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Sandeep Maram THESIS Final UpdatedFeb
Sandeep Maram THESIS Final UpdatedFeb
Controlled Separation
Sandeep Maram
Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
in
Electrical Engineering
Dr. Lamine Mili, Chair
Dr. Yilu Liu
Dr. Virgilio A Centeno
A new power system controlled separation scheme is proposed to prevent the propagation
of cascading failures across a transmission network should it undergoes a major
disturbance, thereby reducing the possibility of a large-scale blackout. This scheme is
developed based on a set of conjectures, which state the following: (i) the locations of
out-of-step operations are independent of the severity and the location of the initial faults;
(ii) these out-of-step operations occur sequentially over a sufficiently long duration so
that relay blocking and transfer tripping can take place to minimize the load-generation
imbalance in the formed islands. To verify these conjectures, extensive dynamic stability
simulations are executed on a 30-bus and a 517-bus system, which exhibit characteristics
suitable for this study. Furthermore, we verify that these out-of-step operations do depend
on the prevailing system topology and the operating conditions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my sincere thanks to my advisor Dr. Lamine Mili for his
continuous support and encouragement during the course my research work. He is an
excellent teacher and mentor to me and always guided me in taking correct decisions for
my academic and career growth. I am very grateful to him for giving me an opportunity
to work under his able guidance. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Yilu
Liu and Dr. Virgilio Centeno for their valuable comments and for serving as my advisory
committee members. Special thanks go to Mike Adibi of IRD Corporation for initiating
this research work, for his continuous encouragement, and for his valuable inputs from
time to time.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 Introduction
11
12
13
14
15
17
17
18
20
22
23
23
26
30
32
35
35
iv
36
37
4-4 Description of the software programs used for conducting the simulations
39
40
41
41
43
44
44
48
48
49
52
53
54
56
57
59
66
67
Chapter 6 Conclusions
69
References
71
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1: Basic structure of a power system
Figure 2-0: Step distance relaying functions for a complete line protection
15
16
17
Figure 2-3: Mho distance relay characteristics with fault impedance loci
18
19
20
Figure 2-6: Out of Step Relay with Blinders (Ohm Unit Relay)
21
22
24
25
31
31
32
32
33
33
34
37
Figure 4-2: Structure of the 517-bus system with four sub-systems connected by
tie-lines
38
42
43
46
47
vi
51
53
Figure 5-3: Apparent impedance path of tie-line e-f for different fault intensities
54
Figure 5-4: Impact on tie-line g-h of blocking the out-of-step relay of tie-line e-f
55
Figure 5-5: Light Load and Peak load case results (38 generators in operation)
56
Figure 5-6: Apparent impedance path for the two network configurations
59
Figure 5-7: Apparent impedance locus of tie-line e-f (blocked) and tie-line g-h
60
Figure 5-8: The transfer tripping operation performed on tie-lines f-h and e-g
61
Figure 5-9: Transient stability curves obtained on the reduced 30-bus system
66
Figure 5-10: Eleven clusters identified on the 30-bus system using k-means
clustering with mean silhouette value of 0.82
vii
68
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-0: Relay time and interrupting time for different line voltages
13
14
30
39
49
Table 5-2: Initial operating conditions for checking the cascading case
50
52
57
58
Table 5-6: Initial operating conditions for the out-of-step blocking and transfer
tripping simulation case
62
Table 5-7: Simulations results obtained using different initial fault locations
63
Table 5-8: Simulations results obtained using different initial fault intensities
64
65
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Electric energy is produced by electric power systems, which are critical infrastructures
whose service is vital to the economy of a nation. Providing continuous supply of electric
energy to meet the load demand is a complex technical challenge. It involves real-time
estimation of the system state together with the control and coordination of generating
units aimed at delivering in a secure manner electric power to the load. Consequently,
power system network security is a major concern worldwide. However, due to
deregulation, power systems are being operated closer to their maximum loadability. In
addition, environmental constraints hinder the expansion of the electric transmission
networks from meeting future demand growth. As a result, power systems are more
vulnerable to severe disturbances like faults on major pieces of equipment. Such
contingencies may result in cascading failures leading to large-scale blackouts. Therefore,
there is a need for new control schemes aimed at reducing this risk. It turns out that
controlled system separation is one good solution to this problem.
Generating
Station /
Power Plant
Generator
Step-Up
Transformer
Transmission Network
(Transmission lines of
765, 500, 345, 230,138
kV)
Subtransmission
Customer
26 kV and 69 kV
Substation
Step-Down
Transformer
Primary
Customer
13 kV and 4 kV
Secondary
Customer
120 V and 240 V
A power system is said to be reliable when it is able to satisfy the power system load
requirements with an acceptable continuity of service at the contractual frequency and
voltage quality. Power system reliability can be sub-divided into two components,
namely, adequacy and security. Adequacy stands for the ability of the system to generate
sufficient power to meet the load demand at every instant of time. On the other hand,
security is defined as the ability of the system to cope with any abnormal disturbances,
which may be caused by short-circuits or unduly relay trippings that result in the loss of
major system components. For the sake of computational feasibility, security N-1 is the
only security level executed by both the power system planners and the control center
operators. Specifically, this function checks whether the system has enough reserve
margins in transmission and in generation to withstand the loss of a single piece of
equipment subject to both system equality and inequality constraints; the latter include
limits on the voltages and currents across the transmission network.
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and various Regional
Reliability Councils have developed system operating and planning standards. These
standards ensure reliable operation of a power system; they are based on the following
requirements [1]:
A balance between the real power generation and the load demand should be
maintained continuously;
The power flows across system transmission lines and transformers should be
monitored to ensure that thermal limits are not exceeded;
The system should return to stability within a reasonable time following any
single contingency;
A reliable operation and control of a power system is a very complex technical challenge.
