Filing # 36935758 E-Filed 01/25/2016 11:37:52 AM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION MICHAEL VOELTZ Plaintiff, vs CASE NO, 15-022044 (02) SENATOR TED CRUZ, etal. Defendants, COMES NOW Defendant, Senator Ted Cruz, by and through his undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b), hereby moves this Court to dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and for failure to state a cause of action, Senator Cruz is a natural born citizen of the United States and is qualified to appear on the Republican Party’s 2016 Presidential Preference Primary Ballot for nomination to that office. INTRODUCTION Asa threshold matter, there are three jurisdictional grounds that require the dismissal of Plaintiff's challenge to Senator Cruz’s eligibility to serve as President of the United States.. First, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has suffered any legally-cognizable “special injury” and has, therefore, failed to establish his standing to sue. Both federal and Florida law are clear that the inclusion of a candidate on the ballot would not inflict any special injury on any voter who is planning to vote in that election, Second, both federal and state courts have recognized that the question whether a candidate is a natural born citizen eligible to serve as President of the United States under the Constitution presents @ nonjusticiable political question that is properly Page 1 of 25 #4 FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL HOWARD FORMAN, CLERK 1/25/2016 11:37:52 AM=***resolved, not by the courts, but by the electoral college and the United States Congress, Finally, Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent the political process fails to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of Florida law. In short, all of these doctrines establish that a voter who Objects to a candidate's inclusion on the ballot should seek redress, not by pursuing remedies in the courts, but by casting a ballot in the voting booth. Plaintiff's suit should accordingly be dismissed. Even if Plaintiff's claim were justiciable, it would be doomed to fail on its mi Senator Cruz is a “natural born Citizen,” eligible to serve as President of the United States because his mother was a U.S. izen. This is true regardless of where his U.S. citizen mother happened to be at the moment she gave birth to him, JURISDICTION 1. THE PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE SENATOR CRUZ’S QUALIFICATIONS TO SERVE AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. An individual voter who objects to a presidential candidate’s inclusion on the primary ballot suffers no legally cognizable injury. In order to bring suit, a Florida plaintiff must first establish that he has “direct and articulable stake” in the outcome of the suit by alleging that that plaintiff has suffered a “special injury.” Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 662 (Fla, 1980). The alleged injury must be “different from the injuries to other citizens and taxpayers.” Soldres v, City of Miami, 166 So. 34-887, 888 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 34 Dist. 2015). Plaintiff has failed to allege either an injury or an interest that is in any way distinct from those of every other Florida voter. Indeed, this same Court dismissed this same legal argument by this same Plaintiff almost, four years ago. See, e.g, Voeltz v. Obama, 2012 WL 4117478 (Fla. Cir Ct Sept. 6, 2012) (‘Because Plaintiff lacks standing, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider his complaint for declaratory relief."); mandamus denied, 126 So.3d 1059 (Fla. 2013). Page 2 of 25Plaintiff accordingly lacks standing and his suit mist be dismissed as countless courts have done with similar challenges to a candidate’s eligibility for the presidency! " See,eg., Voeltz »: Obama, 2012 WL 4117478 (Fla. Cir. Ct, Sept. 6, 2012) (“Because Plaintiff lacks standing, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider his complaint for declaratory relief ‘mandamus denied, 126 $0.34 1059 (Fla. 2013): Grinols v. Electoral Coll, 2013 WL2204885 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2013) (Plaintifs lack standing to bring this action.” aff’ don other grounds, 622 F. App'x 624 (9th Cir, 2015), Reade v-Galvin, 2012 WL. 5385683 (D. Mass. Oct. 30, 2012) (“To the extent that Reade is attempting to bring a claim {0 temove President Obama's name trom the presidential ballot on the ground that he is ineligible for that office, Reade lacks standing.”), aff'd, No. 12-2406 (Ist Cir. une 11, 2013); Armamarie v. Electors for the State, 2013 WL 1726360(D.N.D. Mar. 13, 2013) (“Additionally she lacks standing to challenge President Obama's eligibility to run for or serve as President of the United States.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12-0V= 85, 2013 WIe2158412 (D.N.D. Apr. 22, 2013), appeal dismissed, No; 13-2040 (8th Cir, July 11, 2013); Riethmiller 1. Electors for the State of New Jersey.2013 WL 1501868 (D.NJ, Apr. 11,2013) (Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed as frivolous because Plaintiff lacks Article IK standing.”), appeal dismissed, No. 13-2335 (3d Cir, May 31, 2013); Sibley v. Obama, 866 F. Supp. 24 17 (D:D.C. 2012) (“Plaintiff lacks standing to’challenge President ‘Obama's current tenure in fice, just as others who have made sinilar claims contesting President Obaita’s eligibility for the presidency were found to lack standing.”), aff'd, 2012 WL 6608088 (D.C. Cir. Dee. 6, 2012) (Petitioners remaining claims are likewise without merit forthe reasons stated by the district court.”); Bowhallv ‘Obama, 2010 WL 4932747, (M.D. Ala. Nov, 30, 2010) (*Mr. Bowhal!’s lack of standing to challenge their actions."), aff'd, No. 10-15938-C (1th Cir. Apr. 4, 2011) (affirming order that complaint was frivolous); Barret v. ‘Obama, 2009 WL 3861788 (C.D. Cal, Oct. 29, 2009), aff'd sub nom. Drake v. Obamas 664 F.34 774 (9th Cit. 2011) (CThe District Court property dismissed the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims for lack of Anicte MI standing,”); Kercher v. Obama, 669F. Supp. 24 477 (D.N.J. 2009) (“Without an ‘injury in fact’ necessary for-Article IL standing, the Court cannot exerese jurisdiction over the present aetion.”), affd 612 F.3d 204 (34 Cir: 2010) (We therefore agree with the District Court that Appellants lack standing,"); Cohen v. Obama, 2008 WL 5191864 (DDC. Dec. 11, 2008) (“Plaintf?’s claims fail because he does not have standing to pursue them.") af'd, 332 F. App’x 640 (D.C. Cit. 2009) (“The district court properly held appellant did not allege an injury sufficient to confer Article III standinig.”); Berg v. Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“[Plaintiff] does not have standing to ppusue this matter and we do not have jursdietion to hear it”), aff'd, $86 F.3d 234 (3d Cix. 2009) (“In sum, we agree with the District Court that Berg lacks standing to bring this suit because he has suffered no injury particlarized to him."); Hamblin ¥. Obama, 2009 WE. 2513986 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2009) (“Plaintiffs alleged injuries flow from Plaintf?’s interest in voting for efiible candidates for elected office, Paintf's interes is held in common by all members of the public. That common interest does not conte standing on Plaintiff.”), appeal dismissed, 09- 17014 (9th Cir, Nov. 6, 2009); Hunter v. U.S. Supreme Court, 2009 WL. 111683 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009) (“Plaintiff's claim of harm fails because itis “conjectural or hypothetical,” leaving plaintiff without standing to sue for the requested relief"), appeal dismissed, No. 09-10246 (Sth Cir. July 23, 2009); Sibley w. Alexander, 916 F, Supp. 24 58; 59-60 (D.D.C, 2013) (*For all these reasons, Sibley’s action must be dismissed for lack of standing.”); Aimamarie v. 619 Others, 2013 WL. 363778 (D. Md. Jan: 29, 2013) (“Additionaly, it is noted that plaintiff does noc have standing to bring this action.”), Liberty Legal Found. v, Nat Democratie-Partof the USA: ‘Ines, 875 F. Supp. 26 794 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (“The Court holds that none of the named Plaintiffs have alleged specific facts to demonstrate theit standing to bring this suit"); Annamavie ? Last Name Uncertain v. Electors for the Stae-of Kentucky, 2012 WL S398565 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2012) Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge Obama's canglidacy and eligibility to be on the ballot as she has suffered no injury particularized to her") Riethmller Electors for the State of Virginia, 2012 WL 4742363 (W.D. Va. Oct 4, 2012) (“The plaintiff lacks legal standing to asset the claims set fort inher Complaint and accordingly the court lacks subject-matter jusdicton,”); Riethmiller v. Bleetors for State of Alabama, 2012 WL $042026 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 2,2012) (“To the extent that plaintiff alleges injury by virtue of having an ineligible candidate placed on the ballot by electors in Alabama (a state in which she does not reside) any such injury does not confer standing on the plaintiff”), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 5045219 (MLD. Ala, Oct. 18, 2012) (“While Plaintiff claims to have suffered injury personally, in addition to the injury allexedly suffered by the 650 other petitioners, she still fils to allexe facts sufficient to demonstrate the constitutional requirement of standing.”); Strunk v. Obama, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D-D-C. 2011) (“[Plaintff] thus lacks standing to bring his claim.”); Cook v. Good, 2009 WL 2163535 (M.D. Gia, July 16, 2009) (“Major Cook does not have standing to pursue this action.”;Dawson v. Obama, 2009 WL 532617.(E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) (“Plaintiff has Page 3 of 25A. In Order To Establish Standing, A Florida Plaintiff Must Allege That He Or She Has Suffered A “Special Injury” That Is Distinct And “Different From The Injuries To Other Citizens And Taxpayers.” “Before a court can consider whether an action is illegal, the court must be presented with a justiciable case or controversy between parties who have standing.” Solares v.City of Miami, 166 So. 34 887, 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2015). The Florida doctrine of standing ensures that “a court of law operating as one of the three branches of government under the doctrine of the separation of pows s” exercises only those powers assigned to the judiciary 1d. A plaintiff's “standing is a preliminary suc that is to be decided by the court,” Chuck v. Citrof Homestead Police Dep't, 888 So. 24736, 745 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 34 Dist. 2004), and “is distinet from the merits of the case and should be considered separately.” Fannie Mae v. Legacy Pare Condo. Ass'n, 177 So. 3d 92, 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2015). In order to establish standing, the plaintiff must allege that he or she has a “direct and articulable stake in the outcome of a controversy.” Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 662 (Fla. 1980). See also Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So. 24 665, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sth Dist, 1995) (holding that plaintiff must allege that “he of she has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy”). Requiting that plaintiff establish “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is necessary ‘to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of is wues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions(.)"" Sandstrom v. Leader, 370 $o.2d 3, 4 (1979) (quoting Baker: v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). In sum, “[s}tanding depends on whether a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy, with a legally cognizable interest that would be affected by the outcome of the suffered no cognizable injury and lacks Article II standing.”); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F: Supp. 2463 (DNB 2008) (“Wht is settled, however, is that an individual voter like Hollander lacks standing to raise that challenge in the federal courts.”); Robirison v. Bowen, S67F. Supp. 2d 1144 (N-D. Cal. 2008) (“Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this lawsuit."); Fan Allen». New York State Bd. of Elections, 36 Misc. 34 1212(A), 954 N.Y.S.2d 762\(Sup. Ct 2012) (“In view of petitioners lack of standing to maintain the instant proceeding...) Page 4 of 25litigation," Nedeau v, Gallagher, 851 So 2d 214,215 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. Ist Dist. 2003), See also Centerstate Bank Cent. Fla., N.A. v. Krause, 87 So. 3d 25, 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sth Dis 2012); Zelman v. Zelman, 175 So. 3d 871, 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct: App. 4th Dist. 2015). To establish a'“direct and articulable stake” in the case, a plaintiff must allege that he has suffered a legally cognizable “special injury.” Brown, 382 So. 2d at 662. See also Alachua County v, Scharps, 855 So. 24 195, 198 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. Ist Dist. 2003) (“Generally, in order to have standing to bring an-action the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered or will suffer a special injury.”). The requirement derives from the Supreme Court’s holding in Rickman v, Whitehurst, 73 Fla. 152 (Fla, 1917), that injuries suffered by all citizen taxpayers are properly resolved only by a suit instituted by public officers; a private person has standing only if that person is threatened with or suffers some public or special damage to his individual interests, distinct from that of every other inhabitant”: Ina case where a public official is about to commit an unlawful act, the public by its authorized public officers must institute the proceeding to prevent the wrongful act, unless a private person is threatened with or suffers some public or special damage to his individual interests, distinct from that of every other inhabitant, in which case he may maintain his bill Id, at V58 (emphasis added). A citizen plaintiff “must allege a “special injury” which differs in kind and degree from that sustained by other members of the community at large.” Council for Secular Humanism, Inc:v. McNeil, 44 $0. 