VictoryLand Brief To Supreme Court

E-Filed
12/17/2015 @ 04:02:26 PM
Honorable Julia Jordan Weller
Clerk Of The Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

CASE NOS. 1141044 and 1150027
STATE OF ALABAMA, Appellant
v.
$223,405.86, et al., Appellees.
KC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Cross-Appellant
v.
STATE OF ALABAMA, Cross-Appellee.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MACON COUNTY, ALABAMA
CASE NO. CV-2013-900031
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT,
KC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LLC
Joe Espy, III (ESP002)
J. Flynn Mozingo (MOZ003)
Ben Espy (ESP005)
William M. Espy (ESPOO?)
Melton, Espy & Williams, PC
Post Office Drawer 5130
Montgomery, AL 36103-5130
Telephone: (334) 263-6621
Facsimile: (334) 263-7252
jespy@mewlegal.com
fmozingo@mewlegal.com
bespy@mewlegal.com
wespy@mewlegal.com
Sam Heldman (HEL009)

The Gardner Firm, PC
2805 31st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20008
Telephone: (202) 965-8884
Facsimile: (202) 318-2445
sam@heldman.net
John M. Bolton, III (BOL012)
Charlanna Skaggs (SPE044)
Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco,
Cole & Black, PC
Post Office Box 116
Telephone: (334) 834-7600
Facsimile: (334) 263-5969
jbolton@hillhillcarter.com
cskaggs@hillhillcarter.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT,

KC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LLC
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Oral argument is requested and is important in this case
for multiple reasons. First, this case - more so than any in
this century so far -
presents the Court with an important
test of the Court's approach to constitutional interpretation.

It
tests
whether
the
Court
will
adhere
to
the
"original
intent" philosophy of constitutional law it has traditionally

followed
for
over
one
hundred
years .
This
case
is
an
important test of that because there is an overwhelming record

showing how the People understood Amendment 744 to the ALABAMA
CONSTITUTION OF 1901 when they ratified it.
Second,
involves
The
substantial
factual
record.
this case
record
shows
precisely what the games at issue in this case are. The record
shows why and how they c onstitute "bingo" under Amendment 7 4 4.
The record shows how the word "bingo" has been used, over time
and most importantly during the 2003 ratification debates over
Arnendrnen t
7 4 4.
The Attorney General
would h ave
the
Court
ignore all of this. Oral argument, however, would allow the

Court to explore it and to fully understand it.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .
. vi
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
I.
Facts that shed light on the meaning of Amendment

744, and that support the recognition that the bingo
gameplay on the equipment at issue is permitted b y
the Amendment.
5
A.
The development of bingo, from its origin to

the ratification of Amendment 744 in 2003
including the contemporaneous use of the word
"bingo" to refer to games that are, in all
material respects, like those at issue in this
case.
7
B.
The type of bingo at issue in this

being played in Alabama in 2003.
C.
The very purpose of the proposed Amendment was

to allow Macon County to compete with those
other facilities that were already playing the
type of bingo at issue here, in order to
improve the economy of the County.
. 11
D.
The 2003 debates, in the Legislature and in

Macon County, provide objective evidence that
the word "bingo" was being used to refer to all
forms of bingo, including the electronic games
that were being played in competing facilities.
. 15
ii
case was
9
E.
II.
The Sheriff of Macon County, who is entrusted

by law with enforcement of Amendment 74 4,
issued regulations contemporaneously with the
Amendment's ratification, allowing all forms of
bingo games - - games played with paper cards
and games played with electronic machines.
. 22
Facts regarding the Attorney

picking" enforcement strategy.
General's
"cherry. 24
STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW .
. 27
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .
. 28
ARGUMENT
. 32
I.
As with any other portion of the Constitution, this

Court is to interpret Amendment 744 to effectuate
the original intent of the People; and in a way that
honors the purpose that the Amendment was designed
to accomplish. Correctly int erpreted, Amendment 744
plainly permits electronic bingo of the sort that
was being played at VictoryLand.
. 32
A.
Neither Cornerstone , nor any case following it ,

contains
a
holding about
the meaning of
Amendment 744 .
. 34
B.
The object of all constitutional interpretati o n

i s to ascertain and effectuate the intention of
the People. The Court accomplishes this task
not by l o oking to words alone , bu t by looki ng
t o how the words were used and understood at
the
specific
time,
to
the
debates
over
rati fi cation, to the purpose for which the
provision
was
designed,
and
to
the
c ontemporaneous c onstructi o n of r e sponsibl e
o f f ic ia l s .
. 37
iii
c.
of
standard
traditional
this
Under
constitutional
interpretation,
it
is
overwhelmingly clear that Amendment 744 permits
bingo in all its forms, including electronic
bingo of the sort that was being played at
rival facilities at the time of the Amendment's
ratification.
. 45
D.
The Attorney General's counter-arguments are

unavailing and are contrary to the basic
principles
of
Alabama's
constitutional
democracy.
. 48
E.
1.
The Attorney General's "p l ain meaning"

argument is merely an attempt to impose a
meaning other than the one that was
prevalent during the ratification debates.
This
is
not
valid
constitutional
interpretation, and does not respect the
will of the People.
. 49
2.
The Attorney General incorrectly describes

the nature and extent of the evidence that
sheds light on the meaning of Amendment
744,
and incorrectly argues that such
evidence is irrelevant.
. 53
3.
The absence of the word "electronic" in

Amendment 744 does not justify the Attorne y
General's position.
. 56
4.
The Attorney Gen eral errs in attempting to

us e canons of interpretation in order to
steer the Court from following the original
intent
and
public
understanding
of
Arnendmen t 7 4 4
59
Once Amendment 7 4 4 is correctly interpreted ,

then it is plain t h at t he bingo operations at
VictoryLand were lawful and could not be the
subject of a forfeiture action. The Attorney
Genera l
does
not
even
attempt
to
show
otherwise .
. 64
iv
II.
The Court should also affirm the trial court's order

on the basis of that Court's conclusion that the
Attorney General was engaged in an improper "cherrypickingn enforcement strategy.
. 66
CONCLUSION
. 69
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
. 71
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
KC Economic Development, LLC
Court has
("KCED"), agrees that this
jurisdiction over the Attorney General's appeal.
This Court also has jurisdiction over KCED's appeal. After the
trial court entered its original judgment on June 25,
2015
(C. 1041), KCED filed a timely post-judgment motion on July 7,

2015.
(and
(C.
on
Supp.
a
2-6).
The trial court ruled on that motion
post-judgment
motion
by
the
Attorney
General)
(C. Supp. 36-44) on October 2, 2015 (2C. Supp. 2-5), which was
within the time permitted by ALA. R. Crv. P.
59.1.
KCED then
timely filed a notice of appeal on October 8, 2015.
(2C. Supp.
6-12).
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Paqe(s)
Cases
Alexander v. State,
274 Ala. 441, 150 So. 2d 204
(1963)
. . 38
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona,

U.S. ~~' 133 S.Ct. 2247,
186 L.Ed.2d 239 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 n.7
Aspinwall v. Gowens,
405 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1981)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Baker v. Wright,
257 Ala. 697, 60 So. 2d 825 (1952)
Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach,

4 2 So . 3 d 6 5 (Al a . 2 0 0 9 ) . . . .
59
passim
Barrett v. State,
705 So. 2d 529 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)
62-64
City of Piedmont v. Evans,

642 So. 2 d 435 (Ala. 1994)
61, 62-64
Cole v. Riley,
989 So. 2d 1001 (Ala. 2007)
. 40
Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle,

719 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 2 006)
. . . . . . 42, 54
District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783,
171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008)
........ .
. . . . . 39, 41, 50-51, 52, 54-55, 56, 57' 58
Elmore County v . Tallapoosa County ,
2 21 Al a . 18 2 , 12 8 So . 15 8 ( 19 3 0 )
. 44
Ex parte Brown,
2 6 So . 3 d 1 2 2 2 (Al a . 2 0 0 9 )
. 27
vii
Ex parte Caldwell,
104 So. 3d 901
Ex parte Melof,
735 So. 2d 1172
Ex parte State,
12 1 So . 3 d 3 3 7
(Ala. 2012)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
(Ala. 1999)
( Al a . 2 0 13 )
. . . . . . . . . . . . 33
. 30,
Fox v. McDonald,
101 Ala. 51, 13 So. 416 (1893)
. 43
Houston County Econ. Dev. Auth. v. State,

16 8 So . 3 d 4 (Al a . 2014 ) . . . . . .
. 36
Houston County v. Martin,

2 3 2 Al a . 511 , 16 9 So . 13 ( 19 3 6)
. 43
Kennedy v. Davis,
171 Ala. 609, 55 So. 104
. . . . . . . . . . 67
(1911)
NLRB v. Noel Canning,

U.S.
, 134 S.Ct. 2550,
189 L.Ed.2d 538 (2014) . . .
37
. . . . . . . . . 40 n.7
Opinion of the Justices No. 140,

2 6 3 Al a . 14 1 , 8 1 So . 2 d 6 7 8 ( 1 9 5 5 )
Opinion of the Justices No. 376,

825 So. 2d 109 (Ala. 2002)
. 41
. 38
Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v . Unit ed States,

300 U. S . 98, 57 S.Ct. 356 (1 937 ) . . .
35 - 36
People v. 8,000 Punchboard Card Devices,

142 Cal. App. 3d 618
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
. 51
Sou t h Centra l Bell Telephone Co. v . State ,

. . . .
7 8 9 So . 2 d 13 3 (Al a . 1 9 9 9 )
State v. Greenetrack,
154 So. 3d 94 0 (Al a . 2 014)
viii
50
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
State v. Murphy,
237 Ala. 332, 186 So. 487
. 35, 43
(1939)
State v. Sayre,
118 Ala. 1, 24 So. 89 (1897)
. 37' 38
State v. Stone,
2 3 7 Ala. 7 8, 18 5 So. 4 0 4 ( 193 8)
. 44
State v. Strickland,
289 Ala. 488, 268 So. 2d 766 (1972)
. 59
Stephan v. Parrish,
887 P.2d 127 (Kan.
Sup. Ct. 1994)
. 41 n.8, 54
Towne v. Eisner,
245 U.S. 418, 38 S.Ct. 158 (1918)
U.S. v. 103 Electronic Gambling Devices,
2 2 3 F . 3 d 1 0 91 ( 9th Cir . 2 0 0 0 )
U.S. v. 162 MegaMania Gambling Devices,
2 31 F . 3 d 7 13 ( 1 0th Cir . 2 0 0 0 )
Wehle v. Bradley,
No. 1101290, 2015 WL 6618633
(Ala. Sup. Ct. Oct. 30, 2015)
. 50
9
8-9
. 27
Constitution and Statutes
Page(s)
OFFICIAL RECOMPILATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ALABAMA

OF 1901, LOCAL AMENDMENTS, CALHOUN COUNTY, SECTION 1
(i.e., ALA. CONST. OF 1901, amend. 508)
62 n.11

OF 1901, LOCAL AMENDMENTS, LOWNDES COUNTY, SECTION 3
(i.e., ALA. CONST. OF 1901, amend. 674).
. 35 n.5

OF 1901, LOCAL AMENDMENTS, MACON COUNTY, SECTION 1
(i.e. ' ALA. CONST. OF 1901, amend. 7 4 4)
ix
passim
SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL RECOMPILATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF ALABAMA OF 1901
2, 32, 63
. 12
ALABAMA ACT 8 3-5 7 5

INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT,
25 u.s.c. 2701
Other Authorities
Page (s)
ALA. R. CIV. P. 59.1
. vi
Executive Order No. 13 (2015)

http : //governor . alabama . gov/newsroom/2015 / 11.executiveorder-nurnber-13-2/ (last accessed Dec. 9, 2015)
. . 26, 69
Jefferson, Thomas
Letter to Judge William Johnson,
June 12, 1823,
15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 449-50
. 40
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 616 (11th ed. 20 12)

39 n.6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Attorney General's representation that "[t]his case
is about KC Economic Development's
('KCED')
attempt to defy
Alabama's anti-gambling laws by labeling its machines 'bingo'"

