"Pacification By Assassination: The Legality Of Assassination In Conducting US

Foreign Policy"
David Moon

"I don't want to wipe out everyone. . . Just my enemies."

- Michael Corleone, The Godfather, Part II.
"Assassination" has conjured up images of gangsters sitting around a mahogany
table discussing how they can "eliminate" their competition by "whacking out" their
rivals. But when the discussion turns to the use of assassination in conducting
foreign affairs, it brings two separate and opposing values into consideration. On
the one hand, assassination raises moral questions. Some would argue that
assassination is nothing more than cold blooded murder. But on the other hand,
assassination has been viewed as something necessary and required in the course
of conducting a nation's foreign policy.
Throughout history, the use of assassination has raised these two opposing values.
As a result, this dichotomy is reflected in both international and US laws. In general,
both international and US laws have deemed the use of assassination as immoral,
but these laws have grudgingly accepted the use of assassination to further foreign
policy goals.1 This paper will examine the legality of assassination under both
international and US law. In addition, this paper will also discuss whether the use of
assassination is an effective means of furthering US interests abroad.

I. HISTORY OF ASSASSINATION
In the modern era, assassination has been viewed, by some, as uncivilized and
barbaric.2 But in the annals of recorded history, assassination has been used
effectively to bring about rapid political and social change.
In 44 B.C., Julius Caeser was stabbed to death in the Senate.3 Even though Caeser's
death was extremely brutal, many historians noted that the assassination of Julius
Caeser ushered in the Golden Age Of Rome which was the greatest period of
prosperity for the longest reigning empire the world has ever know.4
Surprisingly, the use of assassination was not limited solely to the political arena.
Many religions have advocated the use of assassination to further the goals of their
respective religions. For example, the god of the ancient Hebrews, Yavneh,
demanded that his people eliminate their enemies: ". . . plow them under with plow
shares but save the virgins."5 Another religious group, the Nizari Ismailis, a political
religious Islamic sect which existed from the 11th to the 13th Centuries, believed
that to assassinate one's enemies was a sacred duty and that it served the will of
Allah.6 Finally, the famous Catholic St. Thomas Aquinas advocated that
assassination is justified by natural law if the elimination of the tyrant is done for
the common good.7 The gaining acceptance for the use of assassination, even by

religious leaders, brought about the grudging acceptance of assassination as a

legitimate military tool.
Towards the 18th Century, military strategists no longer shied away from the topic
of using assassination during war. One of the first strategists which attempted to
grapple with the issue was C. Van Bynkershoek. In 1737, Bynkershoek wrote: "[We]
may destroy an enemy though he be unarmed, and for this purpose we may
employ. . . an assassin. . . in short everything is legitimate against an enemy."8
Another well known military scholar of the time, Emer de Vattel, strongly advocated
the use of assassination during times of war: "We must first of all avoid confusing
assassination with surprises, which are doubtless perfectly lawful in warfare. When
a resolute soldier steals into the enemy's camp at night and makes his way to the
general's tent and stabs him, he does nothing contrary to the natural laws of
war. . ."9
During this time, American leaders were not immune to the slow acceptance of the
use of assassination in times of war. In an ironic twist of fate, President Abraham
Lincoln who was later assassinated, concluded that assassinating a leader is morally
justified when people have suffered under a tyrant for an extended period of time
and has exhausted all legal and peaceful means to overthrow that leader.10
History acknowledges that even though assassination is an extreme method to
bring about change, the use of assassination would be tolerated in certain extreme
situations. As a result, there was an uneasy acceptance of the use of assassination
in order to further the foreign policy goals of a nation.

II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASSASSINATION

1) The Hague Convention

In 1907, the Second Hague Peace Conference was convened in order to set forth
rules and customs in warfare. One issue that the Convention sought to address was
the issue of assassination.11 Article 23(b) of the annex to the Hague Convention IV
stated that it is forbidden "to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to
the hostile nation or army."12 However, applying the term "treachery" fails to take
into account the realities of warfare because potentially any single military action
would contain an element of "treachery." For example, if an operative sought out to
kill one specific individual there would be a flavor of treachery because there was an
element of deception in order for the operative to complete his mission.13 However,
if that same operative went out and sought to attack an entire enemy unit via an
artillery attack, it would not be considered "treacherous", even though deception
was needed to complete the mission.14 This confusion in applying the term
"treachery" is reflected in the United States Army Field Manual. Under Section 27-10
of the US Army Field Manual, it states: "[The Hague Convention] does not. . .
preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone
of hostilities, occupied territory or elsewhere."15 As a result, there are inherent

contradictions as to what sorts of conduct would truly fall under the penumbra of
"treacherous conduct." Because the Hague Convention failed to precisely define
"treacherous conduct", the Convention has left little guidance to scholars and
military officials on what actions would amount to "treachery". Since there is no
clear prohibition on the use of assassination under the Hague Convention, the use
of assassination would be legally justified in times of combat.