3d 112, 121 (Fla. Dist. Cl. App. 1st Dist. 2010), An alleged “injury” that is indistinct from the “injur suffered by-all citizens alike is not special injury” and is insufficient to confer standing to sue. In this vein, “the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly held that citizens and taxpayers lack standing to challenge a governmental action unless they demonstrate either'a special injury, different from the injuries to other citizens and taxpayers, or unless the claim is based on the violation of a provision of the Constitution that Page 5 of 25governs the taxing and spending powers." Solares, 166 So. 3d at 888 (emphasis added): see also Smith v. City of Fort Myers, 944 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct-App. 2d Dist. 2006) (*Generally,a private citizen is precluded from filing a taxpayer complaint to challenge govertiment action unless the private citizen alleges and proves a ‘special injury,” which is an injury that is different from that of the general publie.”). Florida courts look to Article III standing jurisprudence when assessing a plaintiff's standing under Florida law. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Florida has adopted the three basic requirements for establishing Article III standing; namely, that the plaintiffallege: 1) an injury- infact; 2) that is fairly traceable to the conduct complained of: and, 3) that is likely to be redressed by telief from the court: There are three requirements that constitute the “irreducible constitutional minimum” for standing. Vi Agency of Natural Res.y. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771, 146.L. Ed, 2d 836, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000). Fir plaintiff must demonstrate an “injury in fact,” which is “conerete,” “distinct and palpable,” and “actual or imminent.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 109 L..Bd. 2d 135, 110'S: Ct. 1717 (1990). Second, a plaintiff must establish “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. S55, 560, 119 L. Ed. 26.351, 112.8. Ct.2130 (1992). Third, a plaintiff must show “a ‘substantial likelihood” that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.” Stevens, 529 U.S, at 771 State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1113 n4 (Fla, 2004). The lower courts have employed this three- part test, and their decisions make clear that the federal standing analysis is hot inconsistent with the other standing rules found in Florida case law. See, e.g., Pandya’. Israel, 761 So. 2d 454, 456-487 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist:2000) (“To establish standing a party must have an injury in fact for which relief is likely to redress and, in non-constitutional cases, the interest must fall Within a statutory or constitutional guarantee (i.e. the zone of interest).”); Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So. 2d 665, 668 (Fla: Dist. Ct. App. Sth Dist. 1995) (“To establish standing it must be shown that the party suffered injury in fact (economic or otherwise) for which relief is likely to be Page 6 of 25redressed and, in non-constitutional situations, that the interest sought to be protected falls within a statutory or constitutional guarantee (i.¢., the zone of interest...) . . The injury must be distinct and palpable. . .. It may not be abstract, conjectural or hypothetical.) Florida's requirement of a “special injury” corresponds with the requirement in federal Article II standing jurisprudence that plaintiff allege an “injury in fact”. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, a plaintiff fails to allege such an injury-in-fact when that plaintiff “rais{es] only a generally available grievance about government -- claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large.” Lujan»: Defenders of. Wildlife, 504.U.S. 155, 573-574 (1992); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ([W]hen the asserted harm is 4 ‘generalized grievance” shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally-does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”), B, Plaintiff Lacks Standing Because He Has Not Alleged A Cognizable Special Injury, Caused By The Defendant, ‘That Would Be Redressed By Relief From the Court. ‘Applying the Settled principles of federal and Florida standing jurisprudence set forth above, it is beyond dispute that Plaintiff has failed to allege that he has “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” sufficient to “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions(.)"" Sandstrom v, Leader, 370 So.2d 3, 4 (1979) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). Plaintiff has alleged no interest in the case different or distinct from the interest of every other citizen in ifs outcome. Because plaintiff has alleged no injury, plaintiff Page 7 of 25has failed likewise adequately to allege both causation and redressability, ‘The suit should accordingly be dismissed. 1. Plaintiff Has Alleged No “Special” Injury. None of the injuries that plaintiff alleges constitute a “special” injury needed to establish standing under Florida law. Plaintiff's primary asserted injury is that his “right to vote will be diluted, debased and desecrated by the presence of Mr, Cruz and Mr. Rubio on the Florida ballot” due to Plaintiff's belief that these individuals are not “natural born eitizens,” and. therefore are not eligible to serve as President of thie United States: Compl, at 7. Plaintiff claims that an unknown “distribution of the vote” will be “siphoned by ineligible candidates” that should have “been kept off the ballot.” /d. at 8, Plaintif?’s asserted “injury” has been uniformly rejected by courts as insufficient to confer standing. There is no support for relaxing the “special injury” requirement of federal and Florida law in the case of a voter challenge to a candidate’s eligibility to hold office or to an election- related determination or action relating to such eligibility. Indeed, only in the ease of ballot referenda have the courts been willing to hold that “{a] voter has standing to challenge ballot Janguage on a claim that the language fails to comply with subsection 101.161(1), Florida Statutes,” which requires a ballot summary to be printed in “clear and unambiguous language.” City of Hialeah v. Delgado, 963 So. 24.754, 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App. 34 Dist. 2007). Apart trom the special case arising in the context of popular referenda, Voter standing remains contingent on * Defendant Ted Cruz does not respond to Plaintiffs asserted injuries atthe hand of Defendant Secretary of State Ken Detzner, or the non-party Florida Legislature. Ifany such injury oceurred, that injury was selfevidently not caused by Senator Cruz, and cannot be redressed by Senator Cruz. We note, however, that the United States Court of ‘Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected substantially similar claims in 2009, writing: “The essence of Berg's ‘complaint is thatthe defendants, the states; presidential candidates other than Obama, political parties, a majority of American yotets, and Congress ~ alist that includes some who could have challenged, or could still challenge, (Obama's eligibility through Various means ~have not been persuaded by his claim, That grievance, 100, is not one ‘appropriately resolved through the judicial process.’ Whitmore'v. Arkansas, 498 U.S. 149, 155, 110S. Ct. 1717. 109 L. Ed, 2d 135 (1990)." Berg v. Obama, $86 F.3d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 2009). Page 8 of 25the identification of a “special injury” caused to the “real party invinterest:" See, ¢:g., Boardman v.Esieva, 323 So2d 259, 269 (Fla, 1975) (“Being personal to the voter, the right of secrecy may be waived by the voter and it;vould appear that the voter himself is the only party who has standing to protest a violation of the right to vote in seeret.”); Alachua County’ v. Scharps, 855 So. 24.195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Ist Dist. 2003) (holding a taxpayer with no “special injury” lacked standing to challenge a resolution passed by a county which directed that a referendum be placed on a-general election ballot because no exception to the “special injury” rule ap) It should come as no surprise, therefore, that every court to have considered challenges to the eligibility of Senator John McCain and Senator and President Barack Obama to Serve as President of the United States under the Natural Born Citizen Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const., art. II; § 1. 4, concluded that the pfaintifis lacked standing because they had suffered no “injury in fact.” See, e.g., Drake v Obama, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011); Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2010); Sibley v. Obama, 866 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2012); Berg v. Obama, 574F. Supp. 2d 509 (F.D. Pa. 2008); Robinson v. Bowen, $67 F. Supp. 24.1144 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.N.H. 2008); Stamper v. United States, 2008.US. Dist, LEXIS 92938 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2008).> > State courts have similarly rejected these challenges, most often on standing grounds. See, eg, Melnnish v. Bennett, 150 So. 3d 1045 (Ala. 2014) (pet curiam) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim with no opinion); Lamb v. Obama, No. $-15155, 2014 WL 1016308, 2014 Alas, LEXIS 31 (Alaska Mar. 12, 2014) (finding plaintiff lacked standing and lacked legally cognizable claim); Keyes v. Bowen, 189 Cal. App. 4th 647 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2010) (holding that the state had no duty to investigate qualifications); Wrotowski v. Bysiewicz, 289 Conn, 522, 958 A.2d 709 (Conn, 2008) (finding no statutory standing); Ankeny v. Governor of Ind.,.916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. CL. App. 2009) (finding Mr. Obama isa “natural-born citizen’ born within the borders of the United States); see also Strunk v New York State Bd. of Elections, No. 6500/11 2012'N.Y. Mise. LEXIS 1635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (finding plaintiff tacked standing, plaintiff failed to state a claim, and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction); Paige v. State, 2013 Vt. 105,88 A.3d 1182 (Vt. 2013) (finding plaintif?’s claim moot). Page 9 of 25For example, the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania succinctly held that “a candidate's ineligibility under the Natural Born Citizen Clause does not result in an injury in fact to voters.” Berg v. Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509, 520 aff'd 586 F.3d 234 (3d Cit. 2009), The federal District Court for the District of New Hampshire held that “voters have no standing to complain about the participation of an ineligible candidate in an election, even if it results in the siphoning of votes away from an eligible candidate they prefer.” Hollander, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 69. ‘These courts concluded that plaintifis presented only generalized grievances, as opposed to particularized injuries in fact. Berg v. Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509, 519 aff'd 586 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Plaintiff's stake is no greater and his status no more differentiated than that of millions of other voters."). As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained, Even if we assume that the placement of an ineligible candidate on the presidential ballot harmed [Plaintiff], that injury, including any frustration [Plaintiff] felt because others refused to act on his view of the law, was too general for the purposes of Article III; [Plaintiff] shared both his “interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws,” and the objective uncertainty of Obama's possible removal, pari past with all voters; and the relief he sought would have “no more directly and tangibly benefited] him than . . . the public at Jarge.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74. Berg, 586 F.3d at 240. These decisions confirm that Plaintiff lacks standing to maintain this suit challenging Senator Cruz’s eligibility to serve as President of the United States. The same reasoning produced the same result in Jones v. Bush, a case in which the plaintiffS attempted to bring suit to enjoin members of the Electoral College from Texas from voting for both George W. Bush and Richard B: Cheney, on the grounds that they were ihabitants” of the same state. Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 715(N.D. Tex. 2000). The court held that plaintiffs lacked standing because their “assertion that a violation of the Twelfth Amendment will harm them by infringing their right to cast a meaningful vote also fails to Page 10 of 25satisfy the Article MII requirement of a ‘distinet and palpable injury.”