(State's
Brief,
1)
p.
misrepresents
the
arguments
and
overwhelming evidence presented below, as well as the findings

and judgment entered by the trial court after a lengthy bench
trial.
Thus,
KCED
strongly
disagrees
with
the
Attorney
General's Statement of the Case. 1

In
reality,
this
case
is
about
the
Attorney
General
wrongly seeking to have forfeited the equipment, records, and

funds involved in the legal operation of bingo at VictoryLand
in Macon County, as approved by the voters of Macon Count y in
adopting
Amendment
744
to
the
Alabama
Constitution.
VictoryLand's operations complied fully with all regulations

promulgated under the authority of Amendment 744. 2 A Circuit
Judge specially appoint e d by the Chief Justice (plainl y having
However, KCED accepts the Statement of the Case to the

extent it accurately recounts the actual proceedings below,
and does not stray into argument or hyperbole .
1
The proper citation to Amendment 744 is "OFFICIAL

RECOMPILATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ALABAMA OF 1901, LOCAL AMENDMENTS,
MACON COUNTY, SECTION 1." However, to remain consistent with the
test imony and arguments below, the Amendment is re fer red to
herein as "Ame ndme nt 744."
2
been chosen because of his fairness and long experience) heard

testimony and other evidence in an ore tenus proceeding. The
trial court ruled against the Attorney General.
The outcome of this case is important to Macon County,
both for the sake of economic recovery in the County and for
the respect due to the voters of the County who debated and
ratified Amendment 744.
But
the
case
is
also
important,
in
historical
and
jurisprudential sense, to this Court. It allows the Court its

best opportunity in decades to reiterate and explain that the
long-prevailing "originalist" or "original intent" model of
constitutional interpretation still prevails in Alabama. And
it
allows
this
Court
Alabama's courts,
way
for
judges
to
to
demonstrate
that,
at
least
in
constitutional adjudication is not just a

impose
their policy preferences
on
the
People. The People of Alabama need to know that the promise of

their Constitution is still true:
that all political power
resides with them (see SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL RECOMPILATION OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF ALABAMA OF 1901, as amended)
and that this Court
will not thwart their will.

The Attorney General's argument is that interpretation of
Amendment
7 4 4 is wholly governed by Barber v.
Cornerstone
Cmty. Outreach, 42 So. 3d 65 (Ala . 2009), and that the phrase

2
"bingo games" in Amendment 744 means only that type of bingo

that this Court described,
years after the ratification of
Amendment 744, in Cornerstone. But that argument ignores the

historical
context
and
the
enormous
amount
of
unrefuted
evidence of the widespread original intent and original public

meaning of Amendment 744. As the trial court recognized, and
as shown herein, the historical record makes perfectly clear
what
Macon
County's
People
understood
to
be
at
stake
Amendment 744. This Court should honor their decision.
in
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.
Were the bingo operations at VictoryLand permit t ed
by Amendment 744 to the Alabama Constitution?

Yes, when that Amendment is fairl y and properly construed
according
to
the
framework
that
has
governed
the
interpretation of Alabama's Constitution for more than one

hundred years.
2.
Was t h e tr i al court als o c o rrec t in noting th a t the
operations
at
VictoryLand
have
been
subjected
to
unfa i r
targeting b y the Attorne y General while other facilities are

open a nd operating?
Yes; and more recent events, of whi c h this Court can take
judi c ia l n o ti ce , e ven c ompound this seve r e u n fa i rne ss.
3.
and
Sh oul d t h is Cou rt mo d ify t h e tr i al court ' s order ,
de c lare
unconditiona l l y
that
records , a n d f u nds must be re t urn e d ?

Yes .
the
seized
equipment ,
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
I.
Facts that shed light on the meaning of Amendment

744, and that support the recognition that the bingo
gameplay on the equipment at issue is permitted by
the Amendment.
This case comes to the Court with an extensive record of

historical evidence which sheds light on the original intent
and ratification-period meaning of Macon County's Amendment
744.
This Court has never been presented with any remotely
comparable record in any prior case involving bingo under any

local constitutional amendment.
The
evidence
shows
why Macon
County's
Amendment
was
proposed to remedy a specific set of problems; shows both the

historical and the contemporaneous context within which it was
proposed; shows how the proposed Amendment was discussed and
debated in the halls of the Legislature;
proposed
Amendment
was
discussed
and
and shows how the
debated
during
the
ratification period in Macon County. The evidence shows that

the aspects of bingo gameplay to which the State objects in
this
case
entertaining
(such
as
di splays,
fast
and
networked-computer
with
no
need
for
play,
a
with
player
to
personally mark matched numbers or to personally recognize or

announce
victory)
were
known
to
the
People
who
ratified
Amendment 744, and that it was their precise intent to permit

such bingo gameplay.
The trial court credited the evidence at issue, and noted
that
the
State
offered
no
evidence
whatsoever
in
contradiction. (2C. Supp 3). The trial court found, "the Court
concludes
that
the Macon County voter when voting on the
Amendment understood it to be all forms of bingo." (2C. Supp.

3). The trial court noted the evidence that the very purpose
of the Amendment was to allow all forms of bingo,
electronic bingo,
including
so that Macon County could compete with
other facilities where such forms of bingo were being played.

(Id.). The evidence to support these findings is overwhelming.
Long before this Court's Cornerstone decision in 20 09,
Amendment 744 was proposed in t h e Legislature in 2003 and was
ratified by the voters of Macon County in November 2003. But
to understand t he context and the debate in Ma con County in
2003 ,
one
must
start
with
earlier
hist ory
and
then wor k
forward. This history will show, in the end, why it is proper

to understand Macon County's Amendmen t 744 as having a meaning
that
is
d.ierent
attributed
to
from
other
the
meaning
counties'
that
this
bingo-related
Cou rt
has
amendments.
Fortunately, t h e record in this case provides that histor y in
detail, from expert testimony, lay testimony, and documentary

evidence.
A.
The development of bingo, from its origin to the

ratification of Amendment 744 in 2003 - including
the contemporaneous use of the word "bingo" to refer
to games that are, in all material respects, like
those at issue in this case.
Expert
witness,
I .
Nelson
Rose,
law
professor,
explained that the game of bingo has not been a static thing;
it has evolved over time. I t is based on the Italian game of
"lotto" from the 1500s. It was introduced in the United States
in the 1920s as the game of "beano" because players used beans
to mark wooden cards.
(R. 571-73).
As Professor Rose explained, over the years, the game has

evolved and improved with technology. In the 1970s and 1980s,
bingo
hall s
began
using
pre-printed
cards,
whi c h
players
marked with pre-inked markers. Thereafter, handheld computer

devices were introduced which automatically marked a player's
cards ,
signaled a player when h e ma tched a winning pattern,
and allowed a player to play dozens of cards at the same time.

(R. 573-75).
A 1997 news article , " Still Yo ur Grandmother ' s Bingo, But
Supercharged" (KCED Ex. 50), noted that one of the aspects of
even t h e early sort of electronic bingo play that some players
appreciated was that it made it impossible to "sleep a bingo,"

or fail to recognize victory. Still, it was bingo.
The last years of the 20th century, and the first years of
the
21st,
witnessed
the
continued
evolution
in
the
game
referred to as "bingo" as the type of bingo play at issue in

this case came into widespread use. This change, as Professor
Rose
explained,
developments.
included
both
technological
and
legal
(R. 573-89). Networked computer terminals were
developed which allowed patrons to play bingo electronically.

(R.
576).
With improving technology,
bingo machines became faster.

By 2000,
federal
play on the networked
(R. 576-78).
courts had considered those sorts of
networked electronic bingo player stations. Those cases aro se

under t h e I NDIAN GAMI NG REGULATORY ACT, 25
enacted in 1988.
as
2 701, et seq.,
That Act allowed tribes to operate "bingo"
so-called "Class
whe the r
u.s.c.
II"
games;
and so
the
question a ro s e
e l ec tron i c bingo machines were "bi n g o."
The l e g a l
answer, determined before Amendment 7 4 4 was ever proposed or

v o t e d on, was that thes e g ame s we r e "bingo " in the r e l e vant
s e n se
eve n
t houg h
t he
gamepl a y
exp er i e nce
was
mar k e d l y
different from earlier bingo games. Those courts considered

a nd
r e j ect ed the a r g ume nt
i ll e g al
slot
ma c h i n es .
tha t
e l ec t r oni c
e . g .,
See ,
8
U. S .
bingo g ame s
v.
162
are
Me gaMan ia
Gambling Devices, 231 F.3d 713 (10th
explained this history in his
expert testimony.
By 2003,
(9 th
223 F. 3d 1091
Electronic Gambling Devices,

Professor Rose
Cir. 2000); U.S. v. 103
in the country were no
paper games;
unchallenged
(R. 584-89).
as Professor Rose explained,
"bingo" games
c'ir. 2000).
there had been,
the majority of
longer old-fashioned
by that point,
an "enormous
spread" of networked electronic bingo games. Many such games

used
terminals
displayed a
screen,
that
(like
five-by-five
along
the
spinning
with
at
bingo card in the
entertainment-oriented displays.
B.
machines
wheels
issue
here)
corner of
or
the
other
(R. 590-91).
The type of bingo at issue in this case was being

played in Alabama in 2003.
This new technology of bingo had indeed come to Alabama

by
2003.
By
the
time
of
the
proposal
of,
and
vote
on,
Amendment 744, the Poarch Creek Indians in Alabama had been

operating electronic bingo games at all three of their casinos
in Atmore,
2 00 2 .
Montgomery,
and Wetumpka since at least 2001 o r
(Court Ex. 1, pp. 10, 12, 16- 18 ). Ma con County voters
played electronic bingo games at Poarch Creek facilities in

those
counties
and had fir st-hand knowledge of electronic
bingo when Amendment 744 was put to the ratification vote.
(R. 633-34, 690, 697, 700-01, 704-05, 710).

electronic
today,
case.
bingo
games
operated,
and
The Poarch Creek
continue
to
operate
in the same manner as those that were seized in this

They
involved
networked
machines
with
entertaining
displays such as spinning reels along with representations of

bingo cards.
Players do not
(and did not)
need to hear or
watch specific numbers being called. Players do not (and did

not) take action to mark specific numbers. Players do n ot (and
did not)
have to call "bingo" orally to claim victory.
In
short, "bingo" as played at these facilities as of 2003 shared

the qualiti es that the State objects to in this case.
(See
Court Ex. 1, pp. 9-18, 24-29; see also R. 634-35, 695-701).

This overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence shows that
as
of
2003,
across
t he
country
and
in
Macon
County
in
particular, the word "bingo" was being used to refer to more

than the type of game that had existed for much of the 20th
century. As a clear matter of historical fact ,
t h e word was
a1so being used - by legal authorities, by fa c ilities, and by
players - to refer to linked electronic machines on whi ch the

gameplay experience was like the machines in this case . The
word "bingo" included fast-paced networked-terminal games that
did not require the level of player attention and action t hat
was r e qu ired i n t h e older type of pape r-card "bingo ."
10
Some may argue that it was, in some sense, inappropriate

to use the word "bingo" to refer both to the older gameplay
and the newer. Yet, the fact indisputably remains that this is
how the word was used by 2003.
Nonetheless, the fast-paced electronic bingo that emerged
- and that is at issue in this case - did contain the same
core qualities with older versions of bingo. Those qualities
differentiate
include: 1)
it
from
These
qualities
a game played for cash or prizes; 2)
played on
layouts bearing numbers
"slot
or
mac hines."
symbols;
3)
requiring multiple
players competing against one anot her;

drawn;
and 5)
4)
numbers randomly
won by matching a pre-designated pattern of
numbers or symbols.
(R.
57 9-81) . That is what the games at
i ss ue h ere actually involve ,
e v e n when the screens incl ude
entertaining displays of o ther sorts.
(R.
487-99,
502-04,
510-11, 552-54, 561).

C.
The very purpose of the proposed Amendment was to

allow Macon County to compete with those other
facilities that were already playing the type of
bingo at issue here, in order to improve the economy
of the County.
Ame ndme nt 744 was propo sed, d e b ated in the Legislature ,

unanimo usly
County,
adopte d
by
the
Legislature,
debat e d
in Macon
a nd ove rwhe lmingly ratifi e d by t h e voters of Macon
11
County, in the particular historical context at the particular

moment described above:
2003,
when "bingo" in the form at
issue in this case had already come to Alabama, with networked

machines playing fast-paced games that
required much less
player attention and action than the older versions of bingo.