2) The United Nations

Under the United Nations Charter, there is no provision that explicitly prohibits the
use of assassination against foreign officials. However, there are provisions that
implicitly proscribe the use of assassination as a means of furthering a nation's
foreign policy objectives.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits "the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations."16 One scholar has
interpreted Article 2(4) to mean that assassination is an unlawful killing which is
prohibited under international law under any circumstances.17 But such a strict
interpretation ignores other provisions under the United Nations Charter.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter holds that states have an "inherent right of
individual or collective self defense" even in the absence of Security Council
action.18 As a result, Article 51 acknowledges that member states do have an
inherent right to defend against an armed attack. Because Article 51 provides such
a broad mandate for nations to act defensively, even in the absence of Security
Council action, this Article gives nations the ability to choose a wide range of
military options to engage in defensive operations. So the United Nations Charter
would permit a nation to use assassination against an aggressor in times of selfdefense.19 Although the United Nations Charter reflects a moral reprehension
towards the use of assassination, the United Nations Charter does not
unconditionally prohibit the use of assassination in times of self-defense and war.

3) Protocol I Additional To The Geneva Convention Of 1949

Protocol I Additional To The Geneva Convention of 1949 was opened for signing on
December 12, 1977. Protocol I sought to establish certain limitations upon covert
operatives who operated behind enemy lines. Protocol I reflected the concern that
covert combatants would endanger the civilian population within which the
combatants operated.20 Because assassination would most likely require the use of
covert operatives who would operate within a civilian population, Protocol I would
certainly apply to such operations.
Article 44 of the Protocol sought to establish a requirement that "all combatants
distinguish themselves from the civilian population while preparing for or engaging
in an attack."21 As a result, "a soldier who cannot wear a uniform or a
distinguishing insignia in times of war would retain his status as combatant and

would remain entitled to the protection as a prisoner of war so long as he carries

any arms openly."22 Such a provision would hamper any covert operation that
required the assassination of a foreign official. Because the nature of assassination
requires secrecy, an operative who conducts an assassination by hiding his weapon
would lose his prisoner of war status under Article 44 and he would be subject to
the municipal laws of the enemy state.
Protocol I establishes another limitation upon covert operatives. Under Article 37, it
prohibited the killing, injury or capture of an enemy through "perfidy" which is
defined as: "acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that
he is entitled to, obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence."23 This provision
would also hamper operations which requires the assassination of a foreign official.
At times, the nature of assassination may require an operative to mislead an
enemy's confidence in order to execute an assassination. As the comment to Article
37 noted, the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status would be considered an act
of "perfidy."24 As a result, such a provision would squarely apply to operations
involving assassination due to the fact that such operations must deceive their
adversary to believe that the assassins are friendly, harmless civilians.
Protocol I was a source of major controversy. Even though the United States was a
major force in starting the talks which led to Protocol I, President Reagan refused to
submit Protocol I to the Senate in 1987.25 President Reagan gave several reasons
for not sending Protocol I for ratification to the Senate: Protocol I would assist
terrorists and would further endanger civilian lives if the rules under Protocol I were
implemented.26 However there is a more self interested reason why the Reagan
Administration may have been unwilling to seek ratification of Protocol I.
Under Protocol I, if a combatant carried arms secretly, he would have violated
Article 44 for engaging in an ununiformed attack against any target.27 In addition,
under Article 37, such a person would have committed a perfidious attack upon a
person and as a result would lose the status of combatant and could be tried as a
criminal under the laws of the enemy state.28 These provisions of Protocol I would
clearly hamper any covert operation including operations which required operatives
to commit assassinations behind enemy lines. Clearly, such operatives would have
to hide their weapons in order to complete their mission but such actions are in
direct contravention to Protocol I. If the United States was forced to adhere to such
a stringent provision, the US would be forced to limit its options in dealing with
terrorists and other hostile groups. Such a limitation would not be practical from the
standpoint of defending US interests abroad. Therefore Protocol I would not be
conducive to such an operation and the United States by ratifying Protocol I would
have most certainly been forced to forsake any future operation which required the
assassination of a foreign official.29

III. UNITED STATES LAW AND ASSASSINATION

1) The United States Constitution

The United States Constitution does not explicitly address the issue of whether any
branch of the United States Government has the power to assassinate foreign
nationals.30 But as one scholar pointed out: "no federal exercise of power in foreign
affairs will fail for want of constitutional support."31 Since the US Constitution does
not address the issue of assassination, we must turn to the statutes which have
attempted to address the issue.