It involves the execution of functions such as real-time system monitoring and
contingency analysis. However, system responses to different disturbances are difficult to
predict accurately for all operating conditions. Therefore, major failures cannot be
prevented from occurring from time to time; hence, the need of corrective control
schemes to ensure system integrity under major contingencies.
During a normal operating state of a power system, both equality and inequality
constraints are satisfied. Equality constraints refer to the balance between systems
generation and load while inequality constraints state that some system variables, such as
currents and voltages, remain within the normal operating range of the physical
equipment and satisfy system dynamic stability constraints [3]. However, while an
operating condition of a power system is normal with all the constraints being satisfied, it
may be secure or insecure. In the secure case, the system is capable to withstand a single
contingency without violating any of the operating constraints. The reserve margins for
the transmission and generation are sufficient to handle the loss of a single piece of
equipment. In the insecure case, the system is unable to cope with contingencies.
Normal
and
Secure
Restorative
Alert
In Extremis
Emergency
Alert State
In the alert state, a power system is considered to be insecure. System operators must be
alert and constantly keep monitoring equality and inequality constraints. However, in an
event of any contingency, the lack of reserve margins may result in the violation of some
inequality constraints, inducing a transition of the system into emergency state [3]. In that
instance, some equipment may be overloaded, that is, they may operate above their rated
capabilities. If the severity of the disturbance is very high, the system may change its
state directly to the in extremis state when preventive actions are not taken in a timely
manner.
Emergency State
A power system enters an emergency state from an alert state when a contingency occurs
in the system. During emergency conditions, the voltage levels fall below the stability
limits at various buses and the emergency ratings of system components are exceeded
due to overloading, implying that the inequality constraints are violated. The system can
be restored back to the alert state by initiating effective control strategies such as fault
clearing, fast valving, exciter control, generation tripping, and load shedding [3].
In Extremis State
When effective control measures are not applied to a power system operating in an
emergency state, the system will enter in an in-extremis state. Here, both the equality and
inequality constraints are violated [3]. A system settling in an in-extremis state may
undergo cascading outages, which may result in the formation of disconnected islands
while inducing major disruption in service, that is, brownouts or blackouts [2]. Controlled
system separation and load shedding are few actions that may be taken to prevent the
occurrence of major failures and ensure least disruption in service.
Restorative State
This state indicates that control actions are being implemented, which aim at restoring the
integrity of the power system via the sequential connection of the disconnected parts,
including the system load. Depending on the existing operating conditions, the system
may transit from this state to the alert state or the normal state.
6
Since the late 1990s, power systems have been pushed closer to their limits,
resulting in a growing risk for a local failure to cascade into a large-scale catastrophic
blackout. The most common triggering fault of such an event is a short-circuit that
occurs on high voltage or extra-high voltage transmission lines of the system. At the
inception of a disturbance, the relays located on faulty transmission lines operate to clear
the fault. This induces variations of the electrical power generator outputs while the
generator mechanical inputs remain almost constant. The resulting effect of this power
imbalance is the formation of groups of coherent generators operating at different speeds,
swinging one against the others. Eventually this may lead to a loss of synchronism and
the splitting of the network. However, the islands so formed may not have a balance in
generation and load, which makes the failure to propagate further until a complete
collapse of the system. To prevent such events to occur, utilities have installed special
protection schemes based on under-frequency and under-voltage relays that perform load
and generation shedding and line tripping.
After a thorough analysis of the blackouts that struck the North-West of the
United States in summer 1996, Taylor [6] revealed their causes and proposed remedial
actions to prevent them from occurring in the future. In France, Counan et al. [8] studied
the behavior of the French electric system under multiple contingencies. They
recommended the use of curative actions such as load shedding based on frequency
criteria together with system separation induced by local relays trigged by generator loss
of synchronism.
You et al. [12]-[13] propose a power system separation scheme aimed at creating
islands subject to load-generation balance via load shedding based on the rate of
frequency decline. This approach consists in using a slow coherency method to detect
clusters of coherent generator groups, the boundaries of which provide desirable locations
of separation. It involves power system modeling followed by the execution of a
computationally efficient method based on graph theory and pattern recognition. The
method seeks to determine the locations and the timing of system separation. This
approach assumes the availability of real-time wide-area phasor measurements.
Sun et al. [14]-[15] introduce a new two-phase and three-phase system separation
method based on ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDD). Here, the primary focus is
to ensure that the equality and inequality constraints are satisfied in all the islands formed
In summary, we may say that the special protection schemes installed so far by
the utilities are costly and require the implementation of complex tools for the real-time
estimation and assessment of system operating conditions. Consequently, there is a need
for the development of simpler and more cost effective methods of system separation.
The aim of this research work is precisely to meet this need.
The main outcome of this research work is the development of a new and simple power
system controlled separation scheme aimed at preventing cascading events from
propagating further across a transmission network, thereby reducing the possibility of
large-scale blackout. It is a simple procedure that makes use of existing protective and
communication systems to detect the appropriate locations of system separation and to
initiate controlled system islanding with minimal load-generation imbalance [4]. The
proposed method generalizes and broadens the industrys practice on corrective action
implemented during a power system disturbance, which may result in the loss of large
generating units and/or the outages of major transmission lines.
In the proposed method, out-of-step relays are placed across the network and are
continuously monitored at the control center. After the initial fault has occurred, the
system state varies depending on the severity of the fault. Under major disturbances, outof-step relays may trip depending upon whether the prevailing swing impedance locus
passes through their respective tripping zones. However, this relay tripping may result in
the break up of the system into islands with an imbalance of generation and load. In that
event, a relay blocking and transfer tripping is performed so that islanding occurs with
minimal generation-load imbalance. Arming of these out-of-step relays are updated from
time to time or in response to significant changes that may occur in the system topology
and the loading conditions.
