From STATE CRIME: CURE T PERSPECTIVES (edited by Pawn L. Rothe « Carisfapher W. Mullins ° New Brunsuuck, MT: Rutyers Univer sity Press, ) 20// Cuarrer 8 Reinventing Controlling State Crime and Varieties of State Crime and Its Control Wuar | Woutp Have Done DirrereNtLy Ieffrey lan Ross Iv 1995 my EDITED BOOK Controlling State Crime was pub- 19952), Five years later, not only was my follow-up edited book, evolved, Old and rudimentary ideas have either been abandoned or modified, and numerous subject-relevant esays and case studies have accumulated. Some ject of state crime have produced a steady flow of research, while others have moved on to different Then again, new and em been ignored (Ross 2002). wanted to correct this imbalance, and t led to Controlling State Crime and Varieties.( 186 Jerensy [aw Ross Personal history aside, the following sections attempt to give the reader aa sense of the major arguments ftom the original Conlling State Crime, followed by a review of Varieties, and then a eview of what scholarly research has been produced since then to answer the proverbial question of what T would have done differently had I had to do it again. This is not an easy ques- tion to answer. As a relatively introspective schol gency and actions, and no ox is too sacred to gore, partcultly if edited book Contnotiine Stare Crime: AN ItRopuctION In order to understand the control of state crime, it is wise to look at the wider literature in which the concept exists.In general state crime tended to fall linder the subject of political crime. Of the books focusing on political crime, the majority (€g, Bassiouni 1975; Ingraham 1979; Roebuck and Weeber 1978; Schafer 1974;Turk 1982) primarily concentrate on oppositional political crimes, whereas a minority (0. Barak 19918; Comfort 1950; Prost 1973;Tunnell 1993a; Ross 2002) address, to some hat police may take to ‘public order. Hi these actions as state crimes, Others (eg Ingraham 1979) fail to consider oppositional political ccimes as such and focus the bulk oftheir discussion on crimes against the sate Some of these works (¢.g. Sink 1974) simply serve as manuals co aid profes for defending individuals charged litical crimes. ing For example, Hagan's Political Crime: Ideolegy and Criminality (1997) deals with state crime in the context of ypoman rights and genocide and illegal surveillance; and Kitrie’s Rebels Jy theory-laden treatise, looks at “The Control Agenda ‘Many criminologists have concluded that certain types of crime require ‘control than currently available (e.g,, Pepinsky 1980, 4). A minority scrkman 1974; Pepinsky 1980) oppose current crime control efforts on kman 1971) or empirical grounds (Pepinsky 1980; Walker “Those opposed to crime control methods on empirical grounds cite to specify what exactly we should be controlling; the inadequacy ‘and methods co study conventional crime; and the means to deter or reform criminals, Those opposed to controlling crime on ideo! cal grounds believe that since crime is a manifestation of a criminal (or state, we are only furthering the power of that country by a fail to consider controlling state crime as a separate issue, " coe nat A Fetime about he posibity of controling the sate on pene re ha pie ons eee governmental cepa te ‘minimize the abuse of coercive power. ‘The controlling state crime ages the causes of traditional crime in gen the ta ral sie ost gol en ofa eve, Te led becase thre considerable debate overs di crime, identifying perpetr: ae organizations ike Amnesty fecan the bby ou wit ere Nevethlem ming fm mo aves afte eine ee og mode or tery of onl Sh mi panera Ho fone he sos ec ane fae ine The tok wt Sd no these cit Te inoaciy puo te Bok ne mob srl hp ilaing oe Shy 08) aha ee feather ws od etn Fei (095) An ep ur fi rea hole ak Xtina crate neat ine ct Sed oe sel ines 0 ann be, eaten procties onthe other This, ditncion, however sno ensson ruhee ees cognizes that there certain amount ofimerdependence amongs these sctors( 1s Jeremey TaN Ross Causes and Perpentos of State Crime [At the core of each zations capable of or amount of crime agai fe are a number of powerful vn is Regul fe ne itary in many countries have broken the rerio at ca be comiied etn (op. Gl Mo ES oe Ram 198) Seed mest hve ben avec wee Ath ten nese coe ow elcome med aon A ecay ants in ener sd Ge peat fyto engage inthe pe oe Se era ecor om sate cmimgeic onions ae Co oan nd mat ruiney pe may bese ama fe ane obese, entney coe in eansgresses crim= Tobbying, and legal .d by the put by sates inchuding regulatory bodies/agencies and fed against government bute inside the state and outside, The effe n be found both Is is difficult to for control before external ones can get involved. Al ge in public relations exercises. Intersal Controls: State Organizations and Processes Mose educational systems and processes are tragically flawed and hence demand improvement, As