2) The Lieber Code

In 1863, the United States Army attempted to codify all of its military doctrines into
a comprehensive manual. The end result of this effort was the Lieber Code. But the
Lieber Code was also noteworthy for its attempt to address the issue of
assassination. The code explicitly stated: "Civilized nations look with horror upon
offers or rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism."32
Clearly, the Lieber Code viewed assassination as something that was not to be
committed at all whether in times of war or peace. But the Lieber Code was binding
only on members of the US military.33 In the end, with multiple revisions of the US
Army's manual in the past 200 years, the Lieber Code's prohibition on assassination
was gradually eliminated.

3) The War Powers Resolution

After the disastrous fiasco of the Vietnam War, Congress passed the War Powers
Resolution in 1973. The War Powers Resolution set forth various constraints upon
the Executive Branch in conducting military operations abroad. But the War Powers
Resolution did not apply to covert actions.34 Congress' rationale for excluding
covert operations from the War Powers Resolution was: "Congress did not want to
apply the Resolution to covert operations because Congress was not prepared to
forswear the use of covert action. Hence it had to settle for forms of congressional
involvement that would preserve the secrecy of such operations."35 Thus, the
Executive Branch had leeway to conduct covert operations without the burdensome
conditions imposed by the War Powers Resolution.
If the United States Government sought to eliminate a foreign official during
peacetime, such activities would fall under the penumbra of covert operations. As a
result, assassinations could be conducted without the application of War Powers
Resolution presuming that the assassins were non-military operatives. However,
Congress passed legislation to insure that covert operations were not completely
unsupervised by the United States Congress.

4) The Hughs-Ryan Amendment And The 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act

After the passage of the War Powers Resolution, Congress wanted to insure that
covert operations did not escape Congress' supervision. In response to such

concerns, Congress passed the 1974 Hughs-Ryan Amendment36 and the 1980
Intelligence Oversight Act37.
First, the Hughs-Ryan Amendment required that the President must "find that each
covert operation is important to the National Security of the United States" and that
the President must report to Congress.38 Second, the Intelligence Oversight Act
required that the President notify the Senate and House Select Committees on
Intelligence and that the committees be kept "fully and currently informed" of all
intelligence activities.39 Clearly, both the Hughs-Ryan Amendment and the 1980
Intelligence Oversight Act sought to insure that Congress was able to maintain some
level of supervision over covert operations. However, as compared to the
President's duties under the War Powers Resolution, these two pieces of legislation
imposed a less burdensome requirement upon the President.40
There are two primary differences between the War Powers Resolution and the
congressional oversight acts. First, unlike the War Powers Resolution, the HughsRyan Amendment and the Intelligence Oversight Act failed to set a time limit on
covert operations and so such operations can continue indefinitely as long as the
President decided to continue them.41 Second, the statutory scheme of both acts
serve only as notification requirements rather than consultation requirements, and
so the President has leeway in deciding when to notify the committees.42 Due to
less burdensome requirements imposed on the President, the President has the
ability to decide when and how to conduct covert operations including operations
which involve assassination of foreign officials. However, in the mid-1970's
Congress did directly address the issue of US sponsored assassination operations.