The proposed method assumes that the power system consists of clusters of
machines connected via few tie-lines. Furthermore, it relies on the validity of a set of
three conjectures that will be described in Chapter 4. Briefly, these conjectures state that
the locations of out-of-step operations depend on the network topology and loading
conditions but not on the fault location and intensity. Also, it states that there is a
sufficient time-lag between two successive out-of-step operations so that appropriate
corrective actions can take place. Specifically, during a normal operation, at any given
time, the system separation scheme proceeds as follows:
2. Determine the probable locations where out-of-step operation may occur and
identify a large collection of transmission lines whose outages can split the system
into islands based on the current network topology and loading conditions;
10
Chapter 2 is devoted to the description and operation of various protective relays such as
distance relays, impedance relays, out-of-step relays, to cite a few. Furthermore, it
explains the implementation of a relay-blocking-and-transfer-tripping scheme by means
of out-of-step relays. Chapter 3 deals with the modeling of a synchronous machine, its
exciter and governor and provides all the block diagrams of the associated models.
Chapter 4 provides the statement of the proposed three conjectures that constitute the
basis of the current research work and gives the complete description of the test systems
developed to verify them. Furthermore, it outlines various data clustering concepts and
methodologies and advocates their application to the Z-bus matrix of a power
transmission network to identify its weak links. Chapter 5 analyzes the simulation results
that are obtained by carrying out dynamic stability studies on a 30-bus and 517-bus test
system. Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions drawn from this research study.
11
Chapter 2
Protective Relays
In power systems, relays are used to detect abnormal power system conditions that arise
due to faults in the system by a continuous monitoring of various system variables such
as voltages, power flows, power injections, and system frequency [2]. Most protective
relays are used to detect and disconnect an element of the power system that is
functioning outside its normal range. The aim of relays used for protecting various
elements in the system is to provide high dependability and security. A relay that operates
correctly for all the faults, for which it is designed to respond to, is said to have high
dependability. A relay that does not operate incorrectly for any fault is said to have high
security [16]. Relays that are used in transmission line protection are of primary interest
in this research work. These relays are used to clear the faults by controlling the opening
and closing of circuit breakers when a fault occurs in the system. It is very essential that
the relaying schemes employed is able to discriminate between normal loading
conditions, swing conditions, out-of-step conditions and fault conditions [17], [18].
Tripping during stable power swings and faults due to improper functioning of relays
may eventually lead to a total system collapse. Major disturbances that occurred in the
past such as the 1965 Northeast blackout, the blackouts that struck the Western part of the
USA during summer 1996, the North America blackout of August 2003 were the results
of undesirable relay tripping.
During transient conditions, relay actions play a critical role. It is very essential
that a strategy is followed to avoid the splitting of the system at undesirable locations,
which may result in the formation of islands having imbalanced load and generation. Outof-step relaying has been installed to perform tripping and blocking operations when outof-step conditions are detected in the system. In the current chapter we discuss various
distance relays, out-of-step relays and their usage in performing blocking and tripping
operations.
12
Table 2.0: Relay time and interrupting time for different line voltages [17].
Line Voltage
Relay Time
Interrupting Time
in Cycles of 60 Hz
in Cycles of 60 Hz
69 kV
13
115 kV
13
230 kV
-1
345 kV
-1
The time elapsed from the instant the breaker initiates the trip until the time when the
breaker contacts re-close constitutes the reclosing time. The reclosing time is much
longer for high and extra-high voltage lines as the de-ionization time is longer. Table 2.1
shows the typical de-ionization time for different line voltages in cycles of 60 Hz.
13
Minimum De-ionization
in kV
Time( in Cycles)
69
115
8.5
138
10
230
18
345
20
between the relay location and the fault location, measured as the ratio of measured
voltage phasor to measured current phasor, is less than the relay setting [2]. Distance
relays, which utilize local information such as currents and voltages, employ time
intervals in order to discriminate between faults that occur internally and externally to the
protected zone. The characteristic of a distance relay is well understood from the R-X
plane diagrams (See Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). The relay operation takes place when the
measured impedance falls within the relay characteristics, which depend on the parameter
to which the distance relay is set to respond to. It is circular for impedance relays and
horizontal for reactance relays.
Distance relays basically protect three different zones for a given transmission
line. Zone 1 is typically set between 85% and 90% of the line length over which the relay
operates instantaneously. Zones 2 and 3 are adapted for back-up protection of the line. In
these two zones, a timer initiates coordination delays that allow the primary protection to
operate first. Specifically, the coordination delay for Zone 2 is usually of the order of 0.3
seconds. The reach of Zone 2 is generally set from 120% to 150% of the line length. Care
14
is taken that Zone 1 of the neighboring line is operated before Zone 2 for a line being
protected. Regarding Zone 3, it usually extends to 120% to 180% of the neighboring line
section. It is important that Zone 3 coordinates in time and distance with Zone 2 of the
neighboring circuit. Usually the operating time for Zone 3 is set at 1.0 second [16]. The
zones expressed in distance relaying for 100% line protection are displayed in Figure 2.0.
Figure 2-0: Step distance relaying functions for a complete line protection [16].
15
different impedance values, each at different time interval, should a fault occur on the
transmission line under their supervision.
As displayed in Figure 2.1, the tripping characteristic of a simple impedance relay
with impedance elements and timer is a circle centered at the origin. Whenever the value
of the apparent impedance falls within the radius of the circle, the relay operates. On the
other hand, the characteristic of the directional element is a straight line passing through
the origin while being perpendicular to the line of maximum torque [17]. With the
presence of a directional element, the tripping area is defined as that falling within the
circle and above the straight line. The characteristic of an impedance relay with a
directional element and zones is shown in Figure 2.2.
jX
Z
R
16
Note that directional elements are not needed. The third zone
(2.1)
(2.2)
= RA + j XA,
(2.3)
17
Figure 2-3: Mho distance relay characteristics with fault impedance loci [17].