Cabrera argues (1995), our educational reproduces the social order by reinforcing the meritocratic myth and appeal- ist approach t 1. The development of critical What I Would Have Done Differently 189 the most effective ways of ending the “pedagogy of the oppressed,” a process whereby successive leaders behave the way their rulers treated them, To address these criticisms, governments have at their disposal a number ‘of mechanisms external to state criminogenic actors to reactively influence and in some cases control state crime, Some of the processes are freedom of information legislation, colored papers, advisory councils, commissions of inguiry, ombu oversight, legislative committees, watchdog organiza~ tions, and c¢ External Contols: State-Sponsored and Private Organizations and Processes » sovereignty) holds that under normal \djudicate International and State 1995). Alternatively, a number of external Summary ‘The excerpt above is drawn fiom my previous work of 1995. In an effort to continue to focus research and policy on controling state crime, Lema on shes ee book: The gl of Vrs of Sal Chin od ‘was to take this research agenda to the next step; to provide analyses thet cisniel Se tod tar pulbsbad ph organics Hae a control domestic and international sate crime caused by individual countries and their respective criminogenic agencies. One way to achieve this objec- argued, was by, compiling case studies written by country experts who provides a con- states compare tates state crime in par of theory develop- formation, implementation, and evaluation. In short, this type of inquiry is an10 ( Jereney aw Ross important building block in the emerging broader area of political crime. be acknowledged that although there have been comparative dy of state crime and in the of State Caime AND [ts ConTRoL nd edition of Cont Crime was being printed, Varieties ed. It was intended to be the frst of a series of edited books that pro- lect, and plagued with jurisdictional and mandate vagaries among different countries, those studying the control of state crime should select a sample of the total population of countries that exist in the world. Although there are several possible systems and countries to study, the most offers many advantages.* Although communist, auth: and/or lesser developed states have been routinely identified as having a greater incidence of state crime than first world countries, daa from these for- ier types of states are often the most problematic. Adding to this problem is the fact that state agencies in these countries differ substantially in mandates and organization within and between them. For these reasons, Vireties focused on first-world advanced industrialized democracies. As compared to those count by the media when scandals and/or crise ‘quently, access to information on state crit democracies is easier than in authoritarian legitimation occur. Conse- in advanced industrialized in democracies, politicians, governments, and the bureaucracy ate accountable to the citizenry. This is ied through a variety of control mechanisms or processes.° Moreover, during the owe throughout the world. During the 1970s many of these countries experienced so-called crises of capitalism (O'Conner 1973). Governments in these j dictions have adopted a plethora of legal and parliamentary mechani stay in power. It is interesting to discover how controls on state crime can 6 when they are utilized in such a manner as to protect and hide those that are What 1 Would Have Done Differently wt me of the actions and omis- 0 violate the mandate of representa tion that they have received, Reexamining Control In an attempt to develop our notions of conteol, Varieties spent some time reviewing deeper understandings of control. In any organi Je principle of control arises from the need for members to perform their duties in accor dance with some set of standards. Such control should be an ongoing process, not simply a response to some specific wrongdoing. Regardless of the organ- ization, control mechanisms may be either internal or external, controls include hiring policies, enining, supervision, hierarchy, disc codes, policy manuals, collective agreements, exclusivity dimension. According to Bayk United States, for example, deal single ‘on the other hand, regulate the police as governmental processes generally” (1990, Internal and external types ‘The former are bureaucrat ns, while the later appear to be more unstructured and spontaneous. I controls are often the last resort for citizens and usually have some con other forms of control. Conterminously, these control mecha- (both formal and informal) can be ordered along a continuum fe censity (e.g, letters to elected officials) to high intensity (e, attacks, assas nal controls are primarily corven- Land legislated, whereas informal controls are mostly unconventional and