 will simply check the flow of
capital onto the land except under two particular conditions. First, if the investments embed relatively permanent productive forces in the land then the flow of capital
over some future revenue. Stocks and shares, for example, can be sold before any actual production takes place.
The buyers trade their money in return for a share of the
fruits of future labor. Insofar as the money is used to set
labor in motion (or create conditions, such as physical
infrastructures, to enhance the productivity of social
labor), then the fictitious capital stands to be realized.
Even under the best conditions, fictitious capital entails
speculation and under the worst it provides abundant
opportunity for fraud and devaluation. Capitalism could
not function, however, without the large scale creation
and movement of fictitious forms of capital via the credit
system and capital markets. Only in this way can capital
be shifted rapidly from unprofitable to profitable sectors
and regions, new lines of activity opened up, centralization of capitals be achieved, etc. The credit system
(capital markets in particular) becomes the central nervous system for the coordination of accumulation. It also
becomes the central locus of all capitalisms internal contradictions. Crises always appear, in the first instance,
therefore, as financial and monetary crises.
Once the significance of fictitious forms of capital is
established, we can see how it is that property rights over
any form of future revenue might be bought and traded.
Government debt (a right to a share of future taxes) and
mortgages on land (a right to future rents) and property
(a right to amortization payments) all stand to be freely
traded. In the case of land, what is bought and sold is the
title to the ground rent yielded by it. That ground rent,
when capitalized at the going rate of interest, yields the
land price. Hence arises an intimate relationship between
rent and interest. The money laid out by the buyer of land
is equivalent to an interest-bearing investment, a claim
upon the future fruits of labor. Title to land becomes a
form of fictitious capital, in principle no different from
stocks and shares, government bonds, etc. (although it
has certain qualities of security, illiquidity, etc.). Land, in
short, can be regarded as a pure financial asset. This is
the condition, I argue, which dictates the pure form of
landed property under capitalism.
The theory of ground rent tells us that landowners
should ruthlessly appropriate all excess profits due to
relatively permanent advantages of fertility or location
(no matter whether the product of capital or not). Anticipated future excess profits (due to future capital flows
and future labor) affect the price of land in the present insofar as land becomes a pure financial asset, a form of
fictitious capital. Marx excluded such speculative activity
from his purview (except in a few rare instances, e.g.,
Capital, Volume 3 , pp. 774-6) and was therefore content
to view landownership as an entirely passive function.
But land markets, like capital markets, play a vital coordinating role in the allocation of future capital and labor
to the land. Landowners leave behind their passive
stances and can play an active role in the creation of conditions which permit enhanced future rents to be appropriated. In so doing, of course, they condemn future
labor to ever-increasing levels of exploitation in the name
of the land itself. But they also play a vital role in relation
to accumulation.
Landowners can coerce or cooperate with capital to ensure the creation of enhanced ground rents in the future.
By perpetually striving to put the land under its highest
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receive on goods and services. In the end it is the continuous flow of money that is important. This view of
value in motion is vital to Marxs conception of
capital and properly carries over to the study of the circulation of revenues. We must think, therefore, of the
ratio between two flows - of revenue and capital - and
try to situate rent as a social relation of momentary appropriation from both flows (both capital and revenue)
based on the mere fact of land and property ownership.
There is, evidently, plenty of work to be done on the
theory of these relationships.
And what of rent appropriated from the working
class? Clearly, as Engels argued, this is a secondary form
of exploitation. It is nevertheless deserving of analysis. In
this case rent is appropriated off of variable capital, but
insofar as wage rates reflect housing costs then the rate of
surplus value should diminish with rising rents and vice
versa. On this basis Engels attacked those who sought a
solution to the housing question in the absence of any attack upon the wages question. But there is a lot more to it
than that. The manner, extent and form of rental appropriation has important economic, social and ideological
consequences - witness the debate over the politics of
homeownership for the working class, and the effects of
socializing housing provision in many of the advanced
capitalist countries. Furthermore, to the degree that
elements within the working class become property
owners, they, too, can seek to appropriate rents from
fellow-workers. We then encounter the theoretical problem of how to account for rental payments in establishing
the value of labor power as a datum for analysis.
Analysis of such questions reveals some interesting insights. For example, if workers receive a uniform wage,
then some who live close to work will have lower costs of
reproduction because of low transport costs while others
will pay more if they live further away. Properly structured rents on working class housing could then have the
effect of equalizing the real wage to workers at different
locations (the analogy with differential rent on capital is
exact). The relationships between land and property rent,
transport availability and cost, then come into play. The
problem, of course, is that there is nothing in the power
relations between landowners and workers to ensure that
rents are properly structured in the first place. Furthermore, workers also compete for living space against
capitalists (both producers and consumers). The level of
appropriation of rent from one kind of revenue cannot be
understood without reference to levels of appropriation
from other forms of revenue as well as from capital itself.
The full theory of such relationships remains to be
worked out. Marxs theory of rent is partial because it
deals solely with the circulation of capital and excludes
any direct analysis of the circulation of revenues. We cannot, therefore, simply take Marxs categories and make
them work in the actual analysis of the total complex of
land and property markets (particularly in urban areas).
Something more is involved even presuming a society
dominated by a purely capitalist mode of production.
And that something more is the circulation of revenues,
albeit in relation to the circulation of capital which
always remains as its basis.
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4. CONCLUSION
Rent is, we repeat, simply a money payment for the use
of land and its appurtenances. This simple money payment can conceal a host of possible social significations
that can be unravelled only through careful sociohistorical investigation. The task of theory under such
circumstances is to establish the underlying forces that
give social meaning to and fix the level of the rental payment. Under a purely capitalist mode of production these
forces merit disaggregation into those which attach to the
circulation of capital and those which relate to the circulation of revenues (while recognizing that the two circulation processes are dependent upon each other). Additional complications arise because it is not always easy to
distinguish between interest on capital fixed in land (interest on buildings and permanent improvements) and rent
on land pure and simple. Furthermore the different
uses of land as a means, condition, or element of production, or as a reservoir of present or potential use values,
means that the significance of land to users varies from
sector to sector. Project all of these complexities into the
framework of land use competition in which land is just
one out of several different forms of fictitious capital
(stocks and bonds, government debt, etc.) competing for
investment, and we are forced to conclude that there is
nothing simple about that simple money payment even
under conditions of a purely capitalist mode of production.
But the notion of a purely capitalist mode of produc-
REFERENCES
Marx, K., Theories of Surplus Value (3 Parts, Lawrence
and Wishart, London; 1969 and 1972).
Marx, K., and Engels, F., Selected Correspondence (Progress Publishers, Moscow; 1955).
Postel-Vinay, G., La Rente Fonciere dans le Capitalisme
Agricole (Maspero, Paris; 1974).
Rey, P-P., Les Alliances de Classes (Maspero, Paris;
1973).
Tribe, K., Land, Labour and Economic Discourse
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London; 1978).
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