Consider the three zones of an impedance relay, namely Zone 1, 2, and 3. For
Zone i, where i = 1,2, 3, let ri denotes the radius of the tripping characteristic of the ith
element and let Ri and Xi denote the coordinates of the center in the impedance plane of
this element. Then, the distance between the apparent impedance ZA and the center of the
ith zone is given by
di = ((RA Ri )2 + ( XA Xi )2)1/2 .
(2.4)
When di ri 0, the timer di starts counting. On the other hand, when dti Ti, Relay i
operates and the associated circuit-breaker clears the fault at dti = Ti + T0. Here, Ti
denotes the relay time for each element i according to the zone standards while T0
denotes the breaker time at line end A.
in the opening of transmission lines. The unstable and stable power swings are shown in
Figure 2.4. Control actions are typically initiated to bring the system back into stable
equilibrium using protective measures. For instance, when unstable swings occur due to
the loss of synchronism (out-of-step) between two groups of generators, these
fluctuations may be dampened by separating the coherent machines into different groups,
also called coherent areas [17]. The separation should be so that: (1) there is a minimal
load and generation imbalance in each separated area; (2) critical load is protected; (3)
power system is brought back to secure state as soon as possible.
Angle
Unstable
Stable
Time
19
20
Figure 2-6: Out-of-step relay with blinders (Ohm unit relay) [4].
21
F
L O AU
CU LT
S
CL
OS
E
OP
EN
75
60
0"
S
LO WIN
CU G
S
60
90
13
5
18
19
24
D
ER
BLIN
DER
CL
S
PE E
N
BL
IN
30
OPEN
CLO
SE
jX
Chapter 3
System Modeling
3-1 Synchronous Machine Modeling
In a power plant, a synchronous generator is used to convert the mechanical energy
provided by the turbine on the shaft to electrical energy that is injected into the power
system. A synchronous machine mainly consists of two elements, the stator and the rotor.
Armature windings are placed on the stator and operate at high voltages while the field
windings are mounted on the rotor and are energized by DC-current. The three-phase
windings of the armature are distributed symmetrically around the air gap with 120
electrical degrees apart in space [2]. A synchronous machine may have several damper
windings mounted on the rotor. The rotor may be either cylindrical or have salient poles
depending upon the speed at which the machine has to be operated. Figure 3.1 shows the
schematic representation of a three-phase synchronous machine with one pair of field
poles [2].
The dynamic equations that govern a synchronous machine rotation are developed
under several assumptions, which are as follows [2] [19]:
stator windings have equivalent sinusoidal distribution along the air gap;
the relationship between the flux linkages and currents must reflect a conservative
coupling field;
the relationships between the flux linkages and the current are independent of the
shaft angle, shaft when expressed in dqo -coordinate system.
23
e =
p
shaft ,
2
(3.1)
where subscripts notation being used denote the following: a, b, c represent stator phase
windings, fd denotes field windings, 1d denotes d-axis damper winding, 1q and 2q
represent the q-axis damper windings.
24
The electrical equations of the windings present in the synchronous machine as shown in
Figure 3.2 can be obtained using Kirchhoffs voltage law. The voltage equations of the
armature, field and damper windings are expressed as follows 19]:
va = ia rs +
d a
,
dt
(3.2)
vb = ib rs +
d b
,
dt
(3.3)
vc = ic rs +
d c
,
dt
(3.4)
v fd = i fd rfd +
25
d fd
(3.5)
d 1d
,
dt
(3.6)
dt
d 1q
dt
(3.7)
v2 q = i2 q r2 q +
d 2 q
dt
(3.8)
2 d
= Tm Te T f .
p dt
(3.9)
where, J is the inertia constant, Tm is the mechanical torque applied to the shaft in the
direction of rotation, Te is the electrical torque which is opposing the mechanical torque ,
is the rotor angular velocity, and Tfw is the friction windage torque.
26
2
2
2
2
2
Tdqo = cos cos( ) cos( + ) .
3
3
3
1
1
1
2
2
2
(3.10)
The new variables are obtained by projecting the actual variables on three axes,
namely, the direct axis (or axis d), which is along the main axis of the field winding, the
quadrature axis (or axis q), which is along the neutral axis of field winding, and lastly the
stationary axis (or axis o). The inverse transformation is given by
1
Tdqo
sin
cos
1
2
2
) cos(
) 1 .
= sin(
3
3
2
2
) cos( +
) 1
sin( +
3
3
(3.11)
Therefore, we can write the equations of the synchronous machine in the d-q-o reference
frame as follows [19]:
vd = rsid q +
vq = rsiq + d +
vo = rsio +
d q
dt
d o
,
dt
v fd = rfd i fd +
27
d d
,
dt
d fd
dt
(3.12)
(3.13)
(3.14)
(3.15)
d 1d
,
dt
d 1q
v2 q = r2 qi2 q +
dt
d 2 q
dt
(3.16)
(3.17)
(3.18)
(3.19)
3
2
(3.20)
3
2
(3.21)
(3.22)
3
2
(3.23)
3
2
(3.24)
o = Llsio .
(3.25)
2 dw
3 P
= Tm + ( d iq qid ) T fw .
p dt
2 2
(3.26)
All the variables involved in the equations given by (3.1) to (3.25) are expressed in actual
units. They must be converted to per units when they are encoded in a software program.
28
The scaled transient reactance, sub-transient reactance, and time constants are given by
[19]
X 'd = X ls +
1
1
+
X mq X lfd
X "d = X ls +
X "q = X ls +
T 'qo =
1
1
+
X md X lfd
X 'q = X ls +
T 'do =
X fd
s R fd
X 1q
s R1q
(3.27)
(3.28)
1
,
1
1
1
+
+
X md X lfd X l1d
(3.29)
1
,
1
1
1
+
+
X mq X l1q X l 2 q
(3.30)
(3.31)
(3.32)
1
1
X l 1d +
T "do =
1
1
s R1d
+
X md X lfd
(3.33)
1
1
X l 2q +
T "qo =
1
1
s R2 q
+
X mq X l1q
(3.34)
Table 3.1 provides the definitions of the various parameters and variables involved in
Eqs. (3.12) to (3.34).