The record further shows why the constitutional amendment
was proposed,
and it shows also that this
constitutional
amendment
was
discussed
reason for the
widely
and
openly
during the ratification debates. This evidence comes from the

legislative
leaders who
supported the proposed Amendment,
Representative (now Mayor) Johnny Ford and Senator Myron Penn;

from contemporaneous newspaper articles and editorials; and
from advocacy materials that were widely distributed during
the ratification debate.
In 2003,
gambling,
in the form of parimutuel wagering,
had been legal in Macon County for twenty years. ALABAMA ACT
83-575. When wagering revenues began to decrease in the late
1990s and early 2000s, Macon County leaders began researching
other forms o f gambling that would replace lost funding for
schools
and
critical
Macon
nonpro fit
o rgani zations,
community services.
County
citizens
(R.
supported
a nd
633-34,
would
subsidize
658-59,
711-14 ) .
legislat i on
that
would
l e galiz e b ingo i n Macon County to compete with busine ss e s in

12
nearby Montgomery and Elmore Counties that operated paper and

handheld bingo games and to compete with the Native Americans
who were operating electronic bingo games in those counties.
(R. 654-55, 691-92, 704 - 05, 713-14). The inability to compete
with electronic bingo operations elsewhere left the County
"suffering" and "being devastated," as Mayor Ford testified.
(R.
633). The purpose of the proposed Amendment was to end
that suffering and devastation.
(R. 633-34, 658).
When Macon County voters went to the polls in November

2003,
discussion of bingo had largely centered around the
understanding
Amendment.
that
this
was
the
reason
for
the
proposed
(R. 637). Approval of Amendment 744 would include
all forms of bingo, precisely in order to increase revenues to

local governments and businesses, to create more jobs in the
community,
(R.
653-55,
and to provide fund to schools and nonprofits.

658-59,
686,
710).
It would accomplish this by
allowing operations in Macon County to compete on a level

playing
field
with
other
facilities,
including
tribal
facilities, that were running electronic bingo just like the

games at issue here.
(R. 654-55, 691-92, 705, 711-12).
News articles and editorials expressly reflected this

history and contemporaneous understanding of the Amendment's
purpose.
Those
contemporaneous
13
documents,
with
the
widest
possible
local
dissemination,
public
the
confirmed
understanding of what was at stake: the ability to compete on

a level playing field with other facilities such as tribal
facilities
that
were
already
offering
this
very
sort
of
electronic bingo, so that Macon County would have more jobs,

more public revenue for schools and other projects, and more
charitable revenue as well.
(KCED Exs. 8-10, 14-15, 17-1 8) .
Pro-bingo flyers, including those explicitly noting that

"electronic"
and
"machine"
bingo
were
at
stake,
were
disseminated by "Macon Countians for a Better Economy." (KCED

Exs.
4-7,
11,
13, attached hereto as Appendi x 1 ). The very
name of the organization shows the focus of the debate: the

purpose of the proposed Amendment was to help Macon County's
economy, in the way that only fair competition against other
competing facilities could do. One of those flyers explicitly
noted the focus on "ELECTRONIC" bingo and argued that it wou l d
be "good for e ducation,
for me and .
. good for charit ie s ,
. good
. good for you." (KCED Ex. 5).
From these sources,
it is c l ear that every reasonable
voter interested in the ratification debate would h ave known

that this was the purpose: to bring in the sort of jobs and
revenue that could only be gained by competing with rivals ,
14
such as tribal facilities, on a level basis.
(R. 654-55, 691-
92, 705, 711-13).

games,
bingo
electronic
including
games,
Bingo
accomplished all of those goals in Macon County once operation

of
electronic
bingo
games
began
in
December
2003.
addition of bingo games created over 2,000 jobs,

revenue
for
local
organizations,
(R.
governments,
and
increased
and
schools,
taxes
to
local
The
generated
nonprofit
governments.
658-59).
Authorizing
only
old-fashioned
bingo
would
not
have
achieved the goal of economic benefit to Macon County through

effective competition with tribal facilities; as Senator Penn
testified,
bingo
it would be "absurd" to think that old-fashioned
alone
would
have
served
addressed by Amendment 744.

0.
the
purpose
sought
to
be
(R. 680).
The 2003 debates, in the Legislature and in Macon

County, provide objective evidence that the word
"bingo" was being used to refer to all forms of
bingo, including the electronic games that were
being played in competing facilities.
The public discussion and debate throughout the process

made it crystal clear to anyone paying attention that the
"bingo"
that
was
at
stake
in Amendment
744
was
not
just
old-fashioned bingo. The issue that the People of Macon County

were debating was whether to authorize a11 forms of bingo,
15
specifically
including
electronic
bingo,
and
specifically
including the very sort of electronic bingo which was being

played at competing tribal facilities.
(R. 653-55, 686, 690-
92, 703-06, 710-15).

This was clear from the outset, when Representative Ford
held a public meeting to discuss the proposed Amendment even
before he introduced it. Representative Ford told the public
that the Amendment would permit electronic bingo to compete
with tribal facilities.
(R. 639-40, 654-58, 691-92).
This was also crystal clear when the proposed Amendment

was debated and unanimously approved in both Houses of the
Legislature. It was no secret that the Macon County "bingo"
proposal included electronic bingo such as was being played at
tribal facilities and elsewhere. (R. 637, 654-56, 686, 690-92,
703-05,
710,
712-15).
This understanding was
shared -
and
discussed openly - both by the advocates and by the opponents

of the proposal.
(R. 637-39; KCED Ex. 3, attached hereto as
Appendix 2). Opponents of the proposal,
in the Legislature,
decried it precisely because it would allow electronic bingo.

(Id.).
Among those opponents was the Christian Coalition of
Alabama, who lobbied against the Bill on the specific ground

that
it would expand gambling and allow electronic games.
(KCED Ex. 3). Flyers by the Christian Coalition bearing the

16
legend "Vote NO on Electronic Bingo Gaming Machines" were

distributed in the Statehouse prior to the passage of HB660.
(R. 635-38; KCED Ex. 3)
Senator
Penn,
who
sponsored
the
Bill
in
the
Senate,
explained to other Senators in his discussion of the proposa l,

that it would permit bingo in all forms, including electronic,
and that the goal was to allow Macon County to compete with
the
tribal
facilities
with
the
same
types
of
games .
(R. 668-69). He testified, "[T]he whole debate throughout the

entire process in the House, in the Senate, and, also, in the
streets of Macon County was about, mainly, electroni c bingo.
It was -- it included -- the legislation would include all
forms of bingo, but electronic bingo was the centerpoint of
what they argued for or against. "
(R. 670-71).
HB660 did n ot receive any dissenting votes in either the

House or the Senate in spite of the admonition that a vote for
HB660
would
lead
to
the
expansion
operation of electronic bingo games.
of
gambling
a nd
the
(R. 635, 670) .
The proposed Amendment t h en went t o t h e People of Ma con

County for t h e ir ratification debate. Again , the terms of the
debate were such t hat every interested voter would have known
that t h e
bingo.
issue at hand was not old-fashioned ,
The issue ,
as was obviou s
17
s l ow,
paper
f rom t h e a dvocacy of bo t h
proponents
and
opponents,
was
bingo
in
all
its
forms
including, particularly, electronic bingo of the sort that was

already being played at rival facilities in the State.
This
was
discussed
at
public
meetings.
As
then-Representative Ford explained, once the proposal passed

in
the
Legislature,
"We
immediately
started an
effort
to
educate our citizens on the fact that this legislation would

allow
bingo
(R. 637)
to
be
played
in
forms
any
in Macon
County."
(emphasis added). "We held public meetings. We held
town hall meetings. We met with community groups. We wanted to

make sure that our citizens knew that if they voted yes on
this measure,
it would make our gaming industry competitive
with all of the other gaming facilities in the state run by

the Native Americans and others." Id.
On October 30, 2003,
The Tuskegee News editorialized in
favor of Amendment 7 44 before the vote.

editorial
largely
to
noted
that
VictoryLand' s
competition
from
tribal
loss
(KCED Ex.
of
14) . The
business,
facilities,
had
due
been
devastating to the County. The editorial noted that jobs had

been lost when another sort of gaming machine had been halted
at
VictoryLand;
the
editorial
Amendment was approved,
pointed
"Ma.chines
18
out
that
if
the
that wou1d be set up for
bingo will be utilized at VictoryLand's game room . . . Those
jobs that disappeared earlier would return with a yes vote

Tuesday." (Id.)
(emphasis added).
Similarly, on that same day, a front-page article in The

Tuskegee News (KCED Ex. 15) discussed the fact that what was
at stake in the upcoming vote was the ability to compete with

tribal facilities to help the local economy. The article noted
that the vast revenue that VictoryLand had brought to local
government and charities "could be lost if the track isn't
able to offer video gaming to compete with the Porch
.. "(Id.)
Indians .
[sic]
(emphasis added).
The Tuskegee News is the same newspaper in which official
announcements of the constitutional ratification vote were

printed on October 9, 16, and 23, respectively (KCED Exs. 16A16C); this attests to the paper's widespread dissemination in
the County.
Flyers
advocating
for
the Amendment,
and specifically
referencing "electronic" bingo and "all forms" of bingo, were

disseminated
"throughout"
the
cornrnuni ty,
being
placed
on
windshields, handed out after church services, distributed to

"every household throughout the community," etc.
67 4-7 5) .
See
KCED
Ex.
("VOTE
19
YES
FOR
(R. 649-53,
ELECTRONIC
BINGO
MACHINES ON TUESDAY NOV. 4TH)
KCED Ex. 5 ("LET'S JOIN TOGETHER
AND MAKE TUESDAY NOV. 4Ttt A DAY TO REMEMBER IN MACON COUNTY.

IT'S GOOD FOR EDUCATION,
IT'S GOOD FOR CHARITIES,
FOR ME AND IT'S GOOD FOR YOU.
IT'S GOOD
VOTE YES ELECTRONIC BINGO");
KCED Ex. 6 ("VOTE YES ON TUESDAY - NOV. 4Ttt TO AUTHORIZE ALL

FORMS
OF
BINGO
PAPER
BINGO"); KCED Ex.
CARD,
ELECTRONIC
CARD
AND
MACHINE
4,
2003 TO
("VOTE YES ON TUESDAY-NOV.
AUTHORIZE ALL FORMS OF BINGO: PAPER CARD-ELECTRONIC-MACHINE

BINGO FOR THE BETTERMENT OF MACON COUNTY) ; KCED Ex. 11 ("VOTE
YES FOR BINGO ON TUESDAY NOV. 4); and KCED Ex. 13 ("VOTE YES
FOR BINGO ON TUESDAY NOV. 4 Ttt"), all attached as Appendix 1.
The opposing camp's flyer bore the same message - that
the Amendment would permit electronic bingo - and advocated
against it for precisely that reason.
2)
(KCED Ex. 3)
(Appendix
("Vote NO on Electronic Bingo Gaming Machines.") .

The same understanding was discussed openly on broadcast
radio.
Senator
ratification
Penn
debate
had
weekly
period,
bingo
show;
was
and
"the
during
hot
the
topic."
(R. 675 -7 6). Senator Penn would get feedbac k from listeners
and
would
discuss
with
them
electronic
bingo.
(R.
676) .
Representative Ford also had a broadcast radio show; there,

too,
(R .
" e le ctronic"
bingo
was
69 1 - 92 ).
20
the
topic
of
discussion.
And as discussed above,
at the time of the vote, Macon
County voters had already been playing games like these,
as
bingo, in rival facilities elsewhere in the State. (R. 690-91,
701, 704-05, 710).

It is true,
of course,
that the word "electronic" does
not appear in Amendment 744. The evidence shows plainly why

that was: Representative Ford did not want to run any risk of
limiting the types of bingo that could be played in the future
in Macon County.
(R.
654-55).
The goal was to ensure that
Macon County could play all forms of bingo that were, or would
be, played at rival facilities.
(Id.). Only in that way could
Macon
local
County be
assured
that
bingo
facilities
playing on a level field against their rivals.