nonlegislated. ‘Most state criminogenic agencies in advanced industrialized countries ate subject to the previously mentioned types of control. The relative influence of ‘hese mechanisms, however, varies with the state criminogenic agenci in the organization, state agents, and the many different actions the state agents ‘engage in. This process, a subject of recent scholarship, is often referred to 3s the power of state capabilities, a subject of recent scholarship (e.g. 1988; Migdal, Kobli, and Shue 1994). When intolerable lewz ( Jerrrey TaN Ross come to public attention, there is often public and governmental indignation. Moreover, the nature of these politcal systems, unlike the nondemocratic states facilitates the expression of public discontent, which often leads to cal if not the implementation, of greater control. Finally information on the inci- dence of state crime and its effects in fist world countries is easier to obtain and more reliable. ‘Advanced industrialized countries are where much of this research is grounded, For example, Barak’ Crines by the Capitalist Sate began with an introduction to state criminality in advanced capitalist states, and Virites of State Crime and Its Conta is one of the natural follow-ups to this research agenda, Understandably, there is considerable diversity (eg, cultural, ethnic, and developmental) among the plethora of states subsumed by the advanced industrialized democracies label.’ Three groupings filling under this rubric can be iden , nonwestern states, and Anglo-American democracies, States covered in this book range fiom the nonwestern Japan the Anglo-American democracy of Great Britsin (Ross During the 1970s and 1980s all ofthese countries were affected by belt- ies and practices situationally referred to as Reganism, Thatch- to a decline in the provision of social Summary Contributors to the book reviewed the most frequent types of state crime occurring in each state. State crimes take particularly unique forms in advanced industrialized democracies. Eight principle state crimes were cov- ‘ered in the countries analyzed, From least to most frequently occurring, they are military violence (2 countries); human rights violations (3); ax evasion by politicians (3); torture (3); illegal domestic surveillance (4); illegal police vio~ lence (5); corruption/bribery (6); and cover-ups (7) Chapters demonstrated historical depth and covered events and processes connected to overt and covert causes that may otherwise be overlooked. ‘The genesis of these state crimes as well as the success or failure, if any, of solutions implemented to control such crimes are an integral component of the book. The contributions were not content to simply use anecdotal, hearsay, or undocumented evidence. Instead they used empirical data; in other words, the marshaling of historical examples, case studies, and statistics where What 1 Would Have Done Differently 193 appropriate. Each chapter includes a brief historical tre: but the bulk of the discussion covers the past thirty- 1960), a period coterminous with what some researchers label the p trial phase, closed the book with a call to those interested in the subj doing research on the field of state crime, Specifically I asked what we have learned, what the next step is,and what the controls ate that have been found. 4m answering these questions, 1 emphasized the need for case studies in other advanced industrialized democracies, theoretical work, policy work, and mov- ing the discussion toward lesser developed and nonadvanced industridized countries. I argued thar now that we have examined the control of state crime in advanced industrialized countries, we ae in an ideal position to counsel the less developed countries in their efforts to create more democratic socisties. This is not to suggest that we should impose some sort of government sruc- ture on them, or be insensitive to their own indigenous cultures, or processes, but only that the west has made many mistakes and perhaps can help the less developed countries. Waar Dip I Miss Our On? Recoonrzine Stare Came ing State Crime and Varieties of State Crime erature on state crimes has focused on doc ‘umenting and explaining the etiologic of the worst atrocities known to humanity. By the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, researchers and writers had developed a significant amount of literature on crimes of the sate (Ross 1995a, 1995b, 2000a, 2000b; Friedtichs 1995, 1998; Kauzlarich and and Rothe 2005; Kramer and ind Rothe 2004; Mullins and Rothe hs 2006; Rothe 20092, 2009b; Rothe controls (Ross 1995b, 2000b; Rothe and Mullins 2006a, 2006b). While a significant porticn of this work has focused on international and/or foreign domestic controls, land Dawn L. Rothe have focus ro controls and/or of state crime, 7 by the state to effectively controls continue to be perceived as govern