29
vd , vq
vfd , v1d ,v1q ,v2q
rs
rfd , r1d , r1q , r2q
d , q
fd ,1d ,1q ,2 q
id , iq
ifd , i1d , i1q, i2q
Lls
Definitions
armature d-axis, q-axis terminal voltages
d-axis, q-axis field and damper winding voltages
armature phase resistance
d-axis, q-axis field and damper winding resistances
armature flux in d-axis, q-axis
d-axis, q-axis field and damper winding fluxes
armature d-axis, q-axis terminal currents
d-axis, q-axis field and damper winding currents
armature phase leakage inductance
Lmd , Lmq
Xd , Xq
Xd , Xq
Xd , Xq
Tdo , Tqo
Tdo , Tqo
30
31
32
VAR(L)
nref
1+Tf
speed
1 + T rs
rT rs
1 + T gs
SPEED
Velocity and
position limits
SPEED
Dturb
+
R
x
_
g
+
q
1
T ws
At
PMECH
+
qNL
Reference
VAR(L)
PMAX
+
SPEEDHP
1/R
1 + sFT5
(1+sT3)(1+sT4)(1+sT5)
1 + sT1
PMIN = 0
High Pressure Unit
(DH)(ET-HP)2
Reference
VAR(L+1)
+
+
SPEEDLP
-
1/R
1 + sT1
PMECHHP
PMAX
1 + sFT5
(1+sT3)(1+sT4)(1+sT5)
PMIN=0
Low Pressure Unit
(-DH)(ET-HP)2
33
PMECHLP
34
Chapter 4
Methodology and simulation set-up
4-1 Power System Separation Conjectures
The proposed system separation approach that is described in Chapter 1 is based on the
validity of the following three conjectures, which assume that the topology of the power
system consists of clusters of machines connected by few tie-lines [4]:
Conjecture # 1:
Conjecture # 2:
The out-of-step operations take place sequentially. This means that an out-of-step
operation does not occur at multiple locations simultaneously. Furthermore, the
time interval between successive occurrences is sufficient to allow the initiation
of appropriate out-of-step blocking and transfer tripping operations.
Conjecture # 3:
During normal operating conditions, at any given time, there are several locations
that can split the power system into separate parts connected by tie-lines with
light power flows which are the weak links of the system. Transfer tripping
35
operation can be made to these weak links in order to create islands with a
minimal load and generation imbalance, resulting in least disruption of service.
36
dynamic models used in developing the reduced 30-bus system are the round rotor
generator model (GENROU), the IEEE type-1 excitation system model (IEEEX1), the
IEEE standard governor model (IEEESGO), the steam turbine governor model (TGOV1)
and the hydro-governor model (HYGOV). Ten generators, ten exciters and ten governors
were modeled using these representations.
37
Due to its inherent structure, the 517-bus system is fairly stable as compared to
the 30-bus system. It has been observed that for many major blackouts in the past such as
the 1965 Northeast Blackout, the 1997 New York Blackout, and the 2003 US-Canada
Blackout, the network separation occurred at tie lines present within the system or
between the interconnections [1], [5], and [21]. Therefore, this 517-bus system turns out
to be suitable for conducting various transient stability simulations aimed at studying the
validity of the three foregoing conjectures. It is observed that the power flows over the
tie-lines take very different magnitudes for various operating conditions of the system.
Note that the four sub-systems constituting the 517-bus are either generation rich or load
rich under different operating conditions. The turbine-generator dynamic models used for
this system are given in Table 4.2
Figure 4.2: Structure of the 517-bus system with four sub-systems connected by tie-lines.
38
software program includes numerous models of power system devices. The program
utilizes the IPFLOW output as the base case for the calculations it performs [22].
40
In the subsequent sections, we will describe the clustering techniques that are
used to identify the initial out-of-step relay operations. Furthermore, we will describe the
relay and apparent impedance representations that are being used.
41
Agglomerative clustering
1
1, 2
2
1, 2,
3, 4
3
3, 4
4
Divisive clustering
Figure 4.3: Agglomerative and divisive type clustering techniques
42
It is clear that a good partitioning technique should form clusters that contain
elements that are very dissimilar from those belonging to the other clusters. This is done
through the execution of silhouette plots. A cluster having larger silhouette value is
considered to be well separated from the elements in the neighboring clusters.
centroids
centroids
Figure 4-4: k-means partitioning of 22 elements into 4 clusters around four centroids.
43
For a given large-scale power system containing thousands of buses, a huge dataset can
be generated and grouped into different clusters of highly connected buses, which are
related to each other via few tie-lines, termed weak links of the network. From a graphtheoretic viewpoint, these weak links are the minimal cut-sets of the network. Recall that
a minimal cut-set is defined as the minimal collection of links which, when cut, split the
graph into two disconnected sub-graphs [25]. Unfortunately, a graph-theoretic approach
suffers from two major drawbacks; it does not carry information about either the
parameters or the loading conditions of the branches of the transmission network. To
overcome these weaknesses, we may use instead the elements of the Jacobian matrix of
the system power flow model as measures of the electrical distances between buses.
In this research work, we carry out a preliminary study by using the elements of
the Z-bus matrix instead. The latter provides information about the branch parameters,
but not of the branch loading conditions. By applying clustering techniques to the Z-bus
matrix, the weak links of the network may be identified as those branches that have their
ending buses in two different clusters. These identified weak links are expected to be the
locations where out-of-step operation may occur when a disturbance affects the power
system.
basis of individual line impedance [4]. Specifically, the new apparent impedance Z0 is
expressed as
Z0 = Zi / Zij ,
where, Zi is the apparent impedance at the ith bus and Zij is the line impedance connecting
the ith bus to the jth bus. Z0 represents a position in the R0 + jX0 plane. The relay-trippingarea boundary is formed by the line impedance, Zij, being approximately equals to Zi.