* Jones, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (citation omitted). The court explained, “[a] general interest in seeing that the government abides by the Constitution isnot sufficiently individuated or palpable to constitute such an injury.” Id. Nor can a votet assert claims on behalf of competing candidates. See Berg v. Ohama, 586 F.3d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 2009) (Pl ntiff’s “angst that the presence on the ballot of an ineligible candidate might lessen the chances that an eligible candidate might win was a non-cognizable derivative harm.”); see also Arizonians for Official English v. A na, 520U'S. 43,64 (1997) (“An interest shared generally with the public at large in the proper application of the Constitution and laws will not do.”); Crist v. Comm'n on Presidential Debates, 262 F.3d 193, 194 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] voter fails to present an injury-in-fact when the alleged harm is abstract and widely shared or is only derivative of a harm experienced by a candidate.”); Weiss ¥. Johansen, 898 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005) (“[T]he claim should be brought by, or on behalf of, the real party in interest.”), Because Plaintiff Has Alleged No Cognizable Injury, Plaintiff Has Necessarily Failed To Allege Causation And Redressabil Because Plaintiff has not alleged particularized, palpable injury personal to him that has been or will be caused by Senator Cruz’s appearance on Flotida’s presidential primary ballot, there can be no “causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” and there can be no showing of “a ‘substantial likelihood’ that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.” State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1113 n.4 (Fla, 2004) (citations omitted). Il. _ PLAINTIFF'S CHALLENGE PRESENTS A NON-JUSTICIABLE POLITICAL QUESTION Page 11 of 25Plaintiff's suit should also be dismissed because it requests that the court resolve.a nonjusticiable political question, the resolution of which is left to the Electoral Coflege and the Congress. Berg, $86 F.3d at 238. As the District Court for the Norther District of California explained, these questions are committed to the political process by the Constitution: {is clear that mechanisms exist under the Twelfih Amendment and 3 U.S.C. § 15 for any challenge to any candidate to be ventilated when electoral votes are counted, and that the Twentieth Amendment provides guidance regarding how to proceed if a president elect shall have failed to qualify. Issues regarding qualifications for president are quintessentially suited to the foregoing process. Arguments concerning qualifications or lack thereof can be laid before the voting public before the election and, once the election is over, can be raised as objections as the electoral votes are counted in Congress. The members of the Senate and the House of Representatives are well qualified to adjudicate any objections to ballots for allegedly unqualified candidates. Therefore, this order holds that the challenge presented by plaintiff is committed under the Constitution to the electors and the legislative branch, at least in the first instance. Judicial review—if any—should occur only after the electoral and Congressional processes have run their course. Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F.Supp.24.1144, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Likewise, in Grinols v. Electoral College, 2013 WL 2294885 (E.D. Cal. 2013), another suit challenging the qualification of a candidate under the Natural Born Citizen Clause, the court concluded that the determination of a candidate's qualification for that office is a political question committed to the Congress: ‘These various articles and amendments of the Constitution make clear that the Constitution assigns to Congress, and not to federal courts, the responsibility of determining whether a person is qualified to serve as President of the United States. As such, the question presented by Plaintiffs in this ease—whether President Obama may legitimately rum for office and serve as President—i political question that the Court may not answer. Accordingly, this Court, numerous other district courts that have dealt with this issue to date, declines to reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ allegations because doing so would ignore the Constitutional limits imposed on the federal courts. 2013 WL 2294885, at *6. See also Bowhall v. Obama, 2010 WL 4932747, (M.D. Ala. Nov. 30, 2010) (“Further, his claim that the President is a non-natural born citizen is not justiciable by this Page 12 of 25court.”), aff'd, No. 10-15938-C (11th Cir Apr. 4, 2011) (affirming order that complaint was frivolous). ‘The federal courts have made clea , therefore, that whether a presidential candidate is a natural born citizen for purposes of Article II is a political question left, first, to the Electoral College, and, ultimately. to the Congress. State courts have also recognized the political nature of the question. For example, a New to hold the office York court observed that a suit challenging the qualifications of the candidat of President would present “a non-justiciable political question.” see also Strunk v New York State Bd. of Elections, No. 6500/11-2012 N.Y. Mise: LEXIS 1635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). The court explained that “the exclusive means to resolve objections to the electors’ selection of a President or a Vice President” is “by members of the Senate and House of Representatives” at the “meeting of the joint session of Congress” held to count Electoral College votes. /d."The Court recognized the dangers entailed by improper judicial interference in the political process: Ifa state court were to involve itself in the eligibility of a candidate to hold the office of President, a determination reserved for the Electoral College and Congress, it may involve itself in national political matters for which it is institutionally ill-suited and interfere with the constitutional authority of the Electoral College and Congress. Accordingly, the political question doctrine instructs this Court and other courts to refrain from superseding the judgments of the nation's voters and those federal government entities the Constitution designates as the proper forums to determine the eligibility of presidential candidates, Id. The state courts are in accord with the federal courts, therefore, in holding that a question about a candidate's qualification under Article II isa political question to be resolved through the political process. In addition to assigning these toles to the Electoral College and to a joint session of Congress, the Constitution contains two other provisions that r nforce the role of the Legislative Page 13 of 25Branch in determining the eligibility of the President and Vice President. Ifno candidate receives a miajority of electoral votes, the Twelfth Amendment vests the House of Representatives with the authority to select the President, which necessarily involves an evaluation of qualifications. U.S, Const., amend, XXII. Furthermore, the Twentieth Amendment authorizes Congress to provide by law “for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected ...”