Furthermore,
in 2003,
were
(Id.).
there was no case law from this
Court that put the framers of Amendment 744, or the People of

Macon County, on notice that they would have to use the word
"electronic"
or
any
other
particular
word,
in
order
to
effectuate their intent. This Court's decision in Cornerstone

would not come until years later; and no other decision from
this Court put the public on notice that this Court would find
any particular words relevant to discerning the intended and
original meaning of the Amendment.
21
E.
The Sheriff of Macon County, who is entrusted by law

with
enforcement
of
Amendment
744,
issued
regulations contemporaneously with the Amendment's
ratification, allowing all forms of bingo games - games played with paper car ds and games played with
electronic machines.
Amendment
744
gave
the
Sheriff
of
Macon
Count y ,
constitutional officer of the State, the authority to issue

rules and regulations to g o vern the operation o f bingo games
in
the
Co unty .
(R.
7 2 0- 2 3).
The
Sheriff
e x erc i sed
that
authority, promulgating ru l es shortly after the ratification

vote and updating those rules over t h e years .
(R .
7 2 0; KCED
Exs . 2A- 2C ). Thos e r ul es and regu lation s , from December 20 0 3

to
the
present,
have
permitted in Macon
n e twor ked t ermi nal s ,
always
Co unt y
recognized
that
the
"bingo "
includes electronic bingo us ing
s u c h as t h e game s at is sue h e r e .
(KCE D
Exs. 2A- 2C) .

Ano ther a r t icle
2003 ,
j u st wee k s
in
The
Tusk egee
after t h e vote ,
News
on
December
11 ,
n oted t h at the Sh eriff ' s
regulati ons contained pro visi o ns f o r t wo c lasses of licen s e :

o n e for o p era ti ons t h a t wo u ld invo lve b ingo "with paper cards
only with the
numbers
e x tens ive regulati o ns)
called out "

f or
and another
(with more
tho se o p e rations that wo uld use
" e l ect ron i c machines for the b ingo games ." (KCED Ex . 1 8) .
22
The State does not even contend that the games that were
being
played
at
VictoryLand
failed
to
comply
with
the
Sheriff's regulations in any way. In fact, the record contains

extensive evidence that the games at issue do comply with the
Sheriff's regulations. The Sheriff insisted that the games be
tested by a nationally and internationally prominent testing
lab, BMM, and that they be certified as being compliant. (KCED
Exs.
38-40,
52).
representative
The record includes ample testimony by a

of
examination of the
BMM,
demonstrating
equipment,
(after
extensive
including both hardware and
software) that the games at issue are actually "bingo" and are
compliant with the Sheriff's regulations. The games are based
on bingo play,
patterns.
with random ball draws matching preselected
(R. 480-502) . 3
According to Richard Williamson, BMM's representative,

the machines at issue in this case require group play, i.e.,
at least two players; using a distinct electronic bingo card
for each player; a random draw of numbers common to all
players; and an announced display of the win. (R. 487-92;
493-94).
Although the machines also have entertaining
displays, the displays do not influence the outcome of the
bingo being played. (R. 497-99).
3
23
Facts regarding the Attorney

picking" enforcement strategy.
II.
In
its
original
judgment,
the
General' s
trial
court
"cherry-
noted
the
following:
[I]t is undisputed that other facilities within the
State have operated the same type of gaming devices
for
substantial
periods
of
time,
even while
VictoryLand has been shut down. The State did not
dispute that other facilities have the same machines
or that they are open..
. The State also did not
dispute that during that same time frame [August 9,
2010, and the beginning of trial], non-Tribal
facilities in the State of Alabama also operated
electronic bingo games at Center Stage (Houston
County), Greenetrack (Greene County) and Greene
Charity Bingo (Greene County) almost continuously
for 1, 166 days,
1, 134 days,
and 1, 058 days,
respectively.
During this same 4-year period,
VictoryLand operated the same type of electronic
bingo for only 63 days . . . . While electronic bingo
operations at VictoryLand remain shut tered, today ,
both Tribal and non-Tribal facilities within the
State of Alabama continue to operate the same type
of electronic bingo games . The State could not and
did not offer any substantive reason why it
permitted this state of affairs to continue at other
facilities, while taking its present stance against
the same operations at VictoryLand.
It is apparent at the present time that the State of

Alabama is cherrypicking which facilities should
remain open or closed.
(C. 1042-44).
In a post-judgment motion,
issue with
( C.
Supp.
that
aspect
36 - 38) .
But
of
the
the
the Attorney General

Court's
Attorney
24
original
General
took
judgment.
presented
no
evidence to refute the court's
factual
recitals about the
continued operation of other facilities while VictoryLand was

shut down by action of the Attorney General.
(Id.).
Indeed,
the Attorney General did not even suggest that those recitals
were wrong; instead, he pointed to some litigation that he had
instituted in Greene and Houston Counties and disputed the
inference that he was engaged in "cherry-picking." (C. Supp.
36-37) .
KCED responded with affidavits showing that, even at that
very
time,
electronic
bingo
facilities
remained
open
and
operating in Greene, Lowndes, Montgomery, Elmore, and Es cambia

Counties (some of which were non-tribal facilities). (C. Supp.
46-55).
In
its
revised
judgment,
the
trial
cour t
no ted
this
unrefuted evidence, and noted that as of late July 2015, there

were
1,798
e lectronic
bingo
machines
operating
facilities in Greene and Lowndes Counties.
at
six
( 2C . Supp. 3-4) .
The court noted that the State did not deny this.
And the
court, "reiterate[d] its ruling that t he State of Alabama is

cherry picking wh ich facilit i es should remain open or closed
.. The State obviously is not enforcing the law equally."
(2C . Supp. 4).
25
This
Court
can
also
take
judicial
notice
of
the
Governor's Executive Order No. 13, entered November 5, 2015. 4

That
Executive
raised
concern
criminal laws,
Order
with
noted
the
"recent
unequal
judicial
enforcement
including gambling laws,
rulings
have
of Alabama's
against individuals
and businesses." The Governor revoked his earlier Executive

Order which had given the Attorney General primary enforcement
authority over such matters. The Governor directed that "the
primary responsibility for enforcement of Alabama's criminal
laws shall remain with the sheriffs and district attorneys of
each County as guided by their careful interpretation o f t he
laws
of
the
State
of
Alabama
in
their
capacity
as
constitutional officers and officers of the courts."
http : //governor . alabama . g ov/newsroom/ 2 015/11 . exe c utive order-number- 1 3-2 / (l ast accessed Dec. 9, 2015) .
4
26
STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The case comes to this Court on a judgment rendered after

a bench trial. So the ore tenus standard of review applies.
While questions of law can be reviewed de novo,
this Court
will defer to the trial court on questions of fact so long as

there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's
conclusions; it is up to the trial court to assess witnesses'
credibility and to assign weight to their testimony. Wehle v.
Bradley, No. 1101290, 2015 WL 6618633, at *2
(Ala. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 30, 2015). Further, this Court must view the evidence and
the facts in the light most favorable to the findings of the
trial court.
Ex parte Caldwell,
104 So.
3d 901,
904
(Ala.
2012); Ex parte Brown, 26 So. 3d 1222, 1225 (Ala. 2009).
27
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court has recognized for over one hundred years that
the goal of all constitutional interpretation is to ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the People - and that this intent
is gathered not from a sterile review of the text alone but
from review of the text in light of its history, in light of
the
purposes
designed,
for
which
the
constitutional
provision
was
and in light of the historical record that sheds
light on the original public understanding and original intent

of the provision.
This case, involving the interpretation of Amendment 744,
which authorizes
"bingo games"
in Macon County,
is unlike
Cornerstone and subsequent decisions from this Court following

Cornerstone. The reason is that this case comes to this Court
with a clear, overwhelming, and unrefuted historical record of
the legislative proceedings and public debate preceding the
adoption
articles,
standard
of
Amendment
editorials,
of
overwhelmingly
744,
and
including
flyers.
constitutional
clear
from
the
widely
Under
disseminated
the
traditional
interpretation,
record
that
it
Amendment
is
744
permits bingo in all its forms, including electronic bingo of

the sort that was being played at rival facilities in 2003
when the Amendment was adopted. That record shows:
28
* that in 2003, when the Amendment was ratified, the word

"bingo" was being used throughout the nation to describe a new
generation
of
electronic
involving
gameplay,
networked
terminals with a fast-paced bingo game that did not require

the
same
level
of
player
attention
and
action
as
older
versions of the game required;
* that this sort of bingo was being played in Alabama,

and that Macon County voters were among the one s who played
it;
* that this sort of bingo gameplay, and the use of the

word "bingo" to refer to it, came into existence after mo st
other bingo-related constitutional amendments in Alabama had
been adopted;
* that the Peopl e of Macon County sought, and ratified,

Amendment 7 4 4 precisely in order to allow their County to
compete
on
level
playing
field
with
rival
facilities
(includi ng triba l facilities ) that were already offering th i s

very
sort
of bingo gameplay,
in order
to bring
jobs
and
in
the
airwaves ,
in
revenue to Macon County ;

that
the
de b a t e
Legislature
and
in
the
over
Ame ndme n t
Count y
(over
744,
the
both
n e wspapers , and in flyers distributed very widely), made quite

clear that the "bi ngo ga mes " a utho ri zed by t h e Ame ndme nt would
29
not be just old-fashioned bingo, but would include "all forms"

of bingo including "electronic," with this understanding being
shared by proponents and opponents alike; and
that
authority
the
by
Sheriff
Amendment
of
Macon
744
to
County,
who
promulgate
is
given
and
rules
regulations, promptly issued regulations that illustrated this

same public understanding.
None of the
fa c ts
shown by the overwhelming evidence
presented in this case were true, or were shown to be true, in

Cornerstone or subsequent cases in this Court. And Amendment
7 44
was
not
considered
in
Cornerstone,
nor
definitively construed in any subsequent case.
has
it
been
In fact,
in
ordering the issuance of the warrant used to obtain the mone y ,

r ecords,
a nd
equipme nt
t hat
are
the
sub ject
of
t h is
proceeding, this Court promised that the meaning of Amendment

744 would be " revisi t ed at a trial in whi ch the investigat ed
pa rty i s
presen t
a nd has
noti ce and an o pportunit y t o b e
heard." Ex parte State, 1 2 1 So. 3d 337, 357 n.12 (Ala. 201 3) .