When the path taken by the apparent impedance Z0 falls below the line impedance value
of 1.0 p.u., then the relay operates and trips the line under its control. Figure 4.5 shows
the apparent impedance Z0 locus movement in the R0-X0 plane at Bus 136 for Line 136135 of the reduced 30-bus system depicted in Figure 4.1. This locus size increase is due
to a three-phase fault on one of the two parallel lines connecting Bus 127 to Bus 129. It
can be seen that the path taken by the apparent impedance locus that is recorded by the
out-of-step relay present on Line 136-135 varies in magnitude once the fault is cleared.
As displayed in Figure 4.5, the locus movement is towards the tripping area of the relay
represented by a circle. We observe that in this case, the apparent impedance does not
enter the tripping area of the out-of-step relay.
The process has been further simplified in Figure 4.6. Here, the magnitude of the
apparent impedance, Z0, is plotted against time for the same contingency simulation as
described above. The out-of-step relay trips if the value of Z0 falls below 1.0 p.u.. This
representation of the apparent impedance locus and relay tripping area on the basis of line
impedance helps to identify the out-of-step locations in a very simple manner.
45
6
Legend:
F = Fault on Line 127-129
FC = Fault Cleared
R = Successful Reclosure
Simulation = 1.0 sec
t = 0.75 sec
Xo in p.u.
3
Simulation
Ends 1.0 sec
FC = 0.2+ sec
2
F = 0.1- sec
FC = 0.2- sec
R = 0.45+ sec
F = 0.1+ sec
Line Impedance
R = 0.45 - sec
0
0
Ro in p.u
46
10
9
Legend:
F =Fault on Line 127-129
FC=Fault Cleares (Breakers open)
R =Reclosure (Breakers close)
Simulation 1.0 sec
Zo in p.u.
Simulation Ends
6
F-
FC +
R+
R-
4
3
2
FC -
F+
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Time in seconds
47
0.9
Chapter 5
Simulation Results
To verify the validity of the three conjectures stated in Section 4.1, simulations are
performed on the 30-bus and the 517-bus systems for different contingency scenarios.
These conjectures describe the effect of fault location, fault intensity, loading conditions
and network-configuration on the location of the out-of-step operations that may occur in
a power system.
The three conjectures are verified in the following order. First, the existence of a
time delay between the occurrences of two out-of-step operations, called cascading
effect, is demonstrated. Next, the out-of-step blocking and transfer tripping scheme is
studied; this provides the rational behind the proposed controlled separation scheme.
Finally, this scheme is applied to the 30-bus and 517-bus systems to evaluate its ability to
split a network into generation-load balanced parts.
Various
contingency scenarios were simulated on Subsystem E while locations M1, M2, M3 and
M4 were monitored for out-of-step operations. The contingencies for which results were
recorded are described in the subsequent sections. These simulations are categorized
according to the conjectures that are being assessed.
48
(kV)
(p.u)
( )
(MW)
(MVar)
(p.u.)
(p.u.)
(p.u.)
230
1.037
-4.5
122.2
15.4
0.0049
0.0304
0.0570
49
Table 5.2: Initial operating conditions for checking the cascading case.
(kV)
(p.u)
( )
(MW)
(MVar)
(p.u.)
(p.u.)
(p.u.)
e-f
345
1.002
-21.7
-56.0
-51.1
0.006318
0.067500
1.15830
e-g
500
0.998
-35.0
110.6
-67.7
0.000567
0.011025
0.78300
g-h
345
1.058
-14.1
400.8
-46.9
0.006318
0.067500
1.15830
f-h
500
1.060
-2.5
-342.7
-30.4
0.000567
0.011025
0.78300
Tie
One typical simulation result is depicted in Figure 5.1. In this case, a three-phase
fault was applied adjacent to Bus 64 on one of the 230-kV double transmission lines
connecting Bus 64 to Bus 132. The fault was placed at 0.1 second and was cleared at
0.25 second. Therefore, the total fault duration lasted 9 cycles on the 60-Hz basis. The
circuit breakers on both ends of the single-circuit transmission line operated
simultaneously to open and re-close the line at 0.5 seconds. Consequently, the total
reclosing duration was 15 cycles. The resulting apparent impedance locus is displayed in
Figure 5.1. It can be seen that the apparent impedance at Bus e of Tie-Line e-f has
entered the relay tripping zone at time 0.605 second while that at Bus g of Tie-Line g-h
has entered the relay tripping zone at time 1.185 second. Consequently, there is a time
interval of 0.58 second, or approximately 35 cycles, between the two out-of-step
50
operations monitored at points M1 and M2. Therefore, we conclude that the out-of-step
operations do occur with sufficient time interval between two successive out-of-step
operations, depicting a cascading behavior. During this time interval, necessary relay
blocking and transfer-tripping operation can be performed to split the system into
disconnected parts having each a minimal load-generation imbalance.
20
Legend:
18
16
Zo in p.u.
R = Breakers Reclose
e-f Tie trips at 0.605 sec.
14
12
FC
10
g-h Tie
8
6
4
FC
e-f Tie
R e-f Tie Tripps
0
0
51
Bs
(kV)
(p.u)
( )
(MW)
(MVar)
(p.u.)
(p.u.)
(p.u.)
230
1.032
-6.2
344.1
108.2
0.00920
0.09800
0.04770
52
It can be seen from Figure 5.3 that the apparent impedance paths for Tie-Line g-h
enters the tripping area of the out-of-step relay at 1.30 seconds in the first simulated case
and at 1.26 seconds in the second simulated case. Therefore, it can be inferred that for
different initial fault locations with the same fault duration, it is Tie-Line g-h that is
subject to out-of-step operations [4].