.U:S. Const, amend. XX, § 3. In-sum, in every case where it does not vest the authority to determine whether a candidate is qualified to hold the office of President in the Electoral College, the Constitution has assigned that responsibility to the legislative branch, not to the courts. By committing the question exclusively to the Electoral College and to the Congress, the Constitution has guaranteed that neither the States nor the courts will reach conflicting decisions regarding whether a candidate meets the requirements of Article IL It is to ensure that the nation is never in turmoil caused by conflicts among the courts that the political question doctrine bars federal and state courts alike from deciding the question and that the Constitution has feft it to the Electoral College to pass the first judgment on the qualifications of the candidate, Onee the College has done so, it then falls to Congress alone to pass on the constitutional eligibility of the successful candidate, Ibis, therefore, for the Congress t6 decide on the qualifications of the President for all Americans, not for the courts of cach State to decide whether that State will recognize the eligibility of the candidate President fo hold that office. II, PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE UNDER RLORIDA LAW Plaintiff's complaint ignores the pre-established election procedures as mandated by Florida law. Section 103.101 of the Florida Statutes sets forth clear election procedures that must Page 14 of 25be strictly followed by the Florida Seeretary of State. In ofder for an individual to appear on a presidential preference primary ballot, the candidate’s political party must submit his or her name to the Secretary of State to be placed on the presidential primary ballot, Fla, Stat. § 103.101(2). The Secretary of State has no discretion to reject the names submitted by the political parties. On the contrary, Florida law requires the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a list containing the names of the presidential candidates submitted by the parties, and to notify each presidential candidate listed therein. Jd. The Secretary of State's authority is thus limited to performing the ministerial functions that ate specifically prescribed in Title IX of the Florida Statutes. There is no avenue contemplated in the Florida Statutes that permits a court to review the Sectetary of State’s actions to place candidates on the presidential primary ballot. Section 102.168 provides the sole route for contesting an individual’s nomination for office of for contesting an election, It permits a qualified voter to contest the certification of the election or nomination of any person to office within ten days after the results of the election have been certified, Fla. Stat. § 102.168(1)-(2) ee also Burns v. Tondreau, 139 So. 34 481(Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Norman v, Ambler, 46 So, 34.178 (Fla. Ist DCA 2010). ‘An action under Section 102.168 is ripe for review, therefore, only after the Canvassing Board has officially certified the results of an election. The statutory right of intervention under Fla, Stat. § 201,168 is likewise limited to contesting the certification of an election. McPherson v, Flynn, 397 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1981), A pre-election challenge to a candidate’s eligibility is thus not permitted The Florida Supreme Court made clear in McPherson v, Flynn that Florida courts have no inherent power to determine election contests, and because there is no common law right 10 contest elections, any-challenge must be made under the statutory grant of Section 201,168. 397 Page 15 of 25So. 2d at 668; see also Smith v. Tynes, 412 So. 24925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Pearson v. Taylor, 32 So. 2d 826 (Fla, 1947). Moreover, when dealing with a statutory action for an election contest, the statutory provisions must be strictly followed. Bailey v. Davis, 273 So. 24 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). But even if the Court finds that this case is governed by Section 103,021 rather than Section 102.168, Plaintiff's Complaint still fails to assert a proper legal basis for his claim, To be sure, the Second Judicial Circuit Court of Florida has held that a challenge to the eligibility of a candidate for the Office of President of the United States is treated differently under Florida law and is guided by an analysis under Section 103.021, rather than Section 102.168. Voeltz v. Obama, 2012-CA- 00467, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (Fla. 2d DCA, June 29, 2102), Ina similar challenge brought four years ago by Plaintiff Voeltz to President Obama’s constitutional eligibility to serve as President, this Court held that Plaintiff had no recourse under Section 103.021, as there is no method to contest the qualifying or certification of nomination of a presidential candidate. Voeltz v. Obama, 2012-CA-00467, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (Fla, 2d DCA, June 29, 2102) In short, the Complaint is defeetive as it fails to assert a proper legal basis under Florida law to challenge an individual’s nomination to the presidential primary. MERITS IV. SENATOR CRUZ IS A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN ELIGIBLE TO SERVE AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. Article II of the U.S. Constitution states that “No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President.” U.S. Const. art. 11, § 1, cl. 4. Although the Constitution does not define the phrase “natural born Citizen,” its meaning is not difficult to determine. Every judicial Page 16 of 25decision and virtually every constitutional authority agree that: a “natural born Citizen” is, anyone who was a citizen at the momient they were “born”—as opposed to becoming a citizen through the naturalization process at some point after their bitth. See, e.g, Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, On the Meaning of “Natural Born Citizen”, 128 Harv, L. Rev. F. 161,161 (Mar. 11, 2015) (“All the sources routinely used (o interpret the Constitution confirm that the phrase ‘natural born Citizen’ has a specific meaning: namely, someone who was a U.S, citizen at birth : Laurence H. Tribe with no need to go through’a naturalization proceeding at some later time, & Theodore B. Olson, Presidents and Citizenship (March 19, 2008), reprinted in 2 Pub. L. Mise. 509(2012) (“The U,S. Supreme Court gives m ng to terms that.are not expressly defined in the Constitution by looking to the context in which those terms are used; to statutes enacted by the First Congress; and fo the common faw at the time of the Founding, ‘These Sources all confirm that the phrase “natural born” includes . .. birth abroad to parents who were citizens.”) (citations omitted). These sources comport with the common understanding of the term “natural” or “natural born.” Not surprisingly, numerous dictionary definitions of these terms reflect this interpretation. ‘A. Every Reliable Source From the Time of the Writing of the U.S, Constitution Confirms That a Person Who Was a U.S. Citizen at Birth—Like Senator Cruz—Is a “Natural Born Citizen” Eligible To Serve as President. * See, ¢g., 7 Oxford English Dictionary 38 (1961) (defining “natural born” as “having a specified position or character by birth; used exp. with subject"); The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 1899 (1971) (defining “natural-bom” as “Having a specified position of character by birth; used esp. with subject*—"I701 Act7 Anne x. .