Professional Documents
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LABOR
LABOR
114337 /
9.29.95 / Apprenticeship and Learnership
F: Capili (PR) is an employee of Nitto Enterprises. Capili, an apprentice
machinist accidentally injured the leg of the office secretary, on the same
day Capili also managed to injure himself on while working, he was
hospitalized and P incurred 1K-hospital bill. The day after, PR was asked to
resign, subject to payment of his salary and further medical requirement.
PR signed a quitclaim. Days later PRs family sued for illegal dismissal and
payment of monetary benefits. LA favored P. LA said PR acted w/ gross
negligence and that he does not have the proper attitude in such
employment. NLRC reversed. P argues that since PR is only an apprentice
and that he signed a apprenticeship agreement. Hence this petition.
I: WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
R: Petitioners argument is erroneous.
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner
and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly
employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "core maker/molder."
On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner
and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However,
the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990.
Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and
Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was
signed. Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply
with the requirements of the law. Article 57 of the Labor Code
provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship
program through the participation of employers, workers and government
and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship
standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such
objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any
apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine
qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully
enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and
agreements cannot be debased.
Also, the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process.
LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild & CIR / GR L1258212598 / 1.28.61 / Employer-Employee Relationship - Importance /
Concepcion, J P:
F: LVN and Sampaguita (P) seeks to de-certify CIRs (PR) certification that
PMG-The Musical Directors as the sole and exclusive bargaining agency of
all musicians working with P. P also maintains that the certification cannot
be granted since there is no Employee-Employer relationship, PR argues
otherwise.
I: (1) WON the musicians working for P are its employees; (2)
WON there could be any legal relationship between the P and the
musicians.
R: Affirmed.
The musical directors in the instant case have no control over the
musicians involved in the present case. Said directors control neither the
music to be played, nor the musicians playing it. The film companies
summon the musicians to work, through the musical directors. The film
companies, through the musical directors, provide the transportation to
and from the studio. The film companies furnish meal at dinner time. The
motion picture director who is an employee of the company not the
musical director supervises the recording of the musicians and tells
them what to do in every detail, and solely directs the performance of the
musicians before the camera. Held: An employer-employee
relationship exists between the musicians and the film
companies. The relationship exists where the person for whom
the services are performed reserves a right to control not only
the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching
such end. (Alabama Highway Express Co. vs. Local, 612, 108 S. 2d
350.)
212 E: "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an
employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor
organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting
as employer.
The control test is the most important element. It is based on the extent of control the
hirer exercises over a worker. The greater the supervision and control the hirer exercises, the
likelihood that the worker is an employee is higher. [Sonza v. ABS-CBN, G.R. no. 138051,
June 10, 2004].
However, it is not the actual exercise of the right to control but the mere existence of the
right to control that determines the power of control. [Zanotte Shoes v. NLRC, G.R. No.
100664, February 13, 1995].
The existence of the right to control, in order to prove the existence of an employeremployee relationship, must be established by substantial evidence, which is that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion
[Legend Hotel v. Titanium Corp., G.R. No. 153511, July 18, 2012].
1.
2.
Second Tier: Existing economic conditions between the parties are used to determine whether
EER exists [Francisco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 170087, August 31, 2006].
3.
The standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is dependent on the alleged
employer for his continued employment in that line of business. [Orozco v. CA, GR No. 155207,
August 13, 2008].
Manila Golf v. IAC & Llamar / GR No. 64948 / 9.27.94 / EmployerEmployee Relationships Test to Determine / Narvasa, C.J p:
F: Caddies of P, are demanding that they be included in the coverage of
the Social Security System through the SSC, arguing that they are
employees of P. P on the other hand, they have no direct control over PR.
SSC Dismissed the Petition. IAC ruled for P, hence this petition.
I: WON there is EER.
R: As long as it is, the list made in the appealed decision detailing the
various matters of conduct, dress, language, etc. covered by the
petitioner's regulations, does not, in the mind of the Court, so
circumscribe the actions or judgment of the caddies concerned as to
leave them little or no freedom of choice whatsoever in the manner of
carrying out their services. In the very nature of things, caddies must
submit to some supervision of their conduct while enjoying the privilege
of pursuing their occupation within the premises and grounds of whatever
club they do their work in. For all that is made to appear, they work
for the club to which they attach themselves on sufferance but,
on the other hand, also without having to observe any working
hours, free to leave anytime they please, to stay away for as long
as they like. It is not pretended that if found remiss in the
observance of said rules, any discipline may be meted them
beyond barring them from the premises which, it may be
supposed, the Club may do in any case even absent any breach of
the rules, and without violating any right to work on their part.
All these considerations clash frontally with the concept of
employment. The IAC would point to the fact that the Club suggests the
rate of fees payable by the players to the caddies as still another
indication of the latter's status as employees. It seems to the Court,
however, that the intendment of such fact is to the contrary,
showing that the Club has not the measure of control over the
incidents of the caddies' work and compensation that an
employer would possess. The Court agrees with petitioner that
the group rotation system so-called, is less a measure of
employee control than an assurance that the work is fairly
distributed, a caddy who is absent when his turn number is called
simply losing his turn to serve and being assigned instead the
last number for the day.
Medina & Ong v. Judge Bartolome, Aboitiz and Pepsi Cola / GR No.
L-59825 / 9.11.82 / EER Jurisdiction / Abad Santos, J p:
F: Ps former employees of PRs company, alleging that PR Aboitiz
dismissed and publicly humiliated Ps w/o provocation. Ps sued. PR argues
that CFI Makati had no jurisdiction, w/c was denied, pending litigation the
Labor Code was amended, PR now re-raised their jurisdiction contention
basing from Art. 217(b), PR judge granted. Hence this petition.
I: WON the Labor Code has any relevance to the relief sought.
R: Granted. It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not
alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for
damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the
defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the
Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under
review are based on a wrong premise.
Where plaintiffs' complaint for damages arising from the alleged
disgraceful termination of employment does not allege any unfair
labor practice, theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious
acts allegedly committed by the defendants.
Yusen Air & Sea Services Phils, Inc. v. Villamor / GR No. 154060 /
8.16.05 / EER Jurisdiction / Garcia, J p:
F: PR is employed by P as a branch manager; w/c was later reclassified as
a Division Manager, w/c he held until he resigned in 2.1.02. PR then
worked for another company in the same line of business. P Sued, citing
the undertaking which PR agreed with P in lieu of his employment. On the
other hand P apparently sued through the NLRC P for illegal dismissal, PR
also did not answer the civil suit, instead he submitted a motion to
dismiss, and arguing that said court had no jurisdiction. RTC dismissed Ps
complaint. Hence this recourse.
I: WON RTC had the proper jurisdiction.
R: Remanded for Trial. Actually, the present case is not one of first
impression. In a kindred case, Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing vs.
Villarama, with a substantially similar factual backdrop, we held that an
action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute.
Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the
Philippines. It seeks to recover damages agreed upon in the
contract as redress for private respondent's breach of his
contractual obligation to its "damage and prejudice." Such cause
of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the
controversy belongs to the regular courts. The cause of action is
based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217,
jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts.
The Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the "money claims of
workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces
money claims which arise out of or in connection with the
employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or incident of
such relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers
which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable causal
connection with the employer-employee relationship. (SMC v. NLRC)
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim
asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a
result of a trial. Neither can jurisdiction of a court be made to depend
upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or motion to
dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely upon the defendant.