5) Select Committee On Intelligence Activities

In November 1975, the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations

With Respect To Intelligence Activities issued a report which found that the United
States Government was implicated in five assassinations or assassination attempts
against foreign government leaders since 1960.43 The five assassination attempts
backed by the United States Government were against General Rene Schneider of
Chile, President Diem of South Vietnam, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic,
Premier Patric Lumumba of the Congo and President Fidel Castro of Cuba.44
In its report, the Committee urged that assassination should not be used as a tool of
foreign policy except in cases of war.45 The Committee strongly felt that the use of
assassination went against American principles, international law and morality.46
The Committee also noted its concern that the use of assassination would invite
retaliatory action against American leaders and that it could create political
instability in the target nation after the elimination of a high ranking official.47
However, the Committee did concede that assassination did play a constructive role
in certain situations such as when the failure of all nonviolent and lawful means do
not overthrow a tyrant, so assassination was used to end a tyrannical regime.48

Based upon its findings, the Committee strongly urged that legislation should be
created to make it a criminal offense for any person under United States jurisdiction
to assassinate, attempt to assassinate or conspire to assassinate a leader of a
foreign country with which the United States was not at war pursuant to a
declaration of war, or engaged in hostilities pursuant to the War Powers
Resolution.49
The furor created by the Committee's findings regarding American assassination
attempts failed to translate into any cohesive legislation which sought to ban the
use of assassination by US nationals. Despite the Committee's findings, Congress
failed on three separate occasions to pass legislation which proscribed
assassinations of foreign leaders by agents of the United States government.50 In
spite of Congress' failure to pass legislation to proscribe assassinations, President
Gerald Ford issued an Executive Order which directly addressed the issue of
assassination.

6) Executive Order 12,333

In 1976, as a result of Congress' failure to pass legislation to prohibit US agents
from engaging in assassinations, President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order
11,905 which prohibited United States Government employees or agents from
engaging in assassination.51 Presidents Carter and Reagan reissued the Executive
Order (now referred to as Executive Order 12,333) without any significant
changes.52 Both Presidents Bush and Clinton never revoked the Executive Order.53
As a result, Executive Order 12,333 still remains in effect to this day.

Executive Order 12,333 states:

"2.11 Prohibition On Assassination. No person employed by or acting on behalf of
the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in,
assassination.
2.12 Indirect Participation. No agency of the Intelligence Community shall
participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this
order."54

The primary goal behind Executive Order 12,333 included the prohibition of US
intelligence agency officials from assassinating foreign leaders who were viewed as
threats to US interests during peacetime.55 Also the order sought to address the
concerns noted by the Senate Select Committee.56 Finally, the Executive Order
provides a tactical advantage because potential adversaries were unsure whether
the US would ever resort to the use of assassination.57 In other words, "Ambiguity
in our willingness to use tactics such as assassination diminishes the likelihood that
our nation will be forced to engage in such behavior or that it will be the target of
such action by rivals because they would not be in fear of reprisal from a nation

which proscribes assassination."58 Although Executive Order 12,333 appears to

proscribe the use of assassination, the order only proscribes employees and agents
of the United States government from committing assassinations without the
approval of the President Of The United States.

a) The Effectiveness Of Executive Order 12,333 In Proscribing Assassinations By US

Agents

Under the National Security Council Act of 1949, "The President has the authority,
through the National Security Council, to direct the CIA to perform... other functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security."59 This provision
has been interpreted to include the authority to order covert activities that could
violate the laws of the country in which they take place, and some of which involve
the use of force or violence.60 Presuming the President has made the required
finding that a course of action was important to national security, and assuming
reports were provided to Congress, a covert operation that concerned the
assassination of a foreign official would not be illegal under United States law.61
And the existence of Executive Order 12,333 does not change that conclusion.62
Ultimately, the order does not legally prohibit the United States from conducting
assassinations against foreign officials. First, the order at most insures that the
assassination of foreign officials does not occur without direct authorization from
the President.63 As a result, the order only serves to prohibit subordinate officials
from unilaterally engaging in assassinations without prior presidential approval.64
Second, the order seeks to discourage the establishment of "plausible deniability"65
within the government.66 Third, as with all Executive Orders, a sitting president
could unilaterally revoke Executive Order 12,333 into oblivion.67 Therefore,
Executive Order 12,333 was nothing more than a policy statement against the use
of assassination.68

IV. CASE STUDIES IN ASSASSINATION

1) The Effectiveness Of Assassinations In Conducting A Nation's Foreign Policy

Assassinations have been used on many different occasions throughout history. This
paper will limit the scope of the effectiveness of assassinations to assassinations
which occurred in the 20th Century.
An example of an assassination which gave the United States a decisive tactical
advantage during wartime was the assassination of Japanese Admiral Isoruku
Yamamoto. Yamamoto was known as the architect of the Pearl Harbor attack. In
addition, Yamamoto was widely known to be the primary strategist in the fight for
the South Pacific. US Naval Intelligence received precise information as to the day
and time Yamamoto would fly from Rabaul to Bougainville in the South Pacific.69