20
Legend:
F1 = Fault on Line 64-132 in E-System
F2 = Fault on Line 47-33 in E-System
F1C & F2C = Faults clear in 0.15 sec ( 9 cycles )
R1 = Reclosure after 12 cycles
R2 = reclosure after 15 cycles
g-h Tie trips with F1 at 1.30 sec.
g-h Tie tips with F2 at 1.26 sec.
18
R1
F1 & F2
16
R2
Zo in p.u.
14
12
10
8
6
g-h Tie Trips for F1
2
Relay Tripping Zone
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Time in seconds
53
Figure 5.3 displays the apparent impedance paths of two simulated cases with a
three-phase fault placed on one of the double-circuit Line 64-132 that is adjacent to
Bus 64 in the 517-bus system. The fault-clearing-time period was 9 cycles for the first
simulated case and 12 cycles for the second simulated case. In both cases, the reclosing
period for the circuit breakers was 15 cycles while the apparent impedance path for TieLine e-f entered the tripping area of the out-of-step relay at 0.615 second.
From
Figure 5.3, it can be inferred that the location of the out-of-step operation always occurs
on Tie-Line e-f for all simulated fault intensities, hence verifying the first conjecture.
1.4
F1 & F2
1.2
Legend:
F1 & F2 = Faults on Line 64-132 in E-System
F1C = Fault Clears in 0.15 sec ( 9 cycles )
F2C= Fault Clears in 0.2 sec ( 12 cycles )
R1 & R2 = Reclosure after 15 cycles
e-f Tie trips at 0.615 - sec.
e-f Tie trips at 0.615+ sec.
1
0.8
0.6
F1C
F2C
0.4
R1
0.2
R2
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
0.00
Zone
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
Time in seconds
Figure 5.3: Apparent impedance path of Tie-Line e-f for different fault intensities.
54
Figure 5.4 illustrates this impact on Tie-Line e-f. Here, the initial operating
conditions together with the initial fault location are the same as those of the contingency
case described in Figure 5.1. In Figure 5.4, we observe that Tie-Line e-f trips at time
0.605 second while Tie-Line g-h trips at time 1.185 seconds since at these times, the
apparent impedance locus enters the relay tripping area. In the simulated cases, the outof-step relay on Tie-Line e-f tie is armed. This relay recognizes the out-of-step operation
and blocks the relay from tripping Tie-Line e-f. Subsequent to the out-of-step blocking
operation, the out-of-step relay located on Tie-Line g-h, which is not armed, trips TieLine g-h at time 1.26 seconds.
20
18
16
Zo in p.u.
Legend:
F = Fault on Line 64-132 in E-System
FC = Fault Clears
R = Reclosure
e-f Tie trips at 0.615 sec.
g-h Tie trips at 1.260 sec. or 40 cycles later
14
12
FC
10
8
6
FC
g-h Tie
Allowed to Trips
e-f Tie
is Blocked
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Time in seconds
Figure 5.4: Impact on Tie-Line g-h of blocking the out-of-step relay of Tie-Line e-f.
55
24
F
22
Legend:
F = Fault on Line 64-132 in E-System
FC = Fault Cleared
R = breakers Reclosed
Under Peak-Load, g-h Tie Trips at 1.260 sec.
Under Light-Load, g-h Tie Doesn't Trip
20
Zo in p.u.
18
16
14
12
Light-Load
FC
10
Peak-Load
8
6
4
Relay Tripping Zone
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Time in seconds
Figure 5.5: Light Load and Peak load case results (38 generators in operation)
56
1.5
(kV)
(p.u)
( )
(MW)
(MVar)
e-f
345
1.072
-12.4
-192.7
-35.4
e-g
500
1.071
-22.7
172.8
-73.6
g-h
345
1.102
-8.3
165.6
-45.8
f-h
500
1.102
8.3
-188.4
-54.1
Tie
57
steam units along with the combustion units present in the system have been shut down
but the total load and power generation are kept to the same level as those of the first
case.
It can be observed from Figure 5.6 that the apparent impedance locus recorded for
Tie-Line e-f for the simulated case with 38 generators is quite different from the second
case with 24 generators. In the second case, the apparent impedance path enters the
tripping area of the relay while in the first case, it does not. Consequently, we infer that
the location of out-of-step operation depends on the network and/or generation
configuration.
Table 5.5: Initial operating conditions for the reduced network
(kV)
(p.u)
( )
(MW)
(MVar)
e-f
345
1.061
-8.9
-280.8
-6.1
e-g
500
1.068
-11.9
40.8
-68.7
g-h
345
1.198
-4.4
85.0
-33.6
f-h
500
1.193
15.2
-168.
-57.2
Tie
58
1.4
F
Legend:
F = Faults on Line 64-132 in E-System
FC = Faults Cleared
R = Breakers Reclosed
e-f Tie Under Light-Load Condition with 38 Generators.
e-f Tie Under Same Load Condition but with 24 generators
1.2
Log(Zo) in p.u.
1
0.8
0.6
38 Generators
Light-Load
FC
0.4
R
0.2
0
24 Generators
Same Load
-0.2
-0.4
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.2
1.4
Time in seconds
Figure 5.6: Apparent impedance path for the two network configurations.
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 display the results of the simulations that are executed to illustrate
out-of-step blocking and transfer tripping schemes. In this simulation, the total generation
capacity of the E-system and G-system of the 517-bus test system is 10% more than those
of Systems F and H. The initial operating condition for this simulation case is shown in
Table 5.6. In this simulation case, the initial three-phase fault is placed on one of the
double-circuit lines present that are adjacent to Bus 64 for a period of 9 cycles. From the
results obtained in the earlier sections, we can infer that Tie-Line e-f trips at around 0.6
second followed by Tie-Line g-h, which trips around 1.185 seconds or 35 cycles later.
Consequently, the system splits into two unbalanced parts. Therefore, in order to avoid
such system separation, the out-of-step tripping and blocking scheme is initiated.