Notwi thstanding, t he Attorney General wron g l y asks t his
Cou rt to igno r e t h e will of t h e Peop l e of Ma c on County and t o
substitute his view of what gaming ought to include, or thi s
Cou rt 's v iew, ov er the irs. Th e At torn e y Genera l a sks the Cou r t
t o apply a s o -cal l ed " plain meaning" test , or othe r t o ols o f
30
construction, that: 1) impose a preferred meaning rather than

the
one
debate;
that
and
was
2)
prevalent
are
during
contrary
to
the
the
ratification
2003
basic
principles
constitutional democracy and the will
of the
Court
request.
should resoundingly reject
should
demonstrate
in
that
that
Alabama,
People.
This
of
This
Court
constitutional
adjudication is not merely a way for the judiciary to impose

its policy preferences in an anti-democratic fashion.
Therefore, this Court should hold that the operations at
VictoryLand
were
authorized
by Amendment
744,
and
should
require the Attorney General to return the equipment, records,

and funds of which he wrongly sought forfeiture.
In addition,
conclusion
that
the Court should affirm the trial court's

the
Attorney
General
was
engaged
in
an
unlawful "cherry-picking" enforcement strategy, as he doggedly

pursued
VictoryLand
while
allowing
facilities
in
other
counties to remain open, playing the very same games, even up

to the time of the judgment in this case.
31
ARGUMENT
I.
As with any other portion of the Constitution, this

Court is to interpret Amendment 744 to effectuate
the original intent of the People; and in a way that
honors the purpose that the Amendment was designed
to accomplish. Correctly interpreted, Amendment 744
plainly permits electronic bingo of the sort that
was being played at VictoryLand.
The
primary
question
here
concerns
the
meaning
of
Amendment 744, adopted overwhelmingly by the voters of Macon

County in 2003 after significant public debate. To put it most
plainly, the question is whether this Court will interpret the
Amendment
in
the
historical
evidence
manner
of
its
required
by
the
overwhelming
intended meaning,
as
publicly
discussed by its framers and the ratifying People - or whether

this Court will interpret it in a way that is contrary to the
original public understanding and that would utterly fail to
accomplish the People's goal .
One thing must be remembered at the outset: There is no
reason in law why a local constitutional amendment,
such as
Amendment 744, could not authorize the games at issue in this

case. Such an amendment could not be prohibited by any other
part of the Constitution. See SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL RECOMPILATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ALABAMA OF 1901,
political
power
is
inherent
in
32
the
as
amended
people,
and
("That
all
all
free
governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for

their benefit; and that, therefore, they have at all times an
inalienable and indefeasible right to change their form of
government in such manner as they may deem expedient.").
As
Justice
Houston
noted
concurrence in Ex parte Melof,
in
his
735 So.
1999), "[a]mong Supreme Court Justices,

should be paramount."
2d 1172,
special
1188
(Ala.
the notion of truth
As Justice Houston further explained in
regard to constitutional interpretation,

the Supreme Court]
influential
"[w]e
[Justices of
pour corruption on both sacred entities
[the Court and the Constitution] by failing to resist the urge

to drink from the chalice of illegitimate,
power.
With
that
understood,
want
to
but available,
underscore
one
unavoidable truth: that the power to amend the Constitution

rests with the people of the State of Alabama, not with the
members of this Court." Id. at 1188-89. The 1901 Constitution
preserves "the ability of the people to amend the Constitution
to reflect their wishes." Id. at 1189. "Might does not make
right. We should not, simply because we can, shift the power
to amend the Constitution from the hands of the people into
the hands of nine Supreme Court Justices." Id. at 1190.
The truth, in this matter, is indisputable; and the trial
court correctly recognized it:
33
the
People of Macon County
ratified
Amendment
understanding,
744
on
the
of proponents
widespread
and opponents
publicly-stated
alike,
that
it
would permit all forms of bingo that were, or would be, played
in rival facilities.
The truth is that the People of Macon
County saw this as their path to economic revitalization. The

truth is that games materially indistinguishable from the ones
at
issue
here
were,
and
are
now,
being
played
at
rival
facilities as bingo, and the word "bingo" was used to describe

these games in 2003.
This Court should adhere to the truth, and should reject
the Attorney General's attempt to make Alabama's Constitution
follow his own political preferences rather than the People's
will.
A.
Neither Cornerstone, nor any case following it,

contains a holding about the meaning of Amendment
744.
The Attorney General's main argument is that this case is
wholly controlled by Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, 42
So. 3d 65 (Ala. 2009) , and cases following it. He argues that
this Court has already decided that "Cornerstone bingo" (which
requires each player to listen,
yell
victory)
is
the
full
to mark,
e x tent
of
to notice,
each
and
bingo-related constitutional amendment in the State.

Brief, pp. 27-30).
34
and to
every
(State's
But Cornerstone contained no holding about the meaning of

Amendment 744. This conclusion is inherent in the definition
of a "holding." Cornerstone was about Lowndes County, and the
interpretation of Amendment 674 5 which governs bingo in that
County.
to
No one engaged in bingo in Macon County was a party
Cornerstone.
Furthermore,
mentioned in Cornerstone.
Amendment
744
was
not
even
This omission is telling, because
various other amendments relating to bingo in other counties

were mentioned in the opinion.
If this Court had stated any opinion about Amendment 7 44
in Cornerstone, it would have been dicta.
[I]t is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in
connection with the case in which those expressions
are u sed . If they go beyond the case, they may be
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in
a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented
for decision.
Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States, 300 U.S. 98, 103,
57 S.Ct. 356, 358 (19 3 7)
332,
341,
186
So.
(quo ted in State v. Murphy, 237 Ala.
487,
496
(1939)
and
in
other
cases).
Therefore, Cornerstone cannot " control the judgment" of this

Court in this case regarding the meaning of Amendme nt
744
where that "very point is presented for decision" in this case
OFFICIAL
AMENDMENTS,
RECOMP.
LOWNDES COUNTY ,
OF
THE
CONS T.
SECTION
3.
35
OF
ALABAMA
OF
1901,
LOCAL
and was not presented in Cornerstone. Osaka, 300 U.S. at 103,

57 S.Ct at 358.
The same holds true about later cases,
County Econ.
2014),
in
Dev.
which
Auth.
this
v.
State,
Court
such as Houston
168 So.
stated
that
3d 4,
the
11
(Ala.
Cornerstone
definition of "bingo" applies to all bingo-related amendments.

Those cases did not involve Macon County or Amendment 744, and
no one in Macon County was heard in the cases. This Court,
when acting with judicial integrity, must recognize that any
such statement could only be dictum as to Macon County and
Amendment 744. This Court must interpret Amendment 744 now, in
this case,
and cannot avoid that task by stating that the
Court's hands are tied by previous decisions.

In
fact,
this
Court
has
already promised
County litigants would have an opportunity,
that
Macon
in a forfeiture
proceeding like this one, to address the open question of what

types of bingo are permitted in Macon County. In ordering the
issuance of a warrant, in an ex parte proceeding to which the
State was the only party, this Court promised that "both the
issue of what it is that extant 1aw prohibits and the issue
whether the conduct or items at issue rise to the level of
that prohibition are addressed in the ex parte context of an
application for a search warrant only for purposes of deciding
36
whether the State is entitled to the warrant . " Ex parte State,

1 21 So . 3d 337, 357 n.1 2 (Ala. 2013)
(emphasis added) . "[B]oth
issues are subject to being revisited at a tria1 in which the

investigated
party
is
present
(I d . )
opportunity to be heard."
and
has
notice
(emphasis added).
and
an
Thi s is
that case, and as this Court has promised, it is here that the
Court will addr ess "what it is that e x tant law prohibits."
( I d.) .
B.
The object of a ll constitutional i n terpretation is

to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
People. The Court accomplishes this task not by
looking to words alone, but by looking to how the
words were used and understood at the specific time,
to the debates over ratification, to the purpose for
which the provision was designed, and to the
contemporaneous
construction
of
r esponsible
officials.
What
is
the
goal
and
the
governing
method
of
const i tuti o n a l interpre tati on in Al abama ? The an s wer has b e e n

clear
for
over
one
h u n dred
years .
"The
ob ject
of
all
construc tion is t o ascerta i n and effe c tuate the intenti o n o f

t h e people in the a doption of t h e cons ti t uti on ." St ate v .
Sayre ,
118
Corne r st one,
Ala .
42
1,
So .
28 ,
3d
24
So .
at
89 ,
7 9) .
92
(1 897)
"In
(q u oted i n
c o nstruing
t he
Con stituti on , t h e l eading purpose woul d be to asce r tain and

effect u ate the inte n t
and obj ect
37
original l y i n te n d e d to be
accomplished." Alexander v. State, 274 Ala. 441, 446, 150 So.

2d 204, 208
(1963).
Just as this Court has said that in interpreting a phrase

in the 1901 Constitution the Court will "seek to understand
the meaning it would have had for the delegates to the 1901
Constitutional Convention," Opinion of the Justices No. 376,
825 So. 2d 109, 114
(Ala. 2002), the Court in this case will
seek to understand the meaning that Amendment 744 would have

had in Macon County in 2003 when the Amendment was debated and
adopted there.
Obviously, the words used in a constitutional amendment
are the starting point for interpretation. But one cannot look
to the words,
in a detached sense,
from a perspective that
ignores the relevant contemporaneous history. "The intention

is
collected
from
the
words
of
the
instrument,
read
and
interpreted in the l.ight of its history." Sayre, 118 Ala. at
28,
24
So.
at
Cornerstone,
92
42 So.
(emphasis
added)
(cited
and
quoted
in
3d at 79). One asks not what the words
mean to a reader now, but what the words would have meant to
the People at the time, in the context that faced them. "There
can be no just construction or interpretation,
effectuating
the intent of the people, which is not deduced, not only from
the words,
but from the history,

38
of any particular part or
provision of the instrument." Sayre, 118 Ala. at 28, 24 So. at

92.
And,
importantly,
one does not stop and rest satisfied
upon concluding that a given word "normally" had a certain

meaning.
Words
communities,
can
and
mean
the
different
search
is
things
for
how
to
the
different
words
were
understood by the relevant community at the relevant time. The

Supreme Court of the United States recognized this in a case
that this Court has relied upon heavily for its approach to
constitutional interpretation. "Normal meaning may of course
include
an
idiomatic meaning,
but
it
excludes
secret
or
technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary

citizens in the founding generation." Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d
at 79 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
576-77,
128
S.Ct.
2783,
2788,
171
L.Ed.2d
637
(2008))
(emphasis added). "Idiomatic" means "peculiar to a particular

group,
individual,
"universal."
or
style" 6 ;
among
its
opposites
is
The point is that if the People in the relevant
community and time would have understood a word in a certain

way,
then the Court follows that usage,
even if it was an
"idiomatic" usage rather than a perfectly standard one.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER' S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 616 (11th ed. 2012 ) .

39
So the proper approach to a constitutional text is as

Thomas
Jefferson
said:
not
contentious
and
combative
approach, but an approach instead that humbly and generously

attempts to honor the People's usage. "On every question of
construction,
carry
ourselves
back
to
the
time
when
the
Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in

the
debates,
and
instead
of
trying
what
meaning
may
be
squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to

the probable one in which it was passed." Thomas Jefferson,
Letter
to
Judge
William
Johnson,
June
12,
1823,
15
The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 449-50 (quoted in Cole v. Riley,
989 So. 2d 1001, 1017 (Ala. 2007)
(Bolin, J., dissenting)).
In undertaking this task of putting themselves into the

framers'
and
People's mindset,
courts
very often
rely on
evidence from debates and public discussion from the framers,

and in the public debate regarding ratification. Common uses
of
such
evidence
include
the
frequent
reliance
on
The
Federalist Papers in addressing questions that arise under the

United States Constitution. 7
a
real
sense,
The evidence in this case is, in
a modern version of that evidence.
In many
See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning,

U.S.
134
S.Ct. 2550, 2558-59, 2561, 2566, 2577, 189 L.Ed.2d 538 (2014);
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona,
U.S. - - ' 133
S.Ct. 2247, 2253, 2258, 186 L.Ed.2d 239 (2013).
7
40
respects the evidence here is even more probative, as it goes

directly to the People's publicly discussed and widespread
knowledge of what was at stake. 8
The "examination of a variety of legal and other sources
to determine the public understanding of a legal text in the
period after its enactment or ratification . . . is a critical
tool of constitutional interpretation." Heller, 554 U.S. 570
at 605, 128 S.Ct. at 2805 (emphasis in original). "In studying
the
history
of
the
times,"
as
an
aid
to
constitutional
interpretation, "certainly statements in the current press of

the time can be considered." Opinion of the Justices No. 140,
263 Ala.
also,
141,
145,
naturally,
81 So.
look
to
2d 678,
the
682
(1955).
advocacy
Courts will
materials
that
In Cornerstone, the Supreme Court relied heavily on