Because Yamamoto was considered so invaluable to the Japanese war effort, U.S.
Admiral Chester Nimitz personally ordered US fighters to shoot down the transport
that carried Yamamoto.70 Within 12 hours of issuing those orders, Admiral
Yamamoto's plane was shot down and he was killed. The death of Yamamoto badly
crippled the Japanese war effort which in turn led to the eventual defeat of the
Japanese in the Pacific.
During the mid-1980's, multiple US citizens were taken hostage in Lebanon by
Hezbollah, a terrorist group which received support from Iran and Syria. During this
period, three Soviet citizens were taken hostage by Hezbollah for a period of one
week. The reason why the Soviet hostages were released promptly was due to a
single KGB operation. Within several days of the kidnappings, the KGB seized a
leader of the Hezbollah, castrated him, stuffed his testicles into his mouth, shot him
in the head and left his corpse at a Hezbollah base with an ominous note that if the
hostages were not released immediately more of the same would occur.71 Although
the method by which the KGB carried out the assassination was horrendous, the
operation brought about the rapid and safe release of all three Soviet hostages.
Another example of how assassination proved effective was when the Israeli
security agency, Shin Bet located the infamous bomber known as "The Engineer."
From 1993-1996, "The Engineer" was on Israeli security's most wanted list because
he masterminded the use of suicide bombers. He is alleged to have caused the
deaths of 77 people and wounding more than 300 others during this period.72
Eventually, "The Engineer" was located in a house in the Gaza Strip where an
explosion from the earpiece of a cellular phone ended his life.73
Two months after the spontaneous death of "The Engineer", there were three
separate bombings which claimed the lives of 46 people including 2 Americans.74
The retaliatory bombings in response to "The Engineer's" death were not so much
caused by the assassination itself as to what occurred in the days after the
assassination. After the assassination, Shin Bet publicly announced their role in the
assassination of "The Engineer" and even discussed operational details.75 As one
former MOSSAD agent pointed out, Shin Bet's announcement handed Hamas the
justification to kill more Israelis.76
In the end, the assassination of "The Engineer" was an effective move in Israel's
fight against Hamas even though such tragic consequences came about in the
aftermath of the assassination. The assassination of "The Engineer" showed a split
within the Hamas organization itself. One faction of Hamas took responsibility for
the bombings but another Hamas faction denied it.77 More importantly, for the first
time ever, the military wing of Hamas offered a cease-fire if Israel would release all
Hamas prisoners, stop attacks against its militants and cease aggression against
Palestinian citizens.78 Clearly, the death of The Engineer had shocked the
foundation of Hamas and more importantly shook the confidence of Palestinian
extremists. As one Palestinian extremist noted, "[Israel has] the atomic bomb but
we [had "The Engineer"]."79
In October of 1997, Israel was implicated in another operation which involved the
assassination attempt of a Hamas leader in Jordan. But the assassination attempt

failed. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Nentanahyu expressed embarrassment over

the situation and promised to conduct a full investigation. Shortly after the
revelation of the assassination attempt upon the Hamas leader, Hamas sent an offer
to Israel: a promise to cease terrorist operations.80 Although the operation failed
miserably, such an operation has once again brought terrorists to the bargaining
table to negotiate peace.
These examples show that even though the use of assassination raises a moral
dilemma for policy makers, the effectiveness of using assassination to further a
nation's foreign policy goals cannot be denied. As a result, the debate whether to
use assassination to further US foreign policy goals has reached a feverish pitch in
recent years.