59
As shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.8, the tripping of Tie-Line e-f is blocked while the
tripping is transferred to out-of-step relays located on Tie-Lines e-g and f-h. Because TieLine g-h does not trip, the 517-bus system separates into two balanced parts.
The simulation results displayed in Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 are those obtained by
applying on the 517-bus system of the contingency scenarios that are described in
Sections 5.1.2, 5.1.3, and 5.1.5, respectively. These simulations demonstrate the validity
of the three conjectures stated in Section 4.1, which are related to the impact on out-ofstep operations of the fault location, fault intensity, and the network loading levels.
30
Legend:
F = Faults on Line 64-132 in E-System
FC = Faults Cleared
R = Breakers Reclosed
e-f Tie Blocked 0.6 sec.
g-h Tie doesn't trip.
25
The effect of
f-h & e-g Ties tripping
on g-h Tie
Zo in p.u.
20
g-h Tie
F
15
R
FC
10
Relay Tripping
Zone
e-f Tie
FC
Blocked
R
0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Time in seconds
Figure 5.7: Apparent impedance locus of Tie-Line e-f (blocked) and Tie-Line g-h.
60
2.5
F1 & F2
2
R1
1.5
R2
at 0.6 sec
Legend:
F = Fault on Line 64-132 in E-System
FC = Fault Clears (Breakers Open)
R = Breakers Reclose
e-f Tie Blocked and e-g Tie Opens at 0.6 sec.
e-f Tie Blocked and f-h Tie also opens at 0.6 sec.
g-h Tie Does'n Trip
0.5
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Time in seconds
Figure 5.8: The transfer tripping operation performed on Tie-Lines f-h and e-g.
61
(kV)
(p.u)
( )
(MW)
(MVar)
e-f
345
0.997
-25.9
133.0
-70.8
e-g
500
0.957
-38.5
426.7
-46.6
g-h
345
1.055
-12.7
229.2
-31.7
f-h
500
1.067
-20.0
-144.3
-47.4
Tie
62
Table 5-7: Simulation results obtained using different initial fault locations.
Beginning
Initial
Fault
Circuit-
Tie-line
End
of
Fault
Clearing
breaker
Tripping
of
Simulation Location
Reclosing
Simulation
Cycles on
the
15
30
37
90
23.9
16.6
2.0
1.3
1.0
0.7
15
27
35
90
23.9
16.6
1.2
1.4
1.0
0.8
60-Hz basis
Z0 in p.u.
of
Tie-Line e-f
Cycles on
the
60-Hz basis
Z0 in p.u.
of
Tie-Line e-f
63
Table 5-8: Simulation results obtained using different initial fault intensities.
Beginning
Initial
Fault
Circuit-
Tie-line
End
of
Fault
Clearing
breaker
Tripping
of
Simulation Location
Reclosing
Simulation
Cycles on
the
15
21
76
90
16.2
12.6
10.5
14.3
1.0
0.8
18
21
71
90
15.9
12.6
10.0
16.4
1.0
0.5
60-Hz basis
Z0 in p.u.
of
Tie-Line g-h
Cycles on
the
60-Hz basis
Z0 in p.u.
of
Tie-Line g-h
64
Initial
Fault
Circuit-
Tie-line
End
of
Fault
Clearing
breaker
Tripping
of
Simulation Location
Reclosing
Simulation
Cycles on
the
15
21
76
90
16.2
12.6
10.5
14.3
1.0
0.8
15
21
60
90
11.5
11.2
7.5
9.7
1.0
60-Hz basis
Z0 in p.u.
of
Tie-Line e-f
Cycles on
the
60-Hz basis
Z0 in p.u.
of
Tie-Line e-f
65
350
300
250
200
Successful
Reclosure
150
Fault
100
Breakers
Open
50
0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Time in seconds
Figure 5-9: Transient stability swing curves obtained on the reduced 30-bus system.
66
1.0
Consequently, the weak links are the 11 branches connecting these clusters,
namely, Line 102-108, Line 108-112, Line 135 109, Line 136-135, Line 136-139, Line
120-123, Line 115-146, Transformer 144-145, Transformer 143-145, Transformer 148149 and Transformer 134-133.
67
101
102
144
108
145
146
149
148
143
H
109
135
133
136
115
112
127
M2
137
134
136
M3
139
129
132
S
128
140
120
118
M1
142
141
123
124
M4
Figure 5-10: Eleven clusters identified on the 30-bus system using k-means clustering
with mean silhouette value of 0.82.
68
Chapter 6
Conclusions
To decrease the risk of large-scale blackouts, appropriate control actions may be taken on
a power system when it undergoes a major disturbance. Few recognized control actions
are load shedding, generation curtailment, and controlled separation, to cite a few. In this
research work we have developed a new method aimed at performing controlled system
separation using current technologies. Here, a power system is split into islands having
minimal load-generation imbalance.
The proposed approach is based on three conjectures, which are stated and their
validity verified through extensive simulations performed on a 30-bus and a 517-bus
system. On these two test systems, it was verified the following two statements: (i) the
location of out-of-step operations is independent of the location and severity of the initial
fault; (ii) there is sufficient time gap between two out-of-step operations for initiating an
appropriate out-of-step blocking and tripping scheme.
The simulation results revealed that the location of out-of-step operation is highly
system specific and very much dependent on the prevailing system operating conditions.
Therefore, the determination of the out-of-step locations is a critical step to implement
the proposed method to any given power system. The study also revealed that it is
necessary that a power transmission network contains clusters of tightly connected buses
connected via few weak links. These weak interconnections can be identified by a
clustering method or past system experience. When these weak links are heavily loaded,
it is likely that they become the sites of out-of-step operation should the system
undergoes a major disturbance.
As a future work, more robust and effective methods for identifying the weak
links of a power transmission network should be developed. These methods may be
based on clustering techniques [23] applied to the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic model
69
of a power system. Here, both the synchronous machine model and the transmission
network model should be derived and linearized around an appropriate operating point.
70
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[5]
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[18]
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