§ 3 The Children of all natural-bor Subjects, born out of the Ligeance of her Majesty ... shall be deemed to be natural-born Subjects of this Kingdom.”—"1833 Penny Cyel 1. 338/2 It is not true that every person; born ‘out of the dominion of the erovn, is therefore an alien; nor is a person born within them necessarily a natural-born ‘subject."); i (defining “natural” as “Having a certain relative status by birth; natural-born”); Webster's New International Dictionary 1439 (1923) (defining “natural-bom” as “Haying a (certain) status or character by birth; as, natural-born citizens; a natural-born coward”); id. (defining “natural” as “Of, fromcor by, birth; natural-born; as, a natural fool; a natural athlete or musicians-existing or characteristic from birth; innate; inborn; as, natural instincts or talents.") Page 17 of 25Itis well established that enactments of the first United States Congress—convened just three years after the drafting of the Constitution—provide crucial guidance for construing our Constitution: See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1983). Those enactments are strong indicators of what particular terms meant to the Framers at the time the Constitution was written. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986) (the views of the First Congress provide “contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning”) (internal quotation marks omitted). For similar reasons, British law at the ti \e OF the Founding of the United States also provides essential context for determining the meaning of terms used by the Framers of the Constitution. They were, after all, raised in the British legal tradition. See, ¢g,, Ex parte Grossman, 267 US. 87, 109-09 (1925) (“The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to the British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted.”); Ex parte William Wells, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 307, 311 (1855) (“We must then give the word the same meaning as prevailed here and in England at the time it found a place in the constitution.”) With respect {o the phrase “natural bom Citizen,” the First Congress and British law at the time of the Founding are in agreement—a person who is a citizen at birth due to the citizenship of parent is'a “natural born’ citizen. In 1790, the First Congress enacted legislation explicitly providing that “the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens.” Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 104, 104 (emphasis added). This is particularly compelling considering that the First Congress includes eight of the eleven members oF the Page 18 of 25committee that proposed the Natural Born Citizen Clause to the Constitutional Convention. None oftthem objected to the 1790 statute, See Clement & Katyal, supra at 163. Similarly, British law dating back to the 1350s, and in force at the time of Founding, ‘made clear that children born outside:the British Empire to a subject of the Crown were themselves subjects of the Crown, stating that those children were “nafural-born Subjects . ..to all Intents, Constructions, and Purp s whatsoever.” British Nationality Act, 1730, 4 Geo. 2, ¢. 21 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has observed: “Mr. Dicey, in his careful and thoughtful Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws, published in 1896, states the following propositions, his principal rules being printed below in italics: ‘Natural-born British subject” means a British subject who has become a British subject at the moment of his birth.’ United States v; Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.649,,657 (1897) (emphasis in original). British law further recognizes that “[i]t is competent to any country to confer by general or special legislation the privileges of nationality upon those who are born out of its own territory . .. Great Britain considers and treats such persons as natural-born subjects.” Id. at 671- 72 (emphasis added). ‘The original understanding of “natural born Citizen”—anyone who was a citizen of the United States at the moment of their birth—also comports with the Framers’ purpose in adopting this requirement in the Constitution. The Framers included the Natural Born Citizen Clause in. response to a 1787 letter from John Jay to George Washington, in which Jay suggested that the Constitution prohibit “Foreigners” from attaining the position of Commander in Chief. See Letter from John Jay to George Washington (July 25, 1787), in 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 61 (Max Farrand'ed., 1911) (“[Wyhether it would not be wise & seasonable to provide a... . strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our Page 19 of 25national Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in chief of the [AJmerican army shall not be given to, nor devolve on, any but a natural born citizen.”). It is inconceivable that the Framers intended (o exclude a U.S. citizen at birth from holding the office of President, simply because of where he or she happened to be born. After all, that individual is not a “foreigner”—but rather, a U.S. citizen from birth. Indged, itis particularly unlikely that Fay himself would have held such a view, considering that, when he wrote this letter to Washington, he was serving abroad as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and had already fathered three children abroad. Surely Jay did not believe his own children were “foreigners” who were constitutionally ineligible to hold the office of President. B.~ Historical Precedent Confirms That a Person Who Was a U.S. Citizen at Birth Is a “Natural Born Citizen.” American history and practice, as evidenced by previous candidates for President who were born outside the United States, confirm this original understanding of the term “natural bom Citizen.” In 2008, for example, it was widely understood that Senator and presidential- candidate John McCain was ‘a natural born citizen due to his birth to U.S. citizen parents novwithstanding that he was born inthe Panama Canal Zone. Indeed, the United States Senate unanimously passed a resolution confirming that Senator McCain is a natural born citizen, due to his birth to U.S. citizen parents, See S-Res. 511, 110th Cong, (2008) (“previous presidential candidates Were born outside of the United States of America and were understood to be eligible to be President,” consistent with “the purpose and intent of the ‘natural born Citizen’ clause of the Constitution of the United States, as evidenced by the First Congr "sown statute defining the term ‘natural born Citizen”). Page 20 of 25Courts uniformly concluded that Senator MeCain was eligible to serve as President on account of his birth to citizen parents. See, e.g., Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F. Supp: 2d 1144, 1146 (N.D. Cal, 2008) (finding it “highly probable’, .. that Senator MeCain is a natural born citizen” due to his birth to at least one U.S. citizen parent, before dismi Jing ease for lack of standing); Hollander v. McCain, $66 F. Supp. 2463, 66 8 n.3 (D. N.H. 2008) (noting that " we weight of the commentary falls heavily on the side of eligibility” for persons born outside the U.S. to at least one U:S. citizen parent, before dismissing case for lack of standing); Ankeny v. Governor of State of Indiana, 16 N.E.2d 678,685 n. 