itself. Generally, they are government and bureaucratic actions. They types of offenses that have already occurred (often takin, |. quickly circumvented by new procedures ‘the FOT acts in Japan's campaign finance laws)om ( fee eae eae Whet 1 Wes Hoe Done Difeenty oe underfunded and/or understaffed ¢, OSHA and the EPA) (Aulette and symbolic political gestures, or altering policy to immediately appease while a covert direction (Rothe and Mullins 2006b). ion of the negative effects of controls has a long history. Some suggested that cher ar nits of conto (Peters 1989). According "Aside from the average, garde how the power of the pro- political structure, culture, and nonad~ n can frustrate the ability of control efforts. In 1981 Gary Marx. wrote 2 much-cited and reprinted article, “Ironies of Social Control: Authori~ ties as Contributors to Deviance through Escalation, Nonenforcement and ‘Marx describes the process and contexts whereby “author~ ities may play a role in generating deviance” (221). In part hhow law enforcemene officers, as state agents, can frustrate legitimate a Jide of a specific state apparat ens to fight for social justice by engaging in confrontation, filing to and the bureaucracy) and are imposed on the state. enforce the law, and using surreptitious methods to force state opponents to Is actually have co exert some form of pressure ‘break the law and thus become subject co arrest or pacification. Si \d/or ability to penalize after the fact military way) om the state. External controls can be localized or outside of a state’ own sovereign territory. External controls within the rol. Indeed, efforts to cor state have inclided media organi interest groups, and domestic non confront government wrongdoing may not have the intended chilling effece governmental organizations (NGOs). Rothe and Mullins (20062, 2007, ‘one hoped for: All 00 often, controls on state criminogenic agen 20080) and, more recently, Ross and Rothe (2008) refer to these external intended and undesirable effects. agencies as co ‘with the efficacy of Nonetheles, few scholars have outlined what happens to those who con~ thee type of con expected 9 438 38 front secre. Tok (1982), inthe context of expla for example, outlined ase tthe Chicago Police Department in thei extrslegal actions agrnst the in Indian Movement and Black Panther Party activities, State agen~ cluded eavesdropping, false letters/mail, black propaganda information or gray propaganda, harassment arrests, use of infil- tors and agents provocateur, pseudo-gangs, black jacketing, fabrication of and assassinations. Although Turk, Churchill, and Vander Wall pro- scope to provide a gen- racy and the efieacy of these types of constrains, When media of sre pecially sare these eontdcions i a plc spor, the mae fees compel to respond through ations that are typical ey nature and sen inlet eecon of new ves of seedy (Edelman 197 trl famework for examining advene effec of atenpt to comin OF Moreove, constants soch a the meds, poplar opin, and/or Interal contol government criminality, expecially ven the write of dona tate backs ean often be ignored or manipulted vs hegemonic cou, itinistion tat en occ196 ( Jerrrey lan Ross Building on eatlier research (Barak 19913; Ross 1995b, 2000a; Kaualarich and Kramer 1998; Rothe and Mullins 2006b), Ross and Rothe (2008) proposed a continuum hat explains the irony of controlling state crime and provides a model for contextuaizing the forms of x that can intentionally or unintentionally occu retaliation, deBance/esistance, plausible deniability or improving the agency’ ‘explain away crimes, relying on selfrighteousness, ngering, Ross and Rothe have argued that social controls agai criminality are important, the results dften lead to unintended consequences for the attempted controllers. Addi~ tionally, chey highlighted the fact that the victimization of state erime may ‘well be more than the res ts of control. By impli trolling state crime to acknowledge that we must recognize that attempts to Control state criminality may have consequences that are unintended and fetually frustrate our ability to control state crime or result in additional vic~ timization. Conciusion Despite the election of what apy lly evaporate, As human beings and organizations are allowed fee reign to do what they need ‘or want to do to accomplish their goals, state crimes and the need to monitor nd control them will not disappear. We need to be constantly vigilant and fealize that state crimes may morph, particularly as new mechanisms for Nores chap. 8). of political crime by criminology and cx ‘democracy is difficult {ous dimensions and types (Lange and Meadwell 1985; Lijphart 1984) ‘explains the actors and review of diferent per of dem ‘Meadwell (1985). o 5 18. These actions can take place before and afte hag om can eps fee and afer citn aay nag in ome sor ‘example, Lange and