Stephan v. Parrish, 887 P.2d 127 (Kan.
Sup. Ct. 1994). See
Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 83. The Parrish decision, too,
confirms the propriety of this Court's use of the evidence as
a guide to constitutional interpretation. See 887 P.2d at 131
("In ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision,
the primary duty of the courts is to look to the intention of
the makers and adopters of that provision. In interpreting and
construing the constitutional amendment, the court must
examine the language used and consider it in connection with
the general surrounding facts and circumstances that cause the
amendment to be submitted."). The Kansas Supreme Court noted
in that case, "Unfortunate1y, the record is void of any
material evidence of what legislators or voters thought or
intended when they voted to approve [the constitutional
provision at issue]." 887 P.2d at 132 (emphasis added). The
Court is fortunate in this case to have the evidence which the
Supreme Court of Kansas lacked in Parrish.
8
41
proponents and opponents distributed during the ratification

debate; those documents will shed enormous light on how the
ratifying voters would have understood the words of the text.
For example, consider Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle,
719
N.W.2d
408
(Wis.
Sup.
Ct.
2006) . 9
The
Court
there
recognized that "the constitutional debates and practices of

the time" are a primary source of guidance as to the original
intent of a constitutional text .
719 N.W. 2d at 422.
"[T]he
information used to educate the voters during the ratification

campaign provides evidence of the voters'
intent.
'[W] here
such intenti o n appears, the construction and interpretation of

the
acts
must
follow
(alte ra tion in original)
accordingly.'"
719
N.W.2d
at
426
(citat ions omitted). The Court noted
many news articles , public statements , and the l i ke, all made
during the ratification debate, ascribing a certain meaning to
the proposed amendment; and so the Court concluded that this
was the voters' int e nt and therefore the a me ndment must be so
interpreted. 719 N.W.2d at 426-27.
Dairyland involved a cha ll enge to the power of the

Governor
of
Wisconsin ,
following
the
passage
of
a
constitutional a mendment prohibiting gambling except f or
certai n types , to r e n e w a compa c t with in- state Indi a n trib e s
t hat authorized casino-type gaming on Indian r eservat ions .
9
42
Moreover, a court interpreting a constitutional provision

will seek to understand why the provision was proposed and
adopted policy
or
in other words,
governance
well-settled
rule
it
what perceived problem of public

was
meant
to
remedy.
interpretation,
of
"It
is
applicable
a
to
constitutions as well as statutes, that it is permissible in

ascertaining their purpose and intent to look to the history
of the times, the existing order of things, the state of the
law
when
the
instrument
was
adopted,
and
the
conditions
necessitating such adoption." Houston County v. Martin,
232
Ala. 511, 514, 169 So. 13, 16 (1936). This Court quoted and
accepted those very words from Martin, in Cornerstone, 42 So.
3d at 79: when interpreting a constitutional provision,
one
looks to "the conditions necessitating" the adoption of the

provision.
It is a well-settled principle that constitutions,
like statutes, are properly to be expounded in the
light of conditions existing at the time of their
adoption;
. and we consider and weigh the evils
of the old system, which the people intended to cure
by the new.
Fox v.
McDonald,
101 Ala.
51,
66,
13 So.
416,
State v. Murphy, 237 Ala. 332, 335, 186 So. 487,

(rejecting
proposed
construction
43
of
418
490
(1893);
(1939)
constitutional
provision that is "out of harmony with the motivating cause of

the inclusion of this prohibition in our organic law").
In addition,
a court will look to evidence of how the
constitutional provision was interpreted, upon ratification,

by those officials who had an opportunity to understand its
intention and who were legally responsible for enforcing it.
Elmore County v. Tallapoosa County, 221 Ala. 182, 186, 128 So.
158, 161 (1930)
(holding that in interpreting a provision of
the Constitution, great weight is given to the contemporaneous

interpretation thereof by those who had an opportunity to
understand its intention); State v. Stone, 237 Ala. 78, 83-84,
185 So.
404,
408
proper
construction
constitutiona l
(1938)
("[W]hen there is doubt about the
to
be
provision
placed
existing ,
upon
the
statute
or
contemporaneous
construction placed upon same by . . . the officers whose duty

it was to construe them, and . . . the popular interpretation,
as exempli fie d in pra ct ice for a number of years,
looked
to
in
reaching
conclusion
construction.").
44
as
to
should be
the
proper
C.
Under this traditional standard of constitutional

interpretation, it is overwhelmingly clear that
Amendment 744 permits bingo in all its forms,
including electronic bingo of the sort that was
being played at rival facil i ties at the time of the
Amendment's ratification.
the
Under
constitutional
proper
and
approach
traditional
interpretation,
744
Amendment
must
to
be
understood as using the word "bingo" to include all forms of

bingo that were played, or that would be played, at competing
facilities
such as
specifically
the
includes
tribal
facilities
fast-paced
in Alabama.
electronic
bingo,
This
using
networked terminals, which requires less player attention and

action than does older, slower, paper bingo.
In
this
case,
all
of
the
available
indicia
of
constitutional meaning point in this same direction.

First, there is no doubt that the word "bingo," in 2003,
cou1d have this broad meaning. The word was,
used in that way by many people;
in fact,
being
and people were actually,
indisputably playing bingo electronically, including the same

type of machines at issue in this case, and referring to this
new gameplay as "bingo." This differentiates Macon County's
Amendment
744
from
earlier-adopted
provisions
in
other
counties - this Court has never been presented with evidence
45
that the word "bingo" was being used or played in this way
when earlier-adopted provisions were proposed and ratified.
Second,
record.
the purpose of Amendment 744 is clear from the
It was to improve the economy of Macon County,
to
bring jobs, to bring public revenue, and to bring revenue to

private charities, specifically by allowing gaming facilities
in Macon County to compete on a level playing field against
rival facilities.
(R. 655-56, 686, 691-92, 705, 710, 713-14).
Those rival facilities,
by drawing patrons from VictoryLand
with electronic bingo, had devastated Macon County.

34,
691-92,
705,
711-14).
As
Senator
(R. 633-
Penn noted,
it
is
"absurd" to think that Macon County could rebound using only

old-fashioned, slow-paced bingo.
This,
from
too,
(R. 680).
differentiates Macon County's Amendment 744
earlier-adopted
provisions.
It
might
be
possible
to
ascribe to voters in other counties, in earlier days, the mere

desire to have old-fashioned bingo when that was the "only
game in town." In earlier days,
even that slow game might
bring in enough revenue and enjoyment to make a constitutional

amendment worthwhile. But it would be absurd to ascribe that
intention and understanding to Macon County voters in 2003.
Third, the record in this case leaves no possible doubt
about
the
terms
of
the
ratification
46
debate,
and
how
the
reasonably
informed
voter
would
"bingo" as used in the Amendment.

alike
made
it
clear,
through
have
understood
the
word
Proponents and opponents

widely-disseminated
news
articles, opinion pieces, radio broadcasts, public meetings,

and
flyers
"bingo"
distributed
in
the
to
Amendment
every household,
included
all
that
forms
the word
of
bingo,
including electronic bingo as was already being played at

rival facilities.
KCED Exs.
3-11,
General implies)
(R.
686-87,
13-15,
17).
691-92,
703-06,
This is not
a matter of a
709-10,
715;
(as the Attorney
few people testifying about
what they thought the word meant; it is a matter of enormously

widespread,
evidence
shared,
of
publicly-discussed,
community
interpretation.
uniform
It
is
the
objective
sort
of
massive, clear , and undisputed historical record which a true

"originalist" would love to find in any case.
The Attorney
General did not present a single wi tness or any evidence to

contradict this understanding.
This,
again,
differentiates this case from every other
bingo-related case whi ch this Court has decided. The Court has
never
had
s uch
hi storical
e vidence.
In
counties
where
bingo-related amendments were adopted significantly earlier,

it
is
hi storically
certain
that
there
could
be
no
such
e vidence. I n a ny e v e n t , no party to any prior case h as e v e r

47
presented such a historical record on the intent and public

understanding of the ratifying People.
Fourth,
officer
of
the Sheriff of Macon County,

the
authorized
State,
by Amendment
promptly
744,
issued
which
constitutional
regulations
illustrated
this
as
same
understanding of "bingo" as meant by the Amendment. (KCED Exs.

2A-2C).
Given all of these facts,
that could be drawn,
Amendment
744.
That
there is only one conclusion
with integrity,
conclusion
is
about the meaning of
that
Amendment
744,
as
intended by the People, permitted all forms of bingo in Macon

County,
was,
including the games at issue here.
therefore,
therefore,
correct;
wrong.
and
The trial
the
The trial court
Attorney
General
is,
court honored the will of the
People, and the Attorney General seeks to ignore it.

D.
The
Attorney
General's
counter-arguments
are
unavailing and are contrary to the basic principles
of Alabama's constitutional democracy .
The
Attorney
General
makes
only
relatively
brief,
fourteen-page set of legal arguments in his attempt to thwart

the will of the People of Macon County.
(State's Brief, pp.
26-39). Those arguments amount to a request that this Court

ignore
the
will
economy-rescuing
of
measure
the
People.
that
48
the
Rather
People
than
the
intended,
the
Attorney General wants this Court to impose its own preference

on the Amendment and to read it instead as a mere trifling
authorization of old-fashioned parlor entertainment.
This brief has already addressed,
General's
ruling
incorrect
in
his
argument
favor.
His
that
other
above,
the Attorney
Cornerstone
arguments
requires
are
equally
unavailing.
1.
The Attorney General's "plain meaning" argument is

merely an attempt to impose a meaning other than the
one that was prevalent during the ratification
debates.
This
is
not
valid
constitutional
interpretation, and does not respect the will of the
People.
The Attorney General errs by invoking a supposed "plain

meaning" interpretation of Amendment 744. The problem is that
the Attorney General is not actually proposing a meaning that
was,
or would have been,
"plain" to those who debated and
ratified Amendment 744.

It
is
indisputable
that
word
or
phrase
may
mean
something slightly, or even markedly, different depending on

the time and place that the discussion is taking place.
In
legal texts, as in other fields, words can mean one thing in

one place and time,
and another thing in another place and
time . This Court, recognizing this, has quoted Justice Oliver

Wendell Holmes'
famous phrase,
49
"[a]
word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought

and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 38 S.Ct. 158, 159 (1918)
(quoted in
South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. State, 789 So. 2d 133, 141
(Al a. 19 9 9) ) .
The "plain meaning" of a constitutional provision will
naturally be
followed in many cases.
But the quest
for
"plain meaning" must not be taken as a rationale for imposing

a judicially-preferred meaning, without reference to the range
of meanings that the provision actually had, at the time and
p1ace of ratification.
This
itself:
Court
even
recognized
this
point
in Cornerstone
the search is for the meaning of the words to the
Peop1e who adopted the provision. Cornerstone,
42 So. 3d at
79. In Heller (which this Court followed in Cornerstone), the

Supreme Court of the United States demonstrated this with
enormous clarity: it searched for the public understanding of
the
provision
during
the
ratification
debate
and
upon
ratification. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-610, 128 S.Ct. at 27882808.

Heller,
As the Supreme Court of the United States
said in
"Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope
50
they were understood to have when the people adopted them,

whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges
think that scope too broad." 554 U.S. at 634-35, 128 S.Ct. at
2821.
There is no single "plain meaning" of the word "bingo."
The word has multiple meanings - and, more important, it had
multiple meanings
in
2003.
More
particularly,
it
did not
unambiguously mean "bingo of the sort played in elementary

schools and church basements" or "bingo as later described in
Cornerstone" in Macon County in 2003
(which was,
it bears
remembering, several years before Cornerstone was decided).

Certainly, "bingo" can have the meaning that this Court
gave
to
it
in
Cornerstone.
def ini ti on.
Even
before
known,
word
had
the
But
that
"electronic
various
is
not
bingo"
meanings.
the
became
People
v.
only
widely
8,000
Punchboard Card Devices, 142 Cal. App. 3d 618, 622 (Cal. Dist.
Ct .
App .
1 983 )
emerges.").
electronic
described
("No
That
bingo
at
was
of
length
common
more
meaning
clearly
various
above.
sorts
By 2003,
of
the
term
bingo
true
by
2003,
when
had
become
the
common,
as
understanding of
"bingo" at least in some places and contexts had broadened:

the basic feature of matching pre-determined patterns through
random
numbers
remained,
but
51
electronics
made
the
game
speedier and no longer necessitated the same level of player

attention
or
involvement.
People
still
referred
to
this,
widely, as "bingo. " 1 0

Any constitutional theory of textualism or originalism
that
is worthy of any respect
is one that actually takes
seriously the question, "How did the People in the ratifying

community
actually
use
these
words?"
That
question
is
ans wered, as it was answered in Heller, by looking not to the

words
alone
but
to
variety
of
sources
to
see
the
contemporaneous meaning that was attributed to the text as a

whole.
As
we
have
shown
in
this
brief,
the
contemporaneous
meaning that was plain in all the ra tifi cation debates on

Amendment 7 4 4 was that "bingo" meant more than what wou l d
As t h en-Attorney General,
Press
Release
dated
December
investigation of Vi c toryLand:
10
Troy King,
1,
2004,
stated in his
regarding his
It cannot be concluded, as some have, that just

because the game is being played on video consoles ,
it is not "bingo."
Just as no o ne would contend
that e-mai l s are any less a form of correspondence
than are lett e rs written with a quill pen, but
i ns tead rep re s e nt a t echno logi ca l
e volution in
correspondence , similarly, bingo games that are
depicted on a video console can still be bingo
albeit a technologically advanced form of bingo
but bingo nonethel e ss.
(KCED Ex . 23 , L- 6 , p. 2 ).
52
later be described as "Cornerstone bingo." It included bingo

as actually played in competing facilities,
which was not
"Cornerstone bingo," but was the same type of gameplay that

the State challenges here. That is,
actually,
how the word
"bingo" was used at the time and place in question.