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that “Plaintiffs do not cite any authority or develop any cogent legal argument for the propo: ion that @ person ‘must actually be born within one of the fifty States in order to qualify as a natural bor citizen”) Although the issue of Senator MeCain’s eligibility never reached the United States Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas has stated (and no other justice disagreed) that “children born abroad to U.S. parents, subject to some exceptions, are natural-born citizens who do not need to go through the naturalization process.” Zivotofiky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076.2110 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, Justice Thomas invoked various federal statutes, ineltiding the successor to the statuté that conferred eitizenship at birth on Senator Cruz. See id: (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g)). Senator McCain is but one example. Governor George Romney, born in Mexico to U.S. citizen parents, was tinderstood to be a natural born citizen when he ran for President in 1968. See, e.g., Clement & Katyal, supra at 164; see also S. Res. 511, 110th Cong. (2008) (“previous presidential candidates were born outside the United States of America and were understood to be eligible to be President”); Eustace Seligman, 4 Brief for Governor Romney's Eligibility for President, 113 Cong. Rec. 35019, 35020 (1967) (“It is well settled that the term ‘natural born’ ci izen (or subject) included Page 21 of 25not only all those born within the territorial limits of England or of the Colonies but likewise all those who were citizens at birth, wherever their birthplaces might be.”); Id. at 35021 (“It follows from the preceding that Governor Romney, who was a citizen of the United States from his birth by virtue of his parentage, is a natural-born citizen and therefore is eligible under the constitution to be elected to the office of President of the United State Unsurprisingly, the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”)—a non-partisan agency within the Library of Congress that provides legal and policy analysis to members of Congress—has also come to the same conclusion. “In 2011, the CRS isstied a report concluding that the “weight of legal and historical authority indicates that the term ‘natural born* citizen would mean a person who is entitled 10 U.S. citizenship ‘by birth’ or ‘at birth,”” including “by being born abroad to U.S. citizen-parent.” Jack Maskell, Qualifications for President and the. “Natural Born” Citizenship Eligibility Requirement (Congressional Research Service, Report No. 7-570, Nov. 14, 2011), available at htip://www.fas.org/sgp/ers/mise/R42097. pdf; [d. at 50 (“The weight of more recent federal cases, as well as the majority of scholarship on the subject, also indicates that the term ‘natural born citizen’ would most likely include, as well as native born citizens, those born abroad to U.S. citizen-parents, at least one of whom had previously resided in the United States, or those born abroad to one USS. citizen parent who, prior to the birth, had met the requirements of federal law for physical presence inthe country.”) Insum, founding-era sources, Congressional statements, historical precedent, case law, and the overwhelming weight of scholarly authority all command the same conclusion: a “natural born Citizen” is a person who was a U.S. citizen at birth, without the need for later naturalization, Page 22 of 25Plaintiff does not dispute that Senator Cruz meets that definition. The First Congress recognized that a child born to a U.S. citizen parent is a natural born U.S. citizen, no matter where the birth happens to occur. See 1 Stat. 104. And at the time of Senator Cruz’s birth, that principle was ¢odified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7): “The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: . .. a person bom outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years.”* Senator Cruz satisfies this provision, He was born outside the United States, and his ‘mother was a U.S. citizen who was physically present in the U.S. for more than ten years, including at least five afler attaining the age of 14. Senator Cruz. was a United States citizen at the moment of his birth—and thus a “natural born Citizen” eligible to serve as President of the United States, CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, this Court should dismiss the complaint challenging Senator Cruz’s inclusion on the presidential primary ballot in the State of Florida. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished via electronic Today, the relevant law is codified a U'S.C. §1401(2) (2012); “The following shal be nationals and citizens ‘of the United States at birth: ... a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its ‘outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a etizen of the United States who, prior 4 the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, atleast two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years.” Page 23 of 25filing through the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal to Service List below on this 22nd day of January 2016. DAVID DI PIETRO, ESQ. Attorney for Sen: Ted Cruiz 101 NE 3" Ave, Suite 1410 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Primary Service Email Secondary Service Emails nicole@ddpalaw.com; rudy@ddpalaw.com ‘Telephone: (954) 712-3070 Facsimile: (954) 337-3824 DAVID DI PIETRO, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 10370, NICOLE MARTELL, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 100172 RODOLFO MAYOR, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 111647 rudy@ddpalaw.com Page 24 of 25Service List Michael C, Voeltz P.O. Box 450370 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33345 Gabriela M. Prado, Esq, Holtzman Vogel Josefiak Torchinsky, PLLC gprado@hyjt.law jtorchinsky@hvjt. law ssheehy@hyjt law Davis Cooper, Esq. 7431 Ramblers Strand Fort Myers, FL 33967 pdcooper@kirkcooper.com 25