2) US Willingness To Use Assassination

Publicly, the United States government has denounced the use of assassination in
order to further foreign policy objectives. Former CIA Director Robert Inman stated
that assassination was a "cowardly approach to cowardly acts."81 In one of the
most glaring examples of how strongly the United States Government held the
position that assassination was reprehensible was when Air Force Chief Of Staff
Michael J. Dugan was relieved of his post after telling journalists that the United
States would launch an intensive air campaign in which Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein would be personally targeted.82 Even though high officials of the United
States Government had denounced the use of assassination, nevertheless, the US
government has attempted to carry out assassinations.
On April 14, 1986, President Reagan ordered 18 US jet fighters to conduct attacks in
Libya. The bombings came in response to Libya's participation in a bombing of a
nightclub in Berlin where several American soldiers were killed. Author Seymour
Hersch concluded, after speaking to more than 70 different officials in the White
House, State Department, the CIA, the NSA and the Pentagon, that the primary goal
of the Libyan bombing was the assassination of Qadaffi.83 In fact, 9 of the 18 US
fighter jets had one primary mission: to kill Qadaffi and his family.84 Ultimately,
Qadaffi's adopted daughter was killed in the raid.
During Operation Desert Storm, Air Force Chief Of Staff Michael J. Dugan's
statement came to fruition. During the final weeks of the war, the US Air Force used
a bomb whose "primary purpose was to destroy extremely hardened, deeply buried
Iraqi command and control bunkers, kill senior military officials and possibly kill
President Saddam Hussein."85 The bomb designated as GBU-28 was a 4700 lb
bomb capable of penetrating 100 feet or more of earth or 20 feet of concrete.86
The bombs were used twice during the final weeks of the conflict. One of the GBU28's hit a hardened military bunker and killed numerous senior Iraqi military
officers.87
Even though high officials of the United States Government have publicly
denounced the use of assassination in achieving the goals of foreign policy, these

actions clearly show that the US Government would not be adverse to the use of
assassination in the future.

V. FINAL REFLECTIONS
Assassination is legal under international law and US law if the following conditions
are met: assassination is used 1) in a state of war or self defense and 2) that the
assassination is approved by the President of the United States. The next question
raised is when can assassination be justifiably and effectively used in the arena of
foreign policy.
Assassinations cannot be used indiscriminately to the point where the United States
is assassinating every opponent to American policy. If the US did use such a tactic,
world opinion would heavily weigh against the United States. Therefore,
assassinations must be used selectively and discriminately.
The use of assassination should be limited to extreme circumstances. One situation
which could potentially arise in the next several years is the threat of more terrorist
attacks occurring in the United States. But what is more ominous is that terrorists
may have access to chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons. As a result, a
terrorist can potentially kill thousands of Americans in a single attack. In such a
case, the United States should be willing to use assassination as a means of
anticipatory self defense to prevent such horrific occurrences from happening in the
United States. The use of such a tactic would insure that the threat could be
neutralized with minimal collateral damage among an innocent civilian population.
In addition, assassination should be used to counter mass genocide such as the
Holocaust. As one commentator noted, if Hitler had been assassinated, millions of
lives would have been saved.88 The use of assassination in this scenario would
fulfill an important tenant of war, "the avoidance of death among innocent
noncombatants as compared to an overt operation where the deaths of
noncombatants would be extraordinarily high."89 In addition, the use of
assassination to counter such threats would force rival leaders to avoid personal risk
by softening extreme positions that are likely to provoke adversaries into using
force against them personally.90
In conclusion, if assassination is limited to certain extreme situations, it would
provide an effective means for the United States to further its goals in the foreign
policy arena while carrying the support of world opinion.

VI. CONCLUSION
Assassination is a dirty business where most rational people would agree that it is
something to be avoided as much as possible. But in reality, such tactics are
needed to counter extremists who seek to achieve their goals through ultra-violent
means. Even though the United States government would be legally justified in

carrying out an assassination, it would be best to limit such operations to extreme

situations.
In the end, we must heed the words of St. Thomas Acquinas: assassination is
warranted only if it is done for the common good.91 In other words, we must ask
ourselves one question: would the death of a single individual save a substantial
amount of lives? If the answer to this question is "yes", then clearly society would
benefit from the use of assassination in furthering US foreign policy goals. Although
assassination is an unpleasant task, if assassination is used to insure the safety of
many people, then it has been used effectively.

Notes:
1 Michael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination In International And Domestic
Law, 17 Yale J. Int'l L. 609, 611 (1992).
2 Id. at 612.
3 William Shakespeare described the story of the savage manner in which Julius
Caeser was killed. In one of the most memorable descriptions of betrayal, Julius
Caeser realizes that his own friend Brutus had betrayed him and as Caeser laid
dying, his last words were "Et tu, Brute. . ."
4 Richard Camellron, Assassination: Theory And Practice, 13 (Paladin Press 1977).
5 Id. at 4.
6 Id.
7 David Newman and Tyll Van Geel, Executive Order 12333: The Risks Of A Clear
Declaration of Intent, 12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 435, 436 (1989).
8 C. Van Bynkershoek, Quaestinum Juris Publici Libri Duo (1737), reprinted in 14(2)
The Classics Of International Law at 16 (T. Frank trans. 1930).
9 Newman and Van Geel at 435.
10 Note, Executive Order 12,333: The Permissibility Of An American Assassination
Of A Foreign Leader, 25 Cornell Int'l L.J. 401 (1992).
11 Patricia Zengel, Assassination And The Law Of Armed Conflict, 134 Mil. L. Rev.
123, 131 (1991).
12 Id. at 132.
13 Zengel at 136.
14 Id.
15 Johnson at 418.
16 Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states: "All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial

integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent

with the purpose of the United Nations."
17 W. Hays Parks, Memorandum Of Law: Executive Order 12333 And Assassination,
Army Law, December 1989 at 4.
18 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states: "Nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way effect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security."
19 Zengel at 125.
20 Alrdrich, Prospects For United States Ratification Of Additional Protocol To The
1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 7 (1991).
21 Id. at 7.
22 Id. at 9.
23 Zengel at 139.
24 Protocol I., supra, Note 51.
25 Aldrich at 1.
26 Id. at 7.
27 Zengel at 140.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Newman and Van Geel at 435.
31 Id. at 435.
32 Reprinted in 2 The Law Of War, A Documentary History 184 (L. Friedman ed.
1972).
33 Schmitt at 628.
34 Bentley, Keeping Secrets: The Church Committee, Covert Action, And Nicaragua,
25 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 601, 618-619 (1987).
35 Lori Fisler Damrosch, The United States Constitution In Its Third Century: Foreign
Affairs: Distribution of Constitutional Authority: Covert Operations, 83 AJIL 795, 797
(1989).

36 22 USC section 2422 (1982).

37 50 USC section 413 (a)(1), (b) (1982).
38 Damrosch at 797.
39 Id. at 798.
40 Id.
41 22 USC section 2422 (1982). 50 USC section 413 (1982).
42 Id. at 798.
43 S. Rep. No. 463, 94th Congress, 1st Sess. 256, 262 (1975).
44 Id. at 262.
45 Id. at 281.
46 Id. at 281-282.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 258.
49 Zengel at 144.
50 Note, The Legality Of Assassination As An Aspect Of Foreign Policy, 27 VA. J. Int'l
L. 656, 685-686 (1987).
51 Zengel at 144.
52 Id.
53 Note, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United States Violate
International Law In Forcefully Responding To Iraqi Plot To Kill George Bush?, 28
Cornell Int'l L.J. 569, 599 (1995).
54 50 U.S.C. section 401.
55 Zengel at 134.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Newman and Van Geel at 447.
59 50 U.S.C. 403.
60 Interim Report, supra note 59, at 9.
61 Zengel at 147.
62 Id. at 147.

63 Alan C. Miller, Should The US and Its Allies Assassinate Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein?, Los Angeles Times, February 23, 1991 at 1.
64 Zengel at 147.
65 Plausible denial is defined as "a plane where presidential authorization is
obscured to protect the President in the event of public disclosure." Johnson at 404.
66 Zengel at 147.
67 Id.
68 Bentley at 800.
69 Zengel at 137.
70 Id.
71 Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars Of The CIA, 1981-1987, 417 (Simon And
Schuster Press 1987).
72 Lisa Beyer, Death Comes Calling: The Untold Story Of How Israel Hunted Down
And Blew Up Hamas' Fabled Bomber, Time, January 15, 1996 at 43.
73 Id. at 43.
74 Lisa Beyer, Terror At A Crossroads; Two Bloody Sundays In A Row Shake Israel,
Time, March 11, 1986 at 43.
75 Terence Wrong, The Aftermath, The New Republic, April 8, 1996 at 10.
76 Id.
77 Beyer at 43.
78 Id.
79 Patrick Cockburn and Stephanie Nolen, Caf Rumors Raise Bomber From The
Dead, The Independent (London) Jan. 27, 1996 at 11.
80 Return Of The Sheik, Newsweek, Oct. 20, 1997 at 39.
81 Shapiro, Assassination: Is It A Real Option?, Newsweek, April 29, 1986 at 21.
82 L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 1990, at A1.
83 Johnson at 420.
84 Id.
85 John D. Morrocco and David A. Fulghum, USAF Developed 4700 lb Bomb In Crash
Program To Attack Iraqi Military Leaders In Hardened Bunkers, Aviation Week And
Space And Technology. May 6, 1991 at 67.
86 Id.
87 Id.

88 Johnson at 402.
89 Johnson at 303.
90 Newman and Van Geel at 443.
91 Id. at 436.