To claim that the meaning of a phrase is "plain," and to
posit a "plain" meaning that is not how the word was actually
used in the ra tifying community, is not candid legal argument;
it would take the fundamental power away from the People and
put it in the hands of the government.
A "plain meaning"
approach that "plays dumb," and that pretends not to be awar e

of
the
way
the
words
were
actually
used
at
the
time
of
ratification, would not actually be constitutional original ism

at
all.
It would be merely a
type
of
judicial
activism,
imposing the judicial will over the will of the People.

2.
The Attorney General incorrectly describes the

nature and extent of the evidence that sheds light
on the meaning of Amendment 744, and incorrectly
argues that such evidence is irrelevant.
The
Attorney
General
wrongly
argues
that
this
Court
s h ould ignore a ll t h e eviden ce about how Amendment 744 was

understood and debated during the ratification period.
But
that is simply contra ry to wel l-estab l ished law, as has been

e xplained
above.
And,
contrary
53
to
t he
Attorney
Gene ral ' s
dismissive argument,
voters
or
this evidence is not a matter of a few
legislative
leaders
interpreted the text at issue.
testifying
about
On the contrary,
how
they
it is the
precise sort of evidence that cases such as Heller, Parrish,

Dairyland,
and even Cornerstone,
recognize as important in
constitutional interpretation. It is evidence that goes to the

widespread contemporaneous public understanding of what was
being voted on.
Indeed,
if
even
Court
this
looked
only
to
the
widely-disseminated contemporaneous documentary evidence - the

articles,
enough
editorials, and flyers - still even that would be
to
show
understood by
Macon County.
evidence,
the
its
meaning
Amendment
constitutional
Beyond that,
sworn
of
and
744's
text
as
"founding genera ti on"
in
the testimony offers additional
cross-examinable
equivalent
to
the
Federalist Papers. The Attorney General did not even attempt

to refute it.
The Attorney General also errs in claiming that this is
the sort of "secret" meaning which,
under Heller,
ascribed to a constitutional text. But,
cannot be
as explained above,
this was no "secret" meaning. It was the very opposite: it was

shouted from the rooftops.
One can call it an "idiomatic"
usage of the word "bingo" if one cares to do so; but as Heller

54
teaches,
an
"idiomatic"
usage
by
the
founding
generation
governs constitutional interpretation. To claim otherwise, as

the Attorney General does, is to depart from the proper goal
of constitutional interpretation.
To see the error of the Atto r ney General's argument, it
is helpful to imagine how easy the decision in Heller would
have been if the historical record in that case had been as
clear as the hist orical record in this case. Heller involved
a constitutional challenge under the Second Amendment to laws
in the District of Columbia that barred handgun registration
and prohibited un licensed firearms in the home. The critical
question
was
whether
the
Second
Amendment
confers
an
individual right to bear arms outside of milita ry service.

Imagine that , during the debate over ratification of the
Second Amendment, America had been blanketed with pamphlets
from both supporters and opponents , uniformly agreeing that
the measure would provide every individual with a fundamental
personal right to carry arms
for protection of person and
property. Imagine that the l eading newspapers throughout the

land conveyed this same understanding of the text,
in news
articles and even in opinion pieces by the very people who had
drafted the provision ,
wi t h no evidence
in the hi s tori ca l
record that a nyone h ad a contra ry unde rstanding.

55
In
that
scenario,
no
court
with
professionalism
and
integrity would ignore, or refuse to follow, that evidence. No

responsible jurist, no matter what his personal belief about
firearms might be, would hold that the "real" meaning of the
Amendment was something different.
But that is exactly what the Attorney General is wrongly
asking this Court to do.
3.
The absence of the word "electronic" in Amendment

744
does
not
justify the Attorney General's
position.
The Attorney General does no better by arguing that the

Amendment should have included the word "electronic," and that
the
failure
Brief,
pp.
to
include
37-38).
Here,
the
word
is
dispositive.
(State's
is treating
constitutional interpretation not as an honest inquiry into

the People's intent and for the original public understanding
of the text,
People
but as a mere search for
did not
express
their
intent
in
arguments that
the
way
that
the
the
Attorney General would deem sufficient.

The same sort of argument, equally disrespectful towards
the People's original intent and public understanding, could
be made in any case; and it would be equally wrong. One could
have equally well said in Heller that if the drafters of the
Second Amendment wanted it to protect an individual's right to
56
bear arms outside of military service, they should have said

so in some way that would be more "clear." As Heller shows,
that
is
the
not
proper
approach
to
constitutional
interpretation.
In fact,
the Attorney General's argument is extremely

Had
disingenuous.
744
Amendment
included
the
word
"electronic," the Attorney General merely would have argued as he has in regard to bingo in Greene County - that this made
very
little
difference,
and
that
bingo
still
had
to
be
Cornerstone-style in all respects except for the requirement

of paper cards .
959-60
(Ala.
See State v.
2014) .
Greenetrack,
154 So.
3d 94 0,
The Attorney General merely seeks any
argument that he can make to limit bingo gaming in Alabama.

That
is
not
an
honest
approach
to
constitutional
interpretation.
argues
that
Representative
Ford
omitted the word " electronic" b ecause h e wanted to keep his

intent "secret" -
that he wanted to keep other legislators
from knowing that this is what Amendment 744 would allow.

(State ' s Brief,
Attorney
p.
General's
38 ).
This is a pure fabrication on the
part.
As
has
been
explained
above,
Representative Ford ' s desire was that bingo not b e Iimited by

inc ludi ng a wo r d s u c h as " e l ectron ic ."
57
(R.
654-55 ). And h e
explained pub1ic1y that the proposal would allow electronic

bingo,
even
Legislature.
meaning
he
beore
(R.
introduced
637-40).
explicitly
was
As
the
Senator
discussed
proposal
in
Penn testified,
among
the
this
legislators.
(R. 667-69). It was the very ground upon which opponents, such
as the Christian Coalition,
opposed the proposal before the
Legislature. (R. 636-37, 670-71). This is the very opposite of

a "secret"; and it is quite telling, that the Attorney General
is reduced to such pure fabrication in his effort to thwart
the People's intent.
The question, still, is what the People of Macon County
meant by the word "bingo" in 2003. All the evidence points in
only one direction:
encompassed
not
that the word,
only
Cornerstone
in that time and place,

bingo
but
fast-paced,
electronic bingo such as was being played, as bingo, in rival

tribal
facilities.
General claims)
This
is
not
matter
(as
the Attorney
of relying on a "secret" definition of the
word "bingo"; it is a matter of respecting the fact that, even

if one calls this an "idiomatic" use of the word (see Heller),
it is still the way the word was used at that time and place.
This Court must honor the original public understanding, and
original intent, of the text of Amendment 744 .
58
4.
The Attorney General errs in attempting to use

canons of interpretation in order to steer the Court
from following the original intent and public
understanding of Amendment 744.
Finally, the Attorney General wrongly attempts to steer

the Court away from the clear original public meaning and
intent behind Amendment 744,
by asking the Court to apply
certain "canons" of interpretation: a "narrow construction"

canon,
and an appeal
to
the
notion
that
similarly-worded
provisions should be given the same meaning.

Neither of those canons,
could
justify
ignoring
the
even if they had any weight,

overwhelmingly
intended meaning of Amendment 744.

statutes
and
private
legal
clear
original
Even when interpreting
documents,
this
Court
has
recognized that all "canons" of interpretation are subordinate

to the overriding inquiry into the intent behind the statute
or document. See State v. Strickland, 289 Ala. 488, 493, 268
So.
2d 766,
770
(1972)
("All rules for construing statutes
must be regarded as subservient to the end of determining the

legislative intent."); Baker v. Wright, 257 Ala. 697, 702, 60
So.
2d
825,
830
(1952)
(applying
similar
reasoning
when
interpreting a will). The same principle must apply in the

interpretation
of
constitutional
59
provision.
Judicially-
created "canons" should not be elevated over the intent of the

People.
Moreover,
the
force
the Attorney General is greatly exaggerating
of his
chosen
construction" notion:
canons.
that
local
Take,
first,
constitutional
the
"narrow
amendments
relating to bingo should be "narrowly construed." This Court

used that approach in Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 78. There is
some justification for the use of that approach in Cornerstone
and cases following it, precisely because in those cases there
was no evidence that the ratifying voters in the relevant
counties in the relevant years had a broad intent. When faced
with an absence of historical evidence about a provision's
meaning, the Court can sensibly look to canons such as this to
fill in the blanks. But where (as here) the historical record
is so very clear, to apply a "narrow construction" canon would
again be to elevate judicial preferences over the People's
will.
That
is
not
the
proper
approach
to
constitutional
interpretation.
Implicitly recognizing this,
the Attorney General seeks
to bolster his invocation of the "narrow construction" notion

by stating that "narrow construction" was already established
as a governing legal principle in 2003; the implied assertion
is that the drafters and ratifiers of Amendment 744 must have
60
known this,
more
and that they should have written the Amendment
precisely
in
order
to
avoid
the
supposedly-settled
principle of narrow construction.

But the Attorney General has not candidly described the
state
of
bingo-related
regarding
law,
the
constitutional
interpretation
provisions,
as
local
of
of
2003.
The
"narrow construction" standard was only stated by this Court

in
Cornerstone,
Amendment 744.
Court
had
Amendment
some
years
after
the
ratification of
The Attorney General says flatly that "this
already
508
six
had
held
to
that
be
the
narrowly
identical
language
construed"
in
City
in
of
Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435 (Ala. 1994). (State's Brief,

p. 31; see also p. 16). But Evans contains no such holding at
all;
says
it
construction.
nothing
It
held
about
(quite
any
principle
correctly),
of
that
the
narrow
local
amendment allowed only "bingo," and that a certain game which

allowed a person to purchase an "'instant bingo'
ticket or
card" for which a prize was awarded "purely by chance," was

not bingo as authorized by the local bingo ordinance (and was
not a known version of the game "bingo"). But it contained no
generalized holding that would tell
voters,
in
2003,
that
an
Alabama
drafters
court
or
would
ratifying
"narrowly"
construe the word "bingo" to excl.ude games that were actual.l.y

61
being played as bingo in the State of Alabama and throughout

the nation at the time of ratification.
Similarly, Barrett v. State, 705 So. 2d 529 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996), will not bear the weight that the Attorney General
puts on it. The Court of Criminal Appeals described Calhoun
County's Amendment 508 11 as being a "narrow" exception to the
prohibition against lotteries.
Id. at 531,
532. And that is
true, in this sense: it permitted only bingo, not games other

than bingo. But this in itself does not answer the question of
what constitutes bingo. The Court of Criminal Appeals went on
to
hold
quite
understandably
that
the
particular
challenged game, which was called "U-Pick Em" and involved a

player selecting numbers that were fed into a computer, was
not "bingo"; that game would not constitute "bingo" under any
widely-used definition of the word. And there was,
from all
that appears in the opinion, no evidence that anyone had ever

even heard of such a game being called "bingo" when Amendment
508 was being debated and ratified.
This case is enormously different from Barrett and Evans,
for
reasons
discussed
throughout
this
brief.
Here,
indisputably, the games that the Attorney General challenges

11
OFFICIAL RECOMP. OF THE CONST.

AMENDMENTS, CALHOUN COUNTY, SECTION 1.
62
OF ALABAMA OF 1901,
LOCAL
are the very types of games that were being played, throughout
the nation and in Alabama,
under the name "bingo" in 2003.
There is no escaping that fact. And the drafters and ratifiers

of Amendment 744 had no notice of any rule from this Court
that would construe the word "bingo" more narrowly than it was
actually used, in common usage and in the relevant community,
during the ratification period.
Thus, again, this Court should recognize that any canon
of "narrow construction," like all canons, must give way to
the fundamental question of intent. In Evans, in Barrett, in
Cornerstone, and in all the other cases upon which the State
relies, there was no overwhelming historical record going to
original intent; in this case, this Court has such a record.
The power of the People to change their constitution,
CONST. of 1901,
ALA.
2, overrides any judicially-created "narrow
construction" canon.
The same is true of the State's argument that,
because
Amendment 744 uses much of the same language as some other

counties' bingo-related amendments, it must receive the same
interpretation.
This
argument,
too,
would
elevate
judicially-created canon of interpretation over the clear will

of the People. And it must be remembered that, as of 2003, it
was not established by case law that "bingo" would mean only
63
"Cornerstone bingo." Cornerstone was not decided until several

years later. And as discussed above, Evans and Barrett did not
hold that the word "bingo" would always be read to exclude
games that were (at the time of ratification) actually widely
referred to as "bingo."
The State professes to be unable to imagine that "bingo"
could mean something different in Amendment 744 than it does
in other counties'
amendments.
But it is quite obvious how
that could be: because Amendment 744 was debated and adopted
after
period
of
substantial
legal
and
technological
development, in which new ways of playing "bingo" came to be

widely known and still referred to as "bingo." To say that
"bingo"
must
mean
the
constitutional amendments,
different
times,
would
same
thing
in
counties'
all
even though they were adopted at

be
contrary
principles of constitutional
to
the
fundamental
interpretation that have been
described in this brief.

E.
Once Amendment 744 is correctly interpreted, then it

is plain that the bingo operations at VictoryLand
were lawful and could not be the subject of a
forfeiture action. The Attorney General does not
even attempt to show otherwise.
Under
Attorney
correct
General's
interpretation
forfeiture
merit.
64
of Amendment
action
is
entirely
7 4 4,
the
without
The Attorney General does not even offer any contention

about what Amendment 744 means, other than the contention that
it permits only "Cornerstone bingo." As shown above, that is
plainly an
incorrect
interpretation.
offers no fall-back or alternative interpretation.

The Attorney General did not off er any evidence or even
allegation
that
the
bingo
operations
at
VictoryLand
were
unlawful under any standard other than "Cornerstone bingo."

Thus,
once his incorrect interpretation of the Amendment is
rejected, it is apparent that the Attorney General offered no

evidence that the operations were unlawful.
And, indeed, the unrefuted evidence as described in the
Statement of the Facts shows that the games at VictoryLand
were certified by an expert laboratory as being actual bingo,
under a proper understanding of that term.
(KCED Exs. 38-40,
52).
Therefore, the trial court was correct in ruling against

the Attorney General. But in one respect, the trial court did
not go quite far enough.
The
trial
(Hence the cross-appeal.)
court ordered the
return of the
equipment,
records, and funds unless the Attorney General initiated legal

action and/or forfeiture proceedings against facilities
other counties.
( 2C. Supp.
in
4) . Because there is no evidence

65
that the operations at VictoryLand were outside the scope of

what is lawful under Amendment 744 - and because the unrefuted
evidence shows that the operations were indeed lawful - the
proper order is one that unconditiona11y orders the return of
all equipment,
records,
citation of authority,
and funds.
( It surely requires no
to note that forfeiture is only for
unlawful activities and not for activities that are permitted

by the Constitution.)
The Court should also affirm the trial court's order
on the basis of that Court's conclusion that the
Attorney General was engaged in an improper "cherrypicking" enforcement strategy.
II.
If
the
Court
interprets
Amendment
744
correctly,
as
described in Section I of this Argument, then there is no need

to reach t h e tr ial court's ruling t hat it would not be part of
the Attorney General's "cherry-picking" enforcement strategy,
under which other
facilities
(even non - tribal
facilities)
happily remained open and operating the very same games while
VictoryLand was shuttered by the Attorney General.
But if the Court finds it necess ary to reach thi s issue,
the
Court
Alabama's
ma ni fest l y
should affirm.
judi c iary
unfair
The
should
trial
not
proceedings,
66
court
be
in
made
which
was
right
party
one
to
that
such
business
is
shuttered while others are permitted to continue operating in

the very same way.
(C. 1042-46; 2C. Supp. 3-4).
First, it was procedurally proper for the trial court to

rule on this issue; and the Attorney General was not deprived
of an opportunity to be heard on it. A trial court, when asked
to exercise the awesome power of declaring certain activities
unlawful and forfeiting private property, surely has the right
to raise concerns even if they might be different from the
exact arguments that the parties have raised. And the Attorney
General had ample authority to be heard on that issue, and to
present any evidence or argument he wished to present, through
his post-judgment motion.
Second, this is not
(as the Attorney General would have
it) simply a matter of whether the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution was violated. Instead, as the trial
court recognized, an Alabama court has the inherent power to
ensure that it is not being used to perpetuate an injustice.
The judiciary "cannot allow our justice system to do injustice
in the name of doing justice." Aspinwall v. Gowens, 405 So. 2d
134,
137
wrongs,
(Ala.
1981);
"Courts exist to redress or prevent
not to perpetrate them." Kennedy v.
609, 614, 55 So. 104, 105 (1911).
67
Davis,
171 Ala.
Third,
has
completely
failed
to
refute the trial court ' s finding that he was engaged in unfair
cherry-picking as to which facilities would be permitted to
remain open. (C. Supp. 36-38). The Attorney General tells this
Court that he has engaged in some bingo-related enforcement
litigation in Greene and Lowndes Counties, but that in itself
is not enough to refute the material fact.
(C. Supp. 36-37).
He may have engaged in some litigation against some operators;

but the fact remains, as found by the trial court, that he has
countenanced the continued daily operations of facilities in
Greene County and Lowndes County. If he truly believed that
the law of bingo is as simple as he claims in this Court, and
if
he
truly believed that
electronic bingo
everywhere
is
analogous to "cocaine" or "meth" (State's Brief, p. 23), and

if he truly believed in the fair use of his authority, then he
would take swift action against any operator in any county. 12
As the trial court noted, the Attorney General offered no good
reason
why
he
failed
to
take
action
against
the
ongoing
This is especially true where there was unrefuted

testimony that electronic bingo machines previously in use at
VictoryLand, and bearing VictoryLand's ownership stickers on
the s ide o f th e machines, are current ly i n use at trib al
facilities. (R. 734-35).
12
68
operations
of
other
facilities
while
he
with
focused,
extraordinary intensity, on VictoryLand.

Fourth,
after
the
the Governor's Exe cu ti ve Order No.

trial
court's
judgment,
even
13,
issued
compounds
the
unfairness further and makes it all the more clear that this
litigation is a tool of unfair prosecutorial authority. Under
Exe cu ti ve Order 13,
the lawfulness of operations in other
count ies will be overseen by elected local officials, sheriffs

and
attorneys.
district
VictoryLand,
supreme ,
the
But
Attorney
even where his
in
Macon
General
still
opinion differs
County,
seeks
to
as
to
remain
from that of the
responsible local officials.
There is no justification for
leaving
VictoryLand,
Macon
County,
and
subject
to
the
continued, dogged pursuit by the very same Attorney General

who allowed facilities elsewhere to continue to operate.
CONCLUSION
On
the
Attorney
General ' s
appea l,
the
Court
s hould
affirm; and on the cross-appeal, the Court should remand the

case for entry of a judgment that unconditionall y requires the
return o f all the seized e quipment , r ecords , and f unds .
69
Respectfully submitted on December 17, 2015.
Isl J. Flvnn Mozingo

Joe Espy, III (ESP002)
J. Flynn Mozingo (MOZ003)
Ben Espy (ESP005)
William M. Espy (ESP007)
Attorneys for KC Economic
Development, LLC
OF COUNSEL:
Melton, Espy & Williams, P.C.
Post Office Drawer 5130
Montgomery, AL 36103
Telephone: (334) 263-6621
Facsimile: ( 334) 263-7252
jespy@mewlegal.com
fmozingo@mewlegal.com
bespy@mewlegal.com
wespy@mewlegal.com
Sam Heldman (HEL009)
The Gardner Firm, PC
2805 31st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20008
Telephone: (202) 965-8884
Facsimile: (202) 318-2445
sam@heldman.net
John M. Bolton, III (BOL012)
Charlanna Skaggs (SPE044)
Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, PC
Post Office Box 116
Montgomery,
AL 36101-0116
Telephone: (334) 834-7600
Facsimile: (334) 263-5969
jbolton@hillhillcarter.com
cskaggs@hillhillcarter.com
70
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been
filed electronically using the ACIS electronic filing system
and that same will be served on the below listed counsel of
record via electronic communication and United States Postal
Service, properly addressed and postage prepaid, on December
17, 2015:
Luther Strange
John Kachelman, III
Andrew Brasher
Alabama Attorney General's
Off ice
Post Office Box 300152
jkachelman@ago.state . al.us
abrasher@ago.state . al . us
Craig Izard
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 130277
Birmingham, Al 35213
Isl J. Flvnn Mozingo

OF COUNSEL
71
KCED
APPENDIX 1
KCED
Appendix 1
DEFENDAN'rs
EJlHIBIT
--KCED4
DEFENDANrS
EXHIBIT
KCED6
VOTE YES
ON TUESDAY-NOV. 4, 2003
TO
AUTHORIZE ALL
FORMS OF BINGO:
PAPER CARDELECTRONICMACHINE BINGO
FOR THE BETTERMENT
OF
MACON COUNTY
MACON CQU,NTIANS FOR A BETTER
ECONOMY
DEFENDANT'S
i
j
EXHIBIT
--KCED7
KCED
APPENDIX 2
KCED
Appendix 2
State Chairman
Or. Frank Ba er
th
l a
DEFENDANT'S
ll
7
Fall(~)
832-4
EXHIBIT
KCED3
Y.'WW.cc6ama
org

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E-Filed

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

Sam Heldman (HEL009)

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT,

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

presents the Court with an important

test of the Court's approach to constitutional interpretation.

intent" philosophy of constitutional law it has traditionally

important test of that because there is an overwhelming record

The Attorney General

ignore all of this. Oral argument, however, would allow the

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Facts that shed light on the meaning of Amendment

The development of bingo, from its origin to

The type of bingo at issue in this

The very purpose of the proposed Amendment was

The 2003 debates, in the Legislature and in

The Sheriff of Macon County, who is entrusted

Facts regarding the Attorney

STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .

As with any other portion of the Constitution, this

Neither Cornerstone , nor any case following it ,

The object of all constitutional interpretati o n

The Attorney General's counter-arguments are

The Attorney General's "p l ain meaning"

The Attorney General incorrectly describes

The absence of the word "electronic" in

The Attorney Gen eral errs in attempting to

Once Amendment 7 4 4 is correctly interpreted ,

The Court should also affirm the trial court's order

("KCED"), agrees that this

jurisdiction over the Attorney General's appeal.

(C. 1041), KCED filed a timely post-judgment motion on July 7,

The trial court ruled on that motion

timely filed a notice of appeal on October 8, 2015.

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona,

Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach,

City of Piedmont v. Evans,

Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle,

District of Columbia v. Heller,

Houston County Econ. Dev. Auth. v. State,

Houston County v. Martin,

NLRB v. Noel Canning,

Opinion of the Justices No. 140,

Opinion of the Justices No. 376,

Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v . Unit ed States,

People v. 8,000 Punchboard Card Devices,

Sou t h Centra l Bell Telephone Co. v . State ,

Sup. Ct. 1994)

Constitution and Statutes

OFFICIAL RECOMPILATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ALABAMA

OFFICIAL RECOMPILATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ALABAMA

OFFICIAL RECOMPILATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ALABAMA

SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL RECOMPILATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

ALABAMA ACT 8 3-5 7 5